Governmental response to the use of political violence by terrorist
organisations: A comparative case study of the Omagh bomb and the
July 7th London bombings1
Jessie Blackbourn
Terrorism is difficult to define; many authors have tried to conclusively define the term
by producing lists of the motivational aspects of terrorism and possible terrorist actions.
The purpose of this paper is to assess the response of the British government to acts of
terrorism within the United Kingdom (UK), so it is pertinent to use the definition of
terrorism as given in the Terrorism Act 2000.
In this Act „terrorism‟ means the use or threat of an action where an action involves serious
violence against a person; serious damage to a property; endangers a persons life, other than that
of the person committing the action; creates a serious risk to the health or safety of the public, or a
section of the public; or is designed seriously to interfere with or seriously to disrupt an electronic
system. Where the use or threat is designed to influence the government or to intimidate the public
or a section of the public, and the use or threat is made for the purpose of advancing a political,
religious or ideological cause. The use or threat of action which involves the use of firearms or
explosives is terrorism whether or not the use or threat is designed to influence the government or
to intimidate the public or a section of the public 2.
The terrorist attacks on the United States of America on 11th September 2001 changed the
way terrorism is analysed. There is an acceptance that since the attack „everything has
changed‟, for example John Lewis Gaddis contends that “From the moment they did
1
This paper was presented as part of the ‘Perspectives on Power’ Conference run by Quest and
sponsored by the AHRC. This article is from Issue 4 of Quest which contains the proceedings of the
conference. It, and the other papers presented at the conference can be downloaded from
http://www.qub.ac.uk/sites/QUEST/JournalIssues/
2
Accessed at: http://www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/acts2000/00011--b.htm#1.
happen, everyone acknowledged that everything had changed”3. Adrian Guelke,
however, tries to address this proposition. He argues that the attacks have been
misunderstood, “what made 9/11 a turning point in world affairs was not the intrinsic
significance of the day‟s events themselves, but the use made of them to launch a new
phase of Western foreign policy by the governments of the United States and the United
Kingdom”4. Phil Scraton reiterates this view; “September 11 was portrayed as the day
that „changed history‟. After these events „life would never be the same‟… To represent
more broadly those fateful moments or hours as „world changing‟ masked the realities of
international relations and the powerful interests that underpin them”5.
This paper will work from the premise that September 11th did not fundamentally alter
the world, but that the effect of the attacks was to create a domestic situation in which the
government could enact repressive anti-terrorism legislation.
There are instances of unclaimed terrorist attacks, September 11th amongst them,
however it is more productive for most terrorist organisations to claim responsibility for
their acts as the aim of terrorism is to put the public in fear to achieve a political,
religious or ideological goal by influencing the government. The government can respond
to terrorist attacks when it knows the aims of the organisation. How the government
responds to terrorist attacks demonstrates the true power of terrorism. To examine this
3
John Lewis Gaddis, „And Now This – Lessons from the Old Era for the New One‟, in Strobe
Talbott and Nayan Chanda eds, The Age of Terror: America and the World after September 11, Oxford:
Perseus Press, 2001, p. 3.
4
Adrian Guelke, Terrorism and Global Disorder – Political Violence in the Contemporary World,
London and New York: IB Taurus, 2006, pp. 1-2.
5
Phil Scraton eds, Beyond September 11: An Anthology of Dissent, London and Stirling, Virginia:
Pluto Press, 2002, pp. x-xi.
more closely the case studies of the Omagh bomb of 15th August 1998 and the London
bombings of 7th July 2005 will be used. The Omagh and London bombs are useful case
studies as they span the divide over which September 11th sits. Government policy can
therefore be examined in a pre and post September 11th context to determine whether
there has been a shift in policy decisions based on a different threat of terrorism. The
Omagh bomb occurred in a period of increasing peace in Northern Ireland6, whereas the
London bombings came at a time of heightened national security and an increased threat
of international terrorism following September 11th, the Afghanistan invasion and the war
in Iraq. The government‟s response to these two terrorist incidents will demonstrate how
different policies are formed for international and domestic terrorism.
In the immediate aftermath of a terrorist attack, politicians tend to make general
statements of condemnation of the acts and attempt to articulate the terrorist aims and
state that they will not achieve them. The government can then create legislation in line
with the general will of other politicians and the public. The response to the Omagh bomb
and the London bombings produced similar reactions by politicians. Opposition Members
of Parliament (MPs) pledged their unwavering support to any legislation the government
wished to implement to combat the efforts of terrorists, and the government vowed to
bring the terrorists to justice so that democracy would be upheld. The statements by
politicians following the Omagh bomb and the London bombings fall into four main
categories of: condemnation of the incident; an outlining of the aims of the terrorists; an
6
For example, see David McKittrick et al, Lost Lives, Edinburgh and London: Mainstream
Publishing, 2001, pp. 1494-1511 for a comprehensive set of statistics on the number of deaths caused by
paramilitary violence in Northern Ireland.
avowal the terrorists will not succeed; and the government‟s response through legislation
to the incident.
In the House of Commons on 2nd September 1998, UK Prime Minister Tony Blair
condemned the perpetrators of the Omagh bomb by stating, “The whole House will want
to join me in expressing our disgust, outrage and total condemnation of those who were
responsible”7. Following the London bombings Tony Blair said in the Commons on 11th
July 2005 that, “The whole House, I know, will want to state our feelings strongly. We
express our revulsion at this murderous carnage of the innocent”8. Tony Blair and other
politicians expressed their condemnation in relation to both attacks in similar ways; this
shows a collective response to terrorism by politicians.
Although the two attacks were by terrorist groups with different aims and motivations,
the general response of politicians was to claim that the terrorists would not succeed and
that democracy would be upheld. Many politicians claimed that the aim of the Omagh
bombers was to disrupt the peace process. On 18th August 1998 Tony Blair stated that,
“The purpose of the renegades is clear: to wreck the process we have started, to stop the
Good Friday agreement, to portray Sinn Féin as traitors to the cause and to provoke a
reaction of such despair that we give up”9. Then leader of the opposition, William Hague
also made this claim: “They are prepared to do anything to prevent the people of
Northern Ireland from living in peace, in the hope that they can achieve through violence
7
8
9
HC Deb Vol 317 c693 2nd September 1998.
HC Deb Vol 436 c565 11th July 2005.
http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/events/peace/docs/tb18898.htm.
what they know they cannot achieve through democratic persuasion”10. John Hume
reiterated the view, “The objective of the people who did that was to derail the agreement
that had been endorsed so overwhelmingly, not by this House alone, but by the people,
north and south” 11.
The cause of the Omagh bombers was clear and stated, whereas the motivations behind
the perpetrators of the London bombings were not immediately known. This difference
manifested itself in the statements made about the respective aims of these terrorists.
Statements about the motivations of the London bombers were vague and concerned with
attacking a British way of life, rather than with a particular outcome. There were also
parallels drawn to a wider global movement of Islamic terrorism; and the images and
events of September 11th were used as a way to tie Britain more firmly into line with the
US, so that the 7th July London bombings were invoked as Britain‟s “9/11”. Speaking
about the London bombs at Gleneagles, Tony Blair stated that “It is important that those
engaged in terrorism realise that our determination to defend our values and our way of
life is greater than their determination to cause death and destruction to innocent people
in a desire to impose extremism on the world”12. Many politicians echoed Tony Blair‟s
sentiments that day. Shadow Home Secretary David Davis on the 7th July 2005 said,
“This is an attack not just on our capital city, but on our country and our way of life as a
whole… Now is not the time to allow the terrorists to disrupt our lives in any way” 13.
10
11
12
13
HC Deb Vol 317 c696 2nd September 1998.
HC Deb Vol 317 c703 2nd September 1998.
http://www.number-10.gov.uk/output/Page7853.asp.
HC Deb Vol 436 c465-466 7th July 2005.
Then leader of the opposition Michael Howard also responded in a similar way in the
Commons debates on the 11th July 2005, “Although those who perpetrated last
Thursday‟s outrage may think that they have succeeded in their aims, they failed to
achieve what they would have wanted most… They failed to undermine the institutions,
the democracy and the values of which we are all so justly proud” 14.
In both cases, the Omagh bomb and the 7th July London bombings, Tony Blair called for
the perpetrators to be brought to justice, and hinted that the government would introduce
new legislation. Speaking on the introduction of forthcoming terrorism legislation in the
Commons on 2nd September 1998, Blair stated that,
Both we and the Government of the Republic propose to strengthen our anti-terrorist laws to help
bring to justice those who are still dedicated to violence… I believe that they are a proportionate,
targeted response to deal with small, evil groups of violent men who seek to wreck the hopes for
peace… Our basic aim is to make it easier to achieve convictions for membership of the
organisations concerned15.
The main aim of the legislation was to provide the police with greater powers to facilitate
the conviction of suspected terrorists. On the 11th July 2005 Blair made a similar request
to introduce new legislation which would give any powers to the police that they felt
necessary to aid them in preventing further attacks: “There is then the issue of further
anti-terrorist legislation... It will give us an opportunity, in close consultation with the
police and the agencies, to see whether there are additional powers that they might need
to prevent further attacks”16. There is however no conclusive proof that there were
significant failings within the ordinary criminal law which required extra terrorism
14
15
16
HC Deb Vol 436 c568 11th July 2005.
HC Deb Vol 317 c695 2nd September 1998.
HC Deb Vol 436 c566 11th July 2005.
powers to be enacted, or that the police‟s capacity to catch terrorist suspects was greatly
enhanced by the new powers.
Later in the same discussion, Blair requested support from the whole House for the
legislation that he wished to introduce, “It is important, if we possibly can, that when we
come to look at any future legislation, we try to establish it on the basis of a consensus”17.
Blair is using the prevailing mood to request parliament‟s support of his legislation. It is
common in times of perceived national crisis for the executive to request special powers
to enact legislation, however by the time the Terrorism Bill came to be debated; MPs
were concerned with the provisions set out in the legislation.
The notion of British democracy is a main theme of politicians‟ speeches on terrorism, so
why is legislation which severely limits people‟s civil rights the best course of action
following a terrorist act? Following the Omagh bomb, Tony Blair announced to the
Commons that, “There are few more important challenges to democracy, and therefore to
this House, than terrorism in all its forms. We must fight it vigorously wherever it
appears, while holding fast to our democratic principles and the rule of law”18. He
reiterated this sentiment following the 7th July London bombings by saying, “We are
united in our determination that our country will not be defeated by such terror, but will
defeat it and emerge from this horror with our values, our way of life, our tolerance and
respect for others, undiminished”19.
17
18
19
HC Deb Vol 436 c569 11th July 2005.
HC Deb Vol 317 c696 2nd September 1998.
HC Deb Vol 436 c565 11th July 2005.
There is a great emphasis in both Blair‟s statements on fighting terrorism while
maintaining democratic principles. Many measures were introduced which would be
considered unacceptably restrictive in a time of peace, and yet in a heightened security
situation were passed into law. The two pieces of legislation differ, however, in that
during the 1998 Bill there were requests by some MPs to reintroduce internment, which
the government didn‟t favour, yet during the debates on the 2006 Bill, the Commons
rejected a government proposal to increase the length of time a person could be detained
without charge to ninety days. This poses a challenge to the notion of Britain‟s status as a
liberal democratic state; the more restrictive the legislation becomes, the more justified
become the terrorists complaints that society is being repressed by the government and
the only recourse is to violence.
Following the Omagh bomb parliament passed the Criminal Justice (Terrorism and
Conspiracy) Act 1998. The Act altered the rules of evidence, so that evidence from a
senior police officer is admissible as evidence in the conviction of a person for being a
member of a proscribed organisation. It also allowed for inferences of guilt to be drawn
from a suspects refusal to mention relevant information, to provide that forfeiture orders
could be placed on a person convicted of certain terrorist offences, and to extend previous
legislation on conspiracy to include conspiracy to commit terrorist offences outside the
UK. Whilst the law does provide that neither inference of guilt from silence or the
evidence of a police officer can be used alone to seek a conviction, it does allow for each
one to corroborate the other, so that together they can be used to obtain a conviction..
The Terrorism Act 2006 was passed following the London bombings of 2005. The Act‟s
passage through parliament was not as swift or smooth as the Criminal Justice Act which
took only two days to become law, as many of the provisions were controversial. Most
notably the amending of the Terrorism Act 2000 to include promoting, encouraging or
glorifying terrorism as grounds for proscription, and most controversially by increasing
the maximum period of detention to 28 days. In 1998 there were calls by many different
politicians for powers of internment to be reinstated to terrorism legislation on Northern
Ireland. Internment was officially repealed by the Northern Ireland (Emergency
Provisions) Act 1998. In the Commons debates on 2nd September 1998, William Hague
asked the question: “Does the right hon. Gentleman not agree that it was a mistake last
autumn, as we argued then, to remove from our statute book the reserve power of
internment, a power that is retained in the Irish Republic?”20 Tony Blair replied that, “We
had to make a judgment about internment. We have made it clear that we do not rule
anything out for ever”21. David Trimble also voiced concerns about the lack of a
provision for internment in Northern Ireland: “It would be gravely embarrassing if the
Irish Government were prepared to intern but found that they could not do so because
there were no parallel measures in the United Kingdom, allowing members of the Real
IRA to flee to a safe haven in the United Kingdom”22. Tony Blair again responded that,
“My judgment was simply that this is not the right moment”23.
20
21
22
23
HC Deb Vol 317 c697 2nd September 1998.
HC Deb Vol 317 c697 2nd September 1998.
HC Deb Vol 317 c707 2nd September 1998.
HC Deb Vol 317 c708 2nd September 1998.
What then can explain the government‟s fundamental shift in attitude to detention
between 1998 and 2005? In 1998 Northern Ireland had just entered a peace process and
terrorism had been on a downwards trend. Whilst the Omagh bomb was the worst
individual incident of terrorism in Northern Ireland, it can be seen as the tailing off of a
period of terrorism in Northern Irish history. In 2005, however, the potential threat of
political violence from international sources was increasing and potentially infinite.
If, as David Whittaker claims, “Power is intrinsically at the root of political violence”24,
what power did the terrorists demonstrate in the bombing of Omagh and London?
The Real IRA aimed to derail the peace process, but Adrian Guelke argues that in fact the
opposite occurred, “Whatever the intentions of the perpetrators of the Omagh outrage, its
initial political effect was to advance rather than retard the peace process in Northern
Ireland. In particular, the strength of the public backlash against the bombers forced the
Real IRA to declare a ceasefire”25. The incident also led to the first instance of
condemnation by Gerry Adams of an act of republican violence: “My position on what
happened in Omagh on 15th August is quite categoric. I have condemned it without
equivocation. This appalling act was carried out by those opposed to the peace process…
24
David J. Whittaker, Terrorists and Terrorism in the Contemporary World, London and New York:
Routledge, Taylor and Francis Group, 2004, p. 2.
25
Adrian Guelke, Terrorism and Global Disorder – Political Violence in the Contemporary World,
London and New York: IB Taurus, 2006, p. 103.
Sinn Féin believe the violence we have seen must be for all of us now a thing of the past,
over, done with and gone”26.
If the Real IRA failed in its objective, then did the London bombers succeed in theirs?
According to Tony Blair, “Together, we will ensure that though terrorists can kill, they
will never destroy the way of life we share and which we value, and which we will
defend with the strength of our belief and conviction so that it is us and not to the
terrorists, that victory will belong”27. It needs to be questioned whether in fact Britain has
been successful in its fight for democracy and against terrorism this century. With the
enactment of draconian legislation that seriously restricts human rights and infringes on
civil liberties, the government has ensured that the liberal democratic state has been
constrained to the point where it is doubtful that Britain has maintained its democratic
principles.
Bibliography
Official Publications
Criminal Justice (Terrorism and Conspiracy) Act 1998.
House of Commons Hansard.
Terrorism Act 2000.
Terrorism Act 2006.
Websites
http://www.opsi.gov.uk.
26
27
http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/events/peace/docs/ga1998.htm.
http://www.number-10.gov.uk/output/Page7903.asp.
http://cain.ulst.ac.uk.
http://www.number10.gov.uk.
Secondary Sources
Gaddis, J.L. „And Now This – Lessons from the Old Era for the New One‟, in Talbott, S.
and Chanda, N. eds, The Age of Terror: America and the World after September 11,
Oxford: Perseus Press, 2001.
Guelke, A. Terrorism and Global Disorder – Political Violence in the Contemporary
World, London and New York: IB Taurus, 2006.
McKittrick, D. et al, Lost Lives, Edinburgh and London: Mainstream Publishing, 2001.
Scraton, P. eds, Beyond September 11: An Anthology of Dissent, London and Stirling,
Virginia: Pluto Press, 2002.
Whittaker, D.J. Terrorists and Terrorism in the Contemporary World, London and
New York: Routledge, Taylor and Francis Group, 2004.