Asia-Pacific Journal of Advanced Research in Music, Arts, Culture and Literature
Vol. 1, No. 1 (2016), pp. 49-54
http://dx.doi.org/10.21742/ajmacl.2016.1.1.08
Understanding “Jihad” as defined and mis-defined by Muslims
James Pattison1, Hakkyong Kim2, Sungyong Lee3, Youngsik Kim4
1,3
Dept. of Police Administration, Keimyung University, 1095 Dalgubeol-daero,
Dalseo-gu, Daegu, Korea
2
Dept. of Convergence Security, Sungshin Women’s University, 2, Bomun-Ro 34DaGil, Seongbuk-Gu, Seoul, Korea
4
Dept. of Police Administration, Seowon University, 377-3 Musimseoro, Heungdeokgu, Cheongju, Korea
1
[email protected], [email protected], [email protected],
4
[email protected]
Abstract
Not all Muslims are terrorists. In fact, relatively few are. Discerning from where the real
threat comes carries the best hope for addressing and thwarting future terrorist activity.
Islam may be divided among the Shiites and the Sunnis. Sunnis comprise about 90% of
Muslims, and the threat of Islamic terrorism confronting the world most recently is from
among these. But the threat is not from all Sunnis, just a very conservative few called Salafis.
And not all Salafis are threats as these are divided between Purists, Politicos and Jihadis. All
Salafists may intellectually rationalize terror-like activities in their home countries under
precise circumstances, but the Jihadis, a small group within the Salafis are responsible for
most organized terror activities as against nations outside of Arab-related countries. To
characterize these as religious extremists, though, over-simplifies the problem through poor
definition of “religion” insofar as Salafists’ actions are as often “defensive” in their own
minds, and are either politically, economically, or socially minded actions. Islam, like most
“religions” is a social and life structure and can be best understood sociologically. Herein
lies the point of correctly discerning the meaning of “Jihad,” as well as its misuse and abuse
by those that would use the concept to justify terrorist action.
Keywords: Terrorism, Salafi, Religious Extremism, Jihad
1. Introduction
Currently terrorism seems to emanate from Islam. In fact, all people are capable of
horrendous “terrorist” acts given the right combinations of ideas, motivations,
encouragement and support in the furtherance of heartfelt beliefs. It is strong belief in
something, the implications of which are that the only alternative remaining to t he
believer is violent action that lies behind terrorism. Terrorism may be a “normal”
extension of socially acceptable ways of thinking both at the individual or social level.
Our task is to understand something about the heart of the social system or subs ystem
which drives people to act in a manner we call “terrorist,” discerning along the way
what “normal” is for that system.
ISSN: xxxx-xxxx AJMACL
Copyright ⓒ 2016 GV School Publication
Asia-Pacific Journal of Advanced Research in Music, Arts, Culture and Literature
Vol. 1, No. 1 (2016)
2. Paths to Radicalization
No sociological bonding theory offers a complete explanation for terrorism [1].
Randy Borum, however, offers a macro-theory that provides some useful application.
Borum talks about internal and external controls upon individuals that allow
terrorists to overcome the natural human inhibitions to using extreme violent action
against other humans called outside-in and inside-out processes [2] for group terrorists.
“Outside-in” (group effects) are: 1) diffusion of responsibility, 2) de-individuation,
3) unquestioning obedience to apparent authority, and 4) social identity found in being
an active participant in the designs of the terrorist organization [2].
“Inside-out” (cognitive readjustment) involves: 1) moral justification, 2) sanitizing
language that neutralizes the humanity of intended victims, 3) diffusion or placement or
responsibility on others, 4) disregarding or minimizing the injurious effects of one‟s
actions, 5) attribution of blame to victims, and 6) dehumanization of victims [2][3].
Individuals move from passive to violently aggressive (radicalization) through
inside-out cognitive readjustment, while group terrorists also particularly experience
the combination of outside-in and inside-out.
Moghaddam uses a Staircase Metaphor to explain the process of radicalization,
particularly among organized terrorists, describing the process as becoming more open
the notion of committing terror acts [4].
“Ground Floor” - Individuals perceive psychological injustice of material conditions.
“First Floor” - Individuals experience a lack of social mobility.
“Second Floor” - Individuals displace their aggression.
“Third Floor” - Individuals disengage from the common morality (of society).
“Fourth Floor” - Individuals develop an “Us” vs. “Them” complex.
“Fifth Floor” - Individuals sidestep their natural human instinctive inhibitions [3][4].
All of the elaborations from Borum and Moghaddam may apply to a system or part of
a social system that is susceptible to political, economic, or inter -relational hardship. It
is not specifically Islam that generates terrorism, but secular dynamics.
3. Social Systems May Foster Mentalities Receptive to War
Fertile ground for nurturing terrorists is less a matter of generalizing religions and
more about recognizing the confluence of influences otherwise secular within a social
system that naturally rationalizes extreme reaction to perceived “Injustices.”
The biggest problem with defining “religion” generally as fomenting terrorism is the
labeling of entire people groups that fit within that definition and must suffer the stigma
of association with a few within that broad definition that spoil the reputation of all [5].
American Theologian Martin Marty notes that all components of “religion” are
present in “politics:” it focuses our ultimate concern; builds community, appeals to
myth and symbol; has rites and ceremonies; and makes demands upon adherents‟
behaviors [5]. In short, all of these components are of the nature of living in society.
The point is not to suggest that there are no “religions” but that followers of belief
systems are rational beings often devoted to the system in which they live without craze
and mindless adherence.
Georgetown University professor Esposito looks at the catalysts or drivers that move
people to violent action from within their social environment. He notes that “religion”
merely legitimates the actions of people that are acting more precisely to address
political, social, or economic perceived inequities. “Grievances,” Esposito says, spur
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Asia-Pacific Journal of Advanced Research in Music, Arts, Culture and Literature
Vol. 1, No. 1 (2016)
people to action [6]. “Religion” provides the rationale for extreme parameters of the
action (prosecution of “war” using unconventional means - one aspect of terrorism) [6].
Rectifying or preventing inequities are only tangentially related to their relation to God
whose name is invoked to justify the action [5].
4. Mujahedin and Global Terrorism
Islamic countries and populations address the social, economic, and political needs of
the country as do the responsible citizenry of every working nation. The Muslims do so,
however, out of a sense of civic duty that is intrinsically bound up with their spiritual
guidance from the Koran which calls them to good and moral lives - Jihad. And the
countries are run according to those cultural mores and laws upon which the people
have agreed (at least theoretically in social contract). To this extent, Muslim countries
and Muslims in general are no different that people of any other country that have
settled upon a social system and set of laws by which to govern themselves, and by
which they will see to the needs of their fellows socially, economically, and politically.
This is true of the citizens although their governments may be authoritarian, repressive,
and unable to sustain vibrant economies to stave off unemployment, inadequate housing,
inequitable distribution of wealth, and their own corruption [6].
There is a small subset of Muslims (probably less than 0.5 percent) that view 1)
“their own governments” and 2) “foreign governments in relation with their own
governments” with a critical eye as to whether they support or detract from Islam [6].
These watch for anti-Muslim policies, foreign entanglements, and non-Muslim laws
within their own sphere to help them identify those that they must oppose in the name
of Islam. These are extremists in their social theory, and they use the concept of
“Jihad,” as a warrant for violent action. But what the extremists define as “Jihad,” is
akin to what Mohamed described as the “lesser Jihad” from which Muslims should turn
toward the “greater Jihad” - a personal struggle to live a moral life [6].
The Koran never directly associates the concept of Jihad with war but with leading a
good moral life, using all exertions to do so. Yet the community-mindedness and social
justice emphasis of Jihad is also related to the idea of self-defense: an obligation to
defend the faith which governs every aspect of the Muslims‟ lives - especially when the
faith is under attack. Essentially, “Jihad” is living a good life seasoned with community
involvement, good works, meeting the needs of the disadvantaged [6]. But when the
Muslim way of life is threatened by an outside or invading force, the defensive element
of the concept springs forth.
Within the extremist camp there is an even smaller minority of Muslims that use
“Jihad” to characterize their violent in-country and international terrorist actions. These
used “Jihad” to raise violent action in the Afghan war to kick the Soviet Union out of
the country. The Mujahedin fought to defend the social system that was consistent with
their understanding of the Koran. And they won. “Jihad” was still a term defined as
defensive of a social system, but with a primarily violent manifestation [6].
Mujahedin fighters in Afghanistan found themselves an armed and capable army
without a cause for which to crusade. A Mujahedin leader, Osama Bin Laden, asked
Saudi Arabia for haven and sponsorship of more terror actions, but Saudi Arabia
declined. So the fighters struck out on their own in the formation of Al-Qaeda [6]. AlQueda took as their cause the will to act when Muslim governments would not.
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This extremist subculture has revised the priorities of daily “Jihad”, making violent
defense of Islam and their Muslim nation against foreign aggression a cornerstone of
their organization (the terrorists would characterize even aggressive or offensive violent
actions as “defensive” using a broad definition of threats to their society much the same
as our countries do when justifying so-called “first-strike,” prophylactic, or covert
operations in other countries to forestall tragedy at home). Relaxing of the rules
regarding war in the Koran, for instance, that innocent civilians may not be killed, nor
may a Muslim commit suicide, reasoning that if innocent civilians are associated with
an oppressive system in any arguably causal way (as is a voting population in a
democracy), then the civilians are no longer innocent for the purposes of Muslim
violent defensive actions, nor is suicide “suicide” in the traditional sense since those
fighters that kill themselves in defense of Islam can be said to be sacrificing themselves
for a greater cause [6].
Furthermore, because of the inherent disproportions between threatening forces
compared to the relatively modest capabilities of the violent sub-group, together with
the Cosmic level empowerment to fight they say they receive from their God, the
extremists justify the use of tactics that belie Just War or even fair violent combat as
envisioned in the Koran [6].
5. Sects within Sunni Islam: Salafism
Islam may be broken down broadly between Shia and Sunni. As terrorism that is
associated with Islam is predominantly Sunni these days, we will focus on the Sunni.
But Sunni is an extremely populous sect of Islam, while it is actually a portion of a
small group within Sunni Islam that is most associated with terrorism. These are Sunnis
that are associated with the Salafi movement [7]. Salafism is not a “movement” in the
sense of a political movement or institution so much as it is an interpretation of Islam
broadly and the Koran specifically. It can trace its roots to before Wahhab, but Wahhab,
a 17 th century Muslim scholar with ties to the ruling family of Saudi Arabia (which at
that time was not yet a country, and the ruling family was a local ruling family known
as the house of Saud) formalized the early thinking of ultra-conservative Islam.
Wahhabiism has come to be known as Salafism. Salafism advocates the return to
practices, appearances, and attitudes of Mohamed‟s day (7 th century). Salafists believe
that the entirety of Islam is contained within the Koran, and it is not up to religious
leaders or believers to further expound upon it. But Salafists are unyielding in their
conservatism so that they tend not to accept as brothers even mainstream Sunnis [7].
Salafis wear 7 th century attire and untrimmed beards, often with no mustache, like
what they believe the prophet Mohamed did [7]. There are no Salafi mosques, per se,
but they mix with the Muslim population anywhere. The three themes that characterize
Salafi are 1) purity in the sources of religion, 2) purity in practice, and 3) purity in
theology [8]. Theological issues of import to Salafis are everything from the nature of
God to free will versus predestination [8]. Common mainstream Sunni Muslim beliefs
that the Salafis believe to be heretical can be the grounds for violent resistance by
Salafist defenders of the pure faith of Islam: so even Muslim regimes may be targets for
Muslim resistance under certain circumstances [7].
Not even all Salafis are alike. There are three identifiable groups among the Salafis:
the purists, politicos, and the jihadis. Of these only the jihadis advocate violent jihad as
non-Muslims have come to believe Jihad is defined. Within even each of these three
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Asia-Pacific Journal of Advanced Research in Music, Arts, Culture and Literature
Vol. 1, No. 1 (2016)
strains there cannot be universal understanding and interpretation of the Koran as every
person‟s interpretation is subjective [7][8].
Saudi Arabia, for its part, continues to generally support the Salafi movement and
funds Salafi schools around the world, centers, and institutions [7].
6. Jihadi Salafists
Salafis can make good citizens, at least, to some extent. Purist and Politico Salafis
believe that if their political leader is Muslim (even if a bad Muslim) the Koran
demands that they submit and not resist the government [7].
However, as soon as the Muslim government ceases, in Salafi estimation, to be true
Muslim, then Salafis can attack them. A common standard for determining whether a
Muslim government is truly Muslim is whether the government is ruling by Sharia Law
or not [7]. As alluded to above, Salafis believe that Jihad war may be waged only be
Muslim states, using their armies in a declared war. And this is where Jihadi Salifists
break from their Salafi brothers, for where no states pursue Jihad war when they should,
the Jihadi Salafis reason that it is acceptable to welcome any group (terrorist
organization) that is willing to take action where no nation will [7].
Osama Bin Laden, the Al Qaeda, and even ISIS fall within the Jihadi Salafi category,
and are out of favor with the other two branches of the Salafi movement. Nevertheless,
as the Jihadi Salafis remain Muslim and arguably devout, the persons within the violent
branch cannot be fully ostracized by the other branches [8].
The poor plight of Muslim people is the driving force behind Jihadi Salifi terrorism:
they seek to change the policies of encroaching nations or drive out the occupying
forces of what they perceive to be the oppressors of Muslim people in Muslim lands [8].
Using ideas from Borum, we can identify the socialization process of organized
terrorists such as the Jihadi Salafis as fostering an extreme victim mentality,
apportioning blame for the victimization of their society to wealthy, successful,
industrialized, and secular nations that dare to have dealings with Muslim nations. This
victim mentality is complete with a righteous indignation that the ills of their society
are imposed upon them, the realization that “It‟s not right,” “It‟s not fair,” and it is
therefore “unjustness.” Assignment of blame follows “It‟s your fault” thinking. And
then characterization or perception of oppressors as aggressors, calling them to arms in
self-defense [2].
7. Conclusion and Implications
Terrorists grow up in societies that confront them daily with poverty, unemployment,
economic and social failure, and political upheaval. It is natural for children i n these
environments to readily accept the perspective of those they respect: family, friends,
and religious leaders among these. Mentors teach the children to be susp icious of nonArab industrialized nations, linking these nations to the failures of their own society.
When non-Arab nations invade the homelands of these children, they see the wisdom of
their elders and agree in their minds that the outside nations are their oppressors, using
them to exploit resources and offering nothing of substance in return.
A meeting of minds with Salafi Jihadists can only come with understanding of the
terrorists‟ home society and/or subgroup, and meeting them on terms they know and
understand from daily life.
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Asia-Pacific Journal of Advanced Research in Music, Arts, Culture and Literature
Vol. 1, No. 1 (2016)
References
[1] R.L. Akers and C.S. Sellers, “Criminological Theories: Introduction, Evaluation, and Application
(6th edition)”, Oxford University Press, New York, (2013).
[2] R. Borum, “Psychology of terrorism”, University of South Florida, Tampa,
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/208552.pdf, (2004).
[3] J. Pattison and H. Kim, “Profiling the „active cadre‟ of terrorist organizations compared to the
„lone wolf terrorists‟”, Asia-pacific proceedings of applied science and engineering for better
human life, Jeju, Korea, August 17-19 (2016).
[4] F.M. Moghaddam, “American Psychologist”, The Staircase to Terrorism: A psychology
exploration, Vol. 60, 2 (2005).
[5] W.T. Cavanaugh, “Harvard Divinity Bulletin”, Does religion cause violence?. 35, 2&3 (2007)
[6] J.L. Esposito, “in the Roots of Terrorism,” Edited L. Richardson, Routledge, New York, pp.145158, (2006).
[7] J. Brown, “Variations within the Salafi Movement”, Lecture Notes, Georgetown University,
Washington DC, (2005)
[8] Q. Wiktorowicz, “Studies in Conflict and Terrorism”, Anatomy of the Salfi Movement, 29, 3
(2006)
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