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Original: English
NATO Parliamentary Assembly
ECONOMICS AND SECURITY COMMITTEE
SECURITY AND ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENTS IN THE SAHEL
REPORT
Michal SZCZERBA (Poland)
Rapporteur
Sub-Committee on Transition and Development
www.nato-pa.int
22 November 2014
The Vice-chairman of the Committee, Faik Oztrak, prepared the first version of this draft report. Following his
election as Sub-Committee Rapporteur, Michal Szczerba revised the draft for its second reading.
198 ESCTD 14 E rev. 1 fin.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I.
INTRODUCTION: MALI AND THE CRISIS IN THE SAHEL .................................................. 1
II.
REGIONAL ECONOMIC PROFILE ....................................................................................... 2
A.
ECONOMIC CONDITIONS IN MALI ............................................................................. 3
B.
REGIONAL ECONOMIC INTEGRATION ..................................................................... 5
III.
FOOD, DRAUGHTS AND CONFLICT ................................................................................... 7
IV.
POST-CONFLICT RECONSTRUCTION CHALLENGES ....................................................... 9
V.
THE DIFFICULT CIRCUMSTANCES OF WOMEN AND CHILDREN .................................. 10
VI.
CHALLENGES TO STATE LEGITIMACY: BLACK MARKETS, TRANSNATIONAL
ORGANIZED CRIME AND TERRORISM ............................................................................ 11
VII.
INTERNATIONAL AID STRATEGIES.................................................................................. 13
VIII. CONCLUSIONS .................................................................................................................. 16
BIBLIOGRAPHY .................................................................................................................. 18
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I.
INTRODUCTION: MALI AND THE CRISIS IN THE SAHEL
1.
In 2012 Mali confronted the convergence of three ‘distinct but interrelated’ crises: a Tuareg
rebellion in the north, a political and institutional crisis precipitated by a military coup, and the influx
of well-armed terrorist groups in the northern regions of Gao, Kidal and Timbuktu (Francis, 2013).
The seizure of the country’s vast northern region by Islamic extremist groups, that imposed an
extremely harsh and abusive system of rule, ultimately led to a French military intervention
beginning in January 2013. The aim of Operation Serval was to defend the Malian state against
extremist insurgents and to retake the northern territories the rebels had captured. The United
States, the United Kingdom and other European countries supported the effort which they judged
essential to regional stability.
2.
The crisis exposed the fundamental weakness of the Malian state and a range of
trans-border economic and security challenges that if not comprehensively addressed will threaten
stability and security in Mali and beyond. Mali’s challenge is not simply one of restoring order. It is
rather a more comprehensive and complex challenge that includes political, institutional,
economic, and structural development at the local, national and regional levels. Moreover, the task
is not Mali’s alone. Leaders both in North America and Europe recognize that the stakes in Mali
remain very high. A failure to strengthen that country’s institutional capacity and economic
resilience would threaten the entire region and would have security implications for NATO member
states. Making progress on these fronts requires a deeper understanding of the nature of the
challenge and its regional dimensions. This report will outline the most important of these
challenges.
3.
The Sahel region has long confronted an array of daunting development challenges. The
recent civil war in Mali, however, illustrated how weak institutions in a fragile country can swiftly
undermine security and stability beyond that country’s borders. The crisis in Mali triggered an
important international military and aid response which helped limit the damage. But the current
peace is extraordinarily fragile, poverty persists and the international community must endeavour
to support reconstruction and help establish a framework for longer-term peace. Economic
development in the Sahel will not transpire without a modicum of security; yet genuine regional
security remains elusive. This is a “catch 22” that is not easily resolved.
4.
Mali’s problems have an important regional dimension. The broader Sahel faces several
serious transnational and trans-regional threats that national governments alone cannot effectively
address. Breaking the cycle of poverty, conflict, and underdevelopment demands a range of local,
national, regional and international responses, and co-operation across all of these channels.
Efforts are now underway to bridge these divides, but this is far easier said than done.
5.
African civil conflicts have always had strong regional dimensions. In a sense this should not
be surprising given the continent’s colonial legacy, the sometimes arbitrary way in which colonial
powers mapped out the borders and the porous nature of those boundaries today (Söderbaum,
2000). The Malian crisis has been no exception in this regard. An influx of arms and combatants
returning from Libya in the wake of the civil war in that country was an important catalyst of the
Tuareg rebellion in northern Mali. The appearance of al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) in
northern Mali, for example, was one of many consequences of the Algerian civil war in the 1990s.
Transnational organized crime networks had long operated with ease across the region’s vast
sparsely inhabited countryside and uncontrolled borders, and this helped to create space for
terrorists and criminals to move unimpeded from one country to another. It also opened up funding
possibilities so that extremist elements could draw sustenance from illegal market activities.
6.
It would also be misleading to characterize Mali’s crisis as strictly a ‘West African’ or a
‘Sahel/Saharan’ problem. Oftentimes how one defines a region varies according to the specific
question under investigation. Mali itself is both part of West Africa and the Sahel/Sahara and thus
carries two regional identities that coincide with its myriad ethnic, sectarian and geographic
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profiles. Regions, as such, are socially and politically constructed categories and definitional
problems can become highly politicized (Hurell, 1995). This is certainly the case in the region
surrounding Mali. The notion of ‘West Africa’ only emerged after decolonization in the early 1960s
when the UN’s Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) divided Africa into several zones: East,
South, Central, North, and West. West Africa’s identity partly solidified after the creation of the
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in 1975. Moreover, ECOWAS’
demarcation was not a straightforward expression of the ECA’s understanding of West Africa.
Senegal’s President Léopold Senghor, wary that Nigeria would eventually exercise a kind of
hegemony over the region, had asked that it include Zaire (now the Democratic Republic of
Congo) to provide a counterweight to Nigeria (Adedeji, 2004).
7.
There are also differing readings on the Sahel’s reach. According to the EU, the Sahel is
composed of Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania and Niger (EU, 2013a). The EU’s ‘Strategy for
Security and Development in the Sahel’, however, focuses only on the latter three, defining these
as the ‘core Sahelian states’ (EU, 2011). This narrow understanding of the region contrasts with
the UN’s reading. In a Secretary General’s Report that lays out the ‘United Nations Integrated
Strategy for the Sahel’, the region is defined as stretching ‘from Mauritania to Eritrea, including
Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, the Niger, Nigeria, Senegal and the Sudan’ (UN, 2013a). It is evident
from the above that the international community suffers a fundamental problem of definition.
Geographic notions like West Africa or the Sahel are more political constructions than the product
of some natural or historical identity.
8.
The Malian conflict has posed a serious challenge to ECOWAS – one that nevertheless
extends beyond its area of competence. Non-ECOWAS members – Mauritania and Chad – as well
as Libya and Algeria – have either directly or indirectly shaped the Malian situation or have borne
the consequences of the complex conflict that broke out in northern Mali in 2012. Spill-over from
the Libyan revolution helped trigger the Tuareg rebellion in northern Mali. Operation Serval, a
French military operation in Mali to oust Islamic militants from that country’s northern regions,
recast the security landscape by pushing extremist groups out of Mali and into neighbouring
countries. The Operation was legally based on UN Security Council Resolution 2085 and
represented a response to a request for assistance from the Malian interim government for French
military assistance. The operation ended on 15 July 2014. Operation Barkhane, a counter-terrorist
mission engaging 3,000 French troops as well as forces from Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali,
Mauritania and Niger, replaced Operation Serval. That operation has a mandate to operate across
borders in the region. It is worth noting here that there are also extremist groups operating in the
south-eastern part of Libya as well as parts of Mauritania and southern Algeria.
9.
In North Africa, there is no overarching institutional equivalent of ECOWAS. This lacuna
complicates relations among North African states and conditions the way they interact with
ECOWAS members to the south. All of this has an impact on matters like securing borders,
fostering deeper trade relations and creating a climate conducive to achieving greater security,
transnational policy co-ordination, and a higher level of prosperity.
II.
REGIONAL ECONOMIC PROFILE
10. No matter how one defines it, the Sahel region and countries around its edges confront very
serious security and economic challenges. Governments in the region must cope with extreme
poverty, the effects of climate change, repeated food crises, rapid population growth, fragile
governance, corruption, arms, drug and human trafficking, unresolved internal tensions,
sectarianism, political radicalization, violent extremism, and terrorist-linked security threats
(EU, 2011). All of these erode the region’s development prospects if not properly addressed, but
government capacities throughout the region are limited.
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11. The economies of the Sahelian states are heavily reliant on agriculture and pastoralism,
which constitute the primary sources of food and family income. Drought and food price
fluctuations, however, have exacerbated food insecurity and malnutrition. In 2011-2012, the region
suffered a food and malnutrition crises caused by late and irregular rains, political instability and a
lack of institutional resilience. Even though food crises are nothing new to the Sahel, their
increased frequency and severity, perhaps due to climate change as well as mounting political
instability, have eroded the region’s resilience and capacity to counter the worst impacts. The
2011-2012 crisis caused basic food prices to soar and engendered an important increase in
malnutrition rates. As is often the case, conflict exacerbated the food situation. Refugees were on
the move throughout the region as a result of conflicts in both Libya and Cote d’Ivoire. These
events further disrupted food supplies and complicated the logistics of getting food to those in
need. Many countries in the region had suffered from declining institutional resilience in the face of
ever more frequent drought. The absence of contingency food stocks, for example, customarily
worsens the impact of food shocks and this, in turn, lays the groundwork for future crises
(Gubbels, 2012). This is not true across the board, however. Niger was able to react more swiftly
to signs of an impending food crisis as it has created early detection monitoring and advanced
contingency planning. This particular planning model is needed throughout the region.
12. Drought conditions have eased somewhat since 2011-2012, but the Sahel continues to be
extremely vulnerable to external shocks. Mali’s economy, for example, is not sufficiently diversified
and thus vulnerable to sharp fluctuations in commodity prices and drought, both of which invariably
increases food insecurity and poverty and can trigger conflict as well. Despite its considerable
agricultural potential, Mali suffers from a lack of rain and inadequate infrastructure including water
storage facilities, appropriate irrigation structures and grain stocks designed to reduce its
vulnerabilities. Mali’s population is growing at one of the highest rates in the world. This means
that the country’s basic food requirements are constantly expanding.
13. The 2013 African Economic Outlook notes that despite economic recovery and growth in the
Sahel, high poverty levels have persisted. All Sahel countries rank in the lower tier on the Human
Development Index (HDI), and four of them rank among the worst performing countries in the
world. The HDI measures development with the indicators of life expectancy, educational
attainment and income. This makes of the Sahel one of the poorest and least developed regions in
the world, even though recent economic growth rates in several countries have been impressive.
14. Mali’s Human Development Index (HDI) ranking in 2011 was 175 of 187, with a score 0.347
on a scale between 0 and 1. In 2012 it fell to the 182nd spot (UNDP, 2013). Mali was thus already
at the lower end of the HDI when the 2012 crisis erupted and, not surprisingly, the resulting chaos
pushed the country into an even lower level of development (UNDP, 2013). Although Burkina
Faso’s economy grew by 8% in 2012, it ranked 183 in the HDI. Chad’s GDP growth increased
from 1.6% in 2011 to 7.2% in 2012, but it still ranks 184 in the HDI. Mauritania’s GDP grew over
6% in 2012, but it must cope with very high youth unemployment and its HDI rank stands at 155.
Niger’s GDP grew by 13.1% in 2012, which was one of the highest growth rates in Africa; yet it still
ranks 186th in the HDI. It will take years of sustained growth to move these countries into a higher
level of human development.
A.
ECONOMIC CONDITIONS IN MALI
15. In 2009 and 2010 the Malian economy grew at 4.5%, but then slowed to 2.7% in 2011. Food
production declined by 16% due to drought and market shocks linked to the post-electoral crisis in
Cote d’Ivoire, the Libyan civil war, and the global rise in oil, gas, food and other commodity prices.
The primary sector contracted by 5.8%, partly as a result of an 11.6% fall in agricultural
production. Rice production fell by 25% and cereal production plunged by 40%. This precipitated a
serious food shortage. Although economists had forecast a growth rate 5.6% for 2012, the Malian
economy actually shrunk by 1.5%. Tourism had been another important source of foreign
exchange earnings in Mali with the number of tourists to the country rising from 40,000 in 1995 to
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170,000 in 2008. The Northern provinces represented the centre of this industry, but this is
precisely where the civil war broke out in 2011. The resulting violence thus immediately undercut
the vital tourist sector, depriving the country of an important source of foreign exchange (Bossard,
2012a).
16. Not all the economic news was bad. In 2012 gold prices soared and its production in Mali
rose by 9% while foreign purchases of Malian gold jumped by 27.3%. Favourable climatic
conditions that year also generated a 14% increase in agricultural production (World Bank,
2013b). Malian exports and imports increased by 30.5% and 13% in 2012 respectively (African
Development Bank, 2013). Cotton exports, another key generator of precious foreign exchange,
rose by 136.4%. In that same year, however, the manufacturing and service sectors fell by 2.2%
and 8.8% respectively.
17. The mining and gold sectors are effectively economic enclaves and have forged few
backward linkages to the rest of the national economy. In other words, there are no substantial
local supporting industries and service providers for these sectors. Likewise there is no local
cotton processing industry so the cotton sector in Mali confronts difficulties in offsetting the impact
of commodity price fluctuations. The lack of regional commercial integration, moreover, has
militated against the emergence of processing industries and the creation of new jobs. Booming
cotton and gold sales have thus tended to obfuscate these underlying structural problems, which
are not always evident in the country’s GNP growth statistics.
18. Mali’s soaring population has also exacerbated the country’s economic and security
problems. The estimated Malian median age in 2013 was 16 years. 47.7% of Mali’s total
population is aged between 0-14, 19% between 15-24, 26.6% between 25-54, 3.7% between
55-64 and 3% is 65 and over (CIA, 2013). There is thus a demographic bulge at the young end of
the population, a group with very limited job opportunities. Job growth has simply not kept pace
with the expansion of the population, and high youth unemployment has been a factor in political
unrest. In 2011, 15.4% of Malians between 15-39 years old were unemployed and constituted
81.5% of all unemployed people. Youth unemployment has been a catalyst for rising crime rates
and political radicalization. In sub-Saharan Africa as a whole, youth unemployment rates stand at
roughly 12%. In West Africa, exclusion from the labour market perpetuates generational cycles of
poverty, breaks down social cohesion and is usually associated with increasing levels of crime and
violence (IRIN, 2014). Organized criminal groups and political extremists invariably target idle
youth for recruitment.
19. The Malian coup d’état resulted in sharp reductions of Official Development Aid (ODA) to the
country, although major donors like the United States continued to provide humanitarian
assistance. The war damaged vital water networks and destroyed schools, medical facilities as
well as transport and trade facilitating infrastructure (World Bank, 2013a). By triggering the mass
displacement of countless people from Mali’s northern provinces, the security crisis placed
enormous stress on highly fragile social services which only exacerbated the humanitarian crisis.
20. The end of open conflict after the French-led Serval military operation has provided space
for a return to growth reaching 5.0% for 2013 which should continue this year. The African
Development Bank projects growth in 2014 to be 6.7% and 5.6% in 2015 boosted by agriculture,
gold-mining and tertiary sector recovery. But these prospects are at risk from the volatile prices of
the country’s two main exports, gold and cotton, and the delicate security situation. Anticipated
development assistance inflows will provide an additional spur to demand (World Bank, 2013a).
According to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), Malian authorities have employed an
essentially sound macro-economic policy throughout the crisis and its aftermath, and this has
helped limit the economic damage (Global Post, 2014).
21. Prior to the crisis, Mali had made only some progress toward achieving the Millennium
Development Goals (MDGs), but it will certainly not achieve these by the 2015 target date due to
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persistent fragility, insecurity, climatic challenges and food supply problems. Mali has taken
positive steps toward achieving universal primary education, combatting HIV/AIDS, malaria and
other diseases, improving access to safe drinking water and ensuring a modicum of environmental
sustainability. But it will not come close to achieving any of the MDGs except for access to water
partly as a result of the unstable security situation. UNICEF has reported that neonatal problems,
malaria, pneumonia and diarrhoea account for 70% of deaths of children under the age of five and
27% of those under the age of five are malnourished (Smith, 2014). Building a more resilient
economy in Mali will require economic diversification, new infrastructure and far better governance
systems.
B.
REGIONAL ECONOMIC INTEGRATION
22. Achieving a higher degree of regional economic integration in the Sahel would both build
greater scale economies and provide a framework for deeper co-operation and security
(Adedeji, 2004). The low level of regional and international integration is a feature characterizing
much of Africa. The cost of this failure in the Sahel is very apparent. The problem is not a lack of
institutions dedicated to such integration. Indeed, there are several overlapping intergovernmental
organizations focused on economic integration, which engage Sahelian states.
23. ECOWAS is the largest and most important framework for regional economic integration, but
it has made only slow progress in this regard (African Development Bank, 2011).1 Although
smaller in scope, the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU) nominally created a
single market in 2000 by abolishing all tariffs on goods produced within that market, adopting a
common external tariff (CET) as well as a common currency, the Communauté Financière
Africaine (CFA) Franc, which marked it as one of the more ambitious integrative bodies in Africa
(Adedeji, 2004).2 The Community of Sahelo-Saharan States (CENSAD), with 23 member states,
adds yet another layer of complexity to the economic integration picture.3 There are, however, all
manner of caveats blocking genuine integration and not all of the region’s states actively
participate in the life of these institutions. Mauritania, for example, is not part of ECOWAS
although it is a member of the relatively dormant Union du Maghreb Arabe (UMA)
(Ndomo, 2009,).4 Located at a regional crossroads, Mali is currently a member of ECOWAS, the
WAEMU and the CENSAD.
24. The share of Mali’s trade with other countries in the region is insignificant. Intra-regional
trade represents less than 13% of total foreign trade in the WAEMU zone and stands at only
8% among ECOWAS member states (African Development Bank, 2013). As these numbers
suggest, daunting barriers to intra-regional trade persist. Mali is land-locked and utterly depends
on the ports of neighbouring countries in order to export and import. The war struck the Malian
economy hard, and had varying impacts on regional and bilateral trade. Mali, for example, is a
transit country for Senegalese exports to the wider WAEMU zone. In 2012, Senegalese exports to
Mali dropped by 4%, and Malian exports to Senegal fell by 80%.
25. The founding member states of ECOWAS had aspired to forge a common regional
economic space bound together by a single market and one currency (Chambas, 2007).
Article 2 of the founding treaty called for the new body to “promote cooperation and development
1
2
3
4
ECOWAS members are: Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Côte d’Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea,
Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Niger, Nigeria, Mali, Senegal, Sierra Leone, and Togo. http://www.ecowas.int/.
WAEMU members are: Benin, Burkina Faso, Cote d’Ivoire, Guinée Bissau, Mali, Niger and Togo.
http://www.uemoa.int/Pages/UEMOA/L_UEMOA/LesEtatsmembres.aspx
CENSAD member states are: Benin, Burkina Faso, Central African Republic, Chad, Cote d’Ivoire,
Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea Bissau, Liberia, Libya, Mali, Morocco, Niger, Nigeria,
Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Togo and Tunisia.
http://www.africa-union.org/root/au/recs/cen_sad.htm#memberstates
UMA
member
states
are:
Algeria,
Libya,
Mauritania,
Morocco,
and
Tunisia.
http://www.maghrebarabe.org/en/uma.cfm
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in all fields of economic activity (…) and to improve the standard of living of its peoples”
(ECOWAS, 1975). ECOWAS, however, has a long record of poor policy implementation
(Bach, 2004).
26. The 1979 ECOWAS Protocol on Free Movement of Persons, Residence and Establishment
and its four Supplementary Protocols (1985, 1986, 1989, 1990) offer an example of the limits to
integration. Despite the language of that Protocol, ECOWAS has not achieved anything
approaching the free movement of persons and goods. Member governments never fully
implemented key elements of the protocol and different countries adopted different visa entry
requirements, varying immigration and emigration procedures and divergent rules for cross-border
motor traffic (Adepoju et al., 2007). Eight different monetary zones have added extra costs to
trans-border transactions, while different languages invariably impede commerce as there are few
facilities to overcome these language barriers (Adeniran, 2012). Moreover, ECOWAS has never
established a common external tariff (CET) which represents a defining element of a genuine
customs union. Member governments have made little progress in harmonizing macro-economic
policies, building a single currency or establishing a reliable mechanism for funding the
organization itself (Adedeji, 2004).
27. Several factors account for this lack of progress: an absence of policy consensus, a
proliferation of overlapping intergovernmental organizations, political instability, entrenched
interests in the status quo, and a lack of proactive leadership (Adedeji, 2004). ECOWAS and
WAEMU have actually reinforced West African divisions along Anglophone and Francophone lines
(Adeniran, 2012), although WAEMU has proven to be a somewhat more effective agent of
integration (Asante, 2004). There has been talk of a projected unification of ECOWAS and
WAEMU; yet the region’s governments have done little on this front.
28. There are small signs of positive change. On 25 October 2013, ECOWAS Heads of State
agreed to establish a CET, which theoretically should come into force on 1 January 2015. The
leaders reaffirmed their commitment to an integration levy within five years’ time to help underwrite
the administrative costs of building a customs union. They also called for the establishment of an
‘equitable and development oriented’ free trade area with the European Union, and for the
establishment of a common currency for the region (ECOWAS, 2013). Of course, it remains to be
seen if member states will implement any of this. The West African track record in matters of
regional integration suggests a degree of caution is in order.
29. ECOWAS plus Mauritania have also resumed talks to establish a free trade agreement with
the EU through the Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA). Those talks began in October 2003,
but broke up in 2012 due to disagreements over the speed at which West African nations would
willingly lift tariff barriers. With WAEMU’s support, ECOWAS is currently leading the EPA
negotiations to upgrade trade relations, enhance competitiveness and modernize the agricultural
sector. Under the EPA, West African countries would gain the “fullest possible access to the EU
market” (European Commission, 2014). Those countries, including Mali, have also requested
adjustment assistance to offset potential losses linked to market liberalization.
30. A Regional Ministerial Meeting on the Sahel took place on 5 November 2013 in Bamako,
Mali, in which both the UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon and World Bank President
Jim Yong Kim participated. This demonstrated the international community’s concern for this
crisis-ridden region. Yet, for all this diplomatic activity, there has been a ‘striking discrepancy’
between rhetoric and implementation (Söderbaum, 2000). The international community needs to
hold out powerful incentives to help encourage regional actors transform verbal promises into
action. Western market access should lie at the centre of this offer. Creating a deeper trade
relationship with the EU, for example, would represent real progress for the Sahel, but the region’s
governments will also have to make a more concerted effort to hold up their end of the bargain in
terms of market reform and regional integration.
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31. It is also important to consider the role that private markets can play in galvanizing regional
trade and integration. Western Africa has a great deal of economic potential. Financiers in
countries like Morocco are prepared to increase their activities in the region to tap into this
potential. Moroccan officials lament the fact that the trading relationship with Algeria has been
effectively stymied due to the decades-long dispute over the Western Sahara. As a result, they are
looking to Western Africa and the Sahel as potential outlets for Moroccan capital and industry.
This perspective is promising, even if it is partly conditioned by the frozen conflict in the Western
Sahara. But in order for Morocco’s vision to achieve fruition, greater stability in the Sahel will be
essential. Moroccan officials are deeply worried by recent developments in Mali and the greater
Sahel, and its leaders believe instability poses a challenge to its own security.
32. It is worth noting in this regard that Morocco has also seen a significant increase in refugees
moving through its territory as a result of the conflict in the Sahel. Many of these refugees hope to
travel on to Europe but increasing numbers are staying in Morocco, adding new burdens to an
already stretched social support system. The problematic Moroccan-Algerian relationship makes it
all the more difficult to develop a united Maghreb approach in the face of the growing challenge to
the south. The anarchic situation in Libya and Nigeria’s grave problems with the extremist and
violent Boko Haram movement suggests that a trans-regional arc of crisis has emerged with
implications not only for the Sahel, but also for Western Africa, the Maghreb, and the northern and
southern littorals of the Mediterranean (NATO PA Mission Report, Morocco, 153 JOINT 14 E).
III.
FOOD, DRAUGHTS AND CONFLICT
33. Mali was already in the midst of a serious food crisis beginning in 2011 when the political
and security situation began to degrade. The ensuing security crisis turned a bad situation into a
catastrophic humanitarian crisis that ultimately demanded an international response. Climatic
factors can exacerbate conflict under certain circumstances, and this could well have been the
case in the breakdown of security in Mali. But drought is particularly destabilizing when other
conflict-inducing factors come into play. These might include a high rate of poverty, political
exclusion, economic marginalization and cultural, racial or sectarian discrimination. Civil war is
essentially a political and not an environmental phenomenon, and environmental challenges are
thus not in themselves a sufficient explanation for the onset of civil war (Theisen et al., 2012).
34. That said, the burdens on fragile states rise in the midst of droughts which test their
perpetually strained capacities. Climate variability undermines both food security and poverty
reduction efforts if a state is not sufficiently prepared to cope with these impacts (Kandji et al.,
2006). In 2012, approximately 18.7 million people in the Sahel were exposed to food insecurity,
while over 1 million children were at risk from acute malnutrition. Recurring climate shocks, mass
migration and open conflict had substantially eroded resilience in the face of such climatic events
(OCHA, 2013).
35. Food insecurity is not simply a climate-induced condition. The 2011 drought, high food
prices, low agricultural production, and the failure to recover from the 2010 food and nutrition
crisis, all undermined the region’s stability in 2012. The 2010-2011 wars in Cote d’Ivoire and Libya
exacerbated this fragility by lowering remittance earnings, depriving already impoverished
communities of a key source of income and unleashing a flood of weapons, extremists and
disenchanted fighters throughout the region. The repatriation of newly unemployed migrants only
added to the burden not only in Mali but also in Chad and Niger. Mali’s food crisis should thus be
seen as part of a broader series of developments throughout the Sahel (OCHA, 2013).
36. In 2014, an estimated 20.2 million inhabitants of the region are living in conditions of food
insecurity, a worrying increase from 11.3 million in 2013, while an estimated 5 million children
under the age of five are acutely malnourished (OCHA, 2014). Although foods prices began to fall
in 2013, they have remained above the five-year average and food insecurity has risen to
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emergency and near-emergency levels in Niger, north-east Nigeria, northern Mali and Senegal
(OCHA, 2014).
37. Environmental problems including desertification, deteriorating vegetation and soil cover,
river silting, falling rainfall levels, biodiversity loss and eroding living conditions will continue to
pose serious policy dilemmas for Mali and its neighbours.
38. Water shortages in Mali’s north, where most inhabitants depend on pastoral farming for their
survival, threaten that region’s already vulnerable agricultural sector. Chronic malnourishment or
malnutrition is common in this area. The lack of public support to help people cope with harsh
climatic conditions has long fed northern grievances with the government in Bamako. Such
tensions were partly behind several Tuareg rebellions in recent decades. Mali’s north is dependent
on food imports. Regional wars, however, have disrupted food distribution networks, particularly
after the closure of the Algerian border in January 2013. This, in turn, triggered mass migration
towards the south and neighbouring countries. That movement of people further stressed already
vulnerable food distribution systems as the crisis mounted (Marti, 2012).
39. The late arrival of rains, the low availability of cereal stocks in households, and the failure of
markets to function properly weakened Mali’s capacity to recover sufficiently from the previous
crises. Insecurity had undermined investment and led to a kind of collective short-termism that has
triggered longer-term vulnerabilities and patterns of repeated and worsening crises. Irrigation
systems are left unrepaired, storage facilities remain inadequate, markets function in a suboptimal
fashion and herders are prevented from using traditional pastures and water points critical for the
survival of their animals (Oxfam, 2014). Neither Mali nor the international community has yet
adequately addressed several drivers of the humanitarian crisis including limited access to basic
social services, the low capacity of public administration, market instability, and population
displacement, all of which shape the food security outlook (OCHA, 2014).
40. Recurring food crises have also undermined institutional resilience and capacity in Mali. In
other words, each successive food crisis has left the state weaker and the population more
vulnerable. Low adaptive capacities in the face of severe climatic events exacerbate the problems
of weak states, under-developed economies, deficient health care systems, poor infrastructure
and weak education systems (Busby et al., 2013). With strong international support in 2013,
however, food security conditions in Mali have somewhat stabilized, except in the north where
problems persist. The US government estimated that 1.3 million northerners would require food
aid in 2014 (USAID, 2013). At the end of January 2014, Mali as a whole had 800.000 people in
need of immediate food aid, 3,330,000 people at risk of food insecurity, and 301,100 IDPs
(Internally Displaced Persons) and returnees at risk (ECHO, 2014).
41. Improving the regional food security situation demands long-term approaches. Resources
are needed to build greater resilience so that states and international organizations are not
compelled to resort with such frequency to emergency measures (The Economist, 2010). More
rapid and effective decision making in the face of looming food shortages is required as is a better
understanding of demographic variables. The state must maintain and develop critical
infrastructure needed to access the market and to ensure that goods can move quickly to regions
where food demand is high and supplies are limited.
42. At 3-4% per year, population growth in the Sahel is among the highest in the world. The
region’s population is set to double by 2050 (Taje, 2010), and demographic expansion is outpacing
growth in food supplies (ECHO, 2014). The problem will only worsen if the region’s governments
do not address those deficiencies that make it all the more difficult to expand food production and
access to food. The Sahel countries need to develop and implement climate adaptation and
mitigation strategies, as well as improved social safety nets, appropriate trade policies, regional
dialogue and more finely tuned development strategies to cope with the long-term food challenge
(Deressa, 2014).
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IV.
POST-CONFLICT RECONSTRUCTION CHALLENGES
43. Mali’s political, security and food crises undermined already feeble national institutions and
eroded an already weak sense of loyalty to the central state in parts of the country. Long-term
reconstruction efforts need to factor in this problem. Mali does not need to be “re-constructed” as
much as reconceived to end the cycle of violence that has left it so vulnerable. Those piecing the
country back together must address security, political, economic, humanitarian, and social
challenges in a far more comprehensive fashion than in the past. Reconciliation among the various
ethnic groups is central to moving the development agenda forward, but so too is some degree of
political decentralization. This is proving a very difficult undertaking and the recent deterioration of
the security situation in the north suggests that it even may be too early to speak about genuine
reconstruction as long as a low level conflict persists (UN News Centre, 18 August 2014).
44. Post-conflict reconstruction is impossible without a modicum of security. The challenge is
particularly acute in Mali’s northern provinces of Gao, Kidal and Timbuktu. Operation Serval, the
Ouagadougou Agreement, which enabled the Malian army to deploy in Kidal, as well as
presidential and parliamentary elections have all contributed to the restoration of state authority in
many parts of Mali where it had essentially collapsed. But ongoing inter-communal tensions, social
protest and sectarianism suggest that the security situation remains very fragile even as peace
talks are underway (ICG, 2014). Popular resentment against the government in Bamako is partly
due to the state’s failure to address adequately those grievances which inspired past Tuareg
rebellions.
45. Security Sector Reform (SSR) in Mali is essential to stabilizing the situation in the most
restive parts of Mali and improving overall governance. This effort must go beyond restructuring
the Malian armed forces; the Police, the National Guard and the Gendarmerie have all been part
of the problem and their poor performance has raised barriers between the state and sectors of
Malian society. The Malian army requires further training and resources. It cannot perform its core
functions without leaders dedicated to cultivating a genuine esprit de corps among the rank and
file. The 2012 events, which included the retreat of the army from the north, myriad defections of
former rebels who had been serving in the armed forces, and ultimately the military coup itself all
suggest that security sector reform is essential for stabilization.
46. Alleged human rights abuses that elements in the military committed during the war have
further complicated reconciliation with northern communities. Not surprisingly, many in those
communities are very reluctant to see those forces return. Reforming the Malian army should
include two central objectives: rebuilding the army’s capacity to protect the entire Malian territory,
while ensuring that it respects human rights and refrains from entering politics itself. This is far
easier said than done. External support for this reform agenda will thus remain essential.
(ICG, 2014).
47. Corruption and patronage politics constitute another set of problems. The government of
President Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta has resorted to old patronage practices employed by his
predecessors to maintain a modicum of control over the north (ICG, 2014). Former Malian
President Amadou Toumani Touré established a precedent for poor governance in the north. His
government squandered international aid monies targeted to strengthen the security apparatus,
improve social services, and fight the presence of al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), a
Salafi-jihadist militant group and US-designated foreign terrorist organization (FTO) operating in
the Sahara and Sahel (Marchal, 2012; ICG, 2012). Transnational organized criminal groups had
long struggled for control over smuggling routes in northern Mali, and Touré exploited these
rivalries to manage the Tuareg conflict (Lacher, 2012). He supported the creation of local militias
to counter rebels and essentially financed the effort by allowing these militias to participate in the
criminal economy. This method invariably weakened the foundation of state legitimacy while
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gravely undermining its effectiveness – a condition that became readily apparent when heavily
armed Tuareg fighters returned from Libya to challenge the authority of the state (ICG, 2012).
48. Since 1992, the Malian state has failed to fulfil countless promises to decentralize power,
provide core social and economic services, and return resources to regional authorities. Economic
development in the north, building effective services and addressing the protracted marginalization
of its population are essential to breaking the rebellion-conflict cycle. Keïta’s government has
launched national and regional conferences to lay the groundwork for reconciliation,
decentralization and economic development. The first phase of the inter-Malian negotiations
process was held in Algiers from 16-24 July 2014. It engaged Mali’s central government and 6
rebel armed groups, although the MNLA-HCUA-MAA coalition refused to meet with CPA, CM-FPR
and MAA splinter groups and signed a separate but almost entirely similar roadmap for achieving
a comprehensive peace agreement to end the crisis. Both the EU and the African Union have
actively supported these talks. Al-Qaeda linked rebel groups were excluded. The government has
expressed a willingness to make a range of concessions but has rejected a rebel bid to create an
independent Azawad state. The second phase of those talks began on 1 September 2014. The
UN Security Council has called for all parties to respect the cease-fire agreement signed in
May 2014 as well as the declaration of the Cessation of Hostilities signed in Algiers. It also called
for “an inclusive and credible negotiation process open to all communities of the north of Mali”.
The goal is to achieve a durable political resolution to the crisis and establish conditions for longterm peace and stability which respects the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Malian state
(UN News Centre, 16 August 2014). Fighting, however has continued and over the summer of
2014 there was a notable upsurge in attacks on Malian and international forces. Both Tuareg
rebels and al-Qaeda-linked extremists have been active in northern Mali in recent months. In July,
French forces bombed militant positions in the Essakane region west of Timbuktu, while the airport
in Timbuktu came under a rocket attack launched by groups linked to al- Qaeda (Pugliese, 2014).
49. At the time of writing, a new round of peace talks is just getting underway. The three main
separatist groups – the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA, the Arab
Movement of Azawad (MMA) and the High Council for the Unity of Azawad (HCUA) are all
demanding greater autonomy for the north. Mali’s central state authorities insist that any peace
deal respect the country’s territorial integrity. There is room for a deal here but the talks are likely
to be difficult. The active engagement of the international community will be essential to achieving
a final deal (Reuters, 2014).
V.
THE DIFFICULT CIRCUMSTANCES OF WOMEN AND CHILDREN
50. Mali has established legal frameworks to protect the rights of women and children, but the
reality differs substantially from the intent of the law. Women have confronted an array of human
rights transgressions particularly in conflict-ridden regions. These violations include rape, violence,
female genital mutilation/cutting (FGM/C), human trafficking and economic discrimination
(DRL, 2013). Eight-nine percent of Malian women aged 15 to 49 have been subjected to some
form of female genital mutilation and although FGM/C is not allowed in state hospitals, little has
been done to counter this particularly damaging cultural practice.
51. It is worth noting that in the pre-conflict period many women in the north enjoyed a higher
social status than those in the South. Due to traditional matriarchal practices, northern Malian
women enjoyed a more equal status in the household, particularly among the Tuareg
(Matthews, 2014). The situation has changed dramatically with the rise of Islamic conservatism
and the influx of extremist groups into the region. Women were subsequently compelled to
abandon their political, economic and social activities and retreat into seclusion (Lecocq et al.,
2013). Women have been compelled to wear the veil, and failure to comply has triggered harsh
punishment. Several armed groups in the northern regions of Kidal, Gao and Timbuktu have
committed systematic rape and abduction (HRW, 2013). To make matters worse for the local
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population, elements of the Malian military have been accused of similar transgressions
(DRL, 2013).
52. The employment of child labour in agriculture, mining and other sectors remains a common
practice in Mali, even though Malian law outlaws child labour in dangerous conditions
(HRW, 2013). The government, however, has done little to uphold the law. Thousands of children,
for example, continue to work in artisanal gold mining, where many face serious health risks
(HRW, 2013). A large number of children are also working in agriculture under very harsh
conditions while child trafficking remains a serious problem (DLR, 2013).
53. During the latest conflict, northern-based rebel groups, such as MNLA, and pro-government
militias recruited child soldiers and engaged them in active military operations: working
checkpoints, guarding prisoners, and gathering intelligence (DRL, 2013). Altogether, the various
Islamist groups recruited, trained, and deployed several hundred children, some as young as 11
years old (HRW, 2013). Reports indicate that girls were also recruited, some of whom were then
used as sex slaves (DRL, 2013). After the French and Malian military operations, some of these
captured child soldiers were kept in prison next to adults. After an international outcry they were
subsequently released and integrated into rehabilitation centres (DRL, 2013).
VI.
CHALLENGES TO STATE LEGITIMACY:
ORGANIZED CRIME AND TERRORISM
BLACK
MARKETS,
TRANSNATIONAL
54. An array of transnational security challenges played an important part in the Malian political
and security crises and did much to undermine state authority at a critical juncture. Expanding
black markets and a pervasive informal economy, the expansion of international organized
criminal networks, and the growing presence of terrorist groups have challenged states throughout
the Sahel region and are now complicating the reconstruction effort in Mali itself (Pietikainen,
2013).
55. The Sahel’s vast expanse itself poses formidable challenges to the region’s weak states and
makes it acutely difficult to assert authority across national territories. The Malian state is barely
present in parts of Gao, Kidal and Timbuktu. Poor governance and a tendency to militarize that
presence have meant that many Malians resent the state. The Tuareg rebellions, in part,
expressed northern disenchantment with a nefarious combination of neglect and misrule
(ICG, 2014). The manner in which successive Malian administrations addressed northern
complaints only further undermined their authority and legitimacy.
56. The perception that the state often worked with organized criminal networks also helped
perpetuate regional underdevelopment and delegitimized the state in the eyes of many
northerners. When state authority essentially collapsed in northern Mali, national leaders conjured
alternative sources of sovereignty and forms of governance (Utas, 2012). As suggested above,
social and patronage networks played a central role. The notion of a ‘shadow state’ is relevant
here. Leaders did not assert political authority through formal state institutions, but rather through
their capacity to control commercial markets and to manipulate the accumulation of material
benefits. In such systems, individuals have no choice but to appeal to local rulers for favours and
concessions while offering loyalty in return (Reno, 2000). The balances in such shadow state
systems are delicate and unstable. Restructuring fragile state institutions can easily trigger
instability, particularly if authorities offer nothing to replace old arrangements and discarded
structures. The state is thus hard pressed to garner sufficient power and legitimacy to displace the
shadow state. If it fails in this endeavour, violence and upheaval become more likely.
57. The weakness of the Malian state is evident in the vibrancy of a pervasive black market
which has important regional and global links (Grant and Söderbaum, 2003). Indeed, the lack of
genuine regional integration and poorly controlled borders provide a perfect breeding ground for
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black marketers. In Mali’s north, smuggling is perhaps the most lucrative profession today, and
many inhabitants owe their economic survival to these activities. Coping with the problem requires
a strategy for replacing lost employment and income with legally sanctioned work. For a very poor
country, this is not an easy proposition. Mali finds itself in a situation in which consolidating peace
may require toleration of black market operations, at least over the medium term (Lacher, 2012).
Over the long-term, of course, Mali needs an overarching development strategy so that those
working in the black market will have incentives to move into a legal economy which, for all intents
and purposes, has been eviscerated in the north. Unifying regional markets would undercut
smugglers who seek to arbitrage varying customs rates and regulatory practices.
58. Transnational organized criminal groups operating in the Sahel engage in drugs, weapons,
tobacco and human trafficking. Although the region has long provided a haven for smugglers,
there is now a growing presence of transnational organized crime networks. The Sahel is a
traditional transit zone laced with trade routes. Since the 2000s, however, West Africa and the
Sahel have become a hub for global drug trafficking with Mauritania, Mali, Niger and Chad
providing important smuggling centres. The region’s vast uncontrolled space and poor governance
have made it a key link in these trafficking systems (Ellis, 2009). Keen to protect these lucrative
networks, criminal organizations have established mutually beneficial relationships with rebel
groups, terrorists and elements within the state apparatus prepared to look the other way and to
offer various forms of protection (Taje, 2010).
59. Drug trafficking is hardly the region’s only problematic commercial activity. The smuggling of
migrants by sea from West Africa to Europe, the trafficking of weapons from the Cote d’Ivoire and
Libya, a rising number of piracy incidents and armed robbery are all reflections of the region’s
growing criminalization and an important source of its instability (UN, 2013c). Mali must also cope
with the problem of child soldiers. Amnesty International reports that Malian authorities are holding
in prison children recruited by rebel groups. No effort is made to separate the children from the
adult prison population, and many have been denied access to legal service and the possibility of
rehabilitation. Amnesty International has called on Malian and French forces to verify the ages of
detainees and the Ministry of Justice has promised to look into the allegations. It recently released
four minors, although Amnesty has indicated there are more children in jail
(Associated Press, 2014).
60. The same power vacuum that makes illicit commerce possible has also created space for
regional terrorist groups. The rise of Islamic extremism in the Sahel has been a central narrative in
the Mali crisis. The swift transition of the Tuareg rebellion into an Islamic-inspired insurgency that
imposed harsh Sharia law over those areas it controlled, surprised the National Movement for the
Liberation of Azawad (MNLA), many Malian citizens, and the international community. There have
long been concerns that this vast uncontrolled region might eventually offer a ‘safe haven’ for
terrorists. The breakdown of state authority and open rebellion brought this about more far quickly
than analysts had expected (Lacher, 2012).
61. The presence of al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) in Mali’s north dates back to 1998,
when members of the Algerian Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC) first appeared in
Timbuktu. The group demonstrated a degree of sophistication and laid out a strategy that included
trade policies as well as support and protection for commercial activities which the Malian state
could or would not provide. AQIM, known as such since 2007 after its affiliation with al-Qaeda,
quickly embedded itself in a number of local communities. It also derived sustenance from
transnational organized criminal networks operating in the region. Indeed, it adopted elements of
this particular commercial model and began kidnapping Western citizens for ransom in Niger,
Mauritania, and Mali (Lacher, 2012). Profits from these activities underwrote the organization,
which used the funds it generated through these activities to consolidate social, political, and
economic ties to the region.
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62. As AQIM’s position strengthened, there were signs of collusion with some elements in the
Touré administration (Francis, 2013). Not surprisingly, the military’s operations against AQIM were
ineffectual, and there were indications that the government had squandered US and French
financial support to underwrite counterterrorist efforts (ICG, 2012). The advance of extremist
military forces towards Mali’s south ultimately triggered an international intervention. Even though
Operation Serval succeeded in pushing these forces back into the dessert, the security situation in
the region remains tenuous, the terrorist threat persists and a number of the root causes of
political extremism remain fully or partly unaddressed.
VII.
INTERNATIONAL AID STRATEGIES
63. Mali ranks among the world’s most aid dependent countries. According to the OECD’s
Development Assistance Committee (DAC), Mali’s top five donors in 2011-2012 were the United
States, the World Bank’s International Development Association (IDA), the EU, Canada and
France. Since independence, Mali has received substantial development and humanitarian
assistance. Although emergency aid both in the country and the wider region has been critical to
mitigating the effects of recurrent humanitarian crises, longer-term development support is clearly
needed. But it is also essential that this aid not distort the national economy.
64. Until the March 2012 coup, the donor community often praised Mali as a democratic
example for the region and indeed for the entire African continent. Twenty years of democratic
elections had made Mali something of a ‘darling of the aid community’ (IRIN, 2013), and during
that period, international development and humanitarian assistance accounted for more than
50% of the government’s annual budget (Van de Walle, 2012). This support, however, failed to
foster adequate economic, political and institutional development, and as this report has
demonstrated, Mali has remained one of the poorest and least developed countries in the world.
65. After the 2012 coup, the international community initially suspended most international aid
channelled directly through the government. The return to a democratically selected government
triggered a resumption of aid flows from all major international donors. Serious concerns persist
about aid effectiveness and the need for ‘local ownership’ of the development process, and the
misuse of aid. The primary vehicle for aid delivery – central budget support – has helped
strengthen central executive authority. The down side is that the Malian state had also grown ever
more dependent upon external budget support and failed to develop other mechanisms to finance
itself in a sustainable fashion. This too has had the effect of divorcing the public from the life of the
state. Fierce struggles for control of foreign funding potentially weakens the state’s coherence.
The donor community needs to take stock of this problem as it reformulates aid strategies for the
region.
66. The French government launched an initiative in October 2012 to publically list development
project progress and publicize anomalies in aid policy implementation.5 Although some have
criticized this effort for ignoring international standards for aid transparency established by the
International Aid Transparency Initiative (IATI), it does provide a modicum of transparency and
accountability for development support (Berbiere, 2013). Through IATI, a number of donors are
now publishing information regarding 75% of Official Development Flows (ODF) to Mali. IATI
provides an international standard for disseminating aid information in a detailed and accessible
fashion. This helps governments and civil society organizations draw a more complete picture of
aid spending, avoid redundancies and identify anomalies (Steele, 2013).
67. But there have been problems. Anton Op de Beke, the IMF’s resident representative recently
reported that President Keïta’s administration had bought a presidential jet for $40 million, a
purchase that was likely made possible because of international budgetary support. Those kinds
5
The “French Aid to Mali” initiative is available at http://transparence.ambafrance-ml.org
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of purchases can quickly alienate the donor community even though the notion of external
budgetary support is to extend the state some autonomy in spending decisions. In fact, the IMF is
withholding a $46 million poverty reduction loan to Mali until an audit establishes how the
government purchased the plane and reviews several other government budget decisions. The EU
and several countries have deferred some support payments in light of these revelations. Donor
assistance to Mali’s budget in 2014 is roughly $900 million and $340 million of this support is
extended with no strings attached. These deferred payments are likely to slow public investment at
least over the short term (Smith, 2014).
68. On 15 May 2013, delegations from 108 countries and institutions met in Brussels for the
‘Together for a New Mali’ donor conference that the EU, France and Mali organized. Attendees
pledged €3.25 billion to fund the 2013-2014 Plan for the Sustainable Recovery of Mali (PRED)
which the Malian government presented. The conference conclusions noted the fragility of Mali’s
institutions and its governance problems. It suggested that corruption had ‘resulted in a loss of
credibility of State institutions in the eyes of its citizens’ (Joint Chairs’ Conclusions, 2013). In light
of these concerns, the EU has decided to disburse development assistance in a gradual fashion
subject to Mali’s demonstrated commitment to transparency, accountability, good governance,
democratic practice and willingness to deal with endemic corruption challenges
(Spence and Simon, 2013).
69. The EU’s premises its approach to the region on its 2011 Strategy for Security and
Development in the Sahel. The policy is comprehensive and recognizes the link between
development and security. It establishes several lines of action: 1) development, good governance
and internal conflict resolution; 2) political and diplomatic support for regional co-operation;
3) security and the rule of law and, 4) efforts to counter violent extremism (EU, 2013c). Mali’s crisis
has compelled the EU to alter its approach to the region. The EU has thus formally recognized the
importance of the Sahel, it has established a common European position, and European national
support programmes are now to be more closely co-ordinated.
70. After the 2012 coup, the EU adopted ‘prudential measures’ to ensure that it delivered aid
only in a manner that directly benefited the population or supported democratic transition. When
the National Assembly of Mali adopted the political roadmap for transition on 13 February 2013,
the EU then reaffirmed its commitment to broader development assistance. The EU and its
member States pledged €1.35 billion for the 2013-2014 Malian Recovery Plan. The European
Commission is to disburse €523.9 million and has slated €225 million for direct budget support
(EU, 2013b). For 2014-2020, the EU has agreed to provide €5 billion in development assistance
for the entire Sahel region (EU, 2013c). At a 15 May 2013 donor’s conference entitled “Together
for a new Mali”, €3.25 billion were pledged by 56 bilateral and multilateral donors to support a
range of initiatives to encourage better governance, decentralization, public finance management
and general economic recovery. Donors also called for strict monitoring of the manner in which
this support is deployed, and there are strict transparency and accountability requirements tied to
this support although there is also a commitment to give Malian authorities ownership of the
disbursement process (EuropeAid, 2013).
71. In February 2013, the EU also deployed 200 military trainers to Mali at the request of Malian
authorities and in accordance with United Nations Security Council Resolution 2085. The initial
mandate for that mission was for a 15-month deployment, but this was recently extended until
18 May 2016 (EU, 2014). Twenty-three member states have contributed personnel.
72. The United States has long provided support to the Sahel region, even though the region
was historically seen as peripheral to US interests. This changed after the September 11 attacks.
Over the last decade, the United States became more engaged in the region. Prior to the recent
crises, the United States had provided a great deal of support for conflict management activities,
particularly in northern Mali (Van de Walle, 2012). During the 2000s, it focused on
counterterrorism and sought to bolster the counterterrorist capacities of the Malian state. In 2002,
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the United States launched its Pan Sahel Initiative (PSI) to train troops in Chad, Mali, Mauritania
and Niger. In 2005 that effort evolved into the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Initiative (TSCTI)
which represented a ‘much broader, integrated concept’ including economic, social, and political
elements (ICG, 2005). The creation in 2007 of the US Africa Command (AFRICOM) demonstrated
growing US security concerns for the continent, particularly insofar as fragile states were poorly
positioned to resist extremist forces on their territories (Zoubir, 2009). Then in 2009, the United
States launched its Strategy toward Sub-Saharan Africa, based on four pillars: 1) strengthening
democratic institutions; 2) supporting economic growth, trade, and investment; 3) advancing peace
and security; and 4) promoting opportunity and development (“US Strategy Toward Sub-Saharan
Africa”, 2012).
73. By mid-2013, however, US officials felt compelled to review their approach both to the
Maghreb and to the Sahel (Yamamoto, 2013). After the 2012 coup in Mali, the United States
suspended direct aid to the government, although humanitarian support programmes continued. It
only lifted restrictions on bilateral assistance in September 2013 following Ibrahim Boubacar
Keïta’s election and the return of democratically elected government to Mali. The United States
pledged € 235 million at the International Conference to fund Mali’s reconstruction efforts
(EuropeAid). It also made available $231 million in 2013 in humanitarian support (USAID, 2013)
and remains the leading provider of humanitarian aid in response to the food security crisis (CRS,
2014).
74. The United States also supported the French effort to reverse AQUIM’s expansion in
northern Mal. It provided airlift and refuelling support for that operation and also offered training
and supplies to more than 6,000 African soldiers and police as part of the international response.
The US Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Initiative has supported these efforts and other partner
country efforts in the Sahel to constrict terrorist organizations by helping to enhance security
sector capacity and to address the underlying causes of radicalization. The US government is also
very committed to empowering women and girls through good governance, rule of law, food
security, respect for human right, and access to basic services including health care and
education. It has launched a programme in Mali to advance women’s participation in peace
building and in the constitution drafting process, advancing women’s land right and mitigating
election related violence.
75. The World Bank’s International Development Agency (IDA) has made addressing the
problem of fragile states a top priority. Its Centre on Conflict, Security and Development focuses
on the link between fragility and insecurity and has led the Bank’s endeavour to revise its
approach to Mali and the Sahel. It too has made improved transparency, effectiveness and
regional integration top priorities. It is focusing its support on basic services, consolidating the
structural reform programme including transparency in public finance management, increased
productivity, development of functioning social safety nets, and diversification of agricultural
production. The Bank has pledged €480.44 million to support Mali’s development efforts, and on
September 2013, it signed a $50 million zero-interest IDA financing agreement to help underwrite
the Plan for the Sustainable Recovery of Mali (World Bank, 2013b).
76. The African Development Bank (ADB) has also embraced a comprehensive approach to
development in the Sahel. In March 2013 it established a Transition Management and Support
Strategy for Mali. The Strategy’s objectives are to mitigate the impact of the crisis, enhance
resilience, and consolidate state stability (ADB, 2013). The ADB has pledged €240 million for the
2013-2014 Malian Recovery Plan. It is also committed to fostering deeper regional integration. In
November 2013, the ADB pledged $1.9 billion partly to promote the Sahel region integration, on
top of on-going programs valued at an estimated $2 billion (Kaberuka, 2013). Recently approved
ADB projects include the building of a Trans-Sahara Highway ($184.79 million), a project to
improve food security in Mali ($55.27 million) and a programme to bolster the private sector’s role
in climate change mitigation for African countries, including Mali.
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VIII. CONCLUSIONS
77. Genuinely improving Mali’s political and development outlook demands rapid progress
towards reconciliation in northern Mali and throughout the country more broadly. The Tuareg and
other minority communities must be more deeply engaged in the life of the Malian state. The
Dialogue and Reconciliation Commission created in March 2013, however, has lost leverage and
does not enjoy full legitimacy. Mali’s Minister for National Reconciliation and Development of
Northern Regions, Cheick Oumar Diarrah, recently announced the establishment of a new
commission to investigate human rights violations committed in the north since the first Tuareg
rebellion in 1963. Accounting for past human rights violations would represent an important step
toward achieving reconciliation. With peace talks now underway, it is important that the
international community encourage concession making on all sides and make clear the kinds of
benefits, including external support, which the establishment of a permanent peace will bring. This
is all the more important as the security situation has clearly worsened in recent months with
growing attacks on Malian and UN peace keepers.
78. The international community has an important role to play in fostering a spirit of
accountability and reconciliation while supporting Mali’s institutional development and its capacity
to provide for its people. Establishing high anti-corruption standards and using its support as
leverage is an important first step. Corruption has been an important part of the problem in Mali
and the international community needs to ensure that it is not facilitating such practices (ICG,
2014, p. 36). This requires a delicate balance between conferring autonomy to the government
regarding spending decisions and accountability. The government’s decision to purchase a very
expensive Presidential plane both illustrates the problem and has recently become a source of
tension between the government and donors. Donors are quiet correct in their demands for
greater accountability in this case, and the decision to delay some budget support seems a proper
way to make this point.
79. The donor community must therefore continue to work with regional government officials to
ensure transparency and accountability both of disbursed aid monies as well as domestically
generated resources. Corruption has had highly adverse security implications for Mali, and
although fully eradicating the problem represents a nearly impossible goal, its impacts and
pervasiveness must nevertheless be mitigated. Reform of national and local justice systems is
therefore essential and should continue to be a target of the development assistance community.
80. The donor community working with officials and communities in the Sahel should prioritize
climate change adaptation and mitigation strategies in the development agenda of 2014 and
beyond. Climate-related shocks have had a large impact on economies in sub-Saharan Africa.
The likelihood is that these conditions will worsen due to climate change and demographic
conditions. Mitigation and adaption strategies could help to preserve long-term security in the
region. Donor countries should give a special emphasis to building a degree of climate resilience
within economic and state structures, as countries in the Sahel currently have only a weak
capacity to react effectively to drought.
81. The international community should help the region develop financially sustainable and
effective social safety nets to assist those most vulnerable in the region. Efforts are needed to
support broad access to basic social services in order to mitigate the impact of the shocks of those
suffered over the past two years and others that might transpire in the future. This would also
meet a key political demand of many who have suffered as a result of the state’s abdication of this
core state responsibility in the past.
82. Women confront an array of unique challenges in wartime and this has certainly been the
case in Mali. Around 5,000 West African women are annually trafficked into Europe, and many are
forced into prostitution. Ninety percent of girls and woman have undergone genital cutting and six
out of ten are married before the age of 18 (Smith, 2014). It is essential that women be fully
16
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engaged in the reconstruction effort at the national and local levels so that the huge problem of
their marginalization can begin to be addressed. It is interesting to note in this regard that Tuareg
society has a strong matriarchal tradition and women have long exercised formidable if somewhat
implicit power in that society (NATO PA Mission Report, Morocco, 153 JOINT 14 E). Those
engaged in reconciliation and reconstruction efforts both inside and beyond Mali need to recognize
this tradition and find innovative ways to work with it.
83. Youth unemployment is a particularly acute and threatening economic challenge throughout
the Sahel. Economic reform and integration will help here. But job-creating programmes are
essential to address this problem in the Sahel. Donors could link job creation programmes to
broader efforts to initiate integrative infrastructure development projects that will ultimately foster
higher levels of region wide productivity and growth. Mali, like much of the Sahel, also requires
infrastructure for enhancing resilience in the face of food shocks. The international community
must continue to encourage the countries of the region to carry out long-promised programmes
aiming for regional integration. In the past, these efforts have been more rhetorical than real. It is
now time to create a large and dynamic West African market that will itself become a source of
dynamism.
84. Ebola poses a grave threat to Western Africa and to the broader international community. A
small number of cases have recently been identified in Mali, and there is a real risk of the virus
spreading. Mali is in a very vulnerable position given its proximity to more badly affected
neighbours such as Guinea, Liberia, Nigeria and Sierra Leone. Its weak public health system and
porous borders are also critical vulnerabilities. The international community must be engaged not
only in those countries where the disease is evident, but also those neighbouring countries where
it could spread. Preventive measures need to be put in place now to help contain the disease.
Health checks are needed at the region’s borders. Obviously in conflict and post-conflict regions,
implementing these strategies is all the more complicated. But that effort must be undertaken
swiftly and with the consent and support of all the parties.
85. There is increasing evidence of linkages between the political and security crises in North
Africa, the Sahel and West Africa. These linkages give a sense of the extraordinarily wide scope
of the problem and the very difficult policy options Western policy makers confront. The recent
bombing of the airport in Tripoli by Saudi and UAE air forces, for example, suggests both how
unstable this broad region has become and the level of concern about the implications of the
breakdown of state authority in this huge region. In this sense, Mali is part of a bigger picture. The
West faces a serious conundrum in forming a coherent and effective approach to the region. This
is even more apparent given the limited resources Western governments have available to cope
with these challenges, particularly as they confront other daunting problems both domestically and
in theatres closer to home. This expansion of states at risk at a moment of dwindling defence
resources will invariably affect long-term strategic planning in a number of Western countries and
in NATO itself and relations with regional partners, like Morocco, will likely grow more critical.
86. Some in the West will argue that providing assistance to such a remote region cannot be
justified given the economic problems governments are confronting in Europe and North America.
But it is important to recognize how much more costly the collapse of state authority in a country
like Mali would be and the dangers this would pose to the region and to the international
community writ large. It is far more cost effective to help mitigate the conditions that foment
extremism and erode state capacity than to cope with the fallout ensuing from the collapse of a
strategically consequential Sahelian state. For this reason, NATO member governments should be
prepared to deepen their support both for Mali and for MINUSMA (United Nations Multidimensional
Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali), which is working to provide critically security sector
support to Mali. Its members should also continue to pressure all sides in the Malian conflict to
negotiate in good faith to establish an enduring settlement to the conflict.
17
198 ESCTD 14 E rev. 1 fin.
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