P27∼43
The Fear of Opening Pandora’s Box:
China’s Heptagon of Policy Options
in Dealing with the North Korean Issue*
∗
Antoine Bondaz**
Abstract
North Korea, despite its opaque and erratic nature, is remarkably predictable.
The country has made a habit of intentionally provoking its neighbors-including China,
its sole remaining patron-while remaining uncompromising in its pursuit of nuclear
weapons. Self-confident of China’s support, North Korea has repeatedly taken actions
which harm its neighbor’s national interests, which are, by hierarchical order, regional
stability and denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. It is time for China to break this
cycle and reconsider its engagement strategy towards North Korea. However, China’s
policy options are constrained by its fear of a sudden collapse of the North Korean
regime, which will have tremendous consequences on China’s peripheral stability, will
endanger its national economic development, and will be synonymous with opening
Pandora’s Box. Among the heptagon of policy options China has for considerationmaintaining, rebalancing, abandoning, reinforcing, reforming, interfering, and cooperating
-shifting to a policy rooted in regional limited cooperation will offer China the best odds
of effectively securing its own national interests.
Keywords: North Korea, China, Foreign policy, China-North Korea relations,
U.S.-China relations, International cooperation, Nuclear proliferation
* This article is an extended and revised version of a short piece initially published by the CarnegieEndowment for International Peace: Bondaz, Antoine, “A new direction for China’s North Korea
Policy,” Carnegie-Tsinghua Center for Global Policy, August 27, 2013, http://www.carnegietsinghua.org/
2013/08/27/new-direction-for-china-s-north-korea-policy/gkhw, the author is grateful to Kenneth Kwok,
Lily Cheng (Carnegie-Tsinghua Center), Wah-Kwan Lin (Tufts University) and Leonie Allard (Sciences
Po) for their helpful comments.
** An associate fellow at Asia Centre (Paris) and a member of the strategic relief of the Institute for
Strategic Studies-Ecole Militaire (Paris), Antoine Bondaz is a former Visiting Scholar at the CarnegieTsinghua Center for Global Policy (Beijing) and Invited Visiting Fellow at the Ilmin International
Relations Institute (IIRI)/Korea University (Seoul). He is currently completing a PhD in Political
Sciences at Sciences Po under the supervision of Pr. François Godement. 71 boulevard Raspail, 75006
Paris. E-mail: [email protected]; Tel: +33-1-7543-6320; Fax: +33-1-7543-6323.
28 • Korea Review of International Studies
The pessimist complains about the wind;
the optimist expects it to change;
the realist adjusts the sails.
William A. Ward
War clouds over the Peninsula have not been dissipated (Zhang, 2013). North
Korea, despite its opaque and erratic nature, is remarkably predictable. The country has
made a habit of intentionally provoking its neighbors-including China, its sole remaining
patron. Ignoring repeated appeals for restraint from the international community, North
Korea carried out its third nuclear test on February 12, 2013, further entrenching its
nuclear power status. On March 7, 2013, the United Nations Security Council unanimously
adopted Resolution 2094 (2013), condemning the nuclear test and broadening sanctions
against the North Korean regime. “In response”-as stated by North Korea’s official
statements-Pyongyang ratcheted up tensions on the peninsula, abrogating the Armistice
Agreement signed in 1953 and all agreements on non-aggression reached between the
North and South (KCNA, 2013a); nullifying the Joint Declaration on the denuclearization
of the Korean Peninsula (KCNA, 2013b); expressing its will to exercise its right to
make a preemptive nuclear strike on the U.S. bases in the region (KCNA, 2013c);
declaring a sacred war for annihilating the enemy (KCNA, 2013d); suspending all
operations in the Kaesong Industrial Zone (KCNA, 2013h) and lastly, urging foreigners
to evacuate the peninsula (KCNA, 2013i). These provocations have repeatedly harmed
China’s national interests.
In 2013, there were indications that North Korea recognized it had gone too far
and understood it had dangerously tested the limits of China’s patience. North Korea’s
behavior at the time can be understood as yet another charm offensive directed towards
China, as North Korea had been progressively taming its bellicose rhetoric throughout
the year. In early June, North Korea offered to resume talks with South Korea to restore
operations in the Kaesong Industrial Zone. In an effort to directly mend the damage to
the Sino-North Korean relationship, Pyongyang sent special envoys Choe Ryong Hae
and Kim Gye Gwan to Beijing in May and June, and offered to participate in talks with
the United States. In September, North Korean officials participated in a conference
held by the China Institutes for International Studies (CIIS) to celebrate the tenth
anniversary of the Six Party Talks, which hit a dead-end in 2009. This scenario reminds
us of the charm offensive (heping gongshi, 平和攻势) North Korea pursued shortly
after its second nuclear test in May 2009 (Zhang, 2012).1 North Korea’s gestures were
widely praised at the time as positive signs of a change from its intransigent and
belligerent nature. We know now that ultimately there was no fundamental shift in
North Korea, especially on the denuclearization issue. The international communityespecially China-should remain skeptical of these sorts of olive branches.
North Korea is a highly rational state. However, its strategy of provocation and
reconciliation is extremely dangerous, fraught with risks that are highly contingent on
1
In August 2009, North Korea released two previously detained American journalists, as well as a captured
Hyundai employee. North Korea later sent a delegation to attend the funeral of former South Korean
President Kim Dae-Jung, and Central Committee secretary, Kim Ki Nam, to meet with then South Korean
President Lee Myung-bak to promote inter-Korean cooperation.
The Fear of Opening Pandora’s Box • 29
how regional powers-especially China-respond. Pyongyang can afford to be provocative
enough to make its point or secure particular objectives, while it must avoid incurring a
severe Chinese backlash that would negatively influence its material well-being. North
Korea relies on the calculation that China’s concerns about causing instability or regime
collapse in Pyongyang-the fear of opening Pandora’s Box-coupled with persistent strategic
distrust between China and the United States, will continue to constrain Chinese responses
to North Korea’s intransigent behavior. However, if China’s policy options in dealing
with North Korea are indeed limited, China can still afford to alter its policy in a way
that may better promote its national interests.
I. The Radicalization of the North Korean Nuclear Strategy
Pyongyang has repeatedly defied efforts of the international community to restrain
North Korean excesses and remained uncompromising in its pursuit of nuclear weapons.
For more than 20 years, North Korea ignored every attempt by the international community
and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to stop its nuclear weapons program.
North Korea pulled out of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in January 2003;
stated in February 2005 that it had manufactured nuclear weapons; conducted recurrent
missile tests and two nuclear tests in October 2006 and May 2009; revealed the
construction of a uranium enrichment facility in November 2010; conducted two missile
tests in 2012 and a third nuclear test in February 2013.
Since 2012, North Korea has radicalized its position on nuclear weapons,
showing no signs of abandoning them. North Korea, under the leadership of Kim Jong
Un, is institutionalizing its possession of nuclear weapons-what is expressed in the
North Korean rhetoric by “the DPRK’s access to nuclear weapons has been legally
codified” (KCNA, 2013f). In May 2012, North Korea proclaimed itself a “nuclear
power state,” and further enshrined its nuclear status on March 31, 2013 by calling for a
new strategy, the so-called Byungjin line, which is aimed at “carrying out economic
construction and building nuclear armed forces simultaneously” (KCNA, 2013e). On
April 1, 2013, North Korea, a so-called “full-fledged nuclear weapons state,” even
presented its first nuclear doctrine stating that “the DPRK shall neither use nukes
against the non-nuclear states nor threaten them with those weapons unless they join a
hostile nuclear weapons state in its invasion and attack on the DPRK” (KCNA, 2013g).
Prospects for denuclearization are dim. The North Korean leadership no longer
considers nuclear weapons as only deterrent weapons for the purpose of restoring
balance on the Korean Peninsula. They are not only strategic weapons but also “identity
weapons,” political weapons that reinforce the authority of Kim Jong Un (Bondaz,
2014b). First, they are presented by the regime as part of the “revolutionary legacy” of
Kim Jong Il, thus confirming the legitimacy of his son, Kim Jong Un, and strengthening
the dynastic system in North Korea. Second, with nuclear weapons the North Korean
regime offers its people a reason for the hardships they have endured for the last 20
years (Moon and Delury, 2012) and an excuse for the state’s economic backwardness.
As a consequence, such an institutionalization of nuclear weapons makes their
30 • Korea Review of International Studies
abandonment all the more difficult since they are no longer “possessed by the regime”
but are “fully part of the regime’s identity.” To give up their nuclear arsenal would mean
for the regime to deny the rationality of its former policies, which would in turn severely
hit its legitimacy. Thus, North Korea is now mentioning its own denuclearization only
in the framework of a complete denuclearization of the world, including the United
States. North Korea has never traveled so far along its nuclear dead-end (Bondaz,
2014b).
II. Testing China’s Patience
China has repeatedly demonstrated its dissatisfaction with North Korea’s behavior,
especially concerning its nuclear pursuits, on a number of occasions. Beijing initiated
the Six Party Talks as a forum for regional powers to discuss the denuclearization of the
peninsula; vocally criticized North Korea’s nuclear program, voted for UN Security
Council Resolutions 1695 (2006), 1718 (2006) and 1874 (2009) condemning Pyongyang’s
nuclear and missile tests; and implemented internationally approved sanctions on North
Korea.
However, Beijing’s actions since the third nuclear test clearly indicate an
unprecedented level of irritation with Pyongyang. North Korea may have overestimated
China’s patience (Haenle, 2013). In the past, China practiced a form of quiet diplomacy,
holding difficult discussions with North Korea behind closed doors. Lately, China has
been far more public in its condemnation of Pyongyang’s obstinacy. In April 2013,
Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs Wang Yi told UN Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon
that Beijing opposed “provocative words and actions from any party in the region” and
added that the Chinese leadership would “not allow troublemaking at the doorsteps of
China” (Reuters, 2013). Chinese President Xi Jinping echoed this sentiment in a speech
the next day, at the Boao Forum, that was widely believed to be referencing North
Korea. Even Mao Xinyu, the only grandson of Mao Zedong and a major general in
China’s People’s Liberation Army, has called on North Korea to abandon its nuclear
ambitions since it is “a cherished wish of the Chinese people.” (The Chosun Ilbo , 2013)
Based on the press and academic articles, it makes no doubt that China is dissatisfied
by its neighbor’s provocations (Bondaz, 2013b). On February 18, an editorial of the
Global Times said that Beijing should have the courage to oppose Pyongyang since
North Korea’s attitude went against China’s interests. It was “necessary to punish”
(惩罚是必要的, chengfa shi biyao de) the country and China should not allow itself to
be forced to supply a “blind shield” (一味庇护, yiwei bihu), or unconditional protection,
to its neighbor (Global Times, 2013a). In academic articles, North Korea is depicted as
egoistical and arrogant (自我中心与狂妄自大, ziwo zhongxin yu kuangwang zida), not
listening to China’s advice (Chen, 2013). During a program aired on Hong Kong-based
channel Phoenix TV, Professor Zhang Liangui from the Central Party School stated that
Chinese sanctions were not strong enough and that Beijing should leverage North
Korea’s dependency on China to bring the North Korean army to its knees (Yihu, 2013).
Lastly, China has expressed its discontent with North Korea through actions
The Fear of Opening Pandora’s Box • 31
alongside statements. In 2013, Beijing voted in favor of UN Security Council Resolution
2087 and 2094, which condemned North Korea’s third nuclear test. China then went
even further and suspended business operations with North Korea’s Foreign Trade Bank.
In September, China also produced a 236-page list of banned items for export to North
Korea amid proliferation concerns. These actions, even if they are not substantive
enough to carry real political or diplomatic costs towards North Korea, are unprecedented.
However, they are not prone to make North Korea alter its grand strategy of reinforcing
its nuclear status while protecting the regime.
III. Sino-North Korean Divergence of Interests
Recent Sino-North Korean friction may be attributed to a divergence of interests
between China and North Korea. China upholds a hierarchy of interests running from
maintaining regional stability to denuclearizing the Korean peninsula. North Korea on
the other hand has continually engaged in a near formulaic series of regional provocations
while uncompromisingly pursuing nuclear weapons, always focusing on the same top
priority, regime survival. Even though North Korea is taking the same path of selfreliant nuclearization as that of China’s from the 1950s through the 1970s (Shen, 2013),
it is not in China’s interest to keep a nuclearized Korea at its borders.
Pyongyang can afford to be just provocative enough to make its point, or secure
its particular objectives, but it must avoid crossing China’s redline. North Korea has
perfectly integrated China’s top priority-the overall stability of the peninsula-and can
then play its brinkmanship game. That overall stability includes the avoidance by China
of a sudden collapse of the North Korea regime which would open Pandora’s Box, a
period of great uncertainty not only for regional stability, but also for China’s internal
stability. Uncertainty runs from the extent of a massive influx of North Korean refugees,
the future of Chinese economic assets in North Korea or the future of a unified Korea
under the protection of the United States.
There is no doubt that the effects of North Korean provocations and confirmation
of its nuclear status have been severely detrimental to China’s interests. First of all,
North Korea’s intransigence heightens regional tensions at a time when China prioritizes
peripheral stability. On October 24 and 25, 2013, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)
Central Committee convened a national conference on China’s relations with its neighbors,
or so called Peripheral Diplomacy. President Xi Jinping clearly reminded of the need for
China to maintain stability in its periphery in order to enable its economic development
and to realize the “great rejuvenation of the Chinese Nation” (Godement, 2014). Second,
it raises doubts about China’s commitment of being a responsible global power
(Zoellick, 2005) when Beijing seems to resist efforts to rein in its North Korean ally,
thus damaging China’s international image and soft power. Third, a nuclear North Korea
strengthens its negotiating power vis-à-vis China, being less dependent on a strategic
level and even being able to blackmail China (Deng, 2013). Fourth, Pyongyang’s behavior
further entrenches the U.S. bilateral military alliances in the Asia-Pacific (U.S.-Japan
and U.S.-ROK alliances), offers an excuse to Washington to build up its missile defense
in the region (Li, 2012) and fosters trilateral cooperation between the United States,
32 • Korea Review of International Studies
Japan and South Korea (Chen, 2013). Then, North Korea’s behavior legitimizes
Washington’s rebalancing strategy in the region, a strategy that Chinese strategists
perceive as a form of encirclement (Dai, 2010). Fifth, North Korea’s refusal to give up
its nuclear weapons program also elevates Chinese concerns that nuclear weapons might
proliferate throughout the region to such countries as South Korea or Japan.
The last two effects are to be relativized in order to understand China’s rationale.
First, North Korea is more of an “excuse” in terms of political communication than the
main reason behind the U.S. rebalancing towards the Asia-Pacific region. As Barack
Obama stated as early as November 2009 in Japan, the U.S. is a nation of the Pacific,
“Asia and the United States are not separated by this great ocean; we are bound by it.”
The U.S. rebalancing is a long-term and structural strategy more than a short-term
phenomenon that China faces (CASS, 2014). Very few in China, and also in South
Korea, believe that the U.S. will withdraw from the region once the North Korean threat
disappears (Bondaz, 2014a). Second, the debate on the proliferation of nuclear weapons
to Japan and South Korea is not a new one. Concerns about a nuclearization of South
Korea in the 1970s have gradually receded. The political debate in South Korea,
following the third nuclear test in North Korea of February 2013, has been short lived.
Several officials, including Chun Young Woo, presidential secretary for foreign affairs
and national security on February 20, 2013, have clearly stated that South Korea has no
intention of even considering developing a nuclear program (Dalton and Yoon, 2013).
As long as Tokyo and Seoul trust the U.S. extended deterrence, this scenario of
noncompliance with international norms and treaties by powerful democracies is unlikely.
IV. Possible Chinese Approaches
China is the country with the most influence on North Korea. However, vis-à-vis
Pyongyang, Beijing has a toolbox with only one tool - a hammer. China could certainly
trigger a regime collapse by abandoning Pyongyang, but it is less capable of exerting a
more nuanced influence on North Korea’s behavior that would induce it to reform.
Indeed, China’s influence over North Korea should not be overestimated as it faces
inherent limitations. Even though Beijing is Pyongyang’s sole patron, the Sino-North
Korean bilateral relationship deteriorated since China established diplomatic relations
with South Korea in 1992 and further exacerbated China’s pragmatism when dealing
with its unruly neighbor. In this situation, China faces a heptagon of options to choose
from. The option which China selects has to be one that is least detrimental to its
national interests. As an editorial from the Global Times pointed out on February 17,
2013, there is no good alternative and China must avoid picking the worst one (Global
Times, 2013a). We argue that China has a heptagon of policy options at its disposal in
its future dealings with North Korea: maintaining, rebalancing, abandoning, reinforcing,
reforming, interfering, and cooperating.
1. Maintaining
China could opt to maintain the same approach to its dealings with North Korea
The Fear of Opening Pandora’s Box • 33
as it did prior to the third nuclear test. Simultaneously condemning Pyongyang’s nuclear
program and supporting its regime, China’s policy could be defined as a “minimalistic
approach,” opting for a low-to mid-level use of force against North Korea. But this
policy no longer serves China’s national interests since Beijing has proved unable to
stop Pyongyang’s provocations and its pursuit of nuclear weapons.
China condemned North Korea’s nuclear pursuits by initiating the Six Party talks,
opposing North Korea’s nuclear program, voting for United Nations Security Council
Resolutions 1718 (2006) and 1874 (2009), and implementing internationally approved
sanctions on North Korea. At the same time, from 2009 through 2012, China continually
provided critical support to the North Korean regime out of fear that it was on unsteady
ground and might collapse. After Kim Jong Il’s stroke in the summer of 2008, China
attempted to stabilize the succession process by promoting Kim Jong Un’s rise to power.
China resisted efforts to officially condemn North Korea for sinking the Cheonan and
shelling Yeonpyeong in 2010. When Kim Jong Il died on December 17, 2011, during
the 2011 Jasmine Revolutions in the Middle East, the event triggered a new wave of
“End of North Korea-ism.” Victor Cha, former director for Asian affairs in the White
House's National Security Council, went as far as to say that “whether it comes apart in
the next few weeks or over several months, the regime will not be able to hold together
after the untimely death of its leader, Kim Jong-il. […] Such a system simply cannot
hold” (Cha, 2011). The system has held since then and has even reinforced itself thanks
to China. China has helped to ease the dynastic succession by expressing official
support to the young leader Kim Jong Un, offering food aid, and promising bilateral visits
to North Korea. China eventually sent Wang Jiarui, former head of the Communist
Party’s international affairs office and first foreign high official, to meet the young
leader in July 2012.
Beijing’s primary motivation for supporting Pyongyang and refusing to
openlycriticize it has been the fear that the regime could fall during the transition, but at
present North Korea’s internal situation is less uncertain. North Korean leader Kim Jong
Un has consolidated his grasp on power, by largely reestablishing the preeminence of
the ruling party over the army, and appointing members of his inner circle to influential
positions. He successively became “Supreme Leader” on December 28, 2011, “Supreme
Commander” of the armed forces of the Korean People’s Army (KPA) on December 30,
2011, “First secretary” of the Korean Workers’ Party (KWP) on April 11, 2012, “First
Chairman” of the National Defense Commission on April 13, 2012 and eventually
Marshall in July 2012. He now enjoys the same absolute authority his father did in a
state structured around the Suryong system, which virtually deifies the head of state.
China should be less concerned about the regime in Pyongyang suddenly collapsing for
reasons of internal instability, and could afford to modify its North Korea policy in
order to fulfill its secondary interest, the denuclearization of the peninsula.
2. Rebalancing
Rebalancing, sometimes referred to as normalizing, would involve Beijing becoming
strategically closer to South Korea while reducing North Korea’s trade dependency on
China. It remains a highly hypothetical situation that China would side with South
Korea, thus antagonizing North Korea as it did in the 1990s. This approach is both
34 • Korea Review of International Studies
unlikely and contrary to China’s interests.
In an op-ed published by the Global Times, Son Key Young explains that normalizing
refers to “the reorganization of bilateral relations from the current abnormal structure of
dependency, with 90 percent of the North’s trade going through China, into a symmetrical
one between two neighboring states in terms of political and economic relations” (Son,
2013). But China already underwent a diplomatic revolution by shifting from a “one
Korea” policy to a “two Koreas” policy in 1992 when Beijing established formal diplomatic
relations with Seoul (Chung, 2007). China has since tried to maintain a balanced approach
towards the two Koreas, preserving its historical friendship with the North while developing
its trade relations and a strategic cooperative partnership with the South-in 2013, ChinaSouth Korea trade reached $230 billion while China-North Korea trade reached $6.5
billion.
China will not rebalance its policy for a number of reasons. First, South Korea is
tied to the United States through a military alliance signed in January 1954 (Yang, 2014).
It is unlikely that Beijing would be willing to step into the role that Washington currently
fills and provide a security guarantee for South Korea, all the more since it would
contradict China’s long diplomatic stance since Deng Xiaoping of non-discrimination
between neighbors and non-signing of military alliances. According to some Chinese
scholars, Beijing should not try to get closer to Seoul at Pyongyang’s expense, because
Seoul is an ally of Washington in the U.S. “Pivot to Asia” strategy. Since American
troops are stationed on its soil, South Korea is not fully independent and will remain
within America’s “strategic orbit” (Ren, 2013).
Second, strategic distrust between Beijing and Seoul remains prevalent, despite
South Korean President Park Geun Hye’s amiable visit to China in June 2013 and Xi’s
visit to Seoul last July. That distrust has lately been underlined by the unilateral declaration
of an Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) by China, overlapping territories administered
by South Korea in the Yellow Sea. Third, it is not in Beijing’s interests to reduce North
Korea’s trade dependency on China. North Korea’s trade dependency is due more to a
U.S. and Japan embargo, combined with South Korea’s May 24 measures, rather than
an aggressive Chinese policy of economic predation (Cha, 2012). This dependency may
not afford Beijing any influence over North Korean policy, but the trade relationship
enables China to economically develop its northeast. Trade can ultimately revitalize
China’s landlocked provinces of Jilin and Heilongjiang provinces if they leverage their
geographic proximity to North Korea and use it as a transit corridor to the East Sea (or
Sea of Japan).
3. Abandoning
Another option would be for China to nullify the 1961 Sino-North Korean
Mutual Aid and Cooperation Friendship Treaty and cease providing any assistance to
North Korea in the form of food, fuel, or funds. This is the most unpopular option
among Chinese leaders, who dismissed Deng Yuwen from his post as deputy editor of
Study Times, the journal of the Chinese Communist Party’s Central Party School, for
advocating such a policy. Indeed, China can hardly afford to put North Korea in an
adversarial position (Chung and Choi, 2013).
The Fear of Opening Pandora’s Box • 35
Deng Yuwen’s argument for abandoning North Korea in the Financial Times of
27 February, 2013, was something of a bombshell, although the proposal gained much
more attention in Western circles than within the academic debate in China. The full
version of the article, published in Liaowang Zhongguo in March 2013, presents the
writer’s proposal in greater detail. He says that China can continue to support North
Korea for historical, ideological, and strategic reasons. Or, it can choose to “abandon”
its neighbor (放弃, fangqi), who has spiraled out of control and become a “bad asset”
(负资产, fu zichan). Deng also worries that Beijing could one day become a target of
Pyongyang’s “nuclear blackmail” (核訛诈, he e’zha).
Abandoning North Korea would not serve Chinese interests as it would likely
result in a turbulent and unpredictable future for the North Korean regime. As Yu
Meihua, a North Korean expert at the China Reform Forum, puts it, China cannot use
force against North Korea (不可能对朝鲜动武, bu keneng dui chaoxian dongwu) since
any violence would create a lose-lose situation (两败俱伤, liangbai jushang) for South
and North Korea as well as for the major regional powers, including China (Zhang, Xu
and Yu, 2012). In the case of abandonment, North Korea, facing the worst scenario
possible, may also become uncontrollable, as losing its sole remaining patron would put
the country back to the 1990s strategic nightmare it underwent after the collapse of the
USSR, which initiated the first nuclear crisis.
The current order in Pyongyang has persisted for the past two decades solely
with the support of China. Pyongyang may be on more stable ground domestically than
it has been in previous years but the loss of its role as the remaining international patron
would still trigger a regime collapse, opening Pandora’s Box. This course of action
would be particularly dangerous if regional actors-especially China and the United
States-were unable to cooperatively develop a contingency plan to respond to a North
Korean regime collapse. There would be a high risk of misunderstanding, collision, and
potential escalation between these actors as they reacted to a crisis that could result in
disaster. However, until these major regional players move past their diplomatic
constraints and are able to work through their strategic distrust of one another, no such
planning will occur.
4. Reinforcing
The opposite option would be for China to reinforce its alliance with North
Korea, with the dual objective of stabilizing the regime while providing its ally with
sufficient security guarantees so that the regime feels no need to keep its nuclear arsenal.
This last-minute scenario is unlikely for two main reasons: it is anachronistic and China
will not extend its nuclear umbrella to one of its allies.
Even before North Korea’s third nuclear test, and in order to find innovative
ways to denuclearize the peninsula, some voices in China mentioned a scenario in which
Beijing would give North Korea security guarantees in return for disarmament (安全
换弃核, anquan huan qihe). One of the main proponents of this approach is Yu Meihua,
who believes that economic aid in exchange for nuclear disarmament (经援换弃核,
jingyuan huan qihe) would most likely be ineffective as North Korea needs to be
36 • Korea Review of International Studies
reassured (Zhang et al., 2012). This scenario is also indirectly advocated by Chinese
scholars who believe China should recreate the former Northern Triangle with Russia
and North Korea, in order to oppose the Southern Triangle composed of the United
States, Japan and South Korea (Shi, 2011). The Southern Triangle, a set of two bilateral
military alliances with Washington, has been maintained despite the end of the Cold War,
and directly threatens North Korea’s security. It could entail China offering a nuclear
umbrella, or extended deterrence, to North Korea on the model of the U.S. extended
deterrence to its allies.
First, the scenario seems anachronistic since China should have given additional
security to its ally before it reached the nuclear threshold at the beginning of the 2000s.
The 1961 the Sino-North Korean Mutual Aid and Cooperation Friendship Treaty proved
unable to reassure North Korea, thus leading Pyongyang to develop its own nuclear
program. It raises the question of the effectiveness of China’s policy towards North
Korea during the last few decades, and its responsibility in the nuclearization of the
country. Whereas the U.S. persuaded South Korea, using coercive means, to halt its
covert nuclear program under the Park Chung Hee administration during the 1970s,
China has been unsuccessful in persuading its own ally to do the same. Second, this
scenario would be successful only if the North Korean regime considered nuclear
weapons as mere deterrents. Since we argue that the new leadership also considers them
both strategic and identity weapons, providing North Korea security guarantees would
not be sufficient to force dismantlement of its nuclear arsenal. Third, if China tried to
extend a security guarantee to North Korea, it would severely damage China’s international
image, further antagonizing China its neighbors, including South Korea, and prompt
and legitimize a U.S. rebalancing towards the region. Last but not least, China views the
U.S. as the sole actor able to provide North Korea with the security guarantees it needs
to denuclearize. Since many Chinese scholars believe North Korea developed a nuclear
program out of fear of a U.S. intervention, the nuclear issue is mostly seen as a bilateral
issue between Pyongyang and Washington (Zhang et al., 2012).
5. Reforming
Alternatively, China could attempt to compel North Korea to pursue economic
reforms. However, Beijing has long attempted to promote economic reform in Pyongyang
by offering such enticements as development aid and special economic zones, and these
efforts have so far all been unsuccessful. Given this reality, China is unlikely to convince
North Korea to reform anytime soon.
In many instances, North Korea has disingenuously pledged to undertake economic
reforms, paying lip service to Chinese demands in order to mend Sino-North Korean
relations and secure additional bilateral assistance. So far, no substantive economic
reform has occurred even though in his first official speech of July 26, 2012, Kim Jong
Un pledged that North Koreans would “never have to tighten their belts again” (Choe,
2012) and emphasized the need to “improve the livelihoods of the people and build an
economically prosperous country.” However, the young leader has shown no indication
that he is willing to pursue a new path for North Korea’s economy. Pyongyang’s resistance
to engage in economic reform (Haggard and Noland, 2007) may be traced to the
The Fear of Opening Pandora’s Box • 37
regime’s very core. First, one of the main objectives of the regime is to prevent people
from developing relationships and networks of trust that can be used as the basis for
mobilized political opposition and to preserve the advantages of the elite (Byman and
Lind, 2010). Developing a market economy could go against that objective. After the
light economic reforms of the mid-2000s, Kim Jong Il moved back from them, and on
November 30, 2009, North Korea announced a confiscatory currency reform-exchange
of the new currency for the old currency at the rate of 100:1, and later 150:1-aimed at
reinstituting state control over the markets (Haggard and Noland, 2010).
Second, the personality cult built around the Kim dynasty means that North
Korean doctrines are inherently additive and inclusive-new policies cannot contradict or
replace established ones. Kim Jong Il’s policy of Songun, or “military first,” for example,
did not contradict his father Kim Il Sung’s policy of Juche, or “self-sufficiency.” Kim
Jong Un cannot afford to propose a new economic system that marks a significant
departure from his family’s legacy, as by doing so he may undermine the authority of
his father and grandfather and thus his own claim to legitimacy. For that reason, North
Korea will continue to adhere to Songun and Juche, which will entail attempting to
undermine any prospects for denuclearization and promoting its internal economic
development without adopting reforms. This current strategy was clearly presented last
year under the name of Byungjin-line.
6. Interfering
Another approach would be for China to directly interfere in North Korea’s
internal affairs, i.e. to opt for a high-level use of force vis-à-vis North Korea. But doing
so would contradict China’s stance on non-interference-a keystone of its diplomatic
position-and be impractical due to North Korea’s ideological and strategic resistance of
outside meddling (Chung and Choi, 2013).
Deng Yuwen is one of the proponents of such an approach. If the Chinese authorities
do not choose to abandon North Korea, Deng says that they must at least try to install in
Pyongyang a pro-Chinese regime that would denuclearize North Korea. Beijing should
give up its “non-intervention policy” (不干涉政策, bu ganshe zhengce) and develop a
system of “limited intervention” (有限干涉, youxian ganshe) that could better serve its
national interests (Deng, 2013). In a way, this approach is also the one many U.S.
officials promote since “China's participation in pushing the DPRK (North Korea) in a
different direction is critically important” according to Barack Obama’s speech in Japan
last April. But it needs to be clearly stated that such a scenario would be a double-edged
sword as China would start interfering more explicitly in other countries’ internal affairs
such as in Southeast Asia or Africa, for which China has already been criticized.
This approach is more than unlikely. Chinese leaders enshrined the precept of
non-interference in the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence established in the 1950s
to govern relations between states. However, it needs to be clearly stated that since there
is no clear Chinese definition for the principle of non-interference, it creates an ambiguity,
which in turn leaves space for diplomatic flexibility, thus best serving China’s interests.
Indeed, China has been clearly adaptive in the implementation of its policy of noninterference, particularly with regards the concept of Responsibility to Protect (R2P).
38 • Korea Review of International Studies
We believe that China adapts its policy on a spectrum, going from influence (势力,
shìlì) to interference (干涉, gānshè) without crossing a red line: intervention(干预,
gānyù) (Bondaz, 2014c). Intervening in North Korea’s internal affairs, opting for a regime
change, would contradict China’s stance and undermine its credibility and legitimacy as
a champion of traditional state sovereignty.
North Korea is also unlikely to allow any outside actor-including China-to meddle
in its internal affairs. Pyongyang has staunchly opposed any subordination to powerful
neighbors and developed its Juche ideology in order to resist having to “serve the great”
(事大主義) as past Korean kingdoms did in their dealings with the Chinese empire. As
Jonathan Pollack stresses, “survivalism has long dominated the thinking of leaders in
the North, who characterise the DPRK as a small, vulnerable system surrounded by far
more powerful states unprepared to accord it requisite autonomy and international
standing.” North Korea has been “opposed to any subordinate role in its relationship
with its powerful neighbors” (Pollack, 2011). Chinese scholars also underline this aspect
quite well. Ren Weidong, a researcher at the China Institutes for Contemporary
International Relations (CICIR), believes that North Korea is defending its position of
independence, seeking to oppose the American front while reducing its vulnerability to
the Chinese front (Ren, 2013).
7. Cooperating
Beijing is unlikely to adopt a strategy of maintaining, rebalancing, or abandoning
North Korea because these options would be contrary to China’s own national interests.
Reinforcing, reforming and interfering are not feasible and therefore unrealistic options.
That leaves Beijing with only one potential policy approach-cooperation.
This approach involves China further collaborating with regional actors-especially
the United States-in its interactions with North Korea. Adopting a common position and
agenda with other Asia-Pacific powers for dealing with North Korea is the most feasible
strategy for China to serve its own national interests. It will not only promote China’s
national interests of regional stability and denuclearization of the peninsula, but also
raise China’s status as a responsible rising great power currently adjusting its role in the
international order. This approach does not necessarily entail taking drastic measures
that might cause a North Korean collapse, nor does it entail a fundamental strategic
change, but rather it would signify a tactical shift in the modes China uses to promote
regional stability and the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.
Sanctions, incentives, and strategic patience have all failed to prevent North
Korea from disrupting regional stability and enhancing its nuclear arsenal (Fitzpatrick,
2012). An underlying deficiency in all the failed measures is the absence of strategic
consensus among regional powers. Regional actors have repeatedly undermined one
another’s efforts. While then U.S. President George W. Bush was listing North Korea as
part of an “axis of evil,” then South Korean President Kim Dae Jung was promoting the
Sunshine Policy, which called for greater political contact between the two Koreas.
While newly elected South Korean President Lee Myung Bak was cutting off aid to the
North, China was increasing its aid provisions to Pyongyang. This lack of cohesion and
The Fear of Opening Pandora’s Box • 39
coordination has left North Korea to continue on as usual, free from any significant
international pressure.
So long as China remains divided from other regional actors on the matter of
North Korea, Pyongyang will continue to behave with impunity and there will be no
tangible progress on the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. Furthermore, the
North Korean regime-which has proven to be a brilliant diplomatic player over the
years-remains committed to driving a wedge between China and other regional actors.
Pyongyang will benefit if it can keep Beijing from cooperating with these powers,
particularly Washington. For North Korea, a common Sino-American strategy toward
Pyongyang represents a worst-case scenario as it would deprive North Korea of its
traditional leverage. Pyongyang’s current efforts to reduce tensions with Beijing, for
example, are likely to be intended to forestall any such regional cooperation that could
lead to a multinational consensus on how to pursue North Korea’s denuclearization.
The international community-and especially China-should remain skeptical of
any olive branches extended by North Korea. So long as Pyongyang believes it can
engage in intransigent behavior without suffering any dire consequences, it will not modify
its international strategy. Pyongyang must be convinced that any future engagement
must also require serious steps toward denuclearization.
V. A Collaborative Future
Reaching consensus on a North Korea strategy will not be without challenges.
Competition is normal in international relations, and, as a rising power, China will
undeniably experience some tensions with the United States. However, competition
does not inevitably preclude cooperation (Kissinger, 2011). A win-win situation that
provides absolute gains to both great powers-such as the denuclearization of the Korean
Peninsula-is feasible as long as relative gains are balanced. China can afford to work
more cooperatively with other regional actors in pursuit of their common interests, which
uniformly include the denuclearization of the peninsula.
Any multilateral cooperative agreement between China and other regional actors
in addressing North Korea should at a minimum reflect a common position in their
expectations before any form of engagement with Pyongyang begins. This shared position
should include agreements on four points, “the four No’s”: no nuclear recognition, no
more nuclear weapons, no more nuclear tests, and no nuclear proliferation. The international
community needs to make clear that, unlike India and Pakistan (Shen, 2013). North
Korea will be neither recognized nor accepted as a nuclear state. Lastly, cooperation
could be extended to secondary issues such as the dismantlement of North Korea’s
chemical arsenal (Bondaz, 2013b). However, in order for the future to be collaborative,
China’s partners, including the United States and South Korea, must be well aware of
China’s red lines and national interests. As a China expert points out, “without a better
understanding of Chinese motivations, Sino-U.S. cooperation is unlikely to take the form
or depth that Washington wants” (Saalman, 2013).
In June 2013, important bilateral meetings were held. Gen. Jung Seung Jo, Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the South Korean armed forces, and his Chinese counterpart
40 • Korea Review of International Studies
Gen. Fang Fenghui, met in Beijing and agreed to expand strategic cooperation to persuade
North Korea to scrap its nuclear weapons. During two summit meetings this June, Xi
Jinping agreed with both Park Geun Hye and U.S. President Barack Obama on the
importance of regional stability and denuclearization, an imperative that was once again
underlined during Xi’s state visit to Korea last July. However, serious limitations remain
for better trilateral cooperation between China, the United States and South Korea. The
depth of the current cooperation should also not be overestimated and China should not
be the only country to be blamed for the lack of regional cooperation on North Korea.
First, the depth of the Sino-American strategic distrust is the biggest obstacle to better
cooperation between the two regional powers (Wang and Lieberthal, 2012). Some
strategists in China remain particularly resistant to altering the Sino-North Korean
relationship as they believe doing so would play into an American agenda to bring about
a North Korean regime collapse and to eventually weaken China. Second, the three
countries share neither the same wording-China is in favor of the denuclearization of the
peninsula while the United States and South Korea aims to denuclearize North Koreanor the same strategy to achieve their goal-China is averse to the use of force or
unilateral sanctions while the United States and South Korea promote the use of
sanctions to further isolate the North Korean regime. Third, China is actively promoting
the restart of the Six Party Talks, as expressed during the 2013 September Conference at
the CIIS, while the United States and South Korea consider North Korea’s steps towards
denuclearization as a prerequisite what brings the entire denuclearization process into a
dead end.
Defining a common objective is a very important first step. However, it must be
followed by concrete actions, such as the establishment of a shared agenda and strategy
between regional actors. This act of cooperation will send a clear message to North
Korea that China has now little tolerance for provocations that harm its national interests,
and will ultimately force both North Korea and its neighbors to restart multilateral
dialogues in order to keep Northeast Asia stable. If China still prioritizes peripheral
stability, choosing regional limited cooperation among the heptagon of policy options
the country has at its disposal seems best to promote its national interest, while avoiding
the opening of Pandora’s Box.
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