Geopolitical Futures
Keeping the future in focus
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Letter from Genoa
March 7, 2017 The new administration in Washington has some questioning the U.S.’ place in
the world.
By Jacob L. Shapiro
This past weekend I spoke at a conference hosted by Limes, an influential Italian magazine
focused on geopolitics. The topic on everyone’s mind was what U.S. President Donald Trump’s
new administration means for the future of the world. I was asked whether Trump’s election
portends the end of the “American century.” My answer was simple: The “American century”
began in 1991, and it is premature to be sounding the death knell for the U.S.’ position as global
hegemon just because some people wish Trump weren’t president.
Three factors explain why the U.S.’ global position is not in danger. First, American economic
and military power should not be underestimated because of a presidential election. The
election was divisive, but it doesn’t belong in the same category as major domestic political
crises like the Civil War, the Great Depression and the stagnation of the 1970s – although the
U.S. emerged from all these events stronger than anyone at the time foresaw. Second, one
should pay more attention to what Trump does than to what he says. Third, there are no serious
challengers to the U.S.’ dominant global position on the horizon.
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U.S. President Donald Trump speaks to members of the National Governors Association and his administration before a meeting
in the State Dining Room of the White House on Feb. 27, 2017 in Washington. BRENDAN SMIALOWSKI/AFP/Getty Images
The president of the Moscow-based Council on Foreign and Defense Policy was the only
presenter at the conference to offer a meaningful, if flawed, argument suggesting that U.S.
hegemony is at risk. He declared victory for Russia in Syria because Russia prevented regime
change in Damascus. He also declared victory for Russia in Ukraine. He suggested that Russia
and China had a strong relationship and that a troika of the world’s major powers – the U.S.,
Russia and China – should stop competing and instead start cooperating to bring peace and
prosperity to the world.
There are several problems with this view. Russia has not won anything in Syria besides a
chance to get bogged down in a Middle Eastern war of limited strategic significance. Russia
annexed Crimea out of weakness, not out of strength – Ukraine’s breakaway from the Russian
sphere of influence under President Vladimir Putin’s watch was and remains a disaster for
Russia. Russia and China are not and will not become allies. And in terms of military and
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economic might, Russia is not in the same league as the U.S. and China. Its military is limited,
and its GDP in 2015 was slightly less than the state of New York’s.
A Chinese professor who also spoke at the conference agreed with Geopolitical Futures’ forecast
about the U.S.’ long-term position as the global hegemon. He based this, however, on the notion
that China does not want to become like the United States and, therefore, will not challenge the
U.S. position in the world. But this view is flawed. China’s weakness – rather than a cultural
aversion to the acquisition of power – precludes it from challenging the U.S. Domestically, China
is attempting an unprecedented economic transformation, and even if it is successful in the long
run (and GPF is doubtful it can be), such a transition would take decades. Militarily, China does
not even have the strongest navy in its own backyard – everyone forgets about Japan.
One of the themes that ran throughout the conference was the ambiguity of Germany’s strategic
position in all of this. On one hand, Germany is under pressure to increase defense spending and
pull its weight in NATO. On the other, if Germany did increase defense spending, many in Europe
would have a heart attack. Germany’s position in terms of Russia and the Mediterranean is
sometimes unclear. One speaker did make a point of saying that perhaps the world should begin
learning to speak German – to which an audible, collective groan wafted up from the audience.
The notion that Russia, China and the U.S. are equals that should participate in a global stability
troika was entertaining, but it did have a kernel of truth in it. Europe’s fragmentation, which
George Friedman has been writing about for years, is no longer a forecast: It is today’s reality,
and even in danger of becoming passé. Germany has gone from center of gravity to wild card.
France is dreaming of becoming more powerful than the Germans, demonstrating that dreams
don’t have a statute of limitations. Eastern Europe is chomping at the bit of Western European
hypocrisy, and the Balkans is a powder keg. Europe does not solve problems, it collects them:
Greece’s debt crisis, war in Ukraine, the migration crisis, non-performing loans in Italy,
uncertainty in German banks. These are all regular features in the news cycle, but the only
common thread between them is that they are never resolved.
The sum of these perspectives ends where this piece began. The U.S. faces no comparable rival
on the global stage. Eurasia is destabilizing at multiple points. The U.S. may be on the edge of a
domestic crisis revolving around the struggles of the middle class, but this does not mean the
United States’ overwhelming relative power in the world will diminish. Furthermore, and perhaps
most significantly, the rest of the world – even the U.S.’ most serious competitors – recognizes
the United States’ dominance. Trump’s unique behavior has caused many to question whether
his presidency will significantly change the course of U.S. power, but the analytical answers to
all the doubts Trump’s tweets raise will always be more boring than Trump’s persona. At the
geopolitical level, not much has changed besides tone, and tone does not win wars or upend the
status quo.
What has changed is that Eurasia no longer sees America as a benevolent superpower or as a
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well-intentioned yet bumbling global hegemon. The word used to describe the U.S. over and
over here in Genoa was “empire.” An Italian professor who spoke after me (without any irony)
compared Trump to Constantine the Great, the emperor who made Christianity the official
religion of the Roman Empire in the 4th century. No one batted an eyelash at the comparison. It
would have been jarring for many Americans to hear their country called an empire and their
president an emperor. The U.S., after all, was founded in a revolution against an empire.
Trump is no Constantine, and the republic is not in danger of becoming an autocracy. But the
U.S. is an empire. The U.S. has been disabused of the notion that the national interest and moral
preference are synonymous. As a result, the U.S. has lost the will and capability to charge
headlong into every battle no matter how tenuous the strategic significance. This, however,
does not signify the decline of American power. It is its maturation. This maturation began
before Trump came to power and will continue long after his time in office is up.
Trump, The Presidency and Policymaking
The popular understanding of the role of the president in forming policy
can be misleading. Understanding the process – and the limitations of the
president – is important in mapping out the future of US foreign policy.
Learn more about the real constraints of the US president. Download the
free report from the link below.
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