White Eagle, Red Betrayal:
Polish-Soviet Relations in the Second World War, 1939-45
By Cadet Jonathan A. Lewczyk, USAF
Documentation: Cadet Daniel Mosher, USAF, read over my paper, and I incorporated his
corrections into this draft. Lieutenant Colonel John Plating, USAF, read over my draft as well,
and his advice and corrections were also incorporated. Mrs. Cris Schoenbauer proofread my
paper for grammatical errors, and her corrections were also taken into account. Miss Megan
Schoenbauer of Denver University also read my paper for grammatical accuracy. Miss Emily
Washburn of Denver University read over my paper for errors in both flow and grammar as well.
Additionally, she helped me clear up my argument to make the paper more coherent. Colonel
Tomasz Kowalik of the Polish Army read over the final paper to ensure accuracy and to give a
Polish perspective on the work.
Disclaimer
The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the
freedom of expression, academic environment of the United States Air Force Academy. They do
not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United
States Air Force or the United States Air Force Academy.
“To Poles the war is in Poland.”1 This statement by British Minister of Economic
Warfare Lord Selborne summarized the attitude of the Polish Armed Forces and government-inexile during the Second World War. On September 1, 1939, the German Wehrmacht stormed
across the Polish frontier with over 550 battalions of infantry and more than 2,500 tanks.2
Sixteen days later, acting in accordance with secret protocol of the German-Soviet
Nonaggression Pact, over 500,000 Soviet soldiers crossed Poland’s eastern border, effectively
destroying any Polish hopes of repulsing the German aggressor.3 This Soviet action would be a
prelude of things to come in later years, albeit with diplomatic and not military might.
Following Hitler’s successes against the Soviet Union, Poland, under pressure from Great
Britain and the United States, signed the Sikorski-Maiski Agreement on July 30, 1941. This
1
Quoted in Michael Peszke, The Polish Underground Army, the Western Allies, and the Failure of Strategic Unity in
World War II (Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Company, Inc., 2005), 5.
2
Andrew Hempel, Poland in World War II; An Illustrated Military History (New York: Hippocrene Books, Inc.,
2000), 7.
3
Secret Additional Protocol to the Treaty of Non-Aggression between Germany and the USSR concerning
delimitation of German and Soviet spheres of interest in Eastern Europe, Moscow, August 23, 1939, Sikorski
Institute, ed., Documents on Polish-Soviet Relations 1939-1945, 2 vols., (London: Heinemann, 1961), 1:40.
(Hereafter citied as Documents on P.S. Relations)
treaty made the Poles and Soviets allies in the “present war against Hitlerite Germany.”4 In
practice, however, the alliance was tepid at best, with concerns over frontiers, loyalties, and
future intentions ever-present in negotiations. The underlying hostilities culminated during the
Warsaw Uprising of late 1944. Though the Polish Armia Krajowa, or Home Army, fought
valiantly, the German forces finally defeated it after sixty-three days of brutal fighting.5 The
Poles, Great Britain, and the United States made repeated calls for assistance from the Soviet
Premier, Joseph Stalin, but the Soviet Union gave only token gestures of aid to the beleaguered
insurgents, helping to reinforce the idea that the Soviet leader had no intention of seeing an
independent Poland on the maps of Europe ever again.6 Despite British pleas for allied unity,
issues regarding Poland’s eastern frontier, the status of Polish prisoners in the Soviet Union, and
disagreements with the Polish government-in-exile plagued Polish-Soviet relations throughout
the course of the war. The Soviet response to the Warsaw Uprising of 1944 revealed Stalin’s true
intentions regarding the Polish state, which were to establish a puppet communist regime there.
The Germans’ defeat of the Warsaw Uprising along with Soviet indifference to the pleas of
Poland and the allies effectively led to Soviet domination of Polish affairs in the postwar years.
Mistrust between Poland and the Soviet Union existed long before the first shots of the
Warsaw Uprising, and even preceded the opening salvoes of the Second World War. Beginning
in the fifteenth century, the Grand Duchy of Poland-Lithuania engaged in numerous border
struggles with neighboring Muscovy, the predecessor to modern Russia. In the middle of the
seventeenth century, Turks, Tartars, Cossacks, Swedes and Russians simultaneously launched an
attack on Poland, popularly known as the “Deluge.”7 Poland eventually defeated the invaders,
4
Polish-Soviet Agreement annulling the Soviet-German treaties of 1939 relating to Poland, restoring mutual
diplomatic relations, undertaking mutual aid and support in the present war and formation of a Polish Army on the
territory of the USSR. Additional Protocol on an amnesty to be granted to all Polish citizens on the territory of the
USSR deprived of their freedom, London, July 30, 1941, Documents on P.S. Relations, 1:141-142.
5
Hempel, Poland in World War II, 100.
6
Ibid., 99-100.
7
Ibid., 1.
but many estimates suggest Poland lost half of its total population in the fighting.8 Starting in the
mid-1700s, Poland’s now-powerful neighbors of Prussia, Austria-Hungary and Russia began to
annex regions of the nation. The last partition in 1795 effectively wiped Poland off the map of
Europe for more than a century.9 The Poles did not take this lightly, and Polish legions formed in
Napoleon’s armies. These legions fought against all three powers occupying Poland. Though
Napoleon established the Grand Duchy of Warsaw, following his defeat this principality ceased
to exist. The Congress of Vienna did not hear Polish pleas for sovereignty, and the occupation of
Poland continued indefinitely.10
The Russian Empire’s rule over Poland was especially harsh, and Polish patriots
responded with two massive yet unsuccessful uprisings against Russian rule, in 1830 and 1863.11
The Polish patriots’ struggles continued during the First World War when Polish soldiers found
themselves on both sides of the conflict, with the occupying powers engaging each other on the
battlefield. Following the signature of the Treaty of Versailles in 1919, Poland finally declared
its independence 123 years after the last partition took place.12
The lack of a concrete border between Poland and Russia, however, caused problems to
persist in the east. In December 1917, Bolshevik leader Vladimir Lenin stated at the eighth
Communist Party Congress that “should there be no revolutionary movement in other countries,
our position would be hopeless…the difficulties encountered by our revolution will be
completely surmounted only if the world-wide socialist revolution…comes to fruition.”13 With
this in mind, on July 2, 1920, Soviet General Mikhail Tukhachevsky signaled to his men that
“over the dead body of White Poland shines the road to worldwide conflagration!…On to Vilna,
8
“Poland: The Deluge, 1648-67.”
http://www.workmall.com/wfb2001/poland/poland_history_the_deluge_1648_67.html (accessed February 10,
2009).
9
Hempel, Poland in World War II, 2.
10
Ibid., 4.
11
Ibid., 2.
12
Ibid., 4.
13
Bronislaw Kusnierz, Stalin and the Poles: An Indictment of the Soviet Leaders (London: Hollis & Carter, 1949),
11.
Minsk and Warsaw! March!”14 Despite the brutal fighting that ensued, the Poles repelled the
Bolshevik invasion. On March 18, 1921, Poland and the USSR signed the Treaty of Riga, ending
the conflict and giving Poland claims to vast expanses of Ukrainian and Belorussian land. These
claims extended far beyond the “Curzon line,” a line of demarcation proposed by the British in
July 1920 as the border between Poland and the USSR.15 This boundary came to be the source of
great tension between the Poles and Soviets some two decades later.
Historians such as Andrew Hempel have described the 1920s and 1930s as a state of
“stabilized equilibrium” between the two nations, with several peace treaties and accords ratified.
In 1932, Poland and the USSR signed a non-aggression pact, which stated neither party would
“give aid or assistance” to an attack on one another, nor be “openly hostile to the other” in any
conflict.16 This pact initially lasted for only three years, but both parties agreed to extend the
accord until December 31, 1945.17 In addition, Vyacheslav Molotov, then Chairman of the
Council of People’s Commissars, defended Polish actions to the German Ambassador to the
USSR, Friedrich Werner von der Schulenburg, in July 1939. Molotov outlined Poland’s entry
into the British treaty as “a purely defensive instrument” which did not harm German-Polish
relations in any way.18
Despite their mutual distrust, German officials such as Schulenburg started to court
Soviet leadership in early 1939. The Nazi leadership outlined the Third Reich’s desire “to come
to an understanding with Russia on the fate of Poland,” so that “the living spaces of Germany
14
Hempel, Poland in World War II, 5.
James Shotwell and Max Laserson, Poland and Russia: 1919-1945 (New York: King’s Crown Press, 1945), 16,
18.
16
Pact of Non-Aggression between Poland and the USSR, Moscow, July 25, 1932, Documents on P.S. Relations,
1:14-15.
17
Protocol renewing the Pact of Non-Aggression of July 25, 1932, between Poland and the USSR until December
31, 1945, Moscow, May 5, 1934, Documents on P.S. Relations, 1:21-22.
18
Telegram from Minister Ribbentrop to Ambassador Schulenburg referring to his conversation with the Soviet
Charge d’Affaires on the normalization of German-Soviet relations and the necessity of an agreement on the future
of Poland, Berlin, August 3, 1939, Documents on P.S. Relations, 1:32-33.
15
and Russia touch each other, but in their natural requirements they do not overlap.”19 These
interactions displayed the two nation’s attitudes towards the independent Poland created after the
First World War. Despite these exchanges, on May 13, 1939, Vladimir Potemkin, the Deputy
People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs, delivered a message to Polish Foreign Minister, Josef
Beck. He stated that in the event of armed conflict between Germany and Poland, the Soviet
Union would adopt “une attitude bienveillant” (a benevolent attitude) towards the Polish cause,
in accordance with Stalin’s wishes.20 The Soviets, however, continued to explore the possibility
of normalized relations with Germany and its foreseeable consequences.21
After several meetings between Molotov and his German counterpart, Joachim von
Ribbentrop, Germany and the Soviet Union signed a non-aggression pact on August 23, 1939.
This treaty incorporated a secret protocol which concluded that “in the event of a territorial and
political transformation of the territories belonging to the Polish State, the spheres of both
Germany and the USSR shall be bounded approximately by the line of the rivers Narew, Vistula,
and San.”22 News of the treaty stunned Polish leaders, who remembered Poland’s own
agreements with both Germany and the USSR. Molotov insisted, however, that the Soviet-Nazi
treaty was “brought about only by Poland’s negative attitude” towards Soviet and Anglo-French
talks.23 One week later, the German Wehrmacht poured over the Polish border, starting the
Second World War in Europe.
On the same day that Britain and France declared war on Germany, Ribbentrop sent a
19
Telegram from Minister Ribbentrop to Ambassador Schulenburg containing the detailed instruction for his
negotiations aiming to restore German-Soviet friendship and jointly clear up the territorial questions in Eastern
Europe, Berlin, August 14, 1939, Documents on P.S. Relations, 1:33-35.
20
Ann Cardwell, The Case for Poland (Ann Arbor, MI: The Michigan Committee of Americans for Poland, 1945),
11.
21
Telegram from Ambassador Schulenburg to the German Ministry for Foreign Affairs concerning a suggested
political basis for German-Soviet relations, Moscow, July 3, 1939, Documents on P.S. Relations, 1:31.
22
Secret Additional Protocol to the Treaty of Non-Aggression between Germany and the USSR concerning
delimitation of German and Soviet spheres of interest in Eastern Europe, Moscow, August 23, 1939, Documents on
P.S. Relations, 1:40.
23
Extracts from Commissar Molotov’s speech on the ratification of the Soviet-German Non-Aggression Pact
delivered at the fourth Session of the Supreme Council of the USSR, Moscow, August 31, 1939, Documents on P.S.
Relations, 1:41-42.
message to Ambassador Schulenburg in Moscow. The telegram encouraged Schulenburg to ask
Molotov “if the Soviet Union does not consider it desirable for Russian forces to move at the
proper time against Polish military forces in the Russian sphere of interest and…to occupy the
territory.”24 Molotov replied that while “it will be absolutely necessary” for Soviet action,
“through excessive haste we might injure our cause and promote unity among our opponents.”
Molotov feared reprisal for any Soviet action against Poland, following British and French
entrance into the war. Remembering the Polish-Soviet treaties of the mid-1930s and the
Potemkin promise of a benevolent attitude towards a Polish-German conflict, the Polish
Ambassador to the USSR, Waclaw Grzybowski, asked Molotov for assistance. Molotov stated
that the Soviets were prepared “to supply [Poland] only with those raw materials which are
provided for in the quotas for the current year.” When Grzybowski brought up the previous
Polish-Soviet agreements, Molotov insisted “the situation had changed” and that “transit of a
military character might be in contradiction with the Pact concluded with Germany, and so
[Molotov] does not consider that the Soviet Government could allow it.”25 This betrayal, coupled
with French and British inaction in the west, left Poland outnumbered and outgunned by German
forces.
At two A.M. on September 17, 1939, Soviet Premier Joseph Stalin summoned
Ambassador Schulenburg to the Kremlin. He informed the German representative that “the Red
Army would cross the Soviet border this morning at 6 o’clock” and read to him a note that was
going to be handed to the Polish ambassador the next morning, giving justification for the Soviet
action.26 The note delivered to Grzybowski proclaimed “the Polish state and its government have
24
Telegram from Minister Ribbentrop to Ambassador Schulenburg urging Soviet invasion of Eastern Poland,
Berlin, September 3, 1939, Documents on P.S. Relations, 1:42.
25
Telegram from Ambassador Schulenburg to the German Ministry for Foreign Affairs containing Commissar
Molotov’s reply on Soviet invasion of Eastern Poland, Moscow, September 5, 1939, Documents on P.S. Relations,
1:43.
26
Telegram from Ambassador Schulenburg to the German Ministry for Foreign Affairs about his conversation with
Stalin on the entry of the Soviet Army into Poland, Moscow, September 17, 1939, Documents on P.S. Relations,
1:45-46.
virtually ceased to exist” and that in light of this, the Soviet Union ordered the Red Army “to
cross the frontier and to take under their protection the lives and property of the population of
Western Ukraine and Western Byelo-Russia.” The Soviets also intended “to take all measures to
deliver the Polish people from the disastrous war into which they have been plunged by their
unwise leaders” and help them live a life of peace.27 While the Soviets attempted to justify their
invasion by protecting Ukrainian and Belorussian minorities in Poland, their action was in clear
accordance with the Soviet-German non-aggression pact.28 Grzybowski refused to take the note,
and his superiors in Warsaw protested the Soviet action to the international community. The
following day, the British Ministry of Information issued a report on the matter, stating that the
Soviet acts could not be justified to the British Government by the arguments put forth by
Molotov.29 Though Britain and France did not act militarily against the German or Soviet
aggressors, Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain assured the Poles that Britain and France had
“not forgotten their obligations to [Poland] nor weakened in their determination to carry on the
struggle.”30
Not surprisingly, the Germans and Soviets continued to carry out their dismemberment of
Poland, despite the British rhetoric. On September 28, Molotov and Ribbentrop met again, and a
second pact effectively divided Poland into two spheres of influence, with the border between
them based on the old Curzon line. Both the Germans and Soviets agreed upon this proposed
division as the most logical choice. The two parties also decided to “suppress in their territories
all beginnings of [Polish] agitation and inform each other concerning suitable measure for this
27
Shotwell and Laserson, Poland and Russia, 103.
Kusnierz, Stalin and the Poles, 26-30.
29
Extracts from speech by Mr. Chamberlain in the House of Commons on the Soviet aggression in Poland, London,
September 20, 1939, Documents on P.S. Relations, 1:49-51.
30
Ibid., 50.
28
purpose.”31 Despite these agreements, intense fighting still raged in several parts of Poland, and
the Polish government, along with many members of the army and air force, escaped internment
and made their way to Romania and Hungary.32 Finally, on October 6, General Juliusz
Kleeberg’s forces in southeastern Poland surrendered, ending the first campaign of the war.
Throughout Poland, German and Soviet officials began their planned destruction of many
aspects of Polish civilization considered “undesirable” by the aggressors.33
On October 31, 1939, Molotov gave a speech concerning the Polish conflict, highlighting
how the campaign guaranteed the “establishment of friendly relations between the USSR and
Germany.” He commended the Soviet military, and stated that through “one swift blow to
Poland, first by the German Army and then by the Red Army, and nothing was left of this ugly
offspring of the Versailles Treaty.”34 Molotov also reiterated the justification for Soviet action in
Poland, and attempted to put his counterparts’ fears about Germany to rest, insisting that “new
Soviet-German relations were based on a firm foundation of mutual interest.”35 Molotov’s
propaganda, however, did not fool the Polish leadership. In his final report before Poland broke
off diplomatic relations with the USSR, Ambassador Grzybowski highlighted that the Soviet
invasion of Poland “constitutes a consequential step in M. Stalin’s policy.” In addition, no matter
what Polish diplomats said or did, “the Soviets constantly interpreted [Polish actions] so as to
contra pose it to their own policy.” Grzybowski also noted that the Soviet’s possessed “a
primitive system which had as object the complete subjection of individuals to the needs of the
state, which in turn was dependent on the will of one man--Stalin.” Grzybowski further
explained that he somewhat expected to be summoned to the Kremlin to receive news of the
31
Declaration of the Government of the German Reich and the Government of the USSR on the settlement of
problems arising from the “disintegration” of the Polish State, Moscow, September 28, 1939, Documents on P.S.
Relations, 1:54.
32
Hempel, Poland in World War II, 24.
33
Kusnierz, Stalin and the Poles, 40-49.
34
Extracts from Commissar Molotov’s speech on the partition of Poland and Soviet Foreign Relations made at the V
extraordinary session of the Supreme Council of the USSR, Moscow, October 31, 1939, Documents on P.S.
Relations, 1:65-69.
35
Ibid., 67.
Soviet invasion, despite Molotov’s statement that “he did not anticipate that his government
could produce any changes whatever in the existing agreements.” Grzybowski also
foreshadowed the German invasion of the Soviet Union, writing that “his [Stalin’s] entente with
Nazi Germany and his tactic of keeping us deceived until the last moment will bring effects of
the most negative kind to [himself] and the USSR.” Indeed, within two years, Grzybowski’s
premonition came true.36
Deceit and terror epitomized the period between the end of hostilities in October 1939,
and the German invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941. The Soviet occupation forces
rounded up and deported community and religious leaders, extraditing over 1,500,000 Polish
soldiers and citizens to Siberia and Central Asia.37 The Soviets also arrested, deported, and even
executed Polish individuals and civic groups considered “undesirable” and “enemies of the
people,” such as intellectuals, families of military officers and doctors, to name a few.38 The
Soviets herded those bound for the gulags into “specially adapted goods wagons,” not unlike
those used by the Nazis during the Holocaust. The journeys lasted three to six weeks, and the
guards handed out stale bread every two to three days along the way. On reaching their
destinations in the USSR, Soviet officials sent the deportees to “correctional labor camps,”
where exhausting labor prevailed and diseases ran rampant.39 Back in Poland, the Soviet
occupation forces set up “temporary administrations,” staffed almost entirely by Red Army
officers, in order to control Polish society, arrest prominent officials, and attempt to legalize their
claims on Polish territory through manipulation of local elections.40 These were a few of the
tribulations faced by Poles at the hands of the Soviet occupiers before Operation Barbarossa, the
German invasion of the USSR on June 22, 1941.
36
Final Report to the Minister of Foreign Affairs by former Ambassador Grzybowski, Paris, November 6, 1939,
Documents on P.S. Relations, 1:71-90.
37
Stanislaw Mikolajczyk, The Rape of Poland (New York: Whittlesey House, 1948), 17.
38
Kusnierz, Stalin and the Poles, 64-68.
39
Ibid., 74-80.
40
Ibid., 49-56.
The day Barbarossa commenced, the Polish government-in-exile headed by General
Wladyslaw Sikorski saw an opportunity to improve Poland’s international standing, and
immediately pledged to cooperate with the Soviet Union.41 The next night, Sikorski broadcasted
a radio message from London to his occupied homeland, stating that the invasion seemed “very
favorable to Poland.”42 Sikorski also outlined the fact that Russia should declare any GermanSoviet treaties void, which would put Polish-Soviet relations back to the status quo ante of the
1921 Riga treaty. In addition, the general suggested several ways to foster a good relationship
between Poland and the Soviet Union, namely the release of all deportees in the USSR, the
creation of a Polish army in Russia, and the discussion of new Polish borders after the war.43
After some heated debate concerning the future borders of Poland, British Foreign Secretary
Anthony Eden encouraged the Poles to remain quiet on the matter, for the sake of “allied unity.”
Sikorski and Ivan Maisky, Soviet ambassador to London, finally signed an accord to these ends
on July 30, 1941.44
The treaty, hailed by Eden as a “valuable contribution to the Allied cause,” contained
three guarantees: that the Soviet Union recognized that the Soviet-German agreements lost their
validity; Polish-Soviet relations returned to their prewar status; and the two nations would supply
each other with “aid and support of all kinds” in the fight against Germany.45 Additionally, the
accord included provisions for the formation of a Polish army on Soviet soil.46 The next day,
Sikorski made another transmission to occupied Poland, explaining that the “present agreement
only provisionally regulates disputes which have mutually divided us for centuries,” and that the
41
Mikolajczyk, The Rape of Poland, 15.
Broadcast by General Sikorski to the Polish Nation on: ‘Poland and the German-Soviet war,’ London, June 23,
1941, Documents on P.S. Relations, 1:108-112.
43
Antony Polonsky, ed., The Great Powers and the Polish Question; 1941-1945, (London: London School of
Economics and Political Science, 1976), 24.
44
Mikolajczyk, The Rape of Poland, 15.
45
Ibid, 16.
46
Draft of the Agreement between Poland and the USSR as submitted to Moscow by Ambassador Maisky, London,
July 21, 1941, Documents on P.S. Relations, 1:140-141.
42
treaty was necessary to fight the common enemy.47
The Soviets granted Polish POWs and civilians their promised amnesty on August 12,
1941. Even so, only a fraction of the 1,500,000 displaced persons began to show up at train
stations and Polish consulates across Russia.48 A Polish-Soviet military agreement followed on
August 14, which laid the foundation for the Polish army in the USSR. This army consisted only
of land assets, and the government-in-exile in London commanded it as part of the Polish forces
based in Britain.49 Over fifteen thousand Polish officers, however, interned by the Soviets after
the September 1939 fighting remained unaccounted for in November 1941. Stanislaw Kot, the
newly appointed Polish ambassador to the USSR, met with Stalin and Molotov, during which
Stalin stated that “the best relations possible should exist between the Soviet and Polish
nations.”50 After Kot addressed the issue of the missing officers, Stalin assured him that all
officers and enlisted men were alive and well, and that they were en route to Polish recruiting
stations across the country.51 This information was inconsistent with that supplied by the Home
Army, which reported that families of these missing officers had not received mail from them
since March 1940.52 In December, upon meeting General Sikorski for the first time, Stalin told
the Polish prime minister that the missing officers were perhaps “somewhere in Manchuria.”53
Though Sikorski made nothing more of this issue at the time, he did succeed in getting Stalin’s
guarantee to find the Polish soldiers in the Soviet Union shoes and adequate equipment.
Sikorski also wanted to transfer eighty thousand of the Polish soldiers arriving from
Soviet gulags to Iran, where British forces could equip them. To accomplish this endeavor,
Lieutenant General Wladyslaw Anders accompanied Sikorski. Anders was an experienced
47
Broadcast by General Sikorski to Poland, in connection with the Polish-Soviet Agreement, London, July 31, 1941,
Documents on P.S. Relations, 1:144-145.
48
Kusnierz, Stalin and the Poles, 88.
49
Polish-Soviet Military Agreement, Moscow, August 14, 1941, Documents on P.S. Relations, 1:147-148.
50
Record of the conversation held in the Kremlin between Ambassador Kot and M. Stalin in the presence of
Commissar Molotov on the building up of the Polish Army, the fate of the Polish population deported to the USSR
and the release of Polish prisoners of war, Moscow, November 14, 1941, Documents on P.S. Relations, 1:205-213.
51
Ibid., 211.
52
Mikolajczyk, The Rape of Poland, 21.
53
Ibid., 22.
commander, and spent twenty months in various Soviet prison camps. Sikorski and Anders
informed Stalin that some Polish soldiers had gone for weeks without food and that the Soviets
quartered them in summer tents during the dead of winter. On top of this, Soviet supply had still
not issued the soldiers appropriate uniforms. Stalin then accused the Poles of “not wanting to
fight,” and in response Sikorski highlighted the details of his men’s bravery on every front of the
war.54 After a contentious debate, Stalin agreed to take the transfer of the Polish troops into
consideration. The Soviet leader also brought up the issue of Poland’s postwar frontiers to
Sikorski. After the general stated that he assumed the prewar boundaries would prevail, Stalin
informed him that he wanted “to have some alterations in those frontiers…very slight
alterations.” Sikorski evaded the issue, and after signing another friendship treaty with Stalin,
returned to London.55
While still ostensibly allied with Poland, Stalin and his regime began to sow the seeds of
their version of a free and democratic Polish government as early as 1941, in the form of the
“Union of Polish Patriots.” The group’s leader, the Polish communist Wanda Wasilewska, wrote
a book just before the Soviet invasion of Poland. In it, she denounced the Polish nation and
proclaimed Russia her homeland, severing all her remaining connections to Poland.
Wasilewska’s “Union” was to be the beginning of the Lublin government, which the Soviets
installed as a puppet regime after the war.56 The government-in-exile in London could do little to
prevent Stalin’s support of the organization. Stanislaw Mikolajczyk, prime minister after
Sikorski’s death, recalled that American President Franklin Roosevelt and British Prime Minister
Winston Churchill “were reluctant to inject anything into their relations with Stalin that might
displease him.” The two great western powers kept biding time, and hoped that at some point in
54
Minute of the conversation held in the Kremlin between General Sikorski and M. Stalin on the outstanding
problems of Polish-Soviet relations. Present also: Ambassador Kot, Commissar Molotov, Lt.-Gen. Anders, Moscow,
December 3, 1941, Documents on P.S. Relations, 1:231-243.
55
Mikolajczyk, The Rape of Poland, 24.
56
Ibid., 24.
the future they could convince Stalin to concede to the Poles on the issue of administration.57
The year 1942 opened in much the same manner as 1941 closed, with the question of
Poland’s future borders still in contention. Sikorski and Kot fervently rebuked Soviet
proclamations that Lwow was in fact a Ukrainian and Soviet city because, up to the time of the
Soviet invasion, Poland possessed the municipality. They further explained the city’s historical
significance to Poland and that it had never belonged to Ukraine in the past.58 The Soviets
replied that such assertions were “considered offensive” to the USSR, and the British again
pressured Poland to back down for the sake of Allied unity.59 On January 31, 1942, Sikorski and
Churchill discussed Stalin’s possible future aspirations, which Sikorski believed were to expand
communist influence in Europe. Churchill, by contrast, expressed his hope for future dealings
with the Soviet premier, and noted that Stalin “was convinced that Poland’s existence was
essential for Russia as a rampart against Germany.”60 Sikorski, however, possessed a greater
knowledge of Soviet tactics than his British counterpart, and believed that Stalin would attempt
to “introduce communism from Norway to Greece,” a scenario that Churchill contested was
improbable.61 Churchill further informed Sikorski that both the U.S. and Britain agreed that as
long as Germany was still fighting, future borders in Europe “would be in no way discussed.”
Churchill reassured the general, however, that Great Britain would not allow harm to come to
postwar Poland, and “they would guarantee the restitution of a powerful and independent Polish
state.”62
57
Ibid., 26.
Minute of the conversation held in the Kremlin between General Sikorski and M. Stalin on the outstanding
problems of Polish-Soviet relations. Present also: Ambassador Kot, Commissar Molotov, Lt.-Gen. Anders, Moscow,
December 3, 1941, Documents on P.S. Relations, 1:240.
59
Note from the People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs to the Polish Embassy in the USSR on the release of
Polish citizens from prisons and protesting against the word ‘occupation applied
to ‘Western Ukraine’ and ‘Western White Ruthenia,’ Kuibyshev, January 9, 1942, Documents on P.S. Relations,
1:262-263.
60
Notes on a conversation between General Sikorski and Mr. Churchill at Chequers on the problems of PolishSoviet relations and of Stalin’s expansionist aims, London, January 31, 1942, Documents on P.S. Relations, 1:274276.
61
Ibid., 275.
62
Ibid., 276.
58
In the east, the Soviet leadership continued to pressure Anders to send Polish units to the
front lines, though they were still ill-equipped. Anders informed Sikorski that his army should be
ready by June 1, 1942. Sikorski ordered Anders to notify the Soviet command that “in no case
could I [Sikorski] permit troops inadequately armed…to be thrown into battle.”63 Major General
Romuald Wolikowski, one of Anders’ subordinates, told Anders in late February 1942 that his
Soviet counterparts believed sending a division of Polish soldiers would give the impression of
cooperation and goodwill between the two nations. Additionally, because the fighting would
only intensify in the coming spring and summer months, Wolikowski explained that the Soviets
would continue to pressure the Poles to send units to the front, regardless of their combat
readiness. These interactions clearly demonstrated that the Soviets needed more troops in battle,
and that their leadership completely disregarded General Sikorski’s order to not send any
unprepared Polish units to the front. This disrespect for Polish opinion in military matters
continued to be prevalent in Polish-Soviet relations throughout the rest of the war.64
In addition to ignoring Polish military and diplomatic requests, the Soviet Union also
attempted to influence the Polish citizenry still captive under the Nazi jackboot. In March 1942,
a few months after their shaky alliance began, the Soviets started to send propaganda broadcasts
to occupied Poland. The updates portrayed the Soviet soldier as the savior of Poland and that
“every blow inflicted by the Red Army to [the] Germans lifts the lid from Poland’s coffin.”65
The Soviet diatribe also indirectly denounced the efforts of the Polish Home Army, stating that
while the Poles possessed “a self-denying spirit of sacrifice,” their efforts were “simply nothing”
compared to what the Soviets believed could be done by their own forces. The transmissions also
63
General Sikorski’s reply to the telegram from Lt.-General Anders station the conditions under which the Polish
Army could be sent to the front, London, February 7, 1942, Documents on P.S. Relations, 1:279-280.
64
Report from Maj.-General Wolikowski to Lt.-General Anders on his conversations with General Panfilov dealing
with the delay in getting the supplies of arms for the Polish troops, evacuation of a part of them, reduction of
contingents and dispatch of a Polish division to the Soviet-German front., Kuibyshev, February 22, 1942,
Documents on P.S. Relations, 1:282-284.
65
Report made by Counselor Weese on the subject of Soviet broadcasts in Polish, London, March 5, 1942,
Documents on P.S. Relations, 1:286-289.
ordered the establishment of “workers’ committees” to call for better labor conditions from the
German occupiers. A Polish report on the propaganda noted that “the role of such committees
during the Russian Revolution is all too well known to leave any illusions as to the task which
the Soviet Government would like to assign to them in Poland.”66 A Moscow radio program
from Soviet-influenced Poles on February 18, 1942, clearly outlined this facet, and declared “we
[communist Poles] see the Soviet Union as the only possible guarantee of freedom, independence
and security.” Not even a year after the Polish-Soviet alliance commenced, the Soviet
government already began work on a foundation to influence, if not completely control, the
Polish people at the conclusion of the war.67
As the territorial claims of the Soviets continued to grow, the Polish army in the USSR
remained ill-equipped and underfed into late March 1942. Only then did Stalin and the Poles
finally agree to evacuate the army to Iran, where the British could supply it with adequate
equipment.68 In addition, both Britain and the United States did not “propose to conclude any
agreement affecting or compromising the territorial status of the Polish Republic,” and continued
to push the issue to a later date.69 Reports also surfaced that some Soviet gulags were refusing to
release Polish citizens, army officers in particular.70 In addition, diplomatic dilemmas were
commonplace, such as the Soviet arrest of Polish diplomats in Vladivostok and Archangel. The
Soviets also intermittently accused the Poles of collaborating with the Germans prior to 1939. It
was true that on several occasions prominent German officials visited Poland and solicited the
Poles for help against the Soviets, but the Poles turned down such requests. Finally, in February
1943, the Polish government in London released a statement on the issue, iterating that “neither
66
67
68
Ibid., 288.
Ibid., 289.
The Ambassador to the Polish Government-in-exile, Anthony Biddle to Cordell Hull: Telegram, London, March
30, 1942, in The Great Powers and the Polish Question, 1941-1945, ed. Antony Polonsky, (London: London School
of Economics and Political Science, 1976), 103-105.
69
Reply of Mr. Eden to the letter from General Sikorski of April 16, 1942, on the subject of Anglo-Soviet
negotiations, London, April 21, 1942, Documents on P.S. Relations, 1:335-336.
70
Memorandum from the Polish Ministry for Foreign Affairs to Ambassador Drexel Biddle relating to the Polish
problems in the USSR, London, May 29, 1942, Documents on P.S. Relations, 1:355-357.
before the outbreak of this war nor during it has the Polish nation ever agreed to any cooperation with the Germans against the Soviet Union.”71 The declaration also included a clause
addressing that “so far as the question of frontiers between Poland and Soviet Russia is
concerned, the status quo previous to September 1, 1939, is in force.” Stalin did not take the
latter statement lightly. In response, he made it difficult for Polish citizens to avoid conscription
into the Red Army and even began to force Poles to take Soviet citizenship.72 These quandaries,
however, paled in comparison to what German forces discovered near Smolensk in April, 1943.
On April 13, 1943, Berlin radio reported that German units operating in the area of
Smolensk, Russia, found “a great pit…28 metres long and 16 metres wide, filled with 12 layers
of bodies of Polish officers, numbering about 3,000.”73 The German military found similar sites
in other areas of the Soviet Union; however Katyn proved to be the largest of the sites
discovered. Berlin also reported that the officers were in full military uniform, with their hands
tied behind their backs, and all had sustained pistol shots to the neck. The region’s soil had
mummified the bodies, and the Nazis claimed the officers still had their military identification on
them. After two days, the Soviets finally responded to the German accusations, and claimed
“nobody will be misled to the lies and falsifications of the German Fascists.” The Soviets added
that the nearby village was home to a well known historical cemetery, presumably where the
bodies came from.74 Sikorski, recognizing both sides were entirely capable of carrying out the
atrocity, appealed to the International Red Cross to go to the site, still in German hands, and
objectively investigate the cause of the officers’ deaths.75
While the International Red Cross refused to get involved and did not participate in the
71
Declaration of the Polish Government concerning Polish-Soviet relations, London February 25, 1943, Documents
on P.S. Relations, 1:488-489.
72
Minutes of Ambassador Romer’s conversation with President Stalin and M. Molotov at the Kremlin, during the
night of February 26-27, 1943, on some capital issues in Polish-Soviet relations producing a state of tension between
Poland and USSR, Moscow, February 26-27, 1943, Documents on P.S. Relations, 1:489-501.
73
Communique issued by Berlin Broadcasting station on the discovery of graves of Polish officers in the Smolensk
area, Berlin, April 13, 1943, Documents on P.S. Relations, 1:523-524.
74
Mikolajczyk., The Rape of Poland, 24.
75
Statement of the Polish Government concerning the discovery of the graves of Polish officers near Smolensk,
London, April 17, 1943, Documents on P.S. Relations, 1:527-528.
investigation, the Germans assembled a team of doctors from across Europe to investigate the
graves in the Katyn forest. The Polish government sent repeated messages to Stalin to get
information on the more than eight thousand missing officers, but the Soviets never gave the
Poles a definitive answer. Stalin simply responded by sending a message to Churchill, claiming
“the Sikorski Government is striking a treacherous blow at the Soviet Union to help Hitler’s
tyranny” and informed Churchill that “the Soviet Government has decided to interrupt relations
with [the Polish] Government.”76 Despite protests by the Poles, the Soviets severed relations
with the government-in-exile after the Katyn discovery. This made communication between the
two governments impossible and military coordination nonexistent. The German team of doctors
returned a few weeks later and concluded that the killings had taken place in either March or
April 1940 by elements of the Soviet secret police.77
The death of these officers explained the lack of Polish officers reporting to the recruiting
stations set up across Russia. Katyn also accounted for those officers that Stalin told Sikorski
escaped to Manchuria nearly a year earlier. If the Soviets had committed the murders, it also
explained why Stalin and his regime had been so silent on the matter until the Germans
physically discovered the graves themselves, which provided undeniable evidence. It was not
until January 1944 that the Soviets would retake the area around the Katyn forest and conduct
their own investigation, which, not surprisingly, found the Germans at fault for the massacre.78
Until that time, the Poles attempted fervently to restore diplomatic relations with the Soviets. The
two parties continued to disagree on nearly every issue, other than the total defeat of Germany.79
To make matters worse, Poland lost her voice in the international community. On July 4, 1943,
General Sikorski’s plane crashed after takeoff near the Gibraltar coast. Although historians today
76
Telegram from M. Stalin to Mr. Churchill on the subject of the accusation made by the Polish Government against
the USSR on account of the discovery of Polish officers’ graves in Katyn, Moscow, April 21, 1943, Documents on
P.S. Relations, 1:530-531.
77
Cardwell, The Case for Poland, 25-27.
78
Ibid., 27.
79
Shotwell and Laserson, Poland and Russia, 61.
speculate that foul play may have factored into his death, at the time the cause did not matter.
Without Sikorski, Poland lost her most effective leader and skilled diplomat.80
Following Sikorski’s death, Stanislaw Mikolajczyk became the new prime minister of
Poland. He and Churchill immediately had discussions on Polish-Soviet relations, during which
Churchill stated “we’ll have many troubles with them [the Soviets], believe me.”81 The Soviets
continued to reject attempts by the British and Poles to reopen relations, especially with the
question of Poland’s eastern frontier absent from the agenda. Molotov also stated that relations
continued to be broken because he could not “collaborate with the Polish government…it has no
good will.”82
In December 1943, Churchill, Stalin, and Roosevelt met for the first time during the war
in Tehran, Iran. During the conference, Stalin presented the only question he had pertaining to
Poland, which was where the postwar Polish-Soviet border should lie. Stalin urged that the
border be set at the Curzon line, giving two major Polish cities (Lwow and Wilno) to the Soviets.
In exchange for the cities, Stalin suggested extending the Polish border into Germany up to the
Oder River.83 Stalin also insisted that he wanted “an independent and strong Poland after the
war.”84 In addition, with Soviet armies advancing towards Polish territory, Stalin demanded that
the Polish government “declare itself ready to collaborate with the advancing Red Army, fight
the Germans, and outline its plans for the impending campaign on the Polish soil.”85 When
questioned by Churchill if he would resume diplomatic relations with the Polish government in
London, Stalin evaded the issue, and “accused the Poles of fighting against the partisans with all
80
MIkolajczyk, The Rape of Poland, 40.
Ibid., 41.
82
Ibid., 45.
83
Ibid., 48.
84
Note on a conversation between M. Mikolajczyk, M. Romer, Count Raczynski, Mr. Eden, Sir Alexander
Cadogan, Sir Orme Sargent and Sir Owen O’Malley about the respective roles of the Soviet Union, Germany,
Poland and Yugoslavia in Central-Eastern Europe, London, December 22, 1943, Documents on P.S. Relations,
2:116-121.
85
Mikolajczyk, The Rape of Poland, 49.
81
possible means, not excluding delivering partisans into German hands.”86 This, Mikolajczyk
said, was “an affront to the brave men and women of Poland who have been fighting the
Germans without a letup since 1939.” Soviet allegations such as these continued, and formal
contact between the two countries remained absent.87
In addition to dismissing the Polish will to fight, Stalin continued to put in place the
elements which would create a pro-Soviet Polish government after the war. In January 1944,
Polish communist propaganda began to turn up all over Poland, announcing the establishment of
a National Council, the leader of which was the Polish communist Boleslaw Bierut.88 Bierut was
a lifelong Soviet agent whom Stalin sent to Poland “for the establishment of a Communist
government.” Three days after the leaflets appeared, the Russian army crossed into Polish
territory. The establishment of the National Council proved to be the first major step in exerting
communist influence in postwar Poland, the second was the establishment of communist military
might by the advancing Red Army.89
These developments greatly alarmed the Poles in exile. Mikolajczyk rushed to Churchill,
who had repeatedly supported Poland in her endeavors. Churchill proclaimed that the British
government wanted a strong, independent Poland, but one that extended “from the Curzon line to
the Oder,” the exact borders that Stalin had demanded at Tehran. Churchill added that “Great
Britain and the United States will not go to war to defend the eastern frontiers of Poland.”90
Mikolajczyk, astonished by these statements, declared to Churchill that in his opinion “the Soviet
Union’s aim is not only to take the eastern half of our country but to take all of Poland--all of
Europe.” Churchill dismissed this claim and urged Mikolajczyk to accept Stalin’s terms.91
86
Note on a conversation between M. Mikolajczyk, M. Romer, Count Raczynski, Mr. Eden, Sir Alexander
Cadogan, Sir Orme Sargent and Sir Owen O’Malley about the respective roles of the Soviet Union, Germany,
Poland and Yugoslavia in Central-Eastern Europe, London, December 22, 1943, Documents on P.S. Relations,
2:119.
87
Mikolajczyk, The Rape of Poland, 49.
88
Ibid., 49.
89
Ibid., 50.
90
Ibid., 51.
91
Ibid., 52.
With Red Army troops firmly in place across eastern Poland, the Soviets issued a
declaration which formally established their position on the Polish question. They claimed that
the Soviet acquisition of Polish Ukraine and Belarus “created a reliable basis for a solid and
permanent friendship between the Polish people and the neighboring Ukrainian, Byelorussian,
and Russian peoples.”92 In addition, the account stated that the Polish government-in-exile was
“incapable” of working with the Soviet government and incompetent in fighting the Germans.
Both claims did nothing to help improve relations, and the vital coordination needed between
Polish Home Army units and the Red Army remained virtually nonexistent.93
Nonetheless, Prime Minister Mikolajczyk continued preparations for a general uprising
against the Germans in occupied Poland.94 An uprising would show the world that the Poles
longed to fight the Germans, and would help establish a free Polish regime in the capital,
Warsaw. Mikolajczyk ordered General Tadeusz Komorowski, commander of the Home Army, to
cooperate with the Soviets as much as possible. Still, the Soviets never let up on the idea that the
Poles were unreliable soldiers, and that the Home Army was killing Soviet partisans. In March
1944, Mikolajczyk wrote to Roosevelt asking for arms to supply the Home Army and to address
Soviet imperialism. Mikolajczyk informed Roosevelt that while he believed Nazi imperialism
would be destroyed, he feared the possibly of “Poland, and later Europe, be[ing] overwhelmed
against their will by a new wave of communist totalitarianism.”95 He also made clear to
Roosevelt that the Home Army would come out of hiding and cooperate with the Soviets as
much as possible, and that the “Polish Underground took this decision although it is aware of the
dangers resulting from disclosing its organization to the Soviets.” Though they knew the
consequences, the Poles agreed to help the “ally of their allies” once again for the sake of
92
Declaration by the Government of the USSR on the question of the Polish-Soviet frontier, Moscow, January 11,
1944, Documents on P.S. Relations, 2:132-134.
93
Ibid., 134.
94
Hempel, Poland in World War II, 87.
95
Letter from M. Mikolajczyk to President Roosevelt on Soviet imperialism, the need to provide the Home Army
with arms, and the revelation of underground activities to the Soviet authorities, London, March 18, 1944,
Documents on P.S. Relations, 2:207-211.
defeating Germany.96
The communist totalitarianism that Mikolajczyk feared most grew at a rapid pace inside
occupied Poland. In July 1944, the Polish Committee of National Liberation, or Lublin
Committee, established itself in the Soviet-occupied portion of Poland.97 Bierut became the
committee’s leader, as he was the most popular communist in Poland and the Soviets
wholeheartedly trusted him.98 Stalin and his regime now communicated exclusively with this
agency, and not with the legitimate government-in-exile in London. Additionally, the Soviets
fully controlled granting citizenship to those living in Polish territory. These developments
infuriated the government-in-exile, but it pressed on in its mission to restore a democratic and
independent postwar Poland. 99
Throughout the summer of 1944, the Home Army frequently fought against the Germans
and thousands of its soldiers died for the allied cause. Despite their vital assistance to the Red
Army, Soviet forces routinely disarmed and interned these partisans. Many reports surfaced that
Soviet soldiers had even executed Home Army commanders.100 These issues, however, did not
stop the Poles from fighting for their homeland. The Home Army continued to carry out
Operation “Tempest,” the general armed insurrection against the German occupiers, in earnest.
By the summer of 1944, the Red Army advanced to within ten kilometers of Warsaw.101
Moscow’s radio broadcasts to Poland repeated the same message thirteen times over the course
of July 1944, urging; “Poles, the time of liberation is at hand! Poles, to arms! There is not a
moment to lose!”102 The Soviets made a final such radio transmission on July 30, 1944.103 Two
days later, while Prime Minister Mikolajczyk was en route to visit Stalin in Moscow, Home
96
Ibid., 211.
Cardwell, The Case for Poland, 34.
98
Ibid., 34.
99
Mikolajczyk, The Rape of Poland, 71.
100
Memorandum handed by M. Romer to Mr. Eden, asking the British Government to induce the Soviet
Government to establish normal relations between the Red Army and the Home Army, London, July 25, 1944,
Documents on P.S. Relations, 2:296-297.
101
Cardwell, The Case for Poland, 37.
102
Ibid., 37.
103
Mikolajczyk, The Rape of Poland, 69.
97
Army insurgents took to the streets of Warsaw in an attempt to establish Polish national
sovereignty by force.104
The day after the Warsaw Uprising began, Churchill addressed the House of Commons,
expressing his optimism about the impending meeting between Mikolajczyk and Stalin, and that
as “the Russian armies now stand before the gates of Warsaw…they offer freedom, sovereignty
and independence to the Poles.”105 In Warsaw, the Home Army pushed the Germans out of key
positions into the suburbs, where the Germans immediately called for reinforcements.106 They
received some of the finest troops Germany still had to offer, like the Hermann Goering
Division, in addition to the most brutal. The German High Command sent the SS Totenkopf
(Death’s Head) division, known for its ferocity in partisan warfare, to Warsaw.107 This formation
included the SS Dierlewanger brigade, which consisted of criminals and murderers given free
rein to carry out the destruction of Poles throughout the city. The Totenkopf division also
possessed the SS RONA (Russian National Liberation Army) brigade. This formation comprised
of Russian soldiers fighting on the Eastern Front against their former comrades. These two
brigades “raped and killed without any regard to age or gender,” and reports of mass executions
were commonplace.108 Against these opponents, the Home Army mustered forty thousand
individuals, ranging in age, gender, and occupation, of which a mere twenty thousand were
armed.109
On August 3, 1944, Mikolajczyk met with Stalin, and discussed the status of the uprising
as well as the future of Poland. Beginning the conversation, Mikolajczyk outlined specifically his
desires for postwar Poland, including free and democratic elections with the Lublin Committee.
104
Hempel, Poland in World War II, 87.
Mr. Churchill’s statement in the House of Commons on Poland and the necessity of Polish-Soviet friendship as
well as the advantages which would arise from the unification of Polish armed forces based in Western and Eastern
Europe, London, August 2, 1944, Documents on P.S. Relations, 2:309.
106
Mikolajczyk, The Rape of Poland, 69.
107
Ibid., 69.
108
Hempel, Poland in World War II, 92.
109
Ibid., 88.
105
He then asked Stalin “to order help to be given to our units fighting in Warsaw,” and Stalin
immediately responded, “I shall give the necessary orders.”110 Despite Mikolajczyk’s assurances
to work with Bierut, Stalin continued to urge further collaboration with the Soviet-backed Lublin
Committee. Mikolajczyk explained that he desired to go to Warsaw at that moment and establish
a new government with all four major Polish political parties, including the communist Poles.
Stalin rebuked the Polish leader, and told Mikolajczyk his plan was impossible because of the
increased German resistance.111 He then readdressed the issue of the Home Army in Warsaw,
and with respect to fighting the Germans asked “how they could possibly do this, their forces are
not up to that task.” Stalin continued to chastise Mikolajczyk, proclaiming “as a matter of fact
these people do not fight against the Germans, but only hide in woods, being unable to do
anything else.” The Polish leader responded that the Home Army always longed to fight the
Germans and had for nearly five years, but lacked enough ammunition to do so in open combat.
The Soviet premier simply replied, “perhaps they wish to fight but as a matter of fact they are
unable to do so. What a pity.” The meeting went on, but proved fruitless for Mikolajczyk and the
Polish cause.112
The Polish government continued to petition the Soviets for aid in the uprising, especially
to drop arms or even openly engage the Germans in combat outside Warsaw.113 On August 5,
Mikolajczyk received word from inside Poland that “the Red Army on the Warsaw front has
stopped all military operations” and “there is no Soviet intervention…at a distance of a dozen
kilometers from Warsaw.”114 On August 6, Mikolajczyk met with the Lublin Poles, to no avail.
110
Note on a conversation between M. Mikolajczyk and Marshal Stalin on the future frontiers of Poland and
agreement between the Polish Government and the Polish Committee of National Liberation, Moscow, August 3,
1944, Documents on P.S. Relations, 2:309-322.
111
Ibid., 312.
112
Ibid., 315.
113
M. Romer’s note on a conversation between M. Mikolajczyk and M. Bierut and M. Osobka-Morawski in the
presence of M. Molotov on the attempts to reach an agreement with the Committee of National Liberation, Moscow,
August 8, 1944, Documents on P.S. Relations, 2:325-333.
114
Dispatch from the Delegate of the Government and the Chairman of the Council of National Unity to M.
Mikolajczyk informing in of the cessation of military operations by Soviet troops on the Warsaw front, Warsaw,
August 5, 1944, Documents on P.S. Relations, 2:324.
The communists did little to help the plight of the insurgents in Warsaw, and even denied that
there was an uprising occurring.115 At his last meeting with Stalin, Mikolajczyk again pleaded for
assistance for the beleaguered city. Stalin reassured him, and said “I’ll still do my best to help
Warsaw.”116
The Poles also implored the American and British leadership for assistance, both in the
form of supplies and the Polish Parachute Brigade, still based in Britain.117 Mikolajczyk sent an
additional message to Stalin on August 13, asking for aid. Three days later, Stalin replied, and
claimed the uprising was “a reckless adventure causing useless victims among the inhabitants.”
Stalin also informed Mikolajczyk that he would not be responsible for the uprising’s fate,
because no one informed the Soviets of its intended start date. Stalin gave this as the reason why
the Soviet army could not properly render assistance.118 Upon receipt of this information,
Mikolajczyk and his government begged Churchill and Roosevelt to intervene. The Western
Allies sent a note to the Soviets, stating “we believe all three of us should do the utmost to save
as many of the patriots there [in Warsaw] as possible.”119 The reply Stalin returned finally
revealed how he truly viewed the Home Army. He began by addressing the ordeal of the
insurgents: “sooner or later the truth about the handful of power-seeking criminals who launched
the Warsaw adventure will [come] out.”120 He continued by writing that the insurgents “exposed
practically unarmed people to German guns, armor and aircraft.” Stalin also claimed that the
Home Army did not help its position but only caused further harm, and in addition the situation
115
Mikolajczyk, The Rape of Poland, 75-77.
Ibid., 78.
117
Telegram from President Raczkiewicz to President Roosevelt asking for assistance to Warsaw, London, August
12, 1944, Documents on P.S. Relations, 2:339.
118
Telegram from Marshal Stalin to M. Mikolajczyk refusing assistance for the Warsaw Rising because it had not
been previously agreed upon with the Soviet authorities, Moscow, August 16, 1944, Documents on P.S. Relations,
2:346-347.
119
Telegram from President Roosevelt and Mr. Churchill to Marshal Stalin about the assistance for fighting Warsaw
in the name of the common struggle against Germany, London, August 20, 1944, Documents on P.S. Relations,
2:353.
120
Stalin’s negative reply to Roosevelt’s and Churchill’s demands of 20 August for assistance for fighting Warsaw
and the announcement of a Soviet large offensive in that area, Moscow, August 22, 1944, Documents on P.S.
Relations, 2:356.
116
was not used by the Poles “but by the Hitlerites, who are cruelly exterminating the civil
population.” He finished the note, however, by assuring Churchill and Roosevelt “the Red Army
will stint no effort to crush the Germans at Warsaw and liberate it for the Poles.” He believed
this was the best help the insurgents could receive from the Red Army.121
Mikolajczyk and Churchill discussed the matter further on September 1, already four
weeks into the uprising. Churchill was furious at Stalin’s refusals, and insisted the Americans
should still run flights to Warsaw and land on Soviet airfields, despite the fact the Soviets
explicitly denied them permission. Churchill was convinced that Stalin “wouldn’t dare shoot at
those American planes!”122 In the end, the Royal Air Force and their Polish compatriots made
over 200 sorties to Warsaw, and lost 34 aircraft in the process. The Americans also sent airdrops
to the Polish capital as well.123 Mikolajczyk addressed the Polish capital via radio, informing the
insurgents that “those who are murdering you, pretend--by spreading false information--to turn
into your defenders.”124 In this proclamation, Mikolajczyk referred inadvertently to the Soviets.
The Red Army’s halt of its advance within earshot of Warsaw was deplorable to both the London
Poles and the Home Army. The next day, London received Warsaw’s response to the address,
which assured the world that the Poles were “faithful soldiers” and “believe in the cause of our
struggle and therefore we shall go on fighting to the last drop of our blood.”125 After another
month of heroic resistance, the lack of food, supplies, and burial ground for the dead forced
General Komorowski to surrender on October 3, 1944. Over a quarter million Poles lost their
lives.126
The Red Army finally entered the Polish capital in January 1945. Before Warsaw’s
“liberation,” the Germans destroyed ninety percent of the city and sent the uprising’s survivors to
121
Ibid., 356.
MIkolajczyk, The Rape of Poland, 83.
123
Tadeusz Kondracki, “The Warsaw Uprising.” http://www.polishresistance-ak.org/4%20Article.htm (accessed
January 17, 2010).
124
Ibid., 84.
125
Ibid., 84.
126
Ibid., 87.
122
labor camps deep inside the Reich. Prime Minister Mikolajczyk already resigned, and the Lublin
Committee became the first government of postwar Poland. Agreements at the Yalta Conference
in February 1945 were reached when President Franklin D. Roosevelt, Prime Minister Winston
Churchill, and Premier Joseph Stalin worked together to finalize the Polish-Soviet border at
Stalin’s requested Curzon line. Before the war ended, Stalin and Bierut, now the leader of the
Polish provisional government, signed a friendship treaty, hailed by Stalin as “a radical turning
point in the relations between the Soviet Union and Poland towards the alliance and friendship
which was forged in the course of the present war of liberation…our countries can no longer be
opposed to one another.” With Stalin’s “free and democratic” elections in January 1947, the
communists gained complete control of the government, and kept it for nearly fifty years. The
Polish government-in-exile remained in London, and operated until the fall of the communist
regime in 1989.127
Despite that in 1939 Poland was the first to fight the Germans, the Soviet Union was
Hitler’s ally, and that in conjunction Stalin invaded Poland did not affect who truly prevailed at
the conclusion of the Second World War. Stalin and the Soviets gained vast amounts of territory,
capital, and world prestige in the wake of the conflict; the Poles lost much of their territory and
all of their freedom. The Warsaw Uprising gave Stalin the opportunity he needed to rid Poland of
the patriots who would oppose his communist aspirations after the war. Though the two nations
experienced strained relations throughout the course of the conflict, the Polish leadership could
never have foreseen that at the time of armed, open resistance to the common German invader,
the “ally of their allies” would ultimately abandon them. The attitudes prevalent in the Soviet
Union’s relations with the Polish government-in-exile, its reaction to the discovery of the Katyn
massacre, and its domination of postwar border discussions pale in comparison to its inaction
with regard to the Warsaw Uprising. By virtually permitting the Home Army’s destruction and
127
Ibid., 113.
forcing the institution of a non-democratic postwar Polish government, Stalin helped pave the
way for a new era of tension in East-West relations that would last until the fall of the Soviet
Union in 1991.
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