Four Modernizations
Encyclopedia of Modern China, 2009
From World History in Context
The Four Modernizations program was an ambitious national project to reinvigorate the Chinese
economy so that the country could become an advanced industrial nation by the start of the twenty­first
century. It aimed to modernize four sectors: agriculture, industry, science and technology, and national
defense. The program was intended to lay the foundation for China to become a strong socialist state
in the form of a national economic system with a comprehensive industrial base approaching that of the
advanced industrial economies.
The program was first unveiled by Premier Zhou Enlai in his report to the Third National People’s
Congress held on December 21 and 22, 1964. The program was soon derailed, however, by the Great
Proletarian Cultural Revolution (1966–1969). A decade later, Zhou reintroduced the program at the
Fourth National People’s Congress in 1975, a move that signified that China was moving away from
class struggle and toward economic development during the final phase of the Cultural Revolution.
However, the program remained in limbo as it was soon sabotaged by the Gang of Four.
Mao Zedong’s appointed successor, Hua Guofeng, had the Gang of Four arrested on October 6, 1976,
shortly after the death of Mao. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) could then pull itself together to
focus on economic development. Hua, while relying on Maoist dogmatism, was forced to accept the
precepts of the Four Modernizations, which represented the economic policies promoted by Zhou Enlai
and Deng Xiaoping between 1973 and 1976. At the first session of the Fifth National People’s
Congress in February 1978, Hua presented a ten­year economic development plan to implement the
first part of the Four Modernizations. The same congress also incorporated the Four Modernizations
into the state constitution, following its incorporation into the party constitution at the Eleventh Party
Congress in August 1977. Such a move is not surprising when seen from a historical perspective.
China has always wanted to pursue the twin goals of wealth and power (fuqiang) after suffering defeat
and humiliation at the hands of foreign powers. The Four Modernizations program is a concentrated
expression of such sentiment: “If there was such a thing as a national consensus in China, it focused
on the commitment to the Four Modernizations” (Xu Zhongyue 2000, p. 803).
Initially, the policies consisted of targeted investments through the state planning system; that is, they
were largely conventional economic measures with the added element of bringing in advanced foreign
technology, although they violated the voluntarist dogma of mass mobilization and self­sufficiency. The
initial failure of the large investment programs (including the major importation of foreign technology, for
example, for Baoshan Iron and Steel Mill), was made up for gradually during the 1980s.
A change came during the Third Plenum of the Eleventh Central Committee in December 1978, when
Hua was eclipsed by Deng Xiaopeng. To Deng, self­reliance was not a sacred principle and could be
discarded if it did not serve practice. He argued that the political focus of the CCP should be the Four
Modernizations and not class struggle. Gone too was the slogan of continuance of revolution under the
dictatorship of the proletariat. Deng argued that Marxist principles must be adapted to meet the needs
of concrete conditions in order to “build socialism with Chinese characteristics.” Even though the Four
Modernizations policy was de facto abandoned with Deng’s rise to power in 1978, it was not
denounced—it became a central element of the statement of the reform—and for a while it was used
as a slogan to justify the reform policies (even though these involved totally different approaches),
suggesting a continuation from Zhou Enlai’s legacy.
After the launch of the Four Modernizations, the Chinese leadership gradually realized that the
program’s goals could not be accomplished by the turn of the century. The leadership therefore
decided to increase the volume of trade by opening up China’s market and adopting export­oriented
growth, access to advanced technology, and management know­how. At the Twelfth Party Congress in
September 1982, there was a change in the sequence of the four components: Industrial
modernization was given priority over agricultural modernization (China Daily 2007). The reasoning
was that industrialization formed the material basis for the entire modernization program. After the
Thirteenth Party Congress in 1987, the term Four Modernizations was seldom used. Instead, the
vocabulary evolved toward the use of such terms as reform, opening up, and socialist modernization,
reflecting the move from a planned economy to a market economy.
Deng shrewdly propounded the idea of “seeking truth from facts,” and he argued that “practice is the
sole criterion of truth.” This view implies that practice rather than Mao’s words should be the standard
when deciding on the merits of a policy. Social reality and facts, rather than ideology, should form the
basis of truth. Such thinking is very much in line with Deng’s remark that a cat should be judged on its
ability to catch mice rather than its color.
With economic modernization as the national goal, profit incentives and bonuses took the place of
revolutionary slogans. The people’s communes were dismantled and replaced by the responsibility
system. Peasant households had more freedom to decide what to produce and how to sell their
harvest. And factory managers were granted flexibility to negotiate terms with both domestic and
foreign companies.
Agricultural Production ; Economic Development: Overview ; Economic Reform since 1978 ;
Foreign Trade since 1950 ; Industrial Policy since 1949 ; Science and Technology Policy .
SEE ALSO
BIBLIOGRAPHY
China Daily. The 12th Party Congress. 2007. http://chinadaily.com.cn/china/2007­
07/10/content_6142010.htm .
Hsü, Immanuel C. Y. (Xu Zhongyue). The Rise of Modern China. 6th ed. Oxford, U.K.: Oxford University
Press, 2000.
Zhao Enlai. Zai disanjie Quanguo Renmin Daibiao Dahui diyici huiyi shang zhengfu gongzuo baogao
[Government report presented to the First Session of the Third National People’s Congress]. 1964.
http://news.xinhuanet.com/ziliao/2004­10/15/content_2093452.htm .
Zhao Enlai. Zai disijie Quanguo Renmin Daibiao Dahui diyici huiyi shang zhengfu gongzuo baogao
[Government report presented to the First Session of the Fourth National People’s Congress]. 1975.
http://www.people.com.cn/item/lianghui/zlhb/rd/4jie/newfiles/a1070.html .
Michael Heng Siam­Heng (Wang Zhaoxing)
Full Text: COPYRIGHT 2009 Charles Scribner's Sons, a part of Gale, Cengage Learning.
Source Citation
"Four Modernizations." Encyclopedia of Modern China. Ed. David Pong. Vol. 2.
Detroit: Charles Scribner's Sons, 2009. 89­91. World History in Context. Web. 11
Apr. 2016.
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