COLLOQUIUM ON AFRICA’S CONTINENTAL FREE TRADE AREA (CFTA): INTERNAL
COHERENCE, EXTERNAL THREATS
Report of Civil Society Strategy Meeting on ‘Advocacy Around Africa’s Trade and
Development Challenges’
Jointly Organised by
Third World Network-Africa (TWN-Africa) & The United Nations Economic
Commission For Africa (UNECA)
At
Best Premier Hotel, Accra, March 2-3, 2016
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Table of Contents
DAY 1 ............................................................................................................................................................. 1
Background and Introduction ....................................................................................................................... 1
Session 1: Context Setting – Tetteh Hormeku, TWN-Africa ......................................................................... 1
Session 2: Global Trade and the WTO Agenda Post-Nairobi – Ambassador Nathan Irumba, SEATINI and
Aileen Kwa, South Centre ............................................................................................................................. 3
Session 3: Free Trade Agreements – Dr. Alioune Niang, ENDA CACID and Sylvester Bagooro, TWN-Africa 7
Session 4: Agriculture and Industry – Deborah James, OWINFS and Tetteh Hormeku, TWN-Africa ......... 12
Session 5: Services Regulation and Finance – Marc Maes, Trade Policy Officer, 11.11.11 Belgium .......... 16
Day 2 ........................................................................................................................................................... 18
Session 6: Investment Issues and Framework Agreements – Deborah James, OWINFS and Kabinet Cisse,
CECIDE ......................................................................................................................................................... 18
Session 7: UNCTAD 14 and Emerging Issues – Alvin Mosiomo, TJN-Africa and Gyekye Tanoh, TWN-Africa
.................................................................................................................................................................... 24
SESSION 8: Economic Interests and (In) Balances of Power – Baba Aye, UAD and Malcom Damon, EJN.. 27
Session 9: Plenary/Reporting Back ............................................................................................................. 29
LIST OF PARTICIPANTS ................................................................................................................................ 36
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DAY 1
Background and Introduction
The Africa Trade Policy Centre (ATPC) of the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa
(UNECA) and Third World Network-Africa (TWN-Africa) jointly convened a 4-day colloquium on
Africa’s Continental Free Trade Area (CFTA) in Accra from February 29 to March 3, 2016. The
meeting was held in two different segments. The first segment provided a platform for a
dialogue between CSOs and leading policy makers and institutions working on trade and
development in Africa. It aimed to deepen understanding of, and engagement around, the
fundamental imperatives of the CFTA and assessment in the context of outcomes from the
Tenth Ministerial Conference of the WTO held in Nairobi and developments in Regional Free
Trade Agreements like the Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs).
The second segment, which was held from March 2-3, 2016, centred on African CSOs strategy
on advocacy around Africa’s trade and development strategies. The meeting brought together
trade and development activists such as trade unions, faith based organisations, development
think tanks and gender-based groups across Africa and beyond under the aegis of Africa Trade
Network (ATN) to review
i)
strategic issues in relation to trade and Africa’s development; and
ii)
discuss how CSO advocacy could be repositioned and enhanced in response to the
evolving trade policy landscape and its associated challenges.
This report covers only the second segment.
Session 1: Context Setting – Tetteh Hormeku, TWN-Africa
Setting the context for the 2-day discussions, Mr. Tetteh Hormeku expressed concern about the
inability of advocacy organizations in Africa to chart a united front despite the opening up of
more spaces for engagement on the continent. He explained that the purpose of the second
part of the Colloquium was to revisit and reformulate the issues in order to help upgrade the
knowledge of CSOs involved in advocacy work around trade issues. The essence of the
discussions, he explained, was thus to help build the capacity of, and foster a sense of unity
among, African CSOs in teasing out some strategic issues around which to re-fashion their
advocacy engagement efforts.
He noted that the December 2015 WTO Ministerial Conference held in Nairobi presented a
unique opportunity for Africa because it was the first time such an event was held on the
continent. Yet, as he observed, the Nairobi Conference only turned out to be a missed
opportunity because CSOs attended the Conference least prepared; they went to Nairobi
without a common position, and thereby attracted very little visibility. Mr. Hormeku contrasted
this experience with earlier WTO conferences, particularly the Seattle meeting when African
CSOs played a significant role in setting the agenda for discussions.
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Mr. Hormeku added, however, that the seeming relapse in civil society advocacy on trade
issues is not unique to Africa. Buttressing this assertion, he cited the example of Our World is
Not for Sale (OWINFS), a once highly potent, powerful and visible NGO in shaping the agenda
on the trade debate, but which has become much less active in recent years. The need to relaunch more vigorous advocacy efforts, he stated, is thus relevant not only for CSOs in Africa,
but also for organizations in other parts of the globe as well.
Mr. Hormeku explained this apparent decline in advocacy on trade issues in terms of the
evolution of the WTO agenda. He explained that CSO campaigns against the international trade
regime started when civic organizations had just emerged from a vigorous campaign against the
structural adjustment programmes (SAPs). The lessons of SAPs, he posited, enabled the
mobilization of broad-based constituencies in resisting the WTO agenda. This was because the
trade reforms championed within the framework of the WTO were generally seen as an indirect
way of perpetrating the same unfair, northern-driven trade liberalization reforms that had
begun to wreak havoc on the productive capacities of African economies. Mr. Hormeku noted
that CSO advocacy at the time was relatively more successful because the bigger powers were
unable to carry through most of their plans through the WTO agenda.
However, he noted that as the negotiations proceeded, they became locked around specific
technical issues which CSOs were unable to link up to broader constituencies. For example, in
the period leading to the Nairobi Ministerial Conference, one of the main issues in contention
was food security, but the discussions were generally couched in some technical language
around ‘public stockholding’, among others. Such technicalities made it difficult for CSOs to
clearly understand the issues and consequently translate them into their broader agenda for
advocacy.
Again, in the EPA, the difficulty in building a united front, he argued, was as the result of the
fragmented nature of the negotiations. He explained that CSOs were fragmented because the
negotiations were held on regional and country basis, curtailing the ability of civil society and
African governments to mobilize broad-based constituencies across the region. Moreover, the
emergence of new global challenges (e.g. the global financial crises, climate change etc.), has
meant that organizations involved in these specific global development issues shifted their
attention away from wider trade issues. This, he explained, has further contributed to the
fragmentation of CSOs in ways that have in turn undermined broad-based advocacy
engagements on newer/emerging trade-related issues.
Relating these developments to the current state of CSO advocacy, Mr. Hormeku indicated that
CSOs have lost the momentum they managed to gather during the SAPs era. The key challenge
to be confronted, therefore, he suggested, is to begin to build the broad canvas again and
channel that into the current debates around the EPA debates. As part of efforts to understand
the issues and establish a coherent front, he reckoned that the Colloquium on the CFTA offers a
good opportunity to ask how the continent’s own initiative and integration sits vis-à-vis the
global agreements that African governments have signed unto.
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Summarizing his remarks, Mr. Hormeku indicated that the purpose of the day’s sessions was
mainly to explore how the issues that affect Africa’s productive capacities could be queried and
repackaged in terms of new narratives in order to make them more relevant for the continent’s
development agenda. The session was also meant to think through
(i) possible strategies for addressing specific challenges that undermine Africa’s ability in taking
advantage of the current global trade regime; and
(ii) the reformulation of the key issues that could help draw the support/interests of various key
stakeholders.
Session 2: Global Trade and the WTO Agenda Post-Nairobi –
Ambassador Nathan Irumba, SEATINI and Aileen Kwa, South
Centre
In his opening remarks, the chair for this session, Mr. Fredrick Njehu of the Kenya Human Rights
Commission (KHRC), expressed delight that the colloquium presented a good opportunity for
CSOs in Africa to learn from their past failures and experiences in order to re-strategize their
engagements with future multi-lateral negotiations. He indicated that the session would draw
heavily on the experiences of two very versatile speakers who have followed the global value
chain discussion for quite some time, namely Ambassador Nathan Irumba and Ms. Aileen Kwa.
Respectively, these personalities are Uganda’s former Ambassador to the United Nations Office,
World Trade Organization, and presently Chief Executive Director of SEATINI, and Coordinator of
the South Centre Trade Programme.
Summarizing his opening remarks, Mr. Njehu entreated these two speakers to help deepen
participants’ understanding of the global trade regime, examine the key issues discussed in the
Nairobi meeting, explore what is to be anticipated after the Nairobi Ministerial Declaration, and
make proposals as to how Africa and other developing countries could make greater impact in
subsequent multi-lateral negotiations.
Ambassador Nathan Irumba started his presentation by first outlining some of the core
functions of the WTO, namely to: (i) see to the implementation of WTO agreements; (ii) act as a
forum for discussion and administer dispute settlements on trade issues; and (iii) ensure
transparency in the international trading system. He observed, however, that the fate of the
WTO has, for a long time now, been linked more strongly to the Doha Round. This, he noted,
has tended to crowd out the other functions of the Organization. Ambassador Irumba implored
CSOs and other stakeholders in Africa to remain conscious of the fact that the Doha round was
an EU initiative meant to serve European interest and not that of Africa.
He argued that even though it was in the best interest of Africa to have reviewed the Doha
Round before signing unto it, African representatives were somewhat stampeded into signing
on to the agreement before they could have any real opportunity to review it. He described the
Doha Round as ‘a roller coaster characterized by near-breakthroughs and near-breakdowns.’
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He indicated that based on Africa’s bad experience with the SAP reforms, one major concern
raised by Africa was its opposition to the issue of industrial tariffs. African countries were
somewhat assured that issues of agriculture would be addressed genuinely and that the
agreement was to be centered around development, although the very opposite happened.
Also it was understood that agricultural products would benefit from some differential
treatment and this convinced African countries to sign on to the round. He submitted further
that since 2008, there has been a strategic deadlock around discussions on industrial tariffs.
Importantly, whereas advanced development countries have virtually refused to allow the
developing world to support the development of their agricultural sectors, they continue to
demand radical cuts in industrial tariffs. Ambassador Irumba emphasized, therefore, that
within the WTO the so-called talks about inclusive trade have been nothing more than mere
rhetoric. According to Ambassador Irumba, it is ironical that trade facilitation which was
accepted as a mere compromise is beginning to feature so prominently in agreements, as was
evidenced in the Nairobi conference.
Ambassador Irumba explained the growing phenomenon of ‘mega regionals’ in terms of the
emergence of China, India and Brazil as major world powers, and the threat this poses to the
hegemonic dominance of advanced developed countries. In particular, he argued that these
mega regionals epitomize the will and determination of the EU and the US to play more leading
roles in securing a decisive say in the rules applicable to trade and investment in the 21st
Century.
Summarizing his narrative, Ambassador Irumba suggested that as the post-Nairobi discussions
draw near, it is important to revisit Africa’s motivation for joining the Doha Round, namely the
belief that the region’s participation would help address its development challenges. He noted
that the argument that greater integration into global value chains (GVC) lead to more
investment, increased trade and structural transformation can be misleading, emphasizing
further that for developing countries in particular, GVCs often offer very few opportunities for
economic upgrading. He called on developing countries to stand together in order to mobilize
the requisite support to fight for their interests, adding that only through such mobilizations
will the developing world be accorded the seriousness it requires at the negotiation table.
Presentation II: Outcome of MC10 of WTO and Way Forward for Developing Countries - Ms
Aileen Kwa, Coordinator of the South Centre’s Trade Programme
Ms Aileen Kwa’s presentation on the above topic sought to examine the key issues discussed
during the Nairobi Conference, and then present some possible options that should engage the
attention of NGOs in their subsequent advocacy work. She started by highlighting the need to
recognize that the DDA has not yet been concluded, explaining further that the consensus
required to conclude the DDA discussions was not reached during the Nairobi Conference. To
enhance participants’ understanding of the disagreements that still characterize the DDA, she
quoted Paragraph 30 of the Ministerial Declaration as follows:
‘We recognize that many Members reaffirm the Doha Development Agenda, and the
Declarations and Decisions adopted at the Doha Ministerial Conferences held since then,
and reaffirm their full commitment to conclude the DDA on that basis. Other Members
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do not reaffirm the Doha mandates, as they believe new approaches are necessary to
achieve meaningful outcomes in multilateral negotiations. Members have different
views on how to address the negotiations. We acknowledge the strong legal structure of
this Organization’.
Citing paragraph 31 of the Nairobi Ministerial Declaration, she explained further that there was
still a commitment to advance negotiations on the remaining Doha issues. She added, however,
that this same paragraph reflected the disappointment of developing countries in respect of the
draft declaration which was in any case handed to them barely on hour to the end of the
conference.
This disappointment stemmed mainly from the fact that the interest of developing countries
was not so much about whether the Doha issues should remain on the table for discussions, but
more importantly whether those issues were to be discussed within the framework of the
broader DDA architecture. Thus, developing countries were suspicious that the mere reference
to Doha issues without a consideration of wider matters within the DDA architecture could
deny them some opportunities. To this extent, the question remains as to how exactly to go
about the DDA issues. Ms. Kwa added however, that it is within the legal mandate of
developing countries to argue that the Doha Issues remain pending since there has not been
consensus about their conclusion in line WTO rules.
On the ‘New Issues’ raised by developed countries, Ms. Kwa argued that it is a mistaken belief
to think that the Nairobi Ministerial Conference resulted in a decision to begin discussions
around these issues. Explaining this further, she made reference to Paragraph 34 of the Doha
Ministerial Declaration which highlights the disagreements among members regarding the need
to identify and discuss new emerging issues. For Ms Kwa, such disagreements make any talk
about a consideration of new issues illegal, not least as WTO rules require that consensus be
reached among member states before such new issues can be brought up for discussion. On
the way forward, she highlighted three possible options around which CSO advocacy could
revolve:
i.
ii.
iii.
First, civil society could focus on pushing against further expansion of WTO rules
Second, they could insist that the on-going negotiations be considered as part of the
DDA mandate, while taking steps to reject all the new emerging issues ‘from
Singapore’;
The third, more radical option is to reject both the DDA architecture and the emerging
new issues
She then went on to ask what developing countries want from these negotiations, whether
they could actually get what they want from the Doha Round, and what price developing
countries might have to pay in order to realize what they want. She outlined some of the
demands made by developing countries as follows:
 Agriculture reform (domestic support and public stockholding): She explained that
public stockholding has been put on a different track; and, so it can be achieved even
without the DDA.
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 Cotton: Here, contrary to popular assumptions (especially by the US), that the significant
challenges were in relation to financing, export competition and market access, she
argued that what was actually needed to address the structural challenges faced by the
cotton industries of developing countries was the issue of domestic support
 Special and differential treatment: she explained that there are already some provisions
that are important for industrialization (e.g. TRIMS)
 LDC issues (duty free and quota free, and rules of origin).: Here, she expressed some
pessimism about the possibility of developing countries meeting most of their demands
With regard to those that African countries do not want, the following were mentioned:
 Agricultural liberalization of tariffs: She noted that African countries did not regard this
as a major issue. Notwithstanding, she submitted that since it is an issue of policy space,
there is a need to protect the agricultural sector, hence the need to consider the
liberalization of agricultural tariffs more seriously
 Non-Agricultural Market Products (NAMA): This relates to the reduction of tariffs in
industrial products
 Services: On this, Ms Kwa explained that countries are at liberty to decide whether to
liberalize their services sectors or not as far as the DDA framework is concerned.
Relating the discussion to what Africa wants to achieve through the CFTA, she presumed that it
may be best for CSOs on the continent to reject the new issues altogether. Ms. Kwa also
pointed to the dangers of investment agreements, explaining that such agreements are often
meant to protect foreign investors by among others making it difficult to impose performance
requirements on investors. On the new issue of e-commerce, she indicated that there is a work
programme which was developed at the Geneva Ministerial in 1998. She noted that even
though there are no negotiations in the work programme, the developed countries have
already put in proposals in different WTO negotiating committees to push strongly for it. She
also said that there is also an e-commerce chapter in the Transpacific Partnership (TPP)
apparently with the objective of creating one digital international market place.
Reverting to the ‘New Issues’, she called on developing countries to watch out on the proposed
rules around Micro and Small and Medium Enterprises (MSMEs). She described the MSMEs
idea as a problematic agenda, indicating that this represents one main channel through which
advocates of the new issues hope to realize their aim. She also stated that in the Director
General’s report to the General Council, there was a call for more regular involvement of
ministers and the private sector. She hinted that this call was premised on the fact that the
ambassadors in Geneva were rather uncompromising in their positions. The involvement of
ministers and the private sector was therefore envisaged to bring some flexibility to bear on the
discussions and negotiations in the interest of the developed countries.
Discussions, Comments and Questions
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Kick-starting the discussions on this session, one participant provided a different perspective to
the questions posed earlier by Ms. Aileen Kwa, namely what developing countries wants from
the DDA, how to get them, the potential price that might have to be paid in the process, and
whether that price is worth paying. He suggested that in assessing the costs and benefits
associated with the demands put forward by African countries, it was important to bear in mind
the nature of negotiation dynamics at play. He made this point with specific reference to the
situation when some concessions made to African countries in the past only turned out to be
deceitful. He thus implored participants to be weary of the tendency of developed countries to
go to the bargaining table with unfeasible promises in exchange for their own demands.
One participant wondered whether there is any room for maneuver within the WTO in ways
that will lead to better trade reforms in the interest of Africa. He expressed this pessimism
against the backdrop of the divergent views expressed on the relevance of the WTO during the
recent Nairobi meeting when many argued that the Organization no longer served any
meaningful purpose. Related to this, others expressed concern that the WTO seems to be
creating more room for the continuous exploitation of developing countries (especially Africa)
by the West. For such participants, it may well be better for African countries to abandon all
WTO negotiations altogether, and begin to explore ways through which the interests of the
continent could be served by internal platforms like the CFTA
Responding to some of the issues raised by participants, Ambassador Irumba noted that a
major challenge for Africa is the lack of a clear development vision. As an example, he cited the
case of the growing talks about the structural transformation of African economies, even
though the strategies for attaining such transformation remain unclear to many African leaders.
On her part, Ms Aileen Kwa reminded participants that developing countries had already
submitted some demands as part of the DDA, and went on to caution against bringing those
demands into discussions on the new issues; doing so will mean that they may have to fight the
mandate from scratch. Ms. Kwa also called on civil society and African delegations to consider
some key issues in their engagement with the campaigns around the new issues in the WTO
agenda. She noted that important questions to answer are whether the specific issue in
contention border on multilateral trade relations as required by Article 3.2 of the Marrakesh
Agreement, and if so, whether the issue will be mutually advantageous.
Session 3: Free Trade Agreements – Dr. Alioune Niang, ENDA
CACID and Sylvester Bagooro, TWN-Africa
Presentation I: Economic Partnership Agreements – Dr. Alioune Niang of ENDA CACID –
Senegal.
In this presentation, Dr. Alioune Niang sought to explore the relationship between trade
agreements and the specific development challenges facing African countries; and then
highlight some incoherence in the EPAs and other continental free trade agreements. Dr. Niang
started by drawing attention to the limited communication around the EPAs in Africa, and
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bemoaned the fact that many advocacy organizations on the continent had to rely on the EU’s
website for information.
The EPAs, he explained, are presently at different stages of completion across the various subregional groups on the continent. He updated participants on the state of these agreements
across the various sub-regional groups as follows:
 West Africa/ECOWAS sub-region: Processes of collecting signatures are ongoing. Two
member states, namely Nigeria and The Gambia, are yet to append their signatures.
 Central Africa/CEMAC: Here, only Cameroun has so far signed an interim EPA, although
European and Central African negotiators have had discussions at technical levels on
market access, services, cultural cooperation and accompanying measures. Progress has
also been made on the text of the agreement, but the situation in the Central African
Republic has made it difficult for negotiations to proceed.
 East Africa/ EAC: Here, the EPA is now being translated and prepared for signature and
ratification
 Southern Africa/SADC: the agreement has already been translated and awaiting
signatures and ratification.
 Eastern and Southern Africa/ESA: Mozambique, Seychelles, Zimbabwe and Madagascar
signed an interim EPA (iEPA) in 2009 which was consented to by the European
Parliament on 17th January, 2013.
The second part of Dr. Niang’s presentation was on the relationship between the commercial
trade agreements and the challenges of ensuring coherence. He argued that the major
challenge facing the African continent is to ensure vertical and horizontal coherence among the
various agreements of which it is part. He defined vertical coherence as the normative
coherence where there is a transposition of agreements, and expressed concern that most
African countries remain unclear of the relative weight of the various agreements of which they
are signatories. One example relates to the question of whether the EPAs are above the various
continental or bilateral trade agreements to which African governments have signed. Within
the context of the common external tariffs negotiation within ECOWAS, he indicated further
that there are custom duties that are supposed to be binding on some member states but
which are not in accordance with the customs duties they have agreed on with the WTO.
With regard to horizontal forms of incoherencies, Dr. Niang drew attention to the challenge of
ensuring consistencies in sectorial policies. For example, in West Africa, customs duties on rice
under the common external tariffs are fixed at 10% whereas in relation to agriculture in
general, imports are supposed to be reduced in order to reach self-sufficiency in food
production. This, he noted, draws attention to some forms of clear incoherence between
agricultural and trade policies. He further identified incoherencies between the EPAs and the
CFTAs. In his view, whilst the EPA represented the EU’s trade policy instrument in Africa, the
CFTA reflects the interests and ambitions of the continent. He intimated that the objective of
the EPA is to create a discriminatory trade environment by, among other things, satisfying the
exemption clauses in most favoured nations’ status provisions. These apparent differences
between the two agreements, he argued, explain the incoherencies between them.
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Highlighting the discrepancies between the objectives of the EPA and the CFTA, Dr. Niang noted
that whereas a free trade regime implies the free movement of goods and persons, the EU
(through the EPAs) are only interested in the free movements of goods only. He also identified
fundamental differences in strategy in terms of negotiations for the EPA and the CFTA. He
explained that for the EPA, the EU has a strategy of fragmenting the continent, emphasizing
sub-regional blocs and pluralism of regimes in Africa. He observed that the EU had infringed on
some basic principles with respect to the EPAs. His argument was based on the fact that the
parties to the EPA were the EU and ECOWAS, and yet West African countries were approached
individually to ratify the agreement. He therefore wondered why African countries have been
so inconsistent in their dealings in refusing certain conditions under the WTO whilst accepting
same under the EPA. Additionally, he identified an important point that has implications on the
CFTA, namely the elimination of customs duties. He explained that a large number of African
countries depend on customs duties to fund their development and infrastructure.
Supporting a widely held view among most participants in the programme, Dr. Niang intimated
that UNCTAD remains the lone voice of Africa, suggesting the need for African CSOs to explore
possible partnerships with this UN body. He submitted that whilst it was acknowledged that
trade relationships under the EPA ought to be based on reciprocity, he conceded that the
expectation of reciprocity remains outstanding because African countries have made several
unsuccessful attempts in that regard. He concluded that the EPAs are unlikely to help Africa’s
development agenda, and suggested that the continent would thrive much better under
continental free trade agreements.
Presentation II: Mega Regionals and Africa – Mr. Sylvester Bagooro, Third World NetworkAfrica
In this presentation, Mr. Sylvester Bagooro underscored the need for both CSOs and African
governments to remain conscious of the various potential threats that confront the continent in
its various trade agreements. He indicated that the African continent is increasingly being
confronted with various mega regional free trade agreements, among which are the
Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) and the Trans Pacific Partnerships (TPP).
The implications of these agreements for Africa, he explained, have not been sufficiently
interrogated in terms of their impact on the continent’s development goals.
Mr. Bagooro explained the emergence of these mega regionals in terms of the dwindling
relevance of the multilateral trade system, and highlighted three key factors that in turn
account for the growing insignificance of the multilateral system:
 First is the re-configuration of power within the multilateral trade structure, especially
the rise of the BRICS and the increasing importance of China within the global trade
regime;
 Second, this shift has played a role in strengthening the resistance and enhancing the
bargaining powers of developing countries;
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 Third is the increasing reliance on paralleled track trade strategies by big powers
expressed in agreements like the FTAs and MTS. This is an attempt to reintroduce some
of the Singapore issues and those that caused the collapse of the Cancun Ministerial.
Mr. Bagooro posited that the rise of the BRICS in particular was a devastating assault on the
dominance of developed countries in trade negotiations. The developed world is thus searching
for alternative instruments that could better serve their interests. This, he argued, explains the
proliferation of regional free trade agreements such as the EU-South Korea FTAs, EU-ACP and
the EPAs, as well as the EU’s more aggressive approach to the issue of export taxes.
He further identified another more important development which related to the threat of
fragmentation within and among South-South blocs. He pointed out that Africa is the most
endangered region in this fragmentation since emerging countries are also pursuing strategies
aimed at securing access to raw materials in resource-rich developing countries. He explained
that the apparent desperation of the EU in its efforts to control the presence of China in Africa
has led to the intensification of the Union’s so-called ‘Raw Material Initiative’. Importantly, the
EU’s approach of engaging countries individually (rather than the region as one single unit)
through its new raw material strategy has made it increasingly difficult for Africa to adopt a
coherent strategy in its dealings with the Union.
Broadening the discussion, Mr. Bagooro noted that the threats generated by these
fragmentations have been further exacerbated by the rise of mega regionals. Whilst noting that
the increasing prominence of the mega-regionals are indicative of the growing frustration of the
developed world, he added that trade policy makers and trade justice campaigners have reacted
to these mega regionals in ways that will exert pre-eminent norm-setting influence on
international trade frameworks. He argued that the unequal power relations that characterise
the international trade landscape means that these new developments may further erode the
already vulnerable positions of relatively powerless regions (particularly Africa) in their dealings
with the EU and US.
Mr. Bagooro also offered some highlights on the scope of the mega regionals, noting that they
were essentially related to rules around investments, intellectual property rights, services, and
disputes between foreign investors and national governments. He explained that the TTIP for
instance has a rather sweeping chapter that extended the ability of multilaterals to challenge
investment policies related to health and environment. Equally relevant, he emphasised, is the
provision for an investor-state dispute mechanism which allows multinational corporations to
sue a state if a new regulation threatens their expected profit margins. This notwithstanding, he
noted that disagreements remain as to the overall implications of the mega-regionals for Africa’s
development prospects. While for some, they represented an unprecedented opportunity for
both weak and strong countries to negotiate and benefit from international trade, others insist
that the extension of trade liberalization and deregulation through these mega regionals would
lead to loosening the grips of developing countries in safeguarding labour rights, providing
environmental safeguards, and protecting the public interest, among others. From this
pessimistic perspective, weak regions such as Africa are likely to face further threats from
international trade agreements.
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Mr. Bagooro also pointed to some critical missing links in current discussions around the megaregionals. These included:
i.
ii.
iii.
a comprehensive analysis of the actual content of these mega regionals and its
direct and indirect implications for Africa;
the presence of other competing frameworks including those that pertain to geopolitical and international political economy issues. Here, he wondered why an
emerging and highly important force like China was not part of the TPP.
a disregard for the changing and unfolding global economic context.
In view of these missing links in current discussions around the mega regionals, Mr. Bagooro
reckoned that Africa remains in an unknown terrain, and therefore requires innovative and
unified responses to what he termed the ‘fragmentation and paralysis of development goals’.
Mr. Bagooro concluded that home grown frameworks like CFTA and its associated trade &
development priorities and policies can begin to influence important re-orientations in the
interest of the continent.
Discussions, Comments and Questions
Commenting on the presentations, a participant pointed out that although there is a
widespread belief that the mega regionals were new developments in trade, a critical analysis
would reveal that there is rarely anything new about them. He contended that except for its
faster, harder and more radical approach, there was virtually nothing in the TTIP for example
that did not already exist in other free trade agreements. He indicated that the TTIP may well
be a big leap in the wrong direction. This participant further offered some explanation
regarding the EU’s disproportionate interest in the PPIP despite it being already part of some
transpacific agreements.
He pointed out that until now most stakeholders were not concerned about European trade
agreements because the EU’s history of dictating the terms of such agreements and its
unwillingness in accepting proposed changes. However, with the emergence of the US, the EU
felt threatened because of proposals in the negotiations that emphasized regulatory
convergence. He noted that whilst this was new to the EU, and hence its apprehension, the
same cannot be said of Africa which has a long history of submitting to other similar mega trade
provisions. He cautioned African governments and CSOs from accepting the growing calls on
Africa by some organizations in the EU to increase its participation and visibility in the mega
deals. He recommended that instead of getting more involved in the mega deals, African
leaders must take their time to reposition the continent for better alternatives in the future.
Whilst lamenting the rather depressing circumstances of Africa in the EPA journey as portrayed
in Dr. Niang’s presentation, another participant expressed optimism that the continent could
overcome some of the identified challenges. He drew attention to the opportunity for Africa to
deepen state-civil society collaborations through the CFTA.
11
Others suggested the need to put in place appropriate strategies that would help minimize the
possible adverse effects on African countries should the EU proceed to carry through some of
its threats. On this issue, a participant wondered whether a regional solidarity fund could be
established to address the current issues involving Ghana and La Cote D’lvoire.
Session 4: Agriculture and Industry – Deborah James, OWINFS
and Tetteh Hormeku, TWN-Africa
Presentation I: Sustainable Development Goals and Trade Issues – Ms. Deborah James, Global
Coordinator, Our World is Not for Sale.
In this presentation, Ms. Deborah James aimed to analyze the Sustainable Development Goals
(SDGs) in relation to agriculture, identify some specific means of implementing these goals, and
then highlight some specific trade-related challenges that might serve as obstacles for achieving
the SDGs. She began by highlighting the agriculture-related SGDs that relate to ending hunger
and malnutrition, increasing productivity (e.g. through value chain creations), ensuring the
sustainability of agricultural production, and preserving biodiversity. On specific issues that
need to be addressed to help facilitate the implementation of these, she highlighted:




the need for increased investments;
correcting and preventing trade restrictions and distortions in world agricultural
markets;
adopting measures to ensure proper functioning of food commodities markets; and
the elimination of food price volatility.
She drew attention to the several hundred millions of food insecure people in Sub-Saharan
Africa, and argued that this problem cannot be solved by food imports alone. What is important
in addressing the problems of hunger and malnutrition in Africa, she argued, relates more
strongly increased domestic food production on a sustainable basis. She noted further that it
might be tempting to dismiss or underplay the role of trade in attaining the SDG targets of
increasing productivity and access to land and other productive resources on grounds that the
means to achieving these will depend on domestic policies (e.g. on access to credit) rather than
international trade. Ms. James argued however that trade has a huge role to play in these
processes for one important reason: developing countries do not always have the policy space
to invest the way they deem necessary in their agricultural sectors. She noted, for example,
that whilst developed countries continue to make huge investments in support of domestic
producers, developing countries are not allowed to provide substantial subsidies to farmers
under WTO rules. Ms. James also pointed to another trade-related problem that undermine the
agricultural sectors of developing countries; whereas tariffs on finished agricultural products
remain high, tariffs on unprocessed agricultural raw materials (obtained mainly from
developing countries) remain relatively lower. These dynamics, she pointed out, tend to limit
the benefits of value addition to developed countries.
12
Another trade-related issue that has to be addressed to help attain the SDGs on agriculture
relates to the equitable sharing of benefits arising from the utilization of genetic resources. She
noted that as many as 8 out of the 35 areas that currently qualify as bio-diversity hot spots in
the world are in Africa, suggesting that the continent has a rich traditional knowledge in this
regard. However, under the intellectual property rules in the WTO, there are many
transnational corporations that are getting access to traditional resources and benefitting
substantially from traditional knowledge without sharing the benefits of such knowledge with
indigenous communities. This problem has persisted because, as she explained, there are
presently no requirements in the TRIPs agreement that compel TNCs to engage in an equitable
sharing of benefits with indigenous communities.
With regard to the SDG on the proper functioning of the commodity market she submitted that
financialization and speculation in the commodity market will continue to lead to price
volatilities. On the way forward, Ms. James outlined the following policy issues that should be
pursued by trade justice campaigners so as to enhance prospects for achieving the agriculturalrelated SDGs:
 Countries should have the right to support the production of food consumed
domestically. Here, public stockholding for food security programmes must be
considered as part of the “green box”, not subject to limitations or reductions.
 Countries should not have the right to damage other countries’ market. In this regard,
export subsidies should be banned altogether. This includes subsidies that are
considered ‘domestic’ in nature, but which end up going into products that get
exported.
 Countries should have the right to protect their domestic markets from dumping by
other countries.
 Countries should be able to protect their domestic food markets including through the
use of tariffs. This means that where there are negotiations around tariff cuts,
developing countries should be exempted.
On his part, Mr. Tetteh Hormeku, who doubled as chair and discussant for this session,
explored the roles of trade and industrial policies within the context of the multilateral system.
Whiles adopting a historical approach, he noted that his main motivation was to help see how
trade policy could be re-imagined to help attain the ultimate objectives of the CFTA, namely the
diversification of African economies and the promotion of industrialization in the region. Mr.
Hormeku indicated that since the adoption of the SAP reforms, discussions on trade policies,
particularly within the WTO, have often focused on tariff policy with rarely any reference to
wider trade and industrial policies. This relatively narrow focus, he argues, explains why much
of recent trade policy debates within the WTO have been conducted around tariffs.
According to him, this narrower focus represents a major paradigm shift from the 1950s when
countries rarely talked of trade policies. He noted that from around the 1950s through to the
1980s, development debates in both developed and developing countries focused mainly on
industrial policies, with trade considered as just one little instrument of attaining
13
industrialization. The prominence given to trade policy today, he noted, was thus absent at the
time because trade was simply considered as one potential tool for the broader transformation
of societies.
However, with the shift towards structural adjustment and the increased prominence given to
markets, trade policy has come to occupy centre stage while discussions about tariff policies
have increasingly focused on the liberalization of markets. This one-way approach, he noted,
has been driven mainly by the (questionable) assumption that simply opening up markets
would result in greater opportunities for foreign direct investment that will in turn help
countries achieve their development goals. Consequently, almost all other instruments needed
to ensure the effective implementation of industrial policies have now been abolished. Mr.
Hormeku cited the example of performance requirements which countries have previously
used to effectively discipline foreign investors, but which are no more available to developing
countries.
Incidentally, the removal of these alternatives, more direct policy measures has meant that
tariff policy has now become the key, if not the only, instrument for protecting nascent
industries and boosting domestic economies. Mr. Hormeku argued, however, that since the
Doha round, developed countries have increasingly pressed for tariff cuts, denying developing
countries the opportunity of using tariff policies for boosting their domestic economies. Such
pressures on developing countries, he observed, have been carried over to other agreements
such as the EPAs and the mega regionals, with apparent adverse consequences for prospects
for industrialization. He indicated that for many African countries, the movement from
agriculture to manufacturing is an important transition that must be considered as an integral
part of the index of growth and diversification. Yet such a transition, he argued, cannot be left
entirely to the dictates market; governments will have to play important roles in these
processes.
Commenting on tariff policy negotiations under the Doha round, he noted that the ability of
developed countries to push for uniformity in tariffs has further played a major role in curtailing
the tariff policy space that developing countries used to enjoy. He cited the example of Ghana
which prior to Doha, was required to set its industrial tariffs ceiling of around 1.1 percent, but is
now compelled to liberalise 98 percent of its industrial tariffs under the Doha round of talks.
Before Doha, the cutting of tariff was based on across-the-board averages between developed
and developing countries, an approach that provided individual developing the freedom to set
their tariffs according to their own circumstances and interests. Under current WTO rules,
however, the freedom of individual countries to choose how to cut their tariffs has been
gradually replaced with a formula that harmonizes tariff rates across countries. This, Mr.
Hormeku argued, has had disproportionate adverse impact on developing countries where
tariff policies remain relatively more important in protecting infant industries.
Even worse, the EU has been pushing for as much as zero tariff for most of their imports
through the EPA. For Mr. Hormeku, this raises the important question of what the most
appropriate threshold for the CFTA should be. On this issue, he proposed the need for African
countries to utilize the CFTA as one of its instruments for re-containing tariff policy as part of
industrial policy, while making sure that the details and confines of that policy are appropriately
14
set out. He also called for a re-think of attitudes by African countries about tariff policies within
the WTO and consider a possible revision of existing agreements in ways that would be more
beneficial to the region.
Discussions, Comments and Questions
Discussions on this session were directed largely at the presentation made by Ms. Deborah
James. One participant sought clarifications on whether only those countries that are already
on the list of stockholding programmes could continue to pursue such policies until outstanding
issues are resolved in 2017, or whether there was still room for others to join the list of
stockholding countries. Responding to this, Ms. Deborah James noted that the Peace Clause of
the 2013 Bali Ministerial was clear that stockholding policies could be pursued only by countries
that already have existing programmes, a restriction, she noted, presents a major problem to
countries that want to scale up their food security programmes.
Another participant noted that although the pledge by African leaders to commit 10 percent of
their annual budgets to agriculture has now been called into question under WTO, there are
also legitimate basis to raise questions about the commitment of African governments
themselves to agriculture. He argued that the annual agriculture budgets of most African
governments have never reached the 10percent threshold, suggesting that weaknesses in
implementing the Maputo Declaration go well beyond the constraints imposed on African
governments by WTO rules. In her response, Ms. James explained that the WTO has nothing to
do with the implementation (or otherwise) of the Maputo Declaration, and that the 10%
commitment is a reflection of ongoing domestic pressures on African governments to increase
investments in agriculture in line with the objective of addressing food insecurity problems.
On this issue, Ms. Ailen Kwa stated that there seems to be some confusion between the 10% in
the national budget and the 10% in public stockholding within the WTO. She clarified that the
WTO does care about the proportion governments’ budgets allocated to agriculture. Instead,
WTO rules allow developing countries to subsidize up to 10% of the value of production in a
given year. This means that if a country’s value of production in rice is $1000 in a particular
year, then that country will have the right to give up to $100 of subsides.
One participant inquired whether Mr. Hormeku was advising CSOs to push African leaders to
freeze implementation of the current levels of tariffs agreed under the WTO rules, while at the
same time pushing for further lowering tariff rates among African countries within the
framework of the CFTA. Responding, Mr. Hormeku affirmed that African countries have little or
no choice than to promote trade among themselves, but that in general, he was advocating
something slightly more revolutionary than this participant suggested. He noted that both
because of WTO rules and Africa’s own experience under SAPs, many of the policy instruments
for promoting industrialization are no more available to African leaders. These developments,
he emphasized, necessarily suggest the need for a re-appreciation of the multi-facetted role
that tariffs can play in promoting trade and development on the continent.
15
Session 5: Services Regulation and Finance – Marc Maes, Trade
Policy Officer, 11.11.11 Belgium
Presenting on the above theme, Mr. Marc Maes exposed participants to how financial services
are dealt with in trade agreements, and the implications of this for the regulation/deregulation
of these services. He structured his presentation around six key trade frameworks, namely the
General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), the Doha Development Agenda (DDA), Free
Trade Agreements (FTA), Trade in Services Agreement (TISA), EU-Canada Comprehensive
Economic and Trade Agreements (CETA) and the Transatlantic Trade and Investment
Partnership (TTIP). He noted that as one of the treaties of the WTO, the GATS identifies four
modes of supplying services:
i.
ii.
iii.
iv.
The first entails the flow of services from the territory of one Member state into the
territory of another Member
The second entails the movement of a service consumer into another Member's
territory for the purpose of obtaining a given service;
The third mode involves a service supplier of one Member establishing a territorial
presence in another Member's territory to provide a service;
The fourth involves companies in a member state sending their staff to the territory of
another Member to supply a service
He noted that under the GATS, individual countries have the liberty to decide on which specific
services are to be granted market access. While hailing this approach to services liberalization,
Mr. Maes added that the GATS also left several important issues unaddressed, including the
question of how to deal with domestic regulations; rules on subsidies, government
procurement and safeguards; as well as modalities for special and differential preferences for
LDCs.
He further identified three ways in which financial services are dealt with under the GATS:
commitments on market access and national treatment, Annex on financial services, and
prudential carve out in financial services. He contended that the GATS were essentially geared
towards swift liberalization and increased competition, measures that do not necessarily
benefit developing countries. Mr. Maes further highlighted four main focus areas with regard to
services negotiations in the DDA: market access and national development; domestic
regulation; rules and LDC modalities (i.e. special treatment for least-developed countries).
He explained that the EU is now increasingly exploring new strategies for pushing through its
agenda because of its unsuccessful attempts in doing so via the DDA. This he indicated, is
especially evident in the EU’s efforts on the FTAs and their more radical version, namely the
TISA which made provisions for positive list on market access but is characterized by negative
national treatment provisions. He indicated that there were plans for a possible further
expansion of the TISA.
He explained further that although negotiations on the CETA were completed in 2014, CETA’s
approach entails a completely negative list for both market access and national investment. He
noted that the CETA contains regulations on investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS), and also
16
underscored its usefulness in according financial service investors the opportunity to enforce
discipline if they feel unfairly treated. He explained that a similar provision on ISDS will be made
in the TTIP, under which there would be a regulatory cooperation to address divergent services
rules.
Discussions, Comments and Questions
Setting the tone for the discussions, Mr. Gyekye Tanoh reminded participants about the real
world dynamics on finance and services and their ramifications for Africa. He stated that the
neo-liberal development paradigm, as expressed in trade and finance liberalization, has
become extremely distorted. Questioning the basis of the high premium often put on the
attraction of foreign investments in Africa, he highlighted how foreign firms have often taking
advantage of helpless countries, sucking away their resources like parasites. He argued that the
current economic base of Africa is hugely problematic not just because of historical
circumstances, but more importantly, because of the inequitable extension of multinational
dominance in trade, services and financial regimes. He underscored the primacy of having
domestic sector banks for investment, and devising a framework of financial policies that will
help curb destabilizing financial inflows in Africa. He wondered for instance, whether and how
the continent has positioned itself to respond to the proposals concerning the possibility of
having a stand-alone financial services agreement in the CFTA. One participant wanted to know
how claims concerning the decline in the regulatory role of states could be reconciled with the
decision of the US to bail out its banks during the financial crises.
Another participant asked whether a stand-alone financial services agreement under the CFTA
could be the solution to Africa’s financial problems. Responding to this, Mr. Mac Maes advised
against subscribing to a standalone financial services agreement, arguing that such a decision
would literally amount to surrendering the region’s policy space. He explained that Africa’s
participation in financial services agreement is not an inherently bad thing. For instance,
Africa’s entry into discussions on the financial services agreement could aim to help improve
access to credits for small-holder farmers. He explained further that rather than relying on big
banks, the best possible way of supporting agriculture is for governments to identify partners
who will not engage in selective operations mainly based on their profit motives. Securing the
requisite credit for small holder farmers, he added, might require substantial public support, as
with governments’ guarantees as a way of incentivizing potential investors.
With regard to the EPAs, Mr. Maes cautioned African governments against negotiating with the
EU on services. He explained that the EU is accustomed to imposing its demands on weaker
countries usually in the form of an already prepared template. He called on African countries to
keep their policy space and work with other countries and regions that have more favourable
alternative policies.
On his part, Mr. Gyekye Tanoh submitted that with regard to regulation, the state is becoming
increasingly more important in moderating the direction and effects of trade. He said that
although it may well be true that a stand-alone financial and services agreement in CFTA can be
problematic, there was a possibility to advance a genuinely transformative agenda around the
17
CFTA or financial principles about how banking and finance should be reformed. He disagreed
with participants who felt that the presentations had portrayed a rather gloomy picture for
Africa. Rather, he suggested that the challenge is to have a fuller understanding of the
contradictions and fault lines within existing financial trade agreements so as to be able to
harness the opportunities they present. He stated that in order for Africa to address existing
challenges in trade and also achieve substantial gains, it will be critical to, among other things,
fight for a more vigorous role for the state, and pursue a different financial and banking regime.
He concluded that, there is also the need for clarity in the understanding of trade issues,
commitment to trade advocacy and hard work in order to surmount the difficulties that Africa
faces within the global trade regime.
Day 2
Session 6: Investment Issues and Framework Agreements –
Deborah James, OWINFS and Kabinet Cisse, CECIDE
Opening the discussions on this session, Ambassador Nathan Irumba, in his capacity as the
session’s chair, highlighted the significance of private investments for Africa’s development
since independence. He noted that one issue that bordered many of the early postindependent African leaders was the question of whether foreign direct investments actually
served the interests of local populations. He made this point against the backdrop of emerging
concerns at the time that foreign transnational corporations (TNCs) were benefiting
disproportionately from the extraction of natural resources in Africa. He explained, for
example, that within the United Nations, emerging contestations between developing countries
and TNCs about the benefits of foreign investments led to proposals for the developing of a
code of conduct for TNCs under the UN system so as to ensure a balance of rights and
obligations between developing country member states and foreign companies. He noted,
however, that the pro-market orientations of the Reagan and Thatcher administrations
somewhat forced the UN to abandon such proposals. He expressed concerns that developing
country governments have historically been more preoccupied with measures aimed at
attracting foreign capital whiles apparently doing little to understand the impact of such
investments on national development.
Presentation I: Bringing Global Value Chains to the WTO? The Back Door for “New Issues” of
Developed Countries- Ms. Debora James, OWINFS and Director of International Programmes,
Center for Economic and Policy Research, Washington.
Following these remarks, the first formal presentation for session was made by Ms. Debora
James on the theme: ‘Bringing Global Value Chains to the WTO? The Back Door for “New
Issues” of Developed Countries’. Her presentation focused on discussions on global value chains
18
(GVCs) as a way of bringing in new issues into the WTO. As a starting point, she offered a
comprehensive definition of GVCs as a chain of locations where products are researched and
developed, designed, patented or copyrighted as well as materials sourced, manufactured,
finished, packaged, distributed, branded, marketed, and sold.
Ms James observed that recent years have witnessed intensified calls on developing countries
to increase their participation in GVCs on grounds that this would help them to import cheaply
and export more competitively. She identified the OECD, WTO, and the World Bank as the lead
advocates of this call. She cautioned that for African countries, the main question of
importance should not be about how to get more integrated into GVCs, but rather whether
and how participating in such value chains will impact critical development concerns on the
continent. She argued that countries engaged in GVCs often benefit in unequal ways,
suggesting that what matters is not integration per se but more importantly by the manner in
which countries are integrated and the implications of this for national development objectives.
Ms James therefore emphasized the need for Africa and other developing countries to go
beyond merely exploring ways of integrating more deeply into GVCs to addressing specific
questions as to whether and how greater integration would help address their specific
development challenges. In particular, she emphasized the need for African governments to
address a number of specific questions in their quest to getting more integrated into GVCs:
i.
ii.
iii.
iv.
Does/will integration into the GVCs help address the weak productive capacities of
Africa within the broader global economy?
Does it help advance the goals of structural transformation and regional integration
within the continent?
Will greater integration result in the creation of decent jobs and thereby help address
the unemployment problem in the region?
Will integration into GVCs help strengthen SMEs and help address the challenge of food
insecurity?
Whilst recognizing the significance of the investment opportunities offered by multinational
enterprises, she emphasized that there is little evidence that attracting greater investments
from MNCs necessarily contribute to boosting a country’s domestic productive capacity.
Instead, and in cases where the activities of multinational companies focus mainly on the
extraction of natural resources and the exploitation of cheap labour, the impact of greater
integration into GVCs, she argued, could well be counterproductive. With regard to regional
integration, she said African countries are already more integrated in global trade whereas
intra-regional trade on that continent is relatively low compared to other regions. She therefore
wondered how further integration into GVCs could help strengthen regional trade. In the case
of the creation of decent jobs and the promotion of SMEs, Ms. James stated that although
investments by multinational corporations can present opportunities for backward and forward
19
linkages, such opportunities were rarely ever guaranteed. As business entities, multinational
enterprises, she explained, are motivated primarily by the availability of cheap labour and
natural resources and so it is difficult to expect multinational investments to lead to guaranteed
high quality/decent employment. On food security she added that since GVCs are mostly
geared towards exports, they are unlikely to strengthen domestic capacity and food production
for domestic consumption.
In view of all these, Ms. James argued for a rethink of the issues being discussed around the
GVCs in ways that would be beneficial to Africa and other developing countries. On the
question of the specific policies that could be pursued to facilitate the ability of African
countries to position themselves in ways that would allow them to drive greater benefits from
their integration within the global trade regime, Ms. James emphasized the need to pay
particular attention to the following:










Education and skill development
Technological innovation
The provision of adequate infrastructure
Development of domestic financial services
Market intelligence
Local content requirements
Domestic linkages through joint ventures and presence of domestic firms
Developing skills linked to manufacturing
Strengthening the domestic private sector, and
Strong domestic institutions and regulations
She explained further that the reason why Japan, Korea, and Taiwan attained higher benefits
from their integration to GVCs compared to countries like Malaysia, Philippines and Thailand
was precisely because of the active role of the state in the former countries. Here, the state
actively adopted a series of policy interventions that ensured that their domestic private
sectors benefitted in terms of upgrading, reinvestments, and technological spillovers.
For Ms. James, therefore, developing countries that seek to maximize the benefits of
integration should draw inspiration from the experiences of Japan, Korea, and Taiwan by
vigorously pursuing the right mix of policies that will enable them to boost their domestic
productive capacities. She expressed concern that these issues rarely attract sufficient attention
in discussions within the WTO, and argued further that the growing calls on developing
countries to increase their participation in GVC should be understood as part of the wider cost
reduction strategies of multinational corporations (e.g. easy access to raw materials and cheap
labour), rather than genuine efforts aimed at redressing the development challenges of poor
countries.
20
She noted further that although often framed as a way of providing more investment
opportunities for developing countries, the increasing discussions about developing countries’
participation in GVCs are primarily aimed at introducing new issues within the WTO that would
help facilitate the operation of Transnational Corporations. Some of these issues of interest to
the developed world, she revealed, are directly related to the so-called ‘Singapore Issues’ (such
as policies around competition and government procurement) as well as policies around ecommerce, export taxes, sectoral liberalization and intellectual property rules. Expanding on
her argument, she explained that the United States championed the advocacy for suspending
the Doha round with the hope that this will provide an opportunity for exploring the possibility
of re-introducing the new issues that emerged in the Singapore conference into the WTO
agenda.
While recognizing the potentially progressive role that competition policy could play in a
country’s development process, she insisted that the one-size-fits-all strategy advocated by
developed countries is problematic given the significant variations in technological and financial
capabilities of firms in the developed and developing worlds. With regard to government
procurement, she observed that the current proposals would provide significant opportunities
for developed country firms in developing countries whereas the same opportunities would not
be available for developing countries. On the issue of e-commerce, she intimated that there
had been a deliberate attempt at proscribing favourable practices which constitute the very
policies that could help developing countries to gain benefits from their participation in GVCs.
She raised similar concerns in relation to issues about sectoral goods liberalization, services,
and intellectual property rules. Overall, then, she recommended that it would be in the interest
of developing countries to keep the Doha talks alive.
Presentation II: Investment Liberalization in Africa: the Case of the Extractive Sector – Mr.
Kabinet Cisse, Executive Director of CECIDE, Guinea
The second presentation in this session was delivered by Mr. Kabinet Cisse, Executive Director
of CECIDE, Guinea. His presentation sought to address questions formulated around the nature
of foreign investment in Africa, the liberalization of the investment climate and its associated
advantages and disadvantages, as well as the reasons behind the concentration of foreign
investment in Africa’s mining sectors.
Mr. Cisse observed that the perception of investment in the development of countries has
undergone significant changes since the 1960s. He explained that although African
governments, for various socio-political reasons, were generally suspicious of foreign
investments during the early post-colonial period, this suspicion did not last for long as the
quest for socio-economic transformation soon put pressures on national governments to begin
to explore ways of attracting international investments. These pressures, he noted, are evident
in the decision to review the mining and investment codes of many African countries,
apparently in their bid to attracting potential foreign investors. He argued that the incentives
generated by the new mining codes not only attracted multinationals, but also increased the
influence of these companies in shaping political processes in the region. One case in point, he
suggested, is the example of the Democratic Republic of Congo where the sustainability of
21
peace efforts at some point in time, depended heavily on the interests and decisions made by
multinational corporations operating there.
Exploring Africa’s position in attracting global investments, Mr. Cisse cited UNCTAD’s data to
show that the continent’s share of global investment remains abysmal, purged between 2.8%
and 4.8%. He observed that even though the continent had witnessed rapid growth in the last
couple of years, Africa’s share of foreign direct investments remain disproportionately
insignificant, with much of these investments concentrated largely in the extractive sector,
particularly mining. This, he noted, has had some adverse implications not only in relation to
environmental degradation but also in terms of agricultural production and productivity. In
relation to this, Mr. Cisse indicated that a few years ago about 7% of Guinea’s land was under
mining concession in ways that undermined agricultural activities. He reckoned that African
economies have been much less attractive to other forms of foreign investments due mainly to
poor infrastructure. He also mentioned weak corporate and general governance with regard to
mining policy framework as a challenge.
Commenting on the apparent concentration of investment in the mining sector, he said that
there is a belief that there is a strong correlation between the availability of natural resources
and industrialization in any given country. He explained that countries with natural resources
may want to harness their competitive advantage by developing that sector. Mr. Cisse also
noted that the withdrawal of some Western countries had also paved the way for emerging
countries to increase their visibility in the extractive sectors of African economies.
He further explained the significance of investment in the extractive sector, noting that the
BRICS countries have sent clear indications that they can play a role in shaping global
governance. Referring to a study by Ernst and Young, he said that out of 115 enterprise leaders
sampled, about 86% indicated that Africa was a better destination for doing business. Using
Guinea as an example, he explained that the impact of investment in the extractive sector has
been impressive. He pointed out that growth in GDP in Guinea improved continually whilst
value addition and exports have also seen visible improvements. Expanding on the impact of
investments in the continent, Mr. Cisse explained that there are some dimensions in projects
funded by emerging countries which could not be found in projects funded by their Western
counterparts. For example, he noted that emerging countries sometimes ensured on-site
processing or value addition and also developed infrastructure such as roads, ports and
railways. He explained that this development presents some lessons for the continental free
trade. For him, one important lesson worthy of note is that dependence on the natural
resources alone may not significantly enhance development on the continent, since the sector
is subject to price volatility. He called for African countries to define their development goals in
ways that could compel mining firms to contribute to advancement of those goals.
Discussions, Comments and Questions
The two presentations in this session generated a lot of interest among participants, as
evidenced in the vigorous discussions that followed. One participant noted that the emergence
of the BRICS, especially China, has reduced the hegemony of the West, resulting in a
reconfiguration of the ways in which business is conducted in Africa. For this participant, it is
22
precisely this reason that explains why the West is now trying to devise new means of reasserting its dominance within the African space, mainly through the introduction of public
private partnerships. He therefore, wanted to find out whether there are more viable options
investment options vis a vis Public Private Partnerships(PPPs) on the continent especially when
the role of the private sector as a source of financing development is becoming more common
on the continent. In view of this observation, some participants called for more discussions and
clarifications on the wider implications of PPPs on Africa’s development processes. Yet for
others, it is important to take the necessary steps to explore ways by which the African
continent could take advantage of the BRICS whilst avoiding the mistakes of the past.
Drawing from Ms. James’ presentation on the GVCs, one participant cited an UNCTAD report
which revealed that about 80 percent of the world’s value chains are owned or controlled by
multinational corporations. Here, as part of their strategy, MNCs are reported to break their
productions into smaller pieces in a manner that enables them to change the destinations of
their operations. Thus, MNCs, through the idea of the GVCs, are easily and freely able to enter
or exit countries as and when it suits their interests.
One participant also drew attention to the dilemma in which Africa and other developing
countries find themselves with regard to attracting foreign investment. On the one hand, and
citing evidence from studies conducted by UNCTAD, he noted that developing countries that
are highly integrated in GVCs tend to be doing better in a wide range of development
indicators. On the other hand, however, the question of where MNCs invest is not decided by
developing countries; indeed, governments in the developing world have little control over
which multinational enterprises enter and exit their borders. Instead, it is MNCs that are at the
forefront in defining the extent to which developing countries are integrated into GVCs. This
implies that interested countries are required to make themselves attractive to multinationals
by among others introducing tax holidays, loosening their labour laws, reducing regulations,
and dropping transfer controls – all measures that can also have devastating consequences for
a country’s development prospects. Moreover, participants noted that the tendency for a
product to go round several countries before its production is completed can have several
adverse implications, particularly on the environment. Based on this, they called for exploring
more ways of controlling the value chains in terms of how the phases of production of a
product are spread across several countries. Through such control, there could be opportunities
for localizing production through the creation of regional value chains. It was proposed that one
way of doing this is by making international shipping more expensive. Other participants
suggested the need to change the so-called rules of origin in order to enhance the development
of the GVCs.
Providing another dimension to the discussion, a participant intimated that it is imperative to
recognize that a vital component of foreign investment in Africa is not new money but rather a
re-investment of profits generated within the continent itself. By implication, in terms of
absolute value in dollar terms, he reasoned that Africa is in reality not receiving foreign direct
investments. This participant argued further that globally, Africa is more integrated into GVCs
than its level of development would justify. Another participant reminded the forum that in
discussing issues relating to GVCs, it is significant to find out where the ‘actual value’ is being
created and where the value ‘actually resides’. This was in relation to the argument made
23
earlier that in the GVCs the various components in production of goods are spread across
several countries.
One participant also cautioned against the use of trends in GDP as basis for measuring the
growth of African economies. He cited the experiences of countries like Uganda and Senegal
where reported growth figures were reportedly reflected in the gains accruing to transnational
corporations. Commenting on the constant reference to the tendency for TNCs to create global
spaces for exploitation, Ambassador Irumba, who chaired the session, called for thinking
through various ways by which Africa could create complementary value chains.
In her response to the various issues raised in relation to her presentation, Ms Deborah James
reiterated that she was not advocating the need for African countries to withdraw from, or
disengage with, the GVCs. She explained that the discussions in the WTO and the proposals
being made by TNCs in relation to GVCs are not in the interest of developing countries. The
current discussions or proposals around GVCs within the WTO, she explained, are deliberately
skewed towards serving the interests of TNCs, while the set of reforms required to make GVCs
more beneficial to developing countries rarely attract attention.
Responding to an earlier point that most business leaders and multinationals find Africa an
attractive for investment, Mr. Cisse admitted that although there was circulation of capital, this
was not accompanied by free movement of persons. But he argued that the situation was
changing especially with the investment of some emerging countries such as China. For
instance, he underscored the need to recognize that current investments from China, did not
only entail the movement of goods but also of people, hence the increasing protest against
Chinese nationals in some countries across the sub-region. On Africa’s capacity to attract
investment, he further called for a re-look at the continent’s readiness for attracting
transnational capital. He drew attention to specific instances when investments attracted by
African governments could not be put to good use because of the absence of requisite
infrastructure. Mr. Cisse’s point, then, was to remind African governments that private sector
investments are generally encouraged by state-led investments in basic socio-economic
infrastructure such as roads and electricity.
In his concluding remarks, the Chairman for the session emphasized the significance of avoiding
the temptation to concentrate investment gains in large cities across the continent, and called
for the kinds of investment that will promote inclusive growth.
Session 7: UNCTAD 14 and Emerging Issues – Alvin Mosioma,
TJN-Africa and Gyekye Tanoh, TWN-Africa
Co-chaired by Mr. Alvin Mosioma and Mr. Gyekye Tanoh of TJN-Africa and TWN-Africa
respectively, this session adopted a more informal knowledge-sharing approach in which
participants discussed emerging issues around the forthcoming UNCTAD 14 conference.
Setting the context for the session, Mr. Tetteh Hormeku of TWN-Africa explained that given the
historical role of UNCTAD in serving as a counterbalance to institutions of global governance, it
was important to explore possible ways by which the UNCTAD 14 conference could benefit the
24
African continent in more profound ways. In particular, he highlighted the necessity of
discussing the Zero draft of the Presidential address which often serves as the starting point of
discussions; and the organizational and political positioning that could be explored by CSOs as
part of preparations towards the conference. The session also sought to inform participants
about the emerging different positions on the continent regarding the UNCTAD meeting, as
well as explore ways by which CSOs could prepare and present an informed and united front
during the conference.
The first submission on these issues was made Mr. Alvin Mosioma, who serves as the local chair
of CSOs in the forthcoming UNCTAD conference. Mr. Mosioma indicated that although UNCTAD
has consistently been sympathetic to the interests of developing countries during various trade
policy negotiations, it is important to note that such negotiations have often been dominated
by the interests of developed countries and the transnational corporations whose interests
they represent. He emphasized the need to build the capacity of CSOs in order to better
prepare them for the conference. Briefing participants on preparations made by the Tax Justice
Network towards UNCTAD 14, Mr. Mosioma said that the TJN has started mobilizing local civil
society organizations around Nairobi in readiness for the conference. He also stressed the
importance of establishing an Africa Steering Group that will determine the key issues of
interests to be pursued and the specific mechanisms through which those issues could be
pushed. Beyond this group, he also proposed the establishment of an international working
group that would provide a larger platform for conversation.
On his part, Mr. Gyekye Tanoh focused his contributions on the zero draft which will be the
subject matter of the UNCTAD conference and the main basis for the outcome document from
the conference.
He observed that the key thing that the document affirms is the role of UNCTAD as the focal
point for ensuring the integration of trade and development in the international system. He
also noted that the document acknowledged the need to give attention to the standpoint of
developing countries. He noted that the attempt to ensure integration was indicative of a
certain qualitative dimension which could be harnessed for further engagement in the UNCTAD
space.
He informed participants that the zero draft sets out the theme for UNCTAD 14 as: From
Decision to Action: Moving Towards an Inclusive and Equitable Global Economic Environment
for Trade and Development. This theme, he explained, was informed by a number of
supposedly seminal attempts in 2015 to redefine global development. These seminal efforts
ranged from the third Financing for Development Conference in Addis Ababa to the adoption of
the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and Agenda 2063 in New York, as well as the COP 21
in Paris. He noted that most of these newly adopted global development frameworks,
particularly the SDGs, represented an apparent departure from the previously narrower
approach to development. Within the context of these frameworks, attempts are also being
made by UNCTAD to go beyond the previously constraining paradigms of development.
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Mr. Tanoh noted, however, that there are also significant weaknesses associated with all the
newly adopted development agendas. He observed, for example, that the Zero draft sets in its
preamble, a certain economic outlook that emphasizes the in-built imbalances that weigh
against developing countries. Expanding on this point, he suggested that although the subthemes in the UNCTAD document capture many of the key concerns of African countries, the
document does not contain alternative proposals by which these issues could be addressed.
This, he said, provides some opportunities for civil society groups to contribute to the processes
of finalizing the text in ways that would offer concrete benefits to African economies. What is
especially required in this context, he suggested, is the need for a common African position that
is reached through consensus. An improved interface between UNCTAD and civil society would
also be crucial in this regard.
Discussions, Comments and Questions
The discussions were kickstarted by Mr. Hemish Jenkins and Ms. Deborah James who were the
main discussants on the session. Mr. Jenkins pointed out that governments are yet to take
positions on the UNCTAD 14 zero draft document, stating further that given the imperfections
of this draft, it remains uncertain on the extent to which it would serve as the basis for
negotiations. He underscored the relevance of a strong African civil society position on the
draft, and also called on CSOs to facilitate the mobilization of African governments towards the
conference.
On her part, Ms Deborah James gave a background to civil society activity in UNCTAD. She
reported that even though during the Doha round there were various CSOs working on varied
themes, there was no opportunity for engagement with local CSOs in Qatar. She indicated that
UNCTAD 14 appears to offer a different and better opportunity because the presence of a local
CSO such as TJN would provide some rallying point for a possible effective engagement. She
suggested that some initial inputs into the zero draft by TJN could be a significant starting point
for broader civil society engagement at the conference.
Drawing from past experiences, some participants noted that African countries have historically
not been sufficiently organized and formidable enough to confront some key global
development challenges (e.g. climate change, trade and investments etc.) that would be central
to the discussions in the UNCTAD conference. For this set of participants, it was important that
CSOs adopt a more proactive approach in exploring ways of pushing for more meaningful
outcomes; this would require some visible efforts (both individually and collectively) in pushing
forward their demands ahead of the conference.
One participant proposed a two-pronged approach in enhancing the visibility and impact of civil
society on the outcomes of UNCTAD 14. First, civil society advocacy should hinge on already
existing development frameworks in Africa such as the Agenda 2063. Utilizing already existing
frameworks as a rallying point, he suggested, can make it easier for civil society to involve
African leaders in their advocacy efforts. Second, African civil society should identify the key
development priorities of the continent that will serve as a rallying point for advocacy. For
example, he suggested that CSOs could explore a common strategy aimed at addressing issues
26
of employment and pushing for industrialization as part of efforts aimed at transforming
African economies.
One also pointed out that some developed countries have already made attempts to lobby
UNCTAD to be more receptive to their neo-liberal ideas. Others joined the call in emphasizing
the importance of a strong civil society position, particularly given the history of the US in
attempting to stop UNCTAD from considering the concerns of poor countries.
SESSION 8: Economic Interests and (In) Balances of Power –
Baba Aye, UAD and Malcom Damon, EJN
This session was meant to provide a framing for the political context and organizational
challenges and their implications for the ability of civil society to organize and engage
effectively with trade negotiations. It was to set the context for discussions by the various
groups on the identification of the various issues that should engage the attention of CSOs as
well as the possible challenges and the way forward.
Presentation I: Global economic and political interests – Baba Aye, National Convener, United
Action for Democracy.
The first presentation in this session was delivered by Baba Aye who focused on problems and
prospects for popular forces and the strategic considerations for CSO advocacy on trade
reforms. He explored the general context of global economic and political powers, and argued
that global orders are established through contention and collaboration in which the hegemony
of the dominant order is fractured at some points in history. He traced the history of the global
configuration of power relations, and cited the Great Depression and the two world wars, and
the decolonization processes, among others, as key landmarks in these processes. Situating
Africa within the global configurations of power, he stated that the continent was the least
beneficiary of the post-war order in part because of its lack of sovereignty. He argued that TNCs
have become increasingly more powerful and influential in Africa. TNCs, he noted, have
continued to expand their scope in the region because of the crave of governments towards
privatization and their continuous drive towards the attraction of foreign direct investments.
He outlined some problems of popular forces as follows:





The 1 percent depth of material and institutional resources
A relatively lackluster leadership and vision on the continent
“Common sense” of the systems essential immutability
The dilemma of NGOism: altruism-cum-proposal-driven activism
Alternatives of radical-right rising
Further to the above, he identified the following as popular forces prospects:
27




Building on flashlights of popular alternatives
Expanding organization and networks
A new envisioning of possibilities e.g. CFTA
etc.
With regard to strategic considerations for CSOs, he called for more collaboration beyond
workshops and other discussion forums, as well as the need for building synergies beyond
groups involved in trade and development.
Presentation II: Africa: Regional and Domestic Repositioning - Malcom Damon, Executive
Director of the Economic Justice Network
Mr. Malcom Damon, Executive Director of the Economic Justice Network, started his
presentations by referring participants to some contestations and power struggles within the
CFTA. He identified some of these contestations as follows:
 The outcome and impact of the WTO’s Ministerial Conference (WTO MC10)
 The EPAs and their impact of regional integration
 The mega regionals and their potential impact on Africa’s economic development
 Africa’s experience with regional integration with SADC, ECOWAS, and CEMAC, among
others.
He noted that while the CFTA may have a lofty vision, the contestations and power struggles
around it inevitably point to divergent routes in the pursuit of this vision. Mr. Damon called for
further analysis of the roles of various world powers in trying to gain a foothold within Africa.
He noted for example, that whilst the role of the EUs and the US has gained more attention in
CSO advocacy in Africa, there has not been adequate discussion on the role of China within
Africa. He asserted that China’s interests in Africa is largely economic in nature, and speculates
that the country’s different mode of operations (e.g. unlike the EU and US, China is not so much
focused on trade agreements) could explain the limited discussions on its role in Africa. He also
suggested the need for greater engagements with the BRICS and the New Development Banks
given their potential in influencing the continent’s development processes, particularly in terms
of infrastructural development.
With regard to power configurations, he noted that we live in a multipolar world with different
power dynamics. These configurations are often reflected in the quest to pursue individual
country interests and gain power, among other areas of domination. In this regard, within
African context, he identified the role of SA in SADC, Nigeria in ECOWAS and Kenya in East Africa
and how it plays itself out within AU and Africa. He identified the asymmetrical and power
imbalances in some regions within the continent as some factors that usually serve as stumbling
blocks in Africa’s quest to pursue common interests. He also noted that the lack of power within
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the regional economic communities has implications for the CFTA. Using the case of SADC for
example, he noted that the Secretariat is weak because governments have failed to give it the
needed support.
With regard to challenges and opportunities, he said that through the CFTA, AMV, CAADP and
Vision 2063, Africa could possibly carve out its own unique development agenda. He identified
the state of civil society (particularly their lack of resources), as well as Africa’s position in the
global trade regime as a mere exporter of raw materials as some of the challenges that could
impede the continent’s efforts at harnessing the CFTA for development. He pointed out that
opportunities exist in the African Union and regional summits as well as the high level UNCTAD
meeting in Nairobi for further discussions on the CFTA. On the role of the African Trade
Network, he called for a constructive engagement with the UNECA and other platforms. He
added that even though African CSOs are not able to mobilize more broadly, mainly because of
lack of resources, CSOs could concentrate the advocacy at the policy level. He believed that with
the right mix of advocacy and strategic linkages, much impact could be made without investing
so much resources.
Session 9: Plenary/Reporting Back
This Session aimed at discussing the issues that should engage the collective attention of the
participating organizations in the short to medium term, and was chaired jointly by Mr. Tetteh
Hormeku and Dr. Yao Graham, both from TWN-Africa. Participants were divided into four small
groups, with each group required to focus its discussion around an identification of:
i. strategic issues or questions to be addressed;
ii. the major influential actors to be targeted, both allies and “opponents”;
iii. the key strategic messages to be delivered by CSOs and their allies;
iv. the opportunities/potential entry points; and
v. possible elements of an agenda of work going forward.
What follows below is a summary of the reports from the various groups
Group I
In their presentation, members of this group highlighted the context of the CFTA and the role of
CSOs within it as one of the key strategic issues requiring attention. In this regard, they placed
emphasis on building the capacity of civil society and the importance of offering advocacy
support through evidence-based research. The crucial role of the media in providing advocacy
support through investigative journalism was also brought to the fore.
On identification of the major players involved, the group underscored the relevance of
recognizing the diversity in opinions and orientations among CSOs in order to fashion out more
realistic strategies. Participants in this group also suggested the need to go beyond efforts
aimed at courting the support of big powers within various regionals groups and the WTO. For
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example, they also emphasized the usefulness of identifying and working with groups and
businesses that stand to lose from the EPAs and related trade agreements; while at the same
time taking steps to vigorously oppose or counter the positions of vested interest groups such
as TNCs. In terms of sectorial priorities, the group proposed linking their messages to the CFTA
and issues around agriculture. Finally, with regard to opportunities or entry points, they
identified the UNCTAD 14 working space, the AU Summit, the Africa Trade Forum and the CFTA.
Group II
Among the strategic issues raised by this group are: i) outreach and awareness creation on the
CFTA as an aspect of the regional integration agenda in Africa; ii) ensuring linkages and
coherence with other continental processes; iii) identifying ways of recasting the African
integration agenda and CFTA debate within the context of the Abuja Treaty; and iv) an
identification of possible benefits that could be accrued from trade and tariff liberalization.
On the specific strategic issues worthy of note, the group also emphasized the need to utilize
the CFTA as an instrument for addressing a wide range of development challenges that
confront the African continent, such as the promotion of inclusive growth and the structural
transformation of African economies, promoting gender-equity, and addressing existing power
imbalances both between regions and across countries. In this respect, the group suggested
that arguments concerning Africa’s integration processes should not be merely interpreted in
terms of the adverse consequences of trade liberalization, but should be understood as an
opportunity for African countries to transform themselves.
The group outlined some opportunities that could be utilized to push trade reforms in the
interest of Africa and other developing countries. These included the CFTA negotiations, the
forthcoming UNCTAD 14 conference, UNCTAD’s NGO hearings in Geneva and the AU Summit at
both the heads of state and ministerial levels. Other entry points identified included the African
Trade Forum, national trade and industry meetings, Parliamentarians at national and regional
levels, former ambassadors and diplomats who understand trade issues, the media, regional
economic communities, and friends in the global north. Capacity building and the production
of literature also emerged here as a key possible element for an agenda of work. The group also
called for:




the identification of effective outlets such as websites for the dissemination and sharing
of information;
a bigger continental and sub-regional African trade meetings;
the need to link national level engagements with regional initiatives; and
the need to mainstream the issues raised in the discussions into individual
organizational programmes.
On the issue of which major influential actors to target in the advocacy efforts, the group
proposed the following: Trade unions, African governments, Regional economic communities
(ECOWAS, SADC etc.), and research institutions and think thanks (e.g. CODESRIA, ECA, UNCTAD
30
etc). Many potential targets were further identified including national and regional chambers of
commerce, association of manufacturers, and even TNCs.
Group III
Members of this group highlighted the significance of leveraging efforts from various trade
unions in their quest to intensify advocacy. This group also called for mobilization efforts that
moved beyond the national to the regional and continental levels. They encouraged the need to
involve some key stakeholders that would undertake a comprehensive analysis of the key issues
pertaining to trade. It was emphasized that the high level of intellectual deficits among CSOs on
trade issues should be tackled head-on so as to boost their capacity to engage more effectively
at relevant fora and platforms. They suggested that bridging this knowledge gap would
necessarily require some conscious efforts aimed at building the capacity of CSOs on key trade
issues.
Group members also noted that the level of engagement with governments and other
stakeholders has waned in part due to information asymmetry. Consequently, civil society
organizations often prepare reports that are informed by old and sometimes unreliable data.
For members of this group, it is important to ensure that in the processes of building the
capacity of civic groups, opportunities be provided for the transfer and sharing of relevant
information between CSOs and government institutions.
The group also called for a strategic mapping position and leveraging of various like-minded
groups ranging from think tanks to feminist and youth organizations. Moreover, they
advocated two separate platforms for facilitating civil society’s engagement on trade issues:
while the first would train organizations that deal with trade issues, the second will focus on
information gathering as well as exploring opportunities for sharing such information among all
the key actors involved. As part of broader efforts to address the persistent information gap,
and also streamline communication messaging, it was proposed that a committee should be
formed and tasked to transfer joint collective opinions and views to the various groups. Among
other things, this approach, they suggested, would enable the CSOs to present a common and
united front.
As part of efforts for ensuring an efficient and effective communication strategy, members of
the group also emphasized the need to clarify the communication approaches to be adopted at
various levels, as well as identify actors responsible for seeing to the effective implementation
of specific aspects of the communication strategy.
Commenting on opportunities for engagement, the group also mentioned the Agenda 2063 and
the CFTA as important platforms, while also highlighting the significance of funding in trade
advocacy. To this extent, they suggested that the responsibility of fund raising should not be
left to just one organization. Still on the issue of financing, they noted that it is not enough to
focus on encouraging trade among countries within the region, but that it is also imperative to
control the outflows of the financial resources generated within the region.
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The group also called for a revived engagement with the Mbeki Report, noting that although
this report continues to shape trade-related debates, CSOs appeared blissfully indifferent to its
existence. The group further called for a forum for tax justice with the aim of ensuring that
taxes are utilized in a manner that benefit local communities. To achieve this, it was
recommended that African Parliamentarians of social movement extraction should be engaged
in order to get them more informed to better shape discussions relating to trade. The group
cited the apparent decline in the activities and waning visibility of the African Trade Network.
As a starting point, it was proposed that the steering committee to be formed for the UNCTAD
proceedings be utilized for other activities beyond UNCTAD 14. In order to monitor the
progress of work, the group also proposed the preparation of a work plan and the adoption of
the “other voices” approach.
Group IV
This group advocated an economic transformation that is in line with the SDGs, and also
emphasized the need for a multi-level mobilization approach at the national, regional and
continental levels. The group identified some of the key relevant stakeholders in this
mobilization effort to include the African Union, sub-regional institutions, farmer organizations,
trade unions and religious organizations. Here, the need to highlight the value addition
expertise of ATNs was emphasized along the formulation of a civil society position paper
through a declaration.
In terms of what specific available opportunities could be explored, the group highlighted the
necessity of tapping into the expertise of organizations that have been engaged in the EPA
debates. The SDGs were also identified as a viable pointer that could be employed to expose
the contradictions within the neo-liberal development framework. Still on the opportunities
and actions to be carried out, the group also argued for the preparation and dissemination of a
position paper during the next UNCTAD meeting and the World Economic Forum. Additionally,
they proposed the need to appoint specific organizations and/or individuals that would
coordinate or lead CSOs in their engagements with the CFTA and EPA negotiations. The group
concluded its submission with a call for a declaration to be prepared in Ghana that should be
signed by the various organizations before the next UNCTAD meeting.
Summary/recap of key issues from Group Work – Mr. Tetteh Hormeku, TWN-Africa
In an attempt to recap the group presentations, Mr. Tetteh Hormeku identified some broad
themes that emerged from the submissions, namely the issue of sovereignty of policy space;
identification of key power players; issues identification; messaging; potential opportunities to
be leveraged on; and activities to be implemented. Expanding on this, Mr. Hormeku noted that
he starting point identified in most of the various group submissions borders on the sovereignty
of policy space. He noted that there was the need to contextualize the ongoing advocacy
32
around the current paradigm and building alternatives to neoliberalism. Here, it was pointed
out that trade should be seen not as an end in itself but rather as a tool for development. The
discussions also emphasized the need to identify key power players both in support and against
the advocacy. Specifically, the concern was to be more inclusive and expansive in identifying
allies.
Messages: Mr. Hormeku categorized the messaging into two, namely broad and specific
messages. The specific messages focused on moments of intervention, as with the type of
messages that would be useful in the context of UNCTAD, CFTA, the post-Nairobi discussion in
Geneva and those that could arise in the event of the re-activation of the second phase of the
EPA debates. On the means of communicating the messages, there was a call for a definition of
some principles that would ensure that messages were couched to reflect the collective
positions of various groups.
Opportunities and Entry Points: The discussions, he noted, pointed to two sets of opportunities
and entry points that could be harnessed. These were events or moments within the calendar
of the intergovernmental decision making space and those which could be created by CSOs
themselves, in Parliaments, and in other important areas. With regard to the former for
instance, it was recommended that attempts should be focused on the preparations towards
forthcoming events in July such as the WTO discussions, UNCTAD 14 and the CFTA negotiations.
Here, a collective input reflecting the shared position of CSOs was recommended.
What to Do and With Whom: Three issues were pointed out here, namely, networking or
collaboration (both within and outside the continent), mobilization of constituencies and,
capacity building (including knowledge sharing). Related to this, he highlighted the call for the
need to develop a common platform on two fronts; one in the form of a declaration/ position
paper towards UNCTAD 14 and beyond; and two, a forum for the different actors involved (e.g.
through the ATN forum).
Tasks: on the basis of the group submissions, Mr. Hormeku noted that an important concern
that emerged was the need to build the capacity of civil society in order to improve their
understanding of, and enhance their capacity to, engage more effectively. To enhance the
quality and reliability of the knowledge to be acquired for further engagement, the members
called underscored the need for evidenced-based research. The discussions, he noted, pointed
to the need for the production of relevant literature which might entail engaging the services of
a consultant.
Coordination and Partnerships: Based on the presentations, Mr. Hormeku noted that three
forms of partnerships could be harnessed: partnerships between groups such as the ATN, ATPC,
UNECA, and Tax Justice Network; partnerships between such groups and Regional bodies;
partnerships between different thematic working groups.
Horizon: Summing up the positions of the various groups on time horizon, Mr. Hormeku said it
was recommended that in the short term, there should be conscious preparations both
individually and collectively towards the UNCTAD meeting in July. Such preparations, it was
noted, could also be beneficial later on in the CFTA and Africa Trade negotiations, among other
major forthcoming events.
33
Discussions, Comments and Questions
Except for a few notable interventions, discussions and questions were generally limited as
participants had raised similar points in the various groups.
On the idea of a vehicle to drive the process, Dr. Yao Graham, who co-chaired the session,
reminded participants that the ATN already has a tradition of setting up working groups to deal
with specific issues of importance, as with the Climate Change Working Group. He suggested
that following that tradition, a coordinating group could be established within the ATN to serve
as a rallying point for the CFTA.
Another participant emphasized the need for collaborative efforts to go beyond CSOs to the
inclusion of various sub-regional groupings in order to maximize already existing synergies.
Others underscored the need to mainstream emerging issues into the agenda of their individual
organizations. Whilst admitting that the CFTA was a critical element in the current advocacy
chain, one participant suggested a more holistic message in the form of a slogan that captures
the CFTA idea, whilst also highlighting broader structural transformational issues that confront
the continent. He emphasized that such an approach would not only help in projecting the
message of the CFTA but will also provide room for canvassing support for broader issues
beyond the CFTA agenda. This suggestion received the endorsements of several other
participants.
Responding to the point on synergies, Dr. Graham drew attention to some negative experiences
in the past that members could learn from. He noted for instance that, the reality of some
organizations or groups confining their work to the regional levels as opposed to sub-regional
levels arguably undermined the effectiveness of advocacy efforts. Citing the EPA experience as
an example, he argued that the weaknesses in mobilizing business groups and faith-based
organizations were some of the key challenges that affected the advocacy. Flowing from this he
called for the need to get trade unions in particular to be more involved, while also noting the
need to re-integrate various other existing groups in the advocacy efforts.
Summing up the discussion and proposing a way forward, Mr. Alvin Mosioma recommended
that to be able to make the desired impact, it would be important for participants to prepare
and release a general statement on the key issues discussed; prepare a more detailed
document that will feed into the UNCTAD processes (e.g. a critique the Draft Zero document);
prepare a strategic document that maps out who the actors are and what specific opportunities
could be explored; and prepare a list of medium to short term activities that should be
embarked upon to reinvigorate the advocacy efforts. This suggestion attracted substantial buyin among participants, leading to an agreement around the following tasks and responsibilities:
i.
ii.
TWN-Africa to prepare and share a detailed report on the colloquium with
participants
TWN-Africa and two volunteers to draft and share a political declaration/statement
on the basis of the discussions in the colloquium
34
iii.
iv.
TWN-Africa to prepare a proposal on a range of activities to be embarked upon,
both collectively and individually
Tax Justice Network to lead a process of preparing written comments on UNCTAD
President’s Zero Draft towards the July conference.
Summary/General Comments on the Colloquium
By way of ending the discussions, various participants commended the organizers for such an
extremely important forum, noting that it provided a rare opportunity for relevant knowledge
acquisition and networking with other stakeholders. They expressed hope that the meeting
would serve as a springboard in the remobilization of civil society in their advocacy efforts on
trade and development. One participant recommended the need for all the participating
organizations to make efforts aimed at mainstreaming the issues discussed into their individual
and collective organizational advocacy strategies.
Another participant praised the insightful presentations made throughout the forum, whilst
also calling for the greater involvement of women groups and the inclusion of more genderrelated topics in similar forums in the future. Additionally, this participant recommended the
need for future discussions to go well beyond analyzing institutional architectures, to focusing
more strongly on experiential activism. Such an approach, she suggested, will help bring more
practical insights into bear and thereby help inform decision making in a better fashion. .
On his part, Dr. Graham thanked participants for their presence and contributions to the
discussions. He bemoaned the inability of African trade CSOs to marshal a collective presence
both before and during the Nairobi Ministerial conference, but expressed hope that it was still
possible for CSOs to make amends. In this respect, and like many other participants, he noted
that the colloquium will help build CSO capacity for more effective engagements with the CFTA
and other forthcoming gatherings like UNCTAD 14. Finally, Dr. Graham called on participants to
go beyond the discussions and take practical steps within their individual organizations that
would help achieve the desired outcomes. He thanked the ATPC and all participants for their
support throughout the colloquium.
35
LIST OF PARTICIPANTS
1. AILEEN KWA,
South Centre,
19 chemin du Chang d’ Anier
Geneva, Switzerland
+41227918050 +41796258536
[email protected]
Skype ID: aileenkwa
Twitter Handle:
Twitter Handle: @anitar_nayar
6. ANTHONY KWASI NYAME-BAAFI
Director
Ministry of Trade and Industry
Ghana
+233 505 298 697
[email protected]
Skype ID:
Twitter Handle:
2. ALEX NKOSI
IPODE
[email protected]
Cell: +265 999 789820
Skype ID:
7. ATO ONOMA
CODESRIA
Caval 4, Ave Cheikh Anta Diop,
Dakar
+221 777 761 140
[email protected]
Skype ID:
Twitter Handle:
3. ALIOUNE NIANG, DR.
ENDACACID
+221 777 669 886
[email protected]
Skype ID:
Twitter Handle:
8. BABATUNDE AYEABOLA
United Action for Democracy (UAD)
Nigeria
+234 813 579 5607
[email protected]
[email protected]
Skype ID:
Twitter Handle:
4. ALVIN MOSIOMA
TJN-AFRICA
[email protected]
Skype ID:Alvin.Mosioma
Twitter Handle: Alvin Mosioma
5. ANITA NAYAR
Regions Refocus
[email protected]
Cell: + 1 646 241 3296
Skype ID:
9. BERNARD ANABA
ISODEC-GHANA
[email protected]
Cell: 0244584565
36
Skype ID:
Twitter Handle: @ozimzim
15. DAVID LUKE
Coordinator
ATPC ECA,
Addis Ababa-Ethiopia
+251 930 03 5021
[email protected]
10. BONAPAS ONGUGLO
UNCTAD
[email protected]
+41229175496
16. Deborah James
Director of International Policy
CEPR/OWINFS
+1 202 441 6917
11. CAROLNE MUGALLA
EATUC
[email protected]
[email protected]
Cell: +255 785066146
Skype ID:
Twitter Handle:
17. DJÉNÉBA TRAORÉ
Director General
West Africa Institute
Av. Da Liberdade e Democracia
Achada St. Antonio Caixa
postal 396 – A – Praia
Republica de Cabo Verde
+238 262 4058 (office) +238 989
9037 (cell Phone) Fax: +238 262
4059
[email protected]
[email protected]
Skype ID:
Twitter Handle:
12. COLLINS NUNYONAMEH
Ho Polytechnic
0209 126 287
[email protected]
Skype ID: Collins.nunyonameh
Twitter Handle:
13. CORNELIUS ADEDZE
TWN – Africa
233-0302-500419 233-0302-503669
[email protected]
Skype ID:
Twitter Handle:
18. EMMANUEL K. BENSAH
Host of Africa in Focus Show- Radio
XYZ93.1 fm
+233 0268 687 653/0264 278 787
[email protected]
14. DALITSO K. KUBALASA
Malawi Economic Justice Network
(MEJN)
+265999897122 +265888897122
[email protected]
[email protected]
Skype ID: dalitso.kubalasa
Twitter Handle:
19. EUGENE JERNIGAN
CUTS International
Nairobi
[email protected]
+254 722 99 68 37
Skype ID:
37
Twitter Handle:
Skype ID:
Twitter Handle:
20. FREDRICK NJEHU
Kenya Human Rights Commission
(KHRC)
[email protected]
[email protected]
+254 723583251
Skype ID: Frederick.njehu
Twitter Handle: frednjehu
25. HILMA MOTE
ITUC-AFRICA-ALREI
[email protected]
+228 9000 54 56
26. KABINET CISSE
CECIDE-Guinee
+244 620 596 473
[email protected]
Skype ID:
21. GUY MARIUS SAGNA
Coalition NON AUX APE
[email protected]
Cell: 221 78 116 98 66
Skype ID:
Twitter Handle:
27. KATIE TOBIN
Regions Refocus
[email protected]
Cell: +1-347-647-0860
Skype ID: kjt006
Twitter Handle: uncharteredKT
22. GYEKE TANOH
Programme
Officer
Political
Economy
TWN – Africa
P.O. Box AN19452, Accra – North,
Ghana
+233 302 511 189 +233 302 511 108
[email protected]
Skype ID:
Twitter Handle:
28. KODJO EVLO
Universite de Lome
BP 3237 Lome
+228 22 20 08 27 +228 90 01 59 58 /
92 50 43 21
Fax: +228 22 21 85 95
[email protected]/
[email protected]
23. HAMISH JENKINS
UN-NGLS
Palais des Nations
+4122 9172076
[email protected]
29. Kouglo Boevi Lawson Body
Economist
ITUC-Africa
+228 90 17 52 04
[email protected]
24. HEINI SUOMINEU
ATPC/ECA
+2511154434611
[email protected]
30. LEILA KITUYI
TAX JUSTICE NETWORK AFRICA
[email protected]
38
+254-700683506
Skype ID: Leila.kituyi
Twitter Handle: leilakituyi
35. Pauline Vande Pallen
TWN – Africa
+233 302 511 189
[email protected]
Skype ID:
Twitter Handle:
31. MALCOLM DAMON
Economic Justice Network
P.O. Box 2296,
Cape Town, 8000
Cell: +27 83 654 5282
[email protected]
Skype ID: malcomde
Twitter Handle: malcom_ejn
36. PRUDENCE SEBAHIZI
African Union Commission
+251929118210
[email protected]
Skype ID:
32. MARC MAES
Trade Policy Officer
11-11-11
Belgium
+32 25361906
[email protected]
33. NATHAN IRUMBA
Executive Director
SEATINI
TEL: 256 41454086 Cell:
782520172
[email protected]
Skype ID:
Twitter Handle:
Twitter Handle:
37. ROBERT LISINGE
UN-ECA
+251 115443443
[email protected]
Skype ID:
Twitter Handle:
256
38. SYLVESTER BAGOORO
Political economy
TWN – Africa
+233 302 511 189
M: + 23326961132/020 5532724
[email protected]
/[email protected]
Skype ID:
Twitter Handle:
34. NDONGO SAMBA SYLLA
Rosa Luxemberg Foundation West
Africa Office
Dakar
+221 771 519 813
[email protected]
Skype ID:
Twitter Handle:
39. TETTEH HOMERKU
Head of Programmes
TWN – Africa
+233 302 511 189
39
[email protected]
Skype ID:
Twitter Handle:
40. YAO GRAHAM
Coordinator
TWN – Africa
+233 302 511 189
[email protected]
Skype ID:
Twitter Handle:
41. YUSUF SHAMSUDEEN
Centre
for
Democracy
Development
+2347032799268
[email protected]
Skype ID:
Twitter Handle:
and
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