British Campaign for the Defence
of Political Prisoners and Human Rights in Indonesia
TAPOL Bulletin No. 71
September 1985
The "G30S/PKI" symbol is the
major obstacle to democracy
On the occasion of the 20th anniversary of the seizure of power by General Suharto, TA POL invited a former political
prisoner in Indonesia to contribute a piece for publication. The following is a translation of his article.
Here in Indonesia, people are still misled by symbols,
primarily the G30S/A<I symbol. I) Facts about Untung
having carried out a military operation on 30 September
1965, about volunteers from the Pemuda Rakjat [People's
Youth] and Gerwani[lndonesian Women's Movement] being
given military training, are regarded as the absolute
truth, the whole and complete truth. The reality is that
these facts ore only part of the truth, not the whole
truth, and there is no way for the whole truth to be
disclosed here at home as long as people are transfixed
by symbols that have been mystified by the military
regime, helped along by others.
It is a matter of life and death for the Suharto
military regime which now rules the country to prevent
their lies surrounding these symbols from being exposed
for what they are. People like D.N. Ai di t (A<I Chairman),
Njoto (A<I Deputy Chairman), Sakirman and Anwar Sanusi
(both Central Corrmittee members) were all instantly
silenced for no other reason than to prevent the lies
about the G30S/A<I from being exposed. lnasfor as any A<I
leaders were tried in the lawcourts, the primary concern
was that the person in question would not be in a
position to analyse the event in its entirety, would not
be able to deal comprehensively with the circumstances
that led to the occurrence of the G30S/PKI. The trials
also served the purpose of giving the impression that the
law still functions in Indonesia.
The tragedy of the A<I's silence
It ls indeed tragic that in all these 20 years, the PKI
has not been able to present its own account of the
charges made ago inst it, apart from a short statement
circulated by Njoto at Bogor Palace in October 1965, the
defence pleas of a few PKI leaders who were tried in
court which were mostly defensive in nature and dealt
with practical details, and the short statement issued by
the Central Committee of the A<I in October 1965, the
brief message of which was that "the G30S was an internal
affair of the Army". To the knowledge of this writer,
neither the A<I Central Committee nor anyone mandated to
speak on its behalf, nor anyone who could in an emergency
speak for it, has issued a single document capable of
smashing the symbol of the G30S/A<I.
How does one explain the fact that Munir was sentenced
to death and executed whilst Rewang was not sentenced to
I) GJOS stands for the 30 September (1965) Movement; A<I
stands for Indonesian Communist Party.
death and is apparently about to be released even though
he was the principal figure in the South Blitar affair?
This has nothing to do with questions of law. The reasons
are purely political. Munir was regarded as being a
potent ipl danger, someone who might have been able to
destroy that symbol, given the time and opportunity.
Munir had the respect of his comrades. Rewang's record
during interrogation and during his detention was not
considered as anything serious by the men in power. They
saw him as a man without leadership qualities, as a
corrmunist they had no reason to fear. Without knowing the
reasons for such intelligence analysis, the execution of
Munir comes as a 'complete surprise' while Rewang's
'release' is incomprehensible. But one thing is clear: it
all centres on the symbol of the G30S/PKI.
It is understandable that it has been difficult for the
A<I to expose the lies surrounding the G30S/A<I because
of its own reluctance to publicise internal party
affairs, to admit that the party's strategic defeat was
the result of a poverty of theory, making it impossible
for anyone to produce a satisfactory explanation. It may
well be that the Untung movement would never have
happened or would not have been the fiasco it was if the
A<l's strategy had been correct.
That Army generals succeeded in creating the G30S/PKI
is not unconnected with the pre-conditions that had been
brought about by the A<I itself. Unless people have the
courage to be completely open about their own disorders,
it will be difficult to destroy the lies surrounding the
G30S/A<I symbol. Once this has been done, the next
question people will ask is, ''How was it possible for the
A<I with its three millions members, with more than a
hundred of its best cadres in the Central Corrmi ttee, to
have been so easily and rapidly wiped off the political
map of Indonesia? How could the PKI have been swept away
in a political and military adventure, bringing about its
own destruction?'' If people try to expose the lies of the
G30S/A<I syrrbol without having the courage to analyse the
internal facts about the PKI itself, the results will be
the same. The facts will be partial and incomplete.
All democrats will benefit from demystification of the
GJOS/A<I syrri>ol
There is a desperate need to know the absolute truth
about the GJOS/A<l both here in Indonesia and elsewhere
in the world, because the G30S/PKI symbol has been a
calanity not only for conmunists but for the millions of
Indonesians who lost their lives in the wc:ke of the
military seizu re of power . It hos also vict imised
Mu sli ms, nat ionalists; in short, all Indonesian democrats
ore threa tened by that symbol, they con all be pounced on
by Kopkomt ib [the Army's security corrrnond] and face the
likel ihood of being pun ished by t he some lows of
s ubvers ion.
The occasion of the 20th anniversary of the GJOS/PKI is
the refore the appropriate moment to draw attention once.
again to some basic facts so as to refresh our memories,
and to prove that not all of us hove been token in by the
symbol of the GJOS/PKI.
Deception and fabrication
The name Lieutenant-Colonel Un tung gave to his movement
was the 30 Septerrber Movement. It was the military junta
that later added the stroke and the initials, 'PKI'.
President Sukarno himself called it the 1 October
Movement, but this was not a name to the liking of the
military junta because the 1 October Movement was in fact
the start of their mi Ii tary coup d'etat, and it would not
have been appropriate to odd the initials A<I to such a
name. For it was on 1 October that the military launched
their military operation to seize state power from
President Sukarno. Who con deny this?
Even tbough 20 years hove already passed, the GJOS/A<l
is sti 11 foisted on the corrmunity for the most absurd
reasons. Forest fires ore blamed on GJOS/A<l remnants, or
fires that destroy high-rise buildings, or floods. When
workers tc:ke action or peasants defend their land against
expropriation, the GJOS/PKI is held responsible. Even
pickpockets and chicken-thieves ore linked to the
GJOS/PKI.
Someone who is only 20 years old needs a GJOS/PKI
clearance certificate to get a job or enrol at a
university. Even if a person was detained more than ten
years ago, as on ex-tapol (political prisoner) he or she
is issued with on identity cord bearing the initials ET
for ex-tapol. By marking their cords in this way, the men
in power restrict openings for ex-topols to get work.
They ore forbidden from working as journalists or writers
or teachers or preachers. People who ore running a
business must also hove their identity cords stomped with
the ET sign to make sure that no-one will wont to work
for them. On the other hand, ETs still shoulder a number
of burdens: reporting once a month, providing passport
photos twice a year, toking port in indoctrination
courses once a month. This not only means extra financial
burdens, it is also the cause of a great deal of
psychological stress.
Not satisfied with these violations of basic human
rights, the Suharto military regime recently executed
Munir, Rustomo, Gotot and Djoko even though they hod
already served sentences of 17 years. Thus, they were
punished twice over, 17 years in prison plus the death
sentence, which is the most inhuman thing of oil to do.
Why does the Suharto military regime think and act in
such on irrational way? This cannot be understood unless
we toke account of the influence of symbols in Indonesian
society. Just see how Indonesion'society is led astray in
a jungle of symbols. Pancosila, the 1945 Constitution,
Pancosilo Democracy, the Sanctity of Poncosilo, Notional
Stability, and all the rest of it, whereas the myths
surrounding these symbols and the reality of their
practice are poles apart. It's the symbols that people
ore told to believe, not the things that happen in real
life. The G30S/PKI symbol is the holiest symbol of all
for the Suharto military regime. Indeed, how else could
it be for this is the symbol which gave birth to military
power in Indonesia. This is the symbol that made Suharto
President of Indonesia. The G30S/PKI is the bastion of
all the other symbols. The GJOS/PKI symbol is the
greatest achievement of the military junta under the
leadersh i p of Suharto.
This symbol didn't just foll out ·o f the sky. It came
about by means of treachery against the state and moss
murder. It brought Suharto to the surrrnit of state power.
This is why it needs to be constantly replenished, which
2
includes sacrificing the lives of Munir and our other
comrades, all for the sake of preserving the magic of the
G30S/PKI symbol. But it's not only corrrnunist lives that
keep it thriving; others too, including Muslims and
po tr iot ic nationalists like Sow ito, H.R. Dhorsono and
others must be sacrificed to preserve the fiercesome
image of the G30S/PKI symbol.
True, a great deal hos already been written by scholars
in Europe, Australia and America who hove tried to mc:ke
on honest assessment of the G30S/PKI, and hove critically
analysed the problem, but virtually nothing is known
about such work here in Indonesia. Language presents a
barrier, of course, but more than this, it is hos not
proved powerful enough to counter the systematic, ollembracing propaganda churned out by the goverrment, with
the result that the G30S/PKI symbol still misleads people
to the advantage of the military regime.
Whose coup was it?
The events of 1 October led to the overthrow of
President Sukarno. But whose coup was it? On that day,
Sukarno was with the forces of Untung, Latief and Heru at
Halim Perdonokusumah Airbase. He was free to mcke contact
with anyone he wonted and was provided with on escort to
go home to his palace in Bogor. But later on, after his
presidential powers were seized by Suharto, he was placed
under house arrest and even rudely interrogated by 0 man
named Durmawel.
Who, then, overthrew· Sukarno? Who undermined his
authority and mode it impossible for him to run
government affairs and find a political solution, to put
a stop to the spilling of the blood of millions of
innocent people? Who were the assassins of the people?
TAPOL Bulletin No. 71, Septeni:>er 1985
Who carried out a coup d'etat, the G30S/A<l or the
military junta? Who betrayed the state by making secret
contact with Malaysia, Uitung or Ali Murtopo and Benny
Murdani?
The po1riotic forces of the people will not be able to
restore democracy in Indonesia as long as the G30S/A<l
symbol still clouds their vision, as long as we regard
the symbols created by the regime as sacrosanct. The
Suharto military regime can only be thrust aside if the
democratic forces can shake off the Influence of these
disruptive and misleading symbols. Not· yesterday, or
today, but tomorrow for sure, just as surely as the sun
rises in the east, truth and justice will prevail.
Mira, 30 September, 1985, .Jd<arta
~~~~~:~i~a!:;i~;:
!~~Y~::trrso~::;~:e;a~f s~~ •;:;;e:~a;2c=:;: ·.r~-E,_•i_~.~7 ·,. . . . 'ef'".;>$,:.
1965. Aidit was captured on that day by on Army unit under the conTT11Jnd of
....
.•
_.¥
._
9,,.
Colonel Yosir Hadibroto, acting under the orders of Suharto to capture him
and shoot him dead. His murderer's account of the capture and execution was
reported in the Indonesian press in October 1980. (See TAPOL Bulletin, No
41 /42, Septeni>er-November, 1980 for a full translation.)
Aidit's assassin is now governor of the province of Lompung.
Three more long-term political prisoners executed
Three more longterm communist political prisoners were executed at the beginning of JulfJ in Pamekasan an the island of
Madura, north of East Java. ThelJ are Gatot Lestario (Sutarljo), Djoko Untung and Rustomo, all of whom were arrested in
late 1968 or earlfJ 1969. All were tried more than seven 1Jears after their arrest and had spent 17 1Jears in prison blJ the
time of their executions.
The executions were carried out in secret. The first
reports reached the outside world early in August. Only
after widespread protest had been expressed, especially
in Holland, did the authorities in Jakarta finally admit,
on 30 August, that the executions had tcken place.
Secrecy also surrounded the conditions under which the
executions took place. According to independent reports,
close relatives were given a last chance to meet the
condemned men the night before the executions. This did
not include the wives of Gotot Lestario and Djoko Untung,
both of whom are themselves in prison. TAPOL understands
that Gotot met his elderly mother but none of his
children prior to his death.
The three men's bodies were thrown into holes after
execution, and were not properly buried until a month
later.
More executions could follow
Confirming the executions, Justice Minister, Ismail
Saleh claimed they had been in accord with 'due process
of law'. 'Whoever has gone through the existing process
of law ••• and at the end, his request for a pardon is
turned down, must hove his sentence carried out."
~arta Post, 31 August) This means that more executions
could soon follow.
According to AFP in Jakarta (28 August), another
corrrnunist prisoner, trade unionist Ruston Widjajasostra,
whose clemency plea hos been rejected, is soon to be
executed, and Sukotno, former leader of the corrrnunist
youth organisation, Pemuda Rakyat (People's Youth) "who
hos refused to ask for a pardon, could also be shot this
year". Both men were arrested in late 1968, ofter the
Army's crackdown on a group of corrrnunists who tried to
re-organise themselves in South Blitar, East Java,
together with the three men executed in July and Moharrrnad
Munir, who was executed in May.
The "full process of Indonesian law"
~ndonesia's
military rulers are trying to disarm
international protest against the execution of political
prisoners - communist as well as Muslim - by claiming
that the victims hove enjoyed 'due process of the low'.
The some argument is used by western goverrments as
justification for their refusal to td<e positive action
to halt the executions. At a time when the regime is
going ahead with a new wove of trials, it is useful to
excmlne procedures used for political trials.
On 27 August, Lord Avebury, chairman of the
Parliamentary Human Rights Group wrote to the British
Foreign Secretory, Sir Geoffrey Howe, about "the
clandestine execution of three more political prisoners
in Indonesia" which he described as "an act ..• of
extreme and quite gratuitous cruelty''. Surely, he went
on, "there comes a point at which our concern has to be
marked by sane practical initiative, going beyond ritual
incantations of disapproval".
Replying in an undated letter, Sir Geoffrey Howe argued
that "the three men were tried and had their senten~es
upheld according to the full process of Indonesian law".
Such a claim reveals a gross disregard for the violations
of established legal procedures to which all tried
political prisoners ore subjected. In fact, the trials
currently under way serve to renew concern over the
travesties of justice perpetrated in the Indonesian law
courts.
In the following, we excrnine the trial of Gatot
Lestario and Djoko Untung. (A third defendant, Basuki,
died while the trial was in progress under circumstances
that have never been revealed.)
TAPQ.. Bulletin No. 71, Septermer 1985
3
Executions and "fair" trials
Arrest and pre-trial detention
Both men were arrested by military officers acting on
instructions of KOPKAMTIB, the Army's unconstitutional
Operational Commard for the Restoration of Security and
Order, a body that is not answerable to Parliament nor tC?>
any other legal authority. This arm of repression was
created in October 1965, ostensibly for "a transitional
period" to deal with "temporary disorders" but has
remained in existence ever since.
Their trial in Bli tar was held seven years after their
arrest, infringing the stipulations of the criminal
procedural code then in force imposing limits on the
period of detention without trial. Indefinite, longterm
detention was given spurious legitimation by KOA<AMTIB
Decree No 5, 1969 which empowered the Attorney-General to
hold 'suspects' indefinitely without any trial or pending
trial. Here is an example of an illegal body giving
unlawful powers to the regime's law-enforcement officer.
These 'special powers' were granted for use in cases of
'subversion', ie, for political cases.
The charges
Gatot and Djoko were accused of subversive activities
prior to and after 30 September 1965, in particular of
attempting to revive the PKI in South Blitar after it had
been banned. These charges raise two fundamental issues,
the illegality of the 1963 Anti-Subversion Low and the
illegality of General Suharto's 1966 edict banning the
Communist Party (PKI).
Defence lawyers acting for defendants in numerous
subversion trials since 1965 have argued that the AntiSubversion Law which was first enacted as a Presidential
Decree by Sukarno in May 1963 is unconstitutional.
Although it was introduced as an 'emergency measure'
which suspended the basic democratic rights safeguarded
in the Indonesian Constitution, it was formalised as a
low in 1969 with its anti-democratic contents fully
intact.
Unlike other laws which require that criminal acts must
be proven, the Anti-Subversion Law allows the maximum
penalty of death to be passed on a person who "has
engaged in an action with the purpose of, or clearly with
the purpose which is known to him, or can be expected to
be known to him" that fall under a list of vaguelydef ined subversive acts like "deviating from the ideology
of the l"ancasila or the State", "disseminating feelings
of hostility... causing splits, conflict, chaos or
disturbances among the population", and so on.1)
Defence lawyers have appealed to judges to use their
interpretative discretion to reject the Anti-Subv~rsion
Law as unconstitutional, knowing full well that 1udges
are not in a position to do so because they are in the
employ of the Executive, bound by its policies and
therefore not able to act as independent agents.
Although Gatot and Djoko Untung were initia.lly ch~r~ed
under several art ides of the Criminal Code an addition
to the Anti-Subversion Law, these 'subsidiary charges'
were dropped because the prosecutor argued in his
surrming-up speech that the 'primary charges' based on the
Anti-Subversion Law had proved sufficient to bring a
verdict of death.
The decree banning the PKI was issued on 12 March 1966
as a 'presidential decree' signed by General Suharto, not
Sukarno who was still the president. This 'presidential'
decree was later given the status of a decree of the
Consultative Assembly (MPRS}, a body composed of
presidential appointees. The MPRS inherited from Sukarno
was drastically purged of Sukarno appointees who were
replaced with Suharto appointees. This was a case of an
illegal decree being legitimised by an illegallyconstituted law-making Assembly.
The judges
Indonesian judges are appointed by the President and
are not impartial. As civ ii servants, they must belong to
KORPRI, the Corps of Public Servants. The decree setting
up KORffil specifies that its guiding principles are to
maintain political stability and reinforce the allegiance
of its members to the State and the governTient. This fact
alone negates the whole idea of a fair trial. '
The chances of judges exercising any independence in
the cases of people on trial for 'involvement in the 30
September 1965/PKI Movement' were particularly remote.
There have been no known acquittals and sentences possed
down have been extraordinarily harsh. The Suharto regime
rests its claim to legitimacy on its insistence that the
PKI was responsible for the 30 September Movement and
therefore communist defendants could expect no sympathy,
let alone impartiality from their judges.
The Defence
Although some of the defendants now on trial hove been
able to obtain the services of lawyers of their own
choice, this was not the case with Gatot and Djoko
Untung. They tried unsuccessfully to contact three wellknown, independent lawyers, Yap Thiam Hien, Buyung
Nosution and Aryonto. They rejected the court-appointed
lawyers and were therefore forced to handle their own
defence.
1) See Southwood and Flanagan, Indonesia: law, Propaganda
and Terror, Zed Press, London, 1983, page 229-230.
Member of the PKI Politbureou,
Sudisman, on trial in Ja<arta in .lily
1967. Sudismon was the only one of the
five-man Poli tbureau who was brought to
trial and sentenced to death before
being executed. The other four, D.N.
Aidit, M. Lukman, Njoto and Ir
Sakirmon, were all shot dead
irrwnediately after being captured. Apart
from the story told by Yasir Hadibroto
of Aidit's murder, there has been no
official account of any of these
'disappearances'.
TAPOL Bulletin No. 71, Septerri>er 1985
Indonesian political prisoners under sentence of death
This list includes all long-term political prisoners arrested for alleged involvement in the 1965 events who, according
to TA POL 's records, are under sentence of death. In some cases, the most recent entries go back several years.
It also includes Muslim prisoners arrested and tried in the past few years. (Corrections from readers would be welcome.)
Nmne
Age Arrested Sentenced
Prison
Position
2.
Abdullah Alihamy
Asep Svryaman
60
61
Padang
Cipinang
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
Azhar bin Mohanmad Safar
Boiman
Bono (Mvlyono or Walvyo) 59
Anatasivs Bvang
45
Bvngkvs
58
Amar Hanafiah
Hargiyono "
lskandar Svbekti
64
lsmanto
61
Kamarvzaman *
59
Kami!
57
Moman Kuswayadi
Wismar Marpaung
Marsvdi
57
Much tar Effendi Si rat
Moeder isman
Mvlyono Svryowardoyo ** 62
Jvsvf Rabidi *
53
Nvrahoyan
45
Raswad
60
Johan Rivai *
72
Rvslan Widjajasastra ** * 69
Secretary, CDB Riav
PKI 'Special Bureau' and post-1965 COB,
Central Java
Member 'lmran's group' (Muslim)
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
Satar Suryonto
Bambang Si spoyo
Svdiono ***
Svgeng Sugiarto
Svjadi
Svkardjo
Svkarman
Svkatno ****
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
Svlaiman
Svmbodo *
Svpono
Svradi 1)
Svrmo
Svrono Hadiwiyono
Svwandi
Svyono
Tamvri Hidayat
Abdullah Unor 2)
Giyadi Wignyosuharyo
Wiroatmodjo
Amin Zein *
Timzar Zvbil
(sentence under review)
1)
Two Suradis (both Army captains) were listed in 1980. One named Suradi Prawirodiharjo died in Cipinang prison in
1982. The other one, also held in Cipinong, was sentenced to life imprisonment but his sentence was raised to death
on appeal.
Abdullah Unor's death sentence was ini:>osed by the High Court on appeal by the prosecutor against a life sentence
imposed by the District Court. The prosecution had asked the District Court for a death sentence.
1.
2)
36
62
1967
1971
March 1975
August 1975
Sept. 1982
1967
1965
1965
Sept. 1968
Nov. 1969
July 1971
1965
1968
1968
1967
1965
1965
1965?
1965
1965
1967
Dec. 1972
Dec. 1974
March 1968
May 1967
April 1983
1977
July 1976
Avg. 1974
Jan. 1973
1966
1968
1969
April 1968
1968
July 1974
1965
April 1971
May 1985
Sept. 1973
Oct. 1966
1965?
1966
1965
1965
March 1969
May 1976
March 1971
66
56
1968
56
1965
64
1969
1965
Nov. 1969
Feb. 1970
March 1972
Feb. 1970
1965
1968
Oct. 1970
June 1973
1965?
35. 1980
58 1965
65 1965?
35
1977
Sept. 1967
June 1985
Oct. 1968
Oct. 1966
March 1975
Morch? 1978
Medan?
Cipinang
Cipinang
Cipinang
Banjarmasin
Cipinang
Cipinang
PKI 'Special Bureau'
Army, Cakrabirawa
Army sergeant, Cakrabirawa
Secretary, South Kalimantan CDB
Army corporal
PKI Secreter i at
PKI leader, North Sumatra
Head, PKI 'Special Bureau'
Cipinang?
Nvsakembangan Army lieutenant
Member 'Imran's group' {Muslim)
Cipinang
Air Force sergeant-major
PKI, North Sumatra
Army officer
Nvsakembangan PKI, Solo
Cipinang
Army, Cakrabirawa
Army sergeant, Cakrabirawa
Cipinang
Padang
Army major
PKI and former deputy-chairman, SOBS I
Cipinang
Central Council till 1964
Cipinang
Army, Cakrabirawa
'Komondo Jihad' (Muslim)
Air Force colonel
Cipinang
Medan?
Cipinang
Cipinang
Pamekasan
Cipinang
Cipinang
Pamekasan
Cipinang
Cipinang
Cipinang
Cipinang
Pamekasan
Medan
Den Pasor
Jogjakarta
Cipinang
Medan
Padang
Medan
Army, Cakrabirawa
Army sergeant, Cakrabirawa
Member COB, East Java
Secretary-General, Pemvda Rakyat (People's
Youth)
Army, Cakrabirawo
Army I ievtenant
PKI 'Special Bureau'
Army captain
Army sergeant
Army, Cakrabirawa
Central Conmi ttee, PKI
Army
'Komando Jihad' (Muslim)
Army sergeant, Cakrabirawa
Peasant leader and journalist
Muslim journalist
* Death sentence may hove been conmvted.
* * May already have been executed.
* * * Clemency plea against death sentence has been rejected.
**** Svkatno lost his appeal at the Supreme Court and, according to AFP, has refused to ask for clemency.
Glossary
CDB = PKI provincial carmittee.
Cakrabirawa = Palace Guards Regiment
SOBSI = All Indonesia Trade Union Federation
TAPOL Bulletin No. 71, September 1985
s
Gotot's defence statement
The full text of GatDt Lestaiio's defence statement is now available abroad. It is written by hand on nearly 80 pages of
exercise-book. notepaper. The statement was made on 26 December 1975. The following are extracts from the statement which
we publish as an imp ortant document on the extermination of the left which followed in the wak.e of Suharto's seizure of
power twenty years ago.
Members of the Court, Presiding Chairman and Prosecutor,
A dozen Kali sosoks 1) will not prevent the banners ot
Democracy, National Independence and Social Justice from
being unfurled.
On this day, I am going to present my defence. The case
being tried here is a political case which has now
entered its eleventh year, and involves events that
happened ten years ago known as the G30S2) Affair, as
well as events that happened seven years ago known as the
South Blitar Affair.
I have no illusions whatsoever about this trial. I know
that regardless of what ·may have been raised so far in
court, it will in the end comply with and proceed
according to the wishes and intentions of those in power,
the victors. This court which has been given the task of
trying me cannot do other than take sides with and defend
those in power. I understand this perfectly well. Yes,
the trials of the so-called G30S cases that have been
conducted up to now are show-trials which are designed
for political consumption by those in power. The verdicts
have already been fixed by the men in power.
All my comrades have spoken in their trials about the
sufferings of the tapols because of the inhuman way they
are treated, the violations of human rights corrrnitted by
the authorities. Many political prisoners were picked up
on nothing more than guesswork and forced to say that
they were members or sympathisers of the PKI (Partai
Komunis Indonesia, the Indonesian Corrrnunist Party). This
means they were arrested only because of political
differences with the the men now in power.
I con hardly do less than accuse the government for its
barbarous treatment of the tapols. The men in power are
perpetrating genocide - surreptitious, slow-but-sure mass
murder. Whether deliberately or not, they are quietly
acting, in violation of the UN Charter, to exterminate a
group ot people in society whose views, beliefs and ways
of thinking di Her frcrn those of in power. From this
platform, I appeal to all people and organisations to do
everything in their power to compel the Indonesian
government to end practices that are totally at variance
with basic human rights and with every humanitarian
principle.
In October and November 1965, massacres took their toll
of hundreds of thousands of innocent lives. A state
corrrnittee set up on the instructions of President Sukarno
gave a figure of 300,000, while Antara news agency
reported a figure of 500,000 in October 1966. Then in
1969, a campaign of terror and slaughter was unleashed by
state security forces against people in Purwodadi and
Grobogan and yet more lives were lost.
The law ot mdikasi has been used to arrest thousands
upon thousands of people because of 'indications' that
they are members of the People's Youth (PR), the
Indonesian Peasants' Union (BTI), the League for People's
Culture (Lekra) and other organisations; some have been
forced to soy they were members or sympathisers of the
PKI. In virtually every case, the arrests were made
without a warrant and the people have been held
indefinitely. The detainees have remained in detention
for years on end in conditions that fail to comply with
minimum health needs: sleeping on a single mat, crarrrned
to overflowing into cells far in excess of capacity - a
cell for
persons accorrrnodoting a hundred, ten people
~rarrned into a one-person cell, and up to this very day,
1n 1975, cells of two or three metres intended for one
person being used for five.
2?
6
Gatot (right) with other prisoners in Pamekasan
What was the GJOS?
My comrades have told the court that the PKI did not
wage a r.e bell ion or coup, that the dissolution of the A<I
is illegal, and that the South Blitar Affair was an
inevitable consequence of the fact that corrrnunists and
other democrats were placed outside the low, becoming
people who could be murdered at will, without sanction.
US imperialism and the CIA mode many attempts to
overthrow President Sukarno and destroy the PKI •.•. But
Sukarno was too self-confident, too sure of his ability
to unify all groups in Indonesia, and foiled to realise
that there were many sycophants and hypocrites among his
supporters, that the contradiction between the developing
nations and the imperialist countries is a basic world
contradiction which is antagonistic .•.. In 'Tovip', his
17 August speech in 1965, less than two months before the
I October 1965 affair, he described the tense situation
at the time as follows:
"And now they ore also saying that Indonesia will
collapse in October. Yes, indeed, the enemy's cunning
attempts at subversion ore continuing ••• And they are
already predicting that in a month's time, some time
during that month, Sukarno will fall, there will be no
more Sukarno. I have written proof of this."
Because of grave internal weaknesses, the PKI which
clearly supported the policies of the Sukarno Government
did not take the appropriate steps to surmount the
serious situation. On the contrary, some A<I leaders,
totally disregarding organisational procedures, became
involved in an act of military adventurism that was not
based on the consciousness and conviction of the masses
of the people.
(Some) right-wing generals then combined forces in a
body called the Council of Generals which planned a coup
against the lawful Indonesian government under President
Sukarno. The Council of Generals was not on issue created
by the PKI. It was a reality, and quite logically so,
considering the political situation at the time. If it
were possible to bring D.N. Aidit before the court to
testify as a witness, he would certainly be able to
explain the process of events leading up to the Council
of Generals' coup conspiracy. If the judiciary in
Indonesia were independent and impartial, should the
courts not also investigate the right-wing generals who
TAPQ.. Bulletin No. 71, September 1985
were members of the Council of Generals in order to bring
everything out into the open?
The Council of Generals' plan of action against
President Sukarno provoked a response among younger Army
officers who were intent upon thwarting the coup. As a
political party which supported President Sukarno, the
A<I defended the lawful government. Events moved fast. US
imperialism and the CIA used splitting tactics, they had
plenty of experience in destroying patriotic and
democratic forces in many countries and worked to
aggravate domestic tensions.
The younger officers were very worried about President
Sukarno's safety; they became agitated not only in their
hearts but also in their heads at a time when they should
have remained cool-headed. Things got out of control when
they took action to thwart the Council's plan for a co.up
on 5 October 1965. All their pent-up anger finally broke
loose In an action that became known as the 1 October
Movement (Gerakan 1 October, or Gestok, subsequently
called the 30 Septerrber Movement or Gerd<an 30 September,
G30S) under Lieutenant-Colonel Untung, a battalion
commander of the presidential guards, the Cakrabirowa
Regiment.
Many people ask whether it is true that the A<I planned
the G30S. The question has arisen because some A<.I
leaders, including D.N. Aidit, chairman of the PKI
Central Committee, were involved in it. People therefore
believe that the PKI must have been behind it. The PK1 as
a party has never had the chance to explain publicly the
true facts of the case. On the other hand, the New Order
whipped up a campaign asserting that the A<I was the
organiser of the GJOS.
Investigations will show that the PKI never had the
slightest intent ion of overthrowing the Sukarno
gvernment. On the contrary, it defended that government.
The PKI never plamed any coup, and coups are not the way
of the people ... or of Marxism-Leninism.
People ask, but what are the facts about the PKI?
Anyone who seriously and carefully studies the affair
will see, from an investigation of all the PKl documents
rot if ied by PKI congresses, that the G30S along with the
decrees Issued by its Revolutionary Council was an act of
military adventurism, it was not the way to establish
People's Democracy as defined by the A<I Congress.
Therefore, as an organisation, the PKI was not involved
in the G30S. Only a few individuals In the A<I leadership
were Involved in the GJOS. The mass arrest of cadres,
members and syrrpathisers of the PKI on the pretext of
Involvement in the GJOS was a major project sponsored by
US imperialism and the CIA, inspired by the idea of
exterminating the communists and all democratic and
patr lot le forces.
Whose coup was it?
Who in actual fact carried out a coup d'etat? President
Sukarno was quick to take action to regain control of the
crisis. At 11 am on 1 October 1965, he instructed the
Naval Chief-of-Staff, Vice-Admiral E. Martadinanta to
order General Suharto, comnander of KOSlRAD (the Army
Strategic Reserve Command) to report to the
President/Col'TTT'lander-in-Chiefof the Armed Forces. At the
same time, President Sukarno appointed General Pronoto
Reksosamudra as ad interim comnander of the Army and
General Suharto was charged with the task of restoring
order. On the same day, the Information Department of the
Army HQ announced that for the time being, the leadership
of the Army was in the hands of General Suharto. This
announcement was signed by General Suharto himself. Never
before in the life of the Army have there been two formal
decisions taken simaltaneously about the leadership. The
President's odjudant, Colonel Bombang Widjanarko was
ordered to instruct General Unar Wirahadikusuma,
comnonder of the Jakarta Military Col'TTT'land, who was
already at KOSlRAD, to report to the President. General
Suharto told Colonel Bambang Widjanarko that General Umar
could not report to the President.
Acts of Insubordination were committed over and over
again. General A.H. Nasution (Armed Forces Ch ief of
Stoff) was by this time together with the others at
KOSlRAD. The order issued by the President /Commander - in Chief for a cease-fire was obeyed by the GJOS but not by
KOSlRAQ. These generals began to reveal their disloyalty
to the President by refusing to obey his orders. Using
the GJOS as the pretext, they began to show that they
were prepared to go against the President's orders, and
this was to have far-reaching consequences.
Suharto, still a lieutenant-general in 1965, and cornnander
of Kostrad, the Army Strategic Cornnand, with Colonel Sarwo
Edhie. corrmander of the para-corrmandos, the RA<AD, who
spear-headed the massacres in 1965-66. The RA<AD were the
main troops under Suharto's corrmand when he seized power.
While a cabinet meeting was in progress [on 11 March
1966 ], the Palace was surrounded by troops not wearing
any insignia who subsequently turned out to be paracol'TTT'landos(RPKAD). The President and Dr Subandrio flew to
safety in a helicopter and took refuge in Bogor. In The
Smiling General (page 46), O.E Roeder writes that, acting
on the orders of General Suharto, a delegation consisting
of Generals Basuki R:ichmat, A. Jusuf and Amir Machmud
left Jakarta at 14.00 hours to see the President i~
B09or, and told him of the need to create a calm and
stable atmosphere for the government and for the
continuation of the revolution. This could only be
achieved by transferring power from the President to
General Suharto. Going against the advice of his two
closest advisers, Dr Subondrio and Chaerul Saleh, the
President finally handed over powers and signed 0
document later known as on 'Instruction' or 'Order'
(Surat Per int oh), tronsferr ing executive powers t o
General Suharto.
TAPOL Bulletin No. 71, Septerri>er 1985
7
should be taken against the person in charge
implementing the Supersemar far he is guilty
committing criminal offences.
Gatot's defence statement
of
of
lhe 1965-66 massacres
A demonstration outside the Indonesian Embassy in London
on 30 May, 1985.
lhe 11 March 1966 Order
The president signed the 11 March Order not of his own
free will but because he was forced to do so under armed
threat. General Suharto assumed the re ins of s tote power
by means of the 11 March Order.
I now come to the question of the use of the Supersemar
(acronym for the 11 Much Order) to outlaw the FKI. The
authority that was used to outlaw the PK.I was the
Supersemar. Yet, laws were already in force specifically
regulating the political parties, Presidential Decrees
7/1959 and 13/1960. Thus, if measures are to be taken
ago inst a political party, the only grounds are
Presidential Decrees 7/1959 and 13/1960, not the
Supersemar. I repeat, not the Supersemar. Supersemar is
neither a law nor a piece of legislation, it is an order.
The MPRS decree endorsing the Supersemar was
unconstitutional, it was an infringement of the 1945
Constitution.
Perhaps, it may be argued, it was a law based on
emergency conditions. This is not possible either because
(a) the emergency conditions were brought on by those who
used force to demand the Order; at the very least, there
was blatant collaboration between those who surrounded
the Palace and those who demanded the Supersemar. And (b)
the emergency conditions were therefore nothing more than
a pretext .... There was no emergency except that used as
a pretext by those who forced the President to issue the
Supersemar, which was the 'starting point' of an act of
rebellion. It can be stated and formally proven by law
that the Supersemar was an act of rebellion. The most
convincing proof is that the President was removed from
power; he was interrogated, his ministers were arrested,
members of the MPRS and the DPR3) were arrested, and
arrests have continued to the present day ..•• Is this not
a coup?
Thus not only should the actions taken on the basis of
the Supersemar be revoked, including the MFRS decision to
endorse the Supersemar, the dissolution of the PKI and
the creation of KOFKAMTIB (Operational Corrmand for the
Restoration of Security and Order), but legal action
e
I now want to speak about brutality and sadism. The
civilised world was shocked by the horrendous sadism of
the crimes that were sponsored by the fascist military
regime. Things occurred that no-one could ever hove
imagined would happen in Indonesia, a country whose
people are regarded in the West as "the most genteel
people in the world". While it is not good to look back,
we should learn from history. To speak truthfully, I am
very reluctant to speak about those ghastly events, but I
do so because ten years on, the country's rulers still
justify the terror, savagery and slaughter as being
worthwhile as long as the objective of exterminating the
FKI and overthrowing Sukarno was achieved. They hove
shown not the slightest sense of moral responsibility to
investigate the massacres, or at the very least to call
to account those who were in positions of authority at
the time. Nor have they done anything to prevent a
repetition of what happened.
These sadistic crimes have never been condemned, let
alone anyone charged by the people now in power. With the
protection of the security forces who would never have
acted in the way they did without the approval of tneir
anti-conrnunist superiors, groups which supported the
right-wing Army generals ran wild everywhere. Spurred on
by stories of eyes being gouged out and of obscene
practices said to hove taken place at l-lolim Airbase, of
genitals being sloshed (never proven by any doctor's
autopsy), of claims that the GJOS hod dug (groves}4}, and
by slogans proclaiming that far every murdered general,
100,000 communists should pay with their lives, a white
terror was unleashed and sadistic crimes were committed
everywhere. Hundreds of thousands of communists and noncommunists, men, women, youngsters and even children fell
victim to a wave of unparalleled barbarism.
Acts of sadism, unimaginably inh1.XT1an acts of torture,
were perpetrated at the time of the massacres. An entire
family was murdered, the children first, one by one, in
front of the parents, then the wife and husband were
killed. A pregnant women who happened to be the village
head was murdered. Mothers clutching their babies were
slaughtered on river banks. Contests were held. Anyone
who was able to slice a person in half from top to bottom
in the single blow of an axe would qualify far extra
payments (this happened in Singosari}. Many murders took
place on the river banks to ovoid the need far digging
graves. Human heads were hung out in market-places, in
front of houses, along the roadside; some were even
daubed with chalk. Women's corpses with babies suckling
at the breast were thrown into the River Brantas. In
Bengawon Solo Canal (Bojonegoro District}, dozens of
bodies were tied together and used as a raft. There was a
bridge near Dabat (?} where many people were slaughtered.
The many marks of dried-up human blood going down the
side of the bridge was a telling reminder of how many
people had been slaughtered there.
Some people were subjected to a slow death; their limbs
were chopped off one by one. Others were farced to jump
down into trenches, called 'Luweng'. In one prison,
virulently anti -conrnuni st government troops ordered
detainees to jul"ll> off a high platform head first. It was
a miracle for anyone to have survived this ordeal.
Penises were cut off and used to prove how many people a
person hod killed when demanding their pay.
These acts of extermination cannot be described as
excesses, as an outburst by the masses. They were wellorganised, planned and premeditated. This is evident from
the fact that everywhere, in all parts of the country,
the massacres were torgetted not only against ordinary
people but also against local PKI leaders down to the
village level. Those targetted included leaders of the
mass organisations, members of district assemblies (DFRD)
and of district executive organs, district heads,
journalists, businessmen, lawyers and intellectuals.
TAPa... Bulletin No. 71, September 1985
'lndikasi' hos been used to arrest at random anyone
considered undesirable. Sadistic methods ore then used
during interrogation, including severe beatings,
electrical torture, isolation and a diet that brings on
paralysis. Detainees' relatives who know nothing at all
about the affair are subjected to pressure and
intimidation, and threats of blackmail, ill-treated to
destroy their morale, so as to inflict psychological
pressure on the unfortunate topol. Such treatment is
meted out not only to men but to women as well, who often
suffer the added indignity of being raped.
Having perpetrated such methods in the ncrne of the
Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution, the rulers have
created the myth of 'new style PKI members' who are
accused of 'giving guidance' and on the basis of
'indikasi'. To this very day, after almost eleven years,
all this intolerable treatment of the tapols is still
continuing.
The trials
The trials. being conducted are clearly pursuing a
'projected target', aimed at proving that the abortive
G30S was planned and supported by the PKI with the help
of democratic mass organisations and civilian and
military officials said to have been 'under PKI
guidance'. The people to be tr led and the sequence in
which the trials are held is arranged in such a way as to
confirm the New Order's own construction of events. As
many people as possible have been accused of playing a
leading role, and each of them is expected to testify
against others.
On numerous occasions, my comrades have told court
hearings in Jakarta and elsewhere about detainees who
have died as a result of being tortured during
interrogation and of the inhuman treatment of prisoners
in the detention camps. One tapol had no alternative but
to confess to anything because he could not stood the
sadistic torture to which he was subjected. The maltreatment of women is particularly sadistic. In some
places, these poor women are stripped naked and put on a
platform during interrogations conducted at night, with a
bright petromax lanp shining on them. Some women have
been dragged around markets naked. S001e have hod their
vaginas burned or electrified, or have hod bottles pushed
up the"TI. Some topols hove been dragged behind trucks.
Some have become so desperate, going in and out of prison
as victims of blackmail, that they hove corrmi tted
suicide.
In the eyes of the fascist militarists, no violation of
the law in involved because the victims are seen as
obstacles to their policies who must be mercilessly
annihilated, even though there are people in positions of
authority who have acknowledged that ideology cannot be
stomped out by means of violence or by force of arms.
Since the PKI is regarded as a 'latent danger',
KOPKAMTIB must stay in existence indefinitely. State
Department and Pentagon officials often praise Indonesia
as the 'free world's' strongest bastion in Southeast Asia
now that Indonesia's corrmunists and democrats have been
successfully crushed and paralysed and at such low cost.
When the IGGI (Inter-Governmental Group on Indonesia)
raised certain objections about granting more credit
because they were pressing for more favourable
conditions, Foreign Minister Adam Molik's smart response
was; "Yes, but we succeeded brilliantly in crushing the
communists without them forking out a single dollar."
The South Blitar affair
I now come to the South Blitar question. What was the
South Blltar Affair and how did it happen? As I said in a
previous hearing a few days ago, the South Blitar Affair
occurred as the consequence of the overthrow of the
Sukarno government by General Suharto, as the consequence
of corrmunists being placed outside the low, making it
possible for them to be murdered with impunity, as the
consequence of the barbarous white terror that was
unleashed everywhere. This meant that there was no
alternative for corrmunists but to defend themselves and
resist. Is it c001prehensible for anyone to face disaster
without doing something? Is it not understandable for
people placed in such circumstances to escape from
danger, to defend themselves as best they can and to
resist in an effort to survive, in other words, to refuse
to die in vain. It is a natural human instinct to defend
one's own life, it is perfectly understandable when all
other paths are closed except self-defence, to make a
stand against the armed strength of a blood-soaked,
counter-revolutionary government, to toke up arms In
self-defence.
The South Blitar Affair was
forced upon us by the
armed counter-revolution. Armed confrontration occurred
because of the natural human instinct to defend one's
existence when cornered in a position of extreme
adversity. Had there been no bloody oppression,
unparalleled in history for its barbarism, South Blitar
or anything like it would never have happened in such a
short space of time. Because of the ideological
weaknesses that afflicted the PKI, no-one would have
taken such an initiative of their own free will,
abandoning city life and moving into villages, still less
vi Hages like those l n South Blitar where the soi I is
barren.
Tyranny had gained the upper hand, corrmunists hod been
placed outside the protection of the law, the Sukarno
government hod been overthrown and replaced by the anticorrmunist Suhartogovernrrent and armed counter-revolution
was on the rampage. These were the circumstances that
forced surviving A<.1 members to go to the villages and
unite with the poor peasants in South Blitar. Being
political workers who had always regarded it as their
life's work to serve the interests of the people, the
country crid the Indonesian revolution, the PKI cadres who
made their way to South Blitar did not remain idle,
resting their chins on their hands. While protecting
themselves against constant attempts to track them down,
the PKI cadres learned to live in the villages, which was
altogether different from living in the city. They
integrated themselves with the poor peasants and farm
labourers.
The (Army's) pursuit operations grew in intensity.
South Bli tar was blockaded and casualties began to fall.
The homes of the peasants were burnt to the ground; no
houses or huts escaped these operations. The peasants
were forced to move out onto the roads. They were no
longer able to till their fields because the operations
gripped the area like a vice. Cassava gardens were cut to
pieces to prevent corrmunists using them as hiding places.
Confronted by such a level of operations, the only
alternatives were to surrender and be killed or to defend
oneself, md<:e best use of the opportunities avaiioble and
break through the encirclement.
The military regime accused
This court of the Indonesian military regime may regard
me as the accused, but in the court of history, with the
entire people acting as witnesses. I stand here as the
accuser for all the er Imes against humanity already
committed, now being ccrrmitted or still to be COl'TTT'litted
by the present regime against the Indonesian people,
against members of the PKI and the mass organisations,
against the so-called 'remnants', in short, against all
Indonesian patriots and democrats of whatever group,
wherever they ore.
I demand that the person responsible for this regime
should be tried for the crime of genocide. I call upon
this court to initiate an investigation of the mass
murders which I have spoken about repeatedly. I demand
that all the political prisoners should be released and
that all the torture perpetrated against the prisoners
should stop immediately. As I hove already said, the vast
majority of those who ore still languishing in prisons,
in places of detentions, in exile camps, are being held
TAPOL Bulletin No. 71, Septerri>er 1985
9
beca use the i r politics are different from those of the
regime now in powe r.
I firmly believe that the Indonesian people are the
mighty creators of h istory. Truth and justice will surely
win. The present dark ages are only temporary. Unite,
Indonesian people, in the corrrnon struggle for democracy,
national independence and social justice.
Blitar, 26 December 1975
1) Kalisosok is t he pr i son in Surabaya where Ga tot was
held up to the time of his trial.
t of
2 ) G 30S, Ge r akan 30 September or 30 September Mave men
1965.
t
a the
3 ) MPRS , Majelis Pemusyawaratan Rakyat Semen ar •
provisional People ' s Consultative
Assembly or upper
house . DPR, Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat, the People's
Representative Assembly, or low er house.
.
4 ) dug (grave s ). ' holea' is impl~ed, referri".'g to the
well at Lubang Buaya or Crocodiles' Hal~ sitl!ated at
Halim Airbase where the murdered generals bodies were
found. The a'ssociation between 'holes' and 'g~aves'
supposedly dug by PKI members. was frequently made in the
anti-PK! propaganda of the time.
Harassment of ex-prisoners
"Restoring voting rights" is the
excuse for new controls
Follow i ng the announcement (see TAPOL Bulletin No. 70, Juli] 1985) that 1.7 million former po~itical prisoners held f~r
alleged involvement in the 1965 events are being re-registered to determine whether they will be allowed to vote ~n
elections a Presidential Decision has now been issued setting down the procedures to be used. The new arrangements will
subject ;hese men and women to yet more supervision and harassment, reinforcing their status as second-class citizens
without civil rights.
Following the announcement (see TAPOL Bulletin No. 70,
July 1985) that 1.7 million former political prisoners
held for alleged involvement in the 1965 events are being
re-registered to determine whether they will be allowed
to vote in elections, a Presidential Decision has now
been issued setting down the procedures to be used. The
new arrangements will subject these men and women to yet
more supervision and harassment, reinforcing their status
as second-class citizens without civil rights.
All people designated as hoving been 'involved in the
GJOS/PKI affair' who will be subject to these procedures
are classified into three categories. (These same
categories were used when they were political prisoners.)
A-Category are those who were "clearly directly
involved in the GJOS/PKI".
B-Category are those who were "clearly indirectly
involved in the GJOS/PKI".
C-Category are those regarding whom "there are
indications, or it can reasonably be assumed, that they
were directly or indirectly involved in the GJOS/PKI".
Categories A and 8 can be considered for restoration of
their right to vote provided they completed their
sentences or terms of detention - appropriated validated
by the competent authorities - at least one year before
voters are required to register. (Category A meant that
the person detained was to be tried, though not all of
them were; Category B meant they could not be tried for
lack of 'ev idence' but were nevertheless detained
indefinitely . Tens of thousands of those classified as C
were also detained for many years despite official
pronouncements that they were not to be detained
indefinitely.)
Dual or treble control at every stage
For the purposes of deciding who may vote, the village
or kampung head (lurah) together with the territorial
army officer at that level (babinsa) must compile a list
of all persons in their area, giving recommendations for
each individual. These lists must be sent to the
provincial governor through the intermediary officials
for further investigation. Each of the intermediary local
gover1TT1ent officials (camat or sub-district head, bupati
or district head and mayor in the case of urban areas)
t ogether with the mi Ii tary commanding officer and police
c hief at each level will attach their own recommendations
to all the names on the lists before passing them on.
The names will then be sent to the Minister of the
Interior, with a report on each individual accompanied by
the results of all these investigations and bearing the
10
Political prisoners at a 'release' ceremony in 1979.
signature of the provincial governor and the appropriate
military commanding officer in his capacity asKOPKAMTIB
executive officer (Laksus Pangkopkamtibda). To assist
these officials in toking their decisions, Level-I
Consideration Teams will be set up in each province,
while a Central Consideration Team will be set up to
assist the Interior Minister and theKOPKAMTIB Corrrnanderin-Chief in making their final determination.
The investigations will be carried out, "person by
person, selectively and meticulously, based on security
considerations". The criteria are that the person in
question "has shown loyalty and obedience to the nation,
state and government of Indonesia based on the 1945
Constitution and the Pancasila, hos not disseminated the
teachings of Communism/Marxism/Leninism in any form or
shape, has not engaged in any activity disrupting
security or political stability, has complied with oil
regulations issued by KOPKAMTIB regarding government
policy to maintain stability, security and order, and has
obeyed all the laws in force".
This vicious new regulation which shows the regime's
determination to go on hounding leftwing suspects twenty
years after their organisations were banned was issued on
5 September. (Kompos, 10 September)
TAPOL Bulletin No. 71, September 1985
New anti-conmunist hysteria unleashed
The Military regime has unleashed a new ccrnpaign of anticornnunist hysteria, warning in well-publicised statements
that the PKI (Indonesian Corrrnunist Party) was never
'totally uprooted', that many of its members 'evaded
arrest' with the result that the party must continue to
be regarded as a 'latent danger'.
The hysteria provides the regime with justification for
the moss re-registration of former political prisoners
reported in TAPOL Bulletin No. 70, July 1985. It also
serves as a warning to many people at a time when there
are signs of growing social unrest in various parts of
the country.
Central and East Java appear to have been singled out
for special attention, with claims being made by the
military corrrnonder of Central Java and senior civil
ocrninistrators (most of whom ore military men) that 'exA<I members' have started a "closed-mouth" (tutup mulut)
movement, whatever that means. The movement is said to be
getting help from abroad and is alleged to have been
responsible for persuading the European Parliament to
adopt a resolution protesting against the execution of
Moharnnad Munir in Moy this year.
Central Java is said to be particularly 'threatened'
because official sources claim that there are 200,000
(according to one newspaper), or 290,000 (according to
another) former A<I topols in the province. The Governor
claimed that most of these people are concentrated in the
districts of Boyolali and Purwodadi. Several subdistrlcts, including Grobogan, Demak, Kudus, Pati
Rembang, Jepara and Bloro ore mentioned as being 'in need
of special vigilance', because 'A<I remnants' allegedly
use cultural activities, crime and other forms of
violence to advance their political aims. Such remarks
suggest that people in these areas are giving expression
to their discontent in a variety of ways.
General Surano, Minister-Coordinator for Social and
Political Affairs gave his stamp of approval to the
hysteria with a statement in Semarang that ''many A<I
cadres have evaded arrest" and others who were abroad
have "slipped back'' illegally, using "cunning camouflage"
to hide their identity. (Kedaulatan Rd<yat, Semarang, 8
August)
"So, how many have you arrested?'' he was asked. "I
haven't been able to count and can't give details but
rest assured, arrests have been made." I-le claimed that
the current alleged A<I actions first began to be felt in
Central ..bvo, a A<I stronghold in pre-1965 days. The be6t
way to grapple with this 'latent danger', he said, is to
re-register all ex-A<I members/former prisoners. ''There
ore so many of them that if we don't collect concrete
data about their lives, they can pose a real threat."
Checking on people's relatives
NewshasreachedTAPOLabout a questionnaire government
employees in East Java ore required to fill in, giving
details about the post political affiliations of their
parents, parents-in-law, uncles and aunts and other
relatives. Three lecturers at the Teachers' Academy in
Molang were dismissed when it was revealed that their
fathers had been members of one or other of the moss
organisations banned in 1965.
[TAPOL Bullet in, No 68, March 1985, page 24 records the
case of a man who was declared ineligible to stand for
re-election as village head when it was discevered that
his (deceased) brother-In-low was a member of the
outlawed teachers union, P<Rl-NV.]
Corroborating this latest twist in Indonesian witchhunting, Surabaya Pos (5 August) reports that intensive
'screening' of regional goverrment employees hos been
under way, on the instructions of the Governor of East
Java. Several university graduates occupying various
positions were dismissed, reports ~s, when it was
discovered that their fathers had been murdered in 1965
in the anti-GJOS/A<l wave of mass killings when hundreds
of thousands
were slaughtered for alleged 'A<I
involvement'. Such is the 'justice' meted out to the
children of men and women murdered in the anti-corrrnunist
massacres of the late 1960s. In civilised countries, such
people would be eligible for compensation, not liable to
dismissal.
The same paper also reports that a senior official of
the Lumajang district administration was recently
dismissed for alleged GJOS/A<I involvement back in pre1965 days.
Grobogan villagers flee from village head
For a different view of conditions in Grobagan, one of
the sub-districts on the regime's list of 'A<I
troublespots', Ka11>0s (19 August) reports that 30
peasants and their families have fled from a village in
the sub-district because of constant intimidation by the
village head, identified as 'Swt'.
They tell stories of being beaten up, kicked and even
given electric shock by the official for the flimsiest of
reasons. He also attempted to rape a woman in the village
but was only prevented from doing so by the intervention
of her husband.
Other families have also left the village in despair at
the behaviour of the village head who has been in charge
there s Ince 1979. Many who could not afford to move to
other villages decided to accept transmigration rather
than continue to be terrorised by him.
It appears that the trouble with 'Swt' is that he uses
terror to force 'development' activities on the
villagers. A more senior, district official confirmed to
Kompas that 'Swt' imposes harsh discipline in his
village. "But it's not as bad as they make out, just
occasional beatings," he said. Under 'Swt', the village
has an excellent development record . There was no
initiative before he took control so his vigorous
programme came as a shock to the villagers, many of whom
couldn't stand it and decided to leave. "It's just a case
of difficulties that normally arise between father and
children (sic) and shouldn't be exaggerated."
What the official didn't say was that the regime has a
history of violence in Grobogan district which, together
with neighbouring Purwodadi, was a region where many
thousands of alleged cornnunists were slaughtered in 1969,
when the campaign of massacres that climaxed in 1965/66
was resumed for a few months.
New books on order from TAPOL
Olle Tourquist, Dilerrmos
of Third World
Communism. The
Destruction of the PKI
in Indonesia.
Discount price: £5.00
Plus postage:
U<, Europe and overseas/
sea: £1.00
Overseas airmail: £4.50
TAPOL Bulletin No. 71, September 1985
rr:========ii
OLL t fORNQlllST
Amnesty International,
East Timor, Violations
of t-bnan Rights.
Price: £2.00
Plus postage:
UK, Europe and
overseas/sea: £0.75
Overseas airmail:
£2.25
11
Eilropeara Parlianent hits Indonesia again
Following the official confirmation that three more long-term political prisoners were executed in East Java at the
beginning of July, the European Parliament adopted two more resolutions of condemnation on 12 September. (Two resolutions
were adopted in June. See TA POL Bulletin No. 70, July 1985) One calls into question the whole range of EEC economic
relations with Indonesia in the light of the executions. The texts are as follows:
The European Parliament.,
A. dismayed by the executions of the political prisoners
Ruslan Widjajasastra, Gatot Lestario, Djok.o llntung and
Rustomo, 1)
8. whereas, in its resolution of 10 June 1985, it had
already e'<pressed its horror at the execution on 14 Hay
1985 of Mohammad Munir, U1e trade unionist and former
member of parliament after sixteen years in prison,
1. Condemns such death sentences and executions on the
basis of universal human rights and rejects them as
political murders;
2. Calls on the Commission to provide the European
Parliament as quickly as possible with precise
information on economic relations with Indonesia;
.3. Calls on the Commission to submit proposals for a
critical reappraisal of these relations in the light of
this unacceptable violation of human rights in Indonesia;
4. Calls on the Council of Ministers to urge the
governments of the Member States to review their
development relations with Indonesia critically, in
particular within the IGGI, in view of this violation of
human rights;
5. Calls on the Council of Minist;ers to ask the
Government of Indonesia for a full explanation of the
reasons for these executions, for clarification on the
position of government opponents still held in prison
under sentence of death and the Indonesian Government's
intention to grant them an amnesty and to release them;
6. Calls on the C 01mcil of Hinisters to make the
subsequent restoration of economic relations specifically
dependent on these releases;
7. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to
the Commission, the Council, the governments and
Parliaments of the Member States and the President of
Indonesia.
The European Parliament.,
A. recalling its resolution of 12 June 1985, in which it
urged the Indonesian Government to do everything in its
power to prevent the death sentence an four trade union
leaders being carried out,
8. having learnt that at least three of these trade
unionists have been executed by the militarlj regime in
Indonesia,
C.
whereas these executions are contrary to the
underta.ki ngs given by the lndanesian representatives at
the EE C-ASEA N parliamentary meeting during the July partsessian,
O. whereas seventeen other people condemned to death for
their trade union activities are threatened with
execution under the same circumstances,
J. Is outraged at the executions that have already taken
place;
2. Expresses its solidarity with all democrats and all
victims of human rights violations in lndonersia,
irrespective of their political beliefs, race or social
group;
.3. Calls on the Foreign Ministers of the ten Member
States of the European Community meeting in political
cooperation to bring every possible pressure to bear on
the Indonesian Government ta prevent these executions;
4. Instructs its President to forward this resolution ta
the Indonesian Government, the Commission, the Council
and the Foreign Ministers of the Member States.
I )Rvslan Widjajasastra was not executed in July
Powerful City of London mission visits lndo.nesia
Sir Alon Traill, the Lord Moyor of
London, headed a mission of leading city
bankers, insurance directors and
merchants on a visit to Indonesia in
Aug•.ist. The mission included the deputy
chairman of the Stondmd and Chartered
Bonk, the chairman of Poterson-Zochonis,
the Far East advisor to Williams and
Glyns Bank, the chairman of the S.E.
Asia Advisory Group of the British
Overseas Trade Boord, and the secretory
of the S.E. Section Corrmittee of the
LondonChamberofCorrmerce and Industry.
The Lord Mayor and the British anbassador with Suharto
12
The mission's visit was arranged when
J.B. Hobibie, Indonesia's Minister for
Research and Technology, visited London
in June.
The present Lord Mayor appears to hove
considerable business interests of his
own in Indonesia as he regularly visits
the country. Prior to his visit as Lord
Mayor, he had already visited Indonesia
three times.
TAPQ Bulletin No. 71, September 1985
Muslims on trial
"Freeing ourselves from fear"
Syfl.fruddin Prawiranegara, a former Finance Minister, is chairman of Korps Nubaligh Indonesi a , the Indonesian LayPreachers Corps, many of whose board members are now on trial or under arrest. He has been a member of the dissident
Petition-of-50 Group since its inception in 1980. The following extract is from a sermon he gave on ldul Fithri i n June
this year. He was later interrogated by the Jakarta Military Command, whose commander then announced tha t this
"extremist" sermon might result in his being brought to trial. Syafruddin has in any case been mentioned as a likely
defendant in the "Petition-of-50" trials that commenced in August with the trial of Lieutenant-General (retired) H.R.
Dharsono.
Allahu akbar, Allahu akbar, Allahu akbar!
Whilst not forgetting the debts and fines we must still
pay, we can look back with joy because we have completed
the task of cleansing our spirits well. But if we look
ahead, I don't know how many of us still feel happy. If
we look outside - which is a better way of putting it
than saying ahead - Indonesia's world appears to be
clouded in a black fog or mist. We can therefore only see
the situation and events nearer at hand with some
clarity. We cannot see the situation and events that are
farther away, and all we can do is make guesses.
Up to now, we have been paying less attention to the
world outside us. During the month of Ramadhan, we have
been busy straightening ourselves up and cleansing
ourselves, listening to Ramadhan lectures and so on. ldul
Fi thri marks not only the conclusion of the Ramadhan fast
but also the beginning of life and normal pursuits, it
marks the "struggle for life" (original, Eng.) which for
believers must be fought in accordance with the corrrnands
of Allah s.w.t. concerning that which is our right and
that which is not, that which is permitted and that which
is forbidden.
And it is precisely this which is so difficult to do
because Indonesia's world is clouded in a black fog. This
black fog is caused by feelings of fear, fear to express
opinions and fear to report the truth, fear that these
opinions and reports will not please certain government
circles.
The majority of people who signed the ''White Paper" on
the Tanjung Priok tragedy in September 1984 which called
for a "fact-finding corrrnission" (original. Eng.) to
investigate that affair have been interrogated by public
prosecutors regarding their reasons for signing that
document. A senior official called the "White Paper" an
underground pamphlet even though the names and addresses
of the signatories were clearly stated and most of them
played an important role in the independence struggle.
The signatories of the ''White Paper" faced their
interrogators without fear because their aim was not to
bred< the law. On the contrary, their aim was to seek and
uphold truth and justice in line with the demands of
Article 27, paragraph 1 of the Constitution. But
outsiders wonder, with fear in their hearts: why should
people be interrogated for days just because of a thing
like that.
In short, the Tanjung Priok tragedy plus the Bank
Central Asia bombing incidents and the way the courts
treated those who were accused of involvement in those
events have only strengthened the fears and anxieties
that grip ordinary people, particularly the Muslim
corrrnunlty. Fear of expressing what is in their hearts,
and fear of reporting the truth (about things that)
violate the law and which the authorities who are
responsible for the enforcement of law and justice ought
to know about. If such a state of affairs drags on, the
goverrment itself will get confused because it will not
know what is true and what is not true, and what should
be done. And one day, it could be faced with some very
unexpected shocks.
In truth, both the ones who are afraid and that which
causes their fears are victims of the temptations and
trickery of the vile devil, and are hostages to the
devil. And who is it who can liberate us from the yoke of
this vile devil? Only Him, the only right and powerful
One, almighty Allah s.w.t.
Alldhu akbar, Allahu akbar, Allahu akbar!
Dear Muslim brothers and sisters,
If we want to help rid society of this feeling of fear,
we should stand by the following principles:
First, the struggle to rid society of fear which means
struggling to uphold justice and truth involves taking
the risk that we may be arrested, imprisoned and possibly
tortured. Therefore, let us struggle of our own free will
and with our own strength, relying solely upon Allah
s.w.t. Finally, Allah Himself explained to us:
''Whosoever does good will experience his/her own merit
and whosoever caTITiits crime will bear his/her own
punishment."
Naturally, others can JOln us as long as they
understand and approve of the aims of our struggle, and
are conscious of the dangers inherent in the said
struggle.
Second, if we want to uphold truth and justice,
violence should not be used except in self-defence.
Violent will not bring improvements, it will not alter
other people' opinions and convictions: , but will only
invite more violence •.••
Guidelines for preaching in Indonesia
A set of guidelines for
prerJchers was published by
Syafruddin Prawiranegara,
Chairman of the Korps
Mubaligh Indonesia, in April
this year. It is aimed at
advisingKMI members on how
to convey their religious
message in keeping with the
basic Islamic outlook of
preserving the link between
its religious message and
its social message, despite
the risks this .involves at
Syafruddin Prawiranegara
the present time.
Preachers are required to
advise their congregations on all matters pertaining to
their social conditions while avoiding direct accusations
against persons responsible for the difficulties faced,
unless under exceptional circumstances. When differences
of opinion arise with anyone (including those in power),
as for example over the goverrment's insistence on
Pancasila as the sole principle, Syafruddin stresses that
it is their duty to make their views clear and name those
with whom they disagree.
The guidelines also deal with attitudes towards criminal
elements, and condemns attempts to fight crime by means
of violence, an obvious reference to the activities of
the Army's death-squads. Crime can only be dealt with by
tackling the social diseases of poverty and unemployment.
Preachers not only need to understand Islamic teachings.
They also need to understand worldly affairs. "Our
younger members should prepare themselves for a more
significant role than the. kiyai and ulmia most of whom
only know about religious affairs."
TAPOL. Bulletin No. 71, Septerri>er 1985
13
Muslims on trial
On trial for ''subversive'' lecturing
One clear target of Ule manlJ trials now under walj in Jakarta is the Korps Mubaligh Indonesia (KMI), the organisation of
Muslim la1J-preachers ( mubaligh) whose chairman, Sjafruddin Pra wiranega.ra is himself likely to be tried soon. Mani} oU>er
members of the KMI central board are under arrest or on trial, including Mawardi Noor, Oeputlj General Chairman, A.H.
Fatwa and Haji Salim Kadar, Second and Third Chairmen, and board members Abdul O.adir Djaelani and Tony Ardhi.
Hoj i Salim Kadar and Vayon Hendrayaya
The first of the KMI preachers to come for trial were
Haj i Salim Kadar (50), arrested on 18 Septembe'r 1984, and
Yayan Hendrayana (35), former secretary-general of the
KMI Jakarta branch and assistant lecturer at the Islamic
Dakwah (missionary) College, PDTI, who has been under
arrest since 1 October 1984. Both are accused of having
'directly incited' the Tanjung Priok incident on 12
Septerrber last year with their 'inflarrmatory speeches'.
Their trials corrmenced on 20 July and are taking place
concurrently, with a largely similar list of witnesses
being called by the prosecutor. Both men were also
summoned to testify at each other's trials.
A number of the witnesses are members of the security
forces who were assigned to spy on the two men from 30
June till 10 September 1984, that is, for several months
before the Tanjung Priok massacre. (Suara Karyq 17 July)
They go out of their way to suggest that both men were
very popular indeed and addressed huge crowds. Thus, for
instance, Suara Koryo (9 July), the GOLKAR daily, in a
lengthy 'leak' in advance of the trial, quotes one source
as saying that Salim addressed a gathering of 10,000 on
18 August, another of 25,000 on 29 August, another of
30,000 on 1 September and yet another shortly afterwards
of 40,000. One witness even told the court later on that
the meeting addressed by Salim and Yayan at Tanjung Priok
on 12 September was attended by 50,000 people {Kompas, 13
August), contradicting General Benny Murdani's own
official acccJnt which claimed that 1,500 were present.
One can only assume that the figures are deliberately
inflated to eTiphasise the danger these men represent with
their apparently enormous pull on huge crowds of people.
Moreover, if the security forces were aware for so long
before the demonstration in Tanjung Priok that these
'inflarrmatory' lectures were being given, why were no
arrests made until after the Tanjung Priok massacre? This
paradox reinforces the impression that Army intelligence
was involved in a frame-up calculated to incite a major
incident so as to charge Muslim critics with acts of
terror while at the same time inflicting heavy casualties
as a warning to the Muslim corrmunity as a whole. In the
meanwhile, intelligence agents, spying on preachers, were
building up dossiers against the 'extremist lecturers'.
Salim Kadar
14
As for the contents of Salim Kadar's and Yayan
Hendryaya's lectures, neither men deny charges that they
spoke out frequently against the Pancasila as the soleideology (though not necessarily against the Pancosila
itself), that they were critical of the birth control
progrorrme, of official moves to prevent Muslim schoolgirls wearing head-scarves at school, of governmentsponsored Poncosila indoctrination courses (P4) and of
the general elect ions.
Both men are also accused of distributing the pamphlet,
Tega<kon Moralitos Islam Sekalipun Langit Akan
Roboh (Uphold Islamic
Morality even if the Skies
Collapse) and of signing a
pledge of the Jakarta Muslim
corrmuni tyre ject ing Pancasilo
as the sole principle and
rejecting the Societies Law.
Prosecutor demands 'life' for
Vayon
On 12 September, the
prosecutor demanded a life
se nte nee for Yayan for
"subverting the government
and the state ideology".
Another charge was that he
"accused General Murdani of
master-minding the so-called
'mysterious killings' and
accused the President of
corruption."
Yayan Hendrayana
Hoji Mawardi Noor
Haji Mawardi Noor (67), a former parliamentarian for
the Masjumi party (banned under Sukarno and not allowed
to re-establish itself under Suharto) and Deputy General
Chairman of the KMI, was charged with subversion on 16
September. He is accused of spreading hostility and
splits in a series of 14 lectures he is said to have
delivered from late 1983 up to 7 September 1984, in
mosques as well as other public places in Jakarta. His
lectures which "condemned the Pancasila-os-the-soleprinciple policy, rejected Poncasilo indoctrination
courses (P4), rejected school-lessons in Poncasila
Morality Education, and rejected the present Indonesian
government" were seen as an attempt "to undermine the
lawful government".
Asked whether he understood the indictment, the accused
wanted to know what the prosecution meant by "undermine".
A heated discussion ensued with the defence insisting
that the term would have to be defined before the
indictment could be properly assessed. The prosecutor
refused however to explain his meaning, saying that this
would mean entering into the substance of the case.
In their demurrer (eksepsi), the defence also asked why
allegedly subversive lectures delivered by the accused
had been closely monitored for over nine months yet the
security forces hod not arrested him until ~fter the
Tanjung Priok incident.
The accused rejected prosecution allegations that he
favours an Islamic state. To reject Pancasila-as-thesole-principle does not mean rejecting the Pancasila but
TAPOL Bulletin No. 71, September 1985
simply insisting that state regulations about religion
should not be in conflict with the lows of the various
religions. ''The things I said ore being said by other
mubolighs. These views ore widely held in society. It is
quite unjust to brand me as a subversive."
(Kompos, 17 Septerroer)
More severe sentences in East Java
Court verdicts against Muslim political prisoners in
East Jave who ore accused of involvement in a so-called
'Jihad' (Holy War) Corrrnond ore now coming thick and fast.
In TAPOL Bulletin No 70, July 1985, we reported five
sentences that hod been passed by a court in Bojonegoro.
(See that issue also for on assessment of the regime's
claims about the 'Jihad' Command.)
The nine men on trial in Jember, East Java were all
found guilty and sentenced in late June and and July, as
follows: Karto, 15 years; Soiful alias Mustafa, 11 years;
Semoun Effendi, 13 years; Sunorso alias Hasan, 14 years;
Abdusul<kur, alias Anworhodi, 12 years; Anwar, 4 years;
Sohor, 14 years; Asdin alias Muharionto, 12 years; and
Porto alias SolirT} 13 years •. All were found guilty of
subversion for activities in 1979 and 1980, and to hove
deviotetJ from the Poncosilo ideology. According to Suoro
Karyo (18 July), they ore all small formers with little
education and not fluent in Indonesian.
In Probolinggo, the following sentences hove been
passed: Ors Achnod Muhajir, 10 years; Untung Salim al
'H endro, 14 years; Latif, 8 years; Supan al Supandi, 8
years; Maksum, 8 years; Porto Ali, 1 1 years; Suwadak, 9
years; Moshud, 9 years; and Moch. Suroyono, 14 year s. All
the accused have been in detention since 26 November-,
1982.
12 years for disputing Murdoni's version of Tonjung Priok
In Surabaya, Ali Masrum (24), a teacher at a religiou s
school (modrasoh) hos been given a 12-yeor sent ence fo r
organising lectures by lecturers from Jakarta on Islomi c
values, distributing a leaflet entitled, "Chronology of
Attacks on the Muslim Corrmunity in Tonjung Priok" and
circulating cassettes of lectures delivered by Amir Biki
(who was shot dead during the 12 September 1984 Tonjung
Priok massacre) and Syorifin Moloko just prior to the
Tonjung Priok demonstration. These activities were
considered by the court as being aimed at undermi ning
government authority and overthrowing the lawful
Indonesian government.
Ali Mosrum is a well-known broadcaster on private radio
in East Java, and his popularity drew large crowds to his
trial.
The defence team protested against the Court for
holding one of the hearings in secret, in order to listen
to the cassettes containing the two offending lectures.
Answering the defence complaint that this was in
violation of the procedural code, the Court declared that
this hod been done for security reasons. It was the
Court's opinion that "Amir Biki 's lecture contained on
attack on the legal Indonesian government and it was not
fitting for it to be heard by t he public." (Merdeka, 9
September)
The case against A.M. Fatwa
Andi Mappetahang Fatwa, a well-known Muslim preacher and political activist, used the occasion of his trial which opened
in Jakarta in August to explain his views on a range of political, social and religious matters. In a 90-page document
which he read to a packed court-room and to a large, supportive crowd following the proceedings outside, he also gave
details of the acts of terror perpetrated against him since the late 1970s and the maltreatment he has suffered since . his
arrest - in his own words, "my abduction" - on 19 September last year. The following is a short summary with extracts
from this very important document:
Abduction and maltreatment in custody
Fatwa was abducted by troops of the Jakarta Military
Command while he was undergoing interrogation at a
Jakarta police station about his Idul Fitri sermon in
June lost year. The police hod been interrogating him
three times a week for several weeks "in a relaxed
atmosphere", creating the impression that they were
dragging things out as if they were waiting for something
to happen.
In their abduction, the troops violated many procedural
regulations. They dragged him from the police station and
prevented his lawyer, who hod been attending the police
interrogations, from accompanying him to the 'hiuchfeored" Gtmtur Military Police HQ. He found many young
detainees at Guntur, all of them Priok victims. Most hod
swollen faces and other signs of maltreatment, heads
shaven bore, were dressed only in pants and heaped
together like fish just caught in a net.
He describes his own treatment in Guntur where he
remained only one day before being transferred to
Cimonggis detention centre as follows:
"During my interrogation on that first day, two
soldiers armed with long weapons stood guard at the door.
When interrogations ended that night, these guards took
me and pushed me with their weapons into a cell at the
bock, shouting abuse. This first cell was dork but
reasonably well ventilated. As we went passed Tony
Ardhie's cell, the guards doused him with several cans of
water on a cold night. After half on hour, they
transferred me to a foul-smelling cell in the central
area, ventilated by only one tiny hole at the top of a
high wall. The smell of urine was heavy, and I too hod to
urinate on the floor of the cell. I found a section of
floor not recently urinated on, where, in this emergency,
I said my night prayers.
'Just as I was dozing off, the door was kicked open and
I was ordered out, in my underwear and with my feet bore,
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( ff. 1 . K. ri•N& ) • "
lhe last page from A.M. Fatwa's speech in court
TAPOL Bulletin No. 71, September 1985
15
.Muslims on trial
to have my head shaven in the yard ... as they kicked,
punched and poured abuse on me . When I fought the pain by
praying and repeating holy verses, they shouted at me to
stop and beat me even harder. After they had had their
fill, they pushed me back into the cell, but soon after,
at about 3 am, they dragged me out again."
Fatwa was then driven blind-folded to Cimanggis by
troops who added to his torment by making him think that
he was about to be bumped off like a victim of the deathsquads.
In Cimanggis, there were a large nurrber of young men
who were victims of the Tanjung Priok affair. Many were
severely wounded, with bullet wounds in their thighs and
stomachs. Some had had a foot or leg (kaki) amputated.
In Cimanggis military detention centre, the civilian
detainees incarcerated there for the first seven months
after the Tanjung Priok incident suffered the following
restrict ions:
* No writing implements were allowed.
* No books were allowed except for the Ku'ran and even
this was not allowed in for the first two months.
* Detainees' cell were repeatedly searched purely to
inflict mental terror, as no 'prohibited goods' could
possibly have got in because of the many searches.
* Sport was not allowed at all at first. In the final
month, a 15-minute sports break was permitted but this
only happened when "a good guard" was on duty.
* Friday corrmunal prayers were prohibited. It was not
till he was moved to Salemba Prison, seven months later,
that Fatwa could participate in Friday prayers.
"Medical treatment was appalling, not so much because of
the lack of facilities but rather because of attitudes,
behaviour and (lack of) health protection. One young
Priok victim was not allowed to remove a bandage from a
serious wound for two days by which time it was already
putrid. Another victim who had no fewer than 39 wound sf as
a result of being beaten, was left without tream:ient or
a month though many of his wounds were discharging puss
all the' time. A third man whose body became half
paralysed was left screaming with pain for two days in
his cell before a doctor was allowed to examine him and
order him to hospital. A fourth was left screaming with
terror in his cell for an hour when a snake entered.
Fatwa, who spent a period of time in dete~ti.on during
the Sukarno regirre, makes the point that conditions under
which political prisoners were held then were vastly
better than under Suharto, despite his claims that
Indonesia is now living in an "era of law".
Concocting the case against him
When Fatwa was abducted from the police station on 19
September, no arrest warrant was produced in violation of
legal requirements. Nor was a detention order produced
for two weeks I until 3 October. Fatwa explains
that hisI
•
interrogators who were from the Public Prosecutors
Off ice (Kejaksaan), not from the Army, told him frankly
that they were "having problems" making an antisubversion case "only on the basis of my sermons". But as
The charges
That he attended "illegal" meetings, one at the home of
Marine Lieutenant-General (retired) Ali Sadikin on 15
Septerrber 1985 where a White Paper on the Tanjung Priok
incident was discussed, and one at his own home three
days later where plans to carry out bombing attacks and
wage a campaign of "mental terror" were allegedly
discussed.
That he signed the White Poper which, with others, he
circulated to mosques throughout the capital.
That he delivered a number of "inflarrmotory" lectures
accusing the government of being anti-Islam because of
its campaign to force all social organisations to accept
the Poncasila as their sole ideology (azos tunggal).
That he cons pi red with others to bring about the
downfall of the "lawful" government. These others who are
to appear as witnesses in his trial and who are soon to
be tried, accor.d ing to the prosecutor in his charge sheet
against Fatwa, include Lieutenant-General (ret'd) Hartono
Dharsono, former corrmander of the Siliwangi Division and
former Secretary-General of ASEAN (his trial opened in
Septerrber ); Air Vice-Marshall (ret'd) Soey i tno Sukirno,
former ambassador to Australia; Lt-Gen. Ali Sadikin,
former corrmonder of the Marine Corps and governor of
Jakarta; Police General (ret'd) Hoegeng Santoso, former
Chief of Police; Sjafruddin Prawiranegora, a leading
Muslim politician and head of the 1948-49 Emergency
Goverrrnent of the Indonesian Republic in Sumatra; Slamet
Bratanota, politician and Mines and Energy Minister in
Suharto's first post-coup government; H.M. Sanusi, a
leader of Muharrmodiyah and Minister for Small Industries
in Suharto's first post-coup government; Anwar Horyono,
former parliamentarian; and Erlangga, a student.
Fatwa is being charged ore under the 1963 AntiSubversion Decree which corr ies a maxiumum penalty of
death as well as several articles of the Criminal Code.
16
Fatwa leaving court after the first hearing
the days passed, the military came ·up with the idea of
making the White Paper the main charge, satisfied that
this was adequate grounds for a charge-sheet invoking the
Anti-Subversion Decree. Once the case against him had
been concocted, a detention order was issued, asserting
that he had been arrested and was being held under this
Decree.
The process of case-creation was further clarified when
Fatwa met another detainee, Tosri f Tuosikal (recently
tried for involvement in the BCA bombing incidents last
October and given a life sentence) ofter he was moved to
Salemba Prison. ''Tuasikal suddenly began to beg my
forgiveness without me understanding why ••. He had been
fotced to make a confession about me, to acknowledge a
receipt for US$2,000 received from me to purchase bombs.
•.. I was absolutely amazed and at the same time furious
to hear about this vicious slander but he tried to calm
me, showing me bayonet injuries in his chest, and telling
me how he had been tortured night and day with his hands
and feet bound."
Harassment and terror, the lot of a Muslim preacher
Fatwa provides an account of his own experience of
harassment since the mid-1970s. The Jakarta military
TAPa.. Bulletin No. 71, September 1985
authorities first started picking him out for attention
in 1976 because of his activities as the person in charge
of the religious prograrrme of the Municipality, under Ali
Sodikin. The governor ignored several demands for his
dismissal but his position became more vulnerable ofter
Ali Sodikin was replaced as governor in 1977. In 1978, he
was arrested and held for nine months without charge for
allegedly opposing kebotinan (Javanese mysticism), and
lost all his posts in various non-official bodies.
Not long ofter his release from prison, he was sacked
as a civil servant by Interior Minister, General Amir
Mochmud because of a sermon he gave on ldul Fitri and rearrested, though held this time for only two weeks,
perhaps because of critical press reporting at the time.
He never stopped preaching however, and after he signed
the Petition of Fifty in 1980, the physical and mental
terror intensified. He made various attempts to initiate
legal proceedings against senior goverrvnent officials for
slanderous remarks about· him.
All efforts to set himself up in business failed
because licences were refused, while his preaching
continued to be harassed. Wher:i an invitation to preach at
on ldul Fitri gathering in 1980 was withdrawn under Army
pressure and another preacher was "dropped" in his stead,
troops started firing when disturbances broke out among
the congregation. He was held for interrogation for
several days and ultimately released, again because of
the public outcry. On his way to visit relatives of
mosque off iciols who hod been arrested because of their
efforts· to hove him preach, Fatwa was abducted by the
Army and severely beaten. (His account of what happened
was published in TAPCL Bulletin, No. 43, January 1981.)
In 1982, he initiated legal proceedings against the
soldiers responsible for the incident and against Admiral
Sudomo, corrrnander of KOA<AMTIB. as their superior. His
team of lawyers was in turn subjected to terror and
lntimidot ion and eventually abandoned the case while
protesting strongly because their professional freedom as
lawyers had been placed in jeopardy. (See TAPCL Bulletin,
No. 55, January 1983.)
Three retired generals, Aziz Saleh, Ali Sadikin and
Hortono Dhorsono took over his legal defence because they
felt they would not be likely to be terrorised. The case
proceeded but was lost. ("It would have been
inconceivable for KOA<AMTIB to be found guilty," says
Fatwa.) They appealed to the High Court which declared it
was unable to hear the case because the documents were
not considered adequate and returned it to the lower
court. "It is still therefore open to me," says Fatwa,
"to pursue the matter." The indefatigable Fatwa also
declared that he had initiated proceedings against
General Amir Machmud for unfair dismissal from the civil
service in 1979.
In October 1982, an attempt was made on his life when
thugs sloshed his throat while he was driving in Jakarta.
He lists the many occasions when sermons he was
scheduled to deliver were banned by the military ("not
cancelled by mosque officials, as the indictment
claims").
Fatwa's political position
The last 30 pages of his statement are given over to a
exposition of his own political views. He has never
opposed Pancasila, he says. On the contrary, he regards
it as a crucial platform, giving all creeds and opinions
a rightful place in the Republic. He believes that the
Muslim corrmunity, comprising the vast majority of the
population, needs to have an assured place in society,
not forced to conform to Pancosila as the sole ideology.
He has never supported calls for an Islamic state but
stresses that Islam does not allow for a false separation
between politics and state affairs on the one hand, and
religion on the other. The views he expounds are
outstanding for their tolerance towards other creeds and
beliefs; they are completely free of racism and
impressive for the importance he attaches to all groups
being allowed to exercise social control under proper
democratic conditions.
Corrrnenting on the Tanjung Prick affair, he expresses
amazement that the many fiery sermons being delivered in
Priok in the months prior to the affair were never halted
by the security forces while his "far more moderate
sermons" were subjected to constant harassment. Without
saying so, he appears to suspect that the security forces
allowed tensions to grow, leading ultimately to the
crackdown on 12 September and the subsequent onslaught
against Muslim opposition, of which his own trial is an
important part.
New bill on the lawcourts
Lawyers ore very critical of a draft bill on the law
courts which has been submitted to the DPR (the lower
legislative assembly) by the government because it will
reinforce Executive control over the Judiciary. The bill
places judges under two authorities, the Minister of
Justice and the Supreme Court, giving the former preeminence. The just ice minister will exercise "guidance"
(pembinaan) over the organisation, administration and
powers of the lawcourts, while the Supreme Court will be
in charge of "technical guidance". The new law confirms
that judges ore "government officials" (pegawai negeri)
and therefore bound by government policy. On top of that,
it gives the judges who preside over the district
appelate courts (pengadilan tinggi) the power to exercise
supervision over lawyers wishing to practise in all
courts of law.
Lawyers attending a seminar of Peradin, the Bar
Association, were outspoken in their rejection of the
bill which they believe will put an end to what freedoms
they still hove. Haryono Tjitrosoebono, chairman of
Peradin, criticised the downgrading of the Supreme Court
which should safeguard the independence of the judiciary.
(The present structure of the Court which is chaired by
General Ali Said hos in fact already put on end to such
independence.)
The status of judges as government officials has long
been an issue with lawyers who defend political coses.
With such a status, which also means that judges must
Join KffiPRI, the government-sponsored civil servants'
associationwhosemembersmay not deviate from government
policy and ideology, it is not possible for defendants to
expect a fair trial.
Lawyers in East Java were the first to experience the
effects of supervision of their profession by the law
courts when a Surabaya High Court judge announced earlier
this year that lawyers working in the province must
obtain a licence from his court in order to continue with
their practice. He also decreed ' that these licences ore
renewable every two years.( See TAPCL Bulletin, No 68,
March 1985, page 6.) Although lawyers protested strongly
against this encroachment of their independence, the
draft bill means that the East Java precedent in now to
apply nationwide.
..lJdges' criticisms squashed
In fact, misgivings about the projected bill were first
voiced several months ago by the judges association,
lkahi which argued in a statement that members of their
profession would find it difficult to resist (government)
interference in their determination of verdicts if they
continue to be civil servants. The organisation was
quickly forced to retract when General Ali Said publicly
denounced their statement as being "absurd" and 0
"rehash" of earlier complaints. (Tempo, 8 June)
(Source: ~s, 2 Septeni>er and Tempo, 7 Septermer)
TAPOL Bulletin No. 71, Septeni>er 1985
17
Muslims on trial
Islamic educational course on trial
s
· Malang an d ura b aya, East Java in which the accused
A series of trials have been under way since June and July in
all d L are
b all
·
1 ve din a Muslim
educational
network. c
eEd em
facing subversion charges because they have atten d e d or are invo
.
.
ti aga
al
Pendidikan Pondolc. Pesantren Wat. (LPJI<.). Roughly translated, this means Lightening-Course Pesantren
uca on
Institute, pesantren being the name of Islamic religious boarding-schools.
Accusot ions made against the defendants in the
indictments S{Jggest that the LP3K was first launched in
1982 in Bandung and hos since established branches in
many cities throughout Java, attracting a large number of
participants. The trials under way are attended by large
crowds of people, mostly young men and women who make no
secret of their support for the men on trial. Most of the
women wear head-scarves. The court-rooms are reported to
be under heavy guard, with metal-detectors and other
surveillance devices helping to create an atmosphere of
tension.
From the names of people, presumably also under arrest,
being mentioned in the current trials, the Molong and
Surabaya trials ore likely to be followed by others in
Bandung and possibly also Jakarta.
The trials appear to be aimed at establishing a link
between this educational network and a series of bombings
in East and Central Java - the attack on' a seminary in
Malang on Christmas Eve last year, the explosions which
seriously damaged nine stupas at the Borobudur Buddhist
monument in Central Java on 21 January this year and an
explosion on a bus near Banyuwongi, East Java on 16 Morch
which killed seven passengers and injured many others.
The prosecution also appears to be bent on proving that
the men guiding and directing the LP3K were using it as a
training ground for cadres committed to the creation of
an Islamic state in Indonesia. The men named in this
connection are Mursolim Dohlon, a Muslim preacher from
Jakarta, who is now under arrest and whose trial could
come as the climax to the regime's campaign against the
LP](, and Ir M. Sonusi, formerly a leading member of the
Muslim social organisation, Muhammadiyoh and now member
of the Petition-of-50 group who was tried and sentenced
to 19 years in Moy for allegedly funding the bomb
explosions which damaged the offices of Bonk Central Asia
lost October. (See TAPOLBulletin, 69, Moy 1985, p. 9-10)
The defendants
The men on trial for subversion in Molong are Andi
Sukisno (21 ), a student at the Malong Institute of
Educot ion (IKIP), Murdjoko (26) who works for the
Browijaya State University in Malang, Faisal Fochri (21),
a student at the polytechnic attached to Brawijaya
University in Malang and Sugeng Budiono (20) a student of
statistics at the Open University. Others who ore due for
trial according to the public affairs office of the
Molong District Court ore Ir 'FW', recently graduated
from Molong University, Moch. Achwan, chairman of the
Malang branch of the LP]( and 'AKAH' (37) who is
described as the person caught in connection with the bus
explosion;
On trial in Surabaya are Si111>uong Abdul Malik a
preacher and chairman of the Surabaya branch of LP3K and
Andri Horto, a student at Universitas Muhcmadiyah
Surabaya and chairman of the Al-Faloq Mosque Youth also
in Surabaya. who had taken an LP]( course in Malang and
was then put in charge of spiritual affairs for the LP3K
network in Surabaya. The Andri Horta trial is also
referred to as ah 'i Ile gal leaflets subversion' trial
because the accused allegedly distributed leaflets
disputing General Murdani 's account of what happened in
Tanjung Priak last September, but primarily the hearings
appear to deal with LPl<'s educational activities.
Press reports ore typically brief and reveal little
18
Murdjoko in court
about the case being put by the defence. The Golkor
Jakarta doily, Suora Korya devotes more attention than
other papers to these trials, charged apparently to ~elp
the regime build up an image of a dangerous, Musliminspired conspiracy threatening Indonesia's 'Pancosilo
democracy'. (Our access to Suaro Korya reporting is based
on Indonesia Reports logging of the Indonesian press.)
Defence witnesses not produced
An example of the severe constraints faced by the
defence is their failure to secure the presence of the
more senior figures in the LP]( movement in the witness
box. It is the duty of the prose cut ion to produce
witnesses, but witnesses coiled by the defence, including
Mursalim Dahlan, were not produced. At a hearing of the
Murjako trial on 19 August, the prosecution presented the
Investigation Reports (SAP) of four 'witnesses' including
Mursolim Dohlan, claiming that they could not be present
in person. (Sinor Horapon, 20 August) All were identified
only by their initials, implying that they are all under
arrest and awaiting trial. Despite the defendant's
rejection of this testimony from men most of whom he said
he did not even know, the judges decided to accept these
Investigation Reports as formal evidence.
Retired general on trial
The trial of Lieutenant (retired) H.R Dharsono,
formerly corrmander of the Siliwongi Division, has opened
in Jakarta. In his indictment, the prosecutor mentioned
nine members of the Petition-of-50 group as well,
implying that they are also to be tried. They are: MajorGeneral (ret'd) Azis Saleh, former Minister of Health;
Lieutenant-General (ret'd) Ali Sadikin, former Governor
of Jakarta; Major-General (ret'd) Suyitno Sukirno, a
former ambassador; former Chief of Police, Hoegeng I.
Santoso; Syofruddin Prawiranegara; former ministers
Burhanuddin Horahap, Slomet Brotonata and H.M. Sonusi
(serving a 19-yeor sentence); Anwar Haryono, a lawyer.
A full report of Dharsono's trial and other related
trials will appear in the next Bulletin.
TAPOL Bulletin No. 71, September 1985
Another Musi im paper banned
Al-lkhwon, an Islamic newspaper published in Jogjakarta,
hos been banned by order of the Attorney-General. The ban
dated 28 May was not made public until 2 July. The
announcement was made together with an announcement that
the paper's editor, lrfon Suryohordi (24) is under arrest
and is shortly to be tried. Other members of the paper's
staff ore also believed to be under arrest.
Irfan is in the final year of high-school. The
newspaper is accused of having caused public disorder and
unrest by its attacks on Poncosilo, the notional State
leadership and various government prograrrmes such as
family planning. Irfan's trial will apparently take place
in Jogjakarta, with more than 30 witnesses due to be
coiled by the prosecution, of whom at least ten are
professors and lee turer-s at Ga ja Mada University,
Jogjakarta who were naned as advisors and sponsors of the
publication.
Al-llicwon (The Brotherhood) is the successor to ArRisoloh which was banned in October 1983. The AttorneyGenerol announced that the paper was being banned along
with oil other material produced by Bodon K.omunikosi
Pemudo Mosjid (Mosque Youth Corrmunicotions Body) in
Siemon, Jogjakarta. According to press reports, Al-llicwon
was printed monthly with a minimum run of 10,000 copies,
circulating in Jokor ta, Bandung, Jogjakarta, Solo and
Surabaya.
'Suara Mujohidin' is launched
The enforced demise of Al lkhwan does not appear to be
the end of the matter. A new publication, Suara
Mujahidin, with a format and style close to that of the
banned paper, came out with its first edition in May
1985. Published by the Department of Information of
Joma'ah Mujahidin Indonesia {Indonesian Mujahidin
Corrmunity), the first edition - a copy of which has been
obtained by TAPOL - is a 12-page tabloid with articles
attacking the 'kejowen' (Javanese mystics) philosophy
being pr011oted by the Suharto military regime, a stinging
condemnation of the government's family planning
prograrrme, a brief critical analysis of the current reorganisation of the Armed Forces and a lengthy report of
interviews with two Muslim activists who managed to go
into hiding while appeals regarding their cases were
still under consideration.
Admiral Sudomo, Minister of Labour, talking to workers.
Human rights violations
Workers dismissed for defending
their rights
The Minister of Labour, Acrniral {ret'd) Sudomo has
dismissed nearly 800 workers who were employed by the
United Con Company, accusing them of 'anarchic'
behaviour. Making public his decision, he acknowledged
that this was the first time in the history of the Labour
Deportment for a minister to order dismissals. The
decision had been taken, he said, "to prevent the spread
of anarchy which could influence workers in all parts of
the country." (Teft1>0, 31 August)
Prior to his appointment as Minister of Labour in March
1983, Sudomo was corrmander of the military regime's
security agency, KOPKAMTIB (Operational Corrmand for the
Restoration of Security and Order), and he frequently
alludes to his preference from strong- arm tactics and his
KOA<AMTIB past in his dealings with the workers. Since
his appointment, the militarisation of the Department has
been stepped up. The Secretary-General is General Sutopo
Yuwono, an intelligence officer who headed BAKIN, the
intelligence co-ordination agency, for many years.
A labour dispute has been raging at the United Can
Company, a joint Indonesian-Japanese enterprise located
in Tangerang, West Java, s i nee late lost year. The
workers, who are organised in the Union of Metal and
Cer011ic Workers - a member of the FBSI which is the only
trade union federation allowed to exist - submitted a
demand in December last year for the employers to bring
the basis for colculatiing overtime payments into line
with a ministerial decision issued in 1984. When the
company failed to do this and threatened to take action
against the workers, 800 workers held a protest IT)eeting
and called for the dismissal of the personnel officer.
This led to the dismissal of eleven workers which in
turn led to a second demonstration calling for the reinstatement of the dismissed men. During the course of
this demonstration which continued late into the night,
some management staff were unable to gain access to their
cars, which led to a charge, widely reported in the
press, that the workers had held 19 management personnel
hostage. The workers vehemently deny this and say that
this distortion of events is largely responsible for
their shabby treatment ever since.
The eleven dismissed men were then interrogated by the
local military corrmand, and their dismissal was later
upheld by the central arbitration board (P4P), whereupon
the workers held their third demonstration, again calling
for the reinstatement of the men. This was the 'anarchic
behaviour' which resulted inSudomo's dismissal order.
LBH protest
Abdul l-lakim G. Nusantara, Director of the Jakarta Legal
Aid Institute has issued a statement condemning the
minister's decision as a violation of the country's
labour laws and a contradiction of Sudomo's own
declaration less than a year ago that companies should
avoid dismissing their workers, however hard the economic
recession might hit them. Abdul Hakim also warned that
those who have been victimised in this way are perfectly
within their rights to sue the minister.
Bandung students protest at suspensions
Thirty-five students at the Bandung Institute of
Minister of Education, Foud Hassan during a visit to
Technology (ITB) hove been suspended indefinitely for
Bandung but failed ·because they had "not used the proper
toking part in activities involving inhabitants in
procedures". The next day, many students demonstrated
kompungs around the ITB campus. They had planned to hold
with banners and posters but were ordered to disband.
a cultural evening and discussions about current affairs.
These activities were prepared as port of a 'study
Student Defence Cornnittee active
orientation' prograrrme for new students, but ITB
A document of 7 August issued by the ITB Student
authorities refused to allow this on the grounds that all
DefenceCorrmitteewhichhosjustbeenreceivedbyTAPOL,
'university initiation progr011mes' (perploncoon) a r e
criticises the huge funding and corruption surrounding
illegal, on as well as off canpus. (KOlllJOs, 31 August)
the recent Indonesian Film Festival in Bandung. It calls
Following repeated efforts to raise their grievances
for a more socially-oriented film industry and for more
with the Rector, a group of students tried to meet the
attention to be paid to the needs of tht! urban poor.
TAPOL Bulletin No. 71, Septeni>er 1985
19
East Timor
East Timor remains an
international issue
Although the UN General Assembly has again decided this year not to discuss a resolution on East Timar following a report
by the Secretary General, Perez de Cuellar that bilateral consultations between Portugal and Indonesia are still in
progress, the issue of self-determination for East Timar has been more heatedly debated in the past few months than for
many years.
Diplomatic row between Australia and Portugal
Bob Hawke, the Australian Prime Minister raised a storm
of protest at home and abroad with a shameless remark on
Indonesian television on 16 August and later reiterated
in Parliament that Australia "recognises the sovereign
authority of Indonesia over East Timor" and regards the
East Timorese as "citizens of Indonesia".
While the Indonesian press welcomed Hawke's statement,
with the ..Jm<orto Post (22 August} cynically hoping that
the whole affair could now be "buried in the dustbin of
history", many groups in Australia voiced their anger. As
Peter Robertson of the Australian Friends of East Timor
put it, "Australia is risking condemnation and disgrace
from her Pacific neighbours and many Third World
countries. (Sunday Independent, 25 August)
The Australian Labour government did not however reckon
with the strong protest that greeted Hawke's statements
in Lisbon. Two protest notes were sent to Canberra, one
from President Eanes and one from the Portuguese
government. Jill Jolliffe, writing in The Age, (4
September} described this as "the strongest and most
dranatic stand Lisbon has taken since the Indonesian
invasion". The Australian arrbassador in Lisbon was given
a stiff reprimand by the Foreign Ministry and the
Portuguese ambassador in Canberra was recalled "for
consultations", a severe step to take in diplomatic
relations.
Hawke's statement at first appeared to be little more
than a reiteration of the Australian Liberal government's
Jonuary 1978 de jure recognition of Indonesia's
'integrasi' of East Timor. It was however the first
categorical statement by the Labour government and
moreover was apparently needed in order to clear the way
for all-out exploration and exploitation by Australiabosed capital of the rich oil deposits lying between
Australia's northern reaches and the south coast of
Timor. In the first week of September, the Australian
Bond Corporation announced new investments of $233
million to open up 32 wells in four new areas located in
the 'Timor Gap'.
On 19 September, the Portuguese government again
protested to Canberra, this time about plans for joint
Indonesian-Australian exploration of oil resources in the
Timor Sea, port of the territory "over which Portugal is
the internationally-recognised administering power". The
note condemns Australia's "clear disrespect for internal
laws" at a time when East Timor is still listed by the UN
as a non-self-governing territory whose people have not
been able to exercise the right of self-determination.
Hawke's shameless gesture may also have been prompted
by his need to 'ease' relations with Jakarta at a time
when they have been 'clouded' by such issues as the five
Papuan refugees now residing in Thursday Island, and the
recently-established radio link with Fretilin forces
which continues to operate despite a ban imposed by the
Australian government.
Indonesia's official reaction was somewhat less than
jubilant for Foreign Minister Mochtar Kusumaatmaja was
quick to point out that Canberra has not gone far enough
because it has not yet positively acknowledged that an
20
'act of self-determination' occurred in Dili on 31 May
1976, legitimising 'integrasi'.
l.1'-1 'consultations' leading nowhere
Portugal's new firmness on East Timor should be seen in
the context of the 'consultations' which have reportedly
been toking place under UN auspices following the General
Assembly 1982 resolution which instructed the Secretory-
AOOUf t:ASC '{IMO~ J"YSI S(!Wf;'o.l
~Af.IDML .
From The Australian 23 August 1985
General to initiate consultations between the parties
"directly concerned". (Oddly enough, the East Timor
people have never been included under this definition.)
Early in September, Mochtar commented on the
consultations and reiterated that self-determination was
not to be discussed and that consultations with Portugal
would only touch on peripheral matters. Thus, Portugal
has been mode well aware that not even a face-saving
formula is possible, enabling it to appear to be
fulfilling its constitutional obligation to bring about a
process of de-colonisation through on act of selfdetermination in East Timor.
Although East Timor has never become an election issue
in Portugal, President Eanes who will be quitting the
presidency following elections in a few months time has
always attached importance to Portugal's obligations and
has often reprimanded the Socialist government for its
negligence.
Jaime Gana: "Self-detenninotion is the core of the
question"
There is reason to believe that Jaime Gama, Portugal's
Foreign Minister, hos moved closer to the President's
position, recognising that a stolement hos been reached
with Indonesia at the UN. Jaime Gama took the unusual
step of urging the former Portuguese colon{es in Africa
to support East Timor at the Non-Aligned Foreign
Ministers conference in Luanda at the beginning of
September and went to the Angolan capital to attend the
TAPa.. Bulletin No. 71, September 1985
conference himself. Speaking at the UN General Assembly
on 23 September, he stressed, in relation to Portugal's
bilateral talks with Indonesia, that self-determination
for East Timor "is the core of the quest ion". He also
said that respect for human rights in East Timor is
gtill far from meeting our expectations". (AP, 23
Septeni>er)
Another sign of shifting attitudes among Socialist
Party politicians who hope to win both the forthcoming
parliamentary and presidential elections cCl'Tle with a
statement by Minister of State, Antonio Almedia Santos,
the party's candidate for prime minister. In an interview
on 31 August in Faro, he said: "Portugal has a moral
obligation which it cannot decline and it will continue
to be faithful to this and work within the bounds of
possibility so that self-determination for the people of
East Timor can be achieved."(~arta Post, 2 September)
Prime Minister Soares' meeting with Mgr Belo, Apostolic
Administrator of Dili (see separate item) may have also
contributed to reversing his earlier feeble attitude
towards East Timor.
Portugal md<es fo(1Tl(Jl contact with Fretilin
On 24 September, the Portuguese Foreign Minister held a
formal rreeting in New York with Fretilin's representative
to the UN, Jose Ramos 1-iorta. This is the first time such
formal contact has been made and could mark a new
departure in the negotiations currently taking place
between Portugal and Indonesia under UN auspices
regarding the future of East Timor, which have until now
excluded East Timorese participation.
East Timor ruins Indonesia's bid to host 1986 Non-Aligned Surrmit
An even more damaging dent in Indonesia's battered
image was i.nflicted at the September conference of
foreign ministers of the Non-Aligned Movement held in
Luanda, the capital of a country that has consistently
supported East Timor against Indonesia.
The first blow came when, for the first time in the
history of the Non-Aligned Movement, a Fretilin
delegation was invited to attend the opening session
along with other liberation movements, resulting in a
furious row with the Indonesian delegation. The draft
political declaration circulated in advance of the
meeting by the Angolan government as the host, included a
three-paragraph statement on East Timor calling among
other things for East Timorese participation in the UN
consultations.
On his departure for Luanda, flanked by a huge
delegation of senior officials, Foreign Minister Mochtar
declared that "the main task of the Indonesian delegation
this time is to eliminate the East Timor question from
the draft declaration". (Kompos, 30 August) But Moch tar
had another 'main task' which was to push through a
decision that Indonesia would host next year's NonAligned Surrmit and chair the movement till 1989. The
controversy over East Timor proved to be the stumblingblock to this ambition.
Indonesia has made no secret of its desire to host the
1986 Non-Aligned Movement conference. The idea was first
mooted by the Malaysian Prime Minister dl'ling a visit to
.Jakarta last year, and as the Luando meeting drew near,
the idea was more and more enthusiastically promoted by
Foreign Department spokesmen.
A few weeks before the meeting, Mochtar announced at
his weekly press conference that "Indonesia is prP.pared
to host the 1986 sur1T11i t conference of the Non-Aligned
Movement if requested ot next month's meeting". (Jakarta
Post, 12 August) A few weeks later however, he was forced
to admit that this was unlikely to happen as one
criterion is that the host government is not in conflict
with another member of the bloc. Even so, he could not
abandon the idea because Suharto himself was determined
to become the Movement's chairman (maybe he thinks he
isn't likely to get another chance!) and, as every
government minister iii Indonesia knows, . Suharto's wishes
are paramount. This was to have been the crowning glory
of Indonesia's recent posturing as a 'major world power'.
Indeed, it was recently acknowledged that the elaborate
gathering held to mark the 30th anniversary of the
Bandung Conference last April was intended primarily as a
'dress rehearsal' for the l 986 Non-Aligned Surrmi t.
On his arrival at Luanda airport, Mochtar again
announced that Indonesia was seeking the chairmanship,
and while the conference was in progress, back horre in
Jakarta, Gennal Amir Machmud, chairman of Indonesia's
legislative assembly, announced after an audience with
Suharto that Indonesia "should agree (sic) to host the
coming Non-Bloc surrmi t conference" (Kon-pas, 6 September)
Unfort•Jnately for Suharto however, things were not going
Mochtar's way in Luanda.
East Timor proved to be the most hotly debCJted issue in
Luanda, rrore controversial even than the debate over the
Iran-Iraq conflict. "Fretilin, 11 writes Jill Joliffe (For
Eastern Economic Revie~ 19 September) "was principally
supported by the five Poe tuguese-speaking Afr icon
countries, Vietnam, Laos and Vanuatu. What they lacked in
numbers they made up foe in corrmitment: the fight to keep
the reference in (the dcaft declnrotion) resulted in the
most heated debate of the conference."
Indonesia lobbied hard and argued primarily on formal
grounds, thal East Timor had been deleted from the 1983
Political Declaration at the Non-Bloc Surrmit in Delhi and
could not be restored. When a vote was td<:en, Indonesia
mustered a majority, but this did not result in the issue
being dropped. Policy decisions by the Non-Aligned
Movement con only be taken by consensus, with the result
that the three-paragraph reference was kept in the
Political Declaration with a note that consensus was not
reached. And Zimbabwe was chosen as next year's host.
Indonesia's cherished ambition to host the 1986 surrmit
conference was shattered by an issue it has tried for so
long to consign to "the dustbin o·f history". And to ram
home the defeat, it hos now been announced (For Eastern
EconomicRevie~ 26 September) that the question of East
Timor has been included on the agenda of the 1986 surrmit.
Fretilin's message to the Luanda conference
A message to the Non-Aligned Foreign Ministers conference
which was held in Luanda, from Xanana, chairman of the
Revolution Council of Notional Resistance was transmitted
by radio to Darwin on 1 September, in time for delivery
at the conference which opened on 4 September.
After welcoming the Non-Aligned Movement's principles
of non-violence and stressing the need for dialogue to
resolve conflicts, Xanana gave a brief history of East
Timer's 10-year struggle against Indonesian aggression.
Turning to the present situation, he says:
The vile and barbarous aggressor continues to massacre
and torture the population with impunitlj, persecuting and
threatening (people) with death, searching houses and
people, prohibiting travel and demanding travel passes
and controlling even the smallest concentration camps,
with lower rank troops in each camp and higher rank
troops in each village. Even so, the population is forced
to provide securitlj at night for the cowardllJ occupiers.
Each dalJ, ever1Jone - from the elderllJ to the children is forced to do so, with threats of reprisals for each
TAPOL Bulletin No. 71, Septerri>er 1985
21
ask. (questions) about massacres, they are asking the
torturers and the puppet governor.
East Timor
Fretilin attack. Such reprisals occurred in Iliomar last
January when over 40 civilians were shot by the
occupiers, and last Hay in Viqueque where the enemy
position inside the camp killed over 50 civilians with
mortars and grenades concentrated near a building.
This is the constant threat hanging over the East
Timorese population, the real face of military control by
the occupation forces. The herded pop.u lation, unable to
survive without crops, tries to escape the vigilance and
control of the enemy in order to scavenge for food in the
bush, facing the risk. of being caught by patrols and
massacred on suspicion of being in contact with Fretilin.
On the misuse of relief aid from abroad, he says:
The resources of UN ES C 0 are being used to serve
Indonesian policy. The women whose husbands were
massacred by the Indonesians and who agree not to work
for the resistance and to spy for the Indonesians are the
ones who receive the food, tins of condensed milk and
rotten corn.
The 1iberat ion movement is very bitter about the
favourable reports produced by government delegations
that have visited East Timor under Indonesian auspices:
Several governments who use the rhetoric of human
rights are in fact accomplices in the crimes committed in
East Timar. Indonesia has spread false propaganda,
claiming absolute control of East Timar, seeking thereby
to guarantee total impunity for its policy of genocide
and occupation carried out in our homeland. Several
delegations manipulated by Jakarta have given false
testimony about the real situation in East Timar. Tanks
and assault vehicles are hidden outside the towns, war
materials are stored (a way) and the occupation troops
wear civilian clothes while a few pri vileged Timorese are
made to perform for rupiahs to impress the visitors.
Prisoners are transferred to other locations and strong
security placed around the towns, The population is
threatened and told not to speak, and security prevents
them approaching the visitors. These are different
aspects of a farce repeatedly used by the murderous
occupiers of our homeland. In fact, when foreign visitors
Fretilin is particularly angry about the Australian
goverrment's stand, warning that Hawke's statemen~ ~f 16
August will encourage Jakarta to intensify military
operations against the population. This political a~d
diplomatic support will encourage the military to c~rrrn1t
even more atrocities against a defenceless population:
Recentl.y, the Australian government pronounced an
irresponsible and unscrupulous policy, recognising the
military control and brutal repression of our people as
supposed Indonesian sovereignty over East Timar, with the
intention of facilitating negotiations with Jakarta about
exploration for deposits of oil and natural gas in our
southern sea.
We totally repudiate the idea that
humanitarian concern motivates the Australian government
in this dirty political manoeuvre to cover up economic
interests. In the concrete case of the Ti mar Gap, the
rights of the East Timorese people have been usurped in
this operation.
The message makes a strong appeal to the Non-Aligned
Movement to condemn Indonesian aggression and makes the
following proposals:
1) Ta allow entry of independent observers to study the
real situation in East Ti mar.
2) To allow entry of humanitarian organisations to give
direct assistance to the needy population with clothing
and medicine.
J) To consider the proposals for a solution put forward
by Fretilin.
The message in conclusion recalls the original spirit
of the Non-Aligned Movement, putting emphasis on its
anti-colonial and anti-imperialist struggle:
Due to the character of the Non-Aligned Movement, the
just struggle of this small and defenceless Haubere
people is an integral part of the liberation struggles of
peoples of the Third World against imperialism and
colonialism and against the expansionist ambitions of the
big nations who wish to subjugate by force small and
frail peoples. We are confident that you will give due
consideration to the sufferings of the oppressed people
of East Tim or who for ten years have resisted Indonesia's
genocidal war of occupation.
Catholic Church's concern for East Timor grows
The low-profile visit of t-igr Carlos Ximenes Belo,
Apostolic Administrator of Dili, to the Vatican in June
this year led to speculations that he may be seeking
asylum abroad. Only since his return have the facts about
the activities of the leader of the East Timer Church
while abroad become public.
Mgr Belo's efforts to seek a just solution for East
Timor were revealed in an interview with Jacques Guillon,
AFP correspondent in Jakarta, just before returning to
Dili. He told AFP he had gone abroad "to try to launch
new negotiations between Fretilin and Indonesia". When he
met the Pope on 5 July, the Pope told him "to work for
the Church, to fight the suffering of the people and to
seek for o right solution for peace in Timer." He quoted
the Pope as saying: "Now, Timer represents the most
difficult problem in the world."
It is very difficult to know the real facts "because
there is no free information in Timor". Regarding recent
visits of journalists and diplomats to East Timor, he
said that their reports were of little significance.
''Even if these people are independent, they cannot say
the truth because they are too closely guarded to see the
truth." He only wished visitors could see more than the
Indonesian military wanted them to see, that "they will
be able to go into the villages and discuss freely with
the population and not always with the governor, the
22
military chief and the bishop (ie. himself}".
He also explained how carefully he had to manoeuvre. It
had taken him 7 months to obtain clearance from the
military to go abroad. This was why he kept a low profile
while abroad: "I didn't want to speak with journalists in
Rome because I know I could have difficulties getting
back to Dili."
( AFP report, B August telex from Hongkong}
Mgr Belo meets Portuguese leaders
Mgr Belo also made a brief, unannounced visit to Lisbon
and while there sought appointments with President Eanes
and Prime Minister Soares. Fearing that he was being
followed by Indonesian secret agents, he met the Prime
Minister and the President's personal aide at the
Vatican's diplomatic mission where he had sought
diplomatic protection.
He informed them of the serious situation and the
continued fighting, proven by (Indonesian) graves
regularly filling up in Dili cemetery. He hihiself had
officiated at a series of burials of lndonesiali Catholic
officers. When asked by Prime Minister Soare~ about the
comnmist nature of Fretilin, Mgr Belo who is known not
to be sympathetic towards Fretilin, dismissed the claim
as nons~nsical. He said they were pure nationalists.
(Jill Jolliffe in The Age, 4 September)
TAPOL Bulletin No. 71, September 1985
Continued opposite
West Papua
PNG ready to give homes to
refugees?
At last, the West Papuan refugee problem in Papua N.ew
Guinea appears to be moving towards a constructive
solution. In a press statement on 17 September, Prime
Minister Michael Somare said his government would
sympathetically consider resettlement in ~NG for. th~se
refugees not willing to return home, whale con ti nu mg
discussions with Jakarta on the repatriation of those
wishing to return.
Reuters reports him as adding that he would not allow
OPM activities on PNG territory, saying: "For those who
feel they want to make Papua New Guinea not a haven f~r
illegal activities but who want to make PNG their
country of course this would be considered on their
merits.': (Jc'<orto Post, 17 September) It remains to be
seen whether this will modify Somare's shift towards a
more welcoming policy towards the refugees.
Although Prime Minister Somare's statement s~~s lik~ a
move in the right direction, the enormous d1ff 1culties
still lying ahead should not be underestimated. PNG is
currently facing an economic crisis and a budgetary
deficit of major proportions. (PNG Times, 8 September)
Its main source of revenue, mineral exports, has fallen
dramatically because of low pr ices on the world market.
The country's dependence on Australia is far from
healthy. Most analysts stress that Australia is propping
up the PNG economy with $300 million annually in aid but
the balance of trade between the two countries is almost
four to one in Australia's favour, producing huge profits
for the latter's economy, which means that the propping
up goes the other way round, a classical neo-colonial
relationship.
As far as PNG's relations with Indonesia is concerned,
Australia has shown a total lack of policy on the border
issue. Recently, the influential Australian Financial
Review commented that it was about time Australia
formulated a clear policy on the PNG- Indonesian border
region. There is "an increasingly glaring weakness in
Australian foreign policy", the paper wrote, adding that
Foreign Minister Bill Hayden has "created a real paradox
is his pursuit of a sensible contemporary Australian
regional foreign policy by pursuing a strong line on
Vietnam, yet keeping totally aloof in policy terms from
the Irion Jaya-PNG refugee problem". (Quoted in Pacific
Islands Monthly, September 1985)
Australia's 'velvet glove' policy towards the generals'
regime and its invisibility on the refugees raises
West Papuon refugees in PNG.
serious doubts whether Canberra will be willing to
support Somare's intentions to give the 11,000 refugees a
new home.
More refugees cross the border
In the meantime, Indonesian military operations in the
interior of West Papua have caused yet more villagers to
flee towards the border. The BBC reported on 2 September
that some 500 had arrived at Yapsiei in PNG's West Sepik
province where they have built themselves temporary
camps.
The Bishop of Vanimo, Father John Etheridge, who is
closely connected with the welfare of refugees recently
warned that prolonged camp life is causing tensions.
'From what I can see, there is quite a bit of frustration
building up in the camps. There is bound to be tension
when people are stuck in one little spot and they don't
know whether they are going to be allowed to stay or
forced bock to Irion Jayo." ( 1he Australian, 4 September)
Background to the military operations in Ponioi
Continued from page 22
German and American bishops spedc out
In July, a German bishop for the first time spoke out
in strong terms about the human rights situation in East
Timor. Tbe chairman of the German branch of Justitio et
Po~
Bishop Frans Komphous made a strong plea for
solidarity with the suffering East Timorese people and
for pressure on the Indonesian government to put an end
to the war. (Press release, Bistum Lirri>urg, 9 July)
In September, John Cardinal O'Connor, Archbishop of New
York, sent a message of support to the Catholics of East
Timor "in your struggle to preserve and enhanc.e t~e
dignity of life and the right of your people to live in
peace and freedom."
In TAPOL Bulletin No. 70, .Nly 1985, we reported the
heavy loss of life in villages in the Paniai highlands as
a result of Indonesian military operations. A report
dated 26 July from Markos Victoria, headquarters of the
OPM, provides some background information. It states that
early in April this year, a serious clash occurred
between Indonesian troops and OPM guerrillas during which
the Indonesians lost 30 dead, three seriously injured and
seven slightly injured.
In retaliation, a large reinforcement of troops was
dispatched to the area to carry out operations against
the defenceless inhabitants of various villages. During
the course of one month, from 4 June till 6 July, 517
villagers were killed. The new military conrnander of the
province, Major General Hasudungan Simanjuntak, hos
declared the whole region to be "rowan" (disturbed).
TAPOL Bulletin No. 71, Septerri>er 1985
23
West Papua
The Port Vila unity declaration
Seth Rurrkorem (right)
and Jacob Prai (left)
with Barak Sope of the
Vanuatu Governnent, in
the middle, after the
unity declaration was
signed, on 11 July 1985.
A long-awaited move towards unification between the two
wings of the OPM hos now token place with the signing in
Port Vila, the copi tol of Vanuatu, of a declaration on 11
July between the two OPM leaders in exile, Seth Rurrkorem
and Jacob Proi. After nine years of discord and acrimony,
they formally declared a truce and undertook to work
together.
Last November, the first moves towards unification
occurred with an agreement (a copy of which was only
recently received) signed between the two wings inside
West Papua, with M. Prowar representing Markos Victoria,
the Rumkorem headquarters, and Fisor Jorisetow
representing Markos Perrka, the Proi headquarters.
The Port Vila declaration contains a pledge to
safeguard the "survival right of the Melanesian race in
West Papua". Both leaders admit that due to their
disagreements, many casualties had fallen and the
Indonesian military hod been the ones to benefit. If
disunity continues, they said, the result will be "the
obli terot ion of the Melanesian race in West Papua".
Various plans were mentioned, and it is envisaged that
a new name will be agreed upon for the reunified national
liberation movement. Agreement was reached on a division
of responsibilities, with Jacob Prai taking charge of the
political side of the movement and Seth Rumkorem in
charge of military activities. At a future meeting the
date of which is not yet fixed, and new structure and
constitution will be discussed.
Resettling 'isolated' c01T1T1Unities encounters resistance
The tragic fate of two who returned
A report from Vonimo doted 28 July gives on account of
the 50 refugees who returned to Vanimo on 10 June. The
group who hod left their villages 17 months ago hod been
living in Blackwora camp, Vonimo and decided to go home
after a statement by the Indonesian government assuring
them of their safety and proper living conditions.
For the first few days ofter arriving back, they were
treated generously by the authorities, given all kinds of
assurances and transport money for the journey home. But
as the days wore on, a shadow. of fear fell on them as
more and more frequently, they were visited by
intelligence agents asking questions and making threats.
Two of them, Marcus lnggibal Tabuni and Warta Jikwa,
both from Womeno in the Joyowijoyo district were detained
without charge, and were subjected to torture and extreme
mental pressure.
The same report also refers to the fate of the four OPM
guerrillas who were deported to Indonesia on 22 June.
(See TAPOL Bulletin, No. 70, July 1985) All hove been
placed in military custody. Nabot Wal'Yl'lCI, formerly a
corporal in the Indonesian Army who defected on 11
February 1984 is at present detained in the notorious Dok
V, an underground prison in Jayapura where detainees are
subjected to extreme physical and mental torture. The
other three, Ones Sorontouw, lsack Waromi and Ibrahim
t-bnong are detained in the Police subdistrict prison in
Jayapura and are not being allowed to receive visitors.
24
A brief news . item in Kompas (27 August) quotes A.
Sukanto, the district chief of Fakfak in Irion Joya (West
Papua) as complaining that the programne to resettle
'isolated' comnunities in government-designated villages
is not going according to plan. While claiming that the
programme is "in response to the wishes of the people",
he contradicts himself by adding that "there still are
people who want to remain in their places of origin".
The trouble with refusal to comply with the progranme,
says Sukanto, is that it hinders the work of officials in
charge of "giving guidance" because they cannot reach the
remote places where 'isolated people' live.
In a cautiously critical article, Kobar dari KompunG
the publication of the Irion Joya Comnunity Development
Foundation (3-4/Vol. I, 1985) says three government
departments are involved in the programne: the Interior
Ministry which wants to establish "growth centres", the
Forestry Department which wants to remove people from
comnercial forestry areas, and the Social Affairs
Ministry whose aim is to "improve the ideological,
economic and socio-cultural welfare of those people and
to improve the security situation".
Timika, a Fakfak district targetted for resettlement of
'isolated people' is a region of much social discontent,
writes Kd<. It agrees on the need to help indigenous
people, but the plan to turn Timika into a transmigration
site for 40,000 people "may develop the physical area but
not the indigenous people".
TAPOL Bulletin No. 71, September 1985
The reorganisation of the Indonesian armed forces
Part III
The Novy and the Air Force
Four years after Suharto seized power, the Indonesian
Armed Forces (ABRI) underwent a major re-organisation
which was carried out fran October 1969 to April 1970.
The primary objective of the Army leaders then was to
destroy the independence of the Navy and Air Force chiefs
by abolishing their authority over military operations,
thus removing any threat to the Army's control of state
power.
The prevailing view in Army circles was: ''The
integration of the Armed Forces will prevent the
occurrence of situations that arise in Latin America
where a seizure of power is always accompanied by
activities on the part of one of the armed forces or of
individuals within the Armed Forces." (Indonesia
Magazine, No. 1, 5 December 1969, page 83) Integration
meant the total subordination of the other three forces,
the Police, the Air Force and the Navy to the Army High
Command. The 1969 re-organisation firmly established the
Army's organi sat ionol ascendancy and supremacy over the
other three forces.
While the Police Force has now up to a point been decoupled from the Army (see TAPOL Bulletin No. 70, July
1985), the power relationship established in 1969 has not
been disturbed by the present re-organisation.
The Novy (Arni)
The Navy is being trimmed down in numbers even more
drastically than the Army. It has been squeezed into two
commands, losing its territorial character. It has now
been re-organised into what is essentially an operationoriented structure. The two commands are the Eastern
Fleet (Armada Kawasan Timur or Armotim} and the Western
Fleet (Armada Kawasan Barat or Armobor). Naval personnel
are to be reduced and the number of flag officers w ill be
cut from 70 to 46. The Navy's Chief-of - Staff, Admiral M.
Ranly says that rigorous procedures will be used to
select top-ranking officers and between 3,000 and 4,000
naval officers will be pensioned off. Unlike the Army, he
asserts, there are no 'generational problems' in the
Navy; he is the only remaining '1945 - generation' officer
in the force.
The two Fleets will operate from five major bases known
as Lontomal (Pangkolan UtC111a or Prime Bases) located in
Tanjung Pinang (Riau), Teluk Ratai (Lampung, South
Sumatra) which is still be to built, Surabaya (East
Java), Bitung (North Sulawesi) and Ambon (Maluku). The
relative strengths of the two Fleets is as yet difficult
to assess. Eastern Fleet operations will cover a vast
area with numerous islands and seas where foreign vessels
(surface and submarine) have free passage, with illegal
Japanese and Taiwanese trawlers operating with impunity.
It is acknowledged internationally that four of the
sixteen strategically most important straits in the world
(in terms of their use for international sea traffic) are
located within the Indonesian archipelago: the Malacca
Strait, the Lombok Strait, the Ombai Strait and the Wetar
Strait. Major disturbances in any of these straits could
sever the connection between the Pacific Ocean and the
Asian mainland. According to Admiral Romly, the locations
for the five Lantamal have been chosen with these
geographic and strategic considerations in mind.
The Tanjung Pinang Base will take charge of an
operational area stretching from the Malacca Strait to
the Natuna islands, safeguarding the country from
'threats from the north' from the South China Sea . The
Continued on page 28
Mochtar, the racist
The following extracts are from an
interview of Indonesia's Foreign
Minister, Mochtar Kusumaatmaja, by
Peter Hastings, published in the
Sydney Horning Heral.d on 16 August:
The best thing Indonesia has done for
its Melanesian people in Irion Jayo
is to get them off "the habit of
drinking beer", Indonesia's Foreign
Minister tells me.
He is relaxed in an armchair in his
Pejambon office... The Foreign
Minister is at the top of his
engaging form.
.•. He maintains that becou se
Melanesians have been weaned from
beer in Irion Joya, "Jayapura is a
safer place than Port Moresby ••• you
can't mix primitive people with
alchohol. It's a recipe for disaster
everywhere whether it's American
Indians or Australian Aboriginese, or
whoever. You bring them into contact
with alchohol and you destroy them."
On the subject of the PNG border,
he says, "I have done well. I hove
handled the PNG thing right" This is
a reference to the Indonesian policy
of not bringing pressure to bear on
Port Moresby over the border
crossers. "A lot hove come bock to
Irion Jayo, about 2,000 (sic). The
ones who stay in PNG do so because
they don't have to work. We don't
want people who won't work."
•.• But suppose the camps become
''bases" from which OPM supervisors
can move across the border into Irion
Joya, ferment trouble and move back
into their PNG sanctuary? "The
problem is for the PNG," he insists.
''We want lrianese who are able and
willing to work because we want them
to become fulltime citizens of
Indonesia and to pay their way like
everyone else."
••• But what were his thoughts on
the lrianese on Thursday Island who
had been denied refugee status in
Australia? ''The biggest problem of
these lrianese or Papuans or whatever
you call them is that they hove
different cultural values. If they
can manage it, they want to go
through life doing nothing at all. We
don't need people like that."
TAPOL. Bulletin No. 71, Septerri>er 1985
25
I
Book review
Two more books by the Indonesian writer and former political prisoner, Pramoedya Ananta Toer were published in Jakarta on
2J September. The two book.s are .Jejak Langkah, the third part of his tetralogy, and Sang Pemula (The One Who Began), a
biography of the first nationalist journalist, Tirto A dhi Soerjo, the man on whom the principal character in the
tetralogy is based. We are pleased to be able to publish a review of one of the book.s written by Basuk.i Resobowo, a close
colleague of the author's, who is now living in politicc3.J. exile in Holland.
Pramoedya Ananta Toer, Jejak Langkah
(footsteps), Haste Mitra, Jakarta and
Manus Amici, Amsterdam, 1985
Jejak Langkah
is the third part of
the novel Pramoedya wrote while in
exile on B uru Island. He was in
detention and exile for 14 years,
deprived of his freedom and living
in acute hardship. In order to write,
he had to steal time from the forced
physical labour political prisoners
were required to do every day. He had
neither
writing
materiel nor
do cu mentetion, yet he managed to
write
four books. I em
full of
admiration
for
his
outstanding
achievement.
The
first
two
parts
of
his
tetralogy
have
already
been
published,
This Earth of Mankind
(1980) and
Child of all
Nations
(1981)
Both
were
greeted
enthusiastically by the Indonesian
public
and
were
stunningly
successful,
not
only
es literary
works
but commercially
as
well.
Abroad too, the books were acclaimed.
The successes of this leftist writer
who, as a member of Lekra (the
People's League for Culture), was
held es a PK! political prisoner,
shook the
confidence of Suharto
military regime. The two books were
banned
and
withdrawn
from
circulation, and copies were burnt by
the authorities. There were many
protests
abroad,
and
even
in
Indonesia where dissent is so tightly
controlled,
many people expressed
their anger at the brutal way the
authorities
treated
Pramoedya's
books. Now we ell wait to see what
fate will befall his third book.
The decision to ban Pram's books is
quite incomprehensible. These novels
say so much about the history and
times under colonialism, all of which
is
important for people born after
Indonesian independence. The present
generation is incapable of reflecting
on the growth of the Indc;nesian
nation
and
state. Knowledge
of
Indonesia is confined to a schematic
view of history consisting of a chain
of events that occurred in the feudal
era, the colonial era, during the
Japanese
occupation
and
after
independence. Pram's books provide a
different perspective altogether and
should be compulsory readinq for
anyone aspiring to become a welleducated Indonesian.
Jejak langkah continues the story
begun in the first two books, of the
hard life for Indonesians during the
colonial era when they enjoyed no
le gal safeguards. There were only
laws for
Europeans and oriental
foreigners. for native Indonesians
there was only custom law which
protected
the
interests of the
aristocracy (priy ayi) while ordinary
people had nothing but the duty to
serve their superiors. Such was the
fate of Nyai Ontosoroh, the young
village girl who
was sold to a
plantation owner, and of Minke who
was not permitted to marry a girl of
Dutch origin even though he was of
'high
birth',
the
son
of
a
bupati (feudal district head).
Jejak langkah tells how in the
period 1898 to 1918, young Indonesian
students began to realise through the
26
knowledge they acquired that no hum en
being can survive without dignity.
Encouraged by what they had learnt,
they took the first steps towards
creating an organisation that would
struggle
for
the
dignity
of
Indonesian people. I don't want to
discuss the
book ss a
work of
literature; I would rather take a
look et the story it tells in the
context of the awakening end struggle
of modern Indonesians. Whet do I mean
by a
modern Indonesian? I mean
Pramoedye Anenta Toer, a men who has
defended
his
self-respect
and
safeguarded his personal freedom.
The
story
is
simple
end
straightforward,
which
is
how
ordinary people think, who see and
judge everything according to their
social and economic circumstances - a
relative not absolutist approach. It
deals
with a
period in colonial
history when people were being molded
to serve the needs of industrial
capitalism
which
had
replaced
mercantilism.
Many
well-educated
people were needed, end it w es to
serve
these
needs
that
the
colonialists formulated their liberal
ethic el policy,
to
provide
more
education. The story unfolds in a
series of scenes, some of them rather
conventional, that are easy to follow
for people accustomed to w etching
wayeng kulit
(leather
puppet)
performances.
Prem starts by introducing the m sin
liberal-minded
colonialists,
protagonists of the ethical policy
like Kollewijn, Ter Haar end Marie v.
Zeggelen. On the other side is the
Governor-General,
van
Heutz,
pretending to be nice to Minke. The
ethical policy
did
not liberate
people.
On
the
contrary,
it
reinforced the colonial grip because
i t taught Indonesians how to behave,
how to be submissive and obedient to
their superiors. Minke would not go
along
with
the
stream,
always
staunchly ind,e pendent, standing up
f~r
himself against his superiors
hke the medical school director who
expels
him
for
his independent
spirit.
TAPOL Bulletin No. 71, September 1985
It goes on to tell the story of
this young Indonesian freeing himself
from the yoke of traditional ties end
colonial oppression. An exe m ple of
his break with tradition is the way
he chooses the women he marries,
first a Chinese women, Mei, and later
a Moluccan woman named Prinses. He
also
mixes
freely
with
colonial
government
of fie i els
despite
his
father's
misgivings,
whose
traditionalist background teaches him
otherwise.
Hinke also becomes involved in
social,
economic
and
political
affairs, end we see how he has to
cope with each of these problems step
by
step
(the
'footsteps'
in
the
book's title) and through a process
of political education. Hinke spares
nothing in terms of his own personal
wealth, devoting all his time and
energies to producing publications to
disseminate information and political
education to the general public. Then
there
is
a
clash
between his
ideological upbringing, the religion
of
Islam,
end
his
materiel
circumstances (between one's place
end one's identity).
His
portrayal
of
an
emerging
consciousness is gripping. Improving
social end economic conditions is not
achieved
just
by
becoming
entrepreneurs. It involves a struggle
for workers' rights and better wages.
Gradually a conflict unfolds between
the cam peignin g principles of the
Sariket
Dagang
Isla• (Union of
Islamic Traders) and the principles
of popular struggle pursued by Hinke.
Then comes the realisation that the
struggle to free human beings from
political oppression and economic
~xploitation
must
m een
forging
international links with people in
the
neighbouring
countries like
China, Inda- China, Malaya end the
Philippines. These are the things
that create the deep bond between
Hinke and Mei.
I cannot end without saying how
proud I feel, as a member of lekra,
that my Lekre colleague Prem should
have become the first Indonesian
writer to produce a tetrelogy of this
calibre, a four-part masterpiece. The
first
three
are
novels and
the
fourth, entitled The Glasshouse, is a
satire,
And finally,
would like to ask
Wiretm o
Sukitno, the
man· who
initiated the Cultural Manifestol),
end his like; what have you all got
to say for yourselves now, after
enjoying 20 years of protection under
the Suharto military regime, freed
from the shackles which you accused
lekre of placing on your creative
activity? To this day, I have see
nothing spectacular produced by any
of
you
in
literature,
painting,
music, drama, dance or film. The sad
truth is that the New Order does not
provide
fertile
soil for
artistic
creativity. On the contrary, it has
turned
Indonesia into a dumping
ground for the rubbish produced in
the USA and western Europe.
Basuki Resobo 111 o
l) The
Cultural Manifesto ( Hanikebu)
was a proclamation issued by antiLekre ertiats in 1964.
Military profiles
Red-beret clique taces charge
C.I. Sontcso, a counter-insurgency
expert, now heads transmigration
bureaucracy
On 31 July, Major-General Chalimi
Imam Santosa, one of Indonesia's
leading generals, was appointed
Secretary-General of the Department
of Transmigration. His predecessor
was also a general, indicating the
importance the regime ottdches to
this job.
C.I Santosa is of the so-called
'bridging generation', the graduates
of the P3-AD, the provisional
military academy set up in Bandung in
1950. Among his classmates who
graduated In 1952 ore General Benny
Murdoni, now Commander of the Armed
Forces, Major-General Soeweno, n()w
commander of the Strategic Reserve
Command, KOSlRAD, Major-General
Dading Kalbuadi, the 'butcher' of
East Timar who is now Logistics
Assistant of the Armed Forces, (Aslog
AERI), Major-General Soetoryo, now
Intelligence Assistant of AERI
(Asintel AERI) and Major-General
Gunawan Wibisono who until his death
in June this year was Social and
Political Assistant of AERI (Assospol
AERI). This P3-AD clique hos now
become the most influential group of
generals within the Indonesian Army
and AERI as a whole.
C.I. Santosa together with his
whole class of 1952 entered the redberet parocommando corps which was
known at the time as the RPKAD, later
as Kopassandha, and recently renamed
Kopassus (Komando Pasukan Khusus or
Special Troops Command). In mid-1965
he became commander of the RPKAD
First Battalion, taking over from
Benny Murdani who had been sent on an
intelligence assignment, and was
promoted to the rank of major.
During the 1 October 1965 events,
he ployed a vital role in General
Suharto's military operations to
assume control of Jakarta by
commanding the RA<AD unit which
retook ·the headquarters of the
Indonesian Radio (~I), assisted by
Second-Lieutenant Sintong Panjaiton,
the man recently appointed as
commander of Kopossus. On, 2 October,
Major Sontosa was assigned by Suharto
to td<e over the Halim air-base which
was under the control of 'rebel'
troops under Lieutenant-Colonel
Un tung.
For the next few months, C.I.
Sontoso, under the command of
Lieutenant-Colonel Sarwo Edhie, the
notorious RPKAD chief (now the
regime's ideological supremo as head
of the indoctrination board, P7), was
involved in the army-led operations
in Central Java which spearheaded the
massacres in A<l and BTI (peasant
union) strongholds. Blood-stained by
these killings, he returned to
Jakarta early in 1966 to become
involved in the destabilisation
operations of RA<AD, using the
students to disrupt political and
economic Ii f e in the capital which
brought about the downfall of
President Sukarno and the assumption
of full power by General Suharto.
C.I. Santosa remained with the
RPKAD for many years, commanding its
newly-formed Group IV in 1967. In the
early 1970s, he spent several years
abroad, leading the
Indonesian
contingent attached to the UN PeaceKeeping Force in the Middle East.
After his return, he took on his
first territorial assignment as
Chief-of-Staff of the South
Kolimantan Mili tory Command, Kodam
X/Lombung Mangkurat and remained
there till 1978 when he was appointed
KodamXVll/Cendrawosihcommander, in
charge of counter-insurgency in
turbulent West Papua.
In 1982, he was appointed to the
top military 'karyawan' post as
Karyawan Assistant of AERI (Asker
ABRI), in charge of military
appointments in social and political
affairs, and a year later he became
head of ABRl'sKaryowanGuidance Body
(Babinkor) which maintains control
over all military men assigned to
'non-military posts'.
C.I. Santosa's latest appointment
to one of the most important
'karyawan' postings is part of a
number of recent appointments of
people with a red-beret background,
all of themmen who md<e up Murdani 's
inner circle. In the words of
Indonesia Reports (No. 1O, August
1985, page 61 ),
"Santosa's appointment is a further
sign of Murdoni's increasing role in
the transmigration progrome,
particularly in Irion Joya where
Santosa ran all counter-insurgency
operations against the OPM. The
appointment also signals President
Suharto's full-speed ahead
instructions to Martono (Minister of
Transmigration, TAPOL) on
transmi gr at ion. Santoso's last
appointment afforded him intimate
knowledge of where military officers
were assigned to civilian positions
in the government bureaucracy,
thereby likely facilitating somewhat
more inter-departmental cooperation
and coordination in the
tronsmigrot ion effort."
TAPOL Bulletin No. 71, Septerri>er 1985
Sintong Ponjaiton, the new Kopossus
corrrnander
Brigadier-General Sintong Ponjoitan,
the newly-appointed commander of
Kopassus, the poracommondos corps,
has already had a long career of
action and violence.
Born in Tarutung, North Sumatra on
4 September 1941, he went to Java in
1959 after finishing high school and
became a cadet at the Military
Academy inMagelang. After graduating
in 1963, he joined the RPKAD, the
predecessor of Kopassus, and won a
reputation as a soldier of 'valour',
always ready for combat.
On 1 October 1965, Panjai tan, then
a second lieutenant, was in the
detachment assigned to retake the
radio (~I) building which had been
occupied by 'rebel' troops under
Untung's command. Soon afterwards, he
went to Central Java with RPKAD
troops on their murderous mission to
exterminate whole villages of alleged
communists or sympathisers. His next
great 'mission of valour' was in East
Timor whenRA<AD troops were sent on
numerous missions in an attempt to
browbeat the population and reinforce
Indonesia's occupation.
He become a 'public hero' in 1981
when, already a lieutenant-colonel,
he stormed a hijacked Garuda plane at
Bangkok airport with orders from
Benny Murden i to capture and kill the
hijackers. All but one were killed in
the attack, and the surviving
hijacker was later killed as well.
This feat earned him the 'Bintang
Sakti' (sacred star) and promotion to
the rank of colonel.
Prior to his present appointment,
Sintong Panjaitan was commander of
Pusanda Linud in Batujajar,
responsible for training Kopossus
troops in intelligence work and
airborne activities.
His replaces Brigadier-General
WismoyoArismunandor, formerKopossus
Sintong Ponjoi ton
cornnonder, who was suddenly removed
ofter incurring the displeasure of
Mrs Tien Suharto, a close relative by
marriage. Ponjoiton starkly reflects
the murderous image of Kopossus
troops.
27
Continued from page 25
Teluk Ratai Base In South Sumatra will be developed into
a model naval base and is due to start functioning by the
end of this century. Its main operational function will
be protecting the Sunde Straits as the gateway to the
Indian Ocean. A special team of engineers has been
recruited to design this base, making it the most
advanced naval base in the region.
Teluk Ratai hos been chosen to replace the Surabaya
Naval Base which is at present the Navy's ma in base.
Surcboya, one of Indonesia's busiest corrmerciol harbours
and a centre for heavy sea traffic, is no longer
considered suitable for naval operations, in particular
for secret ship movements. Teluk Ratai, a relatively
isolated and quiet area, offers a far more favourable
alternative.
The Bi tung Base in Menado, North Sulawesi is to become
a 'forward base' protecting the frontiers in times of
conflict along the line connecting the Malacca Strait,
the Sulawesi Seo and the Sulu Sea. While no-one mentions
the country regarded by Indonesian military strategists
as the likely 'threat', it is not difficult to conclude
that they have a post-Morcos Philippines in mind.
Arrbon is the headquarters of the fifth naval base,
controlling the rich waters of the Moluccas with special
emphasis on the Banda Seo, richer than any other sea in
the world for its variety of fish.
A major 20-year expansion progrorrme has been launched
to build the Navy along the lines envisaged. New orders
for naval vessels have already been placed, two minesweepers from Holland, additional Type-209 submarines
from West Germany and a series of PSK M<.5-class patrol
boats some of which are on order from South Korea, the
remainder ore to be built locally at the Surabaya
shipyard, PT PAL
The Air Force
The Air Force hos also been rationalised into two
operational conTTICJnds, Operational Corrrnand I (Koopsau I)
based in Jakarta and Operational Corrrnand II (Koopsau II)
based in Ujung Pandang. Under the new structure, all air
bases or Lanud (Pangkalan Udora) will assume the same
responsibilities and will be equipped with the same
number of jet fighter squadrons.
According to Air Chief-of-Staff, Air Marshall Sukardi,
two factors have determined the choice of air-base
locations - protecting the vital, strategic industrial
centres and protecting the so-called rawan (securityprone} regions. The emphasis for the air-bases in the
Western Koopsau I will be on attack squadrons while the
Eastern Koopsau II will rely more on patrol squadrons for
reconnoisance. This indicates that the military
strategists regard the Asian mainland, primarily Vietnam
and China, as the danger areas rather than countries on
the periphery of their eastern waters, the Philippines
and Australia.
Pakon Air Base will occupy a vital position situated at
the crossroads between the Malac.ca Strait and the South
China Sea. A new forward base called Ranai Air Base is
being developed on the Natuna islands, with another one
on Weh Island, the most western tip of the Indonesian
archipelago.
The main jet fighter currently being used by the Air
Force is still the A-4 Sl<yhawk but A~I chiefs are
anxiously looking for a far more advanced aircraft like
the F16, the F20 or the Mirage 2000. In the east, the Air
Force will rely more on the slower Bronco OVJO and the
Boeing 737-200, equipped with side-looking radar, to keep
a lookout over the vast seas around Sulawesi, the
Moluccas and the Lesser $undo Islands.
Air Force personnel will also be cut in nurrber, with
special emphasis on the Air Force Special Corrmand which
was formerly known as Koposgot (Quick Reaction Forces
Comnand}, now to be called Pasl<hasau (Pasukan Khusus TNlAU or Special Air Forcee Troops).
28
Centralised control
Operationally, the Navy and the Air Force will be
firmly under the control of the Affil comnander, General
Benny Murdani. The chiefs-of-staff of these two forces
ore non-vocal, colourless professionals by contrast with
the Army chief-of-staff, General Rudini, and other senior
Army corrmonderswho often project o very public image. As
far as these two forces ore concerned, the emphasis is on
the purchase of modern equipment and advanced technology.
In the words of one novaJ officer, whereas in the Army,
the focus is on manpower and the weapons needed to arm
them (orang yang dipersenjatai), for the Novy and the Air
Force, it is the hardware and weapons systems that count
and the personnel needed to man them (senjato yang
diawaki). Both forces will inevitably become
technologically top-heavy.
Some non-military Affil-watchers hove expressed doubts
about the ability of these two forces to cope with the
advanced systems now under consideration for their use.
The maintenance, operational and coordination
requirements for these 'new toys' are formidable but if
the Affil leadership have their way and western arms
exporters succeed in winning the orders they want, this
is where much of Indonesia's diminishing stock of foreign
currency will be spent.
Next issue: Part VI. Purchasing weapons for A BRI.
*
Part I appeared in Bulletin 69. Part II appeared in
Bulletin 7 o.
Stop Press
A fire almost completely gutted the studios of the
Nu son taro 111 network of Radio Republic Indonesia ~I)
in Banjarmasin, the capitol of South Kolimonton, on 27
Septerrber. This follows a huge fire which completely
destroyed ~l's central studios in Jakarta two months
ago, on 20 July. (See TAPOL Bulletin No 70, .lily 1985)
Despite calls from various circles including people in
the Army's political party, GOLKAR, the government hos
offered no expJanation for the causes of the Jakarta ~I
fire. The latest incident reinforces the impression that
disside1n t groups may be directing their efforts at one of
the regime's most powerful means of propaganda.
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TAPOL Bulletin No. 71, September 1985