Assessment in Education, Vol. 7, No. 2, 2000
Creativity in Art: the feasibility of
assessing current conceptions in the school
context
DONNA KAY BEATTIE
Department of Visual Arts, Brigham Young University, P.O. Box 260402, Provo,
Utah 84602–6402, USA
The article reviews different views of creativity, building on the work of
Czikszentmihaly. It offers a deŽ nition of creativity in terms of trait/process/product. The
issue of how creativity might be assessed is explored using this deŽ nition and some
illustrative examples are provided. The article concludes that creativity can and should be
assessed but that this must be with an appropriate methodology. Such assessment is
important not only for assessing students’ work but also for evaluating curriculum content,
in order to promote curriculum development in the teaching of creativity.
ABSTRACT
Introduction
Despite four decades of research and more than 9000 published works to
date (Runco et al., 1998), creativity still remains mystifying and enigmatic. Over
20 years ago, TrefŽ nger et al. (1971) wrote that no one theory had been sufŽ ciently
widely accepted to serve as a unifying basis for assessment development. Those
words hold true today. Since 1950, creativity has been analysed from nine different
perspectives.
(1) As cognitive, rational and semantic (cognitive approach), equating it with
problem solving and logical thought processes (Gowen, 1972), i.e. ‘ordinary
cognitive processes producing extraordinary products’ (Weisberg, cited in
Sternberg & Lubart, 1999, p. 8). To this end, creative processes were described.
A Western model set forth much earlier by Helmholtz (1896) and Wallas (1926)
remains popular today. The Helmholtz–Wallas model, which takes into account
preconscious thinking, explicated four steps in the creative process: preparation,
incubation, illumination and veriŽ cation. (This particular model became the
systematic and disciplined way most people were taught to be creative.)
(2) As personal trait and environmental (social–personality approach). Creativity
was correlated with personality traits, environmental factors (especially the
early home environment) and with age and developmental stages (Gowen,
1972).
ISSN 0969-594X print; ISSN 1465-329X online/00/020175-18 Ó 2000 Taylor & Francis Ltd
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D. K. Beattie
(3) As mental trait that can be quantiŽ ed (psychometric approach). The creativity
of everyday subjects could be studied via appropriate psychometric measures.
Divergent thinking, in particular, has been the most intensely studied and
well-developed research direction for understanding creativity.
(4) As Freudian and neo-Freudian (psychodynamic approach). The preconscious,
a hazy place somewhere between reality and unconscious patterns or drives but
capable of being recalled, one’s relationship with the parent of the opposite sex
and modes of pleasure were all linked to creativity. Freud’s hypothesis that
‘creative behavior is a continuation of a substitution for the play of childhood’
(cited in Gowen, 1972, p. 18) lent fuel to the Freudian branch of creative
thought.
(5) As psychedelic (mystical approach). Creativity was a result of in uences on or
connections to the preconscious. Relaxation, meditation, hypnosis, visionary
and psychic experiences and drugs could help trigger creativity (Gowen, 1972).
This existential process is viewed as thwarting to the scientiŽ c study of creativity
(Sternberg & Lubart, 1999).
(6) As pragmatic or commercial. Focused on the development of creativity rather
than on scientiŽ c research, this paradigm (championed by De Bono, 1971,
1985, 1992) emphasised teaching people how to be creative. Brainstorming
(Osborn, 1953) and applying synectic thinking (Gordon, 1961) are outcomes of
this direction in creativity study.
A resurgence of interest in creativity during the last decades of the 20th
century, a second golden age in creativity research, has added to the extensive
existent body of knowledge. Current scientiŽ c research introduces three new
post-modern paradigms for studying creativity.
(7) As biological or cognitive neuroscience based. Creative problem solving is
correlated with physiological changes [i.e. creative inspiration occurs during low
levels of cortical and frontal lobe activation and right brain hemisphere, as
opposed to left, activation (Martindale, 1999)].
(8) As computational. Creativity is likened to mental computation (Boden, 1994)
and the computer is used to simulate the creative process or search heuristic and
make unusual or novel associations between familiar ideas (i.e. to transform
conceptual spaces).
(9) As contextual or con uent. The con uential or systems approach emphasises
multidimensionality or the interaction of many different forces. Many models
support this multifaceted conception (e.g. Perkins, 1981; Amabile, 1983, 1996;
Sternberg, 1985; Clark, 1986; Csikszentmihalyi, 1988, 1996; Gardner, 1988,
1993a; Gruber & Davis, 1988; Mumford & Gustafson, 1988; Hong & Milgram,
1996; Kirschenbaum, 1998).
The study of creativity did not end with deŽ ning the concept or analysing its
dimensions, processes and products or pinpointing its source. Other related research
topics included creativity and politics, creativity in women and brain hemispheric
specialisation (Barron, 1988). Researchers sought to understand levels or degrees of
Creativity in Art
177
creativity. A taxonomy of creativity was created by Taylor (1959, pp. 54–61),
beginning with the kind practised by children: ‘expressive creativity’ (spontaneous
children’s drawings), ‘productive creativity’ (artistic or scientiŽ c products where
there are restrictions and controls), ‘inventive creativity’ (ingenuity with materials,
methods or techniques), ‘innovative creativity’ (improvement through modiŽ cation
involving conceptualising skills) and ‘emergenative creativity’ (entirely new principle
or theory around which new schools or movements are derived). With respect to this
model, very few people achieve the highest level of creativity (expert creativity) and
most research has focused on the topic of innovative creativity. In the Ž eld of art
education, similar levels have been described by Eisner (1972) as ‘Boundary Pushing’ (the most common type), ‘Inventing’, ‘Boundary Breaking’ and ‘Aesthetic
Organizing’ (pp. 217–221). The Ž rst three types in Eisner’s scheme emphasise
novelty as a deŽ ning feature, while Aesthetic Organizing highlights coherence and
harmony of aesthetic qualities. Boundary Breaking is identiŽ ed as the least common
type of creativity and demonstrates the highest level of cognition. Similarly, Richards
(1990) and Gardner (1993b) distinguish between ‘big C’ creativity and ‘little c’
creativity and Boden (1991) describes two ends of a creativity continuum, psychological (P) and historical (H), with P being novel to the individual mind and H to
the whole of human history. Csikzentmihalyi (1996, pp. 25–26) recognises three
types of creative person, each qualitatively unique; those who are ‘brilliant’ (interesting, stimulating and express unusual ideas), ‘personally creative’ (experiencing the
world in original and novel ways) and ‘creative unqualiŽ edly’ (effecting signiŽ cant
changes in their culture).
Four signiŽ cant and separate components to help understand and solve the
problem of creativity have provided a basis for comparison and consensus of ideas
over time. Mooney (1963) identiŽ es these components as:
(1) the environment, situation or place in which the creative act occurs (the creative
environment);
(2) the product of creating (the creative product, the most observable sign);
(3) the process of creating (the creative process);
(4) the person who creates (the creative person).
Rhodes (1987) asserts that creativity is made manifest only in the intertwining of
these four components. According to Murdock & Puccio (1993), at least two of the
components have to interact signiŽ cantly. Table I summarizes the most commonly
held factors of creativity from investigations in each of these four areas. The chart
shows the highest percentages of 16 key researchers in the Ž eld agreeing with the
responses. [1]
DeŽ ning Creativity
Under the systems theory umbrella, creativity is removed from a process existing
within a single person at a particular time and placed in a complex social system. A
social conception of creativity is not unlike post-modernist theories of art, which
Components, contributions, features
(highest percentages of like responses)
· Educational and employment opportunities (38%)
· Provides peers to evaluate and conŽ rm creativity in
their domains (38%)
· Background knowledge (31%)
· Audience’s attention (25%)
· Preserves and selects ideas (25%)
· Wealth (19%)
· Styles and paradigms (19%)
· Stimulates and sustains creative processes (13%)
Creative environment or places
(domains, Ž elds, and contexts)
Products of creative thought
(highest percentages of like responses)
· Solutions to problems (81%)
· Responses on creativity tests (81%)
· Explanations for phenomena (81%)
· Technological inventions and artifacts, novel ideas, new
styles, designs, or paradigms (63%)
· Fine arts (painting, sculpture, music) (44%)
· Images and behaviours (13%)
· Expressions of emotions (0%)
· Expressions of abstract ideas (0%)
· Performing arts (dance, drama) (0%)
· Advertising and marketing (0%)
· Photography and Ž lm (0%)
Creative products
·
·
Freedom of spirit that rejects limits imposed by others
(31%)
High degree of self-organization that enables one to set
own rules rather than follow those set by others (31%)
Processes of creativity
(highest percentages of like responses)
· Take time (100%)
· Transformations of the external world and internal
representations by forming analogies and bridging
conceptual gaps (75%)
· May differ (in kind or degree) for varying levels of
creativity (majority)
· Apply recurring themes and recognize patterns and
images of wide scope to make the new familiar and the
old new (50%)
· An active search for gaps in existing knowledge (44%)
· Problem-Ž nding (44%)
· Conscious attempt to break through existing boundaries
and limitations in a Ž eld (44%)
· Initiate from a previous failure to Ž nd an explanation
(44%)
· Incorporate new ideas into existing knowledge (44%)
· Are absolute (multiple creations of the same product
cannot occur) (44%)
· Unique to an individual (an emergent property) (44%)
Creative processes
TABLE I.
Special events or experiences during one’s development
· Have a future career image and deŽ nite role models,
mentors, and paragons (25%)
· Exert sustained effort (25%)
· Demonstrate voluminous productivity (25%)
· Form distinct and closely knit peer groups (19%)
· Enjoy enduring reputations (19%)
· Have contributions that demonstrate precocity and
longevity (13%)
· Moderate level of training in a Ž eld (three years of
university education) (13%)
· Developed and maintained good work habits (13%)
· Have many hobbies (13%)
Personality and motivational qualities
· Discipline and commitment to one’s work (44%)
· Willingness to confront hostility and take intellectual
risks (38%)
· Perseverance (38%)
· Proclivity to curiosity and inquisitiveness (31%)
· Open to new experiences and growth (31%)
· Driving absorption (31%)
· High intrinsic motivation (31%)
Cognitive characteristics
(highest percentages of like responses)
· Uses existing knowledge as base for new ideas (69%)
· Creative in a particular domain (56%)
· Alert to novelty (50%)
· Alert to gaps in knowledge (50%)
· Flexible (38%)
· Skilled decision-maker (38%)
· Thinks metaphorically (31%)
· Originality (25%)
· Articulate and verbally  uent (25%)
· Makes independent judgments (25%)
Creative persons
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D. K. Beattie
Creativity in Art
179
emphasise cultural and societal roles and beliefs to help deŽ ne and understand the
nature of art. An honoriŽ c deŽ nition of art (or more than one) is urged, and this
same view may be appropriate for comprehending creativity as a multidimensional
phenomenon. The concept of creativity cannot be studied or measured without
addressing the parameters of the cultural symbol system in which the creative
activity takes place and the social roles and norms that regulate the given creative
activity (Csikszentmihalyi, 1994). Thus, the crucial question according to Csikszentmihalyi’s theory is ‘where is creativity?’ and not ‘what is creativity?’ (Csikszentmihalyi, 1988, p. 325). Only when this question is sufŽ ciently answered, he maintains,
should we begin to deŽ ne and measure it.
Creativity is viewed as a three-fold concept resulting from the interaction between
a Ž eld, a domain and an individual. ‘Field’ is deŽ ned as ‘the social and cultural
aspects of a profession, job, or craft’ (Feldman et al., 1994, p. 16). For example, in
the visual arts the Ž eld consists of artists, museum curators, art critics, art educators,
collectors, art gallery owners, art historians and administrators of arts foundations
and government agencies that are concerned with culture. The Ž eld determines and
structures the knowledge and inquiry bases of a domain and its members act as
gatekeepers to the domain. In short, it is the Ž eld—the ‘knowledgable others’
(Gardner, 1995, p. 15) who apprehend and judge—that recognizes, preserves and
remembers the creative endeavour (Csikszentmihalyi, 1996).
A ‘domain’ is deŽ ned as the formal ‘structure and organization of a body of
knowledge’ (Feldman et al., 1994, p. 16), a ‘set of symbolic rules and procedures’
(Csikszentmihalyi, 1996, p. 27). Creativity may cross beyond the boundaries of a
domain and sometimes establish a new one (Csikszentmihalyi, 1996). Creativity
exists in every domain.
The individual plays the Ž nal role in Csikszentmihalyi’s tripartite model. The
person is ‘the site of the acquisition, organization, and transformation of knowledge
that has the possibility of changing domains and Ž elds’ (Feldman et al., 1994, p. 16).
Csikszentmihalyi (1996) claims that an unqualiŽ edly creative person is ‘someone
whose thoughts or actions change the domain, or establish a new domain’ (p. 28)
and that a domain cannot ‘be changed without the explicit or implicit consent of a
Ž eld responsible for it’ (p. 28). Moreover, he concludes that ‘creativity is not an
attribute of individuals but of social systems making judgments about individuals ’
(Csikszentmihalyi, 1994, p. 144). Social validation of a creative trait, process or
product is a must.
A dynamic model of conferment is suggested by this provocative reconceptualisation of creativity: the domain transmits information to the individual (i.e. something
must be learned and mastered before it can be changed), the individual produces a
variation, which in turn is selected by the Ž eld and, lastly, the Ž eld passes the
selected and approved variation back to the domain. The cycle starts over with the
changed and evolved domain transmitting new information to the next generation
(Csikszentmihalyi, 1994). Applying this model, creativity (expert creativity) is
deŽ ned as ‘any act, idea, or product that changes an existing domain, or that
transforms an existing domain into a new one’ (Csikszentmihalyi, 1996, p. 28). The
most widely held view of creativity, regardless of perspective, embraces two features:
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D. K. Beattie
the act, idea or product must be viewed as original or novel and as valuable or
appropriate.
This socially constructed deŽ nition of creativity does not embrace creativity in
children because they have not yet mastered a domain and their products are usually
not unique or valuable to the Ž eld. A large amount of time is needed—the 10-year
rule (Hayes, 1989)—before the master level is achieved. Creativity in children may
be the result of a broader knowledge base rather than actual creative thinking (Wolf
& Larson, 1981). A deŽ nition of creativity for youth would emphasise a process
resulting in a product that changes the existing domain as a youngster grasps it.
Fishkin (1998) introduces the term ‘germinal creativity’ (p. 14) as appropriate for
use with children, meaning budding creativity potential. Kirschenbaum’s (1998)
transformational model of creativity, based on the Helmholz–Wallas creative process
(preparation, incubation, illumination, veriŽ cation), is more receptive to student
creativity. He suggests that students, while they are developing expert or adult
creativity, might be assessed on criteria of Contact (meaning behavioural characteristics concerning sensory stimulation and openness), Consciousness (meaning behavioural characteristics relating to problem awareness, boundaries and
representation), Interest (meaning task commitment and self-motivation) and Fantasy (meaning behaviour characteristics concerning imagination).
A second notable con uence model is described by Sternberg & Lubart (1999) as
the ‘investment theory’ (adapted from economic theory, i.e. the buying or pursuing
of ideas that are unknown or have growth potential, persisting, resolving and moving
on to another new or unpopular idea) (p. 10). Six distinct, but inter-related,
resources converge to cause creativity: intellectual abilities, knowledge, styles of
thinking, personality, motivation and environment. Although IQ does not necessarily prescribe creativity, a certain level of IQ is required to master a domain and
creative people do possess substantially above average intelligence (MansŽ eld &
Busse, 1981). MansŽ eld & Busse state that even though the ‘IQ threshold varies
from one Ž eld to another, it is probably higher in scientiŽ c than in artistic Ž elds’
(p. 51).
Researching Creativity
Undoubtedly, continued theoretical and empirical research efforts will contribute to
a better understanding of how to assess creativity. Research areas with import to
assessment are: the creativity of females (gender issues); use of new technologies,
particularly access to the Internet and use of such computer programs as Logo and
LEGO-Logo (Clements, 1995), and their impact on originality and  exibility
(Plucker & Runco, 1998); the role of memory in creation (Barron, 1988); everyday
creativity or the creativity of ordinary people; the impact of learning styles on
creativity.
Questions arise, however, about the role of educational assessment in contributing
to creativity research. Is it possible to assess creativity in the context of a school
curriculum? What factors or components of creativity are most feasible to assess? In
Creativity in Art
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181
Domain
Components of creativity
As a trait
As a process
As a product
FIG . 1. Suggestions for content in creativity assessment.
what ways might creativity be assessed? When should germinal creativity, as exhibited in youth, be assessed?
To help answer these questions, as well as to gather data on the ‘what is
creativity?’ or ‘where is creativity?’ question, an appropriate perspective for studying
creativity in the school context needs to be determined. This author recommends a
con uence or systems approach because it takes into account the physical setting,
the school, the Ž eld of endeavour and the cultural environment. Research supports
the signiŽ cant role that culture plays in deŽ ning the nature of creativity and the
creative process (Lubart, 1999). From this philosophical base, assessment specialists
can construct a 2 3 3 matrix (a Creativity SpeciŽ cations Matrix) similar to that of
Magyari-Beck (1993) for organising future creativity research, which incorporates
two social systems, Culture and Domain. Designed as an information gathering tool
or content blueprint, the Creativity SpeciŽ cations Matrix (see Figure 1) requires
identiŽ cation of factors or criteria of three creative components by different groups,
those representing the prevailing culture and subcultures of the targeted population
and those speaking for the domain (i.e. the Ž eld). Lest this seems an impossible task,
it is well worth noting that creativity as observed in a product is something that
people in a Ž eld can recognise and often come to consensus about, even with little
guidance or when few speciŽ c features are outlined (Barron, 1965; Hennessey &
Amabile, 1988; Amabile, 1996).
In each cell is written what is perceived as relevant and valued knowledge in a
culture(s) and a domain with respect to creative traits, creative products and creative
processes. In short, the matrix determines what one must do in a domain and in a
culture to be identiŽ ed as creative. The degree to which an individual exhibits these
behaviours and successfully performs these activities can then be measured. Implicit
theories or folk theories of creativity, personal and individual deŽ nitions of practitioners, as distinguished from those held by experts (explicit theories), and their
implication for assessment are viewed as exciting new developments in creative
measurement (Plucker & Runco, 1998).
Speaking for the art domain, generally accepted individual traits of creativity are:
ability to transform things, curiosity,  exibility,  uency, originality, preference for
novelty, tolerance of ambiguity, intuitiveness, complexity, perceptual alertness,
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D. K. Beattie
observation, keen awareness of senses, ability to abstract and move from wholes to
parts and a spirit of adventure or risk taking. Creative processes would be any
innovative or effectively surprising (Bruner, 1962) techniques or procedures which
forever change the way art is made, conceived (e.g. Pollock’s dripped paint action
process, Happenings) or re ected upon critically, historically or philosophically and
which may or may not result in a creative product. Epstein (1990) posits that
because products are continuously being edited and rejected as the creator selfassesses them, they are ‘of necessity, a poor index of the creative process’ (p. 139).
Getzels & Csikszentmihalyi (1976) consider creativity in art a process in which the
problem is discovered as students create and not a priori. Creative products in art
might be in the form of transformations (boundary pushing), inventions (e.g. new
materials, styles, conceptions, forms or modes), new theories, manifestos or principles of art (boundary breaking) and aesthetically redeŽ ning or reorganising the
known (aesthetic organising). In short, the creative product in art is new, unusual,
novel, appropriate and re ects a personal original approach.
Creative traits, processes and products, however, may be identiŽ ed quite differently by Eastern, African, Oceanic, Islamic, American Indian cultures and some
minority groups (the reason for constructing a matrix). Cell information from the
domain and different cultural and subcultural sources is then reviewed for feasibility
and appropriateness to educational assessment. Only when there is general agreement among cultural groups and the domain can creativity be operationally deŽ ned
and relevant criteria for measurement be set (Renz & Christopolos, 1968; Bruch,
1975; Hennessey & Amabile, 1988). Moreover, to address a validity criterion of
equity, an assessment of creativity must be culturally based and unbiased. Table I,
listing creative products, creative processes and creative traits, offers examples of
possible cell information as gleaned from past research of these components.
From ongoing research, Kirschenbaum (1998) suggests that proŽ les of students’
germinal creativity be developed, similar to those created for understanding expert
creativity (Csikszentmihalyi, 1996). Once validated, proŽ les could be used as
templates for guiding assessment and informing instruction and prescription.
Assessing Creativity
Over 200 instruments have been developed to identify and assess creativity (Haensly
& Torrance, 1990). The most popular have been tests of divergent thinking skills.
Such tests required students to list multiple ways to use a brick (unusual uses), to
create something novel with a paper clip and a rubber band, to make a picture out
of a given shape or to complete a picture from a stimulus. To improve or stimulate
one’s creativity in the business world, employees were asked to  y kites or crow like
a rooster in a technique called the ‘chicken cheer’ (Smith et al., 1985). No testing
instruments, however, according to Sternberg (1991), have been able to measure the
concept adequately.
A study by Cooper (1991) of six popular creativity measures—Torrance Test of
Creative Thinking (TTCT) (Torrance, 1966), Creativity Assessment Packet (CAP)
(Williams, 1980), Structure of the Intellect Learning Abilities Test (SOI-LA)
Creativity in Art
183
(Meeker et al., 1985), Thinking Creatively with Sounds and Words (Torrance, et al.,
1973), Thinking Creatively in Action and Movement (Torrance, 1981) and the
Khatena–Torrance Creative Perception Inventory (Khatena & Torrance, 1976)—
found them only partially effective in revealing the nature of creativity. Problems
stemmed from the following sources:
·
·
·
·
·
·
format and construction of the tests per se which ignored creative characteristics or
original thinking (e.g. requirements to stay within borders, boxes or boundaries,
sequential commands, poor visual layouts, stimuli and materials);
lack of broad variety in production tasks;
misunderstood and misused subjective scales for identifying creative behaviours
(teacher, parent and student self-report scales);
item construction with too many closed questions as opposed to open-ended
types;
general lack of understanding about the concept of originality or lack of
‘well rounded creativity’ on the part of the test creators (p. 203), which means
strict adherence to their own personal and, perhaps, esoteric understandings of
creativity;
overemphasis on the test measures to be efŽ cient and economical.
Another study (Roweton et al. 1975) revealed that students whose classroom
artistic products and performances were rated as very creative by teacher and peers
did not score high on the TTCT. The Torrance measures were not indicative of
typical classroom creativity as perceived by teacher and students, who held quite
similar conceptions of creativity. (How teachers and students deŽ ne and think about
creativity have become extremely important in understanding creativity today.)
Morse (1994), studying the reliability estimates of scores on factors of the Khatena–
Torrance Creative Perception Inventory (e.g. self-conŽ dence, inquisitiveness, initiative, individuality), found estimates too unreliable for making decisions about
individual children. In some examples, reliability was too low to use even for
decisions about groups of students, as might be useful for determining whether
gifted children exhibit creative traits more than non-gifted children.
Fishkin & Johnson (1998) found weaknesses in several measures designed to
assess creativity in students. Measures of divergent thinking were implemented in
contrived circumstances and were in uenced by other variables; personality self-reports were more useful with adolescents and adults than with children; measuring
products was often hampered by poorly designed scoring rubrics and problems of
agreed-upon criteria and inter-rater training and reliability; well-researched instruments and procedures for measuring creative environments or situations were
lacking; combination measures of interlinking creativity components were scarce
and what was available had inadequate reliability and was based on too few
observations; alternative measures (e.g. performance-based observations) suffered
from few validity studies of performance measures of creativity; personality/attitude
characteristics linked to creativity were not normed and provided limited evidence
between personality/attitude and creativity. Weak evidence of validity, reliability and
inadequate norms appears widespread in creativity measures.
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D. K. Beattie
FIG . 2. Imagination and creative conception exercise.
The popular so-called art creativity test, which instructs students to turn abstract
lines and forms on a paper into objects or a picture (Booth, 1996), is also
problematical (see Figure 2). This ‘one shot’ test, purporting to measure creative
traits of  uency,  exibility, originality and elaboration, suffers from the confounding
of  uency and originality categories ( uency can contaminate originality scores and
vice versa), inadequate measure of  exibility and unclear standards for elaboration.
Both reliability and validity are called into question.
Suggestions for Assessment
·
·
·
·
·
·
·
Based on the latest research, suggestions for assessing creativity emerge. Construction and content of the assessment should focus on tasks/problems/projects that:
are student driven rather than exclusively tester designed;
are ill-deŽ ned and ill-structured, those that require formulation and cannot be
solved without decisions by the student who must add his or her own information
(Kirschenbaum, 1992);
enable students to choose the domain in which they demonstrate their creativity
[Current research indicates that creativity is domain speciŽ c (Baer, 1993a) and
that sufŽ cient knowledge in a domain has to be gained before it can be acted upon
creatively. Baer (1993b) also argues that creativity may also be task speciŽ c within
content areas.];
permit a wide range of possible responses;
are multilevel and can assess various dimensions of creativity;
are situational and based on life and culturally relevant experiences (Bruch,
1973);
require experimentation;
·
Creativity in Art
185
·
·
·
·
·
·
·
·
·
·
·
·
·
·
·
are interesting, challenging, motivating, enjoyable and assist students in learning
new things (Houtz & Krug, 1995);
represent a broad variety of formats and are administered over time, enabling
ample opportunities for creativity to emerge and be observed, the ‘ideal approach
to identiŽ cation’ (Kirschenbaum, 1998, p. 25);
can be performed adequately and without evidence of large variability in individual differences by all members of a given population (i.e. tasks should not rely
heavily on such constructs as verbal  uency, drawing skills and the like) (Hennessey & Amabile, 1988). Computer programs can be used to control widely
variable constructs;
include motivational warm-ups and rich cues; sensory stimulation followed by
a period when sensory stimulation is minimal. Brainstorming does encourage
creativity;
provide adequate time structure for intense focus (‘think time’) on a problem;
manifest a creative format and structure (i.e. applying what is known about
creativity to craft the assessment per se and determine task requirements);
include opportunities for students to demonstrate and document a well-speciŽ ed
search heuristic. Csikszentmihalyi (1994) also describes this process as a personal
‘discovery orientation’ (p. 140) or the way a person discovers or approaches an
experimental situation. He raises a thoughtful caveat, notwithstanding. Assuming
that the discovery orientation is a necessary condition of creativity may be relying
on old cultural or social ideas of creativity;
include opportunities for students to formulate and state a problem rather than
always Ž nd a solution;
include opportunities for students to ask new questions or revisit old ones from a
different perspective;
include opportunities for students to apply a new theory or belief to old images;
include opportunities for students to establish goals, determine what types of goals
to set and if they are met;
include opportunities for students to identify gaps or missing pieces in a problem
or a domain;
include opportunities for students to apply knowledge outside a domain to help
solve a problem within a particular domain (i.e. to use analogical and metaphorical thinking across domains) and to solve a problem in a way not common or
intrinsic to a domain (e.g. visually instead of verbally). Max Ernst describes this
aspect of creativity as the capacity to grasp mutually distinct realities and draw a
spark from their juxtaposition (cited in Roukes, 1982);
include opportunities for students to demonstrate strong self-evaluation and
intuitive skills;
include opportunities for students to revise or reŽ ne products;
include opportunities for students to use creative language;
What might a creativity task look like? The school-based (internal) art problem in
Table II, an example of complex and ill-deŽ ned performance-based tasks, provides
multiple measures for collecting data on creative behaviours. Performance-based
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D. K. Beattie
assessments have only recently been examined as formats for creativity assessments
(Baer, 1994) The problem as described, however, does not encompass assessing the
creativity of response to a work of art, only the art making element. Opportunities
for students to demonstrate creativity in re ecting on a work of art can be incorporated.
To supplement this and other performance-based and naturalistic tasks, additional measures are recommended. Biographical and autobiographical inventories,
including statements of past creative accomplishments, interest and motivational
inventories, questionnaires, teacher, peer and self-ratings, peer, nominations, checklists or other instruments of personality traits and affective states, protocol analyses,
direct observations and portfolios of creative productivity (a creativity portfolio) are
useful formats for collecting creativity data. Social validation techniques can also be
employed to help craft and validate assessment tasks and formats (Plucker & Runco,
1998). A battery of assessment methods is crucial for identifying germinal creativity
in children.
Actual broad assessment criteria for judging such a creativity problem (with its
many dimensions) would be derived from cell data as collected in the Creativity
SpeciŽ cations Matrix described in Figure 1. Factors of creative traits, creative
processes and creative products, intrinsic to the domain and identiŽ ed by the Ž eld
and various cultural groups, would be determined as assessment criteria and
measured. Because creativity is viewed as a social construct, judging requires a panel
of judges including teachers, peers, professionals and students.
Judging procedures of creative tasks should take into consideration the following
features:
·
judges must have sufŽ cient knowledge of and experience in the domain;
judges must be able to recognise creativity as made manifest in the domain (i.e.
judges would be familiar with the factors of creative traits, creative processes and
creative products in their domain and be able to make valid subjective judgments
of them);
· judges must be able to make independent judgments of creativity without imposed
criteria or in uence from other judges. Hennessey & Amabile (1988) insist that
the integrity of such assessment depends on agreement being reached by judges
(consensual agreement) without speciŽ cally ‘spelled out’ indicators, without opportunities to confer and without training to reach agreement;
· judges should make assessments on other dimensions (e.g. technical aspects,
craftsmanship, aesthetic qualities) prior to assessing creativity to determine
whether subjective assessments on such dimensions in uence creativity assessment. Socio-environmental effects on these other subjective dimensions can also
be studied for their possible impact on a judgment of creativity (Hennessey &
Amabile, 1988). (It should be noted that aesthetic organising and organisation of
aesthetic qualities have been identiŽ ed as a creative process and a criterion of a
creative product in art.);
· judges should rate creative products relative to one another, rather than to some
absolute standard of creativity for the domain (Hennessey & Amabile, 1988);
·
Creativity in Art
TABLE II.
Task description
Sample assessment criteria
Students are presented with the problem of curating and
creating a small, personal and innovative art exhibition
based on a theme of their own selection. The theme is
chosen by a dictionary search to Ž nd a word that has
intrigue for organising (curating) an art exhibition.
The word may be completely new to the student
(e.g. outre, meaning bizarre). Students are asked to
brainstorm concepts relating to the word and to play
with the word in a phrase or sentence and with
ambiguities. Once the exhibition theme is determined,
they develop a theme resource Ž le of visual and
written examples (e.g. objects, materials, text) which
connect the theme with self, the real world, the surreal
world and the art world.
· curiosity
· openness to experience
· preference for novelty
· ideational  uency
· inquisitiveness
· tolerance of unfamiliar
sensory stimulation
Five very diverse art works from the history of art (e.g.
three-dimensional, non-objective, conceptual,
representational, non-Western) are chosen by students for
inclusion in their personal thematic art exhibition. All
works must relate to the theme, thereby, representing
linkage to the art world. Analogical and metaphorical
connections are encouraged. Connections must be
described with reasons.
· sensitivity
· identiŽ cation of remote
associations
· questioning
· problem formation and
conceptualising
· re ectiveness
· application of abstract
relationships to generate
new understandings
Students are required to complete sketches and studies,
encompassing different modes (including new art forms),
styles and genres, for three personal artworks that make
a unique contribution to their personal exhibition. Final
original artworks must depict three different conceptual
variations of the theme. One Ž nal work must also push the
boundaries of medium(s)/technique(s)/process(es) and one
must be fantasy. Various exercises augment preliminary
work (e.g. changing, magnifying, multiplying, reversing,
fragmenting, erasing, distorting, disguising, simultaneously
presenting, expanding, transferring, elaborating or
intensifying the sketched images) for the purpose of
Ž nding creative solutions. These tasks may be accomplished
using the computer to create Ž gural formulations.
Brainstorming (individual and group) and dialoguing
opportunities are encouraged.
· task commitment
· persistence
· self-motivation
· seeks stimulation and
knowledge
· playfulness
· visionariness
·  exible thinking
· divergent thinking
· preference for
cognitive complexity
· proliŽ cacy
·  uency
· ability to transform things
· aesthetic organisation
· ability to delay closure of
an artistic problem
· awareness of gaps or
missing pieces
· ability to delay closure
· elegant solution/resolution
· originality
· combining and re-ordering of
concepts
· impact of product
Students keep research journals in which their personal
research techniques or heuristics, idea checklists,
creative ideation and processing behaviours and attitudes
are well documented along with entries that suggest
incubation periods and to what degree they are valued and
feelings of warmth ratings (how close they are to solution)
(Metcalfe, 1986). Future projects can also be described.
· risk taking
· personal heuristic
· established reverie for
incubation activity
· inspiration
· evaluating and reŽ ning
· visionariness
An art exhibition of each student’s own design is set up for
judging purposes. The thematic exhibition must push the
boundaries of the idea of an exhibition, but stay within the
ambits of speciŽ ed space and resource requirements. The
theme, didactic exhibition statement and extended labels,
three original artworks, selected works from the history of
art, any additional materials or objects (as might be
collected in the theme resource Ž le), preliminary sketches
and studies, journal collaborations and other documentation
of problem solving must be put on display. Exhibitions
might be in the form of documentaries for which students
create their own computer software.
· ability to abstract and
move from wholes to
parts
· use of feedback
· synthesis
· elegant solution/resolution
· originality
· impact of the product
187
188
D. K. Beattie
·
judges should view creative products in different random order, and various
dimensions on which judging is based (if determined a priori) should be in
different random order for each judge (Hennessey & Amabile, 1988);
· judges must be able to distinguish a creative product from an intelligent one
(Runco & Mraz, 1991);
· both quality and quantity of creative achievement should be judged (Runco,
1986).
Lastly, Hennessey & Amabile (1988) suggest that: (a) ratings on each creativity
dimension are analysed for inter-rater reliability; (b) dimensions of judgment are
factor analysed to determine the degree of independence between creativity and
other dimensions; (c) if products enable straightforward identiŽ cation of speciŽ c
objective features, then these, too, are recorded and correlated with creativity
judgments.
Conclusions
The big question can now be answered. Is it possible to assess creativity in the
educational context? The answer is ‘yes, but not without great creative effort’. Aside
from establishing the standard speciŽ cations demanded of any quality assessment
(clariŽ cation of: purposes; examinees; domain content; tasks or strategies, and in
particular, how many measures, tasks and administrations would validate an interpretation of creativity; task exercises; a scoring and judging plan; a reporting
plan), several feasibility issues merit special consideration. The latest thinking about
creativity indicates that the assessment thereof should occur within a domain and
not as a construct separated from a domain (i.e. as a component of a broad based
core skills test). Preliminary fact Ž nding on creative traits, processes and products,
therefore, would need to be conducted by a Ž eld about a domain and as perceived
across cultures to determine which factors to assess. Issues of whether creative
activity might be speciŽ c to a particular problem or task, or can be generalised from
a task to the domain at large, need to be studied. Baseline performances of students
(e.g. components of Sternberg and Lubart’s ‘investment theory’) require attention
before attempting an assessment of creativity.
The school level at which an assessment might occur requires scrutiny. The
secondary school is the most probable site, preferable at Grade 9. Two reasons are
worthy of mention for selecting this level. First, research has shown that individuals
need to have acquired sufŽ cient skills and abilities in a domain and primary children
may not have gained enough knowledge. They need to know not only where a
domain has been but also where it might be headed and where it might be pushed
(Gardner, 1995). For the same reasons, Csikszentmihalyi (1996) insists that children can show tremendous talent, but they cannot be creative. Generally speaking,
American students do not have the beneŽ t of continuous education in the art
domain to gain mastery. Second, follow-up studies (as well as prescriptive programming) are desirable once a student has been identiŽ ed as creative in a particular
domain, and a longitudinal study of one or two years duration and additional
Creativity in Art
189
measures would still be possible to complete or implement. Like identifying giftedness, identifying creativeness would become a part of the school agenda, particularly
in high school. Special programming for creative students could take place within
each discipline with opportunities for collaborative tasks across disciplines.
At the elementary level, although aspects of germinal creativity can be assessed,
the emphasis should be placed on teachers modelling creative behaviours. Students
should be actively involved in problem solving, critical thinking, re ective thinking,
divergent thinking, hypothesising, inquiry techniques and creative thinking
(Esquivel, 1995). According to Gardner (1995), genuine creativity may likely only
be achieved if it is modelled and sought over a long period of time.
Whether creativity tasks should be added to other types of mandated assessments
(e.g. content-speciŽ c, standards-based examinations) and whether creativity assessment should be internal with an external component, such as a Creativity Fair or
Creativity Exhibition, are additional matters of interest. Numerous validity issues
would need to be addressed in creativity assessment, such as relevance, content
Ž delity and integrity, exhaustiveness, cognitive complexity, equity, meaningfulness,
straightforwardness, consequences, directness, cost and efŽ ciency and generalisabitity. Reliability issues, inherent in creativity measurement, are also major concerns, particularly if judges are not allowed to confer or be trained to reach
agreement.
In conclusion, the value of assessing creativity must far outweigh all of the
problems such assessment entails. Aside from identiŽ cation and selection of creative
persons, creative processes and creative products, the potential that assessing creativity holds for in uencing creative curriculum development and the way all
students are taught may just be well worth the effort.
Note
[1]
The responses described in Table I are derived from the work and writings of 16 key
researchers (from the USA) in the Ž eld of creativity (Tardif & Sternberg, 1988). These
experts are: Frank Barron, Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi David Henry Feldman, Howard
Gardner, Howard E. Gruber and Sara N. Davis, Beth A. Hennessey and Teresa M.
Amabile, Philip N. Johnson-Laird, Pat Langley and Randolph Jones, D. N. Perkins, Roger
C. Schank, Dean Keith Simonton, Robert J. Sternberg, Calvin W. Taylor, E. Paul
Torrance, Herbert J. Walberg and Robert W. Weisberg.
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