STC
266 STC 14 E
Original: English
NATO Parliamentary Assembly
SUMMARY
of the meeting of the Science and Technology Committee
Yangtze, World Forum,
The Hague, Netherlands
Sunday 23 November 2014
www.nato-pa.int
November 2014
266 STC 14 E
ATTENDANCE LIST
Chairperson
Baroness
RAMSAY
(United Kingdom)
OF
General Rapporteur
Stephen GILBERT (United Kingdom)
Rapporteur of the Sub-Committee on
Energy and Environmental Security
Osman Askin BAK (Turkey)
President of the NATO PA
Hugh BAYLEY (United Kingdom)
Secretary General of the NATO PA
David HOBBS
Member delegations
Belgium
Canada
Croatia
Czech Republic
France
Germany
Greece
Hungary
Italy
Latvia
Lithuania
Luxembourg
Netherlands
Norway
Poland
Portugal
Romania
Slovakia
Spain
United Kingdom
United States
Gerald KINDERMANS
Olga ZRIHEN
Cheryl GALLANT
David M. WELLS
Marin JURJEVIC
Antonin SEDA
Pavel SRAMEK
Jacques GAUTIER
Philippe VITEL
Jürgen HARDT
Charles M. HUBER
Evripidis STYLIANIDIS
Marta DEMETER
Roberto MORASSUT
Domenico SCILIPOTI
Ivans KLEMENTJEVS
Andrius MAZURONIS
Domas PETRULIS
Nancy ARENDT KEMP
Marjolein FABER-VAN de KLASHORST
Maria MARTENS
Jan Arild ELLINGSEN
Marek MARTYNOWSKI
Wojciech PENKALSKI
Dariusz SELIGA
Edmund WITTBRODT
Bruno VITORINO
Haralambie VOCHITOIU
Boris SUSKO
Guillermo MARISCAL
Sir Menzies CAMPBELL
Caroline DINENAGE
Lord JOPLING
Brett GUTHRIE
James SENSENBRENNER
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266 STC 14 E
Associate delegations
Armenia
Sweden
Ukraine
Tevan POGHOSYAN
Lena EMILSSON
Rostyslav PAVLENKO
European Parliament
Evdoxia-Eva KAILI
Parliamentary Observers
Republic of Korea
Moon-Jong HONG
Young-Sun PARK
Speakers
Vice-Admiral Matthieu BORSBOOM, Netherlands’
National Armaments Director
Major General Albert HUSNIAUX, NATO Chief
Scientist
Dr Jonathan FORMAN, Science Policy Advisor,
Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical
Weapons
International Secretariat
Henrik BLIDDAL, Director
Anne-Laure BLEUSE, Co-ordinator
Timo SMIT, Research Assistant
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I.
Opening remarks
Chairperson
by
Baroness
RAMSAY
of
CARTVALE
(United
Kingdom),
1.
The Chairperson, Baroness Ramsay of Cartvale, opened the meeting and thanked the
Dutch Delegation to the NATO Parliamentary Assembly for hosting the Annual Session. She
also thanked the Dutch delegation for organising the committee visit to the NATO
Communication and Information Agency (NCIA) on the day before. The Chairperson
proceeded to introduce the three speakers of the committee meeting: Vice Admiral Matthieu
Borsboom, Netherlands’ National Armaments Director, Major General Albert Husniaux,
NATO Chief Scientist, and Dr Jonathan Forman, Science Policy Advisor at the Organisation
for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). Finally, the Chairperson reminded the
members that the deadline for submitting amendments for the draft Resolution on NATO
Ballistic Missile Defence was at 9.15 that morning.
II.
Adoption of the draft Agenda [206 STC 14 E rev. 1]
2.
The draft Agenda [206 STC 14 E rev. 1] was adopted.
III.
Adoption of the Summary of the Meeting of the Science and Technology Committee
held in Vilnius, Lithuania, on Saturday 31 May 2014 [154 STC 14 E]
3.
The Summary of the Meeting of the Science and Technology Committee held in Vilnius,
Lithuania, on Saturday 31 May 2014 [154 STC 14 E] was adopted without comments.
IV.
Procedure for amendments to the draft Resolution on NATO Ballistic Missile Defence
[227 STC 14 E] presented by Stephen Gilbert (United Kingdom), General Rapporteur.
4.
The Chairperson laid out the procedure for amending the draft Resolutions.
V.
Panel debate with presentations by Vice-Admiral Matthieu BORSBOOM, Netherlands’
National Armaments Director, on The Netherlands’ Defence Industry Strategy and its
Research & Development Policy, and by Major General Albert HUSNIAUX, NATO Chief
Scientist, on NATO Science and Technology Policy
5.
Vice-Admiral Borsboom started his presentation by arguing that armed forces are still
necessary in today’s world. Moreover, given the changed nature of the security challenges they
face, flexibility and adaptability have become critical requirements of contemporary armies. Access
to the right materials and capabilities is an important part of this.
6.
Vice-Admiral Borsboom explained that the mission of the Netherlands’ Defence Material
Organisation (DMO) is to “provide armed forces with the material and information they need to be
able to perform the tasks assigned to them.” The DMO has a crucial role in the Ministry of
Defence, but also works closely with scientific committees and industry. As a consequence of
shrinking defence budgets, much innovation currently takes place outside the defence industry.
Since armed forces must be ready and affordable, the DMO continuously seeks opportunities to
increase its co-operation with scientific institutions and industries.
7.
The Netherlands recently updated its defence industrial strategy in order to enhance the
synergy among these actors. Based on the operational interests and needs of the armed forces,
this strategy aims to position Dutch defence industry and scientific institutions in such a manner
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that they can make a high-quality contribution to the security of the Netherlands, whilst also
operating competitively on the European and global markets. The DMO describes this partnership
with scientific institutions and industry as the ‘Triple Helix’. The trilateral exchange of information
and views is seen as a critical tool to boost innovative capacity, which is necessary to stay ahead
of international threats and challenges and to fill critical capability gaps. Mr Borsboom argued that
this concept of the ‘Triple Helix’ can also be applied internationally, for example in the framework
of NATO. Within the EU context, the European Defence Agency already plays an important role in
this regard.
8.
Regarding procurement policy, the Vice-Admiral explained that it is his responsibility to
provide the armed forces with the equipment they need at the cheapest cost. This means that the
Netherlands uses existing technologies unless the armed forces are in need of capabilities that are
not available ‘off the shelf’, in which case it has to develop these capabilities themselves. In both
cases, however, the DMO is always interested in co-operation with international partners.
Vice-Admiral Borsboom argued that, for the sake of cost efficiency, innovation, and competition,
the European defence market has to become more open. Especially for smaller enterprises,
cross-market entry remains difficult, while these companies are important drivers for innovation
and growth. International co-operation and international institutions therefore continue to need
government support.
9.
Major General Albert Husniaux gave a presentation on NATO Science and Technology.
After a brief historical background on science and technology co-operation in NATO,
Major General Husniaux explained that NATO Science and Technology aims to generate and
apply state-of-the-art, validated knowledge for security and defence purposes. Its mission is to
enable and focus the generation and exploitation of scientific knowledge and technological
innovation in order to support NATO’s core tasks. It does so through scientific and operational
research, analysis, and experimentation; systems engineering; and synthesis, integration, and
validation of scientific evidence-based knowledge. This process is co-ordinated by NATO’s
Science and Technology Board and involves various stakeholders, including member nations,
partners, and NATO staff.
10. As NATO’s Chief Scientist, Major General Husniaux chairs the Science and Technology
Board, represents the Board in meetings with the North Atlantic Council and the Secretary
General, and serves as the Senior Scientific Advisor to NATO’s leadership. In these capacities, he
is responsible for NATO’s Science and Technology strategy, priorities, and initiatives. Using
priorities listed in the Wales Summit declaration as examples, Major General Husniaux explained
that political commitments to prioritise certain capabilities (e.g. joint intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance) requires input from several areas within the realm of science and technology.
Major General Husniaux therefore emphasised the importance of co-operation between all
relevant stakeholders. Scientists must listen to the military to learn what they need, but at the
same time the military needs to listen carefully to the scientists too, in order to know what they can
deliver.
11. Major General Husniaux also underscored the evolution of how military innovation comes
about. He called for a new mind-set in military innovation that focuses on ‘resilience’ and
‘adaptability’ on the one hand, and on ‘control’ on the other. As civilian technologies and industries
have become major drivers of innovation in the military domain, Major General Husniaux further
argued that ‘military innovation’ must leverage both ‘military and civilian inventions.’ To this end,
NATO member states need a defence and security knowledge base in order to take maximum
advantage of all knowledge that exists in the civilian and military spheres. As a ‘strategic enabler’,
the NATO Science and Technology Organisation supports the creation of such a defence and
security knowledge base and operates as a hub for multidisciplinary and multinational initiatives to
spur innovation and technological development – with the overarching aim to support NATO’s core
tasks and priorities.
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12. In the discussion that followed the presentations, various topics were addressed. One
member asked the speakers about concrete capability gaps in European armed forces and how
international collaboration could assist to fill these gaps and to acquire, for example,
third-generation drones. Other members raised the dilemma between increasing international
co-operation and preserving national sovereignty, especially in relation to defence material
procurement and the liberalisation of the European defence market. In terms of the implications of
decreasing defence budgets, members were reminded that besides activities like innovation,
research and development, and procurement, maintenance is a critical (and costly) activity that is
often overlooked. As for the role of parliaments, members and speakers discussed how the
adoption of new technologies and innovation within the realm of defence (but also procurement
processes) could be sped up, in order to stay on a par with non-traditional adversaries, which do
not face the same procedural obstacles as most countries do. Finally, it was agreed that Europe
lags behind in terms of science, technology and engineering and that countries should do more to
encourage people to pursue careers in these fields.
VI.
Presentation by Dr Jonathan FORMAN, Science Policy Advisor, Organisation for the
Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), on Chemical Disarmament in a
Technologically Evolving World
13. Jonathan Forman began his presentation by briefly introducing the OPCW, the
implementing body of the Chemical Weapons Convention. Located in The Hague, the
Netherlands, the OPCW employs 450 staff and operates an annual budget of 73 million EUR. The
organisation has 190 States Parties; only four countries are non-signatories to the Chemical
Weapons Convention (Angola, Egypt, North Korea, and South Sudan), while Israel and Myanmar
have signed but not yet ratified the Convention. In 2013, the OPCW was awarded the Nobel
Peace Prize for its efforts to fully eliminate chemical weapons.
14. The core activities of the OPCW are disarmament (destruction and verification),
non-proliferation (verification), providing assistance and protection against chemical weapons, and
facilitation of international co-operation on chemical research. Dr Forman explained that just a few
states possessed more than 80% of all declared chemical weapon stockpiles. The United States
and Russia are the largest possessors, but significant progress has been made to destroy their
declared stockpiles. Iraq and Libya remain risk countries where remnants of chemical weapons
may still be stored in bunkers, and which could end up in the hands of non-state actors. All of
Syria’s declared chemical weapons have been removed and 95% of these weapons have been
destroyed, but it is not certain that the Syrian government has fully declared all stockpiles and
relevant facilities. Particular concerns exist regarding a few facilities that have been inactive at the
time of signature, but could possibly be reactivated in the future. Moreover across the world,
96 declared chemical weapons production facilities have been destroyed.
15. The OPCW monitors so-called Warfare Agents, precursors and breakdown products for
chemical weapons, industrial ‘dual-use’ chemicals that could be used of the production of chemical
weapons, and other chemical production facilities (OCPF). While this may sound straightforward,
Dr Forman emphasised that these processes require very specific scientific knowledge. Science
and Technology is therefore an important pillar of the work of the OPCW and, encouragingly, the
scientific knowledge of chemicals continues to grow. However, Dr Forman stressed the distinction
between basic research and the ‘fieldable application’ of research, the latter being of higher
interest for the OPCW in terms of the implementation of its mandated tasks.
16. The main scientific developments and concerns for the OPCW are the discovery and
development of new routes to toxic chemicals or new delivery methods for chemical weapons as
well as new methods to disguise banned activities. Knowledge and analysis are critical for the
OPCW to maintain a high level of readiness to stay ahead of these challenges. The OPCW
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therefore has a Scientific Advisory Board, comprised of independent experts, which assesses
developments in Science and Technology and provides scientific and technological advice relevant
to the Chemical Weapons Convention.
17. Following his presentation Dr Forman answered various questions posed by members. He
admitted that negative bilateral relations among States Parties can affect the work of the OPCW
Executive Council. Dr Forman assured members that the timelines for the destruction of the
remainders of the United States’ and Russia’s declared chemical weapons stockpiles is on track.
Full destruction is scheduled to be completed by 2022 and 2016, respectively. Various members
asked questions related to the possibility that chemical weapons would fall into the hands of
non-state actors, for example in Iraq, Syria, or Libya. Dr Forman reminded the members that the
Chemical Weapons Convention only has state signatories and that the OPCW can only monitor
the implementation of national policies. As such, it has limited possibilities to monitor or prevent
non-state actors in their possible pursuit of chemical weapons capabilities. Dr Forman added,
however, that it is unlikely that non-state actors are capable of cutting-edge application of
chemicals necessary to produce sophisticated chemical weapons. However, he acknowledged that
plenty of readily available chemicals exist that could do a lot of harm if they would end up in the
wrong hands.
VII.
Consideration of the draft General Report on The Global Spread of Ballistic Missile
Defences [207 STC 14 E] presented by Stephen GILBERT (United Kingdom), General
Rapporteur
18. Stephen Gilbert presented his report in which he provides a global overview of ballistic
missile defence systems and discusses their potential strategic implications. Mr Gilbert
emphasised that the threat posed by ballistic missiles continues to increase as offensive systems
continue to proliferate across the globe. Of particular concern are efforts by countries hostile to the
Alliance – e.g. Iran and North Korea – to obtain ballistic missile capabilities, which they may intend
to use as a means to carry and deliver weapons of mass destruction (WMD). To counter these
emerging threats, NATO decided at the 2010 Summit in Lisbon to develop a robust missile
defence system to protect the populations and territories of its European members. Mr Gilbert
welcomed the progress made so far, as well as the affirmation by NATO leaders at the Wales
Summit in 2014 that ballistic missile defence constitutes an integral part of NATO’s deterrence and
collective defence capabilities. As the report describes, various NATO partners and other countries
are developing their own missile defence systems, including, most notably, Russia and China.
19. Mr Gilbert also presented some of the policy recommendations that had emerged from the
report and which were incorporated into a draft resolution on NATO Ballistic Missile Defence
[227 STC 14 E]. Calling for the prompt completion of NATO’s ballistic missile defence system –
the European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) – a key recommendation concerned the need
for European members of NATO to provide additional voluntary national contributions to this
capability. To improve the balance in burden sharing with the United States, both in missile
defence as in general, European NATO members should seek to increase their contributions to
the EPAA. Mr Gilbert mentioned increased co-operation and Smart Defence as two examples of
how this could be achieved.
20. Notably, Mr Gilbert strongly recommended that NATO continues to demonstrate that NATO
ballistic missile defence is not directed against Russia, and that its implementation does not in any
way challenge or undermine Russia’s strategic nuclear deterrent capability. While NATO leaders
have repeatedly declared this, Mr Gilbert stressed the importance that the NATO PA would follow
their example, especially since Russia had already been using false claims about NATO ballistic
missile defence as a pretext to build up its offensive military capabilities. The draft resolution
therefore calls on NATO to enact an active policy of unilateral transparency and
confidence-building measures towards Russia and to resume bilateral efforts on ballistic missile
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defence co-operation if, however unlikely it may seem at this point, NATO’s co-operation with
Russia would be reinstated at some point in the future.
21. Mr Moon-Jong Hong (KR), parliamentary observer from the South Korean National
Assembly, wished to clarify a few issues regarding the description in the report of South Korean
ballistic missile defences. Mr Hong disputed that South Korea has deployed US missile defence
technology. Also, regarding the consultations between the United States and South Korea about
the possibility of deploying US Terminal High Altitude Area Defence (THAAD) systems in South
Korea, Mr Hong pointed out that the official position of the South Korean government remains that
this is not a topic of discussion between both countries. Finally, Mr Hong wished to stress that the
satellite program that South Korea is developing to provide early warning against missile threats
aims exclusively to detect missile launches by North Korea. In his response, General Rapporteur
Mr Gilbert thanked Mr Hong for his comments and promised to work with the South Korean
delegation in rephrasing the section on South Korean missile defences to minimise room for
misinterpretation.
22. Another member asked the General Rapporteur how, in his view, parliamentarians can help
to convince the populations and civil societies of their home countries about the added value of
having ballistic missile defences as an additional means of deterrence (besides a traditional
nuclear deterrent capability). The General Rapporteur argued that while it can be difficult at times,
parliamentarians should continue to have a dialogue with sceptics. It is evident that there are
actors that are seeking to acquire WMD and missile technologies, and these actors may be
unaware or uninterested in the consequences of their actions. Ballistic missile defence provides
additional protection against the threats posed by such irrational and irresponsible actors, and is
therefore a capability worth investing in.
23. The draft General Report on The Global Spread of Ballistic Missile Defences
[207 STC 14 E] by Stephen Gilbert (United Kingdom) was adopted unanimously.
VIII. Consideration of the draft Special Report on Cyber Space and Euro-Atlantic Security
[209 STC 14 E] presented by Philippe VITEL (France), Special Rapporteur
24. Philippe Vitel introduced his report, noting that cyber threats to national security are a grave
concern to all NATO countries, thus adding a new level of complexity to the management of
international security. Mr Vitel stated that although cyber security has received sustained,
high-level attention in recent years, countermeasures against cyber threats are still in
developmental stages. Referring to Russia’s hybrid warfare approach and pointing to the circa
600 incidents of outsider attempts to access NATO networks countered every day, he
demonstrated the urgency of the issue in current times.
25. The Rapporteur then presented the sections on Estonia, the United Kingdom and Germany,
which had been added to the report since the Spring Session in Lithuania. With regard to Estonia,
he argued that the 2007 cyber-attack on the country had fostered the establishment of a
successful Estonian cyber security strategy that relies on institutional collaboration and
co-ordination between ministries, public research organisations and the industry as well as cross
border co-operation with international partners.
26. Turning to the United Kingdom, Mr Vitel highlighted the establishment of a national
Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT), tasked to co-operate with government and
industry on national-level cyber security incidents and to establish partnerships with other states
and their CERT counterparts at bilateral and multilateral levels.
27. Finally, with regard to Germany, the Rapporteur mentioned the new Digital Agenda
introduced in Germany, together with a new draft Cyber Security Act, designed to achieve a
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significant improvement in the security of Information Technology systems. He also drew attention
to Germany’s National Strategy to Protect Critical Infrastructure, which promotes a co-operative
relationship between public authorities and private operators of critical infrastructure.
28. The ensuing discussion focused on the need for minimum protection requirements within
NATO that apply to all members’ energy supply and communication systems. The Rapporteur was
critical regarding the fact that there was not yet a consensus between all NATO members to
protect critical civilian infrastructure and urged parliamentarians to promote this issue in their
countries. Discussion then turned to the use of social networks to influence public opinion, both by
the Russian regime and by ‘Da’esh’, formerly labelled the ‘Islamic State’. Mr Vitel maintained that
social networks might become a future report topic as a lot of work remains still to be done in this
area.
29. The draft Special Report on Cyber Space and Euro-Atlantic Security [209 STC 14 E] by
Philippe VITEL (France) was adopted unanimously as amended.
IX.
Consideration of the draft Report of the Sub-Committee on Energy and Environmental
Security European Energy Security: The Southern Gas Corridor [208 STCEES 14 E]
presented by Osman Askin Bak (Turkey), Rapporteur
30. Osman Askin Bak presented his report on European energy security, and to what extent
the so-called Southern Gas Corridor can contribute to the diversification of gas supply routes to
Europe. Mr Bak argued that the crisis in Ukraine had once more underscored the importance of
energy security for Europe – and the world for that matter – and the necessity to decrease its
dependency on Russian gas imports. He further argued that energy-exporting countries should
refrain from using threats to cut-off supplies as a coercive foreign policy instrument, as Russia had
recently done vis-à-vis Ukraine. While this issue was resolved – for now – with the (financial)
support of the European Union (EU) and the International Monitory Fund (IMF), this was a forceful
reminder that European energy policies must adapt to new realities.
31. The EU has taken various measures since the Ukraine crisis to improve its energy security.
In May 2014 the European Commission adopted a new European Energy Security Strategy,
including a so-called energy stress test that showed that prolonged supply disruptions would badly
hurt European economies, particularly those in the Eastern Europe. The EU also agreed on a
Framework for Climate and Energy, which sets ambitious targets to increase energy efficiency and
the use of renewables, as well as to reduce greenhouse gas emissions significantly by 2030. It is
expected that the new EU leadership will further step up efforts to increase European energy
security.
32. The so-called Southern Gas Corridor could enhance European energy security by
connecting the continent to natural gas fields in the Middle East and the Caspian Sea region.
However, only Azerbaijan is projected to deliver significant additional amounts of natural gas to
Europe in the near future through the Trans-Anatolian Pipeline (TANAP) and the Trans-Adriatic
Pipeline (TAP). Although there are more potential suppliers – for example Turkmenistan, Iran,
Iraq, and the countries of the Eastern Mediterranean basin – these countries are all facing various
challenges that will most likely inhibit them from exporting significant amounts of natural gas to
Europe in the short- to medium term.
33. Mr Bak concluded by discussing possible alternatives to the Southern Gas Corridor for
Europe’s energy supply diversification. The Arctic may emerge as a region with new energy
resources and actors. Shale gas may provide a solution to Europe’s energy needs if it could be
imported from the United States and Canada, or if it could be extracted from European soil.
Liquefied natural gas (LNG) imports from world markets are an interesting alternative as well;
Lithuania already successfully minimised its dependency of Russian energy imports by substituting
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some of them for LNG. However, it should also be noted that due to rising energy demands
elsewhere, especially in Asia, the global energy market will become ever-more competitive.
Nuclear power can therefore not simply be dismissed as an alternative, while renewable energy
will become more and more important in the future.
34. Finally, Mr Bak told the members that before the meeting he and Mr Evripidis Stylianidis,
Head of the Greek Delegation to the NATO PA, had discussed some disagreements on certain
parts of the report. They had amicably agreed to remove paragraph 53 from the draft report, as
this committee meeting was not an appropriate forum to discuss controversial topics in the
bilateral relations of their respective countries. The Rapporteur thanked his Greek colleague for his
understanding and consensual approach to resolving the issue. Mr Stylianidis thanked the
Rapporteur for amending the draft report, which he praised as an otherwise excellent and
important report.
35. After the presentation of the report, members discussed various issues related to its content.
The topics of discussion included the potential consequences of the discovery of new gas reserves
in the proximity of conflict-areas, for example in Israel and the Palestinian Territories, the reliability
of future energy supply and demand projections, alternative suppliers of conventional and
non-conventional energy sources, the implications of the ‘shale revolution’ and the potential role of
shale exports in US-EU trade agreements, and how to address public and environmental concerns
related to energy security and the Southern Gas Corridor.
36. The draft Report of the Sub-Committee on Energy and Environmental Security
European Energy Security: The Southern Gas Corridor [208 STCEES 14 E] by
Osman Askin Bak (Turkey), as amended, was adopted unanimously.
X.
Consideration of amendments and vote on the draft Resolution on NATO Ballistic
Missile Defence [227 STC 14 E] presented by Stephen GILBERT (United Kingdom),
General Rapporteur
37. Stephen Gilbert introduced the draft Resolution. He started out by saying that he and the
Committee Director had discussed the section in the report on South Korea’s missile defences
with the South Korean delegation, and that they had resolved Mr Hong’s earlier concerns
regarding the draft report and would be in contact regarding some further clarifications.
38. Mr Gilbert asked Jacques Gautier (FR) to clarify his proposed amendments to
paragraphs 7 and 10.b of the draft resolution. Mr Gautier explained that it is common in NATO
Summit declarations which reference voluntary national contributions to NATO ballistic missile
defence to explicitly include mentions of “contributions in kind”. Mr Gautier agreed with Mr Gilbert’s
suggestion to use the formulation “including contributions in kind” instead of the proposed
“particularly contributions in kind”. The amendment was thus accepted unanimously by the
Committee.
39. The draft Resolution NATO Ballistic Missile Defence [227 STC 14 E], as amended, was
adopted.
XI.
Election of Committee and Sub-Committee officers
40. The mandates of the officers eligible for re-election were renewed, except for
Bruno Vitorino (PT), who did not stand for re-election. The following new officers were elected:
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Science and Technology Committee (STC)
Vice-Chairperson
Caroline DINENAGE (United Kingdom)
Sub-Committee on Energy and Environmental Security (STCEES)
Vice-Chairperson
Vice-Chairperson
XII.
Domenico SCILIPOTI (Italy)
Jacques GAUTIER (France)
Science and Technology Committee future visits and activities
41. The schedule for the upcoming visits was announced, including a visit to the United States
(Connecticut and New York) and a joint visit to Finland and either Estonia or Sweden (to be
determined). The destination of a second Sub-Committee visit had yet to be confirmed; the
Chairperson promised to present possible destinations to the Committee at a later point and
welcomed suggestions by the members.
42.
The Chairperson proceeded to the proposed 2015 reports. The following report titles had
been submitted to the Standing Committee:
STC General Report:
Alliance Capability Gaps: The Role of NATO Science and
Technology
STCEES Report:
The High North
Special Report:
Climate Change
XIII. Any other business
43.
There was no other business.
XIV. Date and place of the next meeting
44. The next meeting of the Science and Technology Committee would occur in Budapest,
Hungary on 16 May 2015, the Chairperson told the delegates.
XV. Closing remarks
45. The Chairperson concluded with some final remarks and acknowledgments. The meeting
closed at 16.00.
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