E,XPLANATIONS:A PRAGMATIC BASISFOR EARLY CHILD
COMPETENCE
Maria Silvia Barbieri. Federica Colavita and Nora Scheuer
l.
Explanations: what are they?
E x p l a n a t i o n so c c u r f r e q u e n t l y i n e v e r y - d a y l i f e . I n s p i t e o f
this, the concept of explanation is not easy to define. Within a given
c o n t e x t , u t t e r a n c e s o r s e q u e n c e so f u t t e r a n c e sc a n b e i n t u i t i v e l y
r e c o g n i z e d a s e x p l a n a t i o n sb y p e o p l e p a r t i c i p a t i n g i n o r o b s e r v i n g
the interactional situation. There are explanationsvia examples (for
example,'Thisis a squirrel. Like the one you saw last week in the
'These
park'), explanations via definitions (for example,
are patches.
Do you know what they are for? To mend holes in cloth'), or
'Ice
e x p l a n a t i o n s b y m e a n s o f c a u s e - e f f e c tr e l a t i o n s ( f o r e x a m p l e ,
crearn melts becauseof the heat'). Various and converging cues can
contribute to this outcome: linguistic cues, such as certain
c o n n e c t i v e s ( b e c a u s e ) ; p a r a l i n g u i s t i cc u e s s u c h a s i n t o n a t i o n i n
spoken language and punctuation in written language (for example,
"Mommy and daddy are shopping. They buy bread, meat and fruits:
apples, apricots, plums, and bananas"); text coherence indicators
(consider, for example the different causal emphasis of these two
'she
had a child and got married' versus 'she got married
sentences:
and had a child'); and lastly, contextual indicators which can
transform the act of showing into one of explaining (as happens
when the speaker is more competent than the partner). In order to
understand what all these phenomenahave in common, we apply a
pragmatic approach to the notion of explanation. Our approach
focuses mainly on the interpersonal aspects and differs from the
line of thought which interprets explanationsas a mere search for
c a u s e s .T h i s l a t t e r l i n e , w h i c h i s b e s t r e p r e s e n t e di n d e v e l o p m e n t a l
psychology by the work of Piaget (1923; 1924), studies
e x p l a n a t i o n sa s a p r o b l e m c o n c e r n i n g p s y c h o l o g yo f r e a s o n i n g .
LPrAPapers in Pragmatics 3, No. 1 (1989), L29-L54
:
131
Our line of research, instead, takes into account some basic
featuresof the concept of explanation in natural interaction: l. The
interactivedimension, i.e. the fact that someone explains something
t o s o m e o n ee l s e ; o t h e r w i s e t h e d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n e x p l a i n a n d
u n d e r s t a n dw i l l b e m i s s e d . 2 . A d i f f e r e n c e o f k n o w l e d g e a n d
authority between the one who offers and the one who receives the
explanation.This lack of knowledge in the one who receives the
explanationjustifies the act of the speaker according to Grice's
c o n v e r s a t i o n aml a x i m s ( 1 9 7 5 ) w h i c h r e q u e s t n o t t o s a y t o o m u c h
nor too little. 3. The aim of restructuring the partner's organization
of information.
These considerationsallow us to try a definition of the act of
giving an explanation on which we are focusing and to specify
t h e c o n d i t i o n s o f i t s s u c c e s s f u l p e r f o r m a n c e i n c o n v e r s a t i o n .W e
define giving an explanation as follows: it is an interactional move
which takes place when one partner offers a piece of new
information(explanans)which refers to an object of joint attention
( e x p l a n a n d u m ) .T h i s n e w i n f o r m a t i o n m a k e s c l e a r w h a t w a s
previously obscure. The need for it may be directly expressed by
the partner by verbal or non-verbal means, or it may be
presupposed
by the speaker for the sake of goals related to the ongoing interaction. This tentative definition allows us to include in
the concept of explanation facts frequently taking place in
interactional contexts which are intuitively recognized as
e x p l a n a t i o n sF. o r e x a m p l e , j u s t i f i c a t i o n s , p a r a p h r a s e so f l e x i c a l
meanings,definitions of objects and indications of functions.
Our Iine of research has been developed following authors
w o r k i n g o n o r d i n a r y e x p l a n a t i o n s ( v o n W r i g h t 1 9 7| ; A n t a k i &
F i e l d i n g l 9 8 l ) w h o h a v e d i s t i n g u i s h e dt w o f o r m s o f e x p l a n a t i o n s :
d e s c r i p t i v ee x p l a n a t i o n s ,w h i c h e x p l a i n s o m e t h i n g b y g i v i n g i t a
name that the audience will understand;and causal explanations
(or agency explanations when they refer to human actions),
d e t e r m i n i n gw h y s o m e t h i n g h a s h a p p e n e d ( f o r a n a n a l o g o u s
d i s t i n c t i o ni n c o g n i t i v e p s y c h o l o g y s e e a l s o C a s t e l f r a n c h i& P a r i s i
I 980).
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Our wor k has b o th th e o re ti c a l a n d e mp i r i cal purposes. On the
t he o re ti cal lev el, we i n te n d to i d e n ti fy th e c o ndi ti ons that need to
be fu l fi l l e d when giv i n g a n e x p l a n a ti o n . On th e empi ri cal l evel , w e
have carried out a qualitative investigation studying the
explanations given by three-year-old children in spontaneous
inte ra cti on and ex plo ri n g w h i c h b e h a v i o u ra l cues coul d be taken
into account to decide whether the subjects honour these
conditions. Though we think that our model of explanation and the
cond i ti o n s we pr opos e a re g e n e ra l l y v a l i d , we chose three-yearolds b e ca us e t hey ar e l i n g u i s ti c a l l y c o mp e te n t enough to be easi l y
understood, while their early age allows us to investigate which are
t he mo st bas ic f eat ur e s o f e x p l a n a ti o n i n i n te racti on.
2. Conditions
defining
the
act
of
explaining
Following t he l i n e e s ta b l i s h e d b y S e a rl e' s w ork on promi ses
(1969) and influenced by the considerationsof Sbisa'(1989) on
eve ryd a y ex planat ions , w e h e re p ro p o s e th e set of condi ti ons w e
t hi n k a n ut t er anc e mu s t fu l fi l i n o rd e r to c o unt as a sati sfactory
performance of
an explaining act, distinguishing between
pre p a ra to r y , es s ent ial, s i n c e ri ty a n d a ffi l i a ti v e condi ti ons.
c on d i ti o n s
l a y th e a p p ro p riate grounds for the
Pre p ar at or y
speech act. Two types were distinguished:
1 . The s peak er s h o u l d b e l i e v e th a t th e new i nformati on i s
nece ssa ry t o t he par tn e r' s k n o w l e d g e o r u n derstandi ng. In other
words, the speaker should believe that the partner does not know
t he e xp l anans or t hat i s n o t a b l e to e s ta b l i s h i ts rel ati on w i th the
exp l a n a n d um by him /h e rs e l f .
2. When explaining, the speaker must be sure that the
explanandum is at the centre of the partner's attention.
A s r egar ds p re p a ra to ry c o n d i ti o n 1 , the need for the
exp l a n a ti on m ay be e x p re s s e d e i th e r b y a d i re ct request from the
partner, or by non verbal means, or by contextual cues indicating
lack o f under s t anding . If th i s ty p e o f p re p a ra tory condi ti on i s not
hono u re d ( neit her t he e x p l a n a n s n o r i ts l i n k w i th the expl anandum
r
133
are new), then Grice's maxims forbidding redundancy in
, v e r e x p l a i n i n gm a y
c o n v e r s a t i oins v i o l a t e d . I n a d u l t c o n v e r s a t i o n o
a c q u i r et h e c o n n o t a t i o no f a n i n s u l t , s i n c e i t i m p l i e s a n a s s u m p t i o n
o f t h e p a r t n e r ' sd i f f i c u l t y i n u n d e r s t a n d i n g .
If preparatory condition 2 is not fulfilled (partner's attention
is missing), then communication fails. The partner will not
understand
the explanation, i.e. he/she will either not notice that an
e x p l a n a t i o nh a s b e e n g i v e n , o r w i l l n o t b e s u r e a b o u t t h e e n t i t y
refened by the explanans.
W e h a v e a l s o d i s t i n g u i s h e dt w o t y p e s o f e s s e n t i a l
c o n di t i o n s :
l . T h e e x p l a n a t i o nm u s t b e c o n s t i t u t e do f b o t h a n e x p l a n a n d u m
and an explanans.
2. The speaker must show concern for the partner's inferential
p a t t e r sn .
It is important to distinguish essential condition I from
p r e p a r a t o r yc o n d i t i o n 2 , t h a t i s , f r o m t h e r e q u i r e m e n t t h a t t h e
e x p l a n a n d u ms h o u l d b e a n o b j e c t o f j o i n t a t t e n t i o n . E s s e n t i a l
condition I requires, instead, that the explanandum, in order to be
consideredas such, must be linked to an explanans. The relation
between explanandum and explanans is recognized either by
inference,or because it is explicitly expressedwith a connective.
Essentialcondition 2 indicates the speaker'sconcern for the
partner'sway of reasoning. The speaker must build an explanation
that will make sense to the partner. This type of condition is not
fulfilled when partners do not share a common understanding of
reality. If the speaker's assumptions are not shared by the partner,
the explanation will be considered absurd, unreasonable or
unacceptable.
Sincerity conditions refer to the fact that the speaker must
considerhim/herself competent to give an explanation on a certain
matter.It is this subjectively felt authoritativenesswhich gives the
power to become the explainer. This power may have different
sources.It may derive from factors external to the interactional
situation,as when the speaker is an expert on the topic being
explained,or it may develop progressively within the interactional
L34
situation, ss when one of the partners turns out to be more
competent in that field. If these conditions are not honoured,then
the explanation is deprived of its value and may be even refused. It
is to be noticed that this condition does not refer to the truth-value
of the speaker's statements, but to his/her authority and
competence as opposed to the partner's ignorance. In this situation
the partner is given the "duty" of taking into account the new piece
of information (Sbisi 1989). We may assume that this condition is
honoured by both partners as far as the explanation is not
challenged.
Meetingaffiliative
conditions means honouring the social
relation between partners. These conditions refer to the
s y m m e t r i c a l - a s y m m e t r i c a la x i s o f t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p , d e r i v e d f r o m
s o c i a l r o l e s . T h i s c o n v e n t i o n a l l y a t t r i b u t e d a u t h o r i t a t i v e n e s sm a k e s
it more likely for one partner to become the explainer. In an
asymmetrical relationship, such as that between child and adult, or
between student and teacher, it is easier for the one who is in a
"upper" position to give an explanation and for the one in an
"lower" position to accept it as such. If the one in an "lower"
position gives an explanation, he/she might even feel compelled to
adapt his/her language to the situation by using, for instance,
c a u t i o u s e x p r e s s i o n s .I n a s y m m e t r i c a l r e l a t i o n s h i p , o n t h e o t h e r
hand, both partners have the same chances to act as explainers.
3.
Empirical
evidence
3.1. Method
The subjects of our analysis were three Italian girls aged three
years (Silvia, Carmela and Serena) attending a kindergarten near
Reggio Emilia. We observed them in different situations: free play,
playing with puzzles and looking at a picture book. Each of these
situations was videotaped twice. A first time, for 20 minutes, with
the teacher participating actively, and a second time, for l5
minutes, with the teacher playing a passive role. The videotapes,
lasting in total 105 minutes, were transcribed attention having
135
been paid to non-verbal behaviour as well. The total corpus
a m o u n t e d t o a b o ut 2 , 4 0 0 u t t e r a n c e s d i f f e r e n t l y d r s t r i b u t e d
b e t w e e na d u l t a n d c h i l d r e n d e p e n d i n g o n w h e t h e r t h e a d u l t w a s
active or passive. In the adult-active situations, the adult produced
a b o u t 1 , 2 0 0 u t t e r a n c e su n e v e n l y d i s t r i b u t e d b e t w e e n b o o k r e a d i n g
(540), free play (320) and puzzles (360) respectively, while the
three children all together produced about 670 utterances with no
d i f f e r e n c e sa m o n g t h e t h r e e s i t u a t i o n s . I n t h e a d u l t - p a s s i v e
situationschildren produced about 410 utterances equally
d i s t r i b u t e da m o n g t h e t h r e e s i t u a t i o n s ; t h e a d u l t , w h o w a s
i n s t r u c t e dt o i n t e r v e n e a s b r i e f l y a s p o s s i b l e a n d o n l y w h e n
produced only 65 utterances.
addressed,
Though we think that the concept of explanation encompassesa
wider range of phenomena besides explanationscontaining a causal
predicate,we decided to analyze in this work only this last type
becausethey can be selected with clear and independent criteria.
In order to select explanation we applied a slightly adapted version
of Hood and Bloom's method (1979: 4). We adopted either formal
criteria,like explicit causal connectives,or semantic criteria, like an
implicit referenceto two events or states having a causal relation
between them. Unlike them, we accepted that one part of the
explanation(usually the explanandum) could be expressed by nonverbal means, or even be a significant contextual event. After this
s e l e c t i o nw e c a r e f u l l y e x a m i n e d t h e i n t e r a c t i o n a l s i t u a t i o n w h i c h
precededand followed each explanation, looking for cues which
would indicate whether the conditions we set were honoured bv
both speaker and partner.
3.2. Criteria of analysis and examples
The honouring of these four conditions may be studied by
e x a m i n i n gt h e i n t e r a c t i o n a l c o n t e x t o f t h e e x p l a n a t i o n " I n s o m e
casesthis test may be done in an easy and direct way, as when the
e x i s t e n c eo f a n o b j e c t o f j o i n t a t t e n t i o n i s a s c e r t a i n e d .A t o t h e r
times,the fact that certain conditions have been respected may
only be inferred from the partner's behaviour. For instance, the
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partner's acceptance of
the explanation shows that it was
n e c e s s a r y .O n o t h e r c a s e s , h e / s h e m a y r e f u s e t h e e x p l a n a t i o n ,
sometimes even indicating which of the conditions has been
'l
already know' points out that the information is
violated: a bored
not new (failure of preparatory condition I ), whereas an annoyed
'Don't
talk about things you don't know about' shorvs that sincerity
conditions have not been fulfilled. We will now present the cues we
relied on in order to determine whether, and how, all four
conditions were observed by our subjects during interaction,
illustrating them with some examples.
3 . 2 . 1. P r e p a r a t o r y c o n d i t i o n s
Preparatory condition 1(the speakershould believe that
the partner does not know the explanans or is not able to establish
the relation between explanans and explanandum by him/herself).
The clearest possible cue is a request for an explanation.When
this does not occur, we can rely on indicators that the speaker may
have noticed, either non-verbal (i.e. the partner's puzzled
(repetitions, misunderstandings) which
expression) or verbal
indicate that the partner has not understood something.
When none of these cases occur, however, we must consider
what the explanation spontaneously offered is about. If the
speaker's explanation refers to his/her own wishes, goals or
intentions, then it is likely that he/she assumes that the partner
does not know what he/she has in mind.
L a s t l y , a n u n e x p e c t e de v e n t w h i c h c o n s t i t u t e s a c o g n i t i v e
problem also prepares the ground for an explanation, since the
speaker may assume that it constitutes a cognitive problem for the
partner too.
Our subjects do not recognize the situation which is apparently
the most favourable: a request for an explanation. They did not
answer any of the explicit requests made by the adult, nor thclse
made by another child (except in one case which we will examine
later).
1 ^ -
L-t /
( I ) Free play in the kitchen. 'f he teacher offers rhe children
some real bread.
Serena:Oresto non si pud mangiare
'You
can't eat this'
Teacher:Ouesto si. Perchd?
'Of
courseyou can. Why not?'
Serena:
.....
(doesnot answer)
Teacher:Ouesto si. si pub mangiare
'You
can eat it.'
(2) The girls are doing jigsaw puzzles. A piece gers sruck and
Silvia is not able to take it out.
Silvia:Perchdnon si toglie questo qui?
'Why
doesn'tthis come out?'
Serena:
.....
(does not answer)
Instead, all three girls seem capable of offering explanations
spontaneously.
The problem here is whether their explanations are
simply a verbal expression of what they are thinking, or whether
there is some concern for the partner's needs. The opportunity for
an explanationmay be grasped not only from a direct r"quesi, but
also from partner's cues such as misunderstandingsor repetitions
which indicate she has not understood something.
(3) Free play in the kitchen.
Silvia:(to Serena)Vuoi mangiare?
'Do
you want to eat?'
r
l, 3B
Serena:(to Silvia) Sono piena
'I'm full.'
Carmela: (to Silvia) Dh da mangiare a Serena
'Give
Serenasomethingto eat.'
Silvia: (to Carmela) Ma no/ che d piena!
'Oh, no!
/ She'sfull.' 1*;
Carmela's insistence shows that she has ignored Serena's
previous answer, motivating Silvia's refusal ('Oh, no!') with the
explanans that justifies it ('She's full').
Most frequently the need for an explanation derives from the
fact that the child is justifying his/her own needs, wishes, intentions
or requests. In such cases the child's being explicit comes from
presupposing that the partner is not capable of inferring it by
h i m / h e r s e l f.
(4) The girls are looking at a book.
Serena: (she pushes Silvia who is not letting her see the book) /
Io non vedo. io non vedo. Ho detto non vedo!
'll
can't see, I can't see. I said I can't see!' (She explains why she
pushed Silvia).
In the following example Serena justifies her refusal to
(*) The bar (D which appears in the examples always precedesthe
e x p l a na n s .
139
immediately exchange puzzles by
to finish the on-going activity.
rendering explicit her intention
(5) Each girl is solving a puzzle. Silvia has finished hers and
wants to exchange puzzles with Serena.
Silvia:Facciamo cambio. Sere?
'I-et's
switch, Sere.'
Aspetta
che finisco
Serena:
'Wait I haven't finished.'
/
Finally, the need for an explanation may be created by an
unexpectedor problematic event in the context.
(6) This situation immediately follows example (2).Silvia has
referred several times to her piece of puzzle being stuck. She
asks the teacher for help, receiving as an answer the advice to
try to do it by herself. She also asks Serena for help, who does
not answer (see example (2)). Finally she bursts out:
Silvia:Perchb non si toglie questo qui?.../Ci vuole un martello!
'Why
doesn't this come out? / We need a hammer.'
The explanans "we need an instrument to exercise force" is
arrived at by the problem resulting from several unsuccessful
efforts.
Here we present another example of an unexpectedsignificant
event.
L40
(7) The girls are playing together. Carmela leaves annoyed after
being pushed by one of her partners.
Serena:(to Silvia)/Le hai fatto male!
'/
You hurt her!'
Carmela's leaving is explained by Silvia being blamed for
having hurt her.
Preparatory condition 2 (when explaining, the speaker must
make sure that the explanandum is within the field of joint
attention). There are two situations in which joint attention is
already guaranteed:in the case of face to face interaction and in the
case where one partner verbalizes the explanandum and the other
one verbalizes the explanans. When joint attention is not already
guaranteed,it is the speaker who must establish it. In order to open
interaction and call for the partner's attention, the speaker may
either verbalize the explanandum, ensure attention by non verbal
means, or combine verbal and non-verbal means.
In the following two examples, joint attention is already
established.
(8) Carmela has unsuccessfully asked Silvia for the book several
times, by both verbal and non verbal-means:she then tries to
pull the book away from Silvia, saying
Carmela (to Silvia) Me lo dai?
'Can
I have it?'
Lasciami./ un po' io,*
'Gimme
it. / It's my turn.'
S i l v i a : ( t o Carmela, covering the book with
Nooo...Not now/ I'm reading.'
I
her arm)
L4L
In this case, since they are both handling the book, joint
attentionis of course guaranteed.From another point of view, the
example is interesting because Carmela's explanation raises the
level of the interaction: after Carmela's explanation, Silvia feels
compelled to explain her position too. During the previous
interaction they had opposed each other with mere (unexplained)
requestsand refusals.
Another case in which joint attention is already established
occurs when the explanandum is verbalized by one partner and the
explanansby the other, as in the following example:
(9) Serenatries to put in a piece of puzzle.
Serena:(to the teacher)Non ci vuole entrare dentro
'It
doesn'tfit.'
Teacher:lPerchd lo sai che bisogna girarlo dall'altra parte.
sembra uguale..
'/Cause' you knowr
)ou have to turn it round' It looks
the same...'
Serena:(she tries and the piece fits; she smiles) C'd andato
'That's
it.'
This is a very special example because here the partner is the
We
did not find a similar example in child-child interaction,
adult.
perhapsbecause of the early age of the participants.
Now we turn to a situation in which joint attention must be
established.One means of achieving this is by verbalizing the
explanandum.
(10) Free play in the kitchen. The girls keep certain distance
from each other.
I u/
Silvia: (to Serena,while putting on an apron) Dopo ci mettiamo a
p
- o s t o i l e r e m b i u l e ./ s i a m o l e c u o c h e !
''fhen
we put on
an apron / We are cooks!'
Even if a shared game had been taking place, the act of putting
on the apron would probably have not been enough to ensure the
partner's attention, since she was not looking at Silvia. By
verbalizing the explanandum this is achieved. From another point of
v i e w , t h i s c a s e i s i n t e r e s t i n g a l s o b e c a u s ei t s h o w s h o w g i v i n g
explanationsduring play interaction helps the speaker to take the
lead in the game. Hisiher proposals carry more weight and seem
more sensible when justified.
The child may also combine verbal and non-verbal means in
order to attract the partner's attention.
( I I ) Serena tries to open a tin. She does not succeed and
approachesthe teacher, showing her the tin.
Serena:(to the teacher)Me lo apri. che non ci riesco?
'You
openit I I can't.'
Or the child may use non-verbal means only.
(12) Serena:(in another moment, showing the teacher a tin)
A{on ci riesco ad aprire
'fCan't
open it.'
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T h e g e s t u r e o f s h o w i n g t h e t i n c o n s t i t u t e st h e e x p l a n a n d u m ,
i . e . a n o n - v e r b a rl e q u e s t f o r h e l p . T h e e x p l a n a n s ,o n t h e o t h e r h a n d ,
is verbal and justifies the request by referring to her own
helplessness.
We can infer from our data that preparatory conditions are
usually fulfilled by children at this age, except in those cases where
the need for the explanation is explicitly verbalized by the parrner
t h r o u g h a d i r e c t r e q u e s t . T h i s c o r r e s p o n d sw i t h t h e d e v e l o p m e n t
sequenceproposed by Hood and Bloom (1919) according to which
t h e c h i l d f i r s t m a k e s c a u s a l s t a t e m e n t s ,t h e n a n s w e r s t o r e q u e s t s
f o r e x p l a n a t i o n sa n d f i n a l l y m a k e s r e q u e s t s f o r e x p l a n a t i o n s .H o o d
& Bloom's account for these findings refers to the fact that
a n s w e r i n ga r e q u e s t f o r e x p l a n a t i o nr e q u i r e s t h a t t h e c h i l d b e a b l e
to encode causal relations with "a semantic intention that is
influenced by the message of the other speaker" (Hood & Bloom
1979, 33), or, in our opinion, to adapt to the other speaker's
viewpoint. In their longitudinal study of 8 children aged 2.6 ro 4
y e a r s t h e y f o u n d m a i n l y c a u s a l s t a t e m e n t sw i t h c o n t e n t s o f d e n i a l s ,
r e f u s a l s ,a n d d i r e c t i o n s , a l m o s t t o t a l l y r e l a t e d t o c h i l d r e n ' s o w n
n e e d sa n d i n t e n t i o n s . T h o u g h t h e l i n g u i s t i c d e v i c e s f o r e x p r e s s i n g
c a u s a l i t yi n I t a l i a n a r e s o m e h o w d i f f e r e n t f r o m E n g l i s h , s i n c e w e
use the same connective perc h d both for interrogative orrd
d e c l a r a t i v es e n t e n c e s , a n d t h e s y n t a x f o r I t a l i a n i n t e r r o g a t i v e
s e n t e n c e iss m u c h s i m p l e r t h a n i n E n g l i s h , w e h a v e f o u n d s i m i l a r
results.It seem to us that at three years language rnainly functions
to regulatejoint activity and that explanationsare likely to occur to
direct a common course of action fiustifications following requests,
e x p r e s s i o n so f w i s h e s , a n d i n t e n t i o n s ) o r t o a v o i d d i s r u p t i o n s
( e x p l a n a t i o n sf o l l o w i n g m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g si,n a d e q u a t e a c t i o n s o r
u n d e s i r e da c t i o n s w h i c h c o u l d a f f e c t t h e s p e a k e r ) . T h e r e . f o r e ,
t h o u g hm o s t e x p l a n a i i o n sa r e l i n k e d t o a s p e a k e r ' sp e r s o n a lp l a n , i n
the interaction they turn out to be adequate and pertinent. As
r e g a r d sp r e p a r a t o r y c o n d i t i o n 2 , t h e s p e a k e r a l w a y s m a k e s s u r e
t h a t t h e e x p l a n a n d u mi s w i t h i n t h e f i e l d o f j o i n t a t t e n t i o n b y
144
various means, the rnost frequent of
explanandum.
which is verbalizing the
3 . 2 . 2 .E s s e n t i a l c o n d i t i o n s
Essential condition I (presence of an explanandum and an
e x p l a n a n s ) .H e r e w e c h e c k e d t h e p r e s e n c eo f b o t h t h e e x p l a n a n d u m
and the explanans.In doing this we did not limit ourselvesto verbal
e x p r e s s i o n s ,s i n c e s o m e t i m e s p a r t o f t h e e x p l a n a t i o n ( u s u a l l y t h e
e x p l a n a n d u m )i s c o n s t i t u t e d b y a g e s t u r e o r a n a c t i o n . W e f o u n d
that the explanandum may even be constituted by an event in the
context. If this event calls for the partner'sattention (preparatory
c o n d i t i o n 2 ) , i t b e c o m e s a n e x p l a n a n d u mi n t h e c a s e a n e x p l a n a n s
refers to it.
I n o u r d a t a , w h i l e t h e e x p l a n a n si s a l w a y s v e r b a l i z e d , t h e
e x p l a n a n d u mi s e x p r e s s e di n t h e v a r i o u s w a y s m e n t i o n e d a b o v e . I n
most cases it is verbalized, sometimesit consists of a gesture or an
action, and in a few cases it either consistsof an event or it must be
inferred from discourse. Herb we will only exemplify the latter
possibility. Illustrations of verbalized explanandum and explanans
may be found in examples (3) and (5); example (4) illustrates an
explanandum consisting in a gesture or an action; example (7)
p r e s e n t sa n e x p l a n a n d u mc o n s i s t i n g o f a n e v e n t .
(13) Free play in the kitchen. Serenaoffers a spoon to Silvia.
Serena:Vuoi questo cucchiaio?
'Want
this spoon?'
Silvia: Ma /io ce I'ho gia
'But/Igotone.'
In this example the explanandum is a tacit refusal, whose only
linguistic cue is but, a word which indicates some sort of opposition.
In the following example the explanandum is a completely
tacit refusal which, however, can be inferred.
I
L1+5
(14) Each girl is solving a puzzle.
S i l v i a :( t o S e r e n a )F a c c i a m o c a m b i o ?
'Wanna
swap?'
Serena:
/Faccio cambio con Carmela
'/ gonna
I
swap with Carmela.
The explanansis Serena'salternativeplan, wirich explains why
she does not want to exchangepuzzles with Silvia.
Essential condition 2 (the speakermust show concern about
the partner'sinferential patterns). In order to explore whether this
conditionis observedwe may use only an indirect cue, i.e. evidence
in further interaction that the partner has accepted the explanation
(he/shedoes or says something that reveals that he/she has noticed
the information which has been offered to him/her). This would
indicate that the explanation seems sensible to the partner. A
weakercue consists in the fact that the partner does not refuse the
e x p l a n a t i o n .T h e s u b j e c t s s t u d i e d i n o u r r e s e a r c h h a v e s i m i l a r
inferential patterns since they are of the same &Be, share a similar
cultural background, and have been attending the same creche for a
long time. Thus, it was highly improbable that they would refuse
each other's explanations. We could therefore infer concern about
the partner's inferential patterns only from the indirect cue
consistingof the partner's behaviour.
Let us consider some cases in which the explanation is
successful.In some cases the partner accepts the explanation: i.e.
she acts accordingly to the speaker's request or proposal, or accepts
the given information (nodding, repeating, etc). In other occasions,
the partner merely acknowledges the new information: that is,
even if she does not agree with the explanation (she does not do
what has been asked to or disagrees with the given explanation),
her behaviourindicates that it has been taken into account.
I n e x a m p l e s ( l l ) a n d ( 1 2 ) t h e t e a c h e r s a t i s f i e st h e c h i l d ' s
request and opens the tin. It is interestingto notice that the
e x p l a n a n st h a t j u s t i f i e s t h e r e q u e s t d o e s n o t h a v e a m e r e l y p o l i t e
p u r p o s e . S i n c e t h i s t e a c h e r u s u a l l y e n c o u r a g e sc h i l d r e n t o s o l v e
p r o b l e m s b y t h e m s e l v e s ,S e r e n a ' s e x p l a n a n s h a s t h e p u r p o s e o f
a v o i d i n g t h e t e a c h e r ' sr e f u s a l b y r e n d e r i n g e x p l i c i t i n a d v a n c e t h a t
s h e h a s a l r e a d y t r i e d b y h e r s e l.f
W e n o w t u r n t o t h e a n a l y s i s o f t w o s o m e w h a tm o r e c o m p l e x
examples.
( 1 5 ) E , a c hg i r l i s d o i n g a p u z z l e .S e r e n ah a s j u s t f i n i s h e dh e r s .
S e r e n a :( t o C a r m e l a ,w h o i s s t i l l w o r k i n g o n h e r s ) F a c c i a m o
canrbio._C.a!!C
Wanna
swap, Carme'l
C a r m e l a .: . .
(doesnot answer)
Silvia: (to Serena)No/ faccio cambio_conte
'No
/ I wanna swap with you.'
Serena:(to Silvia) No /faccio cambio con lei. Dopo. dopo faccio
cambio con ts
'No
/ I'm gonnaswap with her...Then you.'
(to
Silvia:
Serena)Si. aspetta/che lei finisca. /vuoi che faccia un
casino?
'O.K.
Wait / she'sstill doing hers/ You want
her to make a mess of it?'
S e r e n a :( a p p r o a c h e sC a r m e l a a n d h e l p s h e r t o f i n i s h . W h e n a
p i e c e f a l l s d o w n , S e r e n ap i c k s i t u p ) .
A remarkable interlacing of explanations occurs during this
sequence. First, Silvia refuses Serena's plan and justifies her refusal
with her desire to exchange puzzles with Serena herself. But Serena
in lurn rcl'uses Silvia's proposal and justifies this refusal by a
I
L47
r e a f f i r m a t i o no f h e r o r i g i n a l p l a n . A t t h i s p o i n t S i l v i a a c c e p t s
S e r e n a ' sp l a n ( ' O . K . ' ) b u t r e q u i r e s s o m e t h i n g ( ' w a i t ' ) . S h e a l s o
justifies her request (Carmeia has not finished yet) and she explains
why it is necessaryto wait for Carmela to finish (otherwise she will
make a mess of it). In order to decide about Silvia's concern for
Serena's inferential patterns we are interested in Serena's
s u c c e s s i v eb e h a v i o u r . S h e n e i t h e r i n s i s t s n o r p r e s s e s C a r m e l a , b u t
insteadhelps her to finish. In this way she shows that she has taken
Silvia'sexplanationinto account, which turns out to be successful.
(16) The girls are looking at a book. Carmela is slightly apart,
while Serenacomplains to Silvia, who does not allow her to see
the book because she is covering it with her arm. Serena first
p u s h e sS i l v i a s a y i n g
Serena(to Silvia) Non__wdq (Silvia does not move her arm).
'I
can't see'
N o n v e d o ! . . . T i m e t t o u n e l a s t i c o .v e h ! T i m e t t o
u n e l a s t i c oq u a .
'I
can't see...I'll put a rubber band on you,
ah! I'll put a rubber band here!'
Silvia: (ignoresthis)
Serena:Io ti butto fuori dalla finestra
'I'll
throw you out the window.'
Silvia:Ma c'd freddo.../Ionon ci voglio andare.Apro la finestra e
scappo dentro.
'But
it is cold, / I don't want to go there. I'll open the
window and run back inside.'
S e r e n a :( p o i n t i n g a t C a r m e l a ) l - e i . l e i . . l a b u t t i a m o f u o r i d a l l a
finestra
'Let's
throw her, her...out ihe
w i n do w . '
I4B
In t his ex am pl e , S i l v i a ' s e x p l a n a ti o n (I don' t w ant to go there
beca u se it ' s c old) is p a rti a l l y s u c c e s s fu l . It b l o cks S erena' s pl an (to
t hro w Silv ia out of t h e w i n d o w ) o n l y c o n c e rn i n g the obj ect to w hi ch
sh e tri e s t o apply it . Afte r Si l v i a ' s e x p l a n a ti o n , S erena tri es to appl y
the same plan to a different partner, Carmela.
Anot her gr oup o f c a s e s a l l o w s u s to i n fer that the expl anati on
has b e e n ac c ept ed: w h e n th e p a rtn e r i m i ta te s the behavi our of the
sp e a ke r (17) or r epea ts th e e x p l a n a ti o n , a s a whol e or i n part (18)
as a sign of agreement.
(1 7) F r ee play in th e k i tc h e n .
Si l via: ( laughing , s h e c l e a n s h e r h a n d s o n her apron) A desso ci
o u l i a m o le m ani /c h e s o n o c o s i s p o rc h e
'Now
we
are cleaning our hands / they are so dirty.'
Se rena: ( im it at es S i l v i a , w h o l o o k s a t h e r).
(18) Serena and Carmela are sitting next to each other. The
teacher places a puzzle on the table in front of Carmela.
Carmela places it between herself and Serena,as a non-verbal
suggestionto share the puzzle.
Serena:(to Carmela)No /questo b tuo
'No
/ this is yours.'
Carmela:Ouestod mio. Ne vuoi un altro?
'This mine. Do
is
vou want anotherone?'
Successfulexplanations,such as those illustratedby examples
( 1 5 ) , ( 1 7 ) a n d ( 1 8 ) c o n s t i t u t et h e m a j o r i t y i n o u r d a t a .
I
L49
A third way of inferring the successof an explanation is to see
whether the same explanation is used by another partner in further
interaction.Some such cases appear in our data, as when Carmela
'You
open itll can't', exactly reproducing
says to the teacher
Serena'sexplanation in example ( I I ). These examples of "deferred
imitation" are frequent in cases of explanations which regulate
'Wait/I
haven't finished' or 'No (don't
interaction, such as
touch)/thisis mine (yours)'.
It must be said that the evidence for checking whether or not
essentialcondition 2 has been honoured is the weakest both in
qualitative and quantitative terms. In about one third of the cases
we are unable to decide whether this type of condition has been
fulfilled, since these explanations are neither refused, nor
questioned,nor accepted. It is therefore impossible to ascertain
whether the given explanation seemed sensible to the partner.
Another means for ascertaining the explanatory success would
be verifying whether the explanans refers to previously established
rules and therefore to a shared conversational logic. From this point
of view it is interesting to notice that the rules used in our subjects'
explanations are frequently those characteristic of the kindergarten:
sharingthings, taking turns, etc.
3.2.3.Sincerity conditions
This condition states that the explainer must consider
him/herselfcompetent to give an explanation on a certain matter.
We can explore how this condition is fulfilled in various ways, but
mainly by analyzing what the explanation refers to. If it regards the
speaker'sown feelings, intentions, plans, capacities, and previous
experience,then the speaker is obviously the most authoritative
person on the matter. If, instead, the explanation regards other
people or the physical world, then we can rely only on an indirect
indicator:i.e. the fact that the partner accepts the speaker to give an
explanation about a certain matter (a counterexample would be
somethinglike: 'Who do you think you are to speak about this?').
Almost all the explanations in our data refer to the speaker's
i n t e n t i o n sa n d p l a n s . O n l y i n t w o e x a m p l e s d o e s t h e e x p l a n a t i o n
1 F ^
1)U
refer to external objects: in example (6) the speaker's authority
derives from the fact that nobody else had wanted to take it (Silvia
had asked the teacher and Serena for help several times, without
receiving any); in example (15) the explanation refers to the
p a r t n e r ' s c o m p e t e n c ei n a c c o m p l i s h i n g a c e r t a i n t a s k , a n d n o b o d y
questions the fact that the speaker gives an explanation about the
matter. In the absence of formal criteria when we analyze
explanations which do not refer to the speaker's own plans,
intentions, and wishes the only possible cue is the fact that the
authority of the speaker is not questioned.
In a certain w&/, our young subjects seem concerned about
respecting sincerity conditions. In the following example Serena
refuses to explain precisely because she is not able to honour such
conditions:
(19) Serena and Silvia beat the table with their hands. Carmela
imitates them.
Serena:(to Silvia) Carmela vuole fare come noi
'Carmela
wants to do like us.'
Silvia: (to Serena)Perchd?
'Why?'
Serena:Io non lo so
'Don't
know.'
Serena is explaining the meaning of Carmela'saction, but she is
not able to go further in the causal chain which would allow her to
find a reason for this action. A descriptive explanation interprets
the action by saying what the action means, but the explanation
process stops at the first step becausea reason for the action is not
found.
From another point of view, the child seems to be aware in a
certain way of the power derived from explaining. It is interesting
to notice that, mainly during symbolic play, explanationsacquire
151
t h e f u n c t i o no f g u i d i n g p a r t n e r s 'b e h a v i o u r .a n d t h u s o f c o n t r i b u t i n g
to accomplishor to maintain the speaker's leadership. In fact, the
'we
put on an apron/we are cooks' or 'now we'll
child who says
make a pizzallet'sget the salt'is guiding and organizing the game.
3.2.4.Affiliative conditions
This condition refers to the honouring of the social relation
between speaker and listener. Here we observed whether the
relation between partners was symmetrical (child-child) or not
(child-adult). Then we evaluated the relative amount of
explanationsthe child offered to each type of partner. We also
e x p l o r e dw h e t h e r t h e t o p i c o f t h e s e e x p l a n a t i o n sv a r i e d a c c o r d i n g
to the type of partner, in order to see whether, when addressingan
a d u l t ( a s y m m e t r i c a lr e l a t i o n s h i p ) , t h e c h i l d e x p l a i n e d t h i n g s a b o u t
which she could consider herself particularly competent: situations
in which the adult had not been present, on-going games or
referencesto the speaker's own intentions and wishes. In our data,
most of the explanations were addressedto other children, whereas
only a few were addressed to the adult. When we analyzed the
contentof these latter explanations,we found that even this aspect
is influencedby affiliative conditions. In fact, 7 out of 8 cases were
justificationsof requests for help deriving from the speaker's own
wishesor difficulties. The other example was an explanation about a
game situation in which the adult had not participated
(example(17)).
Therefore, we may say that not only did our subjects
give few explanations to the adult, but they also limited such
e x p l a n a t i o n tso m a t t e r s a b o u t w h i c h t h e i r " a u t h o r i t y " w a s s t r o n g e r
than the adult's.
4. Conclusions
We interpret the act of explaining as a social act occurring in
a n i n t e r a c t i o n a lc o n t e x t . T h e c o n d i t i o n s w e d e s c r i b e d a b o v e
the set of rules governingits performance.
constitute
L52
T h e q u a l i t a t i v ea n a l y s i sc a r r i e d o u t , t h o u g h b a s e d o n a l i m i t e d
corpus of data, allows us to conclude that at three years children
know how to explain (i.e. they master the conditions and ways
required to give an explanation). We consider neoVygotskian
frameworks to be the best tool for interpreting our results as a
whole. NeoVygotskian theories stress the role of social interaction in
t h e d e v e l o p m e n t o f l a n g u a g ea n d c o g n i t i o n ( B r u n e r 1 9 8 3 ) , w i t h o u t
denying, however, an active elaboration of the input from the
environment on the part of the subject. Several considerations
support this theoreticalchoice. The first one is that even very young
children are able to give explanations in social interaction in a
c o r r e c t w a y . T h e s e c o n d i s t h e f a c t t ha t o u r su b je c t s u s e
explanations mainly to justify speech acts of their own, such as
requests and refusals. As a matter of fact, according to our data,
children use explanations as instruments to influence and direct
their partners' behaviour considerably more frequently than as a
means to inquire about the world for the satisfactionof their own or
others' cognitive requirements.Lastly, many of the explanations we
analyzed regard the regulation of behaviour according to social
rules, turns or the sharing of objects. If we accept the idea that the
c h i l d e x p l a i n s w h a t s h e k n o w s b e s t , w h a t i n t e r e s t sh e r m o s t , a n d
what serves her main goals, we may suppose that it is only later
t h a t e x p l a n a t i o n s w i l l b e c o m e i n s t r u m e n t s f o r b u i l di n g u p
knowledge about the physical world. Therefore, we hypothesize that
explanations are -in their origins- closely linked to human action,
and to the intentions and plans of the individuals who are
negotiating within interaction. As they grow older, children will be
able to supply explanations about a wider range of objects and
situations which will be increasingly farther away from the
speaker's actions and viewpoints. The causal chain will become
more complex and the capacity to take into account the partner's
inferential patterns will sharpen. The skill in using verbal means
will also progress.
The close bond between explanation and communication can
help us understand why the pragmatic conditions of explaining are
masteredso early. According to Hood and Bloom (1979) our subjects
I
rl q?
w e r e a t t h e b e g i n n i n go f t h e i r e x p l a i n i n gc a p a c i t y . I n o u r d a t a , s u c h
r e q u e s t sf o r e x p l a n a t i o n sw e r e n o t o f t e n d i r e c t e d t o c h i l d r e n , a n d
theserequeststhat were made, were for the most part unanswered.
Therefore, our interpretation relies mainly on the previous
l i t e r a t u r e .N e v e r t h e l e s s ,t h e c h i l d r e n i n t h i s s t u d y w e r e a b l e t o
grasp the need for an explanation by using the very strong
c o n t e x t u a cl u e s w h i c h a l l o w e d t h e m t o g i v e p e r t i n e n t e x p l a n a t i o n s .
Thesecontextual cues were not subtle signals of doubt but obvious
mistakes,unpleasantactions that affected the speaker, and requests
for help that involved the partner directly.
As a final discussionpoint, we want to consider the value we
may attribute to each condition. Two of them, preparatory and
essentialconditions, are more important than the rest in making a
g i v e n i n t e r a c t i o n a lm o v e b e c o m e a n e x p l a n a t i o n . P r e p a r a t o r y a n d
essentialconditions are those more closely linked to the need for
informative exchange (preparatory condition I ) and to its
e f f e c t i v e n e s s( p r e p a r a t o r y c o n d i t i o n 2 a n d e s s e n t i a l c o n d i t i o n s I
and 2). The fulfilment of sincerity and affiliative conditions, on the
other hand, is not required in order to have an explanation. They
are not binding conditions. However, they affect the partner's
judgement of the quality of the information being offered, and the
p o l i t e n e s sw i t h w h i c h i t i s e x p r e s s e d . N e v e r t h e l e s s , a l l f o u r
conditions were taken into account, in different degrees, by the
three-yearold children we observed.
r
L54
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