Magdalena C. Delgado
The role of religion in foreign policy decision making: the cases of Menachem Begin’s Israel, Ayatollah Khomeini’s Iran
and Crown Prince Fahd’s Saudi Arabia
* PLEASE DO NOT CITE *
The role of religion in Menachem Begin’s foreign policy decision making vis-àvis the Camp David Accords and Operation Peace for Galilee (1977-1983)
1.0 Introduction
The foreign policy of Israel’s sixth Prime Minister, Menachem Begin, was pinnacled by his signing
of the Camp David Accords in 1978, and his authorisation of the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in
1982. The former, signed alongside Egyptian President Anwar Sadat, paved the way for a peace
treaty between Israel and Egypt, conditioned on Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai Peninsula, and
proposed a framework for addressing the ‘Palestinian problem’ in the West Bank and Gaza Strip
(the latter never fully implemented, however). The invasion of Lebanon, or ‘Operation Peace for
Galilee’ as Begin termed it, conversely marked the beginning of the ‘First Lebanon War’ and with
it, an already strenuous relationship between the two neighboring states intensified.
Existing analyses surrounding the motives behind both events are plentiful. Telhami (1990), for
example, explains the Camp David Accords in rationalist and systematic terms, referencing various
geopolitical conditions which warranted a peaceful border with a militarily strong Egypt that, given
its recent history of powerful leadership under pan-Arabist Nasser, held more political leverage than
any other Arab state. Such geopolitical conditions included unfolding unrest in Iran, Israel’s sole
regional ally, which would eventually culminate in the Islamic Revolution and subsequent severing
of diplomatic relations with Israel. Others, such as Rowland (1985), have explained Begin’s
behaviour vis-à-vis the Accords, specifically the part addressing the ‘Palestinian problem’, with
reference to ideological factors, arguing that it was Begin’s ideological conviction that Jews inhabit
all of Eretz Yisrael which fostered his refusal to relinquish Israeli sovereignty over the West Bank
and Gaza.
With regards to Operation Peace for Galilee, analysts such as Shlaim (2007) and Maoz (2006) agree
that the invasion, which officially sought to push PLO factions 40 kilometers north of the IsraelLebanon border in order to protect Israeli civilians in the Galilee region, was motivated by Israeli
aims to destroy PLO infrastructure; install a Christian Lebanese, pro-Israel government; and expel
the Syrian army from Lebanon. Ultimately, such measures were thought to foster conditions for a
peace treaty between Israel and Lebanon, which would increase Israel’s security in the region. In
addition to serving such strategic purposes, Operation Peace for Galilee was the culmination of
years of tension and clashes between Israel and factions in Lebanon, one of the most prominent one
being the ‘Battle of Zahleh’ in April of 1981 between Israeli Defense Forces and Syrian Forces in
the Christian Lebanese city of Zahleh.
The purpose of this chapter is not to dispute any such analyses, as they surely capture important
aspects of the motivations behind both the Camp David Accords and Operation Peace for Galilee.
Rather, the aim is to explore the role(s) that religion played in those contexts. The chapter does so
by referencing extensive primary material retrieved through archival and online sources, which
gives insight to the private correspondence, meetings, Knesset speeches and public discourse
surrounding each of the foreign policy outcomes. Looking at such a variety of sources makes it
possible to identify in which contexts and when religion figured in the decision making process.
Magdalena C. Delgado
The role of religion in foreign policy decision making: the cases of Menachem Begin’s Israel, Ayatollah Khomeini’s Iran
and Crown Prince Fahd’s Saudi Arabia
and, on that basis, derive its role(s) in the foreign policy outcomes in question. It is, of course,
impossible to specify religion’s roles with absolute precision, firstly because of lacking access to
decision makers’ innermost thought processes, but also because religion presumably did not operate
in complete isolation - variables rarely do. Nonetheless, religion features significantly in the
decision making processes and public discourse surrounding both the Camp David Accords and
Operation Peace for Galilee and its role in those contexts thus merits detailed study, however
suboptimal its findings.
The analysis is conducted with a focus on Menachem Begin, attributing significant influence to his
personality and beliefs on the decision making processes and ultimately the Camp David Accords
and Operation Peace for Galilee. As the chapter will demonstrate, that meant a stubborn and ardent
insistence on Israeli sovereignty over Eretz Yisrael, and secure borders with Egypt and Lebanon to
ensure Israel’s security. Despite his influential leadership, Begin, as the leader of a democratic state
and member of the international community, worked within a set of structures that would
potentially constrain or support his preferred courses of action. Most notably, these structures
included the Israeli parliament (Knesset), international opinion, domestic public opinion and
external geopolitical environment. The chapter considers the influence of such structures in order to
situate the main analysis, religion’s role in foreign policy, within a comprehensive framework.
Doing so mitigates the risk of attributing unwarranted importance to the main variable under study.
The chapter proceeds in five main parts. First, Begin’s worldview is outlined, as it was on this that
he based his foreign policy doctrine. It shows that Begin’s worldview was premised in large part on
his religious convictions, and argues that a connection can be drawn between the two. Second, the
chapter discusses religion’s role in Begin’s decision making during the Camp David Accords,
particularly its ‘Peace in the Middle East’ framework. It demonstrates how Begin’s religious
convictions led to a set of principled and causal beliefs that, taken together, served as a roadmap
which guided his decision to oppose any concessions that would relinquish Israeli sovereignty over
those territories. Third, the chapter looks at decision making processes and public discourse
surrounding Operation Peace for Galilee. Given an overwhelming focus on security and absence of
religion in those decision making processes, the latter are outlined with a view to highlight their
contrast to Begin’s public discourse surrounding the invasion, as well as their contrast to the
decision making behind the Camp David Accords, in which religion was a driving force. This is
done with a view to argue religion, by and large, played an instrumental role vis-a-vis Operation
Peace for Galilee. Fourth, the chapter evaluates the potential constraints, imposed by domestic and
international structures, that Begin worked under in the respective contexts, concluding however
that none of them significantly constrained Begin’s preferred course of action, either due to his
disregard of them (international opinion) or overlapping interests (Knesset and domestic opinion).
Fifth and finally, the chapter discusses religion’s role in foreign policy by drawing on empirical
findings from the Camp David Accords and Operation Peace for Galilee case studies. On this basis,
it argues that religion takes on not one, essentialist and ahistorical role, but rather distinct roles
depending on the context in which it operates; as such, the chapter concludes that the relationship
between religion and foreign policy is a pragmatic one.
2.0 Liberation of Eretz Yisrael and making peace: discerning the religious premise of Begin’s
foreign policy doctrine.
Magdalena C. Delgado
The role of religion in foreign policy decision making: the cases of Menachem Begin’s Israel, Ayatollah Khomeini’s Iran
and Crown Prince Fahd’s Saudi Arabia
In the words of Begin’s longtime friend and advisor, Harry Hurwitz, Menachem was “above all, [...]
a man of immense and supreme faith”1 , whose constant prayer was “Be’ezrat Haskem” - “With the
help of the Almighty”.2 Another of his colleagues, former U.S. President Jimmy Carter, has made a
similar judgement of Begin’s relationship with God in stating that Begin’s “deep and unswerving
religious commitments [had] always been a guiding factor in his consciousness and in his pursuit of
unswerving goals.3 Scholars dedicated to studying the life and politics of Begin have reached
similar conclusions. Amongst them, Dr. Arnon Lammfrom from the Israeli State Archives, who
comments that “although Begin was not religious in an explicit way [as] he was not a Rabbi; his
soul was religious”.4 Most telling of all, perhaps, are Begin’s personal reflections on his relationship
with God, for example his many references to private moments of prayer in his autobiographical
memoir White Nights: the Story of a Prisoner in Russia (1977). The fact that Begin held deep
religious convictions is, as these excerpts suggest, not disputed; whether and how religion guided
his foreign policy is a different matter and a natural relationship between the two should not be
assumed without critical evaluation. Section 2.0 of the chapter outlines Begin’s worldview, as it was
on this that he based his foreign policy doctrine. Subsequently, the section evaluates the extent to
which Begin’s worldview was premised upon his religious convictions. Determining the connection
between the two aids the analysis of religion’s role in the Camp David Accords and Operation
Peace for Galilee in sections 3.0 and 4.0, as both of those foreign policy outcomes developed from
Begin’s worldview.
2.1 Begin’s worldview
Begin’s worldview consisted, in many ways, of the narrative adopted by all Zionists: that the
Jewish people, expelled from its homeland in Eretz Yisrael by the Romans in the 6th century and
forced to live in persecution and fear on foreign lands, was redeemed with the establishment of the
Israeli state in 1948, which occurred as a result of the undeniable relationship between Jews and
their homeland. Beyond this basic premise, Begin differed from, for example, his Labour Zionist
predecessors in his dedication to territorial maximalist policies, which he insisted extend throughout
Eretz Yisrael. 5 His ideological specificity was seen prior to Israel’s establishment, too: in his
activities as commander of the paramilitary group, Irgun, he was dedicated, by virtue of his staunch
support of Revisionist Zionism, to liberating Mandatory Palestine and establishing a Jewish state on
that territory.6 Interlinked with his territorial maximalist policies, and arguably the reasoning behind
them, was his vision that redemption of the Jewish people would necessarily come from its return to
Eretz Yisrael. Staunch in his belief that Jews were a courageous, grand people, and that this
grandeur had diminished through millennia in exile, Begin believed that Jews would regain their
inherent strength through reconnecting with the Land of Israel. Rowland captures this overarching
1
Harry Hurwitz (1977) Menachem Begin, Johannesburg: The Jewish Herald Pty. Ltd., p. 38
2
Ibid. page 4
3
The American Presidency Project (2013) Visit of Prime Minister Menahem Begin of Israel Remarks of the President and the Prime
Minister at the Welcoming Ceremony. Available from: http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=7825. Accessed: 1 December, 2013
4
Interview with Dr. Arnon Lammfrom at the Israeli State Archives, July 10, 2013. Other scholars with similar views on Begin
include Robert C. Rowland (1985) and Frank Gervasi (1979).
5
His predecessors, contrastingly, subscribed to the view that (all of) Israeli-captured territory of the 1967 war, should be used for
bargaining power during peace talks.
6This
approach diverged from that of the World Zionist Organisation, which sought to establish a Jewish homeland, through a less
military forceful approach. Sofer, Sasson (1988) Begin: An Autonomy of Leadership, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, p. 113-124
Magdalena C. Delgado
The role of religion in foreign policy decision making: the cases of Menachem Begin’s Israel, Ayatollah Khomeini’s Iran
and Crown Prince Fahd’s Saudi Arabia
worldview excellently by the very title of his book: ‘The Myth of Redemption Through Return’.
‘Myth’, in this context, serves specifically to highlight that the content of Begin’s worldview was
constructed by subjective interpretations of historical and contemporary events that, whether true or
false, served as absolute truth for him.7
This is not to say that there were not dimensions of Begin’s worldview that were less than strictly
ideological. Sofer notes that reality, for Begin, existed on two levels: one ideological as detailed
above, and another resting on the ‘rationality of political realism’.8 This complexity in his
worldview is perhaps nowhere better illustrated, than in Begin’s personal letter of August 4, 1980 to
Sadat in which he writes,
Jerusalem, in its entirety, is the indivisible capital of Israel, a city reunited and indivisible for all generations’ […] To the Jewish people
Jerusalem is not only holy; it is their history for three millennia, their
heart, their dream, the visible symbol of their national redemption.
You assure me, Mr. President, that you are for the unity of Jerusalem,
but in your speech at the National Press Club in Washington, a few
months ago, you demanded that “Eastern Jerusalem” can be put under
Arab sovereignty. This is a contradiction in terms. Two sovereignties
over one city mean its re-partition. Impossible. […] The same applies
to our settlements in Judea, Samaria, the Gaza District, and the Golan
Heights. They are legal and they are an integral part of our national
security. None of them will ever be removed.9
In this excerpt, Begin speaks about Israel’s claim to Jerusalem with reference to the city’s religious
meaning for the Jewish people (‘Jerusalem is not only holy’); its historical importance (‘it is [the
Jews’] history for three millennia); its legal status ([the settlements] are legal’); and finally, its
implications for Israel’s security (‘[the settlements] are an integral part of our national security’).
The tension between ideology and political realism, pointed to above, is clear from this passage.
The contrasting dimensions of Begin’s worldview - ideology and political realism - reflected in his
foreign policy which was characterised by two main tenets: liberation of the historic Jewish
homeland, Eretz Yisrael; and peace with Israel’s neighbouring states to ensure Israel’s security. The
best way of achieving these aims, according to Begin, was through diplomacy and use of force, as is
summed up in the excerpt from Begin’s discourse below:
This ought to be the rule for us: every nation should try to achieve its
national goal by diplomatic means, as far as is possible. The use of
force, if right is on your side, is not forbidden. At times it is even
obligatory.10
7
Rowland, Robert C. (1985) The Rhetoric of Menachem Begin: The Myth of Redemption Through Return, Maryland: University
Press of America
8
Sofer, Sasson (1988) Begin: An Autonomy of Leadership, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, p. 99
9
‘Letters following Begin’s Hospitalization, August 2-27, 1980’ in Hurwitz, Harry & Medad, Yisrael, ed. (2011) Peace in the
Making: The Menachem Begin-Anwar El-Sadat Personal Correspondence’ Jerusalem: Gefen Publishing House in cooperation with
the Menachem Begin Heritage Centre, p. 202-203.
10
Begin cited in Sofer, Sasson (1988) Begin: An Autonomy of Leadership, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, p. 139
Magdalena C. Delgado
The role of religion in foreign policy decision making: the cases of Menachem Begin’s Israel, Ayatollah Khomeini’s Iran
and Crown Prince Fahd’s Saudi Arabia
Despite the many instances where political realism can be discerned in Begin’s discourse, analysts
such as Sofer (1988) argue that it is evident from reviewing his discourse and actions, that in
Begin’s ‘[…] profound inner contradiction, the romantic element has frequently undermined the
realistic political assumptions […] Begin’s general outlook, the basic principles of the policies for
which he strove throughout his life, rested upon principles of ‘natural right’ or ‘historical right,
which are totally beyond proof’.11 The triumph, if you will, of Begin’s ideology can be seen in his
unequivocal reference to the West Bank 12 by its Biblical names of ‘Judea and Samaria’, even when
that territory was discussed in a strictly non-ideological context. This is clear from looking at a
personal correspondence between Begin and Sadat, in which Sadat wrote, voicing specific points of
disagreement between him and Begin, that
It goes without saying, also, that these actions contradict the provision
of the Fourth Geneva Convention which prohibits the annexation of
occupied territories.13
Begin, specifically addressing Sadat’s point above, replied that
The Egyptian delegate votes for a resolution demanding that by
November 15, Israel withdraw from Judea, Samaria (my language),
the Gaza District, the Golan Height and Jerusalem.14
Begin’s insistence to refer to the West Bank by its Biblical name, despite the non-ideological
context in which the area is discussed, implies, if nothing else, a constant presence (and thus
importance) of Begin’s ideology.
2.2 The religious constituent of Begin’s worldview
From this overview it is possible to discern a spiritual worldview premised on Begin’s idea of
Jewish redemption through return to Eretz Yisrael. The worldview has a spiritual character not
necessarily because is tied to religion (Judaism); but rather by being a worldview that saw Israel
and the Jewish people pre-determined to fulfill a specific destiny. This comes, very possibly, as a
result of Begin’s time in jail in the early 1940s 15 during which he was confronted with
‘immeasurable human suffering’16, which led him to the conclusion that ‘faith is the sole spiritual
11
Sofer, Sasson (1988) Begin: An Autonomy of Leadership, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, p. 99
12 As
is the territory between Israel’s internationally recognised borders and Jordan officially labelled.
13
‘Letters following Begin’s Hospitalization, August 2-27, 1980’ in Hurwitz, Harry & Medad, Yisrael, ed. (2011) Peace in the
Making: The Menachem Begin-Anwar El-Sadat Personal Correspondence’ Jerusalem: Gefen Publishing House in cooperation with
the Menachem Begin Heritage Centre, p. 191.
14Ibid.
p.199.
15
Begin was jailed by Russian soldiers on the charge of being the chairman of Betar, a Revisionist paramilitary youth movement, in
Poland.
16
‘Letters following Begin’s Hospitalization, August 2-27, 1980’ in Hurwitz, Harry & Medad, Yisrael, ed. (2011) Peace in the
Making: The Menachem Begin-Anwar El-Sadat Personal Correspondence’ Jerusalem: Gefen Publishing House in cooperation with
the Menachem Begin Heritage Centre, p. 191.
Magdalena C. Delgado
The role of religion in foreign policy decision making: the cases of Menachem Begin’s Israel, Ayatollah Khomeini’s Iran
and Crown Prince Fahd’s Saudi Arabia
mode of withstanding [human suffering]’.17 He was very much of the persuasion that time and
destiny would ultimately resolve any national and personal predicament; a belief that was, in part,
confirmed to him by the establishment of Israel in 1948, following millennia of Jewish persecution
in the Diaspora, and not least the atrocities of the Holocaust.
The spiritual character of Begin’s worldview, interesting as it may be in the study of ideas and
foreign policy, does not lend itself directly to the very specific study of religion’s impact on foreign
policy. A similarly general and spiritual view could be held by an irreligious individual, and the two
must thus not be conflated. Therefore, when considering religion as a worldview and its impact as
such on foreign policy, it is necessary to identify strands within that view that are explicitly
religious. In other words: discern the extent to which Begin’s worldview derives from his religious
conviction. It is, of course, impossible to determine this with precision, due to lacking access to
Begin’s thought processes. Nonetheless, it is possible to detect, through various discourse excerpts,
that Begin reasoned his aspiration to ‘return’ to Eretz Yisrael, in large part, on the grounds of
religion. In a public prayer at the Wailing Wall following Israel’s (re)capture of Jerusalem in 1967,
Begin spoke the following words:
We shall yet come to Hebron, the city of the Four Couples, and
there we shall prostrate ourselves at the graves of the Patriarchs
of our people. We shall yet be on the way to Euphrath as thou
comest to Bethlehem of Judah. We shall pray at the Tomb of
Rachel and we shall bring to mind the prayer of the prophet: “A
voice is heard in Raman, weiling and bitter lamentation, Rachel
weeping for her children, she refuseth to be comforted for her
children, for they are not. Refrain thy voice from weeping and
thine eyes from tears for there is a reward for thy labour, saith
the Lord, and they shall return from the land of the enemy. And
there is hope for thy latter end and thy children shall return to
their borders.18
In this passage, Begin expresses his vision that Jews will go to (presumably inhabit) Hebron and
Bethlehem of Judah, both which cities are part of Eretz Yisrael. More interestingly, Begin does
more than ‘just’ pray for Jewish inhabitation of those cities; he refers to ‘the city of the Four
Couples’ and ‘the Tomb of Rachel’ - holy places of the ancient Israeli state - to highlight an ancient
religious bond to the land. The part of Begin’s worldview which aspires to a ‘return to Eretz
Yisrael’, then, seems to be rationalised through religious Jewish ties to this land, as opposed to, say,
strictly historical ones.
The same logic is found in less religiously charged settings too: in his response to Sadat’s speech
delivered to the Knesset on November 20, 1977, in which Sadat referred to the West Bank and Gaza
as ‘the Occupied Territories’19 , and called for Israel’s presumed understanding of the need to create
17
Ibid. p.199.
18
‘Begin addresses Jewish Leaders in New York, September 20, 1978’ Hurwitz, Harry & Medad, Yisrael, ed. (2011) Peace in the
Making: The Menachem Begin-Anwar El-Sadat Personal Correspondence’ Jerusalem: Gefen Publishing House in cooperation with
the Menachem Begin Heritage Centre, p. 167-168.
19
The Camp David Accords and Related Documents (1998) Beer-Sheva: The Chaim Herzog Center for Middle East Studies and
Diplomacy, p. 39
Magdalena C. Delgado
The role of religion in foreign policy decision making: the cases of Menachem Begin’s Israel, Ayatollah Khomeini’s Iran
and Crown Prince Fahd’s Saudi Arabia
a Palestinian state, given the Jews ‘moral and legal justification to set up a national home on a land
that did not all belong to [them]’ 20, Begin said:
‘[…] it is my duty to tell our guest and the peoples watching us and
listening to our words about the link between our people and this land.
[…] No sir, we did not take over any strange land. We returned to our
homeland. The link between our people and this land is eternal. It was
created at the dawn of human history. It was never severed. In this
land we established our civilization. Here our prophets spoke those
holy words you cited this very day; there the Kings of Judah and Israel
prostrated themselves; here we became a nation; here we established
our Kingdom and, when we were exiled from our country by the force
that was exercised against us, even when we were far away we did not
forget this Land, not even for a single day; we prayed for it; we longer
for it; we have believed in our return to it’21
Here, Begin speaks of the Jews’ eternal link to the Land, a choice of word which has a religious
rather than historically factual connotation. Similarly, he speaks of prophets who spoke holy words
on the Land of Israel, a land that Jews for millennia subsequently, prayed that they would return to.
Begin expressed a similar view in his address to the Egyptian people on November 1977,
demonstrates:
It is in the Holy Koran, in Surah 5, that our right to this land was
stated and sanctified. May I read to you this eternal surah. “Recall
when Moses said to his people, O my people, remember the goodness
of Allah towards you when He appointed prophets among you. O my
people, enter the Holy Land which Allah hath written down as yours. 22
Taken together with the previous examples, this excerpt indicates that Begin’s worldview which
stipulated a ‘return to Eretz Yisrael’ is upheld by the Jews’ religious ties to that land. The fact that
his expression of it held constant across very different settings (public religious audience, the
Knesset, and the Egyptian public) makes his dedication to it all the more tenable. What is more,
Begin was an unusually outspoken, stubborn and assiduous diplomatic figure, which reflects in his
private and public statements alike. Various accounts from Begin’s negotiation colleagues confirm
this; for example, Egypt’s Foreign Minister, Mohamed Ibrahim Kamel, who in his first-hand
account of the negotiations at Camp David notes,
Every hour brought reports of further concessions. Begin insisted on
deletion of all reference to “the non-admissibility of acquiring territory by
force”, telling Carter that “if he had to sign or cut off his two hands he still
would not sign it.” This resulted in the deletion of the reference to this
20
Ibid., p. 42
21
Ibid., p. 48-49
22
‘Begin broadcasts directly to the Egyptian People, November 11. 1977’ Hurwitz, Harry & Medad, Yisrael, ed. (2011) Peace in the
Making: The Menachem Begin-Anwar El-Sadat Personal Correspondence’ Jerusalem: Gefen Publishing House in cooperation with
the Menachem Begin Heritage Centre, p. 8.
Magdalena C. Delgado
The role of religion in foreign policy decision making: the cases of Menachem Begin’s Israel, Ayatollah Khomeini’s Iran
and Crown Prince Fahd’s Saudi Arabia
cardinal principle of Resolution 242. […] In return for the word “full” that
Carter had added to the phrase “autonomy”, Begin insisted on inserting the
phrase “administrative council” between brackets before the phrase “the
self-governing authority” so as to minimize its jurisdiction to administrative
questions to the exclusion of the legislative and judicial. 23
Whilst it may have made negotiations taxing for his colleagues, Begin’s outspoken and assiduous
personality enables the development of good analysis in that his discourse can be viewed as a
largely accurate representation of his views and reasoning processes.
Section 2.0 has showed that Begin’s worldview, premised on Begin’s idea that Jewish redemption
would occur through a return to Eretz Yisrael, reflected in a foreign policy doctrine that was
characterised by two main tenets: liberation of the historic Jewish homeland, Eretz Yisrael; and
peace with Israel’s neighbouring states to ensure Israel’s security. With reference to discursive
excerpts and Begin’s personality, the section has also shown that Begin’s religious conviction
served as the basis for his worldview. By implication, it is possible to discern a connection, however
indirect, between Begin’s religious conviction and his foreign policy for which it served as
premised. How religion’s role played out is the subject matter of sections 3.0 and 4.0, which explore
that question in relation to the Camp David Accords and Operation Peace for Galilee.
One important disclaimer before proceeding with the analysis: however apparent the relationship
between Begin’s religious conviction, worldview and foreign policy; religion is unlikely to have
operated as an independent variable, if for no other reason than the complexities of the human
mind. Existing studies dealing with similarly unquantifiable concepts such as ‘identity’ and
‘culture’ have affirmed this conundrum: in their book Identity and Foreign Policy in the Middle
East (2002), which comprises of six country-specific case studies and their respective authors’ take
on how national and state identities affect foreign policy, Telhami and Barnett make the informed
assertion that identity cannot be identified as operating like a ‘master variable’ which exerts direct
causal effect(s) on a foreign policy decision. 24 Religion, a variable that is arguably less compound
than that of identity, should not be expected to exert a strictly causal relationship either.
3.0 Religion and the Camp David Accords: providing a road map for the decision making
process
This is, Ladies and Gentlemen, the third greatest day in my life. The
first was May 14, 1948, when our flag was hoisted […] The second
day was when Jerusalem became one city and our […] soldiers […]
kissed the ancient stones of the remnants of the Western Wall, destined
to protect the chosen place of God’s glory. […] This is the third
[greatest] day in my life. I have signed a treaty of peace with our
neighbor, with Egypt. The heart is full and overflowing.25
23
Kamel, Mohamed Ibrahim (1986) The Camp David Accords: A Testimony, London: KPI Ltd., p. 372
24
Telhami, Shibley & Barnett, Michael N. (2002) Identity and Foreign Policy in the Middle East, New York: Cornell University
Press, p. 13
25 Israel
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Treaty of Peace between Israel and Egypt. Protocols, Annexes, Letters, Memorandum of
Agreement between Israel and the United States, Addresses of Presidents Carter and Sadat, and Prime Minister Begin, 26 March
1979’, Volumes 4-5:1977-1977.
Magdalena C. Delgado
The role of religion in foreign policy decision making: the cases of Menachem Begin’s Israel, Ayatollah Khomeini’s Iran
and Crown Prince Fahd’s Saudi Arabia
These words were spoken by Begin, following his signing of the Treaty of Peace between Egypt
and Israel, on the lawn of the White House in Washington on March 26, 1979, alongside signatory
Egyptian President Anwar Al-Sadat and, witness, US President Jimmy Carter. The peace treaty was
a result of negotiations preceding and following the Camp David Accords, signed and witnessed by
the same three parties some six months prior. A two-framework agreement, the accords comprised
of plans for ‘Peace in the Middle East’ and ‘the Conclusion of a Peace Treaty between Egypt and
Israel’. The former agreement addressed the need to ‘solve the Palestinian problem in all its
aspects’26 by allowing for full autonomy to Palestinian Arabs living in the West Bank and Gaza,
while providing for Israeli forces to remain in specified locations during a transitional period of five
years. The final status of the West Bank and Gaza was to be determined through future negotiations.
The latter agreement called for full withdrawal of Israeli military forces from the Sinai Peninsula,
granting full exercise of Egyptian sovereignty over that territory, and leading to the establishment of
a binding peace treaty between Egypt and Israel, including diplomatic relations.27
Throughout Begin’s political career,28 first as leader of the opposition and, from May of 1977, as
Prime Minister, he expressed an unequivocal commitment to territorial maximalist policies vis-à-vis
Eretz Yisrael, or Land of Israel, 29 which he interpreted to comprise of the territory of British
Mandate in Palestine (that is, roughly, present day Israel, Jordan, Gaza and the West Bank).30 He
was a staunch believer in Jews’ right to inhabit Eretz Yisrael based on their historical and religious
ties to that land; an opinion which he raised publicly and privately on countless occasions. His
agreement, then, to sign the Camp David Accords, which not only demonstrated friendly relations
with Sadat, a man whose country had been at war with Israel five times during the preceding thirty
years and was a staunch critic of Israel’s mere existence; but also required territorial sacrifice on
Israel’s part, came as a shock to many, particularly Israeli religious movements. To the neutral
observer, too, Begin’s decision to sign the Camp David Accords would seem intuitively at odds
with the territorial maximalist policies, which he had hitherto so vehemently promoted.
A meticulous appraisal of the Camp David Accords suggests that this was not the case. With regards
to the Framework II which called for an Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty conditional on the withdrawal
of Israeli military forces from the Sinai, Begin’s compliance did not contradict his ideological
stance, as the Sinai Peninsula, unlike Judea, Samaria and the Gaza Strip, did (does) not constitute
the Biblical promised land. While it is true that Begin, as leader of the opposition, disapproved of
ruling Labour’s interim talks with Egypt and the United States which concerned the potential
26
‘Text of the Camp David Accords’ The Camp David Accords and Related Documents (1998) Beer-Sheva: The Chaim Herzog
Center for Middle East Studies and Diplomacy, p. 160
27
Ibid. p 161
28
Begin’s involvement in politics predated the Israeli state’s establishment, but it was only after this that his concern with specific
territory was made explicit. He first became politically active at the age of 15, upon joining the Revisionist paramilitary youth
movement ‘Betar’; a movement whose leader, Ze’ev Jabotinsky, was to become his mentor. Upon Jabotinsky’s death in 1940, Begin
inherited leadership of the Revisionist movement, and sought to implement its vision of establishing a Jewish state in Palestine,
through his activities as commander of the Zionist paramilitary group ‘Irgun’, and subsequently through that group’s successive
political party ‘Herut’.
29
‘Eretz Yisrael’ and ‘Land of Israel’ is used interchangeably henceforth.
30
See Appendix 1 for map of British Mandate in Palestine.
Magdalena C. Delgado
The role of religion in foreign policy decision making: the cases of Menachem Begin’s Israel, Ayatollah Khomeini’s Iran
and Crown Prince Fahd’s Saudi Arabia
withdrawal of Israel from the Sinai Peninsula;31 he did so because these did not request a final
peace treaty between Israel and Egypt, and not because they challenged his ideological agenda.32 In
other words, Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai, as it was agreed to in the Camp David Accords, did
not constitute a departure from religious reasoning.
This too, was the case for Framework I, which called for full autonomy to Palestinian Arabs living
in the West Bank and Gaza. Whilst the notion of relinquishing control of Judea, Samaria and Gaza,
which were (are) considered Biblical territories of the highest stature, would understandably prompt
hostile and startled reactions by religious movements in particular, Begin entered into and signed
the Camp David Accords with the intention of maintaining Israeli sovereignty over those areas. This
becomes evident when appraising the agreement in light of the negotiations that preceded it, the
(lack of) actions that followed it and indeed the minute details which comprised it: through Begin’s
meticulous and tenacious approach to the negotiations, detailed by various first-hand accounts, he
ensured that the final agreement to which he gave his signature at Camp David, was phrased in such
a way that he could be neither expected nor forced to make any compromise that would require
Israeli settlement or military withdrawal from Judea, Samaria and Gaza, much less one that would
relinquish Israeli sovereignty over the territories.
An example of the type of assiduousness and concessional requests exposed by Begin is detailed by
former Security Council member, William B. Quandt, who was actively involved in the Camp
David Accords. He describes Begin as ‘intransigent’33 and having ‘a feel for the strategic use of
time, taking the negotiations to the brink of collapse over secondary issues to avoid being pressed
on key problems’.34 By ‘key problems’ Quandt refers specifically to the Palestinian issue, where
Begin demonstrated an ‘unwillingness to accept that the principle of withdrawal from occupied
territory, as called for in Resolution 242, should apply to the West Bank and Gaza at the end of a
transitional period’,35 and that ‘any agreement […] concerning Egyptian-Israeli relations should in
no way be dependent on resolving the Palestinian question’.36
To suggest, based on this analysis, that Begin’s behaviour vis-à-vis the question of Judea, Samaria
and Gaza was premised on and driven by his religious conviction is of course a supposition, as
other factors may well have motivated this behaviour. However, it is however not a supposition that
is entirely farfetched, given Begin’s extensive reference to the Jewish people’s righteous claim to
Eretz Israel by virtue of its religious (as opposed to only historical) ties to that land, which he
invoked repeatedly in public as well as private communications and thoughts.
31
Following the 1973 Yom Kippur War, Egypt’s Anwar Al-Sadat, wanting to regain control over Sinai and having realised after
Egyptian partial defeat during the 1973 war that this would be achieved better through negotiations than on the battle field, entered
into interim negotiations with the US and Israel. These negotiations were not explicit in necessitating a final Israeli-Egyptian peace
agreement however, and it was with this point that Begin took issue.
32
Sofer, Sasson (1988) Begin: An Autonomy of Leadership, Oxford: Basil, p. 53
33
Quandt, William B. (2005) Peace Process: American Diplomacy and the Arab-Israeli Conflict since 1967, 3rd edition, Washington
DC: The Brookings Institution, p. 198
34
Ibid, p. 201
35
Ibid, p. 198
36
Ibid, p. 198
Magdalena C. Delgado
The role of religion in foreign policy decision making: the cases of Menachem Begin’s Israel, Ayatollah Khomeini’s Iran
and Crown Prince Fahd’s Saudi Arabia
By drawing on Goldstein & Keohane’s (1993) framework for the study of ideas and foreign policy,
the following section demonstrates that religion’s influence in this context, played out by providing
Begin with two types of beliefs (principled and causal) which, together, constituted a road-map that
rendered it impermissible to relinquish Israeli sovereignty over Judea, Samaria and Gaza, as those
territories comprised Eretz Yisrael.
!
3.1 Principled beliefs
Principled beliefs, as Goldstein and Keohane term them, are usually defined in terms of larger
worldviews, and serve to ‘specify criteria for distinguishing between right and wrong’.37 Such
beliefs are discernible in Begin’s discourse in that he expresses his belief in the Jewish right to
inhabit Eretz Yisrael. To apply Goldstein & Keohane’s terminology: Begin’s conviction that an
inherent right was given to the Jewish people by God, serves as a principled belief which allows
him to interpret Israeli sovereignty over Eretz Yisrael as right. Lack of or opposition to Israeli
sovereignty over this territory is, in turn, wrong. An emblematic example of how religion allowed
for the facilitation of such a principled belief is found in Begin’s clandestine letter of March 5, 1978
to Sadat. Addressing a particular press conference in which an Egyptian journalist confirmed the
acceptance by Sadat and Egypt of Israel’s right to exist, Begin said:
‘[…] we have never asked for such recognition. Every nation […] has
the same right to exist, be it large or small, strong or weak, near or far.
Indeed, we were given our right to exist by the God of Abraham, Isaac
and Jacob. We have paid a price for that right, higher perhaps than any
other nation. It is inherent; it required no recognition.’38
A similar example, expressed in a public setting, is found in Begin’s address to the Knesset and
Sadat, during the Egyptian president’s visit to Jerusalem on November 20, 1977. In reference to the
Arab-Israeli war of 1948, Begin said:
‘With the help of God Almighty, we overcame the forces of
aggression, and we have guaranteed existence for our nation – not
only for this generation, but for the coming generations, too. We do
not believe in might. We believe in right, only right’39
These examples refer to Israel in terms of its very existence; that is, regardless of its borders
spanning beyond armistice lines40 or not. Begin also used the same discourse in specific reference
to the ‘Palestinian question’, as it was discussed in the context of the Camp David Agreement,
however. In a letter to Sadat on May 1980, upon pressure from the latter to alter his position vis-à37
Goldstein, Judith & Keohane, Robert O., ed. (1993) Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions and Political Change, Ithaca
and London: Cornell University Press, p. 9
38
‘An exchange of letters’ in Hurwitz, Harry & Medad, Yisrael, ed. (2011) Peace in the Making: The Menachem Begin-Anwar ElSadat Personal Correspondence’ Jerusalem: Gefen Publishing House in cooperation with the Menachem Begin Heritage Centre, p.
67.
39
‘Prime Minister Menachem Begin’s Speech to the Knesset, November 20, 1977’ The Camp David Accords and Related Documents
(1998) Beer-Sheva: The Chaim Herzog Center for Middle East Studies and Diplomacy, p. 46
40
‘Armistice lines’ refer to internationally recognised borders which exclude the West Bank (Judea and Samaria) and the Gaza
District.
Magdalena C. Delgado
The role of religion in foreign policy decision making: the cases of Menachem Begin’s Israel, Ayatollah Khomeini’s Iran
and Crown Prince Fahd’s Saudi Arabia
vis the Palestinian question, Begin answered that ‘Our position on settlements in Judea, Samaria
and the Gaza District is certainly well-known to you, as is that on Jerusalem: it is the exercise of our
inherent right […]’41. Perhaps no more explicitly is the same view expressed than in his address at
the Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organisations, in which he asserted:
The Bible is a living document – eternally living document. We live
on this Book, with this Book – forever. And my predecessor of blessed
memory, the late Mr. Ben-Gurion, aptly expressed himself when he
said, ‘Some people say that the British Mandate is our Bible. It is
untrue’ he said. ‘The Bible is our mandate!’ Yes, Judea, Samaria and
the Gaza Strip are integral parts of Eretz Yisrael – the land of our
forefathers, which we have never forgotten during exile, when we
were a persecuted minority, humiliated, killed, our blood shed, burned
alive. We always remembered Zion, and Zion means Eretz Yisrael. It
is our land as of right.42
In short, Begin’s religious conviction allowed for the facilitation of his view that Jews, as a matter
of principle granted by God, have a right to inhabit Judea, Samaria and Gaza, as well as Eretz
Yisrael as a whole.
3.2 Causal beliefs
Causal beliefs, as characterized by Goldstein & Keohane, are distinguishable from principled
beliefs by virtue of their function to ‘provide a guide for the individual on how to obtain a specific
objective’43 – an objective that is itself valued because of principled beliefs, and understandable
only within the context of broader world views. Begin’s religious conviction constituted causal
beliefs in that he anticipated Jewish redemption through the return to Eretz Yisrael. This rationale
formed, as we have seen, the overarching framework of his world view, and led as well to his
principled belief in the justness of Israeli sovereignty over Eretz Yisrael.
Rowland notes how Begin believed that, by returning to biblical Israel, the living center of Judaism,
Jews would regain the strength that had diminished through millennia in the Diaspora.44 This causal
belief can be discerned is his letter to Sadat, in which he wrote that
We, the descendants of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob […], returned
through the course of history, time and again, having never severed
our ties with this land of our ancestors’. […] None of us mortals can
know the will of god Almighty, but surely as the history of the
41
Hurwitz, Harry & Medad, Yisrael, ed. (2011) Peace in the Making: The Menachem Begin-Anwar El-Sadat Personal
Correspondence’ Jerusalem: Gefen Publishing House in cooperation with the Menachem Begin Heritage Centre, p. 184-185.
42
‘Begin addresses Jewish Leaders in New York, September 20, 1978’ Hurwitz, Harry & Medad, Yisrael, ed. (2011) Peace in the
Making: The Menachem Begin-Anwar El-Sadat Personal Correspondence’ Jerusalem: Gefen Publishing House in cooperation with
the Menachem Begin Heritage Centre, p. 88.
43
Goldstein, Judith & Keohane, Robert O., ed. (1993) Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions and Political Change, Ithaca
and London: Cornell University Press, p. 10
44
Rowland, Robert C. (1985) The Rhetoric of Menachem Begin: The Myth of Redemption Through Return, Maryland: University
Press of America, 164.
Magdalena C. Delgado
The role of religion in foreign policy decision making: the cases of Menachem Begin’s Israel, Ayatollah Khomeini’s Iran
and Crown Prince Fahd’s Saudi Arabia
Egyptian people will find its completion in Egypt, so the history of the
Jewish people will find both its expression and consummation in their
own land, the Land of Israel’.45
Begin’s references to the ‘expression’ and ‘consummation’ of Jews ‘in their own land, the Land of
Israel’ make palpable the causal link pointed to above between Jews’ return to Eretz Yisrael on the
one hand, and their redemption on the other. To understand fully how this causal belief operated,
drawing on Begin’s personality is useful: he had what some refer to as an ‘arguably unmatched
skill’ of taking an idea and building it into a pattern for the purpose of granting legitimacy to an
existing idea, as well as a ‘large capacity for self-persuasion’. Such pragmatism renders Begin’s
conviction in the causal belief that ‘return equals redemption’ all the more plausible. To the extent
that such a causal belief is formulated within the context of his broader worldview, and to the extent
that the worldview (as we have seen above) is formulated in large part due to religious conviction,
Begin’s causal belief emanates, as well, from religion.
Judaism, as it has been demonstrated thus far, influenced Begin policy vis-à-vis ‘the Palestinian
problem’ by providing the source of his worldview as well as specific principled beliefs and causal
beliefs which, taken together, saw it just and desirable for Jews to inhabit Eretz Yisrael. In doing so,
religion assumed the very influential role of prescribing Israeli presence on Judea, Samaria and the
Gaza District. This role is, arguably, specific to the given context due to the unique relationship the
between territories in question and Jewish scripture.
3.3 Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty
In other contexts religion assumes a less prescriptive role. Such is the case in Begin’s policy vis-àvis the Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty. Here, Begin would recurrently employ a religious framing
suggesting that the peace between Egypt and Israel was an act that was commended by God. This is
evident in his speech at the signing of the Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty, where he spoke the
following words:
[…] The ancient Jewish people gave the world the vision of eternal
peace, of universal disarmament, of abolishing the teaching and
learning of war. Two prophets, Yeshayahu ben Amotz and Micha
Hamorashti, having foreseen the spiritual unity of man under God –
with His word coming forth from Jerusalem – gave the nations of the
world the following vision expressed in identical terms: “And they
shall beat their swords into plowshares and their spears into pruning
hooks. Nation shall not lift up sword against nation; neither shall they
learn war anymore.” Despite the tragedies and disappointments of the
past, we must never forsake that vision, that human dream, that
unshakable faith. Peace is the beauty of life. It is sunshine. It is the
45
Hurwitz, Harry & Medad, Yisrael, ed. (2011) Peace in the Making: The Menachem Begin-Anwar El-Sadat Personal
Correspondence’ Jerusalem: Gefen Publishing House in cooperation with the Menachem Begin Heritage Centre, p. 207.
Magdalena C. Delgado
The role of religion in foreign policy decision making: the cases of Menachem Begin’s Israel, Ayatollah Khomeini’s Iran
and Crown Prince Fahd’s Saudi Arabia
smile of a child, the love of a mother, the joy of a father, the
togetherness of a family.46
In this excerpt, Begin draws a connection between Jewish prophetical teachings praising the
practice of peace, and the peace between Egypt and Israel, with the clear intention of suggesting
that an Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty is in accordance with religious teaching, and is therefore a
benevolent one. A similar reference is found in Begin and Sadat’s joint press conference following
Sadat’s visit to Jerusalem in 1977 in which Begin remarked:
[…] as we both believe, the President and I, in Divine Providence,
before the departure of the President and his party, we pray to the
Almighty that he give all of us the wisdom to continue in our efforts to
bring peace to our nations – real peace […]47
Although perhaps less explicitly than in the quote above, Begin frames the immanent EgyptianIsraeli peace as something, which is somehow in line with God’s will. This is distinct from the
references he made to narratives relating to the Palestinian question which, as we have seen,
employed a framing which suggested that it was Israeli presence on Judea, Samaria and the Gaza
District (not peace as in the Egyptian case), which was commanded by God. In turn, this
demonstrates that religion takes on a distinct role in this separate context.
Section 3.0 has showed that in spite of giving the immediate impression that they constitute a
departure from religious reasoning, the Camp David Accords were in fact largely driven by Begin’s
religious conviction. This is particularly the case in the context of Framework I ‘Peace Plan for the
Middle East’, where religion formed a set of principled and causal beliefs which in turn served as a
roadmap for Begin’s decision making. In the context of Framework II ‘the Conclusion of a Peace
Treaty between Egypt and Israel’, religion assumed a distinct and less assertive role by condoning
peace and territorial withdrawal (as opposed to territorial presence). Section 4.0 below will explore
religion’s role(s) in Begin’s decision making vis-à-vis Operation Peace for Galilee.
4.0 Religion and Operation Peace for Galilee: a means to mobilise support of a failing foreign
policy.
On 6 June, 1982 Israel launched a military invasion, ‘Operation Peace for Galilee’, into Southern
Lebanon, which officially sought to push PLO factions 40 kilometers north of the Israel-Lebanon
border in order to protect civilians in the Galilee region in Northern Israel. Analysts such as Shlaim
(2007), Maoz (2006) and Freilich (2012) largely agree, and archival sources cited throughout this
chapter confirm this, that the objectives of the operation also included destroying PLO
infrastructure in Lebanon; installing a Christian Lebanese, pro-Israel government; and expelling the
Syrian army from Lebanon. Ultimately, such measures were thought to foster conditions for a peace
treaty between Israel and Lebanon, which would increase Israel’s security in the region. In contrast
to especially Framework I of the Camp David Accords which was driven by Begin’s religious
46
Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Treaty of Peace between Israel and Egypt. Protocols, Annexes, Letters, Memorandum of
Agreement between Israel and the United States, Addresses of Presidents Carter and Sadat, and Prime Minister Begin, 26 March
1979’, Volumes 4-5:1977-1977.
47
‘Begin Addresses Jewish Leaders in New York, September 20. 1978’ in Hurwitz, Harry & Medad, Yisrael, ed. (2011) Peace in the
Making: The Menachem Begin-Anwar El-Sadat Personal Correspondence’ Jerusalem: Gefen Publishing House in cooperation with
the Menachem Begin Heritage Centre, p. 88.
Magdalena C. Delgado
The role of religion in foreign policy decision making: the cases of Menachem Begin’s Israel, Ayatollah Khomeini’s Iran
and Crown Prince Fahd’s Saudi Arabia
ideals, Operation Peace for Galilee was above all driven by security concerns and occasionally also
justified with reference to humanitarianism and international law. Religion did not figure in private
talks between Begin and his Israeli and international negotiation partners, apart from a few cases in
which players in the conflict were characterised along religious lines (for example, pro-Israeli
forces in Lebanon were referred to as ‘the Christians’). Only in his public discourse following
Israel’s seizure of West Beirut, after which public support of Operation Peace for Galilee
diminished, did Begin make extensive reference to Judaism. The timing of that discourse is
significant, as it suggests that Judaism was used instrumentally and thus assumed a much different
role than in the context of the Camp David Accords.
This section will demonstrate the abovementioned themes of the decision-making behind Operation
Peace for Galilee with reference to empirics retrieved from the Israeli State Archives, with a view to
substantiate the claim that religion served as a means of justification, as opposed to a driving force
which was the case vis-à-vis the Camp David Accords. This contrast is drawn in order to highlight
the different roles of religion in foreign policy decision making - a theme which will be elaborated
upon in the conclusion.
4.1 Security threats in Lebanon
The decision to launch Operation Peace for Galilee was made following an assassination attempt by
the Abu Nidal Organisation48 against the Israeli Ambassador to the United Kingdom, but as Begin’s
then Defense Minister, Ariel Sharon, has since related in his memoirs, the assassination attempt was
‘merely the spark that lit the fuse’49 . The operation was, above all, a response to various
developments in an increasingly hostile Lebanon, which were thought to pose direct threats to
Israel’s security. Most threatening amongst these developments was PLO’s firing of artillery shells
into Israel’s Galilee region, and Syrian deployment of missiles in Lebanon along with an increased
anti-Israel Syrian military presence in that country. The security-driven rationale behind the
operation is expressed in Begin’s private letter of 30 May, 1982 to U.S. Secretary Alexander Haig,
in which he repeatedly clarified that Israel was acting with force in order to protect Israeli citizens
and the Jewish state. In the same letter, Haig expressed concern about future Israeli military actions
in Lebanon and encouraged Israel to exercise military restraint. Begin found Haig’s suggestion
inappropriate as he thought that there “[was] in Lebanon a neo-nazi terrorist organization which
constantly proclaim[ed] its design to kill [Israeli] people in Israel and abroad - men, women and
children [...]”50 , and he took Haig’s suggestion to mean that Israel “should let [the PLO] kill
[Israeli] citizens and brethren - and do nothing”51. Begin ensured Haig that Israel’s reconnaissance
flights would continue to fly over Lebanon, as “he would never expose the Jews to such danger,
because of what had happened to [them] in the Past.”52 As the letter reveals, Begin’s policy vis-àvis Lebanon was driven by security concerns, which were in turn reinforced by Jewish suffering
during the Holocaust.
48
The Abu Nidal Organisation (ANO) was a militant Palestinian splinter group.
49
Malaspina, Ann (2009) Creation of the Modern Middle East, New York: Infobase Publishing, p. 81
50 Album
5, p. 84
51 Album
5, p. 84
52
Album 5, p. 84
Magdalena C. Delgado
The role of religion in foreign policy decision making: the cases of Menachem Begin’s Israel, Ayatollah Khomeini’s Iran
and Crown Prince Fahd’s Saudi Arabia
In a meeting with U.S. Ambassador Robert McFarlane on 11 August the following year, Begin
furthermore expressed that Israel’s principal goals in the context of Operation Peace for Galilee
were “[...] a) to strengthen the government of President Amin Jemayel, and b) to get Syrians to
withdraw from Lebanon” 53. In a separate letter to U.S. President Ronald Reagan, he stated that “It
is [clear] Mr. President, that the security of Israel and the lives of its citizens are at stake”. 54
Together, these excerpts from distinct contexts demonstrate that Operation Peace for Galilee was
launched in defense of the security of Israel and her citizens, both of which were put under threat by
hostilities in Lebanon. Moreover, both Begin and his cabinet members were consistent to analyse
the regional and international dimensions of the security threat emanating from Lebanon, as the
following excerpt from a meeting demonstrates:
Syria and Iraq have used the PLO and Lebanon’s territory as a
battleground for their struggle against each other and against third
countries such as Jordan. Russia and Libya use the PLO as a
convenient pipeline to international terror. Saudi Arabia and other
Gulf states use their support of the PLO to gain respectability with the
radical states and buy peace and quiet domestically.55
Incorporating regional and international dimensions into the analyses of a conflict as the one
between Israel and Lebanon, is far from unusual. What is noteworthy is that such dimensions were
largely absent, or at the very least secondary, during decision making processes behind Framework I
of the Camp David Accords, despite various regional developments posing potentially serious
security threats to Israel. Not only does Israel’s attention to the complex, international dimensions
of the security-threat in Lebanon confirm that these played a major role in decision making process;
their absence from the Camp David talks confirm that those decision making processes were based
on ideological reasoning. This argument is developed further in the discussion in section 6.0.
4.2 International law and enlightened local reasoning
While Begin primarily justified Operation Peace for Galilee by referencing threats that the PLO,
Syrian forces and international powers posed to the security of Israel and her people, he would
occasionally also do so with reference to modern concepts like ‘international law’ and ‘enlightened
logical reasoning’. This is evident, for example, during a private meeting between Begin and U.S.
Ambassador Lewis on 16 June, 1983 during which Lewis attempted to decrease Israel’s pressure on
the Lebanese to ratify the May 17 Agreement between Israel and Lebanon, in order to allow for
more negotiation time between Lebanese and Syrian representatives.56 Begin decidedly argued for
instruments of ratification to be exchanged immediately and supported his position with the concise
statement: “That is international law”.57
53 Album
2, p. 61
54 Album
2, p. 11
55 Album
1, p. 13
56
The May 17 Agreement was a U.S.-brokered agreement which called for a termination of the state of war between Israel and
Lebanon and security cooperation between the two countries. The agreement’s most notable points include the replacement of Israeli
military positions in Lebanon with Lebanese ones, although Israeli military withdrawal was contingent on Syrian troops doing the
same. The agreements was never ratified, due to the Lebanese Army collapsing in 1984 and Syrian forces refusing to withdraw.
57 Album
1, p. 113
Magdalena C. Delgado
The role of religion in foreign policy decision making: the cases of Menachem Begin’s Israel, Ayatollah Khomeini’s Iran
and Crown Prince Fahd’s Saudi Arabia
In a statement before the Knesset on 8 June, 1982, he similarly referenced international law as the
rightful justification for Operation Peace for Galilee:
[…] for a long time, too long, the Jew was excluded from all the laws
which applied to all nations. No more. The laws which apply to other
nations will apply to our nation – the Jewish people. The right of selfdefense accorded to all other nations is also accorded to us. No more
and no less.58
A stance which he reiterated in his private correspondence with Ronald Reagan, by asking the
American President:
Do we not have “the inherent right to self-defense”? Does not Article 51
of the Charter apply to us? Is the Jewish state an exception to all the rules
applying to all other nations?’59
In public discourse, Israel (not Begin specifically, although he in all likelihood agreed with it)
summoned people to apply a fair and enlightened logic when evaluating Operation Peace for
Galilee, as the following excerpt demonstrates:
We Israelis appeal to the conscience of enlightened people [my
emphasis] everywhere, asking them to understand and support us. We
must point out that the ceasefire of July 1981 has been interpreted in
many quarters as prohibiting any and all Israeli measures against the
hostile bases. While leaving the forces entrenched in these bases free
to attack Israel and its citizens everywhere except one specific border.
In reality this interpretation amounts to a one-sided cease-fire
permitting the attacker to attack while binding the hands of the
attacked party. This is a situation which fair and logically minded
people [my emphasis] would certainly reject, which no nations or
government would accept and which we too emphatically reject. We
feel that in taking this position we are entitled to the support of the
world’s enlightened nations [my emphasis].60
The use of modern concepts of international law as well as the appeal to the world’s enlightened
and logically minded people to justify Operation Peace for Galilee, is at odds with the public and
private rhetoric Begin used during the Camp David Accords. In that context, his justifications for
laying Jewish claims to Judea, Samaria and Gaza were based on ancient spiritual and historical ties
to those territories. Thus, two different ‘logics’ were applied, which were respectively tied to
modernity in the context of Operation Peace for Galilee, and ancient religious history in the context
of the Camp David Accords. Given Begin’s binary ideological-realist disposition, his views were
58
Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Statement in the Knesset by Prime Minister Begin, 8 June 1982, Vol. : 1982-1984
59
Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Exchange of Letters between President Reagan and Prime Minister Begin, 6 June 1982, Vol. 8:
1982-1984
60 Album
1, p. 19
Magdalena C. Delgado
The role of religion in foreign policy decision making: the cases of Menachem Begin’s Israel, Ayatollah Khomeini’s Iran
and Crown Prince Fahd’s Saudi Arabia
often less than consistent and it is thus not difficult to conceive that his discourse would entail
discrepancies. As will be discussed in greater detail in section 6.0’s discussion, this specific
discrepancy does however suggest that Begin’s minimal reference to modern concepts during Camp
David public or private negotiations, reinforces religion’s role as a driving force behind those
negotiations.
4.3 Defining protagonists in the Israeli-Lebanese conflict
The sections above demonstrate that the decision making processes behind Operation Peace for
Galilee were dominated by security concerns and justified through references to international law.
This implicitly suggests that religion did not figure in those processes; and rightly so, as it by no
means constituted a driving force. In the very few places where religion is discernible in the
decision making process, it is employed as a means to characterise factions in the conflict. This is
evident in private talks between Dr. Kimche, Lebanese Ambassador Fattal and U.S. Ambassador
Draper on 7 April, 1983, in which Kimche states that “amongst many factions present [in the South
of Lebanon] including Druze, Shiites and Christians, there are strong Khomeini elements amongst
some of the Shi’ites”.61 Begin did not take part in the abovementioned talks, but he is nonetheless
likely to have been exposed to the discourse and did, in a separate context, employ similar
characterisations himself. The following excerpts from a private meeting between him and U.S.
Ambassador Habib demonstrates this.
Begin:
The Syrians say they won’t let [PLO members] in. They will disarm
them, even their side-weapons.62 [...] The Norwegian people are
friendly, but the Norwegian unit signed a secret agreement with the
PLO we captured in Lebanon. The Dutch unit is also hostile and
creates real anti-Semitism in Holland”.63
Habib:
The French and Italians said to us that we have to have some link to
the UN to satisfy their internal procedures”.64 [...] I have made it clear
to the Lebanese that there will be no MNF without the Lebanese
Army. The Sunnis in particular, and to an extent the PLO, don’t trust
the Lebanese Army, because it is generally Phalangist-controlled”.65
Begin:
But they have Moslem units.66
61 Album
1, p. 85
62 Album
3, p. 107
63 Album
3, p. 108
64 Album
3, p. 108
65 Album
3, p. 111
66 Album
3, p. 111
Magdalena C. Delgado
The role of religion in foreign policy decision making: the cases of Menachem Begin’s Israel, Ayatollah Khomeini’s Iran
and Crown Prince Fahd’s Saudi Arabia
Habib:
Precisely. We are going to get the Lebanese Army to structure units of
Moslems. Sakis says they don’t have enough Moslem officers, and the
Moslems don’t trust the Christians.67
In the course of this meeting, both Begin and Habib characterise factions directly involved in the
conflict, along religious lines by identifying them as Sunnis, Moslems and Christians. Notably, this
stands in contrast to how Begin and Habib characterised international factions which had an indirect
stake in the conflict such as the Norwegians, Dutch, French and Italians, who were rather identified
along nationalist lines. This discrepancy is not consistent across all contexts, but - together with the
statements by Shamir and Haig above - it does demonstrate that religion in its broadest sense (that
is, beyond Judaism) was used characterise the main players in the Lebanese conflict. Whether such
characterisation constituted anything more than a convenient rhetorical tool which served to
descriptively map out the conflict’s protagonists is unlikely, due to said inconsistencies and an
overwhelming focus on security concerns throughout the overall decision making process.
Religion’s most protruding role in the Lebanese context appears only in public discourse, as the
section below demonstrates.
4.4 Begin public use of religion
In one of his numerous private letters to Reagan, Begin expressed dissatisfaction with the U.S.
president’s Middle East Plan which proposed Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon as well as a renewal
of the Middle East peace process. Begin concluded the letter with a reference to chapter 62 in the
Book of Isaiah: ‘For Zion’s sake will I not hold my peace, and for Jerusalem’s sake I will not rest’ 68,
presumably to appeal to Reagan’s Christian beliefs, or as an expression of his own view that his
actions were condoned by God (or perhaps both). With the exception of this one example, religion
played virtually no role in private meetings and conversations concerning Operation Peace for
Galilee, as the examples throughout section 4.0 have emphasised. Only in Begin’s public discourse
including his speeches to the Knesset, did religion figure. One example is Begin’s interview on CBS
television on 21 June 1981, in which he was asked about Israeli efforts to rebuild Lebanon
following the launch of Operation Peace for Galilee. Begin explained that,
[…] we are already healing a great number of Lebanese sick.
Yesterday I visited our wounded in the Hadassah Hospital in Ein
Karem, and I found Lebanese patients there. They are being treated
well. This is natural. This is nothing to brag about. After all, we are
the Jewish people. We have an open heart for everyone. If he is
wounded, even an enemy has to be treated.69 [my emphasis]
This excerpt shows that Begin framed Operation Peace for Galilee as an action carried out with
immense consideration for civilians, and driven by a humanism deriving from the essence of
67 Album
3, p. 111
68
Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Letter from Prime Minister Begin to President Reagan, 5 September 1982, Vol.8: 1982-1984
69
Ibid.
Magdalena C. Delgado
The role of religion in foreign policy decision making: the cases of Menachem Begin’s Israel, Ayatollah Khomeini’s Iran
and Crown Prince Fahd’s Saudi Arabia
Judaism. Moreover, a statement by the Government of Israel on 11 June 1982, in the context of
praising the IDF’s fighting, reads:
The Government pays homage to the heroic and the brave who
sacrificed their lives for the sake of the peace of Galilee and of all the
citizens of Israel. May God console the bereaved families who lost
their dear ones, amongst all who mourn for Zion and fight for
Jerusalem, and may they know no more sorrow. 70
Religion is here invoked to reinforce Begin’s expression of consolation to the families of fallen
Israeli soldiers and furthermore as a means to implicitly strengthen people’s belief in and fight for
Israel’s security. A more explicit reference to Judaism’s role in Operation Peace for Galilee is found
in Begin’s address to the Knesset on June 8, 1982, in which he explained his motivations for
launching Operation Peace for Galilee, referring repeatedly to his view that the operation was
launched due to a lacking alternative. In what seems as an effort to defend his decision, he stated
that
[...] from time to time our nation has an encounter with history. And
so, our soldiers are now in Tyre. We recall Ezekiel, chapter 27, verse
8: “Thy wise me, O Tyre, were in thee, they were thy pilots.” We are
standing today in Sidon and we recall Isaiah, chapter 23, verse 12:
“Thou shalt no more rejoice, O thou oppressed virgin daughter of
Sidon.” We also recall the two chapters in the Book of Kings on the
friendship between Hiram, King of Tyre, and our King David, and on
the alliance our King Solomon formed with the King of Tyre at the
time of the construction of the First Temple. We will not be able to
give Tyre what Solomon gave it, but we can give it security, peace and
tranquility. And only on condition that there be peace and tranquility
in Nahariya, which was shelled from Tyre for many years, with
Katyusha shells. No longer. All will be tranquil – both we and they.71
In this passage, Begin legitimised the confrontation between Israeli forces and their adversaries in
Tyre and Sidon72 by making references to Biblical prophecies by Ezekiel and Isaiah, presumably as
a means to make sense of the death and injury that was bound to result from the clashes. Moreover,
Begin referenced the Biblical Book of Kings to highlight the historic ties between Tyre and ancient
Israel, so as to accredit an immanent peace treaty between modern-day Lebanon and Israel. As
Begin presented it, for such a peace treaty to be established – an aspiration that he voiced on
countless occasions – the removal of PLO’s threat from Southern Lebanon was necessitated. Begin
related a similar message in his address to the Knesset on June 29, 1982. Speaking here in defense
of Israel’s seizure of west Beirut, he stated:
We don’t want even a square millimetre of Lebanese soil. Lebanon
isn’t the Land of Israel. From ancient time until the end of all
70 Album
1, p. 24
71
Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Statement in the Knesset by Prime Minister Begin, 8 June 1982, Vol. 8.8: 1982-1984
72
Both Tyre and Sidon are cities in the Southern Governorate of Lebanon that were invaded during ‘Operation Peace for Galilee’.
Magdalena C. Delgado
The role of religion in foreign policy decision making: the cases of Menachem Begin’s Israel, Ayatollah Khomeini’s Iran
and Crown Prince Fahd’s Saudi Arabia
generations, it hasn’t been the Land of Israel. We want to renew the
alliance with Lebanon, as it was in ancient time between Israel and
Judah and Lebanon. We will renew it. But first of all we must get rid
of this scourge that isn’t written in the Torah, these terrorists whom I
don’t even want to describe by their correct name […] the Jewish
people can exist, with God’s help, only by the readiness to sacrifice on
the part of our finest sons, only through willingness and selfsacrifice’. 73
Again, Begin justified the Israeli presence in Lebanon by invoking religious discourse.
Specifically, he suggested that the threat posed by PLO and Syrians in Lebanon jeopardised the
existence of the Jewish people; a statement which reflects his view (consistently present in his
general discourse) of Jews as God’s chosen people, whose redemption depended on its ties with the
Land of Israel. Any danger posed to that territory or its Jewish inhabitants, would jeopardise the
Jews’ God-given destiny. Syrian and PLO presence in Lebanon, then, presented an obstacle to
God’s plan. Similarly, Begin indirectly stated that PLO’s (or, the scourge as he labelled it) presence
in Lebanon was not condoned by the Torah and must thus be removed; not until its removal, could a
peace between modern-day Israel and Lebanon emerge. Begin stressed the desirability of such a
peace treaty by drawing on ancient ties between Israel, Judah and Lebanon, clearly alluding to an
immanent peace between the two countries as something which would be commended by higher
powers. With this benign aim as the ultimate goal, any clashes incurring between IDF and
Palestinian factions became justifiable.
A significant aspect of Begin’s use of religious references in his public speech, is timing. All of the
excerpts above are notably taken from discourse which preceded Israel’s seizure of West Beirut or,
in the case of Begin’s speech to the Knesset on 8 june 1981, only briefly preceded it. This is
significant because the opinion of the Israeli and international public as well as that of the Knesset
turned decidedly unsupportive of Operation Peace for Galilee following Israeli advances in West
Beirut. Prior to those advances, Begin’s Operation Peace for Galilee received close to unanimous
support from domestic and international constituencies. Significantly, at that time, Begin’s public
discourse largely matched his private discourse; that is, his discourse was security focused and
frequently included detailed descriptions of deadly weaponry held by Syrian and Palestinian
adversaries, as well as exhaustive outlines of the dangers that PLO’s proximity to the Israeli border
posed. The timing of Begin’s religious discourse, whether public or private, suggests that it was
invoked at times when references to militant threats, weapon descriptions, etc. were not sufficient to
legitimise the situation at hand. By extension, this points towards an instrumental use of religion on
Begin’s part, as a means to garner public support around Operation Peace for Galilee.
The analysis thus far has sought to derive religion’s role in Israeli foreign policy vis-a-vis Camp
David Accords and Operation Peace for Galilee, and has done so with a focus on Begin’s decision
making. This analytical approach has yielded findings which suggest that Begin’s religious
convictions were a driving force behind the Camp David Accords; and that religion served an
instrumental purpose in the Lebanese context. Owing to its narrow focus however, the preceding
analysis arguably presents a shrewd take on the decision making process, warranting too much
importance to Begin’s influence on foreign policy, and indeed also to the role of religion in the
73
Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Address in the Knesset by Prime Minister Begin, 29 June 1982, Vol.8: 1982-1984
Magdalena C. Delgado
The role of religion in foreign policy decision making: the cases of Menachem Begin’s Israel, Ayatollah Khomeini’s Iran
and Crown Prince Fahd’s Saudi Arabia
decision making processes. Such an evaluation is particularly plausible given the nature of Israel’s
political system - parliamentary democracy - through which Begin was necessarily implicated by a
set of structures, ranging from public opinion to the Knesset votes. These structures and their
potential impact on Begin’s decision making vis-à-vis Camp David Accords and Operation Peace
for Galilee are considered in section 5.0 below.
5.0 Begin’s decision making environment: implications of the Knesset, domestic opinion,
international opinion and geopolitical factors.
Although intransigent and bent on implementing his preferred foreign policies (Israeli sovereignty
over Judea and Samaria, Peace with Egypt, and invasion of Lebanon), Begin, being the leader of a
democratic state and member of the international community, worked within a set of structures that
would potentially constrain or support his preferred courses of action. Most notably, these structures
included the Israeli parliament (Knesset), international opinion, domestic public opinion and
external geopolitical environment. Of these, Begin held domestic opinion and Knesset opinion in
particularly high regard for, as he himself repeated many times over, his primary interest lied in
serving the Jewish people and not in accumulating wealth and power. The following sections
demonstrate how such structures figured in Begin’s decision making vis-à-vis the Camp David
Accords and Operation Peace for Galilee, concluding, however, that no one of them significantly
constrained the Prime Minister’s preferred course of action, either due to his disregard of them
(international opinion) or overlapping interests (Knesset, domestic opinion).
5.1 Institutional context
Israel is a parliamentary democracy, in which the leader of the elected party with a majority of votes
is appointed by the President to form a government. Once a proposed government 74 is approved by
the Knesset, that leader is appointed as Prime Minister, and henceforth serves as head of the cabinet
and government at large. Due to Israel’s multiparty system, the leading party typically forms a
government through coalitions with smaller parties, which renders Israeli politics fragile and
possibly very fractioned. In turn, the Prime Minister has to manage the relationships with his
coalition carefully, so as to ensure the most possible support for his preferred course of action.
Following Likud’s landslide victory in May 1977, Begin formed a coalition with the National
Religious Party, Agudat Yisrael, and Shlomtzi. Both the National Religious Party and Agudat
Yisrael were primarily concerned with issues pertaining to the Jewish character of Israeli domestic
society and less so with issues of foreign policy, although the former did become increasingly
supportive of Jewish settlements on the Land of Israel following the Arab-Israeli war of 1967. 75
Shlomtzion, headed by Ariel Sharon, merged with Likud immediately after the 1977 elections. 76
The National Democratic Party, whose declared purpose was to “bring about change in Israeli
74
Such a government must have at least 51% of parliamentary seats.
75
Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2013) Parliamentary Groups: Agudat Yisrael. Available from: http://www.knesset.gov.il/faction/
eng/FactionPage_eng.asp?PG=22. Accessed 2 December, 2013
76
Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2013) Parliamentary Groups: Shlomzion. Available from: http://www.knesset.gov.il/faction/
eng/FactionPage_eng.asp?PG=49
Magdalena C. Delgado
The role of religion in foreign policy decision making: the cases of Menachem Begin’s Israel, Ayatollah Khomeini’s Iran
and Crown Prince Fahd’s Saudi Arabia
politics”77 , also formed part of Begin’s coalition but its power was limited, as Begin did not need
the it for a majority in the Knesset. Moreover, that party ceased to exist in 1978.78 The opposition
was led by Alignment’s Shimon Peres and, together with Begin’s coalition made up the ninth
Knesset and eighteenth government of Israel. It was a setting whose democratic nature Begin held
in high regard. An example of this appears in sitting 145 of the ninth Knesset, during which Begin
presented the latter with a coalition proposal asking for approval of the Camp David Agreements. In
that context, Begin stated:
Ours is a parliamentary, not a presidential, regime, and our task is to
implement the policy that the Knesset has decided to undertake”79 [...]
“It is a clear cut decision that we are making today. We will not delude
anyone. If the Knesset so decides, the decision will be implemented
[...] I beseech each and every one, for God’s sake, vote as you wish
but let a clear-cut decision be made by the majority in the Knesset so
that tomorrow we can begin the work of preparing the negotiations
and, God willing, sign a peace treaty.80
The remaining content of that sitting makes it is clear that Begin’s preferred course of action was
for the Knesset to approve the Camp David Accords and accept Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai
Peninsula. But as the excerpt above highlights, it is also clear that Begin respected that such a
course of action was entirely contingent on the Knesset’s approval. Begin’s cabinet demonstrated
similar considerations. This becomes clear when looking at, for example, transcripts from a meeting
between Dr. David Kimche and Ambassador Antoine Fattal who, respectively, were the chief
negotiators for Israel and Lebanon during Operation Peace for Galilee. In their discussion of an
immanent agreement that would call for Israeli withdrawal from the southeast of Beirut to the Awali
River, Kimche highlighted that opposition member, Yitzhak Rabin, had stressed the urgency of such
an agreement. Kimche explained to Ambassador Fattal:
I want you to understand the pressures under which we are working.
Mr. Rabin is a member of the Opposition but he is not just a figure
that we need not take any notice of. In our democratic society, the
leader of the largest Opposition party has something to say [...] 81
As Begin, his negotiators were aware and indeed respected that they worked within structures of a
parliamentary democracy, which held them accountable to a range of political parties with
potentially conflicting preferences. The extent to which Begin’s preferences were constrained by
institutional factors differed according to the foreign policy in question.
77
Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2013) Parliamentary Groups: Democratic Movement for Change. Available from: http://
www.knesset.gov.il/faction/eng/FactionPage_eng.asp?PG=47
78
Ibid.
79
Hurwitz, Harry & Medad, Yisrael, ed. (2011) Peace in the Making: The Menachem Begin-Anwar El-Sadat Personal
Correspondence’ Jerusalem: Gefen Publishing House in cooperation with the Menachem Begin Heritage Centre, p. 184-185, p. 284
80
Ibid., p. 286
81
Israel-Lebanon album 1, page x
Magdalena C. Delgado
The role of religion in foreign policy decision making: the cases of Menachem Begin’s Israel, Ayatollah Khomeini’s Iran
and Crown Prince Fahd’s Saudi Arabia
Firstly, with regards to Operation Peace for Galilee: both Begin, his cabinet and the Knesset at large
supported the launch of Operation Peace for Galilee, largely due to convincing efforts by Begin’s
then Defense Minister, Ariel Sharon. As such, the primary material presented in section 4.2 which
demonstrates that it was Begin’s security concerns for Israel that prompted his launch of Operation
Peace for Galilee, can be thought to adequately affect reality. Following its initial stage, the Knesset
mounted increasing opposition to Israel’s invasion, which is likely to have prompted Begin’s
religious references as well as his early resignation from the post of Prime Minister. In sum, the
Knesset’s gradual opposition to Operation Peace for Galilee, while allowing for the initial launch of
the invasion, eventually caused Begin to abandon his position.
Secondly, with regards to Framework II of the Camp David Accords: on the whole, the ninth
Knesset concurred that said framework, which proposed to conclude a peace treaty with Egypt
including Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai Peninsula, should be implemented. This is reflected in
the final votes on that matter where 84 Knesset members voted in favour, 19 Knesset members
voted against and 17 Knesset members abstained from voting.82 In other words, there was a clear
supportive majority, some indifference and only limited opposition to implementing Framework II
of the Camp David Accords. As such, Begin was not constrained in his preferred course of action in
that context, either.
Finally, regarding Framework I of the Camp David Accords. In the context of this agreement, which
called for full autonomy to Palestinian Arabs living in the West Bank and Gaza on the condition of
Israeli military presence in specific locations, Begin met significant opposition from his cabinet
members. His obstinacy caused him to alienate key figures in his cabinet whose preferred policy
vis-a-vis Judea and Samaria was to withdraw to pre-1967 armistice lines. Foreign Minister Moshe
Dayan, a former Alignment member of Israel’s political left, opposed Begin’s insistence on
settlement-building in Judea and Samaria, felt increasingly bypassed on foreign policy issues and
eventually resigned in October 1979.83 Similarly, Defense Minister Ezer Weizmann, who in the
years preceding Camp David had become increasingly dovish in his foreign policy stance,
disagreed with Begin’s uncompromisable settlement policies and resigned from the government in
1980.84 The opposition that Begin faced from his advisors did not prompt him to change neither his
negotiation approach nor end-goal. Importantly, Israeli Prime Ministers are not bound to abide by
the cabinet’s agreement (unlike the Knesset’s agreement), and the conflictual views of Dayan and
Weizmann would then not have served as a serious constraint in Begin’s decision making. The fact
that Begin was willing to dismiss the opinion of his advisors so readily does, in turn, emphasise his
dedication to Israeli sovereignty over Judea and Samaria.
5.2 International opinion
Begin was never one to let (non-Jewish) international opinion affect his vision for Israel or dictate
the direction of his foreign policy. This was presumably a result of his stubborn character as well as
82
Hurwitz, Harry & Medad, Yisrael, ed. (2011) Peace in the Making: The Menachem Begin-Anwar El-Sadat Personal
Correspondence’ Jerusalem: Gefen Publishing House in cooperation with the Menachem Begin Heritage Centre, p. 287
83
Jerry A. Grunor (2005) Let My People Go: The trials and tribulations of the people of Israel, and the heroes who helped in their
independence from British colonization, Lincoln: iUniversity, p. 311-312
84
Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2013) The Prime Minister’s Office; The President and Minister Memorial Council: Ezer
Weizmann. Available from: http://www.pmo.gov.il/English/Memorials/Presidents/Pages/EzerWeizmann.aspx. Accessed 5 December
2013.
Magdalena C. Delgado
The role of religion in foreign policy decision making: the cases of Menachem Begin’s Israel, Ayatollah Khomeini’s Iran
and Crown Prince Fahd’s Saudi Arabia
his view of Jews as a unique and strong people who, as Begin himself put it to U.S. Ambassador
Samuel Lewis in a closed meeting, “[...] has lived for 3700 years without a memorandum of
understanding with America and will live another 3,700 years without it.” Scholars largely agree
with such an analysis; Sofer (1988), for example, writes that Begin, at least in his public
pronouncements, subscribed to the view that international constraints are unreal.85 Similarly,
Rowland (1985) has pointed out that Begin oftentimes made statements towards or about his
international allies “which [could] only be characterized as non-strategic”86 , due to their offensive
nature. One example is Begin’s response to a series of “tough questions”87 posed to him by the
Senate’s Foreign Relations Committee, which brought U.S. financial aid to Israel into question, in
the context of the later stages of Operation Peace for Galilee. To this, Begin responded that he
“came to Washington [...] representing a sovereign state, and [not] with [his] hand outstretched for
aid. [The U.S. Senate] could keep its money”.88 In other words, Begin did not use diplomatic
terminology to conceal his intentions towards international allies. Moreover, Begin was clear to
ensure Israeli domestic constituencies of his resistance to international pressures. In the context of
presenting the Camp David Accords to the Knesset, for example, Begin stated: “[...] I know what it
is to withstand pressure. I have no need to brag...During the past nine months hardly a single
newspaper in Israel or the world has had one good word to say about me...That pressure had no
effect, however [...]”89.
The examples above first and foremost demonstrate that Begin was unfased by pressures from
Israel’s international allies. Secondarily, they suggest that Begin faced international opposition to
his policies vis-a-vis Operation Peace for Galilee and the Camp David Accords. While the latter is
correct in the context of the specific examples used, it would be inaccurate to characterise Begin’s
foreign policies as ones that were generally opposed internationally. After all, the Camp David
Accords were mediated by U.S. President Carter and by extension also supported by the U.S. What
is more, American public opinion rose during Israel’s peace negotiations with Egypt and a Pew
opinion poll suggests that, amongst the subset of Americans who were familiar with the Middle
East, 51% favoured Israel when it returned the Sinai peninsula to Israel in 1982.90 International
support surrounding Operation Peace for Galilee was much less evident, particularly in the
operation’s later stages. The U.S. initially showed its support,91 but President Reagan later
expressed that “[...] he was “horrified” to learn of the killings of Palestinians in west Beirut and
[...] joined with France and Italy in calling for United Nations observers to be sent immediately to the
95
Sofer, Sasson (1988) Begin: An Autonomy of Leadership, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, p. 121
85
Sofer, Sasson (1988) Begin: An Autonomy of Leadership, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, p. 115
86
Rowland, Robert C. (1985) The Rhetoric of Menachem Begin: The Myth of Redemption Through Return, Maryland: University
Press of America, p. 6
87
Ibid., p. 6
88
Ibid.
89
Hurwitz, Harry & Medad, Yisrael, ed. (2011) Peace in the Making: The Menachem Begin-Anwar El-Sadat Personal
Correspondence’ Jerusalem: Gefen Publishing House in cooperation with the Menachem Begin Heritage Centre, p. 284
90
Pew Forum (2013) The Six Day War: Its Aftermath in American Public Opinion, Available from: http://www.pewforum.org/
2007/05/30/a-six-day-war-its-aftermath-in-american-public-opinion/ Accessed: December 6, 2013
91
Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2013) Operation Peace for Galilee. Available from: http://www.knesset.gov.il/lexicon/eng/
shalom_galil_eng.htm Accessed 3 December, 2013
Magdalena C. Delgado
The role of religion in foreign policy decision making: the cases of Menachem Begin’s Israel, Ayatollah Khomeini’s Iran
and Crown Prince Fahd’s Saudi Arabia
sites of the murders.”92 In the same vein, American public opinion for Israel declined a few weeks into
Operation Peace for Galilee, with a Pew opinion poll suggesting that only 32% sympathised with
Israel. 93 However supportive or unsupportive the opinion of international elites and publics, it is not
likely to have had a decisive influence on Begin’s decision making for the reasons outlined above. This
stands in sharp difference to domestic public opinion which, as we will see in the section below, was
immensely influential on Begin’s decision making.
5.3 Domestic public opinion
“I dedicated my life to the liberation of my people”94. As this quote suggests, Begin’s primary
interest as a public servant lied in serving the Jewish people’s interest; for that reason, he was most
serious about holding himself and his government accountable to the Israeli public. This is
reflected, for example, in a meeting of August 15, 1982 between Begin and U.S. Ambassador
Habib, in which they discuss Syrian soldiers’ redeployment in Lebanon. Habib suggested that Israel
accept the Syrian redeployment, to which Begin responded:
What rationale would we have to explain to our people through the Knesset
that we are leaving [the Syrians] in Lebanon, facing our soldiers, a group of
enemy soldiers who had shot at us and killed our men and who now will
move a short distance and will again face our Army? For the past 8 weeks
we had battled with them. So let them go back to their own country.
Otherwise we will bot be able to explain it to our nation.95
Begin’s response clearly demonstrates that he was mindful of his accountability to domestic
constituencies when deciding on a policy. This is further supported by a statement from Jimmy
Carter who in the context of his work with Begin during the Camp David peace talks, recalls that:
We were running public opinion polls in Israel every four days during Camp
David. Begin would tell me the people back home “will never accept me
doing this.” I would say “Mr. Prime Minister, here’s a poll that was run day
before yesterday in Israel. Sixty-three percent of the people approve of this.”
It made an impact. I think that public opinion back home is a very important
element.96
Another example which reflects Begin’s sense of accountability can be drawn from the type of
material kept in the Israeli State Archives, which includes numerous letters from Israeli citizens in
which the latter express praise as well as condemnation for Begin’s policies vis-a-vis the Camp
92
International New York Times (1982) Christian Militiamen Accused of a Massacre in Beirut Camps; U.S. says the Toll is at least
300 Available from: http://select.nytimes.com/gst/
abstract.htmlres=FB0C17FC3B5C0C7A8DDDA00894DA484D81&scp=35&sq=massacre+lebanon&st=nyt Accessed 1 December,
2013
93
Pew Forum (2013) The Six Day War: Its Aftermath in American Public Opinion, Available from: http://www.pewforum.org/
2007/05/30/a-six-day-war-its-aftermath-in-american-public-opinion/ Accessed: December 6, 2013
94
Begin, Menachem (2007), White Nights: The Story of a Prisoner in Russia, 2nd edition, Jerusalem: Steimatzky Means Books, p.
114
95
Israel-Lebanon album 3, p. 86
96
Conversations with Carter (1998). Edited by Don Richardson, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. p. 296.
Magdalena C. Delgado
The role of religion in foreign policy decision making: the cases of Menachem Begin’s Israel, Ayatollah Khomeini’s Iran
and Crown Prince Fahd’s Saudi Arabia
David Accords and Operation Peace for Galilee.97 It is not clear how directly public condemnation
and praise impacted on Begin’s decision making, but the fact that such documents are kept
alongside transcripts of high-level meetings is, together with the examples above, telling of the
importance that Begin attributed to the viewpoints of his public constituencies.
Inevitably, some domestic opposition did amount vis-a-vis Begin’s foreign policy. In the context of
Camp David, this came from Israeli religious movements who viewed Judea, Samaria and the Gaza
Strip as sacred Jewish land. To them, Camp David’s Framework I signified a religious affront of the
first degree, and Begin’s signing of the accords was symbolically associated with the shameful
peace signed with Hitler in 1939 by Britain’s Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain. The ‘betrayal’,
as was his accord signing characterised, prompted establishment of ‘The Covenant of Eretz Yisrael
Loyalists’; a large-scale coalition composed of student group, political movement and settler
supporters of the maximalist cause, which sought to ‘alert the public about the grave error
committed by Begin’.98 (Initially unbeknownst to these groups and indeed contrary to intuitive
analysis, Begin - as we have seen in section 3.0 - determinedly negotiated with his American and
Egyptian counterparts with a view to never relinquish Israeli control and Jewish presence in what he
considered Biblical land. His reasoning was based largely on religious grounds and was probably
the reason that Framework I was never realised. This narrative would undoubtedly have been a
surprise to the supporters of The Covenant of Eretz Yisrael Loyalists.)
Apart from the relatively small but very vocal opposition of The Covenant of Eretz Yisrael
Loyalists, Israeli public opinion vis-a-vis the Camp David Accords and Operation Peace for Galilee
suggests that Begin would not have felt exceedingly constrained in his foreign policy actions. With
regards to the two-framework Camp David Accords, public opinion was by and large supportive.
Begin’s recognition of Israel’s public support vis-a-vis the Accords was expressed in his speech
before the Knesset on 20 November 1977, during Anwar al-Sadat’s first visit to Jerusalem:
Today, Jerusalem is bedecked with two flags - the Egyptian and the Israeli.
Together, Mr. President, we have seen our little children waving both flags.
Let us sign a peace treaty and establish such a situation forever both in
Jerusalem and in Cairo. I hope the day will come when Egyptian children
will wave Israeli and Egyptian flags together, just as the Israeli children are
waving both of these flags together in Jerusalem [...]99
Similarly, with respect to Operation Peace for Galilee, the Israeli public was overwhelmingly
supportive of Begin’s foreign policy decision to launch a military operation in Lebanon. So much so
that former Israeli deputy national security adviser Charles Freilich describes Begin as being ‘bound
to action’100 by ‘his public commitments’101 during the operation’s early stages. As the operation
97
See i.e. Israel-Lebanon album 6
98
Sprinzak, Ehud (1989) The Emergence of the Israeli Radical Right, Comparative Politics, 21 (2), p. 175
99
Hurwitz, Harry & Medad, Yisrael, ed. (2011) Peace in the Making: The Menachem Begin-Anwar El-Sadat Personal
Correspondence’ Jerusalem: Gefen Publishing House in cooperation with the Menachem Begin Heritage Centre, page 32
100
Charles D. Freilich, “Israel in Lebanon - Getting It Wrong: The 1982 Invasion, 2000 Withdrawal, and 2006 War, Israel Journal of
Foreign Affairs VI:3 (2012), p. 68
101
Charles D. Freilich, “Israel in Lebanon - Getting It Wrong: The 1982 Invasion, 2000 Withdrawal, and 2006 War, Israel Journal of
Foreign Affairs VI:3 (2012), p. 68
Magdalena C. Delgado
The role of religion in foreign policy decision making: the cases of Menachem Begin’s Israel, Ayatollah Khomeini’s Iran
and Crown Prince Fahd’s Saudi Arabia
went awry in its later stages, particularly following an attack on the IDF headquarters in Lebanon
which killed 36 Israeli soldiers, public opinion became heavily divided.102 Begin resigned shortly
after, due partly to his sense of responsibility for lives of soldiers lost.103
5.4 External geopolitical environment
Prior even to Israel’s establishment in 1948, while still a member of the underground opposition,
Begin staunchly supported the idea of making full, contractual peace with all of Israel’s neighboring
Arab states, which he believed would enhance Israel’s security in the region. Once in the position of
Prime Minister, Begin reiterated this stance, most notably in his speech to the Knesset during
Sadat’s visit to Jerusalem, in which he stated that “We want peace with all our neighbors - with
Egypt and with Jordan, with Syria and with Lebanon”. 104
Although Begin’s intentions to conduct peace negotiations with Egypt had been long established, a
set of trends developed regionally in the years preceding the Camp David Accords, which rendered
Israel’s geopolitical conditions progressively hostile and very possibly reassured, if not prompted,
Begin in his friendly outreach to Egypt. Unrest was unfolding in Iran, Israel’s sole regional ally,
which would eventually culminate in the Islamic Revolution in 1979 and subsequent severing of
diplomatic relations with Israel. Moreover, Islamist discourse was growing regionally, alongside
(although not necessarily interlinked with) an increasing anti-Israel sentiment solidified by five
Arab-Israeli wars that had occurred since Israel’s establishment in 1948. Anti-Israeli sentiment in
powerful Gulf states was emphasised by the Saudi Arabia-led oil embargo in 1973-74, which was
imposed in protest of Western nations’ aid to Israel during the Yom Kippur War, as well as to
pressure those nations into demanding Israeli withdrawal from the territories captured during the
1967 Arab-Israeli war.
A populous and militarily strong Egypt that, given its recent history of powerful leadership under
pan-Arabist Nasser held more political leverage than any other Arab state, seemed for Israel, a
peace treaty signatory of high calibre that would serve to increase Israel’s security standing in the
region. Scholars such as Telhami (1990) have developed analyses that convincingly explain the
Camp David Accords signing in rationalist and systematic terms. 105
Israel’s insecurity, fostered as it was by a such hostile geopolitical environment, was significantly
worsened in 1981 when unfriendly development started to take place within Israel’s northern
neighbor, Lebanon. Syria, who following the Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty replaced Egypt as
Israel’s primary enemy, had deployed surface-to-air missiles in Lebanon. A Syrian military presence
in an already politically weak Lebanon, would make Lebanon part of the confrontation states and
thus changed the regional balance of power against Israel’s favour. Moreover, Israeli Military
Intelligence warned that Syrian deployment of missiles was part of a clandestine Syrian plan to
102Ynet
News (2013) The Lebanon War (1982). Available from http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3631005,00.html,
Accessed: 7 December, 2013
103
Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2013) Operation Peace for Galileee. Available from: http://www.knesset.gov.il/lexicon/eng/
shalom_galil_eng.htm Accessed: 8 December, 2013
104
Hurwitz, Harry & Medad, Yisrael, ed. (2011) Peace in the Making: The Menachem Begin-Anwar El-Sadat Personal
Correspondence’ Jerusalem: Gefen Publishing House in cooperation with the Menachem Begin Heritage Centre, page 31
105
Telhami, Shibley (1990) Power and Leadership in International Bargaining: The Path to The Camp David Accords, New York:
Columbia University Press: New York, p. 43
Magdalena C. Delgado
The role of religion in foreign policy decision making: the cases of Menachem Begin’s Israel, Ayatollah Khomeini’s Iran
and Crown Prince Fahd’s Saudi Arabia
wage war against Israel from Lebanese territories. In addition to the Syrian threat, PLO forces in
Southern Lebanon had recently bombarded the Galilee region in northern Israel with 1000 rockets
and artillery shells, making the PLO a military threat as opposed to a terrorist one, which it had
been thus far.
Charles Freilich, a former Israeli national security advisor, related that these changes in Israel’s
strategic circumstances prompted Operation Peace for Galilee in 1982, which was intended to
ultimately, once Syrian and PLO forces were defeated and a Christian, pro-Israeli government
installed, result in a contractual peace with Lebanon.106 A meeting between Dr. Kimche and U.S.
Ambassador Draper on 7 April, 1983 furthermore suggests that Israel thought the Lebanese threat
further escalated by Iran’s growing regional influence, as Kimche perceived Southern Lebanon as
“[...] an area where you have strong Khomeni elements among some of the Shi’ites. And I am sure
some of my friends here can confirm here that there are some Khomeni elements that are very, very
hostile [...] to us [...].107
Much like the institutional context as well as international and Israeli public opinion, geopolitical
factors did not constrain Begin’s preferred foreign policies vis-a-vis the Camp David Accords and
Operation Peace for Galilee. With the exception of opposition from Moshe Dayan and Ezer
Weizmann, all such factors largely supported if not facilitated Begin’s actions in relation to those
policies. When they did not, such as during the later stages of Operation Peace for Galilee, Begin
changed his course of action (i.e. resigned from ministerial post). This means that the analytical
concern raised earlier regarding the chapter’s unduly attention to Begin as the main decision maker
and religion as the main variable, can be put to rest. By implication, the chapter’s preceding
analysis can be read as an accurate representation of Begin’s approach to the decision making
process; that is, his statements, public discourse and private correspondence can be thought to be
uninfluenced by structural concerns.
6.0 Discussion & Conclusion
Broadly, the chapter has thus far argued that religion took on distinct roles in Begin’s decision
making vis-a-vis the Camp David Accords and Operation Peace for Galilee. It has done so by
demonstrating that Begin referenced Judaism extensively across private and public contexts during
Camp David’s Framework I (Peace in the Middle East) negotiations, leading to the conclusion that
religion constituted a driving force in that context. Conversely, with regards to Camp David’s
Framework II (the Conclusion of a Peace Treaty between Egypt and Israel) and Operation Peace for
Galilee, the chapter has shown that Begin’s invocation of religion, being limited to public contexts
(including the Knesset) in times of increasing public and parliamentary disillusionment with the
invasion, served as an instrument to mobilise domestic support. This distinction offers a perspective
on the comparatively large extent to which religion figured in Camp David negotiations relating to
Peace in the Middle East.
Importantly, this distinction also reinforces the argument that religion was a driving force in Begin’s
decision making vis-a-vis the Camp David Accords, especially Framework I of that agreement. This
becomes evident when the decision making processes behind both Camp David and Operation
Peace for Galilee are looked at in the broader context of structural factors, in particular the regional
106
Charles D. Freilich, “Israel in Lebanon - Getting It Wrong: The 1982 Invasion, 2000 Withdrawal, and 2006 War, Israel Journal of
Foreign Affairs VI:3 (2012) and Shlaim, Avi (2007). Lion of Jordan; The life of King Hussein in War and Peace. Allen Lane. p. 412
107
Israel-Lebanon album 1: p. 2
Magdalena C. Delgado
The role of religion in foreign policy decision making: the cases of Menachem Begin’s Israel, Ayatollah Khomeini’s Iran
and Crown Prince Fahd’s Saudi Arabia
and international geopolitical environment, international opinion and domestic public opinion.
Three sets of findings, touched upon throughout the chapter, support this argument:
The first has to do with the different extents to which security concerns figured in negotiations.
Such concerns were, as we have seen, dominating cabinet discussions preceding and during
Operation Peace for Galilee, but were largely absent from Camp David talks. While their
importance to the former context is obvious given, in particular, the tangible threat of PLO forces in
Southern Lebanon, it is not immediately clear why such concerns did not figure extensively in the
Camp David context. After all, PLO forces were also operating in Judea and Samaria preceding and
during Camp David negotiations. What is more Begin was aware of this threat. On a few occasions
he reasoned his apprehension towards Palestinian sovereignty with reference to the security threat
posed by the PLO,108 which he considered a terrorist organisation aimed at destroying the Israeli
State. One example of this is Begin’s statement to the Zionist General Council on 23 June 1977:
‘We are faced with the most cruel enemy since the Nazis. […] No agreement will be made […] that
would transfer Judea and Samaria and Gaza to these murderers.’109 In spite of such a security
threat, Begin’s employed an overwhelming ideological reasoning and discourse throughout the
Camp David Accords. Indeed, it was Begin’s adamant ideological response to what Defence
Minister Ezer Weizmann and Foreign Minister Moshe Dayan viewed as serious security threats in
Judea and Samaria, which prompted those delegates to resign from their respective cabinet
positions. In other words, Begin employed two very different strategies to two foreign policy issues
that, from a security perspective, were arguably not so distinctive. This, then, reinforces the
argument that Begin’s decision making vis-a-vis the Judea and Samaria was shaped by ideology; an
ideology that, as section 2.0 of this chapter has shown in detail, was premised on his religious
conviction.
Secondly and related, with regards to how international security dimensions implicated
negotiations. During the Camp David Accords, Begin’s focus was primarily on ensuring that Israeli
sovereignty over Judea and Samaria would not be relinquished; a focus which rendered broader
international security dimensions of the Camp David Accords secondary at best, and
inconsequential at worst. This narrow approach to decision making contrasted with that behind
Operation Peace for Galilee. In the latter context, Begin viewed the invasion through a
comprehensive prism which considered the implications of Israeli presence and advances in
Lebanon, for the foreign policies of regional and international powers. Specifically, Begin
consistently expressed concern about Syria’s Soviet-backed involvement in Lebanon, as well as
Saudi Arabian and Iranian support of PLO and Syrian forces, respectively. The strategy behind
Operation Peace for Galilee was necessarily implicated by such dimensions, and so Begin’s
comprehensive perspective is all but merited. However, regional and international implications of
Israel’s foreign policy were far from limited to Operation Peace for Galilee. During the Camp
David Accords too, were there several regional trends that arguably merited much more
consideration than Begin awarded them. As section 4.0 of this chapter outlines in detail, such trends
included social and political unrest in Iran and increasing Islamic discourse discourse throughout
the Middle East. What is more, such developments added to an existing hostility amongst states in
108
The Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO) was established in 1964 with the official aim of liberating Palestine through armed
struggle, and establishing a sovereign Palestinian state on the territory that had comprised the former British Mandate. Until the
Middle East Peace Process in the 1990s, the PLO refused to recognise Israel’s right to exist, and was viewed by both Israel and the
United States as a terrorist organisation.
109
Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Statement by Prime Minister Begin to the Zionist General Council, 23 June 1977, Vol. 4-5:
1977-1979
Magdalena C. Delgado
The role of religion in foreign policy decision making: the cases of Menachem Begin’s Israel, Ayatollah Khomeini’s Iran
and Crown Prince Fahd’s Saudi Arabia
the region which notably manifested in the Arab-Israeli wars of 1949, 1956, 1967 and 1973, as well
as the oil-embargo imposed by Saudi Arabia in 1974. Although the international political, social and
economic environments during Camp David Accords and Operation Peace for Galilee were not
identical, the disparities between them do not immediately warrant two such evidently distinct
approaches to negotiations. As the point above concerning the extent to which security concerns
figured in negotiations, this evaluation reinforces the argument that religion served as a driving
force for Begin during Camp David negotiations.
Thirdly, with regards to Begin’s means of justifying his foreign policies. As section 4.0 highlighted,
Begin justified Operation Peace for Galilee, with reference to modern concepts such as
‘international law’ and through appeals to the world’s ‘enlightened’ and ‘logically minded people’.
Such references, although invoked only secondarily and in relation to security concerns, are at odds
with his rhetoric vis-a-vis the Camp David Accords, which had an almost exclusively ideological
basis. The latter context did not necessarily call for such ideological emphasis however, as Begin
himself demonstrated by occasionally referencing international law in his attempts to justify Israeli
policy vis-a-vis Judea and Samaria. One example of the following statement by Begin to Sadat in
the context of their discussion at the Ismailia summit on 26 December, 1977: ‘[...] Resolution 242
does not commit Israel to total withdrawal, and therefore this matter is a matter for negotiation, to
establish those secure and recognized boundaries which are mentioned in the second paragraph of
Resolution 242’ [...].110 Balancing his ideological rhetoric with consistent references to tangible
concepts such as international law might have galvanised more support, as an emphasis on the
former was necessarily limited in that it mainly appealed to Jews (and only ideologically inclined
Jews, at that). Yet Begin incessantly relied on ideological references and, being the candid person
that he was, particularly when discussing matters related to Judea and Samaria, one must assume
that these were reflections of personal convictions. Together with the two previous points, this
overwhelming presence of ideology throughout the Camp David talks and its absence from
Operation Peace for Galilee negotiations, despite similarities in geopolitical environments,
reinforces its role as a driving force in the former context. Given the religious premise of Begin’s
ideological policy towards Judea and Samaria, religion then assumes the role of a driving force
behind the Camp David Accords, and a forceful one at that.
While religion was constrained to public discourse in the Lebanese context and by implication
played a less than determining role, its importance need not be dismissed on the grounds of
instrumentalism. While the possibility that Begin’s public use of Judaism was instrumental is
certainly real, one must be careful to assume that such measures necessarily served exclusively as a
calculated means to foster support for specific policies amongst constituencies. Given Begin’s
candid dedication to Jewish scripture and tradition, it is perfectly plausible that Judaism genuinely
assumed all of the roles alerted to above, for him. Various scholars would support this assumption,
including e.g. Breuning (2003) who argues that public discourse is inevitably related to a decision
maker’s thoughts as his or her discourse is the end-product of a reasoning process.111
To conclude, the findings outlined throughout this chapter and discussed above suggest that
religion, as it figured in Begin’s decision making behind the Camp David Accords and Operation
Peace for Galilee, did not assume one, essential and ahistorical role vis-a-vis foreign policy. Rather,
110
Hurwitz, Harry & Medad, Yisrael, ed. (2011) Peace in the Making: The Menachem Begin-Anwar El-Sadat Personal
Correspondence’ Jerusalem: Gefen Publishing House in cooperation with the Menachem Begin Heritage Centre, p. 60
111
Marijke Breuning, The Role of Analogies and Abstract Reasoning in Decision-Making: Evidence from the Debate over Truman's
Proposal for Development Assistance, International Studies Quarterly,Vol. 47, No. 2 (Jun., 2003), pp. 229-245
Magdalena C. Delgado
The role of religion in foreign policy decision making: the cases of Menachem Begin’s Israel, Ayatollah Khomeini’s Iran
and Crown Prince Fahd’s Saudi Arabia
religion took on roles which were developed in relation to the context in which it operated. At times
such roles appear at odds with one another: for example, Judaism’s role as the force which
prescribed Israeli presence on Judea, Samaria and Gaza, which it assumed in the context of the
Camp David Accords, arguably stands in contrast to a Judaism that defended violent clashes
between the IDF and PLO factions in Southern Lebanon. What these examples combine to show
however, is that religion is a multifaceted phenomena just as the interpretations of it are - even if
such interpretations are formulated by a single person.
In the case of Menachem Begin’s foreign policy, Judaism assumed its most influential role vis-a-vis
the Peace Plan for the Middle East. Here, Begin’s religious conviction allowed for the facilitation of
three sets of beliefs: a worldview premised on the ‘myth of redemption through return’; a principled
belief which saw it right for Israeli sovereignty to extend throughout Eretz Yisrael; and a causal
belief which postulated that a reclamation of Israeli sovereignty over Eretz Yisrael would lead to
redemption of the Jewish people. Taken together, these beliefs served as a road map which guided
Begin’s behaviour vis-a-vis that specific policy. With regards to Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty and
Operation Peace for Galilee, religion did not serve as a driving force in the same way; rather it
served to condone largely security-driven decisions in those contexts.
This observation points towards a pragmatic relationship between religion and foreign policy. As
such, the conclusion drawn from the material of this chapter arguably reveals more about human
nature, in general, than it does about religion and foreign policy, in particular: namely that the
human mind harnesses complex beliefs systems which are modified in order to explain and/or
justify given decisions. This is not to say that religion does not matter in foreign policy; but rather
that its role(s) can be neither generalised nor inferred without reference to the specific context(s) in
which it operates.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
“Address by Prime Minister Menachem Begin to the Egyptian People”, Jimmy Carter Library and
Museum, 11 November. 1977. (Accessed 1 March, 2013)
Barnett, Michael N. (2002) The Israeli Identity and the Peace Process: Re/creating the Un/
thinkable, in Telhami, Shibley & Barnett, Michael N. (2002) Identity and Foreign Policy in the
Middle East, New York: Cornell University Press
Begin Center (2012) On The Operation to Destroy the Iraqi Nuclear Reactor Accessible via
www.begincenter.org.il/uploads/articles/.../11%20May%201981.pdf Accessed on April 10, 2013.
Begin, Menachem (2007), White Nights: The Story of a Prisoner in Russia, 2nd edition, Jerusalem:
Steimatzky Means Books, p. 114
Brecher, Michael (1972), The Foreign Policy System of Israel: Setting, Images, Process, New
Haven: Yale University Press
Marijke Breuning, The Role of Analogies and Abstract Reasoning in Decision-Making: Evidence
from the Debate over Truman's Proposal for Development Assistance, International Studies
Quarterly,Vol. 47, No. 2 (Jun., 2003), pp. 229-245
Magdalena C. Delgado
The role of religion in foreign policy decision making: the cases of Menachem Begin’s Israel, Ayatollah Khomeini’s Iran
and Crown Prince Fahd’s Saudi Arabia
British Broadcasting Corporation (2012) Israel and the Palestinians: Key Maps. Accessible via:
http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/static/in_depth/world/2001/israel_and_palestinians/key_maps/
Accessed February 20, 2013
Carter, Jimmy 2009) We Can Have Peace In The Holy Land: A Plan That Will Work, New York:
Simon & Schuster
Fuksman-Sha’al (Ed) (2002), The Camp David Accords: A Collection of Articles and Lectures,
Jerusalem: The Menachem Begin Heritage Centre
Gervasi, Frank (1979), The Life and Times of Menachem Begin, New York: G P Putnam’s Sons
Goldstein, Judith & Keohane, Robert O., ed. (1993) Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions
and Political Change, Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press
Hirschler, Gertrude and Eckman, Lester S. (1979) Menachem Begin: From Freedom Fighter to
Statesman, New York Shengold Publishers, Inc
Hurwitz, Harry (1977) Menachem Begin, Johannesburg: The Jewish Herald (Pty) Ltd
Hurwitz, Harry & Medad, Yisrael, ed. (2011) Peace in the Making: The Menachem Begin-Anwar
El-Sadat Personal Correspondence’ Jerusalem: Gefen Publishing House in cooperation with the
Menachem Begin Heritage Centre
International New York Times (1982) Christian Militiamen Accused of a Massacre in Beirut
Camps; U.S. says the Toll is at least 300 Available from: http://select.nytimes.com/gst/
abstract.htmlres=FB0C17FC3B5C0C7A8DDDA00894DA484D81&scp=35&sq=massacre
+lebanon&st=nyt Accessed 1 December, 2013
Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2006), Israel’s Story in Maps: Israel’s Changing Borders,
Accessed: March 1, 2013
Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2013) Parliamentary Groups: Agudat Yisrael. Available from:
http://www.knesset.gov.il/faction/eng/FactionPage_eng.asp?PG=22. Accessed 2 December, 2013
Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2013) Parliamentary Groups: Shlomzion. Available from: http://
www.knesset.gov.il/faction/eng/FactionPage_eng.asp?PG=49
Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2013) Operation Peace for Galilee. Available from: http://
www.knesset.gov.il/lexicon/eng/shalom_galil_eng.htm Accessed 3 December, 2013
Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Treaty of Peace between Israel and Egypt. Protocols, Annexes,
Letters, Memorandum of Agreement between Israel and the United States, Addresses of Presidents
Carter and Sadat, and Prime Minister Begin, 26 March 1979’, Volumes 4-5:1977-1977.
Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Statement by Prime Minister Begin to the Zionist General
Council, 23 June 1977, Vol. 4-5: 1977-1977
Magdalena C. Delgado
The role of religion in foreign policy decision making: the cases of Menachem Begin’s Israel, Ayatollah Khomeini’s Iran
and Crown Prince Fahd’s Saudi Arabia
Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Israel Cabinet Decision, 6 June 1982, Vol.8: 1982-1984
Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Exchange of Letters between President Reagan and Prime
Minister Begin, 6 June 1982, Vol. 8: 1982-1984
Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Statement in the Knesset by Prime Minister Begin, 8 June 1982,
Vol. 8.8: 1982-1984
Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Interview with Prime Minister Begin on Israel television, 15 June
1982, Vol.8: 1982-1984
Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Address in the Knesset by Prime Minister Begin, 29 June 1982,
Vol.8: 1982-1984
Kamel, Mohamed Ibrahim (1986) The Camp David Accords: A Testimony, London: KPI Ltd.
Knesset Homepage (2013) Factional and Government Make-Up of the Ninth Knesset. Available
from: http://www.knesset.gov.il/history/eng/eng_hist9_s.htm [Accessed March 1, 2013]
Malaspina, Ann (2009) Creation of the Modern Middle East, New York: Infobase Publishing Maoz,
Zeev (2006) Defending the Holy Land, Michigan: University of Michigan Press
Pew Forum (2013) The Six Day War: Its Aftermath in American Public Opinion, Available from:
http://www.pewforum.org/2007/05/30/a-six-day-war-its-aftermath-in-american-public-opinion/
Accessed: December 6, 2013
‘Prime Minister Menachem Begin’s Speech to the Knesset, November 20, 1977’ The Camp David
Accords and Related Documents (1998) Beer-Sheva: The Chaim Herzog Center for Middle East
Studies and Diplomacy, p. 46
Quandt, William B. (1986) Camp David: Peacemaking and Politics, Washington DC: The
Brookings Institution
Quandt, William B. (2005) Peace Process: American Diplomacy and the Arab-Israeli Conflict since
1967, 3rd edition, Washington DC: The Brookings Institution
Rabinovich, Abraham (2005) The Yom Kippur War: The Epic Encounter That Transformed the
Middle East. New York, NY: Schocken Books
Rowland, Robert C. (1985) The Rhetoric of Menachem Begin: The Myth of Redemption Through
Return, Maryland: University Press of America
Schiff, Ze’ev (1984) Lebanon: Motivations and Interests in Israel’s Policy, The Middle East
Journal, 38 (2)
Shlaim, Avi (2007) Lion of Jordan: The life of King Hussein in War and Peace, London: Penguin
Book Ltd.
Silver, Eric (1984) Begin: A Biography, London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson Ltd Sofer, Sasson (1988)
Begin: An Autonomy of Leadership, Oxford: Basil Blackwell
Magdalena C. Delgado
The role of religion in foreign policy decision making: the cases of Menachem Begin’s Israel, Ayatollah Khomeini’s Iran
and Crown Prince Fahd’s Saudi Arabia
Stein, Kenneth W. (1999) Heroic Diplomacy: Sadat, Kissinger, Carter, Begin, and the Quest for
Arab-Israeli Peace, New York: Routledge
Sprinzak, Ehud (1989), The Emergence of the Israeli Radical Right, Comparative Politics, 21 (2),
pp.171-192.
The American Presidency Project (2013) Visit of Prime Minister Menahem Begin of Israel Remarks
of the President and the Prime Minister at the Welcoming Ceremony. Accessible via: http://
www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=7825. Accessed 1 December, 2013
Telhami, Shibley (1990) Power and Leadership in International Bargaining: The Path to The Camp
David Accords, New York: Columbia University Press: New York
Telhami, Shibley & Barnett, Michael N. (2002) Identity and Foreign Policy in the Middle East,
New York: Cornell University Press
Yaniv, Avner & Lieber, Robert J. (1983), Personal Whim or Strategic Imperative? The Israeli
Invasion of Lebanon, International Security, 8 (2), pp. 117-142
Ynet News (2013) The Lebanon War (1982). Available from http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/
0,7340,L-3631005,00.html, Accessed: 7 December, 2013