New Political Science, Volume 23, Number 1, 2001
Marginalization and Resistance: The Plight of the Nuba
People*
Hunud Abia Kadouf
International Islamic University, Malaysia
Abstract This paper describes partly the rise of the political consciousness of the Nuba
people in Sudan. Throughout modern Sudanese political history the Nuba have been
victimized Žrst by the colonial powers and later by the northern Sudanese political elite.
The present conict in the Nuba Mountains is the refusal of the Nuba people to succumb
to the different types of coercion staged by the Sudan government to ensure political
hegemony. This inevitably gave breed to antagonisms against policies of domination. At
the core of the dispute, therefore, are factors such as political marginalization, economic
deprivation and socio-cultural indoctrination. Few examples are given to demonstrate
how the northern political elite manipulates religion and Arabic culture in furtherance
of northern Sudanese racial as well as political supremacy.
Introduction
This paper deals with recent developments in modern Sudanese political
history. An attempt is made to discuss this in terms of two contradictory
processes: a process of “hegemony” on the part of the “center” represented by
the Sudanese political elite, and another process of “resistance” put up by those
greater sections of the society conveniently referred to as “peripheral.” A
multiplicity of political, economic, religious, and socio-cultural factors were
brought to bear in this struggle and confrontation. Though all these factors are
of key signiŽcance in understanding the overall situation, the paper will underline the role of religion in providing the northern elite with its ideological
underpinning. This is so since the political elite has systematically manipulated
religion to achieve its political goals and consolidate its grip over power. I use
the term “power” here in a Weberian sense, as an “opportunity existing within
a social relationship which permits one to carry out one’s own will even against
resistance and regardless of the basis on which this opportunity rests.”1
* A modiŽed version of this paper was presented at a conference on “Religion and
Conict in Sudan” at Yale University, May 6–8, 1999. Many people assisted me in many ways
in writing this paper. I thank them all. My gratitude is particularly extended to Mohamed
Mahmud and Richard Gray for their insightful comments on the earlier draft. I am also
indebted to Hasan Ahmad Ibrahim and Mahmud Qalandar for kindly reading the Žrst draft
of this paper. Any shortcomings are my sole responsibility.
1
Max Weber, Basic Concepts in Sociology (Secaucus, NJ: Citadel Press, 1972), p. 117; see
also Bertrand Russell, Power (London: Allen & Anwin, 1946). Quoted in W. Friedmann, An
ISSN 0739-3148 print/ISSN 1469-9931 online/01/010045–19 Ó
DOI: 10.1080/07393140120030331
2001 Caucus for a New Political Science
46 Hunud Abia Kadouf
The focus of my treatment in dealing with the processes above will be the
Nuba people of southern Kordofan. In the antagonistic context of the Sudan,
“power” and “religion” are intimately intertwined, representing concrete and
compelling aspects of the conict that impact on people’s everyday lives and
interactions. The paper will deal with the northern political elite’s project and
unfailing orchestration of cultural indoctrination vis-à-vis the Nuba people. It
will further underline the social discord created by this cultural imposition,
contrasting it with a relatively previous peaceful situation.2 Further, examples
are given to demonstrate the deplorable situation of those Nuba who moved to
urban centers as they were caught in the maze of shari’a laws.
The Multifaceted Nature of Conict in the Nuba Mountains
The Nuba Mountains occupy a politically important location as an intermediate
zone between two distinctive cultures of northern and southern Sudan. The
inhabitants of the Nuba Mountains are an amalgam of different ethnic groups.
The original inhabitants, the Nuba, are by far the most dominant group. Other
ethnic groups and communities from southern Sudan, the fallata from West
Africa, in addition to the Baqqara, also live alongside the Nuba in the area.3 A
sizeable number of merchants and traders commonly referred to as jallaba,
originally of Arab stock from northern Sudan, are found in towns and larger
villages. Besides the above inhabitants, temporary migrants move to the area at
certain seasonal peaks. These include large-scale mechanized farm owners and
their laborers. In the dry season other cattle and camel herders from outside the
area start to move into different directions across the plains hunting for water
and pasture. Some of these herders, such as the Umbororu, come from far across
the Sudanese western borders. These different groups pursue traditionally
different modes of economic life. Thus, while the Nuba are mainly agriculturists
with relatively few animals, the Baqqara are pastoral cattle herders. The majority
of southerners and the fallata work either as wage laborers or as horticulturists.
That is in addition to those who are there on a temporary basis for purposes of
investing in mechanized farming or as government ofŽcials.
The population structure in the area evidently warrants a conclusion that if
Sudan has aptly been described as the “microcosm of Africa”4 and Kordofan as
“a microcosm of Sudan,”5 the Nuba Mountains may as well be regarded as an
epitome of cultural transfusion of different ethnic groups in Sudan. It is indeed
(Footnote continued)
Introductionto World Politics(London and New York: Macmillan and St. Martin’s Press, 1957),
p. 4.
2
This can be paralleled only with what happened during the Turco-Egyptian rule and
the Mahdiyya where slave raids and Arab invading armies forced most of the Nuba to retreat
to the mountains. See Ann Lesch, The Sudan: Contested Identities (Bloomington and
Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1998), p. 27.
3
Sir Harold Alfred MacMichael, The Tribes of Northern and Central Kordofan (London:
Cass, 1967), pp. 1, 4, 88.
4
Muddathir ‘Abd Al-Rahim, Imperialism and Nationalism in the Sudan: A Study in
Constitutional and Political Development 1899–1956 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1969), p. vii.
5
Martha Saavedra, “Ethnicity, Resources and the Central State: Politics in the Nuba
Mountains, 1950 to the 1990s,” in Endre Stiansen and Michael Kevane (eds), Kordofan Invaded:
Peripheral Incorporation and Social Transformation in Islamic Africa (Leiden: Brill, 1998), p. 223.
Marginalization and Resistance 47
an area where, as described by Saavedra, different ethnic groups have remarkably shown societal reconciliation in the modern Sudanese politics.6 But intermittent shifting of allegiances on private, local, and central levels always tend to
break such reconciliation, being so fragile as they were whenever there was a
conict of interest of either party.
This array of population structure has its problems as it contributed effectively to the enhancement of conicts in the region. Since there is, almost
certainly, some conuence of economic activities, conict of interests over
natural resources was therefore inevitable. Added to that were the unbalanced
state policies leading to the emergence of a marked class differentiation based on
an “increased socioeconomic stratiŽcation.”7
However, the state of conict in the Nuba Mountains was never a new
phenomenon. Hostilities existed in a nearly Hobbesian style from time immemorial. Factors generating such conicts are so divergent to the extent that the
intensity, nature and causes tend to differ from time to time. Some of the
activities leading to conict may be classiŽed as recurrent. Nevertheless, conicts
during Turco-Egyptian rule, the Mahdiyya, and the Žrst three decades of the
Condominium regime consisted mainly of raids by either organized hostile
neighboring groups for obtaining cattle and slaves or by government forces in
cases of rebellion. Reasons for raiding Nuba villages may now be differentiated
qualitatively from what used to exist in the pre-independent era. Nonetheless, it
should be pointed out that the same raids either by the Popular Defense Forces
(formerly ethnic militias), together with the government forces, have continued
in full sway in the Nuba area, particularly after 1985.
Modern factors leading to conict range from political marginalization,
forcible displacement of the Nuba to the so-called “peace camps,” the brutality
of the government security forces, abductions and rampant killings by the
pro-government militias, later developed into the infamous and notorious Popular Defense Forces. To these one would add religious prejudice, ethnic hatred,
and the civil war. In terms of allocated resources, land shortage may be cited as
another conict-generating factor. This is due to pressures created over the land
as a result of the encroachment of the mechanized farms over grazing areas and
traditional land holdings. Total lack of equitable distribution of economic
opportunities in these lands to the local farmers may add a further dimension to
the conict. On another level, absence of social services, complete destruction of
the educational system, political injustice, and lack of security to limb and
property has also contributed to the intensiŽcation of tensions in the region.
The Politics of Marginalization
During the Colonial Period
Except for some insigniŽcant political moves by the Black Bloc during 1938 and
1952, the Nuba seemed to have registered total absence from the pre-independence national struggle. It could also be argued that at that time both the
colonial power and the northern nationalists were paternalistic in their attitude
6
7
Ibid., p. 223.
Ibid., p. 228.
48 Hunud Abia Kadouf
toward the Nuba and reluctant to pay attention to their political role. There was
not a single Nuba member in the Graduate Congress when established in 1938.
Whether that reected lack of education among the Nuba or whether it was a
deliberate act of exclusion on the part of the Congress would in both cases reect
the neglect to which the Nuba were subject. According to Gawain Bell, the
tumultuous events of the 1930s, namely, the conclusion of the Anglo-Egyptian
Treaty 1936 and the formation of the Graduate Congress in 1938, seemed
insigniŽcant and passed unnoticed by the Nuba as their area was completely
sealed off from any events taking place in other parts of the country.8
Despite the fact that the Nuba had staged several revolts against the colonial
administration9 and despite their distinguished military service in the Sudan
Defense Force,10 the Nuba were still absent in the country’s early political scene.
The belligerent behavior of the Nuba apparently explained the adverse attitude
developed by the colonialists against them. Not only was their area declared a
“Closed District,”11 but their education was left entirely in the hands of the
missionaries. No one would contest the fact that “the education of a literate
generation of Nuba was a prerequisite for Nuba participation in trade and
politics.”12 The missionaries, however, were not keen to equip the Nuba with the
kind of education capable of putting them on an equal basis with the rest of the
country. With no education and little exposure to the outer world the Nuba were
naturally not expected to participate equally in any of the important political
events leading to the country’s independence.
For example, when an Advisory Council for the northern Sudan was set up
in 1943 to “give the northern Sudanese a limited share in policy making,”13 it did
not include a Nuba representative. In a fallacious argument the Civil Secretary,
Sir Douglas Newbold reasoned that it was sufŽcient, though with difŽculty, that
the Nuba be represented in the Kordofan Province Council.14 This duality of the
British policy toward the Nuba was aptly criticized by the Graduate Congress.15
It was pointed out that while it is not necessary for the country’s unity that all
its parts should be on the same level of development, nevertheless, the exclusion
8
Sir Gawain Bell, “The Growth of Sudanese Nationalism: Devolution and the Road to
Independence,” in Deborah Lavin, (ed.), The Condominium Remembered: Proceedings of the
Durham Sudan Historical Records Conference 1982, Vol. I: The Making of the Sudanese State
(University of Durham, 1991), p. 147. Some regional pressure groups such as the Black Bloc
(al-Kutla al-Sawda’) in 1938 and 1953 that emerged to voice concerns and Žght against the
hegemony of the northern elite had little impact on the development of Nuba political
organization.
9
See Gerd Bauman, National Integrationand Local Integrity: The Miri of the Nuba Mountains
in the Sudan (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987), p. 12.
10
Reporting on the actions of Nuba Žghters in the Eritrean and Abyssinian campaigns,
1940–1942, Col. Sir Guy Campbell says that in the heat of battle, Nuba soldiers “just went
in like a dose of salts and nothing stopped them. The only trouble was to getting them back
again.” Deborah Lavin (ed.), The Condominium Remembered, p. 124.
11
See generally the Passports and Permits Ordinance 1922.
12
Gerd Baumann, op. cit., p. 12.
13
Ibid., 148; see also ‘Abd Al-Rahim, op. cit., p. 135 ff.
14
PRO-FO 403/468, despatch no. 33951, extract from broadcast on the Advisory Council
for the Northern Sudan by Sir Douglas Newbold, KBE, on January 14, 1944, p. 102.
15
PRO-FO 403/468, despatch no. 33951, extract from a memorandum by the President,
Graduate’s Congress, Omdurman to His Excellency the Governor-General, Khartoum, 1944,
p. 100.
Marginalization and Resistance 49
of the Nuba Mountains from participation in the Advisory Council would
perpetrate further divisions and mistrust.
Until the mid-1930s, the Nuba did not receive any attention from the
colonialists that could remotely be called development in order to improve their
socioeconomic or educational conditions. Instead the prime concern of the
British administration during that period was directed to the taming of the
unruly belligerent Nuba who continued to put up Žerce resistance in the face of
the colonial power.
The British policy concerning Nuba administration, as characterized by the
famous memorandum by Gillan,16 spelled out clearly the dilemma and quandary
of this policy. On one hand, it was felt that something must be done for the
Nuba development. On the other hand, and since that could be achieved only
through education, it could not be implemented as that would almost inevitably
lead to the Arabization and Islamization of the Nuba, eventually creating what
Gillan called “a third-rate Arab.”17 Fictitious though it might appear, it was the
administrator’s headache then to try and Žnd a way out of this predicament and
secure “… for Nuba communities a chance of regional participation without
cultural alienation, and of an integration that would not immediately destroy
their ethnic and local integrity.”18 As time went on, the quest for integration
came in the form of a policy of attaching the Nuba to the north. The idea was
that by doing so the Nuba would eventually achieve the Žnal assimilation with
northern social mode of thought with little political demands of their own. Such
policy was, undoubtedly, regarded as a form of betrayal on the part of the
British administration.19 It was obvious that the British were busy in directing
their policy of protecting the south from the north and neglected the Nuba to
live their fate on their own. They erroneously assumed that the integration
between the Nuba, though culturally similar to the south, and the north was
already underway with no serious conicts.20 This point was to prove disastrous
particularly in terms of Nuba political development.
However, the eventual alienation of the Nuba from Sudanese mainstream
politics became apparent since the north obviously never regarded the Nuba as
equal partners in shaping the political future of the country after independence.
Unwisely, northern politicians appeared to follow British policy that was based
entirely on the general notion of “divide and rule.”21 It might be argued that
though the British policy did not aim to beneŽt any Sudanese community in
16
J. A. Gillan, Some Aspects of Nuba Administration (Khatroum: Sudan Government
Memoranda, no. 1, 1931).
17
Ibid., p. 35. It is indeed that kind of policy which now created a second-class citizen
from a Nuba.
18
Baumann, op. cit., p. 13.
19
The policy of betrayal of the Nuba has unfortunately persisted until the present time.
The international community hardly took notice of Nuba genocide and the UN has so far
failed to extend its food operation Lifeline to the Nuba Mountains. Mel Middleton summed
up the situation by saying, “For the National Islamic Front regime of Sudan to blatantly get
away with barring all outside assistance to the Nuba People, for well over a decade, with
scarcely a whimper of protest in the halls of diplomatic disquisition, is testimony of a system
which, despite its rhetoric, displays a cynical contempt for the rights of the innocent.” In
NaŽr: The Newsletter of the Nuba Solidarity Abroad 5:3 (1999), p. 15.
20
See Gawain Bell, “The Growth of Sudanese Nationalism,” op. cit., p. 150.
21
Muddathir, Imperialism and Nationalism, op. cit., p. 143.
50 Hunud Abia Kadouf
particular (except of course certain ethnic and religious leaders), the Nuba were
the most disadvantaged of all. Not only was the Nuba area declared “closed”
in the face of any external contact, but the people themselves were not allowed
to travel outside their respective areas. In contrast the rest of the north continued
to develop both educationally, politically and economically. Disparities in
wealth distribution, education and economic development, eventually leading
to the present conict, were therefore inevitable.22 As pointed out by Saavedra:
These policies guaranteed that by the time of self-rule and independence, the
Nuba were ill-equipped, politically and economically, vis-à-vis their Arab neighbors, and that the region as a whole lagged behind those to the north and east.23
By avoiding creation of any form of Nuba administrative cadres, even at its
lowest level, to share in the country’s political life, the colonial administration
deliberately fostered the political backwardness of the Nuba.24 Undoubtedly,
there were some beneŽts gained by the Nuba in becoming part of the northern
Sudan. But the package was too meager to warrant any useful comparisons.
They learned Arabic and a good number of them eventually became Muslims
with relatively lesser problems in coexisting with the Arabized north. Nevertheless, the gravest aw of attaching the Nuba to the north, as indicated, was
leaving them to develop entirely on their own without assistance, as if they were
equals to the more socially cohesive and politically advanced north.
Marginalization under National Governments
The marginalization experienced by the Nuba during the Condominium intensiŽed after independence with the transfer of power to the northern political
elite. It should be remarked, though, that the Nuba people did not experience
this sense of marginalization alone. It was similarly and acutely sensed also by
northern Sudanese Arabs in relation to the so-called Arab sister nations.25 In fear
of not being dubbed as Africans, and in order not to be alienated from the Arab
world, the reaction was that the northern political elite had to clutch tenaciously
to the notions of Arabism and religion as sources of identity. Both parties, those
Sudanese claiming Africanism as a base in contrast to those advocating Arabism,
had therefore some bitter experiences that need be underscored. The sense of
alienation between the northern Arabized elite and the African Sudanese led to
the eruption of the civil war between south and north on the eve of independence. When the civil war broke out again (after the collapse of the Addis Ababa
peace accord) in 1983, the situation was ripe for the Nuba to play an active part
22
Most representatives from the Nuba Mountains in the 1954 Žrst Sudanese parliament,
particularly those from the southern part of the Mountains, were sent out from the north
to represent these Nuba constituencies. The practice continued for nearly a decade after
country’s independence.
23
Saavedra, op. cit., p. 225.
24
See Lesch, op. cit., p. 33. See also G. N. Sanderson, “ The Ghost of Adam Smith,” in M.
W. Daly (ed.), Modernization in the Sudan (New York: Lilian Barber, 1985), pp. 106–110,
115–116.
25
See Ali A. Mazrui, “The Multiple Marginality of the Sudan,” in Yusuf Fadl Hasan (ed.),
Sudan in Africa (Khartoum: Khartoum University Press, 1985), pp. 240–454; Ann Lesch, op.
cit., pp. 212–213.
Marginalization and Resistance 51
in it. By the mid-1980s, the “ongoing tensions between Nuba and Arab tribes
over water and grazing rights were exacerbated by the alienation of land to
private mechanized agricultural schemes and by drought, which forced Arab
herdsmen to move into the Nuba-populated hills.”26
The ofŽcial line on the part of governments has, until recently,27 been one of
refusing to acknowledge the existence of any grievances resulting in conict and
famine in the Nuba Mountains. This evasive attitude was central to the government policy and was unfortunately supported by some Nuba.28 When we
consider the history of tensions and conicts between the Nuba and their
neighboring ethnic groups we Žnd that all the communities inhabiting the area
evolved workable dynamics of coexistence. They devised over years mechanisms for conict resolution and managed to live together in a relative peace for
many generations. The involvement of the “center” did not, however, only ruin
this state of relative peace and accommodation, but gradually laid the foundation for marginalization and racial discrimination against the Nuba on the
national and regional levels. The policy of land distribution in the mechanized
farms, which excludes the Nuba leading to their economic deprivation, and the
indiscriminate process of Islamization and Arabicization that proved prejudicial
against Nuba cultures is one aspect of such marginalization. Further examples
may demonstrate the policy of racial discrimination.
The Žrst example concerns a decree that President Nimairi issued ordering
the deportation of all those without identiŽcation cards and without known jobs
to their respective ethnic areas or otherwise their removal to agricultural
schemes for forced labor. The reason was to rid the capital, as claimed, of a
chronic rise in crime rates. The process was popularly known as kashsha,
referring to the “cleansing” and “purgation” of the capital. The Nuba, and all
those with obvious African features, were the main targets. The army was
deployed in the streets of Khartoum to implement the decree. In as much as the
whole process was a agrant abuse to human rights and thus violated the
fundamental rights of all Sudanese to exercise their right of freedom of movement, the kashsha was performed in a brutally humiliating and inhumane way.
Those apprehended were rounded up and sent either to football stadiums or
specially prepared camps. Among those arrested were university students,
government ofŽcials, and a member of parliament from Darfur. This led to
general resentment even within the army quarters against such racially based
measures and the government had to Žnally stop it. The measure was reminiscent of the British colonial policy of the 1920s when the Nuba were prevented
to travel to the north without a permit.
Another incidence showing the “racially” based policy of the government
26
Ann Lesch, op. cit., p. 91.
A notable development in the government view occurred only as recent as late 1999.
In a meeting between President al-Bashir and al-Sadiq al-Mahdi, an opposition leader, in
Djibouti where both ofŽcially acknowledged the existence of the Nuba problem.
28
Some Nuba intellectuals such as Dr. Kabashawr Kuku, who later became a minister,
defended the Islamist regime’s policy in the Nuba Mountains, denying the human rights
violations and the existence of famine in the region. Such statements damaged the Nuba
cause, as the international community believed it. A great deal of suffering was done before
the international community realized the gravity of the human rights situation and scale of
the famine in the area.
27
52 Hunud Abia Kadouf
against the Nuba became brutally apparent during the premiership of Dr.
al-Jazuli Daf’ Allah’s transitional government after the 1985 popular uprising
that overthrew Nimairi’s regime. In September of 1985, the government announced that it had foiled an attempted coup allegedly inspired by the veteran
Nuba politician Fr. Philip ‘Abbas Ghabbush and led by Nuba and southern
elements. The Prime Minister described the alleged coup as a “racist” act
directed against the country and appealed to the people to rise up to defend
their threatened “cultural heritage.” It was striking that the Prime Minister did
not seem to include the Nuba in the country’s cultural heritage whether by
virtue of their African heritage or by virtue of their Islamic heritage as the great
majority of the Nuba profess Islam. Fr. Philip Ghabbush and a number of Nuba
politicians were detained and later released after intensive interrogations. Others, particularly those in active military service, were sentenced to different
terms of imprisonment. It should be pointed out in this connection that coups
attempted by any groups other than Arabized northerners are usually labeled as
“racist” and “regional.”
It must now become clear how depicting the Nuba as “racists,” “Žfth
columnists,” “rebels” and “inŽdels” was employed as a part of an overall
strategy. The seriousness of such an approach resides in the fact that the terms
were used as part of a discourse that aimed at cutting off the Nuba, and
particularly their political activists, from mainstream Sudanese politics. The
language used in describing the Nuba, particularly a term like “inŽdel” that the
Islamist regime of al-Bashir favors, is designed to deepen the marginalization of
the Nuba and legitimize their genocide and the ravage of their land.
Aspects of Nuba Resistance
The Pre-Condominium Era
As has been indicated, the early history of the Nuba was full of almost incessant
wars. The invading Arabs and raids for slaves by the Turco-Egyptian regime and
some punitive expeditions by the Mahdists succeeded in driving most of the
Nuba into the recesses of the Mountains. The wars between the Arabs and the
Nuba, and amongst the Nuba themselves, continued for centuries. It came to a
tolerable situation only in the Žrst quarter of the 20th century as a result of the
policy of Pax Britannica.29 However, neither under the Turco-Egyptians nor
under the Mahdists were the Nuba completely subjugated, except for a few
groups. In most cases the Nuba were left largely on their own.
During the Condominium Rule
The number of uprisings that took place in the Nuba area against the AngloEgyptian Condominium rule indicates that resistance was stronger in the Nuba
Mountains than in any other part of the country. According to Gerd Baumann,
the political subjugation of the Nuba “proved an extremely difŽcult task in the
face of no less than thirty distinct local rebellions in the Žrst three decades of
29
See generally S. F. Nadel, The Nuba: An AnthropologicalStudy of the Hill Tribes of Kordofan
(London: Oxford University Press, 1947).
Marginalization and Resistance 53
Anglo-Egyptian power, and a seemingly interminable succession of punitive
patrols.”30
Most renowned among these revolts were those of Sultan ‘Ajabna of the
Nyimang and al-Faki ‘Ali al-Mirawi of Kadugli. However, it should be pointed
out that what was actually taking place in the Mountains were disorganized
rebellions of individual groups led by traditional leaders, most of whom were
also spiritual leaders. These rebellions were in deŽance of the authority of the
new government rather than being a uniŽed Nuba action meant to address their
political problems. This was a situation not dissimilar to what was taking place
in the south which was described by Deng in the following terms:
[T]he spiritual leaders of the resistance movement only wanted their people to be
left alone in peace … , while the government wanted to penetrate their society and
assert its control. It was a clash of identities, cultures, and the substantive values
of power; [in which the alien] … government came in direct confrontation with
the … authority of traditional African leaders. 31
The political signiŽcance was, therefore, so localized that, like that of the south,
it virtually had no impact on the rise of the nationalist movement in the 1920s
and the developments that followed leading to the establishment of the Graduates’ Congress. But the Nuba were never quiet and continued to express their
political dissatisfaction in one form or another. Their resistance took different
forms and at times culminated into violent armed confrontation with the
authorities.
Resistance after Independence
As noted above, the colonial power failed to prepare the Nuba to participate in
the country’s administration after their departure comparable to what took
place, however negligible, in other parts of the country.32 This had its negative
impact on the future political development of the Nuba. There was little
difference in the general discriminatory policy against the Nuba after independence. 33 The fear by the Black Bloc that “national colonialists” will merely
replace the foreign colonialists after independence was later brutally vindicated.
One would only mention the continuation of paying the demeaning diqniyya
after independence (a tax levied on the person) by the Nuba for nearly a decade
when it had been abolished in other parts of the country.
The October uprising of 1964 against General ‘Abbud was a landmark in the
development of Nuba politics. The period after this uprising witnessed the birth
of the Žrst Nuba political organization known as the General Union of the Nuba
(GUN). For the Žrst time there was a genuine Nuba representation in the
National Assembly during 1965–1968 parliamentary elections.34 That was a
30
Baumann, op. cit., p. 11, emphasis added.
Francis M. Deng, War of Visions: Conict of Identities in the Sudan (Washington, DC:
Brookings Institution, 1995), p. 78.
32
One of the demands of the Black Bloc before independence was that the district
commissioners stay in the Nuba area until such a time that the Nuba become capable of
standing on their own. See Saavedra, op. cit., p. 237.
33
See generally Philip ‘Abbas Gaboush, “The Growth of Black Political Consciousness
in Northern Sudan,” Africa Today 20:3 (1973), pp. 29–43.
34
Other Nuba based political organizations such as the Free Negroes Organizations 1967
and the United Front for the Liberation of the African Sudan 1969 were both short-lived.
31
54 Hunud Abia Kadouf
short-lived victory, in terms of political history, as divisions soon crept into this
fragile ethnically based organization resulting in the two factions of Mahmud
Hasib and Fr. Philip Ghabbush.
Another serious turning point in Nuba politics occurred during the 16 years
of Nimairi’s regime. The policies of the regime were such that it consolidated the
hegemony of the jallaba in addition to deepening the ethnic divisions between
various Nuba groups and between the Nuba and the Baqqara.35 But this
consolidation of northern hegemony led to the hardening of the hitherto uid
Nuba ethnic identities into a more militant political identity.36 Thus, and despite
the modernization and decentralization promises of Nimairi’s regime,37 it was
during that period that the Nuba were most seriously hit. The bitter irony is that
someone like President Nimairi needed Leni Riefenstahl’s photographs to discover the naked backwardness of the Nuba people. Nuba visibility, which
gained a particular momentum since the October 1964 uprising, was dealt a
severe blow and Nuba issues were being relegated into obscurity under Nimairi’s regime. Fr. Philip Ghabbush, who did not believe in the role of Nuba
intellectuals, failed to hold the Nuba together. The faction of Mahmud Hasib,
who was known for his Nasserite and Arab nationalist sympathies, allied itself
to Nimairi’s regime. This has done a great damage to the Nuba cause as it thus
shattered their hopes for a common Nuba political platform.
All attempts by Nuba activists to draw the attention of the government to the
deplorable situation of the Nuba people were always depicted as “racist.” The
political frustration of some Nuba activists was dramatically expressed in 1975
when they took part in the attempted coup of Colonel Hasan Husain which was
dismissed as “racist.”38 Even Mahmud Hasib who was a conŽrmed ally of
Nimairi’s regime was disillusioned and started, while Governor of Kordofan, to
press for a real devolution of power. He was silenced after Nimeiri rebuked him
privately.39 Two contradictory results followed this state of affairs. On the one
hand, there developed a sort of complete complacency and dissociation of some
Nuba intellectuals from participating in open political activities. That was so
either out of mere apathy or out of a choice to keep out of trouble. On the other
hand, some frustrated young intellectuals went underground and started to
form secret societies to express their political dissatisfaction. Societies such as
“Komolo,” “al-Sakhr al-Aswad” (“Black Rock”) and “Nahnu Kadugli” (“We are
Kadugli”) were direct products of Nuba political frustration.40 As there were no
35
Saavedra, op. cit., p. 241.
Ann Lesch, op. cit., p. 25.; Saavedra, op. cit., p. 223.
37
Saavedra, op. cit., p. 241.
38
Notable among them were ‘Abbas Barsham, Hammad al-Ihaimir, and Abd al-Rahman
Idris. Barsham was reportedly tortured by Abu al-Qasim Muhammad Ibrahim, the
vice-president, who reportedly heaped racial abuse on him, telling him that he was not Žt
to rule the country. He was later killed. Al-Ihaimir was killed in action and Idris managed
to ee the country.
39
Saavedra, op. cit., p. 242.
40
Frustration of greater sectors in the north due to political marginalization was not
unique to the Nuba alone. Among regional organizations that sprang up to articulate
regional grievances were the Darfur Development Front in the west, the Beja Congress in
the east, and the General Union of the Ingessana Mountains and the General Union of the
Funj in the southeast. Regional bodies came together in 1985 forming the Rural Solidarity
Front.
36
Marginalization and Resistance 55
immediate solutions to address this frustration many of the Nuba were left with
little choice except to opt for a violent mode of political expression.
The Komolo41 Organization
The genesis of the organization goes back to the 1970s when Yusuf Kuwa and
a few others, mostly university students, thought it was time to create a body
that would reafŽrm the African identity of the Nuba and adequately address
their political as well as cultural aspirations.42 Komolo started as a secret society
at Tillaw Secondary School where Yusuf Kuwa was then teaching.43
It is conceded that besides the previous political movement started by the
General Union of the Nuba in the 1960s, no organization had a more profound
effect on the Nuba political consciousness than the Komolo movement. It managed during the Nimeiri era to contest and dominate local politics and even win
a seat in the State Assembly by its leader Yusuf Kuwa. The 1985 events of
popular upheaval gave another chance for this clandestine society, this time in
the form of newly formed Sudan Labor Party to inuence Nuba political scene,
particularly when it took sides with SNP. The political demarcation between
Komolo, Nahnu Kadugli, and the Sudan Labor Party at one point appeared quite
blurred. The revival of the General Union44 of the Nuba for the second time after
General Nimeiri’s overthrow in 1985 was philosophical. One of its numerous
agenda, similar to the general stance of Komolo and Nahnu Kadugli, was to
propagate and portray Nuba African identity in contradistinction to the claims
of Arabism that was used indiscriminately in the Sudanese politics. In contrast,
the Sudan National Party (SNP) of Fr. Philip Ghabbush was at pains to project
itself as a “national” party that worked on attracting non-Nuba as well. Though
GUN in its new political strategy was not, in principle, against a national
orientation that brings Nuba and non-Nuba in one political organization, it
believed that the time was not ripe yet for such an organization. The Labor
Party, which comprised members from Komolo and Nahnu Kadugli, chose to ally
itself with the SNP rather than GUN. The real motive was the belief that they
could contain the SNP more than they could the GUN. This in effect blew any
chances of Nuba political uniŽcation as the traditional mistrust against the
intellectuals have come into play again.
The impact of Komolo should be distinguished from the Sudan National Party
and on certain points from the newly organized GUN. The progress it made was
due to a carefully chosen agenda though with a rather crudely deŽned political
strategy. While Komolo came into being as a result of despair and a deep sense
of political and cultural marginalization, it nevertheless went on to truly rep41
There is some controversy regarding the precise meaning of this word. It has been
suggested that the term means “youth” in both Miri and Kadugli languages.
42
’Izz al-Din Kuku, “A Brief Introduction to the History of Komolo,” NaŽir: The Newsletter
of the Nuba Mountains, Sudan 3:4 (1998),p. 8. See also African Rights, Facing Genocide: The Nuba
of Sudan (London: A Publication of African Rights, 1995), pp. 56, 100 ff.
43
Most of these secret political societies started in Kadugli, the Tillaw secondary school
being the hub. They targeted students but tended to exclude some of the well-educated
Nuba.
44
This was a freshly organized political party that came into being after 1985. It was led
by Dr. Al-Amin Hamouda, and comprised top Nuba educated elite.
56 Hunud Abia Kadouf
resent the culmination of the political frustration and the disillusionment felt by
the Nuba youth at the time. The only problem with Komolo was its ethnocentricity. Thus, by trying to deliberately exclude some Nuba intellectuals belonging to
certain ethnic groups, and by refusing to acknowledge any political dialogue
with the government as an alternative mode of resistance, it allowed itself to
degenerate into something similar to the cultural or religious fanaticism against
which it struggled.
A Memorandum of Protest
In November of 1989, when the government of the National Islamic Front was
barely Žve months old, a group of Nuba intellectuals, under the chairmanship
of the present writer, sent a strongly worded memorandum to ‘Umar al-Bashir
and the members of the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC). A meeting
was arranged by Brigadier Ibrahim Na’yil Idam, himself a Nuba, then Minister
of Youth and Sports and chief of security, to meet the Chairman of the RCC. The
memorandum brought to the attention of the authorities some of the gravest
atrocities committed by the government forces and the armed Arab militias
against unarmed Nuba civilians. It was demanded that an ofŽcial inquiry should
be conducted to look into the suspicious deaths and disappearances of Nuba
intellectuals in the area. It also condemned land policy and asked for equitable
distribution of farming schemes in the mechanized farming sector. The memorandum was strongly worded and accused al-Bashir of being personally implicated for condoning the violence of ethnic militias. This act aroused wide
indignation from the authorities resulting in a public rebuke of the Nuba
intellectuals and the top army brass by General al-Bashir. However, not only did
all atrocities complained of go on unabated, but the government proceeded with
the implementation of its policies of creating the notorious Popular Defense
Forces.45
Apostasy in the Nuba Mountains
A further example demonstrating Nuba resistance to the government’s policies
may be drawn from the case of a Nuba Muslim who renounced Islam in deŽance
to the shari’a laws that sanction the death penalty for apostasy. However, this
was not the Žrst time a Nuba opted to convert from one religion to another, as
there exist dozens of similar unreported instances.46 Of a particular interest is the
case of a Nuba Muslim school teacher by the name of al-Faki Kuku Hasan, who
converted to Christianity in 1998. This incident had social, religious, and political
signiŽcance perhaps because of its timing. Without diminishing the personal,
spiritual and existential dimensions of this act, we can also see it as an
expression of a highly signiŽcant message of afŽrmation and resistance in the
45
It must be mentioned in this connection that Brigadier Ibrahim Nayel Idam was
instrumental in supporting the formation of the Popular Defense Forces in the Mountains
upon Žerce objections by the Nuba intellectuals.
46
It has rightly been noted that: “A signiŽcant number [of the Nuba] have converted from
Islam to Christianity [and vice versa or from animism to Islam] … most Nuba Moslems
practise or tolerate practices that the ruling extremists consider un-Islamic.” African Rights,
op. cit., p. 288.
Marginalization and Resistance 57
particular context within which it unfolded. The political dimension became
more apparent during trial, as it grasped the attention of all Nuba, most of
whom unfailingly used to swarm the courtroom during the trial. It was as if the
whole Nuba culture, politics and identity were put to trial. The conversion
occurred at a time when frustration and despair at its apex were bitterly felt by
all Nuba. The government was engaged in an overall heavy crackdown on the
Nuba and mass relocation of people to the so-called “peace camps,” where
forced labor and the raping of women or their forcible marrying to security
forces became a routine practice. Under the pretext of providing education and
good life, Nuba children were abducted forcibly to unknown places in the north.
Atrocities against peaceful citizens by the Popular Defense Forces and the
so-called government friendly forces of Anya Nya II were becoming commonplace.47 The economic situation of most of the Nuba living in the urban areas
was deplorable. Thus, for the majority of the Nuba, the incident was a demonstration of a different mode of political resistance. Although the act of conversion is classiŽed as an “apostasy,” a crime punishable by death under the
Criminal Act 1991,48 the accused was remanded into custody several times and
his trial was Žnally suspended, as the court was unable to proceed due to both
internal and external pressures.49
The Role of Religion in the Nuba Conict
General
Presumably, the nature of any religion is to satisfy its adherents’ aspirations for
spiritual security by making it possible for them to cope with the brutal realities
of the human condition. Referring to the Nuba religion, it must be remarked that
the Nuba people do not profess a single form of religion. There are Nuba
Christians and Nuba Muslims, as well as those who follow traditional modes of
spirituality. It is important to note that following one religion or another was
never a divisive factor in any of the numerous Nuba communities. In effect,
neither Christianity nor Islam was met with any hostilities or prejudices from
indigenous religions.
A word about the perspective of traditional religions is in order. Traditional
religious systems seem to work nicely perhaps for two reasons. First, there is
nothing called Nuba religion in the sense that the Nuba do not share identical
religious beliefs and cosmological ideas. Nuba spirituality is personal in nature.
Thus, similar to other African religions and unlike Islam or Christianity, Nuba
religious practices are characterized by “immediacy.” While Islam and Christianity preach reward in an afterlife, traditional religions uphold the notion that
supernatural powers may inict immediate worldly sanctions upon any moral
47
African Rights, op. cit., pp. 137–275. Anya Nya refers to the guerrilla forces that
southern Žghters launched in 1963. The forces of Anya Nya I fought until their dissolution
and incorporation into the army after the 1972 Addis Ababa agreement that ended the civil
war. Anya Nya II was reconstituted in 1983 with the resumption of the civil war. Despite
its separatist agenda, Anya Nya II is allied to the government against the Sudan People’s
Liberation Movement/Army.
48
S. 126 (2) of the Criminal Act 1991.
49
The convert is currently receiving treatment in Jordan from paralysis suffered from
torture in custody.
58 Hunud Abia Kadouf
transgressions50. Second, each Nuba individual owes his allegiance Žrst to his
family, then to his clan or lineage and then to his ethnic group, respectively. The
idea of adhering to a religion that transcends any family or ethnic boundaries is
alien to Nuba thought. That is why the Nuba never based their wars on religious
causes. Now with the new strategy of proselytization of Islam as “a new cultural
model,” most of the Nuba converts have changed their attitude by shifting their
traditional allegiance from locality to universality as required by Islam. Due to
this change in their religious outlook, those Nuba must also be blamed for
certain social discords and religious based conicts in the area.
Religious Factors in Spreading Racial Hatred
The role of Islam in Sudanese politics is patently evident. In the Nuba context,
Islam has been manipulated in generating and perpetuating conict in the area.
The argument here is that the Sudanese version of Islam has introduced a
different perspective to the political conict in the country. Islam, particularly in
the Sudan, is imbued with the racial notions of Arabism with which it identiŽes.
These twin processes of Arabization and Islamization have always been the
foundation of governmental policy since independence. Ignoring the country’s
immense heterogeneity and placing Arabization and Islamization at the center of
reconstructing a national identity alienated large sections of the population and
led to the emergence of separatist movements of the south and eventually drove
the Nuba to take arms.
The Nuba took arms because of the long history of racial discrimination in
addition to political, economic and cultural marginalization.51 Religion became
an issue in the conict through deliberate government propaganda by which it
claimed that the war was against Islam. A good majority of the Nuba in the
SPLA forces are dedicated Muslims. Not only that, but also the government
started to treat all Muslims in the Nuba Mountains, particularly those in the
SPLA controlled areas, as rebels Žghting against Islam and to be treated as
“inŽdels” who deserve to be killed. That was the underlying idea behind a fatwa
(legal opinion) of jihad against the Nuba people issued in 1992 at el-Obeid under
the auspices of the government authorities. Let us then examine the context of
this declaration more closely.
The Jihad in the Nuba Mountains
Two points need to be mentioned as a background to the declaration of jihad
(Islamic holy war) in the Nuba Mountains. First, in 1986 the government of
al-Sadiq al-Mahdi, sensing its lack of control in the Nuba region, started to
appeal to traditional ethnic allegiances for support. It chose one of its ministers,
Fadlalla Burma, a former army ofŽcer and member of the Baqqara, to orchestrate
the task of arming pro-government Baqqara militias in south Kordofan known
as Marahil forces. This was done under the pretext of protecting Arab herders
from sporadic attacks by the SPLA. Second, this was to be accompanied by an
50
See I. M. Lewis, “Introduction: Islam and Traditional Belief and Ritual,” in I. M. Lewis
(ed.), Islam in Tropical Africa (London: International African Institute, 1980), p. 59.
51
African Rights, Food and Power in Sudan: A Critique of Humanitarianism (London: A
Publication of African Rights, 1997), p. 175.
Marginalization and Resistance 59
intensiŽcation of the Arabicization and Islamization processes of the “pagan”
Nuba. The strategic plan was to create a so-called “Arab belt” to act as a buffer
zone between the north and the south.
Pushing religion to the center stage of local politics reached its apex when in
1992 jihad was declared in the Nuba Mountains and the south. That was so
following some military setbacks against the SPLA, in which the Nuba took an
active part. In response, the then governor of Kordofan and his commissioner for
the Nuba Mountains declared jihad as the most extreme measure of retaliation.
In connection with this government-sponsored jihad it is important to bear in
mind that it did not target only the “pagan” or “inŽdel” Nuba but also Nuba
Muslims.52 The jihad was followed, in April of 1992, by a fatwa (religious opinion)
pursuant to a meeting held in el-Obeid to legitimize the call for jihad against the
“inŽdels,” “hypocrites,” and the rebels in the Nuba Mountains and in the south.
The meeting was composed of imams of mosques, shaikhs of SuŽ sects, and
religious scholars. Since the meeting was held under the auspices of the
government, it can be reasonably argued that the government knowingly
supported a call that would most certainly result in acts of genocide against the
Nuba.53 This is exactly what happened, for the fatwa led to the most brutal
atrocities and indiscriminate killings against the Nuba. On a theoretical and
oppositional level the fatwa raised questions about whether Muslims are allowed
to kill non-Muslims except in self-defense and whether an open rebellion on the
part of Muslims against an unjust Muslim ruler was warranted.
Cultural Alienation of the Nuba: Urbanization and the Shari’a Laws
The numbers of the Nuba people in the urban areas, particularly around the
national capital of Khartoum, Khartoum North and Omdurman, have increased
dramatically in the last two decades. Famine, and seeking better economic
opportunities, in addition to the raging civil war, were among many factors
leading to the displacement of the Nuba from their homelands. The presence of
the Nuba around the capital has produced profound changes in their social,
cultural and political life. Space and qualiŽcation do not allow the present writer
to delve into these areas. Nevertheless, sufŽce it to say that the displacement of
the Nuba from their traditional homeland has certainly drawn them not only
nearer to the complexity of the larger Sudanese community, but also to the
proximate participation in Sudanese mainstream politics. An example of the
latter may be given where a Nuba parliamentary representative, Fr. Philip
Ghabbush, won a seat in the 1986 elections in Khartoum North. It has also
undoubtedly accelerated the long awaited processes of Islamicization and Arabicization of the greater majority of the Nuba. Glaring disadvantages comprised
lack of proper education, scarcity in job opportunities, health problems, and
cultural alienation, to cite but a few instances. Few examples may be given
below, of which the aforementioned operations of kashsha was undoubtedly one,
to demonstrate the precarious situation of the Nuba in urban areas.
The imposition of the shari’a laws by President Nimairi in 1983 left its
52
53
Ibid., pp. 286–287.
African Rights, 1995, op. cit.
60 Hunud Abia Kadouf
devastating mark on the Nuba cultural and social as well as customary institutions. A few examples will demonstrate the nature of such effect. ClassiŽed as
part of the northern region, the Nuba, unlike the southerners, were not exempted despite their sizeable non-Muslim population from the Penal Code 1983
(repealed 1991) or the Criminal Act 1991. According to s. 5(3) of the Criminal Act
1991, the southerners were exempted from the operations of the following
provisions, namely: s. 78(1) drinking alcohol and nuisance; s. 79 dealing in
alcohol; s. 85 sale of carcass; s. 126 apostasy (ridda); s. 139(1) penalty for causing
intentional wound; s. 146(1,2,3) penalty for adultery; s. 157 false accusation for
chastity; s. 168 penalty for armed robbery (hiraba); and s. 171 penalty of capital
theft. The above provisions applied to the Nuba without the least consideration
to their diversiŽed cultural backgrounds and despite the fact that a good number
of them do not subscribe to Islam. The result in some cases was nothing less than
grave injustice and a complete loss of integrity to some of them.
The application of the shari’a laws by some of the judges, who invariably
became part of the government’s instutionalized proselytization process, have
created a lot of problems, especially in issues involving the choice of law. In fact,
the Judgements (Basic Rules) Act 1983 left little room, if any, for the judge to
apply any rules, customary or otherwise, unless they were in total conformity
with shari’a principles. The application of custom ranks sixth in the list of
priority of legal principles to be resorted to in case no legislative text existed. But
even then the custom must conform to Islamic principles. As has been reported
about the above Act:
Judges were given wide discretion to determine what was or was not covered by
Shari’a law, and a number of judges used this act to create charges against a
defendant or to Žnd defendants guilty of crimes for which they had not been
charged. 54
Many of the Nuba in the urban areas were therefore caught in the intricacy
of the shari’a laws when applied indiscriminately without determining whether
a person was a Muslim or not. A series of alcohol related offenses were created
and applied to non-Muslim Nuba who in normal situations should not have
been subjected to them. While I was practicing law I handled many cases in
which the Nuba were harassed, expelled from homes, had their property
conŽscated, ogged and jailed for alcohol related offenses or cases relating to
their personal laws.
More troubling still is the situation where in matrimonial disputes a Nuba
residing in an urban area will risk losing the case if he/she tried to submit to the
jurisdiction of the shari’a courts. The other alternative is to go back to the
respective ethnic area for adjudication. It should be noted that the courts in such
cases are instrumental in applying shari’a law in complete disregard to the
personal laws of the parties. This gave rise to situations where the Nuba would
be driven in a subtle way to abandon their customs and be acculturated in
Arabic or Islamic ways. What makes this process objectionable is the deliberate
cultural conditioning on the part of government institutions which throw their
54
Adib Halasa, J. D. Cooke and Ustinia Dolgopol, The Return to Democracy in
Sudan–Report of a Mission on Behalf of the International Commission of Jurists (Geneva:
International Commission of Jurists, 1986), p. 76.
Marginalization and Resistance 61
weight behind one culture at the expense of another. Little attention is paid to
the Nuba ideas, values, attitudes and opinions as shaped by their religious or
moral beliefs. A good legal system, it may be argued, is one which appreciates
the attitudes and motives shaping people’s social activities. These attitudes and
motives emanate from the totality of cultural interactions in which people
engage. A legal system that fails to take this cultural context into account
invariably sows seeds of injustice against the people who turn to it seeking
redress.
Two Cases
The failure of the current Sudanese legal system vis-à-vis the Nuba may be
demonstrated through two cases. Both cases came to my personal attention
while I was a practicing lawyer in Khartoum. The Žrst concerned a young Nuba
woman and her husband who contracted a customary marriage. The young
woman eloped with her husband to the capital before her marriage ceremonies
were completed as the husband had paid only part of the marriage consideration. In the capital, the woman gave birth to a baby girl and stayed with her
in-laws in the absence of her husband who worked as an expatriate worker. Her
family members who wanted the in-laws to pay the remaining portion of the
marriage consideration eventually traced her to Omdurman. When the in-laws
did not comply, the young woman’s family members, in what seemed to be an
act motivated by frustration and spite, took legal action accusing her and her
husband of adultery. The court wasted no time in Žnding the accused guilty of
the alleged crime under the Penal Code 1983. When the husband returned both
of us tried in vain to convince the court about the customary nature of the whole
process as the marriage itself was not contracted Islamically. It took us almost
a year before the Chief Justice directed the release of the woman.
The novelty is not only in classifying such an act as a crime but also
categorizing it as being against shari’a law thus governed by the Criminal Act
1983. More serious still were the changes introduced in the burden of proof for
adultery crimes and the application of Islamic notions of adultery to non-Muslim
marriages. It should further be remarked that traditionally, in most Nuba
communities, promiscuous sexual relationships with a married woman would
be considered an offense against the husband rather than a punishable crime per
se. When adultery takes place it would be put right by payment of compensation
to the husband whose marital right has been infringed. Other means involve a
process of self-help (a traditional process where individuals take law into their
own hands to claim right without recourse to legitimate authorities), social
ostracization or ridiculing by songs. In as much as Nuba morality does not
approve of extramarital sexual behavior, the act is not classiŽed as a criminal
offense, while the nature of retributive deterrence is different from that stipulated by shari’a. However, this traditional classiŽcation is changing not because
of a change in the Nuba conceptions of the legal nature of “adultery” but simply
because, due to the imposition of concepts of law and order during the
Condominium, its committal may eventually lead to affrays resulting in breach
of peace. This is not to claim that the impact of imposing an Islamic notion of
“adultery” is to be disregarded. What is suggested is that the religious background of the parties coupled with the customary nature of the marriage should
62 Hunud Abia Kadouf
have been the determinant factors in disposing of this type of cases. That is at
least so since what constitutes a valid marriage under Nuba customary law is
emphatically different from that of Islamic shari’a.
The second case concerns matrimonial property. It relates to a Nuba woman
of the Nyimang group who ed her matrimonial home and settled in Omdurman with a paramour without marriage. When the paramour later died a
dispute arose between the woman and the brother of the deceased as to who
should inherit the deceased’s property including land. According to custom, the
woman is not entitled to inherit in such cases since her Žrst marriage is still
subsisting anyway.55 It was proved, among other things, that the woman was
still married to another man who had not divorced her. The court refused to take
notice of the earlier customary marriage and instead heard witnesses to the
effect that deceased and defendant lived as husband and wife all the time. That
was enough, according to the court, to constitute a valid marriage by reputation
under the shari’a law. A subsequent appeal to the higher court was also rejected.
By interpreting the actions of the woman and her paramour as constituting
a valid marriage by sheer reputation under Islamic shari’a, the court had
introduced a new concept into the Nuba (Nyimang) ideas of matrimonial
relations. Such an idea is a novelty and should be rejected as it fails to capture
the meanings underlying the behavioral patterns of the individuals involved.
Obviously, the framework under which the shari’a law operates, be it cultural,
religious, moral or societal, cannot readily be cognizable by the disputing
parties. The shari’a rule applied under the circumstances should be regarded as
a “meta-rule” that goes beyond the cultural milieu of the Nuba traditional
society. The decision must be rejected once more since the rules applied are
neither in the text nor in the minds of the participants.
Conclusion
It has been pointed out how the government tried to utilize religion as a political
tool to justify acts based on racial discrimination. Some Qur’anic verses, Prophetic traditions, and popular songs are used discursively to emphasize the
moral responsibility of the public to Žght against the so-called “inŽdels” and the
rebels from the Nuba and the south. For the northern ruling elite religious
ideologies must be exploited to their fullest. In the post-independence Sudanese
context, religion has supplied a convenient mask for a ruthless hegemony of the
Arabized northerners who wanted to establish themselves as undisputed masters over the bodies and minds of an African majority. This ruling elite, whether
military or civilian, have constantly based their legitimacy on religious foundations and have, in the process, attempted to delegitimize their opponents by
either dispensing them as enemies of Allah or ironically depicting them as
“racists.”Since “ideological and power motivations are almost invariably
mixed,”56 and as religion can undoubtedly be constructed to form the basis of
political power structure in the country, it will thus continue to remain at the
55
It must be noted that according to Nyimang customary law women generally do not
inherit durable valuables such as land and cattle. See generally Hunud Abia Kadouf, The
Nyimang Law of Property (PhD thesis, University of London, 1981).
56
W. Friedmann, op. cit., p. 3.
Marginalization and Resistance 63
center of conict in the modern Sudan. Worse still for the Nuba is the situation
whereby political legitimacy were to be based entirely on religion fused with
racial hatred. If so it would be even harder to envisage any political improvement for them in an already bleak situation.