MUNICH SECURITY CONFERENCE 2008
Selected speeches
8-10 February, 2008
Speaker: Gates, Robert Michael
Function: Secretary of Defense, United States of America
Nation
Organization: United States of America
Speech at the 44th Munich Conference on Security Policy
02/10/2008
Thank you for that introduction. I would also like to thank the people of Munich for
once again allowing us to gather in this beautiful city.
I am glad to see many of my colleagues here, as well as many of the delegations that
were with us in Vilnius for the NATO ministerial. As I said in Vilnius – three weeks
ago I accomplished a key goal I have been pursuing for the last year: through the good
offices of the Los Angeles Times, I finally brought unity to NATO – though not as I
wished.
It is an honor to be invited to speak here for a second, and last, year as U.S. Secretary of
Defense.
Vilnius was my fourth NATO ministerial since taking this post, but my first in a nation
that had been part of the former Soviet Union. Lithuania was one of the first nations to
be swallowed by the Soviets, and the first republic to declare its independence as Baltic
push came to Soviet shove. It is now a proud member of NATO, and the leader of a
Provincial Reconstruction Team in Afghanistan.
For the transatlantic alliance, the period in which Lithuania and other captive nations
gained their independence was a time of reflection. Not only were we pondering
enlargement to secure the wave of democracy sweeping across Eastern Europe, but
NATO was also pondering the very concept of collective self-defense in a post- Cold
War world.
We saw this in 1991, when NATO issued its first Strategic Concept. This document
recognized that [QUOTE] a “single massive and global threat ha[d] given way to
diverse and multi-directional risks” [UNQUOTE] – challenges such as weapons
proliferation; disruption of the flow of vital resources; ethnic conflict; and terrorism.
Overcoming these threats, the document stated, would require a “broad approach to
security,” with political, economic, and social elements.
From the perspective of one who played a role in that effort to redirect NATO 17 years
ago, today I would like to discuss a subject that embodies the security challenges that
have emerged since that time, and correspondingly, the capabilities we need, in this new
era.
That subject is, not surprisingly, Afghanistan. After six years of war, at a time when
some may sense frustration, impatience, or even exhaustion with this mission, I believe
it is valuable to step back and take stock of Afghanistan:
First, within the context of the long-standing purpose of the Alliance, and how it relates
to the threats of a post Cold War world;
Second, with regard to NATO’s vision of becoming a transformed, multifaceted,
expeditionary force – and how we have evolved in accordance with that vision; and
Finally, to recapitulate to the people of Europe the importance of the Afghanistan
mission and its relationship to the wider terrorist threat.
There is little doubt that the mission in Afghanistan is unprecedented. It is, in fact,
NATO’s first ground war and it is dramatically different than anything NATO has done
before. However, on a conceptual level, I believe it falls squarely within the traditional
bounds of the Alliance’s core purpose: to defend the security interests and values of the
transatlantic community.
During the 1990s, even as we tried to predict what form the threats of the 21st century
would take, Afghanistan was, in reality becoming exactly what we were discussing in
theory. Subsequent events during the intervening years have shown that:
Instability and conflict abroad have the potential to spread and strike directly at the
hearts of our nations;
New technology and communications connect criminal and terrorist networks far and
wide, and allow local problems to become regional and even global;
Economic, social, and humanitarian problems caused by massive immigration flows
radiate outward with little regard for national borders;
A nexus between narcotics and terrorists increases the resources available to extremists
in the region, while increasing the drug flow to European streets; and
The presence of safe havens, combined with a lack of development and governance,
allow Islamic extremists to turn a poisonous ideology into a global movement.
More than five years ago in Prague, in the wake of the September 11th attacks, our
nations set out to transform NATO into an expeditionary force capable of dealing with
threats of this type – capable of helping other nations help themselves to avoid
Afghanistan’s fate. At the time, I imagine many were unsure of what, exactly, this
would look like – what new structures, training, funding, mindsets, and manpower
would be needed. Since then, however, we have applied our vision on the ground in
Afghanistan.
Today:
Nearly 50,000 troops from some 40 allies and partner nations serve under NATO
command, thousands of miles from the Alliance’s traditional borders;
Growing numbers of reconstruction and security training teams are making a real
difference in the lives of the Afghan people; and
NATO’s offensive and counterinsurgency operations in the South have dislodged the
Taliban from their strongholds and reduced their ability to launch large scale or
coordinated attacks.
Due to NATO’s efforts, as Minister Jung pointed out yesterday, Afghanistan has made
substantial progress in health care, education, and the economy – bettering the lives of
millions of its citizens.
Through the Afghan mission, we have developed a much more sophisticated
understanding of what capabilities we need as an Alliance and what shortcomings must
be addressed.
Since the Riga summit, there has been much focus on whether all allies are meeting
their commitments and carrying their share of the burden. I have had a few things to say
about that myself. In truth, virtually all allies are fulfilling the individual commitments
they have made. The problem is that the Alliance as a whole has not fulfilled its broader
commitment from Riga to meet the force requirements of the commander in the field.
As we think about how to satisfy those requirements, we should look more creatively at
other ways to ensure that all allies can contribute more to this mission – and share this
burden. But we must not – we cannot – become a two-tiered Alliance of those who are
willing to fight and those who are not. Such a development, with all its implications for
collective security, would effectively destroy the Alliance.
As many of you know, a Strategic Vision document is being drafted that will assess
NATO’s and our partners’ achievements in Afghanistan, and will produce a set of
realistic goals and a roadmap to meet them over the next three to five years. We
continue urgently to need a senior civilian – a European in my view – to coordinate all
non-military international assistance to the Afghan government and people. The lack of
such coordination is seriously hampering our efforts to help the Afghans build a free
and secure country.
The really hard question the Alliance faces is whether the whole of our effort is adding
up to less than the sum of its parts, and, if that is the case, what we should do to reverse
that equation.
As an Alliance, we must be willing to discard some of the bureaucratic hurdles that
have accumulated over the years and hinder our progress in Afghanistan. This means
more willingness to think and act differently – and quickly. To pass initiatives such as
the NATO Commander’s Emergency Response Fund. This tool has proven itself
elsewhere, but will, for NATO, require a more flexible approach to budgeting and
funding.
Additionally, it is clear that we need a common set of training standards for every one
going to Afghanistan – whether they are combat troops conducting counterinsurgency
operations; civilians working in Provincial Reconstruction Teams; or members of
operational mentoring and liaison training teams. Unless we are all on the same page –
unless our efforts are tied together and unified by similar tactics, training, and goals –
then the whole of our efforts will indeed be less than the sum of the parts.
I also worry that there is a developing theology about a clear-cut division of labor
between civilian and military matters – one that sometimes plays out in debates over the
respective roles of the European Union and NATO, and even among the NATO allies.
In many respects, this conversation echoes one that has taken place – and still is – in the
United States within the civilian and military agencies of the U.S. government as a
result of the Afghanistan and Iraq campaigns.
For the United States, the lessons we have learned these past six years – and in many
cases re-learned – have not been easy ones. We have stumbled along the way, and we
are still learning. Now, in Iraq, we are applying a comprehensive strategy that
emphasizes the security of the local population – those who will ultimately take control
of their own security – and brings to bear in the same place and often at the same time
civilian resources for economic and political development.
We have learned that war in the 21st century does not have stark divisions between
civilian and military components. It is a continuous scale that slides from combat
operations to economic development, governance and reconstruction – frequently all at
the same time.
The Alliance must put aside any theology that attempts clearly to divide civilian and
military operations. It is unrealistic. We must live in the real world. As we noted as far
back as 1991, in the real world, security has economic, political, and social dimensions.
And vice versa. In the future, the E.U. and NATO will have to find ways to work
together better, to share certain roles – neither excluding NATO from civilian-military
operations nor barring the E.U. from purely military missions. In short, I agree entirely
with Secretary General de Hoop Scheffer and Minister Morin’s comments yesterday
that there must be a “complimentarity” between the E.U. and NATO.
At the same time, in NATO, some allies ought not to have the luxury of opting only for
stability and civilian operations, thus forcing other Allies to bear a disproportionate
share of the fighting and the dying.
Overall, the last few years have seen a dramatic evolution in NATO’s thinking and in its
posture. With all the new capabilities we have forged in the heat of battle – and with
new attitudes – we are seeing what it means to be expeditionary. What is required to
spread stability beyond our borders. We must now commit ourselves to institutionalize
what we have learned and to complete our transformation.
Just as we must be realistic about the nature and complexity of the struggle in
Afghanistan, so too must we be realistic about politics in our various countries. NATO,
after all, is an alliance whose constituent governments all answer to their citizens.
My colleagues in Vilnius and those in this room certainly understand the serious threat
we face in Afghanistan. But I am concerned that many people on this continent may not
comprehend the magnitude of the direct threat to European security. For the United
States, September 11th was a galvanizing event – one that opened the American
public’s eyes to dangers from distant lands. It was especially poignant since our
government had been heavily involved in Afghanistan in the 1980s, only to make the
grievous error – of which I was at least partly responsible – of abandoning a destitute
and war-torn nation after the last Soviet soldier crossed the Termez bridge.
While nearly all the Alliance governments appreciate the importance of the Afghanistan
mission, European public support for it is weak. Many Europeans question the
relevance of our actions and doubt whether the mission is worth the lives of their sons
and daughters. As a result, many want to remove their troops. The reality of fragile
coalition governments makes it difficult to take risks. And communicating the
seriousness of the threat posed by Islamic extremism in Afghanistan, the Middle East,
Europe, and globally remains a steep challenge.
As opinion leaders and government officials, we are the ones who must make the case
publicly and persistently.
So now I would like to add my voice to those of many allied leaders and speak directly
to the people of Europe: The threat posed by violent Islamic extremism is real – and it is
not going away. You know all too well about the attacks in Madrid and London. But
there have also been multiple smaller attacks in Istanbul, Amsterdam, Paris, and
Glasgow, among others. Numerous cells and plots have been disrupted in recent years
as well – many of them seeking large-scale death and destruction, such as:
A complex plot to down multiple airliners over the Atlantic that could have killed
hundreds or even thousands;
A plot to use ricin and release cyanide in the London Underground;
A separate plan for a chemical attack in the Paris metro;
Plots in Belgium, England, and Germany involving car bombs that could have killed
hundreds;
Homemade bombs targeting commuter and high-speed trains in Spain and Germany;
Individuals arrested in Bosnia with explosives, a suicide belt, and an instructional
propaganda video;
Two plots in Denmark involving explosives, fertilizer, and a bomb-making video; and
Just in the last few weeks, Spanish authorities arrested 14 Islamic extremists in
Barcelona suspected of planning suicide attacks against public transport systems in
Spain, Portugal, France, Germany, and Britain.
Imagine, for a moment, if some or all of these attacks had come to pass. Imagine if
Islamic terrorists had managed to strike your capitals on the same scale as they struck in
New York. Imagine if they had laid their hands on weapons and materials with even
greater destructive capability – weapons of the sort all too easily accessible in the world
today. We forget at our peril that the ambition of Islamic extremists is limited only by
opportunity.
We should also remember that terrorist cells in Europe are not purely homegrown or
unconnected to events far away – or simply a matter of domestic law and order. Some
are funded from abroad. Some hate all western democracies, not just the United States.
Many who have been arrested have had direct connections to Al Qaeda. Some have met
with top leaders or attended training camps abroad. Some are connected to Al Qaeda in
Iraq. In the most recent case, the Barcelona cell appears to have ties to a terrorist
training network run by Baitullah Mehsud, a Pakistan-based extremist commander
affiliated with the Taliban and Al Qaeda – who we believe was responsible for the
assassination of Benazir Bhutto.
What unites them is that they are all followers of the same movement – a movement
that is no longer tethered to any strict hierarchy but one that has become an independent
force of its own. Capable of animating a corps of devoted followers without direct
contact. And capable of inspiring violence without direct orders.
It is an ideological movement that has, over the years, been methodically built on the
illusion of success. After all, about the only thing they have accomplished recently is
the death of thousands of innocent Muslims while trying to create discord across the
Middle East. So far they have failed. But they have twisted this reality into an aura of
success in many parts of the world. It raises the question: What would happen if the
false success they proclaim became real success? If they triumphed in Iraq or
Afghanistan, or managed to topple the government of Pakistan? Or a major Middle
Eastern government?
Aside from the chaos that would instantly be sown in the region, success there would
beget success on many other fronts as the cancer metastasized further and more rapidly
than it already has. Many more followers could join their ranks, both in the region and
in susceptible populations across the globe. With safe havens in the Middle East, and
new tactics honed on the battlefield and transmitted via the Internet, violence and
terrorism worldwide could surge.
I am not indulging in scare tactics. Nor am I exaggerating either the threat or inflating
the consequences of a victory for extremists. Nor am I saying that the extremists are ten
feet tall. The task before us is to fracture and destroy this movement in its infancy – to
permanently reduce its ability to strike globally and catastrophically, while deflating its
ideology. Our best opportunity as an alliance to do this is in Afghanistan. Just as the
hollowness of Communism was laid bare with the collapse of the Soviet Union, so too
would success in Afghanistan, as well as in Iraq, strike a decisive blow against what
some commentators have called Al Qaeda-ism.
This is a steep challenge. But the events of the last year have proven one thing above all
else: If we are willing to stand together, we can prevail. It will not be quick, and it will
not be easy – but it can be done.
In the years ahead, the credibility of NATO, and indeed the viability of the EuroAtlantic security project itself, will depend on how we perform now. Other actors in the
global arena – Hezbollah, Iran and others – are watching what we say and what we do,
and making choices about their future course.
Everyone knows that in 2009 the United States will have a new administration. And this
time, next year, you will be hearing from a new Secretary of Defense.
But regardless of which party is in power, regardless who stands at this podium, the
threats we face now and in the future are real. They will not go away. Overcoming them
will require unity between opposition parties and across various governments, and
uncommon purpose within the Alliance and with other friends and partners.
I began my remarks with a bit of history about NATO in the 1990s. I would like to close
with a few words about the dawn of the transatlantic Alliance.
From our present-day vantage point, victory in the Cold War now seems almost
preordained. But as we prepare to celebrate NATO’s 60th anniversary next year, it is
useful to recall that 60 years ago, in 1948, the year of the Berlin airlift, few people
would have been all that optimistic about the future of Europe, or the prospect of a
Western alliance. The Continent was devastated, its economy in shambles. The United
States was debating the European recovery program – known as the Marshall Plan – and
faced a resurgent isolationism. Europe was under siege – with pressure from
communism being felt in Germany, France, Finland, Norway, Italy, Czechoslovakia,
and Greece.
In January of that year, Ernest Bevin, the British foreign secretary, went before
parliament to discuss the Soviet Union and other threats to the United Kingdom.
Between all the “kindred souls of the West,” he said, “there should be an effective
understanding bound together by common ideals for which the Western Powers have
twice in one generation shed their blood.”
Less than two months later, President Harry Truman stood in the United States
Congress and echoed that sentiment. He said: “The time has come when the free men
and women of the world must face the threat to their liberty squarely and courageously .
. . Unity of purpose, unity of effort, and unity of spirit are essential to accomplish the
task before us.”
That unity held for decades through ups and downs. It held despite divisions and
discord, stresses and strains, and through several crises where another major war in
Europe loomed large. Alexis de Tocqueville once warned that democracies, when it
came to foreign affairs, were ill-suited to pursue a [QUOTE] “great undertaking” and
“follow it [through] with determination.” But the democracies of the West did just that –
for more than 40 years. And they can do so once more today.
We must find the resolve to confront together a new set of challenges. So that, many
years from now, our children and their children will look back on this period as a time
when we recommitted ourselves to the common ideals that bind us together. A time
when we again faced a threat to peace and to our liberty squarely and courageously. A
time when we again shed blood and helped war devastated people nourish the seeds of
freedom and foster peaceful, productive societies. That mission drew us together in
1948 and keeps us together today.
Many years from now, perhaps future generations will look back on this period and say,
“victory seemed almost preordained.”
Thank you.
Speaker: Hoon, Geoffrey
Function: M.P., Secretary of State of Defense, United Kingdom of Great Britain
and Northern Ireland
Nation/
Organization: United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
Transatlantic Relations
02/07/2004
The transatlantic relationship has been marked by a long, history of sustained and
reliable mutual support. In practice, the benefits of the relationship have been most
clearly demonstrated on the continent of Europe during the 20th century. It has been
pivotal in helping us preserve the freedom, security and democracy we cherish.
We in Europe know that our world would be a much more dangerous place if America
had chosen to follow an isolationist path. We know that such a course was open to
successive US Presidents. We know that it would probably have been politically
popular in the United States, l want to restate my appreciation for all those - including
many here today - who have resisted that easy route and who have chosen the harder
road of international engagement.
Because without that engagement in European affairs by the United States -without a
strong transatlantic relationship - we would never have overcome the threat posed by
tyranny during the last century.
Without the military power of the United States to back the international community's
commitments, the Taleban regime would still be in power in Kabul and Milosevic
would still be terrorising Kosovo..
And of course without the US led coalition, Saddam Hussein would still be in power in
Baghdad - ignoring his obligation under UNJ resolutions, terrorising and torturing his
own people and depriving them of the basic human rights.
I know that the issue of intelligence on Weapons of Mass Destruction remains
controversial - not least in the United Kingdom: but two points are clear from the
factual record:
Firstly, Saddam Hussein used chemical weapons and admitted seeking nuclear
weapons: theses risks are gone;
And secondly, since the intervention there has been more progress on counter
proliferation than for a decade in North Korea, Iran and most dramatically in Libya.
But there are still threats to European security - maybe from outside its borders but of a
new and terrifying nature. This threat is real and it is shared with the United States.
Consequently, in the immediate aftermath of September 11th , allied democracies drew
together in NATO in a show of unity against terror.
In barely two months the Taleban regime was removed from Afghanistan and AI Qaeda
was severally disrupted.
But the Americans did not do all this alone - they formed coalitions. As the United
States National Security Strategy acknowledges: "There is little of lasting consequences
that the United States can accomplish in the world without the sustained co-operation of
its allies and friends in Canada and Europe."
Last year, of course, saw strains within NATO and the United Nations over Iraq. Some
went out of their way to push a European Union dimension as a counterweight to the
defence relationship with the United States. The dangerous consequence of policies that
result in the Polarisation of US-EU relations is that it can feed misunderstanding and
encourage Isolationist tendencies on both sides of the Atlantic, l want to make it clear
that there is no appetite amongst the European Union members, nor indeed among
wider invitees, for that to happen,
Economic power and military might are balances that shape our relationships - these
balances shift over time. A transatlantic relationship need not be an equal one to be
successful - but it does require a common understanding of the challenges we face and a
common purpose to meet them together.
The Challenges
The real challenges for the new relationship lie not in the academic definition of the
ESDP-NATO relationship. instead, the real and immediate challenges are in the threat
posed by international terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and
the consequences of failing or failed states.
It is generally accepted that a strategic conventional threat to Europe is unlikely to
emerge in the short term. But the events of the last 5 years have demonstrated the
uncertain nature of the global security environment and have underlined the range of
new menaces facing us in place of the old threat. Since September 11th, 2001 the
attacks in Bali, Jakarta, Casablanca and Bombay - in Mombassa, Najaf, Riyad, Baghdad
- and most recently in Istanbul the very real danger that international terrorism poses to
all of us.
The continuing proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction is another pressing cause
for concern. Soma states will continue to seek WMD, particularly as access to the
technology and production capabilities becomes easier. We know as well that
international terrorists are seeking to increase their access to chemical, biological and
radiological means to .enhance their capacity for disruption and dislocation.
Weak and failing states also present an increasing problem. Such states are
characterised by political mismanagement, ethnic and religious tensions or economic
collapse. They can contain areas of ungoverned territory, which provide havens and
sources of support for terrorist groups and criminal networks. Here the European
interest is extensive and enduring. it is an area where ESDP can make a useful
contribution, especially in providing quick reaction capability to the United Nations.
Regional analysis
So where will the future threats to the peace and security of Europe arise? The EU
Security Strategy sets this out clearly and in ways wholly compatible with the
transatlantic relationship. These rag Ions immediately adjacent Europe - the near East
North Africa and the Gulf - are likely to continue 10 have the most significant bearing
on Western security interests. Potentially destabilising social, political, and economic
problems demand that we engage in conflict prevention, as well as responding rapidly
to emerging crises.
The Middle East still presents the most significant security challenge. The
Israeli/Palestinian problem is undoubtedly a major regional issue. The international
community must continue its efforts to secure a lasting settlement Although recent
operations have largely neutralised one threat, weapons of mass destruction are
continuing to proliferate across the Middle East and beyond and will be a continuing
concern. Developing relationships are high on the agenda for the North Atlantic nations.
Looking beyond the regions adjacent to Europe, we have to recognise that there will be
a greater need for commitments further afield. Of course, crises could occur anywhere
across the world and the transatlantic alliance may not, as a whole, be engaged in every
case, But it -will wish to be involved in dialogue and discussions. Expanding effective
diplomacy beyond the existing NATO Partnership for Peace countries must therefore be
a long term goal.
Much of what I've outlined leads to the conclusion that one of the greatest risks to our
peace and security is that the strategic environment will change faster than we can
understand - or indeed adapt to, A strong transatlantic relationship is essential in
ensuring that does not happen.
Implications for Defence
What then are the implications of these challenges for the Defence strategies of the
Allies?
In meeting the global terrorist threat we must be prepared to conduct operations at
relatively small scale but at very short notice, at long range, and indeed with high
frequency. The relative importance of peace support and humanitarian operations is also
likely to increase, as we recognise the contribution that state failure can make to
terrorism. We need to try to avoid a repeat of what happened for example in
Afghanistan.
We welcome NATO's Steps to take a-wider role in that country and to show our support
I can announce that we are prepared to take command of the Northern Region Group
there, including the Provisional Reconstruction Tearr,s7 and deploying UK troops
currently in Kabul
The range of tasks expected of our armed forces will be broad - from peacekeeping,
humanitarian and confidence-building operations through to counter-terrorism and highintensity combat against s diverse set of potential adversaries.
Regional tensions and potential conflicts are likely to create a sustained high demand
for enduring peace support commitments, such as the extended deployments that we
have seen in recent times in the Balkans. The military to civil transition demands special
skills. There is much to learn about how best to harness the full range of levers that
nations and multinational institutions can bring to bear. In planning terms, the Alliance
must be better at recognising the long term nature of nation building.
The lessons we are learning in Iraq, in Africa and elsewhere are bitter and expensive
ones. We must ensure we do not lose sight of them, particularly when the politics of
consensus throws up a less than effective compromise.
The multilateral response required will set a premium on the capacity of our forces to
inter-operate with those of other countries. It is highly unlikely that the United Kingdom
would be engaged in high intensity large-scale operations without the United States, a
judgement born of past experience, shared interest and our assessment of strategic
trends. This will drive the technologically challenging and financially expensive
requirement to inter-operate with the United States, This will not just be in the 'soft'
world of communications and information networks" but in the harder world of strategic
deployment and training at the most challenging level of military operations.
European allies in NATO, and through ESDP, have a key part to play in our collective
defence and security, it will be vital for them to link together on the battlefield through
technology. To play a part nations must be able to plug into a multinational response at
different layers-of the military system. Work in the EU, such as the new Defence
Agency, and the NATO initiative on Usability are key enablers to develop effective
deployable forces.
Also in this context I would highlight a Franco-British proposal made at our most-recent
summit, that the EU should develop the capability to deploy battle-group size force
packages in response to crises identified by the UN. The aim will be for these battlegroups to be able to act rapidly and robustly under Chapter VII mandate to stabilise the
situation before handing over to longer term UN or regional peacekeeping.
This will be an important initiative enhance the real usability of European forces in a
fashion complementary to NATO's efforts and we will be presenting our proposals the
EU in the near future.
The key to retaining interoperability with the United States is likely to rest in the
successful Operation of NATO's new Allied Command for Transformation in short - it
is time for Europe to up its game - and America must be an enthusiastic enabler in this
process.
Where there is a requirement for active military operations. targets are likely to be
fleeting: and the opportunities for effective action will depend on the speed of our
response. This will be driven by access to effective intelligence something many nations
believe they have - but something that NATO lacks in an integrated form. Developing
more effective Intelligence integration is a vital first step.
International Organisations
The responsibility for meeting these threats falls globally, to all of us. So where military
action is required, it will be most effective, both tactically and strategically, when it
comes in the form of partnerships, alliances and coalitions.
For Europe the key organisations through which we act will be NATO and the
European Union. NATO will remain the cornerstone of our collective defence and for
crisis management in the Euro-Atlantic area. 1t is also the most important transatlantic
Organisation, through which the United States will engage with its allies in planning
and conducting military operations.
NATO provides a strong base from which to assemble a military response and to
facilitate planning, deployment and operations. However, the Alliance will need to
further develop their expeditionary and crisis management capabilities. This means
investing wisely to create and maintain modern, well-equipped military forces capable
of doing the job.
The success of the NATO initiatives agreed at Prague will be a real test of the Alliance's
willingness to' transform itself. In turn this will be a factor in ultimately determining
whether the United States sees sufficient advantage in continued engagement through
NATO itself.
The EU - through its Common Foreign and Security Policy supported by the European
Security and Defence Policy - will provide a complementary organisations through
which we can act where NATO as a whole is not engaged. The Berlin Plus
arrangements and NATO-EU transparency are key enablers to success.
In Europe, there must be a better recognition of America's huge investment in the
international system of which they were key architects, from NATO to the United
Nations: and an acknowledgement that the current Administration has continued to use
the international system, not least on a host of key issues in the Security Council - a
two-state solution for Israel and Palestine, Afghanistan and Iraq, and many other cases.
In turn, America must continue to work hard at its various relationships if she is to
retain the support and goodwill she certainly today enjoys.
Conclusion
NATO will continue to occupy a key position in our planning. NATO will also remain
the basis for our collective defence, for crisis management in the Euro-Atlantic area and
for facing together new threats to our security. The North Atlantic nations understand
the common threats and must come together in a common purpose.
The transatlantic relationship must also evolve beyond the parochial. It must face up the
challenge elsewhere - turning to addressing the Middle East; finding a new role for
Russia; establishing a confidence with China as it emerges into great power Status; and
recognise India as an emerging and significant player. These opportunities to establish
effective and enduring relations must not be missed. It is crucial that all allies play a
part,
The US have demonstrated their willingness to remain engaged. We are fortunate that
they continue to see that it is in their own interests to continue to do so. !t is certainly in
ours.
© 1999 - 2008 Munich Conference on Security Policy (Legal notice)
Speaker: Morin, Hervé
Function: Minister of Defense, French Republic
Nation/
Organization: French Republic
Je voudrais tout d’abord remercier les organisateurs de la 44ème « Conférence sur la
Politique de Sécurité », et tout particulièrement son Président, M. Horst TELTSCHIK,
de leur invitation à m’exprimer pour la première fois devant cette assemblée si
prestigieuse des spécialistes des questions de sécurité et de défense.
J’avais eu la chance d’accompagner, comme collaborateur, un ancien ministre français
de la Défense, M. François LEOTARD, quand il était venu s’exprimer ici, il y a
quelques années. Je suis très heureux, qu’avec un peu plus de cheveux gris, il me soit
donné l’occasion d’intervenir aujourd’hui pour la première fois devant vous, aux côtés
de mon ami Franz-Josef JUNG.
A moins de deux mois du sommet de Bucarest, mais aussi à cinq mois de notre
présidence de l’Union européenne, il est important que nous Français, puissions
partager nos réflexions sur le devenir de notre communauté transatlantique, à laquelle
nous sommes tous ici si attachés.
Vous le savez, celles-ci s’inscrivent dans un débat de fond engagé en France à
l’initiative du Président de la République depuis l’été dernier, qui anime les travaux du
« Livre blanc sur la défense et la sécurité ».
Essayons ensemble de tracer ces quelques pistes.
1. Réflexions sur l’évolution de l’OTAN :
Nous sommes ici réunis autour du thème « l’Alliance atlantique, Bucarest et au-delà…
». Pour moi, cela signifie d’abord la rénovation proprement dite de la structure même de
l’Alliance, même si la France n’est pas dans le commandement intégré. D’ailleurs, je
propose qu’un jour les observateurs s’interrogent sur ce que c’est qu’être actuellement
dans le commandement intégré, que ce que faire partie de cette structure veut dire, par
rapport à la position actuelle de la France dans l’Alliance, quelles implications cela a
pour nos forces et notre indépendance. Je ne voudrais pas que vous me reprochiez une
quelconque « gallic arrogance ». Je sais que l’alliance fait beaucoup pour évoluer mais
permettez- moi de vous livrer quelques réflexions.
Dans cette question de l’évolution de l’OTAN, je vois une triple problématique :
Une problématique interne d’abord, qui touche à la nécessaire réforme interne de
l’Alliance : à l’heure où nos démocraties sont confrontées à des contraintes budgétaires
croissantes, l’OTAN doit s’atteler résolument à cette exigence de rationalisation - en
termes de coût global, de nombre d’hommes, de nombre d’états-majors.
Je rappelle que L’OTAN c’est un budget de 2 Md€, c’est plus de 22 000 personnes
employés à plein temps (pour 66 000 hommes en opérations !), c’est près de 320
comités ou sous comités dont certains portent le nom de « comité sur les défis de la
société moderne » ou « comité pour la nourriture ou l’agriculture » !
Je sais que le Secrétaire Général M. de HOOP SCHEFFER est convaincu de la nécessité
de rendre l’Alliance plus efficiente. Il faut maintenant aller plus loin et plus vite.
Bien sûr, le bilan de la rénovation lancée lors du sommet de Prague en 2002 est positif :
Nos forces, essentiellement statiques et organisées pour affronter celles du pacte de
Varsovie, sont devenues réactives et projetables, aptes au combat dans des
environnements très divers grâce à des armements modernes et adaptés. Les armées de
nos Alliés d’Europe centrale ont été mises au standard de l’OTAN et sont maintenant
interopérables avec celles des autres membres de l’Alliance.
Pour autant, on ne doit pas en rester là. L’Alliance doit se rénover pour être toujours
plus réactive et flexible, en phase avec une époque plus instable et imprévisible — si
différente de la glaciation stratégique qui nous a longtemps servi de cadre.
La réforme de la structure de commandement doit être poursuivie avec détermination :
le nombre des états-majors a déjà été réduit, mais des marges de progrès subsistent. En
réponse aux objectifs de Prague, nous avons développé 16 états-majors de composantes
projetables, mais, parallèlement, nous conservons 6 structures permanentes du même
type, issues de la guerre froide et devenues redondantes.
Nous savons tous que les économies que ces réformes permettront de dégager seront
utiles ailleurs, au sein de l’Alliance pour la conduite des opérations en cours, et plus
généralement dans l’ensemble des budgets que nous consacrons à la défense.
Les travaux engagés par l’OTAN pour réformer le processus de planification de défense
doivent également être poursuivis. Le processus actuel, que tous s’accordent à trouver
long et fastidieux, a été conçu dans une logique de Guerre froide : il visait à construire
collectivement notre outil de défense pour faire face, dans un cadre stable, à un ennemi
clairement identifié. Aujourd’hui, les difficultés rencontrées par l’Alliance en
Afghanistan — je pense en particulier aux drones et aux hélicoptères de transport —
démontrent que ce processus n’a pas permis de garantir la mise à disposition des
capacités répondant aux besoins des opérations actuelles. Il nous faut un processus plus
souple, plus transparent et qui mobilise moins de personnes.
Pour autant, il est fondamental de trouver dans ce processus un juste équilibre entre la
satisfaction de besoins urgents issus des opérations en cours et le développement des
capacités futures. Il est tout aussi important que les nations conservent l'entière maîtrise
du choix du cadre dans lequel elles souhaitent employer les capacités qu’elles ont
développées — souvent au prix d’un effort financier important —, que ce soit au profit
de l'Alliance ou non.
Une question particulière dans ce débat : la question du financement commun.
Appliquons à l’OTAN et à l’Union européenne les mêmes règles. Il n’est pas normal
que certains acceptent dans une structure un effort qu’ils refusent de faire dans l’autre.
C’est en levant ce genre de blocages que nous ferons progresser à la fois la rénovation
de l’Alliance et l’Europe de la Défense.
La problématique des frontières, ensuite. Jusqu’où l’Alliance a-t-elle vocation à
s’élargir : où nous arrêterons-nous ? Nous traiterons à Bucarest quelques cas
particuliers, mais nous devons avoir ensemble une réflexion plus globale. Je considère
pour ma part que nous faisons partie d’une communauté euro-atlantique, une
communauté de valeurs qui repose sur des fondements philosophiques communs, sur les
mêmes fondations. Certes le pacte social américain est différent du pacte social
européen – mais ce sont les mêmes penseurs, le même siècle des lumières, qui nous ont
inspiré. Le Génie européen, c’est le génie d’une société qui a forgé son identité sur des
solidarités, sur le sentiment que l’appartenance à un projet commun et non sur le
principe que l’appartenace relève de la naissance.
Face à un monde qu’on appelait, souvenez vous, il y a moins de vingt ans le Tiers
monde et vers lequel le pouvoir bascule irrésistiblement, nous aurons besoin de
nouvelles solidarités pour porter notre communauté de valeurs. Ce sont ces éléments
déterminants qui nous rassemblent et doivent guider notre politique à venir.
Troisième idée, enfin : que doit devenir l’OTAN ? Pour moi, le fondement de l’Alliance
est bien une alliance militaire, soudée autour de l’article 5 qui pose les bases juridiques
de notre défense collective. L’OTAN s’est progressivement dotée de capacités de
gestion de crises, elle intervient aujourd’hui hors du territoire de l’Alliance. Doit-elle
devenir un outil de stabilisation global, une sorte de « gendarme du monde » qui irait
jusqu’à une concurrence avec l’ONU ?
Ces réflexions ne sont pas théoriques : elle trouvent à l’inverse une application très
concrète, immédiate, en Afghanistan, qui a constitué le cœur de nos débats à Vilnius.
Ce théâtre revêt pour nous une importance particulière, car on y retrouve, entremêlés, la
plupart des problématiques, des risques et des menaces auxquelles nous sommes
confrontés : le terrorisme, le fanatisme religieux, les sentiments anti-occidentaux, la
criminalité, la pauvreté, les trafics d'armes et de drogue, la fragilité de l'Etat de droit, la
corruption…
En Afghanistan, la solution n’est pas simplement militaire, nous le savons bien, même
si un effort supplémentaire doit peut-être être fait à court terme. L’action militaire est
stérile si elle n’est pas suivie d’une vraie action globale sur le terrain — c’est un peu
comme l’effet de la vague sur le sable, l’action continue du flux et du reflux de l’océan.
Nous remportons des victoires militaires – c’est l’urgence – mais dès que nos forces
sont parties, la situation revient à l’identique ou presque : c’est le reflux de la vague sur
le sable.
Si la solution n’est pas militaire, elle ne consiste pas non plus à vouloir créer ex-nihilo
dans ce pays une démocratie à l’occidentale : nous ne pouvons pas appliquer à ce pays
une vision occidentaliste, ethno-centrée. Il nous faut accepter d’intégrer dans notre
approche tout le poids de l’histoire et de cultures différentes. La France défend cette
idée depuis longtemps et j’ai été heureux de constater de vrais points de convergence
dans le discours de Gordon BROWN en décembre dernier devant la Chambre des
communes.
Agir aujourd’hui ensemble en Afghanistan, agir à la fois sur les plans militaire et civil,
c'est préparer notre sécurité de demain. En effet, comme l’a écrit Antoine de SaintExupéry dans Citadelle, « L’avenir n'est jamais que du présent à mettre en ordre.
L’avenir, on n’a pas à le prévoir mais à le permettre. »
Précisément, pour permettre l’avenir, il nous faut garder à l’esprit notre objectif : un
pays stable aux mains des Afghans. Les opérations militaires ne sont qu’un élément –
certes essentiel s’agissant de la lutte contre Al Qaida – pour y parvenir.
Agir aujourd'hui pour notre sécurité de demain, cela signifie donc d’une part de disposer
des moyens d'action nécessaires, d’autre part d’adapter notre stratégie à la situation
afghane et, enfin, de la rendre claire pour nos opinions publiques.
Disposer des moyens d'intervenir et exprimer concrètement la volonté d’agir. Les
difficultés rencontrées en matière de génération de forces, les interrogations de certains
alliés sur la solidarité effective au sein de l’Alliance sont autant de questions à prendre
au sérieux. Que moins d'un dixième de nos forces soit apte à la projection, l’incapacité
de fournir une quinzaine d’hélicoptères de transport lourd, tout cela me paraît frappant.
Cela doit nous amener collectivement à consentir un effort de défense à hauteur des
enjeux qui sont les nôtres. Le général de Gaulle rappelait que l’Etat ne peut faillir à sa
défense sans se détruire lui-même. Ce jugement implacable me paraît plus que jamais
d’actualité ; nos démocraties doivent le méditer.
Deuxièmement, adapter notre stratégie. D'une part, il nous faut mettre en œuvre
collectivement au sein de l'Alliance, et dans chacune de nos capitales, un volet de
diplomatie publique qui convaincra nos opinions et nos représentations nationales de la
justesse et de la pertinence de notre action en Afghanistan.
D'autre part, il nous faut sur place conjuguer des actions militaires et civiles bien ciblées
et adaptées à ce type de crise, ce qui passe par une meilleure coordination des acteurs. Il
est plus que jamais temps de nommer une personnalité reconnue pour ses compétences
et son charisme pour remplir cette tâche au nom de l'Organisation des Nations Unies, en
étroite coordination avec les autorités afghanes.
2. L’OTAN et l’Union européenne, deux acteurs complémentaires qui doivent agir
ensemble :
Je suis convaincu que les difficultés que nous éprouvons dans la génération de forces,
en Afghanistan comme au Tchad, ne sont rien d’autre que l’expression militaire de la
résignation politique européenne. L’Europe ne s’assume pas. Elle se complaît dans sa
situation de dépendance. Les Etats-Unis le regrettent, mais en même temps ils s’en sont
longuement satisfaits — dans une sorte de schizophrénie. J’en ai longuement parlé la
semaine dernière à Washington avec mon ami Robert GATES. L’Europe doit en effet
faire plus pour partager le fardeau de sa défense, mais les Nations européennes ne le
feront que si elles prennent conscience de leur propre responsabilités, et cette
conscience là ne viendra que si elles sortent de l’infantilisation dans laquelle on les
confine. C’est parce qu’elles accèderont à l’âge adulte qu’elles feront un effort
supplémentaire. Et on voit bien que l’union européenne ce n’est pas moins d’alliance
mais plus de forces – de ce réservoir de forces qui sont au service de l’Alliance et de
l’Union européenne.
Bucarest doit marquer la transformation de l’Alliance et en même temps être le moment
où les Européens décident d’assumer leur part du fardeau. Et cela doit se faire dans une
démarche responsable et assumée, et non dans un Berlin plus à l’envers. L’Europe ne
peut se contenter d’être l’agence civile de l’OTAN.
Vous le savez, les zones menacées par de fortes tensions sont nombreuses : en Afrique,
au Moyen-Orient, en Europe orientale, en Asie centrale et du sud. A priori, l’Afrique
c’est plutôt pour l’Europe, l’Asie c’est plus pour l’OTAN. Face à la multiplication de
ces crises, qui peuvent nous menacer directement, il n’y a pas de trop plein mais des
manques. Il y a plus de crises que de capacités pour y faire face. L’Union européenne et
l’OTAN sont ainsi toutes deux nécessaires et complémentaires.
L’ampleur de la menace et le poids des enjeux nous imposent de trouver les meilleures
voies et moyens pour agir, en utilisant l'une ou l'autre organisation selon les avantages
de chacune et selon les crises. Comme le rappelait récemment encore le Président de la
République, les opposer n’a aucun sens parce que l’OTAN et l’UE sont pour nous les
deux volets d’une même politique de sécurité et de défense.
Nous pouvons – et je dirais même nous devons – agir de front vers le renforcement de
l'Europe de la Défense et vers la mise en place d’une OTAN plus réactive et plus
flexible.
Ensemble, notre approche doit donc être politique, mais aussi capacitaire, pour revisiter
et dynamiser la coopération entre une Alliance atlantique appelée à poursuivre son
évolution — et au sein de laquelle la France a vocation à prendre toute sa place — et
l'Union européenne.
3. Nous avons besoin d’une Europe de la Défense forte :
Le bilan de l’Europe de la Défense est incontestable, au cours de ces dix années depuis
Saint-Malo. L’Européen convaincu que je suis en est fier, au moment où l’Union
s'apprête à lancer une nouvelle opération militaire autonome au Tchad et en République
centre-africaine. Les esprits chagrins peuvent souligner les obstacles rencontrés, les
difficultés posées par la génération de forces… Mais qui eût pensé, il y a dix ans encore,
que l’Union européenne amènerait sur l’un des théâtres africains les plus difficiles
plusieurs centaines de soldats irlandais, polonais, suédois, lettons… ?
J’y vois pour ma part une forte volonté d’implication des Etats membres qui, jusqu’à
présent, ne constituaient pas toujours le cœur des forces projetées par l’Union. J’y vois
aussi le signe d’une maturité nouvelle de la politique européenne de sécurité et de
défense. Vous me permettrez d’ailleurs de remercier les Etats membres contributeurs,
qui permettent de donner à cette opération, dont les enjeux humanitaires au Darfour sont
vitaux, une véritable dimension européenne.
L’une des priorités affichées de la Présidence Française de l’Union sera de renforcer les
capacités de défense des Européens. La France est décidée à saisir toutes les
opportunités et les instruments qui nous sont offerts par le traité de Lisbonne, pour
renforcer concrètement la PESD et engager avec les Etats membres la production de
capacités de gestion de crise sous une forme mutualisée.
Vouloir construire l’Europe de la défense, c’est bien davantage qu’une conviction
personnelle : c’est aussi la conclusion d’une analyse pragmatique. Il est grand temps de
prendre en compte les intérêts de notre continent, et notamment l’enjeu de la stabilité
régionale au voisinage d’une UE qui compte plus de 450 millions d’habitants et dont le
PIB pèse le quart de la production mondiale. Quand on a créé des intérêts communs, on
a besoin de les défendre en commun. Et nous avons bien plus que des intérêts à
défendre : une communauté de valeurs, un modèle de société, un patrimoine immatériel.
Comment peut-on affirmer un destin commun et ne pas construire l’appareil qui assume
sa protection, c’est-à-dire l’Europe de la défense ?
Construire l’Europe de la défense, c’est s’identifier, c’est prendre conscience de
l’existence de l’Europe et de ce que nous sommes nous-mêmes en tant qu’Européens.
Construire l’Europe de la défense, c’est donner de la chair à l’Europe — et d’abord
parce qu’il s’agit d’hommes, c’est faire prendre conscience à chacun des Européens
qu’à côté de leur citoyenneté, il y a une citoyenneté européenne reposant sur le partage
d’un système de droit.
Nous avons également un message de paix et d’humanité à porter, avec d’autant plus de
légitimité, d’autant plus de forces que nous avons su tirer les leçons de notre propre
histoire. C’est un message d’optimisme, un message de confiance pour le monde entier,
notamment en Afrique : d’un continent déchiré, nous avons su construire un continent
en harmonie et prospère. L’Europe est une « école de paix et de stabilité », avait dit un
chef d’Etat européen. Voilà ce que nous devons construire, et faire partager.
Nous devons bâtir cet ensemble sur l’idée du partage, de la responsabilité exercée par
quelques-uns au profit des autres. Ce n’est pas un abandon, mais un passage à une
nouvelle forme de souveraineté, une souveraineté collective.
Ouvrons des pistes pour l’avenir : pour surveiller nos frontières ou nos espaces, dans le
domaine maritime par exemple. L’OTAN mène le projet MSA pour lutter contre le
terrorisme, nous souhaitons que l’Europe ait un réseau interconnecté en temps réel,
comparable à ce qui se fait en défense aérienne – pour la totalité de la surveillance
maritime, qu’elle soit civile ou militaire avec des procédures d’intervention qui allient
l’ensemble des moyens.
Nous voyons bien qu’il n’y a pas opposition mais complémentarité des moyens entre
l’Otan et l’Union européenne. Nous proposons que certaines nations prennent en charge
pour d’autres certaines missions ou certaines fonctions, que leurs capacités militaires
permettent de réaliser - je pense par exemple à ce qu’à fait l’OTAN pour la défense
aérienne.
Là aussi, c’est aller vers une meilleure efficience des moyens et des efforts. Ce n’est pas
du moins, mais du plus. Par exemple, nous voulons que les systèmes de forces dits
européens soit utilisés en priorité pour les opérations décidées par l’Union européenne.
Quand on va visiter, mon cher Franz-Josef, l’Etat major du Corps Européen, à
Strasbourg, et que l’on voit que de tels investissements humains et matériels sont si peu
utilisés, on se dit que dédier a priori de tels systèmes à l’union européenne, ce n’est pas
du moins mais du plus pour notre Alliance euro-atlantique.
J’arrête là mes exemples mais je pourrais aussi évoquer la problématique industrielle. Il
nous faudra bien, un jour, enfin, considérer que nos pertes de souveraineté individuelle
que nous vivons avec douleur dans une vision nationale étriquée nous les mesurions par
rapport à ce qu’un projet européen, véritable pilier européen de l’Alliance, nous
apporterait pour notre souveraineté collective.
Finalement, construire une défense européenne forte, c’est nous donner les moyens
d’avoir une influence dans le monde. Pour reprendre l’expression du Chancelier Helmut
Kohl en 1983, c’est le moyen « d’éviter d’être le simple jouet de la politique d’autrui ».
Pour faire face aux crises d’aujourd’hui et de demain, nous avons besoin d’une Europe
forte, aux côtés de nos Alliés américains, comme d’une Alliance forte.
Vous l’aurez compris, le dogme est un mot que j’ai exclu de mon vocabulaire, comme
de ma pratique. Nous considérons que le pragmatisme doit nous guider et que, face aux
enjeux cruciaux auxquels nos pays sont confrontés, l’efficacité doit être la règle. Nos
concitoyens ne nous le pardonneraient pas.
Un nouvel environnement stratégique est en place, où il est moins que jamais question
de percevoir les dividendes de la paix. Une perception plus aiguë des risques et menaces
qui pèsent sur nous, nous anime désormais et nous impose d’agir. C’est cette vigilance
qui nous a poussés à transformer l'Alliance atlantique pour répondre aux nouveaux
enjeux de sécurité que représentent notamment les questions de sécurité énergétique ou
de cyber-attaques.
Le regard de la France sur l'OTAN a nécessairement changé et suscité naturellement
une réflexion renouvelée sur la relation que nous devons entretenir avec elle, en tant
qu’allié et force de proposition. La refonte du concept stratégique et le sommet du
60ème anniversaire devraient à cet égard constituer deux rendez-vous importants de
l’année prochaine pour la rénovation de l’Alliance.
L’Europe de la Défense est à nos yeux une nécessité stratégique tout aussi forte. Notre
mission est de continuer à la développer pour qu’elle puisse agir en bonne intelligence
avec l’Alliance atlantique, que les deux organisations soient ou non déployées
simultanément.
Saint-Exupéry — décidément un Français de bon conseil — disait : « Dans la vie, il n’y
a pas de solutions. Il y a des forces en marche ; il faut les créer et les solutions suivent. »
Je crois que, pour trouver la réponse au problème sécuritaire auquel chacune de nos
nations est confrontée aujourd'hui, il nous faut créer ces forces en marche. Au bout, il y
a la paix de l’Europe et du monde.
Je vous remercie de votre attention.
© 1999 - 2008 Munich Conference on Security Policy (Legal notice)
Speaker: Ivanov, Sergey B.
Function: First Deputy Prime Minister, Russian Federation
Nation/
Organization: Russian Federation
Where is Russia heading? New Vision of Pan-European Security
02/10/2008
Ladies and gentlemen, Excellencies,
Yesterday, HT, opening the conference, said he would speak German, as there is
German TV here. Being more liberal, I will speak English – despite the fact there is
Russian TV crews here.
Hope you would agree that we have all reasons to call Mr. Teltschik a patriarch of this
international forum (it is his 10th Conference) and if we speak about me, Im an oldtimer since this is my 8th address to the esteemed auditorium from this podium.
For Gates, this is his last address as defence secretary. This is my first as not one.
(laugh)
It gives me pleasure to note that the authority of the Munich Conference on Security
Policy has increased considerably in recent years. It has gradually turned into a
universal venue where leading politicians and experts can express their opinions on
international developments, exchange views and jointly discuss solutions to various
problems.
As President Putin has stated in Munich last year, we don't have to limit ourselves only
to diplomatic courtesy, but can frankly address all issues. This is the attitude I will try to
follow.
I am sure that everyone here clearly realizes that the process of Russia's revival
objectively combines our ambition to occupy an appropriate place in the world politics
and commitment to maintain our national interests.
Right away I would like to make a point: we do not intend to meet this challenge by
establishing military blocs or engaging in open confrontation with our partners.
Russia’s way is different: we are consistently developing multivector cooperation with
various nations both on a bilateral level and in the framework of key international and
regional organizations.
This strategic targeting is entirely consistent with the new perception of the world by
the Russians who now are confident of their potential and, consequently, are capable of
thinking globally.
We have abandoned ideological and other prejudices. We don’t export ideology
anymore, you will agree with that. We export only goods and capital.This is also a point
of departure in our relations with international partners.
Russia is an open country undergoing unprecedented historic transformation, firmly
intending to stay in the mainstream of the world politics and economics. We did
everything to get rid of internal shocks and to take a secure path of evolutionary
development with transparent goals.
I am confident that during the forthcoming Presidential elections to be held on March
the 2nd in Russia, the people of our country will demonstrate their full support for this
policy.
We respect the values cherished by America and Europe for centuries. Democracy is
our main guideline, too. But we can hardly accept that there exists some universal
experience or idea to serve as a “master standard” for all times and nations – a kind of a
“Troy ounce” to measure political structures, national cultures, religions, convictions
and mentality.
Therefore our perception is based on the notion of development models’ diversity as
well as variety of ways of understanding and attaining harmony in society.
At the same time Russia shares the opinion that democracy requires similar skills and
institutions as those needed for the functioning of free markets. Therefore, market
principles combined with social responsibility have already become a solid foundation
for our economy.
As a result, during the last 9 years, the gross domestic product in Russia has increased
by 80 per cent, which is nearly twice as much compared to the average world indicators
staying at around 46 per cent. Continuity of this process is ensured by accelerated
integration of our country into the world economic system.
Russia is becoming more attractive for foreign investors. Thus, over the past year, net
capital inflow has almost doubled against the previous year to reach $82.3 billion.
Foreign direct investments account now for more than 3 per cent of the GDP (gross
domestic product).
Alongside, external assets of a number of major Russian companies increase, too,
despite of the antagonism on the part of some European countries.
We do not aim to buy the entire Old World with our petrodollars. But welcoming
foreign investors in Russia, we naturally expect this to be a two way traffic. Yet, for the
moment, the ratio of accumulated mutual investments is one to ten in favor of the
European Union. That means 10 dollars invested in the EU, and only one dollar in
Russia.
Moreover, while talking about liberalization, these states close their own markets and
often accompany this with criticism of the Russian leaders who allegedly “deviate from
the classical principles of the market economy”.
Some even try to stick the label of “state capitalism” to our economic model.
May I disagree.
The state-private partnership is the key mechanism ensuring the development in Russia.
Our goal is not just the mixed economy, but ensuring of a close interaction between its
two sectors - state and private, with eventual shift of balance towards the latter.
As a part of these practices large integrated structures are being established in Russia
giving the investors an opportunity to participate in the privatization process.
I am convinced that at this stage the increased state involvement in economic life in
Russia has no alternative. To say more, only state interference allows the national
economy to make a shift from a one-sided raw material orientation towards the
innovative development strategy.
We focus on those sectors of technology in which Russia has always had leading
positions in the world and which can serve as a basis for our further development.
First of all, those include aircraft engineering and production, shipbuilding, atomic
energy, missile and space technologies. Im also now chairman of the board of the Joint
Aviation Corporation, and would like to inform you that our cooperation with Boeing is
flourishing.
Significant efforts are being made in the key area of advanced knowledge-intensive
branches capable of producing innovative, breakthrough technologies within the next
10-20 years.
Nano-technology is believed to be one of those and the newly established state-owned
corporation will conduct its activity specifically on the basis of state-private partnership.
The government will fund nanotechnologies only when the private sector is interested in
investing in them too.
To encourage development in other areas, specialized institutions are being set up,
including the Russian Venture Company, the Investment Fund and the Bank for
Development.
Last year, the Government has allocated an equivalent of 21 billion US dollars to
provide capital for these structures. The Federal budget for years 2008-2009 has a
provision for 18 billion US dollars for these purposes.
But even such significant financial injections by the Government are in no way a “cureall” since the need to repair infrastructure discrepancies, which accompany Russia's
economic growth, would alone require funds amounting up to one thousand billion US
dollars. We calculated, to modernise our whole Russian infrastructure – roads, etc. We
have calculated the sum we need and we need to attract it from the markets.
Therefore, we rely mostly on private investments, while governmental support acts as a
accelerator for innovations and a guarantee for financial involvement of the private
sector, including foreign companies. It is self-explanatory that in the case of the latter
we seek to ensure that the entire process does not negatively affect sensitive aspects of
national security.
Thus, a new draft law is now being considered to adopt detailed regulations related to
foreign investments in sectors of strategic importance. It should be emphasized that it is
based on a "permissive" approach. This is yet another proof that we are not developing
any kind of a closed and strictly regulated economy. On the contrary, we aim at
establishing a normal and civilized market.
To tell you more, the current structural reforms are already yielding positive results. In
2007, about two thirds of the Russian GDP was generated in the real industrial,
construction and trade sectors. Volume of production of mining industries has grown by
two per cent only – and that includes oil and gas, by the way - during the same period,
while manufacturing and machine building industries have shown a ten- and twenty per
cent growth, accordingly. On the whole, the GDP last year grew 8.1 percent. That’s not
a bad figure.
We have good reasons to be satisfied with these figures.
At the same time, I would like to specifically note that the shift from the primary-sectorbased economy does not imply any kind of deviation from the fuel and energy sector.
Partners can rest assured that Russia has been strictly fulfilling and will continue to
fulfill all its commitments regarding energy supplies – I would like to stress that
particularly.
Moreover, we do our best to develop our export potential and make it free from the
political conditions in certain transit countries.
It is with this in mind that Russia and Germany have begun the construction of the
North European Gas Pipeline. The “South Stream” project is also entering the
implementation phase.
Furthermore, we have consistently advocated long-term contractual relations,
improvement of the pricing system, as well as establishment of alternative trading
platforms.
In anticipation of a possible question I would like to state straight away that we are not
masterminding any kind of "energy expansion". We simply do our best to achieve
maximum economic benefits in the existing situation.
High world prices on the exported oil and gas have resulted in the fact that by now, for
the first time in the history of the Soviet Union and Russia, our gold and currency
reserves have approached the level of 500 billion US dollars.
The aggregate assets of the Reserve Fund and the National Welfare Fund that
accumulate the excessive gains from the sales of raw materials now exceed 150 billion
US dollars.
This provides unprecedented opportunities for economic growth in Russia aiming at a
higher standard of living for our people and developing modern social infrastructure.
The growing economy means additional jobs and decent wages, modern working and
living conditions, new possibilities for professional growth, as well as better education,
healthcare, housing, incentives for population growth, mass sports and culture.
As a matter of priority we have tuned home policy to focus on human investment.
The success of all efforts taken by the Russian authorities will ultimately be determined
by the efficiency of social policy aimed at satisfying vital needs of rank and file
Russians and improving the quality of their lives.
The ”human capital” is becoming the main factor and basic indicator of development
and growth. To the best of our understanding this constitutes the main idea of a socially
responsible economy.
As President Putin has stressed the day before yesterday at the State Council meeting in
Moscow, devoted to Russia’s development trends for the period up to the year 2020, we
intend to set up the society “of real and equal opportunities, the society without poverty,
providing social security for each individual”.
Therefore, in order to ensure a dynamic progress in Russia we are shifting to a
principally new policy aiming at the social development and going far beyond mere
payment of social benefits.
“ The New social policy” is basically the policy of humanism with major goals widely
supported by the Russian people.
Suggested priorities include rising of public sector salaries, allowance for servicemen,
pensions, scholarships, unemployment benefits, maternity allowance.
This year in Russia has been declared the Year of the Family, which should result in
new incentives and mechanisms to effectively implement our demographic strategy.
To sum it all, may I stress that we have set up a very special objective: by the year 2020
Russia should be among the world’s five biggest economies with per capita GDP of
over 30 000 US dollars. Right now, by the way it is around 12 000 USD.
Getting richer Russia will not pose a threat to the security of other countries. Yet our
influence on global proceses will continue to grow.
Besides, historically, many present-day issues are still considered through the prism of
relation between Moscow and Washington/
Indeed the two countries have long been sharing a special responsibility for the future of
the world. Besides, this could continue to serve as a firm basis unifying our nations.
However, major trends of contemporary development, including emerging
multipolarity, as well as diversified risks and threats suggest that tackling issues of
strategic stability can no longer remain in the exclusive sphere of relations between our
two powers.
Objectively time has come to open this framework for all leading states interested in
cooperation in order to ensure the overall security.
This is the essence of our proposals related to the anti-missile defense and to the
intermediate- and short- range missiles.
Today, there are several nuclear powers in the world and even more countries with a
strong missile capability. All of them, and not Russia and the United States alone,
should share the responsibility for maintaining strategic stability. As Mr El-Baradei
stated yesterday, and I agree, proliferation is out of the tune. Rules of the games need to
be much, much stricter, as they are broken all the way, hundreds of times.
This is entirely true for the states which have deliberately chosen not to possess the
deadly potential and which have a high moral commitment for a nuclear free and secure
world.
However, objectively, Russia-US ties will certainly retain their significance.
This primarily concerns control over strategic offensive arms.
The SALT I should be replaced by a regime capable to ensure the highest possible
predictability in this area, which is vital for the whole mankind.
Here, I would like to stress that it is imperative to ensure that provisions of such a
regime should be legally binding so that, in due course, it would really become possible
to shift to the control over nuclear weapons and the process of their gradual reduction
on a multilateral basis.
As I see it, this is precisely an area of international relations where Russia and the
United States not merely could, but are directly obliged to show leadership.
Sooner or later, we will have to start working in a multilateral format since none of us
here, I am sure, has any doubts about the importance of multilateral barriers to WMD
proliferation.
In this connection, it is noteworthy that Russia and the United States have been seeking,
and not without success, to compel all countries to join their Global Initiative to Combat
Nuclear Terrorism. At the same time, the two countries are advancing a new joint
initiative in the field of nuclear energy and non-proliferation, approved at
Kennebankport. By the way, yesterday, the idea of enrichment centres has been
mentioned. A centre like this has already been opened in Siberia, under the IAEA’s
strict control, and 2 countries have already joined – Armenia and Kazakstan. So it
already works.
I hope that we will also find common ground on the issue of non-militarization of space.
In the coming days, Russia is going to table a relevant draft treaty at the Conference on
Disarmament.
On the whole, I am firmly convinced that making use of Russian-American strategic
heritage as a ground for creating of a modern open collective security system, also in
Europe, represents a reasonable alternative to unilateral destruction of its potential.
Responsible politicians are bound to notice the unifying trends and to work for pooling
efforts in resolving major crucial issues without holding them hostage to short-lived
policy considerations.
And again about terrorism. It is a dreadful phenomenon and, evidently, the archenemy
of the whole civilized world.
No doubt, fighting it gives an ample opportunity for the joint action. But how can we
discuss effective interaction if, until present, we have failed to reach accord even on
defining what "terrorism" is?
On the other hand some states strive to exploit antiterrorist activities as a pretext to
achieving their own geopolitical and economic goals.
It is time we should decisively abandon all approaches that have long divided our world
on ideological grounds.
Overcoming the past tendencies has become a protracted process with the double
standard attitude towards Russia, which even includes attempts to return to the
containment policy.
It is high time for us to finally develop a common vision of the world we live in.
We will make no progress until we elaborate clear and generally accepted rules of
cooperation in international affairs. Otherwise, as experience shows, there is no sense to
talk about "concurrence of strategic goals" and "certain tactical disagreements".
This is particularly true in the case of European security. Russian policy with regard to
the OSCE, the Council of Europe and multilateral instruments such as the CFE Treaty is
aimed precisely at ensuring that no one could strengthen its security at the expense of
others, and making it crystal clear to everyone that European security as our common
cause and achievement is indivisible and comprehensive.
Ladies and Gentlemen,
And, finally, to answer the question chosen as the topic of our discussion - "Where is
Russia heading?" ‑ I will formulate a short answer.
Russia is heading towards the creation of a socially-oriented market economy,
improvement of living standards and quality of life of its people, as well as evolutionary
development of the country in the context of close international cooperation based on
the principles of international law.
Thank you.
Speaker: de Hoop Scheffer, Jaap
Function: Secretary General, NATO, Brussels
Nation/
Organization: NATO
Speech at the 44th Munich Conference on Security Policy
02/09/2008
Dr. Teltschik, Ministers, Excellencies, Ladies and Gentlemen, Dear Friends,
Let me start by saying a sincere word of thanks to you, Horst Teltschik. This is the last
Security Conference under your able chairmanship. You are only the second chairman
since Ewald von Kleist founded it 46 years ago. This testifies not only to your own
sterling reputation, and your drive and imagination, but also to the special and unique
nature of this event. So I wish you well and look forward to working with your
successor.
The "Wehrkunde", as we still all call this conference, means the "study of defence".
And we gather here in Munich each February to analyze not only the nature of the
challenges we face, but also to assess - always candidly, always objectively - how we
are doing and what remains to be done. As NATO looks to its Bucharest Summit in
April, I believe there are four key things that we have to get right.
First we have to ensure that the Afghanistan mission is on the right track so there is not
just the reality but also the perception of progress in our parliaments and publics.
Second, we have to integrate the Balkans more firmly into Euro-Atlantic structures and
keep the door of Euro-Atlantic integration open to the new democracies on this
continent.
Third, we must develop our ability to interact and cooperate with other players, such as
the UN, the EU, the World Bank, and the NGOs. Security doesn't last without
reconstruction, development, good governance and political reconciliation.
So a comprehensive approach is more than just a noble objective; we need to actually
apply it in practice.
And fourth, NATO cannot stay on the sidelines as new threats to our populations
emerge - including threats close to home. Proliferation of WMD, but also of missile
technology, terrorism, cyber attacks and vulnerabilities in our energy supply lines are
collective challenges, and we must provide collective responses to them.
First, Afghanistan. In a number of areas, such as helicopters, intra-theatre transport,
manoeuvre battalions and training the Afghan National Army, we have still not been
able to fill the current shortfalls. We must. We must also look more creatively at
pooling capabilities, pooling resources, to get the equipment we need to the places we
need them.
We have also seen from recent operations such as in Musa Qala that Afghan soldiers,
when properly trained and equipped, can take the lead and prevail. So we must redouble
our efforts and meet our targets for standing up the Afghan National Army. It is their
country. The sooner they can stand on their feet, the better for us all.
But we can only prevail in Afghanistan if all of the Allies are working together on the
basis of one NATO strategy, with common goals, common benchmarks and maximum
flexibility in the use of our forces. Let us remember the wise words of a former
SACEUR: one team - one mission: in together, out together". Yesterday, in Vilnius, I
saw an Alliance united in this mission for the long term. I expect that to be reconfirmed
at the Bucharest Summit, where we should also lay out a roadmap for the future of our
mission.
One more observation about our presence in Afghanistan. The International Community
and the Afghan Government must work together on the basis of shared universal values
and mutual respect.
For us in NATO that means that we accept to be criticized when we are not careful
enough to avoid civilian casualties and that we adapt our military procedures (and that
we have done). It also means that there should be understanding from our Afghan
friends that we have great difficulty to accept a death sentence for a young journalist for
downloading an article from the Internet.
Public support in our societies for our soldiers' presence in Afghanistan will erode if we
do not agree on the universal values we are defending, together with our Afghan friends.
This is all about hearts and minds, here and at the Hindu Kush.
Let me now turn to what I call Europe's unfinished business - the Balkans. The days and
weeks ahead will be complicated as we seek finally to resolve the issue of Kosovo's
status. NATO stands ready to ensure that Kosovo remains stable and a place where both
Kosovo Albanians and Kosovo Serbs can co-exist peacefully. But it is also important
that we create a new dynamic in the region. The peoples of the region deserve better
than the endless repetition of old ethnic arguments and territorial turf wars.
That is why I hope at our Bucharest Summit Allies will be ready to open NATO's door
to new members from this region, and to reach out to new partners such as Montenegro
and Bosnia-Herzegovina who have made it clear that they too do not want to be left
behind. We must also make clear to Serbia that there is no viable future in a retreat into
sullen nationalism. Its future too lies in Euro-Atlantic integration. But it takes two to
tango, and Serbia must demonstrate that it accepts the responsibilities of a modern
European democracy. NATO is ready to do its part to engage Serbia and make it not
only a partner in principle but a partner in reality as well.
We have seen in the Balkans how much progress we have been able to make when the
major organisations have a common stake and a more or less equal commitment to a
particular mission. That's why I will continue to urge a comprehensive approach. I am
hopeful that in the near future NATO and the UN will sign a common declaration which
will expand and intensify our cooperation.
Regulars here at the Munich Conference have heard me talk often enough about the
impediments to better cooperation between NATO and the EU.
But the imminence of the EU deploying its ESDP mission to Kosovo as well as the EU's
police training mission in Afghanistan, remind us that it makes sense for both
organisations to have better instruments for coordination. We must lift the remaining
political hurdles, a task requiring the highest political attention in NATO and EU
capitals. I very much welcome President Sarkozy's initiative not only to bring France
closer to NATO, to have France take its full place in the Alliance again, but also to
bring the EU and NATO closer together. Complementarity should be the keyword here.
Let me address my final theme. NATO has always been seen by our publics as the
organisation which defends them. But our publics quite rightly ask what NATO is doing
to deal with issues which are closer to home than Kunduz. If you are an Estonian, you
are clearly worried about the recurrence of massive cyber attacks; if you are British or
Spanish or Turkish and have witnessed major terrorist attacks on your territory, you
obviously wonder what is coming next; and many in Europe might ask how to cope if
energy supplies are disrupted.
That is why I have long been calling for NATO to look seriously at these issues; not
because I believe that NATO has all the answers - indeed tackling these challenges
requires a multifaceted approach and a great deal of coordination between national
governments and international organisations. But I do believe that given the threats
these challenges pose, they are a legitimate topic of debate for the Alliance. Indeed, you
would be alarmed if you discovered that NATO was riot debating these issues. That is
why I hope and expect that at Bucharest we will define a clear way forward in areas
such as missile defence, energy security and cyber defence. We must not simply
produce analyses where we all agree that these threats are real or even growing, and
then refuse to identify appropriate responses.
We need to come up with collective responses. Not doing so would simply open the
door for individual allies to seek out bilateral or other arrangements - and that would
threaten the indivisibility of allied security.
That is why, when it comes to missile defence, I am pleased to see that everybody sees
the advantage of having this discussion where it belongs: in NATO. We agree on the
threat, we agree on the feasibility, now we have to take the discussion further.
Of course this also touches on our relations to Russia. We invited President Putin to
attend a NATO Russia Council in Bucharest. We all agree that we want to use the
NATO-Russia Council to constructively engage with the Russian Federation. While
there are issues we presently cannot find agreement on - only to mention Missile
Defence, CFE, Kosovo - we continue our valuable, practical co-operation in many areas
of common interest. To engage is the key word.
One final point: A year ago, from this platform, I called for thinking to begin on a new
Strategic Concept for NATO. I still feel that we need soon to start work to prepare the
ground. There are some important questions that need to be debated. How should we
see Article 5 in the 21st century? What is the right balance between expeditionary
missions and protecting our populations at home? What is the future of NATO's
partnerships?
These are important questions. I know NATO well enough by now to be sure that the
Alliance is strong enough to have these debates, and emerge stronger from them.
Ladies and Gentlemen, Dear Friends.
The difficulties that I have outlined here today are not a threat to NATO; they are a
positive challenge that we are fully capable of meeting. Our Bucharest Summit will
show the way, but we cannot rest on our laurels. Our 60th anniversary next year is not
an occasion for simply re-living past glories. It must demonstrate to our publics that
NATO is every bit as vital to security in the 21st century as it was in days long gone by
- when we first developed the pleasant habit of coming to Munich every February for
the "Wehrkunde".
Thank you.
Speaker: Solana Madariaga, Dr. Javier
Function: Secretary General, Council of the European Union; High Representative
for the Common Foreign and Security Policy; Secretary General, Western
European Union, Brussels
Nation/
Organization: EU
Speech at the 44th Munich Conference on Security Policy
02/10/2008
Dear Horst, let me congratulate you on the award and on another successful conference.
Russia has a long tradition of being a European and world power. To regain its status as
major world power has been the first priority of Russian foreign policy during the
Presidency of Vladimir Putin. In many ways, this objective has been achieved. Russia is
back.
For us, Europe is stronger and more stable with a strong and open Russia reaching out
to the world.
In the meantime the world has changed. Thankfully, we no longer have a bipolar order
dominated by confrontation between two superpowers with Europe as the fault-line. Cooperation has replaced confrontation. There are also new players: China, India, Japan, to
name a few.
Then there are new global threats: global warming, the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction and international terrorism.
And regional threats. In Europe, we have to deal with instability that has come out of
the end of the Cold War, as discussed in a panel yesterday..
We also know that tension and instability outside Europe - in the Middle East, Africa
and elsewhere - is a threat to our security in Europe, Russia and the US.
In short, this is a new world. With shifting threats, we see shifts in the way to deal with
them. There are more actors, and more flexible constellations.
In this new international security architecture, Russia is a key partner. We want to work
as much as possible with a Russia that is ready to play its part. Indeed, little of value can
be achieved without Russia, and almost nothing against it.
Of course, it is not always easy to agree on what to do. But in most cases we manage.
The recent agreement in Berlin on a new UNSC resolution on Iran a good example.
The European Union and Russia are both global actors. But we also share a continent. It
is sometimes easier to be global strategic partners than to be good neighbours.
We have some well-known disagreements. From trade disputes to travel restrictions to
concerns over whether media and organisations like the British Council can operate in
truly free and independent manner.
But trade is booming. And co-operation expanding to a wide range of areas. This broad
nature of relationship has a stabilising effect.
Nevertheless, we do not have a real strategic convergence yet. Still lingering mistrust
here and there. Believe we are at a turning point.
To consolidate the new paradigm of co-operation in Europe, I see three priorities.
First, we need to build on the achievements of our predecessors. This means
maintaining the treaty regimes on which our security and societies are built.
For us, the CFE Treaty – both its ceilings and its confidence building measures –
remains a cornerstone of European security. Losing it increases the risk of creeping
mistrust.
The same goes for the manner in which other treaties and issues, like missile defence,
are discussed and ultimately decided upon. As we rightly seek to defend ourselves
against new threats, we should be careful that we do not, unintentionally, create new
sources of suspicion or tensions amongst us.
The founding treaties of the Council of Europe and the OSCE define what it means to
be European. Both organisations have adapted successfully to new circumstances. It is
difficult to imagine building a new European security order on a different platform.
Respect for the rules of these organisations is indispensable.
Secondly, we must find more common ground based on the rule of law.
If we want our companies to compete on open markets without generating political
disputes, we need common rules and an agreed framework to enforce them. WTO offers
a key element of this framework. I look forward to Russia joining.
The emphasis given recently by Russian Deputy PM Medvedev to the rule of law is as
significant as it is welcome. I do not want to quote him out of context. But I agree when
he says about Russia that “if it wants to become a civilised state, first of all we have to
become lawful.”
Developing a shared commitment to the rule of law will be a major strategic challenge
in the coming years.
This has implications across the board, as in the field of energy. Our interdependence in
energy is a fact. A quick look at the map of existing pipelines confirms this.
There is a justified concern across Europe about Russia seeming more interested in
investing in future leverage than in future production. Contrast Gazprom's strategic
spending spree abroad with the lack of investment at home.
So we need a European framework for energy, based on the rule of law and reciprocity.
Finally, as a third priority, we must match our rhetoric with concrete action.
Resolving the frozen conflicts in Europe is particularly important. If we continue
working closely together, we can get a durable settlement to the these conflicts.
Resolving these conflicts is important per se: enabling these countries to focus on
essential political and economic reforms. But it also important for us, for confidence,
for our stability and to show we can solve problems.
During the Cold War, Europe was the frontline. It was here that military planners
envisaged a possible military confrontation.
Now we have the chance to make Europe a continent of stability. A source of hope for
more troubled regions of the world. It is in the interest of both the EU and Russia to
make this happen. This would not be a minor contribution to world order.
© 1999 - 2008 Munich Conference on Security Policy (Legal notice)
Speaker: Tadic, Boris
Function: President, Republic of Serbia
Nation/
Organization: Republic of Serbia
The World in Disarray - Shifting Powers, Lack of Strategies
02/08/2008
Your Excellencies, Dear Friends, Ladies and Gentlemen,
I have come here to Munich after another resounding victory for democracy in Serbia.
What began in October 2000 has been firmly consolidated. For the first time since the
overthrow of Slobodan Milosevic, we are within reach of the point of no return in
Southeast Europe.
Sunday last marked the beginning of a fresh chapter in the region's development. Our
success is a great victory for all who believe that Europe is good for Serbia, good for the
Balkans, good for all the nations of the Old Continent. I know that many of you in this
room understand our challenges, and I want to take this opportunity to thank you for
your support. Let me be clear at the outset. This was not a struggle between the past and
the present. It was about the different approaches to the future. My Opponent argued
there was a choice for Serbia between Kosovo and Europe. And, to be honest, once or
twice during the campaign, I worried that some of you agreed with him. But I argued
otherwise. And I'm glad that the Citizens of Serbia supported me in that view. What am
I trying to say to you, Ladies and Gentlemen?
The folly of Milosevic brought my nation to the awful choice between treason or
intransigence. We don't deserve this today. And I see it as my solemn duty to lead us out
of that, by leading us into a future that is not poisoned by such a choice. This means that
we cannot accept the dismembering of our country. In this we are no different from any
other internationally recognized State. This also means that we cannot accept the
isolation of Serbia, as we move decisively forward to full membership in the European
Union. The preservation of territorial integrity, and deep engagement with Europe and
the world. These are the core principles, the basic tenets, of our national interest. And
they will not change. I hope I have made myself clear to you about my vision and my
resolve. I will not allow cynical ploys to deter me, nor can I afford to be transfixed by
the whims of diplomatic convenience. Consolidating our victory will not be easy. We
may be compelled to conduct new parliamentary elections in May. But I know that by
working together—by not losing track of the goal we all share—we can contribute to an
outcome that is good for Serbia, good for the region, good for Europe, and good for
global security.
Ladies and Gentlemen,
Concern for global security is what has brought us all here to Munich. The security
environment in which we operate has evolved. Today's world is more interdependent,
less coherent, and less predictable. The dangers posed by conventional military threats
have lessened, while dangers posed by unconventional ones—such as rogue regimes,
terrorism, secessionism, the proliferation of WMD, ethnic and religious extremism,
organized crime—have dramatically increased since the end of the Cold War. I believe
that Serbia has its own unique contribution to make in the noble effort to bring peace to
the world. That is why we have expressed our readiness to participate in peacekeeping
missions conducted under the flag of the United Nations—so as to assist post-conflict
societies to rebuild and reconstruct, as is being done already in various parts of the
world. Moreover, we are deeply committed to a security policy of constructive
engagement. This is why I believe in Serbia's participation in Euro-Atlantic structures
such as Partnership for Peace. My country's security relationships, rooted in shared
values, must be deepened—the sooner, the better. That is the way we intensify
communication and guarantee stability in our region, and thus contribute to global
security. Serbia will not be left behind. And this leads me to the issue that I'm sure you
all want to hear me speak about, and that is Kosovo.
Ladies and Gentlemen,
When it comes to resolving Kosovo's future status, Serbian democracy is a guarantor of
stability, and Serbian patriotism is a part of the solution.
Serbia's geography, and Serbia's true aspirations, are assets to us all. We want to be an
active participant in the quest for greater global security. And for us, that starts with the
Balkans. My Friends, the time has come for genuine realism. Three parties are essential
to the resolution of the Kosovo question: Belgrade, Pristina and the international
community in which, as I understand, the European Union is willing to play an
increasingly significant role. We welcome as a matter of principle any demonstration of
Europe's deepening commitment to the Western Balkans. And for that reason, we
welcome the EU's desire to increase its presence in our southern province of Kosovo.
But at the same time, we must all be very careful about cutting corners. I say to you that
we must remain vigilant of the dangers of expediency, and take seriously the strategic
priorities we all share. That means that we must all embrace the only indisputable
international legal framework to move forward in concert, together. Any fresh
international engagement in our southern province must pass the scrutiny of the
Security Council of the United Nations. And yet, there is an unfortunate rush in some
quarters to move on the Kosovo question right now. Will this mean new conditionalities
for Serbia? I hope not, because there are many of us who rightly feel that conditionality
is another word for punishment. I understand the existing Hague requirements—and we
will fulfill them in the very near future. You have our solemn promise, because we
know that democracy in Serbia cannot flourish without a full and open account of what
took place during the 1990s. But hear me when I tell you that there is a difference
between schadenfreude and justice. The former is a willful act of power, the latter
requires the patient democratic submission to the law by all.
And the law in the case of Kosovo is set by the United Nations Security Council, as
Resolution 1244 makes plain. Acting through the Security Council guarantees the
ultimate legitimacy of outcomes. The alternative is a dangerous leap into the dark
unknown in a time of great global turbulence. The precedent that would be established
should Serbia be partitioned against its will—which is what the imposed independence
of Kosovo is in truth—could in turn result in the escalation of many existing conflicts,
the re-activation of a number of frozen conflicts, and the instigation of who knows how
many new conflicts.
There is still time to prevent the situation from spiraling needlessly out of control. The
architecture of international order need not be undermined. On the contrary, by working
together, by playing by the rules, we can strengthen it. The secure, legitimate way
forward lies in reaffirming the centrality of the United Nations. As responsible members
of the international community, we have an obligation to honor the role of an institution
we ourselves created for the express purpose of enhancing international security. That
institution is the United Nations, that crucible of human hope for peace and security in a
troubled world.
Ladies and Gentlemen,
Let's do some plain speaking here. The only way to resolve differences in the Europe of
the 21st century is through negotiations. Serious negotiations that continue until all
parties feel satisfied. That's how Europe has been transformed from a place of strife to a
place of concord. And that's how we avoid setting precedents that could strike at the
very foundation of the architecture of international security.
In the case of Kosovo, only by applying the principles of European decision making can
we bind my region to the historical achievement that is the European Union—principles
such as compromise, concession, and consensus-building among all the stakeholders,
through a process of deliberate, patient, and sustained negotiations.
The way I see it, serious negotiations on Kosovo are needed now. Serious negotiations
are needed to protect the Serbs in Kosovo as well as our holy sites.
Serious negotiations are needed to continue the international presence in Kosovo. And,
surely, serious negotiations are needed if we hope to build a stable, democratic and
multiethnic society in our southern province. If in the weeks to come such negotiations
do not occur, I fear that all three parties will end up paying a prohibitively high price.
And that is something that none of us can afford. I appeal to all the countries here
present, and to the authorities in Pristina, to understand the spirit in which I make these
remarks. We cannot afford any more missed opportunities to build trust, to seek
agreement, to consolidate values, and to arrive at a solution that benefits us all.
Ladies and Gentlemen,
The optimal solution, of course, is for all of Serbia—including Kosovo—to become a
member of the European Union. Do we have the vision, the strategic foresight, to see
this through? Whatever the choice of means, let's start by doing the obvious. Let's start
talking to each other seriously. Let's narrow the differences. Let's think regionally and
about people's hopes for a better life. Let's reach beyond our fears and our constraints.
Let's leave behind the winner-take-all attitude—and reject the parochial maximalism
that got us into this mess in the first place. Let us, in short, remember what the real prize
is: a prosperous, secure future we can all share—a European future for all. I am ready to
do my part—to channel the hope, to remove the fear, and to instill the confidence in
ourselves necessary to succeed in the noble project to secure the future against those
who challenge its very foundation.
Thank you for hearing me tonight.
© 1999 - 2008 Munich Conference on Security Policy (Legal notice)
Speaker: Koumura, Masahiko
Function: Minister of Foreign Affairs, Japan
Nation/
Organization: Japan
Asia: Building the International Stability
02/10/2008
Dr. Teltschik, Distinguished Panelists, Ladies and Gentlemen,
I would like to begin by saying that I am delighted to be here as the first Japanese
cabinet minister attending this conference.
When we discuss today's international community, we should not limit ourselves to
discussions on traditional security or military aspects. I think we also need to address
regional or global challenges beyond national borders.
Issues that the world economy is facing today, such as the current subprime loan issue,
also have to be keenly watched as they closely relate to security issues.
In this perspective, although I hesitate to raise it as a security issue, environmental
issues including global warming also constitute threats that the entire world has to work
together to deal with. Prime Minister Fukuda attended the Annual Meeting of the World
Economic Forum in Davos last month and pointed out that climate change is a real
problem with significant effects on our day-to-day lives and economic activities. In his
speech, Prime Minister Fukuda proposed the "Cool Earth Promotion Programme,"
announcing for the first time Japan's determination to set a quantified national target for
the greenhouse gas emissions reductions to be realized from now on, along with other
countries. Also, Prime Minister Fukuda showed Japan's concrete resolve by announcing
to assist developing countries on the scale of 10 billion US dollars. I think it is partly
taken for granted that Japan will play an initiative role in the field of the environment,
but how about security? Today, I would like to provide an overview of Asia and discuss
Japan's role in the security arena.
So, now let's take a look at Asia, which is the most dynamically changing region in the
world. Not to mention the rise of China and India, ASEAN is acquiring more and more
confidence both politically and economically. Russia is hoping to develop its far-east
and east-Siberian region by promoting its links with Asia. When I say "Asia," I include
Oceanian countries such as Australia, which has been increasing its international role,
including in the security field. Approximately 25% of the entire world's GDP is
concentrated in this region.
Stability and prosperity of Asia are crucial for stability and prosperity of the world.
Japan, as the region's oldest democracy that has been nurturing ideas such as "the rule of
law" and "compliance with contracts" for hundreds of years, and as the world's second
largest economy constituting approximately 40% of Asia's total GDP, has been
contributing to building stability in this region.
However, there still exist remnants of the Cold War in the region. These factors cast a
shadow on the great potential of the region, and may even lead to instability in the
region. In particular, the North Korean issues have made the regional security
environment extremely difficult since the beginning of the 1990s. Currently, these
issues are being addressed in the framework of the Six-Party Talks. The international
community must continue to be united in demanding North Korea to provide "a
complete and correct declaration" of all its nuclear programs including nuclear
weapons, to disable all existing nuclear facilities, and eventually to completely abandon
its nuclear programs. Improvement in North Korea's human rights situation, including
the resolution of the abduction issue, is also essential.
With regard to the Taiwan Straits, there must not be any unilateral attempt to change the
status quo, which would heighten cross-strait tensions and cause harm to regional
stability.
Both understanding and cooperation of our European friends continue to be extremely
important.
Under such circumstances, we need to increase transparency in the region through
political and military confidence building, thereby lowering the risks that lead to
instability. There are three important pillars in order to achieve this goal. First,
continued U.S. engagement in the stability and development of Asia is indispensable.
The presence of U.S. forces is a lynchpin for the stability of the region. Also, we should
not forget that the Asian economy is substantially dependent on the U.S. market.
Second, constructive and future-oriented relations have to be built among Asian
countries, and third, frameworks for a multi-layered, open and interest-sharing regional
cooperation have to be promoted.
Based upon this idea, the Fukuda administration proposed the idea of "synergies"
between the Japan-U.S. Alliance and its diplomacy toward Asia. Needless to say, the
Japan-U.S. Alliance provides an essential foundation for maintaining the U.S. presence
in the region. By reinforcing this alliance, the foundation for peace and prosperity in
Asia will be strengthened. Also, realizing a stable, open, prosperous and developing
Asia will be of mutual interest of Japan and the U.S. Particularly, expanding the scope
of Japan's activity in Asia will enhance the value of its alliance with the U.S., which will
lead to further strengthening of the alliance. In the context of the first pillar that I
referred to, which is U.S. engagement, I do not think that I need to go on explaining
how close our relationship with the U.S. is. I would just like to mention that Japan's
MSDF Aegis destroyer "Kongo" successfully intercepted a ballistic missile target in a
Japan-U.S. bilateral joint flight test last December. This was the first successful test
conducted by any country other than the U.S.
In my statement today, I intend to focus on the second pillar—relations among Asian
countries, particularly Japan-China relations, which I expect most of you to be
interested in—and on the third pillar—regional cooperation in Asia.
Ladies and gentlemen,
China is now a key player not only in Asia but also in the international community. The
economic rise of China brings a huge opportunity for the international community.
China plays an active role as chair of the Six-Party Talks. Japan welcomes such a
constructive role of China in East Asia.
Japan and China now share great responsibilities for the stability of Asia and the world.
We are working together to establish "a mutually beneficial relationship based on
common strategic interests." In early December last year, I visited China to attend the
First Japan-China High-Level Economic Dialogue, where I had fruitful discussions with
my counterparts including Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi. In the meeting, I proposed to
work together in tackling global challenges, such as the environment, saving energy,
climate change and provision of assistance to Africa.
Near the end of this past year, Prime Minister Fukuda also visited China and agreed to
keep working to give concrete form to the "mutually beneficial relationship."
At the same time, Japan and China will exert their wisdom in resolving the resource
development issue in the East China Sea, an issue of mutual concern for both countries.
We believe that such efforts by our countries will ultimately contribute to the stability
and prosperity of the entire region and the global community.
President Hu Jintao is scheduled to visit Japan around this spring. We will take
advantage of such high-level visits to further enhance a constructive relationship
between our two countries.
On the other hand, we believe that China's military modernization is still not sufficiently
transparent. For example, we expect to hear a more detailed explanation about the
composition of its military expenses, which has performed a double-digit expansion for
19 consecutive years. Ensuring military transparency fosters mutual confidence and
leads to regional stability. Military modernization and expansion of military expenses
with a lack of transparency will result in increased regional concern. Again, we expect
to see China's efforts in this regard.
With regard to movements toward the presidential election in Taiwan in March, we
expect both China and Taiwan to act in a calm and peaceful manner.
Japan has also been cooperating with other key countries of the region towards the
stability of the region. For example, with India—the world's largest democracy leading
the growth of Asia—we have established a firm partnership, including the
commencement of an annual leaders' exchange since Prime Minister Singh's visit to
Japan in December 2006, and have been deepening cooperation on a variety of regional
and global issues including security.
Furthermore, we should endeavor to reach a final resolution on the unsettled territorial
issue with Russia, and must upgrade Japan-Russia relations to a higher dimension.
We will continue our efforts to realize the region's peace and prosperity in cooperation
with countries of the region including Australia and Korea.
So far, I have explained the existing hopes and concerns in Asia. Let me remind you
that European countries have a significant influence on this region. We ask all the
European countries to understand the realities of Asia and to play a positive role for the
stability of the region.
Ladies and gentlemen,
Now, let me move on to the third pillar of my statement, which is promotion of
frameworks for regional cooperation. Asia is a region where countries of diverse
ethnicities, religions, cultures, political systems, social structures and values, all coexist.
Asia, a region with even greater diversity than Europe which is nonetheless diverse,
does not have "The Asian Institution," comparable to the EU, NATO, or OSCE.
However, we have a common recognition in Asia today that we should cooperate as a
community to tackle the various challenges we face. We have a number of regional
frameworks such as ASEAN+3, ARF and APEC that exist in a multi-layered fashion.
The East Asia Summit has also been held since 2005. These regional frameworks
complement each other and constitute a multinational system in which concrete
cooperation is promoted while common values and interests are fostered.
From the eyes of Europe and America, regional cooperation in Asia may seem to be
progressing much too slowly. You may even feel frustration on the lack of speed in
decision-making in the various fora. However, regional cooperation in Asia is all about
steadily accumulating functional cooperation in respective areas, patiently and firmly
cultivating the roots of cooperation. Such is the way in which community building in
Asia works.
The ASEAN Charter was adopted last November, under the able leadership of
Singapore as ASEAN Chair. Japan highly welcomes the adoption of the Charter as a
demonstration of the will of the member countries toward an integrated ASEAN.
Universal values, such as fundamental freedom, democracy, human rights and the rule
of law, are enshrined in the ASEAN Charter. These values are achieved in the true sense
by attaining economic prosperity which leads to the creation of a large middle-class
capable of shouldering a free and democratic system. This is why Japan is committed to
continuing its support for the development of other Asian countries, making full use of
its own experience and knowledge earned through its long history of democracy and
market economy.
It would be most useful if European countries also provide cooperation and assistance,
so that universal values will be further promoted as the foundation of our regional
community.
Ladies and gentlemen,
I have been focusing on Asia, but as I mentioned at the outset of my speech, security
can no longer be maintained just by one country or within one region. Japan, as a
country which owes its prosperity to the peace and stability of the international
community, fully recognizes this. This is why Japan, as a "Peace Fostering Nation," is
committed to fulfilling its responsibility by playing an active role in building peace in
the international community.
Under a firm resolve that Japan should never drop out from the "fight against
terrorism," we passed a new law on January 11th based on which Japan's Maritime Self
Defense Forces are about to resume their replenishment activities at sea in the Indian
Ocean. In Iraq, Japan's Air Self Defense Forces are continuing their air-lift support to
assist the reconstruction efforts by Iraq.
With the aim of realizing global peace and prosperity, together with extending
assistance through ODA, Japan has participated in peacekeeping operations and other
international peace cooperation activities in Cambodia, Timor-Leste and elsewhere.
Regarding participation in peacekeeping operations, we believe that there is still room
to do more in view of Japan's capacity, and intend to actively promote participation in
UN missions under the present legal framework. We also intend to utilize our past
experience and enhance our study on a legal framework necessary to make most of
Japan's human resources in a more flexible manner for international peace cooperation
activities.
As underlined in the recent G8 Summit meetings, peacebuilding is one of the key
challenges for the international community. In light of this, Japan has started a pilot
program to develop human resources in Asia in the field of peacebuilding. The trainees
of the inaugural class are engaged, under challenging living conditions, in practical
work in the actual field of peacebuilding in locations such as Kosovo, the Sudan,
Timor-Leste and Sri Lanka. Recently, Japan has decided to extend assistance to PKO
training centers in Africa. Up until now, Japan has provided little assistance to militaryrelated projects, even when the recipient institution is working on peacekeeping
operations. However, with the growing needs, we decided to start extending assistance
in this area. We would like to expand this kind of assistance to Asia as well in the
future.
Ladies and gentlemen,
Japan has hosted the Tokyo International Conference on African Development since
1993, jointly with UN and other organizations inviting leaders from African countries.
In this coming May, we will hold the 4th conference (TICAD IV) in Yokohama, Japan.
Also, in July, as the G8 Chair, we will host the G8 Summit in Toyako, Hokkaido.
Furthermore, at the UN, Japan has been fulfilling the duties of the chair of the
Peacebuilding Commission.
By making use of these opportunities, we hope to tackle various important issues facing
the international society, such as peace building, development and global environment,
and to send out a robust message to the world.
Thank you very much for your kind attention.
© 1999 - 2008 Munich Conference on Security Policy (Legal notice)