Personality and Individual Di€erences 27 (1999) 969±984
www.elsevier.com/locate/paid
Constructive thinking: a complex coping variable that
distinctively in¯uences the e€ectiveness of speci®c dicult
goals
Anat Drach-Zahavy a, Anit Somech b,*
a
Faculty of Industrial Engineering and Management, Technion-Israel Institute of Technology, Haifa 32100, Israel
b
Faculty of Education, University of Haifa, Haifa 31905, Israel
Received 26 February 1998; received in revised form 11 September 1998; accepted 12 January 1999
Abstract
The main purpose of the present work was to examine the construct of Constructive Thinking
[Epstein, S., & Meier, P. (1989). Constructive thinking: a broad coping variable with speci®c
components. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 57, 332±350] in the context of task
performance with speci®c dicult goals. Based on former studies we hypothesized that di€erent aspects
of Constructive Thinking would in¯uence task performance and adaptation to change in the nature of
the task distinctively. Moreover, in line with the Goal Setting paradigm, we suggested that good
behavioral and emotional coping (as compared to poor coping) would help subjects to overcome the
inherent diculties of speci®c dicult goals and to bene®t from their motivating advantages. In
contrast, high categorical thinking, superstitious thinking, naive optimism and Negative Thinking would
lead to decrement performance under speci®c dicult goals. To test our hypotheses 155 subjects
engaged in the stocks' prediction task developed by Earley, Connolly, and Eakergen [Earley, P. C.,
Connolly, T., & Eakergen, G. (1989) Goal, strategy development and task performance. Journal of
Applied Psychology, 74, 24±33]. We used a two by two design in which goals and experimental phase (as
repeated factor) conditions were varied to test the hypotheses. In addition, Constructive Thinking was
introduces as a personal disposition. Results supported the hypotheses on categorical thinking,
superstitious thinking, naive optimism and Negative Thinking but not those on behavioral and
emotional coping. These results are discussed in light of the di€erences between these di€erent subscales
and their relevance to Goal Setting theory. # 1999 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved.
Keywords: Constructive thinking; Dicult goals; Coping; Performance; Adaptation to change
* Corresponding author. Tel.: +972-4-824-5767; fax +972-4-826-0211.
E-mail address: [email protected] (A. Somech)
0191-8869/99/$ - see front matter # 1999 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved.
PII: S 0 1 9 1 - 8 8 6 9 ( 9 9 ) 0 0 0 4 1 - 0
970
A. Drach-Zahavy, A. Somech / Personality and Individual Di€erences 27 (1999) 969±984
1. Introduction
The complex dynamic workplace requires the individual to adapt e€ectively to the changing
demands of the environment. Consequently, predicting work performance becomes a challenge
for theoreticians and practitioners. The current study inquired this issue by integrating a
personality explanation, Constructive Thinking (Epstein & Meier, 1989) and a situational
explanation, Goal Setting theory (Locke & Latham, 1990). The purpose of the present study
was to investigate the power of Constructive Thinking in predicting performance under various
goal assignments.
1.1. Constructive Thinking
Constructive Thinking refers to a set of cognitive productive and counterproductive
automatic habitual thoughts that a€ects one's ability to think in a manner that solves problems
(Epstein & Meier, 1989; Katz & Epstein, 1991; Epstein, 1992).
The concept of Constructive Thinking integrates two existing models: the concept of
practical intelligence (Sternberg & Wagner, 1986) and the concepts of irrational thinking of
Ellis (1962).
Like Sternberg's concept of practical intelligence, Constructive Thinking was developed to
address the question of `why smart people act dumb' (Epstein & Meier, 1989). Much research
has pointed out that intelligence, as conventionally measured, is often unrelated to success in
life in general, or to problem-solving in everyday life in particular (e.g. Sternberg & Wagner,
1986; Felsman & Vaillant, 1987; Epstein & Meier, 1989).
The research of Sternberg and Wagner (1986) implied that gaining various types of practical
information concerning self, tasks and social environment is often far more important for
success than intellectual ability as measured by IQ tests. They suggested that a measure of
individuals' tacit knowledge may be a far more powerful predictor of problem-solving and
success.
Epstein (e.g. Epstein & Meier, 1989; Katz & Epstein, 1991; Epstein, 1992) approached the
issue of practical intelligence from a di€erent perspective.
Addressing Ellis's concepts of irrational thinking, he suggested that the way individuals
manage their emotions is a major factor in determining how e€ectively they can use their
intellectual ability (Epstein & Meier, 1989; Katz & Epstein, 1991; Epstein, 1992). Good
constructive thinkers hold a set of habitual adaptive thoughts that help them to control their
feelings and to sustain an action-oriented approach to coping. In contrast, poor constructive
thinkers possess maladaptive automatic thoughts that interfere with the process of emotion
monitoring. Consequently, they engage in ine€ective coping processes through gross
overgeneralizations directed towards the self and others. Hence, Constructive Thinking is a
broad nonintellective cognitive variable that a€ects one's problem-solving ability (Epstein &
Meier, 1989).
Constructive Thinking is usually measured by the CTI (Constructive Thinking Inventory:
Epstein & Meier, 1989). The CTI was developed by sampling the domain of people's selfreported habitual thoughts in everyday life. Factor analysis of items describing these cognitions
revealed the existence of a global coping factor and six more speci®c coping factors Emotional
A. Drach-Zahavy, A. Somech / Personality and Individual Di€erences 27 (1999) 969±984
971
Coping, Behavioral Coping, Categorical Thinking, Superstitious Thinking, Naive Optimism
and Negative Thinking. Good emotional coping emphasizes self-acceptance, absence of
negative overgeneralization, nonsensitivity and absence of dwelling. Behavioral Coping focuses
on positive thinking, action orientation and conscientiousness. Categorical Thinking,
Superstitious Thinking, Naive Optimism and Negative Thinking refer to patterns of cognitive
distortion or irrational thinking which re¯ect the veridicality of a persons interpretations of
reality. (for a detailed description of the scale, its reliability and various discriminate and
convergent validity indexes see Epstein & Meier (1989)).
Since its development in 1989, the construct and measure of Constructive Thinking has
attracted excessive research. Most studies used correlational methods to examine its underlying
components. For example, Hurley (1990) showed that good Emotional and Behavioral Coping
were related to maintaining a sense of self-esteem and self-worth, whereas Categorical
Thinking, Superstitious Thinking, Naive Optimism and Negative Thinking were negatively
related to self-esteem measures. These results indicated that good emotional and behavioral
coping thinkers rated themselves consistently higher than poor thinkers on self-accepting and
other accepting conduct. In another study, Hurley (1991) showed that good Emotional and
Behavioral Coping were related to rational thinking and to the denial of irrational thoughts as
measured by the IDEE scale of Kassinove, Crisci and Tiegerman (1977). In contrast,
Categorical Thinking, Superstitious Thinking, Naive Optimism and Negative Thinking were
negatively related to rational thinking.
Other studies were interested in the relation of Constructive Thinking to overgeneralization.
Results have shown, that the four subscales of Categorical Thinking, Superstitious Thinking,
Naive Optimism and Negative Thinking measure some forms of overgeneralization-rigid ways
of thinking (Categorical Thinking), reliance on superstitious or other forms of magical thinking
(Superstitious Thinking), engagement in grandiose self-enhancement (Naive Optimism) or
excessive use of negative overgeneralization (Negative Thinking) Ð to explain the environment
(Epstein & Meier, 1989). The Epstein (1992) study further supported the notion that poor
constructive thinkers (as measured by the global scale) engaged more than good constructive
thinkers in negative overgeneralization, at least following negative outcomes.
Katz and Epstein (1991) examined the cognitive, emotional and behavioral responses of
good and poor constructive thinkers while performing stressful tasks. Results showed that poor
constructive thinkers judged themselves more harshly, exhibited more negative a€ect and
exhibited during a recovery period an increase in physiological arousal, attributed to the
intrusion of negative self-attributions, as contrasted with a decrease in arousal observed in
good constructive thinkers.
Taken together, these results support the notion that Constructive Thinking, as a cognitive
set of habitual thoughts, in¯uences a range of cognitive, a€ective and behavioral responses.
Nevertheless, the question of whether the di€erences between poor and good constructive
thinkers a€ects performance remains unsolved. There is some evidence that Constructive
Thinking relates to various indices of success in everyday life such as work, marriage and
social relationships (Epstein & Meier, 1989). Moreover, Constructive Thinking is de®ned as an
enhanced ability to solve problems. Yet, Katz and Epstein (1991) could not demonstrate that
good constructive thinkers perform better than poor ones on a simple but stressful task.
The present study addresses this question and examines the distinctive e€ects of Constructive
972
A. Drach-Zahavy, A. Somech / Personality and Individual Di€erences 27 (1999) 969±984
Thinking on task performance. Speci®cally, our aim was to study the joint e€ects of the
personal disposition of Constructive Thinking under the assignment of speci®c dicult goals
on performance. We approach this question by integrating the concept of Constructive
Thinking by Epstein and Meier (1989) and the theoretical model of Goal Setting (Locke &
Latham, 1990).
1.2. Goal setting
Goal Setting theory has established that speci®c challenging goals lead to higher task
performance than speci®c, unchallenging goals, vague goals or no goals (Locke, Shaw, Saari &
Latham, 1981; Tubbs, 1986; Mento, Steel & Karren, 1987; Kanfer, 1990; Locke & Latham,
1990). Speci®c goals refer to goals that are de®ned in quantitative terms, in contrast to more
vague goals, which instruct performers to `do their best'.
Challenging goals refer to dicult goals, that only 30% of performers can attain. Goals can
be assigned by others (e.g. supervisor), self-set by the performer or jointly assigned. According
to the theory, speci®c challenging goals in¯uence performance by directing attention, e€ort and
persistence toward the prescribed role (e.g. Locke et al., 1981; Locke & Latham, 1990) and by
developing appropriate task strategies that promote goal attainment.
Although support for the ecacy of these interventions is consistent, several studies have
recently indicated that as tasks become more complex the typical motivational e€ects of
speci®c dicult goals may not hold or may even become harmful (e.g. Jackson & Zedeck,
1982; Campbell, 1984; Earley, 1985, 1986; Huber, 1985; Wood, Mento & Locke, 1987; Earley,
Connolly & Eakergen, 1989; Earley, Lee & Hanson, 1989b; Kanfer & Ackerman, 1989; Gist,
Stevens & Bavetta, 1991; Drach-Zahavy & Erez, 1997).
Complex tasks di€er from simpler tasks on cognitive intricacy. Complex tasks demand
handling more acts simultaneously, sequencing and coordinating acts and adjusting acts to a
more dynamic environment (Wood, 1986). Dynamic environment imposes additional load on
the performer due to the need to adjust to change. Change situations also lead to psychological
states such as anxiety, ambiguity and resistance to change, that inhibit task performance.
Hence, as tasks become more complex it is not sucient to work `harder' but it is essential
to work `smarter', that is, to use more ¯exible thought, to adapt performance to the changing
environment and to avoid the use of oversimpli®ed work strategies (e.g. Wood, 1986; Earley et
al., 1989a).
Consequently, some authors have recently pointed out the drawbacks of Goal Setting in the
performance of complex tasks. For example, focusing on one set of prescribed aspects of
performance was shown to be not without shortcomings (e.g. Dweck & Legget, 1988; Heyman
& Dweck, 1992). Several studies have demonstrated that the pursuit of speci®c challenging
goals may distract attention from learning the underlying rules that govern performance and
lead to the development of oversimpli®ed inappropriate strategies (Dweck & Legget, 1988;
Earley et al., 1989a; Kanfer & Ackerman, 1989; Senge, 1990; Heyman & Dweck, 1992; DrachZahavy & Erez, 1997). The assignment of speci®c challenging goals may lead to `tunnel vision'
Ð considering the aspects of performance prescribed by the goals alone and ignoring other
rather important aspects of performance. This troublesome phenomenon has long been
recognized by research in problem-solving and decision-making. For example, Janis and Mann
A. Drach-Zahavy, A. Somech / Personality and Individual Di€erences 27 (1999) 969±984
973
(1977) have suggested that narrowing of attention may have fatal consequences on
performance when the task demands a vast consideration of alternative solutions and
innovative problem-solving. Keinan, Friedland and Arad (1991) showed that managers under
stress make poor decisions based on a narrow search of alternatives.
Another major criticism to Goal Setting theory is that as tasks become more dicult,
speci®c challenging goals may create excessive stress. Individuals cope with that threat by
diverting cognitive resources from the task to emotional coping processes such as handling
anxiety and controlling the negative intrusive thoughts that in¯ate them. Because individuals
are limited in resources (e.g. time, energy, attention), the allocation of attention to selfregulation processes at the expense of on-task activities hinders task performance (Kanfer &
Ackerman, 1989; Kanfer, Ackerman, Murtha, Dugdale & Nelson, 1994; Drach-Zahavy & Erez,
1997).
In sum, these results indicate that speci®c dicult goals may contain built-in disadvantages
for the performance of complex tasks such as oversimpli®cation, tunnel vision and excessive
stress. These explanations focused mainly on situational interventions of goals and ignored
individual di€erences in corresponding dispositions. The purpose of the present study is to
examine the joint e€ects of Constructive Thinking and speci®c dicult goals on the
performance of complex tasks. We suggested that Constructive Thinking would help subjects
to overcome the inherent diculties of speci®c dicult goals and to bene®t from their
motivating advantages.
In addition, almost no research has been conducted on adaptation to changes in a dynamic
complex task. In this study we will examine the e€ects of goals and constructive thinking on
adaptation to change.
Consequently, we expected that good constructive thinkers would enhance their performance
and adapt better to changes in the nature of the task under the assignment of speci®c dicult
goals as compared with more vague goals (that instruct subjects to do their best). In contrast,
poor Constructive Thinking would sharpen these problems and hamper performance and
adaptation level. More speci®cally, based on former research our hypotheses are:
1.2.1. The e€ects of constructive thinking
The performance of good constructive thinkers (as measured by the six subscales) will be
higher than the performance of poor behavioral thinkers
1.2.2. The interaction between constructive thinking and goals
For good constructive coping thinkers (as measured by the six subscales), setting dicult
goals would lead to better performance, while for poor behavioral Coping thinkers, setting do
your bestgoals will lead to better e€ects.
1.2.3. The interaction between behavioral coping, goals and change
In the dynamic complex task, introducing change will have negative e€ects on performance
of poor constructive thinkers (as measured by the six subscales) who are assigned speci®c
challenging goals rather than do your best goals. In contrast, change will have a positive e€ect
on the performance of good constructive thinkers (as measured by the six subscales) who are
assigned speci®c challenging goals.
974
A. Drach-Zahavy, A. Somech / Personality and Individual Di€erences 27 (1999) 969±984
2. Method
2.1. Participants
The participants were 155 (76 male and 79 female) undergraduate management students
enrolled in a graduate-level course on organizational behavior. They participated in the study
as part of a classroom exercise.
2.2. Experimental task
In keeping with the complex task literature (e.g. Wood, 1986), we selected a task for which
performance was dependent on adequate coordination among di€erent performance
dimensions and on successful adaptation to changes in the nature of the task, which re¯ects a
dynamic environment.
The task employed in this study was developed and tested in previous studies (for a detailed
description see Earley et al. (1989a)). In essence, the task simulated the work of stockbrokers
and required subjects to predict the stock value of 120 di€erent ®rms, based on business data.
Stock value was determined as a linear function of three information cues: the performance of
each: company's production, marketing and R&D divisions compared with their own targets.
This equation di€ered in each of the two experimental phases as followed: In phase one the
equation which predicted the stock value was: Y1=0.33 X1+0.67 X2+0 X3. A change in the
equation was introduced in phase two: Y2=0.50 X1+0 X2+0.50 X3, where Y1 is the stock
value at stage 1, Y2 the stock value at stage 2, X1 the production division performance, X2 the
marketing division performance and X3 the R&D division performance.
In each trial, participants were presented the business data (in percentages) and they
recorded their predictions (in US$) without prior knowledge of the predicting formula. For
instance, the business data might be: ®rm's name, Dalia; business area, textiles; production
120%; marketing 90%; R&D, 150%.
After each trial the actual market price was read aloud to provide immediate feedback. The
two phase design allowed us to test the adaptation to changes in the prediction equation.
2.3. Design
The study consisted of 22 (goalsexperimental phase) cross factorial design with
experimental phase as the repeated factor. In addition, Constructive Thinking was introduced
as a personal disposition. Goal Setting conditions were speci®c challenging goals and general
goals. The challenging goal consisted of predicting accurate stock price in at least 80 trials.
Pilot testing using the speci®c challenging goal revealed that nearly 30% of the subjects could
achieve this goal. Individuals in the general goal condition were instructed to do their best in
predicting stocks value.
Constructive Thinking level was determined by subjects' response to the CTI (Epstein &
Meier, 1989). The experimental phase consisted of 90 trials of predicting stock value using the
®rst formula and 30 more trials using the second formula.
A. Drach-Zahavy, A. Somech / Personality and Individual Di€erences 27 (1999) 969±984
975
2.4. Measures
Constructive Thinking was measured by the CTI self-report questionnaire developed by
Epstein and Meier (1989). The CTI is a 108-item self-report instrument that was designed to
assess experimental coping de®ned as the automatic thoughts that people experience in
everyday living. The instructions for the CTI ask subjects to rate on a ®ve-point Likert-type
scale the frequency these automatic constructive and destructive thoughts occur in their
everyday life. (e.g. ``When something bad happens to me, I feel that more bad things are likely
to follow'', ``I usually react actively instead of thinking and complaining'').
On the basis of factor analysis of a large item pool representing this domain, six speci®c
subscales were identi®ed: Behavioral Coping, Emotional Coping, Categorical Thinking,
Superstitious Thinking, Naive Optimism and Negative Thinking.
The Emotional and Behavioral coping subscales are keyed so that higher scores indicate
greater constructive thinking whereas the other ®ve subscales are keyed so that higher scores
indicate more maladaptive or destructive thinking.
Cronbach's a reliabilities for the speci®c subscales were: 0.88 for Emotional Coping, 0.81 for
Behavioral Coping, 0.77 for Categorical Thinking, 0.79 for Superstitious Thinking, 0.71 for
Naive Optimism and 0.86 for Negative Thinking.
2.5. Performance
Performance was measured by the mean absolute error Ð the absolute value of the
di€erence between the subject's prediction and the actual stock's price. Hence, high
performance score re¯ects poor performance quality.
2.6. Procedures
Subjects were randomly assigned to one of the goal conditions. After being seated, They
completed the CTI questionnaire. Next the experimenter introduced himself to the trainees as a
researcher interested in decision-making processes and presented an overview of the forecasting
task. The experimenter informed all subjects that although the task was a simulation of a stock
market, they should not necessarily assume that the market would perform according to their
past experiences, so they should approach the forecasting with an open mind. After the short
debrie®ng, subjects were given a 10-trial practice session to familiarize themselves with the task.
On each trial, the experimenter read aloud the experimental data and instructed subjects to
record their prediction on the answering sheet. He then paused for about 7 s before
announcing the actual stock price, which the participants wrote down beside their prediction.
Performance scores in the practice session served as a measure of ability. At this point the
manipulations of the goal conditions were introduced. The experimenter enacted the Goal
Setting manipulation by instructing subjects-orally and in writing to `do your best' or to `meet
the speci®c challenging goal of 80 correct predictions'. The subjects then worked on the
predicting task for approximately one hour. After 90 trials, which constituted the ®rst phase,
subjects were instructed to take a short break but were not told of the change of predicting
formula. A few minutes later subjects completed the remaining 30 trials in the same manner.
976
Emotional Coping
Behavioral Coping
Categorical Thinking
Superstitious Thinking
Naive Optimism
Negative Thinking
Phase I
Do best
Good thinkers
Do best
Poor thinkers
Dicult goals
Good thinkers
Dicult goals
Poor thinkers
M=10.86
S.D.=3.18
M=10.07
S.D.=2.41
M=11.12
S.D.=4.35
M=11.18
S.D.=2.46
M=10.02
S.D.=2.64
M=10.57
S.D.=2.83
M=11.94
S.D.=2.78
M=10.91
S.D.=3.19
M=9.89
S.D.=2.41
M=10.84
S.D.=2.99
M=10.63
S.D.=2.78
M=11.51
S.D.=3.51
M=10.51
S.D.=2.54
M=10.26
S.D.=3.08
M=10.23
S.D.=2.37
M=12.68
S.D.=3.59
M=10.11
S.D.=2.32
M=10.64
S.D.=3.09
M=10.57
S.D.=2.43
M=11.41
S.D.=3.34
M=9.89
S.D.=2.41
M=10.84
S.D.=2.99
M=10.63
S.D.=2.78
M=11.51
S.D.=3.51
Phase II
Do best
Good thinkers
Do best
Poor thinkers
Dicult goals
Good thinkers
Dicult goals
Poor thinkers
M=10.33
S.D.=3.56
10.27
S.D.=3.55
M=8.71
S.D.=3.95
M=12.30
S.D.=4.45
M=10.50
S.D.=2.99
M=10.21
S.D.=3.76
M=10.90
S.D.=3.82
M=11.33
S.D.=4.85
M=10.01
S.D.=3.89
M=10.53
S.D.=3.23
M=8.66
S.D.=3.37
M=10.67
S.D.=3.73
M=10.37
S.D.=3.73
M=10.19
S.D.=3.30
M=8.51
S.D.=3.71
M=15.65
S.D.=4.76
M=10.02
S.D.=3.50
M=10.52
S.D.=3.58
M=8.01
S.D.=4.01
M=12.61
S.D.=4.37
M=10.01
S.D.=3.89
M=10.53
S.D.=3.23
M=8.66
S.D.=3.37
M=10.67
S.D.=3.73
a
High performance scores mean low quality performance.
A. Drach-Zahavy, A. Somech / Personality and Individual Di€erences 27 (1999) 969±984
Table 1
Performancea: means and S.D.s by experimental conditions
A. Drach-Zahavy, A. Somech / Personality and Individual Di€erences 27 (1999) 969±984
977
Table 2
Performance: three-way ANOVA with repeated measures by experimental conditions
Source
MS
df
F
Emotional Coping (EC)
Between
Goals
7.48
EC
23.55
GoalsEC
0.73
Error
25.01
1
1
1
151
0.30
0.94
0.03
Within
Phase
Phasegoals
PhaseEC
PhasegoalsEC
Error
1
1
1
1
151
0.71
0.70
0.71
0.72
1.63
1.79
1.72
1.51
12.06
Categorical Thinking (CT)
Source
MS
df
F
Behavioral Coping (BC)
Between
Goals
17.37
BC
1.09
GoalsBC
9.62
Error
25.11
1
1
1
151
0.69
0.04
0.38
Within
Phase
Phasegoals
PhaseBC
PhasegoalsBC
Error
1
1
1
1
151
0.38
0.32
0.38
0.30
9.29
11.85
9.21
12.87
11.99
Superstitious Thinking (ST)
Between
Goals
CT
GoalsCT
Error
15.12
45.93
17.44
15.22
1
1
1
144
0.99
3.02
1.15
Between
Goals
ST
GoalsST
Error
383.89
503.69
594.27
19.43
1
1
1
151
19.75 25.91 30.57 Within
Phase
Phasegoals
PhaseCT
PhasegoalsCT
Error
15.06
50.01
5.32
34.46
5.7
1
1
1
1
144
2.64
8.77 0.93
6.04
Within
Phase
Phasegoals
PhaseST
PhasegoalsST
Error
173.29
172.52
204.65
214.65
9.90
1
1
1
1
151
17.49 17.41 20.66 21.69 32.4
118.97
37.11
14.88
1
1
1
144
2.18
7.99 2.49
1.81
2.78
0.18
0.03
5.94
1
1
1
1
144
0.31
0.47
0.03
0.00
Naive Optimism (NO)
Between
Goals
NO
GoalsNO
Error
Within
Phase
Phasegoals
PhaseNO
PhasegoalsNO
Error
p < 0.05.
Negative Thinking (NT)
39.86
126.25
56.38
24.24
1
1
1
151
1.64
5.21
2.33
Between
Goals
NT
GoalsNT
Error
49.61
54.75
48.22
56.63
11.58
1
1
1
1
151
4.28
4.73
4.16
4.89
Within
Phase
Phasegoals
PhaseNT
PhasegoalsNT
Error
978
A. Drach-Zahavy, A. Somech / Personality and Individual Di€erences 27 (1999) 969±984
Finally, the participants completed a postexperimental questionnaire that included a
manipulation check.
3. Results
3.1. Manipulation check
3.1.1. Goal manipulation
We assessed the Goal Setting manipulation by using a 4-item Likert-type scale describing
subjects' perception of the diculty and speci®city of the goals assigned (``How dicult was
your performance goal?''; ``How dicult would such performance goals be for a subject with
similar ability to yours?''; ``How speci®c was your performance goal?''; ``How clear was the
goal explained to you?''). Cronbach's a reliabilities were 0.84 for goal diculty and 0.81 for
goal speci®city. To assess goal diculty, we averaged responses to the ®rst two items and
analyzed them using a one-way analysis of variance. There was a signi®cant e€ect of goal
diculty on perceptions of goal diculty (F(1, 145)=7.59, p < 0.01). Speci®cally, speci®c
challenging goals were perceived more dicult than do your best goals. To assess goal
speci®city, we did the same analysis with responses to the third and fourth items and again
obtained the expected signi®cant main e€ect (F(1, 145)=5.66, p < 0.01). Speci®c challenging
goals were perceived as more speci®c than do-your-best goals.
Ability was measured by the baseline performance in the ®rst 10 trials (prior to the
experimental manipulations being introduced). Scores were analyzed using one-way ANOVA.
Results did not demonstrate any signi®cant di€erences in ability among the experimental
conditions.
3.2. Hypothesis testing
We analyzed the e€ects of the six components of Constructive Thinking, goals and
experimental phase (change) and their interactions on performance by repeated measures
analyses of variance (ANOVA), using experimental phase as repeated measure. (We did six
separate analyses for the six subscales). Table 1 presents the mean performance scores and
standard deviations and Table 2 summarizes the results of the analysis of variance. Fig. 1
presents a visual display of the results.
3.2.1. The e€ects of emotional coping, goals and experimental phase on performance
The results from the ANOVA did not demonstrate signi®cant di€erences between the
Emotional Coping measure, goals, experimental phase and their interaction on performance
( p>0.05).
3.2.2. The e€ects of behavioral coping, goals and experimental phase on performance
The results from the ANOVA did not demonstrate signi®cant di€erences between the
Behavioral Coping measure, goals, experimental phase and their interaction on performance
( p>0.05).
A. Drach-Zahavy, A. Somech / Personality and Individual Di€erences 27 (1999) 969±984
979
Fig. 1. Performance means by experimental conditions. High performance scores mean low quality performance.
3.2.3. The e€ects of categorical thinking, goals and experimental phase on performance
The results from the ANOVA demonstrated signi®cant within interaction e€ects of phase
and goals (F(1, 144)=8.77, p < 0.003) and of phase, goal and Categorical Thinking (F(1,
144)=6.04, p < 0.01) (see Table 2 and Fig. 1). More speci®cally, the experimental conditions
a€ected performance only in the second performance phase. These ®ndings demonstrated the
typical bene®cial e€ect of speci®c dicult goals in the second performance phase, but only for
low Categorical Thinking subjects, indicating that high Categorical Thinking interferes with
subjects' ability to adjust to changes in the nature of the task.
3.2.4. The e€ects of superstitious thinking, goals and experimental phase on performance
The results of the ANOVA demonstrated signi®cant main e€ects of goals (F(1, 151)=19.75,
p < 0.0001), Superstitious thinking (F(1, 151)=25.91, p < 0.0001) and experimental phase
((F(1, 151)=17.49, p < 0.0001) as well as interaction e€ects of goals and superstitious thinking
(F(1, 151)=30.57, p < 0.0001). There were also within interaction e€ects of experimental
conditions with experimental phase (F(1, 151)=17.41, p < 0.0001, (F(1, 151)=20.66, p <
980
A. Drach-Zahavy, A. Somech / Personality and Individual Di€erences 27 (1999) 969±984
0.0001) and (F(1, 151)=21.69, p < 0.0001) for phasegoals phaseSuperstitious Thinking and
phasegoalsSuperstitious Thinking, correspondingly) (see Table 2 and Fig. 1). These results
demonstrated the di€erential e€ects of speci®c dicult goals on low and high Superstitious
Thinking subjects in the two experimental phases. In the ®rst performance phase: under the do
your best goal condition, no signi®cant di€erences in performance of low and high
Superstitious Thinking subjects were found, whereas under the dicult goal condition low
Superstitious Thinking subjects outperformed high Superstitious Thinking subjects. These
di€erences were magni®ed in the second performance phase: Low Superstitious Thinking
subjects improved their performance in comparison to phase 1 under the dicult goal
condition, indicating an improved ability to cope with changes in the nature of the task,
whereas high Superstitious Thinking subjects decreased their performance in comparison to
phase 1 under the dicult goal condition, indicating poor adjustment ability to change.
3.2.5. The e€ects of naive optimism, goals and experimental phase on performance
The results of the ANOVA demonstrated signi®cant main e€ects of Naive Optimism (F(1,
151)=5.21, p < 0.02) and of experimental phase (F(1, 151)=4.28, p < 0.04) as well as
interaction e€ects of the experimental conditions with the experimental phase (F(1, 151)=4.73,
p < 0.03), F(1, 151)=4.16, p < 0.04) and F(1, 151)=4.89, p < 0.03) for goals and experimental
phase, Naive Optimism and experimental phase and goals and Naive Optimism and
experimental phase, correspondingly). (see Table 2 and Fig. 1). The signi®cant main e€ect of
Naive Optimism indicated that low Naive Optimism subjects performed better than high Naive
Optimism subjects. However, the interaction e€ects demonstrated the di€erential e€ects of
speci®c dicult goals on low and high Naive Optimism subjects in the two experimental
phases. In the ®rst performance phase: under the do your best goal condition, no signi®cant
di€erences in performance of low and high Naive Optimism subjects were found, whereas
under the dicult goal condition low Naive Optimism subjects outperformed high Naive
Optimism subjects. These di€erences were more profound in the second performance phase:
low Naive Optimism subjects improved their performance in compare to phase 1 under the
dicult goal condition, indicating an improved ability to cope with changes in the nature of
the task, whereas high Naive Optimism subjects decreased their performance in comparison to
phase 1 under the dicult goal condition.
3.2.6. The e€ects of negative thinking, goals, experimental phase and their interactions
Results showed main e€ect of Negative Thinking on performance (F(1, 144)=118.97,
p < 0.001), indicating that low Negative Thinking subjects performed better than high Negative
Thinking subjects (see Table 2 and Fig. 1). No other signi®cant e€ects on performance were
found.
In sum, the ®ndings from the present study supported our hypotheses concerning Categorical
Thinking, Superstitious Thinking, Naive Optimism and Negative Thinking.
Results demonstrated that low Categorical Thinking, Superstitious Thinking and Naive
Optimism help individuals to bene®t from the challenging goal assignment and lead to better
performance and adaptation to change in the nature of the task. Additionally, low Negative
Thinking as compared with high Negative Thinking promote better performance and
adaptation level in both goal conditions. Nevertheless, our results did not support our
A. Drach-Zahavy, A. Somech / Personality and Individual Di€erences 27 (1999) 969±984
981
hypotheses concerning Emotional and Behavioral Coping, indicating that Emotional and
Behavioral Coping did not a€ect performance and adaptation to change.
4. Discussion
This study examined the implications of poor and good Constructive Thinking to the
performance of comple tasks and to the adaptation to change. More speci®cally, this study
addressed the question of whether Constructive Thinking could strengthen the bene®cial e€ects
of speci®c challenging goals on the performance and adaptation to change. The answer to this
questions is important as the modern workplace is increasingly characterized by high stress,
heavy work load and more complex tasks. Yet, a growing amount of empirical evidence points
to the various shortcomings of speci®c dicult goals which impede the performance of
complex tasks: focusing on one set of prescribed aspects of performance on the expense of
others (e.g. Earley et al., 1989a) oversimpli®ed strategy development or tunnel vision (e.g.
Huber, 1985; Kanfer & Ackerman, 1989; Earley et al., 1989a) and diverting attention to
handling anxiety and Negative Thinking (Kanfer & Ackerman, 1989; Kanfer et al., 1994;
Drach-Zahavy & Erez, 1997). We approached this debate by integrating the concept of
Constructing Thinking, a broad coping variable (Epstein & Meier, 1989) with Goal Setting
model (Locke & Latham, 1990). This perspective contributed some insights.
First, the present ®ndings provided initial support for the notion that Constructive Thinking
is a complex construct with distinctive e€ects on the performance of complex tasks. Second, we
propose that at least Categorical Thinking, Superstitious Thinking and Naive Optimism can
in¯uence the e€ectiveness of speci®c dicult goals.
4.1. The e€ects of constructive thinking
The results of the present study showed, in line with our hypothesis, that Constructive
Thinking was a potent predictor of performance of complex tasks. More speci®cally, low
Superstitious Thinking, Naive Optimism and Negative thinking consistently produced higher
performance than high Superstitious Thinking, Naive Optimism and Negative thinking.
(In addition, note that also Categorical Thinking in¯uenced performance but only in
interaction with goals, as will be discussed in Section 4.2). Nevertheless, in contrast to our
prediction, our ®ndings could not demonstrate signi®cant e€ects of Emotional and Behavioral
Coping on performance. These ®ndings partially supported Katz and Epstein's (1991)
conclusion that Constructive Thinking as measured by the global CTI scale was not
signi®cantly related to performance. (Note that previous research has shown that the CTI
global scale was signi®cantly and positively related to Behavioral and Emotional Coping).
Taken together, these ®ndings support previous observations found by Hurley (1990) that
the CTI subscales can be clustered into two somewhat di€erent bulks: the one encompasses
Emotional and Behavioral Coping and can be seen as constructive scales, whereas the second
cluster includes Categorical Thinking, Superstitious Thinking, Naive Optimism and Negative
Thinking and relates more to nonconstructive scales (Hurley, 1990). The present results further
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suggested that these distinct bulks may have unique e€ects on the performance of complex
tasks.
Why do these subscales a€ect performance distinctively? The answer clearly must be
somewhat tentative in light of the small number of studies so far probing this issue. Previous
research has indicated that Emotional and Behavioral Coping was positively related to various
aspects of success in everyday life like marriage, career, etc. (Epstein & Meier, 1989), but not
to the performance of more concrete, time-focused tasks (Katz & Epstein, 1991). On the other
hand, Categorical Thinking, Superstitious Thinking, Naive Optimism and Negative Thinking
have demonstrated negative but modest correlations with general success indicators, but as the
present ®ndings indicated, signi®cantly a€ected task performance. These ®ndings imply that
Emotional and Behavioral Coping as compared with Categorical Thinking, Superstitious
Thinking, Naive Optimism and Negative Thinking may be di€erent in scope. Emotional and
Behavioral Coping, which focus on controlling one's feelings and sustaining an action-oriented
approach in the face of obstacles, may have implications for general coping in the long run. In
contrast, The nonconstructive scales which emphasize ine€ective coping processes through
gross overgeneralizations and a rigid way of thinking, may re¯ect a fundamental cognitive
disability that interferes with problem-solving processes in the short run.
Epstein (1992) examined the question whether the automatic irrational thoughts that make
up poor Constructive Thinking represent major cognitive incapacity or are more based on a
motivational basis to protect the self. His results indicated that poor constructive thinkers have
a selective bias toward negative inferences about the self. Moreover, good and poor
constructive thinkers did not di€er in the frequency of positive overgeneralizations or of
inferences about others. Epstein concluded that The CTI global scale measures
overgeneralizations based on a need to protect the self. While not denying Epstein's
conclusion, we suggest that other subscales of the CTI such as the nonconstructive subscales,
may pertain to cognitive diculties. Further research is needed to con®rm the cognitive
constrains as well as the motivational drive explanations. However, the signi®cant joint e€ects
of nonconstructive thinking and Goal Setting provided further insights into these explanations,
as discussed in Section 4.2.
4.2. The joint e€ects of Destructive Thinking and Goal Setting
In this study we attempted to explore the boundaries of the Goal Setting model through
examination of a related personality disposition of Constructive Thinking. The ®ndings were,
in line with our hypotheses and demonstrated that although in the ®rst performance phase,
goals did not a€ect performance, in the second performance phase speci®c dicult goals, as
compared with do your best goals, enhanced the performance of low Categorical Thinking,
Superstitious Thinking, Naive Optimism and Negative Thinking subjects but inhibited the
performance of high level subjects on those subscales. These ®ndings provided only partial
support for the goal-setting research literature indicating that as tasks become more complex,
the contribution of dicult goals is evident only in later stages of performance (e.g. Kanfer &
Ackerman, 1989). In contrast, our results suggested that these bene®cial e€ects of goals refer to
low Categorical Thinking, Superstitious Thinking, Naive Optimism or Negative Thinking
subjects only.
A. Drach-Zahavy, A. Somech / Personality and Individual Di€erences 27 (1999) 969±984
983
The design of the present study entitled us to examine how subjects adapt to a dynamic
environment. The change in the predicting formula in phase 2 allowed for testing how low and
high constructive thinkers regulated their performance under the two goal conditions. Results
indicate that low Categorical Thinking, Superstitious Thinking, Naive Optimism and Negative
Thinking subjects who received speci®c dicult goals improved their performance in phase two
over phase one, indicating high adaptation to change. A possible explanation is that these
subjects engage in more ¯exible thinking, re®ne their strategies in accordance with information
¯ow and therefore adjust better to change. In contrast, high Categorical Thinking,
Superstitious Thinking, Naive Optimism and Negative Thinking who received speci®c dicult
goals exhibited decreased performance in phase two compared with phase one, demonstrating
low level of adaptation to the dynamic environment. These results further illuminated the
nature of the nonconstructive subscales thinking as a cognitive set of habitual thoughts that
interfere with the bene®cial e€ects of goals on performance.
In sum, our study demonstrated that Categorical Thinking, Superstitious Thinking, Naive
Optimism and Negative Thinking, which refer to an inherent bias to overgeneralize, to use
superstitious and other rigid ways of thinking and to dwell on past failures, interacts with the
corresponding nature of goals to inhibit performance.
The present work has contributed in re®ning the boundaries of Goal Setting. Our results
serve to sharpen the distinction between conditions in which Goal Setting helps and those in
which it does not. Attempts to overcome the shortcomings of Goal Setting should therefore be
directed at e€orts to design better goals (e.g. learning goals, Dweck & Legget, 1988) or strategy
goals, Drach-Zahavy & Erez, 1997) as well as to further investigate individual di€erences that
possibly foster goal attainment.
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