Article
State Decay and Civil War: A
Discourse on Power in Sierra Leone
Critical Sociology
37(2) 199­–216
© The Author(s) 2011
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DOI: 10.1177/0896920510379438
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Abu Bakarr Bah
Northern Illinois University, USA
Abstract
Building upon the works of Karl Marx, Max Weber, Alexis de Tocqueville and Michel Foucault,
this article develops a concept of power that bridges the structure-agency, control-benefit
and macro-micro divides in sociology. Using Sierra Leone as a case study, the article identifies
three forms of power that are manifested in political, economic, and everyday life situations.
It traces political and economic power to the struggles for control over the government and
the economic exploitation of the state by the elite. It argues that the forms of political and
economic power that emerged in Sierra Leone led to state decay, which created conditions
for the civil war. Furthermore, it examines the micro manifestation of power by combatants
and ordinary people during the civil war. The article contributes to the theoretical discourse
on power in sociology by bringing in an African political experience, which is often missing in
sociological theory. Keywords
Africa, civil war, corruption, forms of power, sociological theory, Sierra Leone
Introduction
The conundrums of decision making, resource control, and exerting influence over the conduct of
individuals have featured prominently in sociological discourses. These are the issues of power the
founding fathers of sociology dealt with in their works. Power has been viewed in terms of the
configuration of the state and the relations among individuals and groups. In his critique of capitalism, Karl Marx examined the economic foundation of power. Max Weber discussed power in terms
of stratification and domination. In the works of Alexis de Tocqueville, we see a discourse on
power that centered on the relation between the state and its citizens. These discourses of power
were largely informed by the economic, social, and political realities of Europeans during the
18th and 19th centuries. Most recently, Michel Foucault has addressed the microphysics of power
and its implications for everyday life.
These rich theoretical discourses of power are insightful for understanding some of the political
problems that have been facing the world, such as the civil war in Sierra Leone. This article
Corresponding author:
Abu Bakarr Bah, Department of Sociology, Northern Illinois University, DeKalb, IL 60115, USA.
Email: [email protected]
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addresses the power-related questions in the civil war: what forms of power developed in Sierra
Leone? Who exercised power? What are the effects of power on the country? How did ordinary
people experience the effects of power? To answer these questions, I engage in a critical discourse
on power that is rooted in the works of Marx, Weber, Tocqueville, and Foucault. Taken together,
these theorists provide a rich sociological discourse on power that goes beyond the European
realities that they examined. In a similar way, Abner Cohen (1981) used classical sociological
theory to study power in Sierra Leone. However, Cohen focused on the culture of the political
elite as manifested among the Creoles. While this article also deals with power and infuses
classical sociological theory with African political reality, its substance is different from Cohen’s
study. Instead of looking at the normative and symbolic aspects of elite power and its cultural
reproduction, this article examines the actions of the elite, which led to state decay and created
conditions for the civil war, and the way power was manifested by combatants during the war.
Though the actions may be conditioned by the elite culture, the focus is on the political and personal motives of the elite and the national implications of their actions. The goal of this article is
to provide a multifaceted discourse on power that can shed light on the causes and nature of
the war in Sierra Leone. By using the works of the above mentioned theorists to discuss the
war, the article expands their discourses of power and brings African political realities into the
discourse of sociological theory.
State Decay and the Civil War
The notion of state decay is critical for understanding the nature of power and the war in Sierra
Leone. There were significant political and economic problems prior to the war that raise serious
questions about the efficacy of the state and the legitimacy of the government. Robert Bates
(1981: 3) raised the question as to ‘Why should reasonable men adopt public policies that have
harmful consequences for the societies they govern?’ African regimes have been typically
described as patrimonial, neopatrimonial and sultanist, which invoke Weber’s notion of traditional
authority. These categories have been weaved into the concept of personal rule, which depicts the
prevalence of patronage politics and its negative political and economic effects. African states
weakened by colonialism, international dependency and enclave production not only fail to promote
economic and social development, but too often become oppressive and unstable (Bates, 2008;
Leonard and Straus, 2003).
Robert Rotberg (2004) identified three problematic types of states in the developing world,
namely: collapsed, failed, and weak states. Sierra Leone was classified as a failed state. Rotberg’s
definition of failure centers on the state’s inability to provide basic security, political freedom, and
social services. In his study of constitutionalism and democracy in the former Soviet republics,
Stephen Holmes (1999) used the notion of state decay to examine the crumbling of the system of
power and the emergence of a modern version of the state of nature. While the concept of failed
state depicts the deplorable realities of Sierra Leone during the war, state decay points to the deterioration of the state’s capacity to deliver positive political goods during the years leading to the
war. State decay was manifested in economic decline, corruption, dilapidation of state institutions
and infrastructure, and breakdown of the rule of law.
State decay led to severe economic and political problems. In 1990, for example, Sierra Leone
ranked last on the Human Development Index with a value of 0.048 (UNDP, 1991). As economic
conditions worsened, so did political instability. There were civil unrest, demonstrations, and an
underground youth opposition movement against the All People’s Congress (APC) government
(Abdullah, 1998). Faced with mounting domestic and international pressures, the government
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promised political reforms. In the midst of the democratization charade, the civil war erupted in
March 1991. The critical questions are: what led to state decay? What are the consequences of state
decay? Studies of African states tend to either prioritize the historical and structural causes of state
decay or the effects of state decay on ethnicity and violence (Bates, 2008; Leonard and Straus,
2003). This study addresses both sides by tracing state decay to the form of political and economic
power that emerged in Sierra Leone and examining how state decay created conditions for the civil
war which unleashed a brutal form of power upon the masses.
What is Power?
Power has often been viewed in terms of the struggle to exercise control and gain benefits in
situations that are mediated by structure and agency. Dennis Wrong (1995: 21) sees power as ‘the
capacity to produce intended and foreseen effects on others.’ Power takes multiple forms, such as
force, manipulation, persuasion, and authority. Working largely within a macro framework of state
formation, Gianfranco Poggi (2001: 14) views power as the ability to ‘lay routine, enforceable
boundaries upon the activities of other human subjects … in so far as that ability rests on the former
subjects’ control over resources.’ He identified three main forms of social power: political,
ideological/normative, and economic.1 C. Wright Mills (1956) understands power as control
over political, economic, and military institutions, which allows the power elite to make public
decisions and differentiate themselves from the masses. In contrast, Richard Emerson (1962)
focuses on the relation of dependency among actors in micro settings. Individuals gain benefits and
exercise control by manipulating the dependency relation. Power, especially at the micro level,
tends to gravitate toward equilibrium. Pierre Bourdieu (1977, 1984) sees power as social and
cultural capital, which actors use to navigate economic and social spaces. While his notions of
symbolic power and habitus are sensitive to structure, Bourdieu pays significant attention to
agency. Patricia Collins (1990) also tried to transcend the structure-agency dichotomy in her
discourse on power. Her notion of matrix of domination points to ways in which structure, agency,
and emotions inform the way African American women experience and resist race, gender, and
class oppressions. Instead of reducing power to zero-sum choices: structure or agency, exercising
control or gaining benefits, and macro or micro level analysis, I take a multifaceted approach to
power that pulls all of these dimensions together.
Marx provides a concept of power that does not only deal with structure and the pursuit of
wealth, but also recognizes agency and social control in human relations. Marx’s concept of power
is rooted in his notion of species being, which sees human beings as creative. Creativity is manifested in the labor process through which we objectify ourselves. However, this creative power is
constantly subverted by oppressive modes of production. In the process, human beings become
exploiters or victims of exploitation; and very often both (Marx, 1964a). Powerlessness, which the
majority of people experience, is a direct result of property relations. Property relations, especially
under capitalism, lead to exploitation of the masses and deprive them of the material means to
realize their full potential as human beings. This exploitation is inherently tied to the ‘restless
never-ending process of profit-making’ and ‘boundless greed after riches’ (Marx, 1978: 334). Karl
Marx and Friedrich Engels (1978) further argue that exploitation is fermented through ideology.
By controlling the means of mental production, the ruling class masks its interest as the general
good of the masses and controls the state. This exploitative power relation intensifies the class
struggle between the haves and have-nots.
Weber’s concept of power revolves around two critical issues: access to resources and control
over action. As he points out in his study of stratification, power emerges out of the differential
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access to economic and social resources. Though power is visible in class and status situations,
Weber’s main focus is on the state and politics, which embody the most profound exercise of
power. The exercise of power in the modern state is most vivid in plebiscitary democracy and the
bureaucratic apparatus. Power is ‘the chance of a man or of a number of men to realize their own
will in a communal action even against the resistance of others who are participating in the action’
(Weber, 1946: 180). It is predicated on the system of legitimacy, which facilitates compliance.
He identified three bases of legitimacy (legal authority, charismatic authority, and traditional
authority), which underscore the importance of structure, culture, and agency in Weber’s discourse
on power.
Tocqueville’s concept of power centers on the relation of control between the state and its citizens. This relation is not only rooted in the political structure, but also influenced by agency. Two
principles inform his notion of power: equality and liberty. Power is essentially the ability of the
state to encroach on the liberties of its people. Conversely, powerlessness is the inability of citizens
to resist (De Tocqueville, 1899). Tocqueville is concerned with two forms of power: state power
and people power. State power is exercised by those in control of the state. In contrast, people
power lies in civil society. While being critical of state power, he is at ease with people power. For
Tocqueville, state power has a perpetual tendency toward despotism which must be averted. The
way to ensure liberty is to boost the people’s ability to resist the powers of the state by promoting
a culture of grassroots civic participation. Under ideal conditions, the state must be counterbalanced by an equally strong civil society.
Michel Foucault (1977, 1980) presents a microscopic notion of power that revolves around
agency and formal mechanisms of control. His primary focus is on the way individuals experience
power in heterogeneous and localized social settings. Power is exercised by using exceptional
discipline or technologies of domination which produce docile bodies. He sees the exercise of
power in the form of a net-like organization that cannot be monopolized. Rather, each individual
has the potential to intermittently exercise power and be subjected to power, albeit unevenly. As
Foucault (1980: 98) states, power ‘is never localized here or there, never in anybody’s hands, never
appropriated as a commodity or piece of wealth.’ Foucault asserts the omnipresent nature of power,
but does not see power as omnipotent. Power is constantly resisted through a variety of means and
at multiple social locations. This unsettled nature of power raises an intriguing question about the
ability of those that are perceived to be powerless to adjust, evade, and resist power.
The foregoing discourse shows that power entails both the exercise of control and struggle to
gain benefits in situations that are mediated by structure and agency. Depending on the social setting,
the emphasis can be on control, benefits, structure, or agency. However, power cannot be reduced
to just one of these dimensions without undermining its meaning. As such, I view power in a
broader sense that encompasses all four dimensions. Such a broad view of power is critical for
understanding the factors that led to the war in Sierra Leone and the ways individuals experienced
it. Weber’s notion of power as the ability to impose one’s will upon others is a critical beginning.
Following Marx, Tocqueville and Foucault, however, it must be hastily added that such action is
geared toward exerting political, social and psychological control and securing economic and
social benefits. Furthermore, the outcome of such action is mediated by structural conditions and
the abilities that actors bring to bear on the situation. Thus, power is the struggle to exercise control
and gain economic and social benefits in situations that are mediated by structure and agency. Such
struggles are manifested in political, economic, and everyday life situations that reflect the multifaceted nature of power.
Power is inherently tied to political struggles. As Weber and Tocqueville point out, power is
embedded in the state. The state exerts political power over its citizens through its control of the
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means of violence and economic resources and claim to legitimacy. Of critical importance are the
political process for gaining control of the state, basis of legitimacy, and bureaucratic apparatus for
effective control of day-to-day affairs. Marx saw the state as an extension of class relations, which
empower the elite and promote conflicts. At the center of the conflicts are the elite who are constantly vying for power.
Power is also manifested in economic relations. While Marx’s work is a critique of capitalist
societies, he sheds light on the economic foundation of power, exploitative tendencies in human
relations, and the social boundary between the victim and victimizer which are so pervasive in
countries such as Sierra Leone. Though Sierra Leone is on the periphery of the world capitalist
system, its economic relations raise questions about the same moral imperatives of fairness, equity,
and honest work that Marx underscores in his discourse on power in capitalist societies. In both
Marx and Weber, economic power is geared toward the accumulation of wealth and stratification
of individuals into a class and status system that privilege the elite at the expense of the masses.
Power is also visible in everyday life situations where individuals experience and exercise
power in micro settings. Such experiences may be the result of structural arrangements or the direct
actions of other individuals. There are three critical attributes of the micro manifestation of power.
First, power emerges in the everyday world that is taken for granted. Second, power directly affects
the human consciousness. Third, power is exercised on a temporal and situational basis. As
Foucault points out, power is part of everyday experiences affecting not only the body, but also
the sense of self. Though the manifestation of power in the everyday world is often unproblematic,
its cumulative impact on the perception of power relations is significant. Micro manifestations
of power are insightful for understanding the build up of political and social grievances and the
difficulties of postwar reconciliation.
Manifestations of Power and the Civil War
In Sierra Leone, power is manifested in political, economic, and everyday life situations. It is
derived from the political and economic structures and abilities of strategically situated individuals to manipulate the social and political environment to their advantage. Too often, power is used
to accumulate wealth and violate the right of citizens and exercised in ways that are destructive to
national development. Naturally, the conditions of state decay that characterized Sierra Leone
raise questions about the link between the political and economic manifestations of power and the
civil war.
Struggle for Political Power and the Emergence of Dictatorship
The civil war has its roots in the struggle for political power which undermined democracy in
Sierra Leone. Politics has been plagued by ethnic favoritism, corruption, and political patronage.
Though these problems can be attributed to the legacies of colonialism, it is equally true that the
elite exploited the problems to promote their narrow political ambitions. The cumulative effects of
these problems are the erosion of the rule of law, disintegration of the electoral system, and emergence of military and one-party dictatorships which created the conditions for war.
Since Sierra Leone gained independence from British rule in 1961, its politics has been controlled by the Sierra Leone Peoples Party (SLPP) and the APC which are dominated by the three
biggest ethnic groups (i.e. Mende, Temne, and Limba). The SLPP was formed in 1951 by members
of the ruling families from various ethnic groups in the hinterland to counter the political dominance
of the Creoles. Internal power struggle within the SLPP led to the formation of the APC in 1960.
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Gradually, the SLPP was reduced to a Mende-dominated party, while the Temnes and Limbas
dominated the APC. After bitter struggles between the APC and SLPP, president Siaka Stevens and
his ruling APC exploited the political instability to introduce one-party rule. The SLPP was revived
in the early 1990s during the campaign to restore democracy. It regained power after the 1996
elections, but lost to the APC led by Ernest Koroma during the 2007 elections. The contest between
the SLPP and APC has been effectively reduced to an ethnic power struggle between the Mendes
who are the majority in the south and east and the Temnes and Limbas who dominate the north
(Kandeh, 1992). Smaller ethnic groups, such as Kissi, Creole, Fula, Loko, and Soso, have been
marginalized and people of non-black African descent denied full citizenship. Ethnic politics
has been manifested in nearly all elections, especially during the 1967 and 2007 elections. It
has created political instability and contributed to the entrenchment of patronage politics and the
emergence of one-party and military dictatorships.
Patronage has been a key feature of political power in Sierra Leone. Though politics cannot be
devoid of the problems associated with resource distribution, the manner in which resources are
distributed affects the way power is perceived. Political patronage centers on the president and a
tiny clique of confidants, mostly from the president’s ethnic group or region. Stevens transformed
the state into an APC political apparatus, which he tightly controlled. President Joseph Saidu
Momoh’s government was run by the ‘Ekutay’ group (Kpundeh, 1994). They used state resources
to maintain their stay in office. Practically, the ruling elite saw the state as a means of gaining
wealth and distributing personal favors (Reno, 1995). Political patronage undermines transparency
in government and blurs the critical boundary between public and private action. This culture of
political patronage makes state officials comfortable in treating state resources as their private
property and perpetuates corruption and nepotism. By the time the war broke out, the system of
political patronage had rendered state institutions dysfunctional. The state as a whole was in decay.
One-party rule, adopted by the APC government in 1978, had significant implications for the
power struggle. It was introduced on the pretext of promoting national unity and economic development. However, the practice of one-party rule proved to be disastrous. The APC’s grip on power
foreclosed any meaningful political opposition to government action and made it easy for politicians to engage in corruption. Instead of reducing ethnic and regional animosity, one-party rule
intensified it. From its inception, one-party rule was viewed as a calculated move by the ruling
APC to eliminate the SLPP and marginalize southerners. One-party rule also perpetuated a political culture that revolved around patronage. The APC was tightly controlled by Stevens and his
handpicked successor, Momoh. Under one-party rule, the APC mismanaged the economy and
stifled political dissent. One-party rule undermined the efficiency and legitimacy of the government.
Viewed from the lens of Tocqueville’s discourse on power, one-party rule was a gross empowerment of the state at the expense of the people.
The struggle for political power has also been exacerbated by the intervention of the military in
politics. Military intervention first began with the 21 March 1967 coup, led by Brigadier David
Lansana, which triggered a series of counter coups by officers belonging to different ethnic groups.
The coup was to preempt the handover of power from the SLPP to APC following the bitterly contested March 1967 elections. Two days later, Lansana was overthrown by a group of officers who
formed the National Reformation Council (NRC) headed by Andrew Juxon-Smith. On 18 April
1968, the NRC was overthrown by non-commissioned officers, known as the Anti-Corruption
Revolutionary Movement (ACRM) headed by John Amadu Bangura. The ACRM immediately
restored civilian rule by installing the APC leader, Stevens, as prime minister (Fisher, 1969). The
APC kept the military out of power for more than two decades by co-opting senior officers, arresting
officers suspected of political ambitions, executing accused coup plotters, and building a loyal
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paramilitary force. In 1992, however, the military overthrew the APC and formed the National
Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC) led by Captain Valentine Strasser. It reluctantly handed power
to a civilian government following the 1996 multiparty elections. A year later, in collaboration with
the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), it overthrew the elected SLPP government of president
Ahmad Tejan Kabbah, and formed the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) led by Major
Johnny Paul Koroma. The international community refused to recognize the junta. In 1998, the
AFRC was deposed by the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group
(ECOMOG) backed by Civil Defense Forces (CDF), commonly known as Kamajors, and mercenaries supporting the exiled government of Kabbah. Military involvement in politics unwisely interrupted the democratic process and intensified dictatorship. Despite its messianic claims, the military
has proved incapable of ending ethnicity, patronage, and corruption in politics. Military governments were equally corrupt, brutal, and plagued by ethnic animosities. This is most evident in the
series of coups that took place in the late 1960s and the failures of the NPRC and AFRC. As Strasser
himself acknowledged to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), ‘The army should be in
the barracks and stay out of politics’ (TRC, 2004, Appendix 3, Part Three: 259).
The RUF rebellion could be seen as an anticipated outcome of the state decay that resulted from
the form of political power manifested in Sierra Leone. By taking up arms against the APC government, Foday Sankoh and other disgruntled Sierra Leoneans sought to reclaim their political rights
and end the economic exploitation of the state. They promised the masses freedom and prosperity.
As Mohamed Augustine Brima confessed, the RUF:
tried to persuade us to join them. The most important thing why they were able to convince us was that
after we have joined them we will get free education, electricity supply, good roads and water supply.
During that time it happened that I have just completed my fifth form [education] and my parents were
poor and they were unable to support me further. (TRC, 2004, Appendix 3, Part Two: 458).
The initial outbreak of the civil war could be seen as a genuine struggle to end economic exploitation and dictatorship. However, as Marx (1964b) points out, revolutionary struggles often get
brutal and further oppress the poor. The rebellion quickly turned into a brutal and exploitative war
camouflaged as a political struggle for democracy and economic progress. The lack of political
vision and honesty in the civil war is most evident in the atrocities committed against civilians and
the greed for power and wealth which fueled the war (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004). The RUF
boycotted the 1996 elections and vigorously exploited diamond resources, while the government
refused to recognize their legitimate grievances and continued to prosecute the war.
Economic Exploitation and State Decay
Prior to the civil war, the political elite exploited the state by embezzling government funds. These
activities effectively ruined the state and led to economic hardship. While economic power is often
derived from market relations, in Sierra Leone economic power has been rooted in access to the
state. The fusion of economic and political power is most evident in the shady relation between
the political and business elite in the mining industry, which led to the emergence of the shadow
state characterized by rampant corruption (Reno, 1995). By the time the war broke out, corruption
had become a primary means of accumulating wealth for the elite and a necessary means of survival for the masses. The endemic corruption has been attributed to socio-cultural and systemic
factors which tolerate wrongdoing. Bankole Thompson and Gary Potter (1997: 141) argue that
corruption is predisposed by a ‘clash between modern culture and traditional culture’ which ‘blurs
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the distinction between the official roles of public officers and their personal interest’. They
attribute corruption to ineffective judicial and law enforcement practices. Other factors which
account for corruption include low salaries, poor professional ethos, ill-defined official duties, lack
of transparency and accountability in the political system, and inadequate political leadership
(Kpundeh, 1999).
Since corruption is rampant in Sierra Leone, it is important to take note of the various kinds of
corruption and their relative effects on state decay. Stephen Riley (1993) identified four forms of
government corruption in Africa, namely: incidental, systematic, systemic, and personal. While all
of these contribute to state decay and violate the law, systemic and personal corruption are the
clearest manifestations of the kind of economic power that led to state decay and the war. These
are not the kinds of corruption that are necessitated by low salaries and the daily struggle to
provide food, clothing and shelter. Rather, they are driven by greed for wealth and by the culture
of political patronage. They often involve embezzlement of huge sums of state funds by the elite.
Though the vast majority of corruption cases have not been properly documented or proven in
court, it is common knowledge that politicians, top civil servants and wealthy business people
frequently embezzle huge sums of government funds (Thompson and Potter, 1997). Common
sense alone calls into question the high standard of living maintained by senior government officials
and the luxury goods they consume, which far exceed the reach of their salaries. This common
knowledge has been buttressed by several high profile embezzlement scandals during the 1980s,
such as ‘vouchergate’, ‘squandergate’ and ‘milliongate’ (Kpundeh, 1999). Several government
investigations shed light on the economic exploitation of the state by individuals who are wellpositioned within the political system and bureaucratic apparatus. Some of these investigations
include the Foster Commission established by Stevens, the Tucker Commission set up by Momoh,
the Beccles-Davies, Marcus-Jones and Nylander commissions of inquiry formed by Strasser,
and the audit conducted by the presidential transition team of Koroma. While government investigations tend to be marred by political witch-hunt, populist rhetoric and superficiality, these investigations shed light on the economic exploitation of the state. In particular, the reports of the
Beccles-Davies and the Marcus-Jones commissions have emerged as a reputable documentation of
high-level corruption.
The Beccles-Davies Commission found presidents Stevens and Momoh and several top government officials guilty of embezzlement. Stevens was prime minister from April 1968 to April 1971
and continued in office as president until November 1985. Momoh succeeded Stevens and served
as president until April 1992. The commission found that their personal emoluments could not
have been enough to secure the assets that they accumulated. Stevens’s official earnings during
his entire tenure in office amounted to 271,975 leones, yet he owned numerous properties worth
millions of leones.2 His Kabassa Lodge alone was estimated to have cost 3.3 million leones at the
time of completion in the early 1980s. Momoh owned numerous properties worth millions of
leones, 23 vehicles, bank accounts with millions of leones, foreign bank accounts, and other investments worth millions of leones which far exceeded his official salary. Similarly, several ministers,
the head of the armed forces, and inspector general of police were found guilty of accumulating
assets that far exceeded their official earnings. The commission ordered the confiscation of their
properties and imposed fines on them (Sierra Leone Government, 1993a). The Marcus-Jones
Commission also found several government officials and businesspersons guilty of corruption and
embezzlement. They were ordered to refund several millions of leones and some of their properties
were confiscated (Sierra Leone Government, 1993b).
Despite the bitter lessons of the war, corruption has persisted. According to a World Bank
survey (1996–2006), Sierra Leone ranks among the most corrupt countries and is one of those
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doing the least to control corruption. In 1996, its percentile ranking for control of corruption was
around 1 percent. Between 1998 and 2002, its ranking fluctuated between 17 and 27 percent.
Since 2002, its ranking has dropped to around 6 percent in 2006 (Kaufmann et al., 2007). The
Anti-Corruption Commission (2001, 2002, 2003) has exposed several cases of corruption under
the SLPP government. In its 2001 report, the commission documented 58 cases of misappropriation
of government funds or property and 13 cases of donor funds in various ministries. In 2002, it
investigated 79 cases, some of which involved the State House, National Development Bank, and
the military. Most of the cases involved the customs and excise department; 43 cases were either
in court or with the office of the Attorney General. In 2003, the commission had 37 cases involving
misappropriation of government funds or property and 18 cases involving donor funds across
various departments such as education, income tax, and energy. Though the number of cases went
down, corruption did not necessarily decline. As the commission acknowledged in its 2003 report,
it does not have enough resources to deal fully with the huge caseloads. The commission itself is
not free of corruption. One of the cases it investigated involved the commission itself.
Several businessmen have been implicated or found guilty of corruption and embezzlement of
government funds. Jamil Mohamed, who was a close associate of Stevens, fled Sierra Leone in the
midst of strong allegations of fraudulent activities and inappropriate meddling in government
affairs (Reno, 1995). The Tucker Commission discovered a scheme involving officials at the
Ministry of Education and business people who fraudulently received government grants on the
pretext that they were proprietors of independent schools (Kpundeh, 1995). The Marcus-Jones
Commission found Mahmoud Kadi, a prominent businessman, guilty of embezzling government
funds through fraudulent contract activities (Sierra Leone Government, 1993b).
The cumulative effect of corruption which characterizes economic power in Sierra Leone is
state decay. Corruption destroyed the formal economy, ruined national institutions, undermined the
rule of law, and drained the state of vital resources. To be sure, corruption and state decay feed
off one another. While corruption contributes to state decay, the crumbling of state institutions
provides a favorable environment for corruption. However, one needs to focus on the effects of
corruption on state decay in order to better understand the political and social grievances that led
to the civil war. By the time the war broke out, Sierra Leone was one of the poorest countries in
the world with high mortality rates, widespread unemployment, low literacy rate, and poor infrastructure. Under such conditions, the state did not only lose the ability to provide positive political
outcomes. It also lost legitimacy and became more oppressive.
War and Everyday Experiences of Power and Powerlessness
The civil war lasted from March 1991 to January 2002. It was started by the RUF and combatants
belonging to the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL), collectively referred to as ‘rebels’.
The RUF, led by Foday Sankoh, was formed by Sierra Leoneans trained in Libya and supported by
Charles Taylor (Abdullah, 1998; Gberie, 2005).3 Its declared goal was to overthrow the APC
government and implement a revolutionary change to promote economic development. After the
military overthrew the APC government, the RUF continued to fight the NPRC military government and the elected SLPP government that succeeded it. Initially, the Armed Forces of the
Republic of Sierra Leone (AFRSL), supported by Nigerian and Guinean troops, mercenaries, and
the United Liberation Movement of Liberia (ULIMO) fought the rebels on behalf of the government.4 The government also allied itself with the CDF created by local communities to defend
themselves against the rebels and renegade soldiers of the AFRSL. As the war evolved, a significant fraction of the AFRSL connived with the RUF and formed the AFRC/RUF alliance that
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overthrew the SLPP government of Kabbah. The exiled government of Kabbah, supported by
ECOMOG, CDF and mercenaries, fought the RUF and the AFRC. Shortly after the signing of the
July 1999 Lome Peace Agreement, the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) was
established to implement the agreement. UNAMSIL deployed around 17,500 military personnel to
accomplish its mandate. It encountered difficulties with the RUF and AFRC, while generally supporting the government of Kabbah.
The civil war represents the cumulative effects of the destructive political and economic power
manifested in Sierra Leone and a brutal exercise of power by combatants over civilians. As the
state lost control over law and order, combatants gained more power to control the lives of
ordinary people and inflict punishment. There are victims and perpetrators in the war. The victims
are civilians whose liberties and dignity were violated. The TRC (2004, Appendix 1: 9–22) has
documented 40,242 counts of violations committed against 14,995 people during the war. The
violations include forced displacement, abduction, arbitrary detention, killing, destruction of
property, torture, rape, sexual slavery, amputation, cannibalism, and drugging. At the height of the
war in 1999, nearly half a million Sierra Leoneans were refugees (UNHCR, 2003, Statistical
Annex I: Table A.6). The perpetrators of these gruesome acts are combatants belonging to various
armed factions. According to the TRC (2004, Appendix 1: 23), 59.2 percent of the documented
violations are attributed to the RUF, 9.8 percent to the AFRC, 6.7 percent to the Sierra Leone army
(i.e. AFRSL), 5.9 percent to the CDF, and 0.7 percent to ECOMOG.
One of the dilemmas of the war is delineating between victim and victimizer. Too often, this
distinction is blurred. There are people who became victims and perpetrators during the course of
the war. These are individuals, especially orphans, abducted by combatants and eventually conscripted into their ranks. As Ansu Koroma recalled:
All of us were lined up again and asked whether we were interested in joining the ‘movement’. Anyone
who was not interested in the movement was asked to indicate so by putting up his/her right hand. Two
people put up their hands. Their throats were cut off. Our leader took the remainder of us to the training
base. (TRC, 2004, Appendix 3, Part Two: 1010).
Once conscripted, they become perpetrators. Ansu Koroma stayed in the RUF and eventually
became a military police commander. As Master Rokono also told the TRC (2004, Appendix 3,
Part Two: 113):
Before the war broke out in our part of the country, I was in class one in a school in Mattru. We were on
holidays in a village around Mattru when the rebels attacked us. The rebels killed some people and they
abducted us. They asked us to join them and, wherever they went, they took us along with them … They
trained us and gave us guns; they punished me a lot. We would attack places, kill people and take some of
the people away. We also took creatures away during such attacks.
The brutality of the war instilled widespread fear among civilians. As Aminata Sampa Bangura
recounted, ‘I had never seen a rebel before and they captured me. I was so frightened that I urinated
on my pants. The[y] captured me together with 14 others’ (TRC, 2004, Appendix 3, Part Two: 7).
Combatants employed brutal tactics that were aimed at causing fear and displacing people. The
RUF was particularly notorious for these brutal tactics. Power was manifested in the ability to
inflict punishment and violate norms of human decency with impunity. As Father Mario recalled,
‘The rebels enjoyed punishing us. They enjoyed it when you scream and cry. That was a sad
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surprise to me’ (TRC, 2004, Appendix 3, Part Two: 519). Such power was often exercised during
chance encounters between civilians and combatants.
Power and powerlessness are simultaneously manifested in the everyday atrocities that marred
the war. Victims helplessly watched as their loved ones were killed and their own bodies mutilated
by combatants. While hiding in a hole, Pa Santigie Kamara watched rebels kill his five children,
three wives, and brother (TRC, 2004, Appendix 3, Part Two). Fatmata Kamara painfully told the
TRC (2004, Appendix 3, Part One: 95): ‘The rebels ... beheaded my sister and took us to Seven Up
garage. They killed two of my friends. At that time I was a virgin, I have done nothing wrong, they
have killed my sister, my mother and father.’ Fatmata stated further, ‘After amputating my friend’s
hand, he called one of his boys and he raped me, they said they were still not satisfied, they tied us
and chopped off our feet.’ Salifu Kanu also recalled how the Kamajors amputated his fingers and
the arm of an elderly woman. (TRC, 2004, Appendix 3, Part Two). Too often, the powerless victims
were at the mercy of the combatants. James Morseray confessed to burying a pregnant woman
alive (TRC, 2004, Appendix 3, Part Two). Master Patrick Bangura told the TRC (2004, Appendix 3,
Part Two: 749):
I was with my boss Morris Kallon. We came across an old man with his three children and they ordered
me to cut off the old man’s hand and I did; as I had been drugged. Later they gave another command to cut
off the woman’s leg as they were said to be collaborating with the Kamajors.
Civilians often found themselves powerless when attacked by armed combatants. Their only
recourse was to abandon their homes and run into the bush or relatively safer towns. Those that
were caught had no option but to obey the commands of their captors. Captives were often scared
to escape because they had been seen with their captors, forcefully tattooed, or intimidated by the
brutal killing of others who tried to escape. As Foucault (1977: 200) rightly notes, ‘Visibility is a
trap.’ Fatmata Jalloh was abducted in Kabala in 1998 at the age of 13 and taken to Freetown. She
told the TRC (2004, Appendix 3, Part Two: 481), ‘Initially when we arrived, I had wanted to run
away. But I was afraid because some civilians had seen me with these people. Because of that I
could not run away.’ Mustapha Musa, an abductee who became a rebel, testified, ‘If an escapee was
caught his or her forehead was branded with the RUF symbol. Red-hot iron was used … If the red
hot iron was not available, they use new razors … That was [why] I decided to stay’ (TRC, 2004,
Appendix 3, Part Two: 1014).
Despite the apparent dichotomy between power and powerless, there are many instances where
power is resisted by the powerless and the powerful become powerless. As Foucault points out,
power is not omnipotent. Victims managed to overcome the fear that was instilled in them and
confront their victimizers. Sahr Meh-Meh Nicol endured a lot of abuse from rebels, but eventually
found the courage to fight for his life. Rebels burnt his house, which they occupied for days, and
abducted him. He ran from the rebels, but was caught by another group of rebels who tried to
amputate his hands. After the rebels refused his plea for mercy, he decided to put up a fight. He
escaped with a wound (TRC, 2004, Appendix 3, Part One). Ibrahim fought off six rebels who
attacked him and his friends. He told the rebels that he would die bravely, rather than comply with
their orders. After the rebels shot one of his friends, he snatched the gun and knocked four of the
rebels to the ground. He fled just before another group of rebels approached him (TRC, 2004,
Appendix 3, Part One). Lady Dikpama and her father confronted a group of rebels who wanted to
kill her husband and abduct her daughter. She demanded to know why her husband and daughter
were arrested and tried to reason with the rebels. She bravely confronted the rebels, even after they
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killed her husband (TRC, 2004, Appendix 3, Part Two). Hawa Sheriff and her daughter were shot
during the rebel attack on Koidu. She used a razor blade to operate on her own foot and her daughter’s head to remove the bullets (TRC, 2004, Appendix 3, Part Two).
Despite their powers, combatants too faced situations of powerlessness. Their own colleagues
and enemy forces abused them. In some cases, they suffered emotional breakdown. Master
Bowanag, an RUF child soldier, recalled his painful treatment by the RUF and the Kamajors. He
was arrested by the Kamajors after escaping from the RUF (TRC, 2004, Appendix 3, Part Two).
Mohamed Augustine Brima was an administrator within the RUF security department. He painfully watched the RUF execute his own brother, who was a member of the Kamajors (TRC, 2004,
Appendix 3, Part Two). Abdulai Sesay, a powerful RUF combatant, suffered emotional breakdown
during a mission. He told the TRC (2004, Appendix 3, Part Two: 553): ‘As we went ahead I
remembered about my late mother and I was distressed. I was crying as I advanced. I told my boys
not to call me Col. any longer.’ Another RUF combatant, James Morseray, told the TRC (2004,
Appendix 3, Part Two: 277):
The day I entered DDR [program] I was so happy. I compared the two lives I had lived and I observed that
being a rebel was not a good one. The Indians [i.e. UN peacekeepers] usually left us to walk around. I saw
my uncle and I cried. I was so surprised to see him. I thought he was dead. I asked for my mother and he
told me that my father and mother were dead. I asked him about my family members. Since we separated,
I don’t know where they had been.
Contextualizing State Power: Middleman Minorities,
Traditional Rulers, and International Actors
Up to this point, I have viewed the manifestation of power in Sierra Leone largely as a struggle for
political power and economic exploitation of the state by the political elite and the RUF. While the
manifestations of power in political, economic, and everyday life situations illustrate the nature of
state power, it is also important to note three critical layers of power that interact with the state.
These are the middleman minority ethnic groups, institution of traditional rule (i.e. chieftaincy),
and international institutions. Though fundamentally different, these three layers of power provide
complementary environments for contextualizing the sources and manifestation of political and
economic power in Sierra Leone.
The nature of economic power in Sierra Leone raises intriguing questions about the influence
and status of middleman minority ethnic groups, most notably Creole, Lebanese and Fula.5 These
three groups have successfully positioned themselves as middleman minorities and acquired
significant economic power (Bonacich, 1973). During the colonial and immediate postcolonial
period, Creoles were the most dominant black Africans in the civil service and formal economy.
However, their position has drastically declined in both of these sectors as other ethnic groups have
settled in Freetown. The Lebanese have been heavily involved in the import-export business and
procurement of government contracts, which made them well-connected with the political elite.
Fulas dominate the informal economy, especially cattle and retail trade, but until recently maintained minimal economic relations with the government. They have now entered the import-export
business and filled the vacuum left by Lebanese businessmen who fled the country during the war
(Jalloh, 1999). All three groups became important economic brokers by acting as middleman
minorities between ordinary Sierra Leoneans and state-controlled resources on the one hand and
the import-export world economy on the other hand.
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These three ethnic groups are politically marginalized partly due to their relatively small
numbers and late settlement in the country. Creoles lost their dominant positions in politics and
the civil service as the SLPP and APC gained power. Until recently, Fulas mostly kept aloof from
politics. Fulas consist of indigenous Sierra Leonean Fulas and Fula immigrants from Guinea and
other West African countries. However, the generous citizenship laws toward people of black
African descent, especially at the time of independence in 1961, have made it easy for these two
groups of Fula to integrate. Their growing numbers, coupled with their wealth and investment in
western education, has enabled Fulas to increase their political participation. In contrast, the
Lebanese are politically excluded because the laws deny citizenship (jus sanguinis or jus soli) to
people who are not of ‘Negro African descent’. Such people can only become citizens by naturalization, which disqualifies them from holding government offices (Sierra Leone, 1973). The
Lebanese, who have lived in Sierra Leone since the colonial era, fall into this politically excluded
non-black African category. The only exceptions are Molatos, who have mixed black African and
non-black ancestry. The denial of full citizenship to non-black Africans was conditioned by the
racialized British colonial rule which denied black Africans citizenship and placed them at the
bottom of the political, economic and social hierarchy. This ugly legacy of racial gradation has
metamorphosed into a postcolonial racial inequality that blemishes democracy. As Tocqueville
rightly argues, democracy must be based on the principles of equality and liberty. Sierra Leone
recently amended its citizenship laws to recognize dual citizenship. However, the amendment
retained the ‘Negro African descent’ criterion for citizenship based on birth or descent (Sierra
Leone, 2006).
The economic and political statuses of these three ethnic groups not only demonstrate how
minorities carve out a niche for themselves in the ethnic power struggle but also how they infiltrate the state and counterbalance the powers of the dominant ethnic groups. As Foucault points
out, power cannot be monopolized. Though Creoles lost their political power, they have held
significant offices in military governments and Freetown city government. Furthermore, they
have adjusted to the ethnic proliferation in Freetown and contours of ethnic politics. In recent
years, Fulas too have managed to hold significant government offices and actively participate
in national politics. They not only use their economic resources to promote their political interests, but also amicably live among other ethnic groups in virtually all parts of the country and
work with the political elite with dexterity. While the Lebanese have not made direct gains in
politics, they have used their wealth to exert influence over the political elite and maintain a
cozy relation with them as evident in the extensive ties between Jamil Mohamed and the APC
regime. A significant development for Sierra Leonean Lebanese is the appointment of John
Saad, who is a Molato, as minister of housing and infrastructural development in the current
APC government.
The second layer is the institution of traditional rule which predates the modern state in Sierra
Leone. Though the specific form of traditional rule varies from one ethnic group to another, they
share the key features of what Weber termed traditional authority. Prior to colonial rule, traditional rule was the core political, military, and cultural institution among the various ethnic groups
that lived in present-day Sierra Leone (Fyfe, 1962). Chiefs (i.e. traditional rulers) were co-opted
into the British colonial administration through the indirect rule system (Mamdani, 1996).
Gradually, traditional rule was relegated to a form of local government that on the one hand
became an instrument of pacification and exploitation and on the other hand a vehicle for resistance against colonialism. After independence, traditional rule survived as a form of local government, a custodian of culture, and molder of ethnic identity.
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Though the local government powers of the institution of traditional rule are subject to the
control of the national government, the institution retains its position as the foundation of ethnic
cultural identity and the most important source of legitimacy among the rural masses. This cultural
role and deep-rooted legitimacy make traditional rule an important factor in the discourse of
power in Sierra Leone. Politicians quickly realized that chiefs are vital political assets that could
serve as liaisons between them and the rural masses and give the government a cover of legitimacy.
This led to a complex dependency relation between politicians and chiefs. Politicians depended on
chiefs for political support, while chiefs depended on politicians for economic favors. As Reno
(1995) points out, in the diamond rich Kono district, for example, Siaka Stevens exploited the
institution of traditional rule for both political and economic gains. Chiefs soon became an integral
part of the system of political patronage, albeit as junior partners.
Chiefs often find themselves in awkward situations of giving cover of legitimacy to regimes that
are corrupt and oppressive against their people. As Marx feared, they inadvertently provide politicians with the means to exert mental control over the masses. In fairness, many chiefs resist.
However, like the colonial regime, successive postcolonial governments find ways to co-opt chiefs
by giving them money and other favors and manipulating ethnic sentiments. When soft tactics fail,
they interfere in the process of selecting chiefs and impose their preferred candidates on the people
(Fanthorpe, 2005). Despite the pacification of chiefs, they remain critical liaisons between the
political elite in charge of the state and the rural masses. Chiefs seize opportunities to switch
allegiances during elections, extract resources from politicians, and even expose the government’s
lack of legitimacy by withdrawing support, albeit temporarily.
During the civil war, chiefs, especially in the South, played a critical role in lending legitimacy
to the SLPP government and resisting the rebels and renegade soldiers. The Kamajors, built around
the institution of traditional rule, became a critical military force that defended the rural masses and
a vital political and cultural movement that filled the vacuum left by the exiled government. As the
country is rebuilding, chiefs are reverting to their prewar role as cultural power brokers that are
vulnerable to manipulation by politicians.
The other important factor in the discourse of state power in Sierra Leone is the role of international institutions and western governments. Like most African countries, Sierra Leone has been
dependent on western governments and financial institutions for economic assistance (Delacroix
and Ragin, 1981; Fearon, 1988). Since the end of colonial rule, the state has been receiving various
forms of economic assistance which reinforce its dependency. This financial support has huge
implications for state power. In many ways, international economic assistance has empowered the
government by providing it with vital resources. Too often, the resources are misused through
political patronage and corruption.
The end of the Cold War and the rise of neoliberal economic policies during the 1980s led to a
serious rethinking of western support to developing countries. In response to domestic and international pressures, western governments and financial institutions introduced stringent rules for
countries seeking financial assistance. They demanded democratic reforms and austerity measures
(Bratton and Van de Walle, 1997; Wiseman, 1996). The policies of the international financial institutions and western governments led to severe economic crisis in Sierra Leone which effectively
undermined the power of the state. The government lost vital resources that partially sustained the
system of political patronage and corruption. At the same time, the worsening economic conditions
led to popular demands for multiparty democracy. As the international community pressured the
government, so did the citizens feel empowered to demand accountability from the political elite.
These political and economic developments opened a window for political reforms, which could
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have shifted power from the one-party state to the people. Unfortunately, the exercise was manipulated by the political elite, who were determined to stay in power at all costs.
Conclusion
The article engages in a simultaneous analysis of the causes of the civil war in Sierra Leone and a
discourse on power with the aim of bringing African political reality into sociological theory. The
war raises questions about the political, economic, and social conditions in Sierra Leone. The central
question in this article deals with the link between political and economic power and the civil war.
To understand this connection, the article examines the struggles for political power and the economic exploitation of the state. It points to the ways in which ethnic politics and corruption led to
forms of political and economic power that undermined the efficacy of the state and the legitimacy
of the government. The critical lesson for Sierra Leone is to understand the inherent risks of instability associated with dictatorship, which breeds corruption and ethnic political animosity. By deviating from democracy, Sierra Leone fell into the thorny path of dictatorship. While democracy may
not necessarily guarantee a smooth road to peace and prosperity, dictatorships are prone to abuse
power and create conditions of state decay. As I argue, the war is born out of the conditions of state
decay that characterized the country. The challenges are how to consolidate the democratic process
that came out of the war, deal with corruption, and address the economic problems of the country.
The article identifies three major ways in which power is manifested in Sierra Leone. Power is
manifested in political, economic, and everyday life situations. While these categories do not necessarily exhaust the variety of ways in which power is manifested, they transcend the common
dichotomies in the discourses of power and provide useful ways of looking at power in African
countries. Power is a multifaceted social reality, which has been difficult to conceptualize. This
article engages in a discourse on power not necessarily to refute other ways of conceptualizing
power. Rather, it bridges the three most common divides in the studies of power: structure-agency,
control-benefits, and macro-micro level analysis. As I argue, power is derived from social structures and exercised by actors in ways that are geared toward exerting control and gaining economic
and social benefits. By examining the causes of the civil war and the lived experiences of ordinary
people during the war, the article makes a connection between the macro discourse of power at the
level of the state and the micro manifestations of power in the daily lives of people.
Too often, sociological theory has been driven by western political, economic, and social
experiences. This article deliberately invokes the works of the founding fathers of sociology in
order to connect African political realities with some of the core works in sociological theory. By
so doing, the article demonstrates the relevance of sociological theory for contemporary African
societies and how African political realities enrich sociological theory. For example, the article
underscores the issue of corruption, which is often missing in western discourse on power.
Furthermore, it shows a brutal manifestation of power during the civil war that is unimaginable
in western democracies. As sociology moves forward, it must not only conduct research across
different parts of the world, but it must also reflexively broaden the experiences that shape the
discourses in sociological theory.
Acknowledgements
I thank Northern Illinois University for supporting this study through its summer research and artistry
grants, the West African Research Association for its generous support, and the anonymous reviewers for
their insightful comments and suggestions on previous drafts of this article.
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Notes
1 Poggi also took note of military power.
2 The leone (Le) was introduced in 1964 and pegged to the British pound at a rate of Le2 = £1 (in December
1967, Le1 = US$1.20). In November 1978, the Leone was pegged to the SDR of the International
Monetary Fund. Its value has sharply declined. For example, Le1 = US$0.81 (1982), Le1 = US$ 0.21
(1985), Le499 = US$1 (1992), Le2092 = US$1 (2000), and Le2908 = US$1 (September 2005). See
Riddell (1985) and IMF’s International Financial Statistics Yearbook volumes: 43(2) (February 1990),
51(2) (February 1998), and 58(12) (December 2005).
3 Charles Taylor was the leader of the NPFL rebel movement and the president of Liberia from 1997 to
2003. He is currently standing trial for war crimes at the Special Court for Sierra Leone (The Hague).
4 ULIMO was a rebel movement in Liberia fighting against the NPFL.
5 Officially, Sierra Leone has 16 indigenous ethnic groups. The Lebanese are included in this count.
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