THE YEARS OF
LYNDON
JOHNSON
****
THE
PAS SAGE
OF POWER
Robert A. Caro
Alfred A. Knopf
New York
2012
THIS IS A BORZOI BOOK
PUBLISHED BY ALFRED A. KNOPF
Copyright © 2012 by Robert A. Caro, Inc.
All rights reserved. Published in the United States by Alfred A. Knopf,
a division of Random House, Inc., New York, and in Canada
by Random House of Canada Limited, Toronto.
www.aaknopf.com
Knopf, Borzoi Books, and the colophon are registered trademarks
of Random House, Inc.
A portion of this work was previously published in The New Yorkei
Cataloging-in-Publication Data is on file with the Library of Congress
ISBN 978-0-679-40507-8
Jacket design by R. D. Scudellari, adapted by Carol Devine Carson
Manufactured in the United States of America
First Edition
23
In the Books of Law
the Senate as early as it did—on Feb
early skirmish on that bill, the skirmish
the
of
e
outcom
the
ruary io—because of
civil rights loose from Judge Smith’s
pry
to
as
that had begun before Christm
ended almost on schedule—on the
had
House Rules Committee. That encounter
schedule which back in December Smith and House Republican Leader Halleck
had agreed to accept.
Not that that had been an indication of good faith on the part of the judge.
Hardly had Smith gaveled the Rules Committee into order on January 9 to
open its hearings on the bill when his agreement began to demonstrate a certain
ry
it
elasticity. During testimony by the very first witness, House Judicia Comm
s
bitter
feeling
of
urrent
underc
tee chairman Emanuel Celler of New York, “the
d
of
Celler
accuse
over the measure began showing,” UPI reported, as Smith
through,”
“railroading” the bill through his committee. “We don’t railroad bills
and it had
Celler said. “Do you prefer the word ‘strong-armed’?” Smith asked,
was not a
g”)
-armin
“strong
(or
ading”
“railro
immediately become apparent that
each wit
d
allowe
iT-le
guilty.
be
to
crime of which the judge himself was going
f and
himsel
ns
questio
erable
ness to testify at such length—asking them innum
Mis
of
r
Colme
M.
m
allowing another southern stalwart, Representative Willia
hour
points”
sissippi, to ask innumerable others, “going over and over the same
of
eight
only
after hour, the Times reported—that after seven days of hearings,
pace, the sched
the thirty witnesses scheduled to testify had been heard. At that
would not last
s
hearing
the
hat
ber—t
ule that had been agreed upon in Decem
gless.
meanin
longer than twelve days—was rapidly becoming
That schedule was going to be accelerated, however.
put in place
Celler began mentioning to reporters the lever that Johnson had
behind which
in December with his telephone call to Richard Bolling, the lever
far enough,
the President had thrown “his full weight,” and that would, if pushed
from consid
subject Smith to the “indignity” of having his committee discharged
to the agreeup
live
to
ed
eration of the bill. Celler said he certainly expect Smith
THE CIVIL RIGHTS BILL ARRIVED ifl
In the Books of Law
559
UPI reported, “Celler also
nent, and complete the hearings expeditiously. “But,”
rge petition, which could
discha
for
a
nade clear that efforts to get enough votes
not be abandoned.”
would
stall,
)ypass the committee if there were a prolonged
res to add to
signatu
up
ng
Iohnson told Larry O’Brien to go back to work roundi
as.*
Christm
;he 130 that had been placed on the petition before
d another one.
And when that lever appeared to be stuck, Johnson inserte
bore only 178 signa
Despite O’Brien’s efforts, on January 18 the petition still
were Democratic
them
of
153
since
and
r,
tures, forty short of the required numbe
ratic side of the
Democ
the
from
ed
signatures, not too many more could be expect
come from the
to
have
House. And while most of the necessary forty would
still advising
were
Republican side, Republican leaders, from Halleck on down,
procedure by signing.
GOP congressmen not to circumvent traditional House
bill released were
Republican members of the Rules Committee who wanted the
ant to take it
“reluct
still
were
d,
reporte
getting the same advice, and, the Times
k was in the
Hallec
s
Charle
i8,
y
away from the chairman.” But at noon on Januar
‘If I were
said,
“I
recall,
to
Oval Office. Using logic at first, as Johnson was later
n
Birthday
Lincol
you, Charlie, I wouldn’t dare. go out and try to make a
Howard Smith’s got
speech that’ll laugh you out of the goddamned park when
before then.’ “And
his foot on Lincoln’s neck. You’d better get that [the billj out
Halleck sitting in
with
ne,
telepho
the
g
up
then he used a blunter weapon. Pickin
Webb about
James
r
istrato
Admin
front of him, the President called NASA
concerning
them
of
one
,
requests the Republican Leader had made of NASA
institution
ional
Purdue University in West Lafayette, Indiana, the largest educat
.
.
in his congressional district.
g for reelec
“He wants to know what he can tell his people when he’s runnin
do for Pur
can
we
what
know
to
wants
tion that he’s done for them lately, and he
k. Now
Hallec
e
Charli
for
can
I
ng
due,” Johnson told Webb. “I need to do anythi
isn’t there something you can do?”
ing that
Webb replied that he would “talk with him” and “work out someth
n set up a time for
he’ll come back to you and tell you he’s pleased with.” Johnso
Office, Johnson
the two men to meet. And then, after Halleck had left the Oval
Let’s help him.”
got down to the nut-cutting. “Now, Jim,” he said. “This is it
I
hope when he
and
I
can,
ing
Webb said that he would certainly “do everyth
er,
was not what
howev
Hoping,
comes back to you he’ll tell you that I’ve.
. “If he’s not
Lyndon Johnson had in mind. The civil rights bill was still stalled
talking to you
satisfied when he comes back to me, why, then, I’m going to be
again,” he said.
.
.“
‘I don’t
*J{e advised O’Brien what to say to Republicans. “What I’d say to them is this:
ent
[peti
statem
the
sign
to
ing
unwill
being
want.. the party of Lincoln to go down in history as
They
roll.
honor
an
It’s
roll.
honor
golden
a
That’s
there.
of
off
be
tion]. I don’t want your name to
in
it.
on
name
your
that. I want
are the men who care, [those men] whose name is signed to
these towns.’
.
.
.
560
TO
BECOME
A
PRESIDENT
with Halleck on January 21, he tele
Webb got the message. After meeting
that we could do some things at Purdue,”
phoned the President. “I showed him
rs,
run three-quarters of a million dolla and
Webb said, “a building that would
racts
cont
and
rants
ts and contracts”—g
we’re talking about some research gran
ng
havi
b,
Web
ue was well qualified. And
for which, he was careful to say, Purd
d
foun
had
n years, knew that once Johnson
worked for Lyndon Johnson for fiftee
for fur
rol a man, he liked to keep it in place
a weapon that would help him cont
itate
to
facil
said,
rator
inist
adm
the NASA
ther use. He had worked things out,
key
.
The
well
as
e
futur
ediately but in the
Halleck’s cooperation not only imm
he
:’
each
year
wed
rene
three years and then
research grant “would be spread over
to
ng
willi
re
you’
is that if you tell him that
said. “The net effect, Mr. President,
on
an
it
t
erates with you, I can implemen
follow this policy as long as he coop
the
minute he kicks over the traces, we stop
installment basis. In other words, the
installment.”
Whether or not the contracts for Pur
“Sounds good,” Lyndon Johnson said.
n
wing day, January 22, some Republica
due had anything to do with it, the follo
ly
ious
prev
had
n doing what Halleck
members of the Rules Committee bega
se
Democratic committee members to devi
advised them not to do: meeting with
the
se
d up the civil rights hearings and relea
a move to force Judge Smith to spee
e the
morning, Thursday, January 23, whil
bill to the floor. “All during” the next
from
calls
take
to
ing
hear
leaving the
hearings were going on, “members were
n
blica
Repu
that
g
and reports were circulatin
party leaders,” the Times reported,
it.
to
d
adde
be
the petition, were about to
signatures, previously withheld from
long
ndered. Saying “I have been here
Just before lunch, Judge Smith surre
ite
defin
announced that he had agreed to a
enough to know the facts of life,” he
l be
January 30—and said the bill “wil
date on which the hearings would end—
said,
date. “By the agreement,” the Times
voted out” and sent to the floor on that
by
him
from
away
on of having the bill taken
“Mr. Smith was spared the humiliati
he
said
son
John
ce on Saturday, January 25,
his committee.” At a press conferen
the
to
said
being made in civil rights. I have
was “very happy about the progress
to go
ght it would be rather unbecoming
[Republican] leadership that I. thou
oln
still had the civil rights bill that Linc
out and talk about Lincoln when we
at
Wh
it.”
on
act
dn’t
coul
a committee that
would be so interested in locked up in
on
se
Hou
the
of
floor
e sent the bill to the
ever the reasons, the Rules Committe
Senate.
on February 10, sending it to the
it
January 30, and the House passed
s at a
right
“is moving on the tax cut and civil
“Congress,” Marquis Childs wrote,
nceivable.”
pace that a short time ago seemed inco
.
.
in the Senate now—
about to grind to a halt, for the bill was
to pass
civil rights bills. In the 1964 fight
the Senate that was the graveyard of
e: the
ntag
son would have a great adva
John F. Kennedy’s civil rights bill, John
Kenatmosphere for his program”—that
“transformation”—the “sympathetic
THAT PACE WAS
In the Books of Law
561
nedy’s death had created in Washington. But sympathy for civil rights—majority
opinion in the nation, majority opinion even in the Senate—had collided with the
Senate’s Southern Caucus before, and had lost every time. New lines of attack
would be necessary.
One would be the line that Johnson had spelled out to Sorensen in June.
Since the South used other Administration bills as hostages against civil rights,
don’t give them any hostages. By February 10, when the civil rights bill arrived
in the Senate, the most valuable hostage, the tax cut bill, was out of the South’s
clutches, “locked and key” in the storm cellar of completed legislation, and so
were the appropriations bills. And Johnson made sure that no other bills would
wander onto the battlefield to be captured and held hostage. After the civil rights
bill got to the floor (by a 54—37 vote that ended a determined Southern attempt to
refer it instead to the Judiciary Committee chaired by Mississippi’s Eastland), he
told Larry O’Brien and his other legislative aides that no new bills would be sent
to the Senate by the White House. “They can filibuster until hell freezes over,” he
said. “I’m not going to put anything [else] on that floor until this is done.”
Then there was the question of compromises. The bill had finally been
passed by the House Judiciary Committee largely because of the assistance of its
ranking Republican member, William McCulloch of Ohio, a quietly determined
champion of civil rights. Angered by the fact that desperately needed sections of
both the 1957 and 1960 civil rights bills, in particular fair employment and public
accommodations, had been bargained away in return for the South’s agreement
not to filibuster, McCulloch had, in dealing with Robert Kennedy and Justice
Department aides Marshall and Katzenbach, made his support of the Kennedy bill
conditional on a promise that, as Katzenbach was to put it, “we.. not give away
in the Senate” any provisions of the House bill. Not only was McCulloch’s posi
tion on a civil rights bill influential with his GOP House colleagues, one tenet of
GOP Leader Halleck’s allegiance to House prerogatives was his policy of treating
the ranking GOP member of each committee as, in effect, his party’s chairman on
that committee and supporting his recommendations—in this case McCulloch’s
no-compromise position—on legislation. Feeling therefore that only McCul
loch’s support could get the bill through Judiciary, Robert Kennedy had given him
the unequivocal no-compromise promise he demanded. In the Senate, however,
there was someone who was insisting on compromise, and he was the only sena
tor who could deliver the Republican votes necessary for cloture. Everett Dirksen
had promised Katzenbach in 1963—shortly before President Kennedy’s assassi
nation—that he would deliver them, that “this bill will come to a vote in the Sen
ate.” But Dirksen’s promises always had considerable elasticity to them, and
now, in 1964, discussing the bill with Katzenbach and Burke Marshall, the two
Kennedy men discovered, as Katzenbach puts it, that “he obviously wanted the
bill rewritten, to appear different, even if there were no substantive changes, so
that he could explain to his colleagues all the changes he had negotiated.”
Changes—substantive or not—meant negotiations: compromise. And on two
.
TO
562
BECOME
A
PRESIDENT
s
points—the public accommodations and fair employment sections—the change
Dirksen wanted were substantive. “Under [President] Kennedy,” the conviction
in Washington had been, as Evans and Novak expressed it, that “one or both of
these sections would have been sacrificed. to eliminate or at least shorten a
Southern filibuster,” and that there would be other compromises as well, for,
without them, the bill could not get through the Senate. And Dirksen was confi
dent that the situation would be no different under the new President. The Repub
te
lican Leader “expected President Johnson to be willing, as in the past, to negotia
says.
bach
some compromise,” Katzen
e
Compromises had always been a key element in southern strategy becaus
d
lengthy
require
one
each
out
ng
of the time element that was so decisive. Worki
negotiations behind closed doors and then lengthy discussions on the Senate
part of
floor—not filibusters exactly but a time-consuming, calendar-consuming
normal legislative business. And each compromise meant, of course, that the
Senate bill would be different from the bill the House had approved, and that
therefore after the Senate passed its version of the bill, it would have to go to a
iled,
Senate-House conference committee so that the changes could be reconc
be
could
bills
doors
one of those conference committees behind whose closed
would
it
emasculated, or delayed indefinitely, without public explanation. And,
omise
become apparent not long after the bill reached the Senate in 1964, compr
hell
in
way
no
was
there
that
knew
“We
again.
was going to be a southern tactic
t
though
we
bill,
but
rights
civil
the
we could muster the necessary votes to defeat
that
ments
amend
to
agree
to
we could filibuster long enough to get the other side
n
would make it less offensive,” is the way Russell’s Georgia colleague, Herma
.
.
Talmadge, puts it.
Johnson refused to compromise. In public, in answer to a press conference
[the
question about the possibility of one, he said, “I am in favor of passing it
tive
legisla
to
talking
,
private
In
t
bill] in the Senate exactly in its presen form.”
deals.”
no
and
wheels
no
leaders, he had a more pungent phrase. “There will be
was
There was, as always, a political calculation behind his stance. “I knew,” he
s]
liberal
to tell Doris Goodwin, “that if I didn’t get out in front on this issue, [the
I had to produce a civil rights bill that was even stronger than
would get me.
,
the one they’d have gotten if Kennedy had lived.” And there was, as always
“no
be
would
there
in
d
Goodw
Richar
something more than calculation. Assuring
the
compromises on civil rights; I’m not going to bend an inch,” he added, “In
I
always
.
But
Senate [as Leader] I did the best I could. But I had to be careful
vowed that if I ever had the power I’d make sure every Negro had the same
chance as every white man. Now I have it. And I’m going to use it.”
.
.
.
.
.
.
“I’ll do on the bill just what you think is best to do
We won’t do anything that you don’t want to do,” Johnson put the
on the bill.
lot
attorney general out front in the 1964 battle (“For political reasons, it made a
TELLING ROBERT KENNEDY
..
.
In the Books of Law
563
of sense,” Kennedy was to note; his partisans would have difficulty finding fault
with the bill if he was in charge of it), and Kennedy and his Justice Department
aides would play a key role in it. And since this was a battle in the Senate, a body
fiercely jealous of its prerogatives, and a President’s hand couldn’t be too visible
there, the floor leader of the bill, after Mansfield had declined the assignment,
became the Democrats’ Assistant Leader, Hubert Humphrey.
Summoning Humphrey to the Oval Office, Johnson told him, Humphrey
to
was recall, that “You have this great Opportunity now, Hubert, but you liberals
will never deliver. You don’t know the rules of the Senate, and your liberal
friends will be off making speeches when they ought to be present.”
“I would have been outraged if he hadn’t been basically right and histori
cally accurate,” Humphrey was to say. And, he was to say, Johnson was being
accurate about him, too. “He had sized me up. He knew very well that I would
say, ‘Damn you, I’ll show you.’ “And then “having made his point he shifted the
conversation and more quietly and equally firmly he promised he would back me
to the hilt. As I left, he stood and moved towards me with his towering intensity:
‘Call me whenever there’s trouble or anything you want me to do.’
“He knew just how to get to me,” Humphrey says.
Humphrey had always had a gift for oratory, and for friendship, and all
through the civil rights battle of 1964 he employed both gifts, in eloquent
speeches, and in keeping the Senate debate as civil as possible. “I marveled at the
way he handled the bill’s opponents,” a liberal senator recalls. “He always kept
his ebullient manner, and would talk with the southerners. He was always genial
and friendly, thus keeping the debate from becoming vicious.” He had never had
a gift for (or even much interest in) the more pragmatic requirements of Senate
warfare: for learning, and using, the rules. (Russell “knew all the rules. and
how to use them,” Johnson had told him in that Oval Office lecture. “He [John
son] said liberals had never really worked to understand the rules and how to use
them, that we never organized effectively,
predicting that we would fall apart
in dissension, be absent when quorum calls were made and when critical votes
were taken.”) Nor had he ever had a gift for organization; or for counting votes
without false optimism. Now, however, he learned the rules; and he organized his
forces so that the rules couldn’t be so easily used against them. After the bill got
to the floor, a series of Russell maneuvers delayed its being made the pending
business until March 30, when the filibuster began. A key southern tactic had
always been the quorum call: a demand, often in the middle of the night, that
the chair call the roll to determine if the number of senators present was the num
ber required—fifty-one—to conduct business. Each senator is allowed to speak
only twice within a legislative “day.” But if within the time limit, the required
fifty-one couldn’t be rounded up, the Senate was automatically adjourned. The
next session would therefore be a new legislative day, and southern senators who
had already spoken twice on the previous day could start all over again with two
more speeches. Making sure that fifty-one senators could be rounded up was
.
.
.
.
.
TO
564
BECOME
A
PRESIDENT
forces against” a filibuster, Nicholas
“perhaps the hardest part of managing the
liberal Democrats, and the few lib-.
nized
Katzenbach was to say. Humphrey orga
that only once during the entire fili
eral Republicans, into rotating platoons so
quorum. To respond on the floor to
buster were the liberals unable to muster a
bill, he appointed floor captains, each
southern attacks on the substance of the
to defend each major section. This
with a team of four or five senators under him,
chance to debate the bill [and] get
gave the senators, as Humphrey noted, “a
part of the team fighting for civil
some press for themselves, to be known as
ing, he, the liberal Republican
rights.. They seemed to like it.” Each morn
floor captains, civil rights leaders,
Whip Thomas Kuchel of California, their
organized labor met in Humphrey’s
Robert Kennedy aides and lobbyists from
room with organization charts, duty
office—one writer called it “a veritable war
southern maneuvers and map out
rosters and progress calendars”—to anticipate
ways to counter them.
to count, now Lyndon Johnson
And if Hubert Humphrey had never learned
no longer so wishful. Of the sixtytaught him how. Suddenly his thinking was
ur were southerners or border state
seven Democrats, twenty-three or twenty-fo
, so no more than forty-four Dem
senators unalterably opposed to desegregation
cloture. Liberal Republican votes, at
ocratic votes could be counted on to vote for
-six or fifty-seven. “Somewhere we
most, brought the total to only about fifty
tional votes,” and, Humphrey saw,
would have to pick up about ten or eleven addi
tionally conservative midwestern
the only place to get them was from tradi
son reminded him of what he knew:
Republicans, an unlikely source. And John
s. “He said, ‘Now you know that this
that there was only one way to get those vote
he said, ‘You and I are going to
bill can’t pass unless you get Ev Dirksen.’ And
n. He’s got to look good
You’ve got to let him have a piece of the actio
get Ev.
all the time.’
look good. Seeing that “he had a
Humphrey made the Republican leader
in it, a prominent place. Although
sense of history,” he gave Dirksen a place
fair employment arid public accom
Dirksen had announced his opposition to the
on Meet the Press on March 8,
modations sections, Humphrey, appearing
s of his country before he thinks
ignored his statements. “He is a man who think
Senator Dirksen has to face the
of his party. and I sincerely believe that when
and where his leadership will be
moment of decision where his influence
ssary to pass this bill, he will not be
required to give us the votes that are nece
found wanting.”
said in a phone call afterwards,
“Boy, that was right,” Lyndon Johnson
g just right now. You just keep at
as Humphrey would recall. “You’re doin
drink with Dirksen! You talk to
that.. You get in there to see Dirksen! You
Dirksen! You listen to Dirksen!”
the historically important fig
“The gentle pressure left room for him to be
master builder of a
sanship, the
ure in our struggle, the statesman above parti
Humphrey was to say. But, he says,
legislative edifice that would last forever,”
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
In the Books of Law
565
“as much as Dirksen liked the stroking. if he thought we had no chance, he
would have kept his distance” or “insisted on major compromises as the price for
his support.” So therefore, Humphrey says, “of the greatest importance was Pres
ident Johnson’s public and private pronouncements that no compromises were
possible this time,” that “it was going to be a strong bill or nothing.”
.
.
SPRING—all through April and May—the battle would go on.
In Mississippi, clergymen arriving from the North were given orientation
sessions that included instructions on how to protect themselves after they had
been knocked down (protection of the kidneys against assailants’ kicks was
emphasized), not that the instructions always helped: a Cleveland rabbi was seri
ously injured when he was hit in the head with an iron bar. These volunteers
were, of course, joining local black civil rights workers who had been risking
their lives for years, and, like them, were virtually without protection, with
nowhere to turn for help; many of the beatings took place as policemen or state
troopers watched. And looming over the volunteers always was the spectre of
jail—and what might happen to them in jail. (“The officers forced me to unclothe
and lie on my back. One of the officers beat me between my legs with a belt,”
wrote Bessie Turner.) The sacrifices made in Mississippi would include the lives
of three young civil rights workers—James Chaney, Andrew Goodman and
Michael Schwerner, a young black man and two young white Jewish men from
New York City—who were arrested by a deputy sheriff, released into a Ku Klux
Klan ambush and murdered. Eloquent though Martin Luther King’s speeches
might be, for his aides, each speech was an occasion for dread. “A mob might
form,” one explained. “They came right into the Negro neighborhood a few
months ago to get them at the [civil rights] office.” His public appearances had to
be scheduled carefully. “I don’t like to have Dr. King on the road at night.”
In Washington, meanwhile, Students Speak for Civil Rights were holding
daily rallies near the base of the Washington Monument. Making what they
called a “pilgrimage” to Washington, students from seventy-five religious semi
naries from around the country divided into three-member teams (a Catholic, a
Protestant and a Jew) to begin a twenty-four-hour-a-day vigil at the Lincoln
Memorial to pray for the bill’s passage—a vigil they pledged wouldn’t end until
it passed. Clergymen were playing a larger and larger role. Meeting on April 1,
the Leadership Conference on Civil Rights arranged for a daily prayer service,
led by a rabbi or a minister or a priest, to be held in a Lutheran church on Capitol
Hill one hour before the Senate convened each day. On April 28, a National
Interreligious Convocation in support of civil rights began at Georgetown Uni
versity. More than six thousand people attended. Ministers, priests and rabbis
fanned out to Capitol Hill. They crammed the galleries, next to the observers,
like Joseph Rauh and Clarence Mitchell, who had been there for years. “You
couldn’t turn around where there wasn’t a clerical collar next to you,” Rauh
ALL
THAT
566
TO
BECOME
A
PRESIDENT
delegation—the offices of the sena
recalls. And they visited—delegation after
tors whose votes were needed for cloture.
e off the familiar—and hostile—
The clergymen helped shift the tide of battl
time, become mired in the Senate.
terrain in which civil rights had, time after
It
new fresh guns, fresh rations.
“This was kind of like getting an army with
en
ts
conc
men
orce
reinf
e
Thes
.
says
made all the difference in the world,” Rauh
estern, mostly Republican, mostly con
trated their efforts in states, mostly midw
h interest in, let alone sentiment for,
servative, in which there had never been muc
and the NAACP and other Africancivil rights. In these states, labor unions
few members. That wasn’t true of
American organizations had relatively
Washington to see the fight through.
churches. And the clergymen stayed in
seeing Catholic nuns away from the
“This was the first time that I ever recalled
James Hamilton of the National Coun
convents for more than a few days,” says
t among religious groups that this was a
cil of Churches. “There was agreemen
aside.” And the issue was, thanks to
priority issue and other things had to be laid
from these states found themselves no
Johnson, finally understood. Senators
n’t against civil rights but only against
longer able to maintain that they were
cutting off debate through cloture.
changing inviolable Senate procedure by
ing from the church people,” Humphrey
“Just wait until [these senatorsj start hear
borne out. Walking off the Senate floor
had predicted, and the prediction was
a vote that defeated a Russell parlia
after supporting the civil rights forces on
that satisfies those two goddamned bish
mentary maneuver, Mundt said, “I hope
ops who called me last night.”
sen went to the White House. He
As for the President, on April 29, Dirk
he was going to let the President know
went in blustering, telling reporters that
necessary Republican votes for cloture:
that only compromise would produce the
out any change. Well, in my humble opin
“You say you want the House bill with
play. What do you have to say?”
ion, you are not going to get it. Now it’s your
a very different tone. What John
His comments when he came out were in
little—or, at any rate, nothing that Dirk
son had had to say was, apparently, very
n
tions about civil rights, the Republica
sen wanted to repeat. To reporters’ ques
barely touched on the subject.
Leader said that he and the President had
knowing nothing about the tactics
Johnson maintained his public posture of
involve myself in the procedure of the
being used. “As President, I don’t try to
ce in May. “I think Senator Mansfield
Senate,” he said during a press conferen
the situation than I am. I am not trying
and Senator Humphrey are much closer to
g another press conference about a
to dodge you. Ijust don’t know.” Asked durin
, he said, “All I know is what I read
specific amendment that was being proposed
all the tactics, devising many of them
in the papers.” In reality, however, he knew
ell would use to counter them and how
himself, thinking ahead to the tactics Russ
turn. And the generals carrying out his
those tactics could then be countered in
shoulders—with little patience. After
tactics knew that he was looking over their
s, which one leader likened to “batthe weekly congressional leaders’ breakfast
..
.
567
In the Books of Law
the White House unable to
fIeld briefings,” Humphrey said that he often left
g. And when, as spring
member whether or not he had actually eaten anythin
still not there, Johnson took,
as turning into summer, the votes for cloture were
ehind the scenes, a more direct hand.
the concept of cloture.
Southerners were not the only Democrats opposed to
tant to support it because the
enators from sparsely populated states were reluc
power of the larger states.
Lght to filibuster was their best defense against the
western states, however—
1any of the more sparsely populated states were
on projects, irrigation projects,
iestern states with requests (for dams, reclamati
rtment of the Interior. JohnDepa
unding for their vast national parks) before the
n senators that while “I
on had Secretary of the Interior Udall tell wester
I did suggest to
le,
:ouldn’t argue with them that they were wrong in princip
case.” Exceptions began to be
hem that they should make an exception in this
of Oklahoma, Cannon of
nade: by Anderson of New Mexico, Monroney
d to cloture than Carl Hayevada. No senator had been more adamantly oppose
a’s water shortage with
Arizon
len, but Hayden’s lifelong ambition was to solve
, time for satisfying
-seven
eighty
he Central Arizona Water Project, and, at age
that a Hayden vote for cloture
imbitions was growing short. Johnson suggested
vote was needed to obtain clo
would advance the project; Hayden said that if his
disasters—were enlisted in the
ture, Johnson could have it. Acts of God—natural
n wanted to send $o million
cause. There was an earthquake in Alaska; Johnso
hrey were afraid that if they
in emergency assistance, but Mansfield and Hump
even temporarily to allow the
allowed civil rights to be removed from the floor
l would block civil rights
necessary disaster relief bill to be brought there, Russel
procedure that would prevent
from being brought back. Johnson thought of a
These people [in
“Mike
Russell from doing that, and telephoned Mansfield:
I don’t want to be in a posi
Alaskal are suffering and they’ve got no money..
, for obvious reasons.
Senate
the
tion of interfering with what you all are doing in
ng taking place.”
sufferi
of
But. it is a real emergency, and there’s a lot
d L. Bartlett, wantedto get
Alaska’s two senators, Ernest Gruening and Edwar
Air Force Two was waiting for
home as quickly as possible; they were told that
hrey, “I am prepared, before
them at Andrews. On May 13 Gruening told Hump
long, to vote for cloture.”
..
.
.
.
.
.
May began, the votes were neverthe
Senate was going to recess for
less still not there for cloture. And on July 7, the
becoming more clear, the nom
the Republican convention, at which, it was now
opposed to cloture and the civil
ly
terab
inee was likely to be Goldwater, still unal
tance of conservative Republi
rights bill. His nomination would harden the resis
a vote against the position of
cans to both, since a vote for either one would be
there would be an election
their party’s presidential nominee. And in November,
seats. Humphrey knew, as one
not only for President, but for thirty-three Senate
SAcRIFIcE, PRAYERS, PERSUASION—as
568
TO
BECOME
A
PRESIDENT
wn out until one“the daily sessions would be dra
account of the bill says, that
ning.” Time was
paig
be anxious to get out cam
third of the Senate.. would
growing very short.
from his visit
still Dirksen. “Having learned”
The key—the only key—was
not going to
ount puts it, “that the President was
to the Oval Office, as another acc
time to talk with
y Leader had “decided it was
make any deal,” the Minorit
Humphrey and Company.”
out the states
never stopped. “We are carving
The courtship of Dirksen had
n will find it
kse
Dir
h blue lights and hoping that
man’s niche and bathing it wit
the Repub
for
ocratic aide said. Other reasons
irresistible to step into it,” a Dem
an election year,
oming more compelling. It was
lican Leader to give in were bec
was running.
know which way the political tide
and he didn’t need the polls to
the party of Lin
puts it, “the Republicans were
And “after all,” as one account
“inheritors of a
e
wer
ty
Lincoln’s state. His par
coin.” Dirksen was from Illinois,
Watching the
.”
w he could preserve or destroy
grand legacy that Dirksen kne
the sinking
got
ge
h civil rights, Herman Talmad
canny GOP Leader wrestle wit
ng side of history.”
let Republicans be on the wro
feeling that “he wasn’t about to
ksen proposed
tributed something to the bill, Dir
Anxious to show that he had con
il I sign them,”
ng to be against them right up unt
goi
“I’m
.
ents
ndm
ame
of
es
seri
a
quential in their
ately. Several (generally inconse
Johnson told Humphrey priv
make sure he
to
Kennedy with McCulloch
effect) were cleared by Robert
n agreed that
kse
added to the bill on May 12. Dir
wouldn’t object—and then were
, the Republican
. When Johnson telephoned him
the time for cloture had arrived
k we’ve gone far
that morning, “Dick. I thin
Leader said he had told Russell
about procedure
n, “We’ll. see what we can do
enough.” He promised Johnso
buttoned up.”
to get this thing on the road and
the man
Lincoln,’ Johnson said. “And
“You’re worthy of the ‘Land of
ntion
atte
per
pro
bill, and I’ll see that you get
from Illinois is going to pass the
and credit.”
ve to be difficult.
pro
ld
wou
g
s to go alon
Persuading enough Republican
caucus, Dirksen
a bitterly divided Republican
ng
owi
foll
20,
y
Ma
on
gh
hou
Alt
e civil rights
the bill was going to pass becaus
called in reporters to tell them that
es, and nei
vot
e,” he still didn’t have enough
was “an idea whose time has com
ndments to be
denly began pressing for ame
ther did Humphrey. Russell sud
phrey and Mans
ts could be filibustered. Hum
brought to the floor. Amendmen
se cloture votes,”
more time to nail down tho
field had to stall. “We need
Humphrey said on June 4.
after a fili
, by a 71—29 vote, on June io,
The cloture motion was passed
enty-three
Tw
.
ory
was the longest in Senate hist
buster of fifty-seven days that
atic side
ocr
tion; forty-four votes from the Dem
Democrats voted against that mo
ed
s vot for it;
ksen, twenty-seven Republican
was all it got. But, thanks to Dir
ther series of
ained opposed. There ensued ano
only six, including Goldwater, rem
sage, 73 to 27,
ndments to the bill, before its pas
floor fights over proposed ame
.
.
..
“
.
In the Books of Law
569
came on June 19. Thousands of people crowded around the Senate wing of the
Capitol, cheering and applauding senators as they came out. When Humphrey
emerged three hours later, they were still waiting to cheer him.
Because of the amendments that had been added, the bill then had to go
back to the House, to Judge Smith’s House Rules Committee, but, overriding the
judge, McCulloch, Boiling, Clarence Brown and their allies got it released from
Rules to the floor—with a rule allowing only a one-hour debate—on June 30,
and the debate occurred on July i. On July 2, it passed the House. Johnson
signed the Civil Rights Act of 1964 into law that evening—eight days before the
Republican National Convention, and the national presidential season, opened.
“We have talked long enough.. about civil rights,” Lyndon Johnson had
said. “It is time.. to write it in the books of law”—to embody justice and
equality in legislation. It would require another piece of legislation, the Voting
Rights Act of 1965, to give black Americans the weapon—the vote—that this
master of power felt would be decisive because it would give them, he said, the
power to “do the rest for themselves.”
The 1965 Act would be passed after another titanic struggle, in which, with
men and women (and children, many children) being beaten in Selma on their
way to the Edmund Pettus Bridge, singing “We Shall Overcome” as they marched
into tear gas and billy clubs and bullwhips, Lyndon Johnson went before Con
gress and said, “We Shall Overcome,” thereby adopting the civil rights rallying
cry as his own. (When Martin Luther King, watching the speech on television in
Selma, heard Johnson say that, he began to cry—the first time his assistants had
ever seen him cry.)* In 1965, Johnson was able to deploy from the Oval Office
more weapons than he had available the year before. James Farmer, sitting
beside the President as he used the telephone, heard him “cajoling, threatening,
everything else, whatever was necessary,” to get the bill passed. To bring black
Americans more fully into the political system, he had to break the power of the
South in the Senate—and he broke it. It was Abraham Lincoln who “struck off
the chains of black Americans,” I have written, “but it was Lyndon Johnson who
led them into voting booths, closed democracy’s sacred curtain behind them,
placed their hands upon the lever that gave them a hold on their own destiny,
made them, at last and forever, a true part of American political life.” How true a
part? Forty-three years later, a mere blink of history’s eye, a black American,
Barack Obama, was sitting behind the desk in the Oval Office.
The 1964 Civil Rights Act and the 1965 Voting Rights Act would not be
Lyndon Johnson’s only victories in the fight for social justice. Other bills passed
during his Administration made strides toward ending discrimination in public
accommodations, in education, employment, even in private housing. Almost a
century after Abraham Lincoln had freed black men and women from slavery,
.
.
*For a fuller description of Johnson’s speech, and its antecedents, and of Dr. King’s reac
tion, see Means ofAscent, pp. xiii—xx.
570
TO
NECOME
A
PRESIDENT
women, and indeed
xican-American men and
Me
and
n—
me
wo
and
rights which America
“black men
not enjoy many of the
did
l
stil
or—
col
of
s
n Johnson who
most American
e written. “It was Lyndo
hav
I
s,”
zen
citi
its
d
tee
nineteenth cen
supposedly guaran
n President during the
bee
had
n
col
Lin
.”
hts
Presidents
gave them those rig
its seventeen American
all
of
y,
tur
cen
eth
and
tury. During the twenti
that black Americans
the greatest champion
s
wa
n
,
nso
use
Joh
Ho
s
ine
ite
Ba
Wh
“Lyndon
had in the
all Americans of color
eed
ind
and
gle
s
sin
can
eri
the
th
Mexic an-Am
ls of government. Wi
they had in all the hal
white skin that they
the greatest champion
atest champion with a
gre
the
s
wa
he
n,
col
ker for the poor
exception of Lin
s to become the lawma
wa
He
.
lic
pub
Re
the
of at least a
had in the history of
He was to be the bearer
.
sed
res
opp
the
and
,
and the downtrodden
e had so long been denied
se to whom social justic
tho
to
e
to
tic
jus
ded
ial
nee
soc
ly
of
ate
measure
se who so desper
measure of dignity to tho
to them by America.”
the restorer of at least a
er of the promises made
eem
red
the
y,
nit
dig
e
ndon Johnson left
be given som
of law” By the time Ly
ks
boo
the
in
it
ite
wr
above all Presi
“It is time... to
se books, had become,
tho
in
g
itin
wr
of
lot
a
I have said,
office, he had done
n, the President who, as
sio
pas
com
of
r
ifie
cod
was gov
dents save Lincoln, the
ks by which America
boo
e
tut
sta
the
o
int
tice
“wrote mercy and jus
g—had taken a small but
begun to do that writin
had
he
ent
sid
Pre
as
d
ld barriers that, at the
erned.” An
breaking the century-o
ard
tow
p
ste
t
firs
le,
tab
Hill—with that tele
crucial, ineluc
t civil rights on Capitol
ins
aga
od
sto
l
stil
,
ice
ber 2, 1963; with
time he took off
tative Bolling on Decem
sen
pre
Re
to
de
ma
t the discharge
phone call he had
his presidency, to suppor
in
ly
ear
so
de,
ma
lever was
that decision he had
realized that only one
he
en
wh
de,
ma
he
n
petition; with that decisio
.
into it with all his might
available to him, to lean