BORN EQUAL
COUNTRY CASE
STUDY:
NIGERIA
1 GROWTH, POVERTY AND INEQUALITY
Nigeria is the largest country in Africa with a population of around 170 million people, accounting
for just under half of the total west African population. After South Africa, Nigeria is Africa’s second
largest economy. Between 2002 and 2010, its per capita gross domestic product (GDP) based on
purchasing power parity (PPP) increased by 76.3% (see Figure 1).
Figure 1 Nigeria’s per capita GDP and gross national income (GNI) growth
Nigeria's GDP and GNI Per Capita
Growth
(Current USD $)
2500
2000
1500
1000
500
0
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
GNI
GNI (PPP)
GDP
GDP (PPP)
Despite strong economic growth, 68% of the population still live in poverty, and until 2004 this
situation was steadily worsening. 1 In stark contrast, Nigeria is home to some of the wealthiest
people in the world such as Aliko Dangote, Africa's richest man in 2012 according to Forbes
Magazine, with a net worth of $11.2 billion. 2
These wealth disparities can partly be explained by the poor distribution of the benefits of growth.
Since 1992, crude oil exports have been the key driver of the rapidly growing economy, accounting
for 95% of the country’s export earnings, 80% of government revenues, and more than 40% of GDP
throughout the 1990s. 3 Since 2000, oil revenues have levelled at approximately a third of GDP, 4
while the contribution from agriculture and technology has become more significant. However, the
benefits of the wealth generated by oil production have not been evenly distributed among the
population, 5 nor has the oil sector generated jobs. About two-thirds of the population live on less
than $1 a day, and the unemployment rate in 2011 was 23.9%, up from 21.1% in 2010. 6
Although the agriculture sector accounted for just over 37% of GDP in 2011 and has grown over
recent years (from 32% in 2006 7), it is only just starting to be a contributor to growth. 8 Almost half
of the population is involved in this sector; 80% of them are subsistence farmers. 9 Data from the
2003 Nigeria Living Standards Survey (NLSS) show that, among all occupational groups, agriculture
has the highest poverty incidence rate, at 62.7%. 10 And women are disproportionately represented
in agricultural production: 54 million of Nigeria’s 80.2 million women live and work in rural areas
where they constitute 60%–79% of the rural workforce. Moderate growth and limited economic
opportunities in the agriculture sector are key challenges for poverty reduction, as are the high
proportion of the population (at least 75%) working in the informal sector and high unemployment
rates, particularly among young people. 11
To date, government investment in social services has been paltry relative to demand. Between 2005
and 2010, Nigeria’s social spending decreased below the level required by international agreements,
and is now among the lowest in west Africa. 12 There have been small signs of improvement since
2010 with increases in the health and education budgets (both up from 4% to 6% in the 2011 federal
budget). However, child nutrition and protection have received very little attention in terms of
funds, policies and a strong institutional framework for implementation. 13
2 TRENDS IN INEQUALITIES
Nigeria has exceptionally high and rising levels of inequality: the Gini index increased from 42.9 in
2004 to 48.8 in 2010. 14 As of 2009, approximately 20% of the population owned 65% of the national
wealth. 15
There are also profound regional inequalities in Nigeria, with northern states considerably poorer
than southern states on average (see Figures 2 and 3). The ten poorest states are all in the north,
with a poverty rate higher than 60%, while nine of the ten richest states are in the south. Across the
country, poverty has increased since 1980, with the largest increases in the north and south-west
(see Figure 2). At the extreme ends of the spectrum, Jigawa state had a poverty incidence of c.90% in
2004, while in Oyo it was c.20% (see figure 3). 16
Figure 2 Prevalence of poverty in Nigeria, 1980–2004
Notes: * Poverty measure used for 1980, 1985, 1992 and 1996 was two-thirds of mean per capita expenditure, but for
2004 was food (2,900 calories) and non-food expenditure.
** States by geopolitical zones are as follows:
North-east: Adamawa, Bauchi, Borno, Gombe, Taraba and Yobe
North-west: Jigawa, Kaduna, Kano, Katsina, Kebbi, Sokoto and Zamfara
North-central: Benue, FCT, Kogi, Kwara, Niger, Plateau and Nasarawa
South-east: Abia, Anambra, Ebonyi, Enugu and Imo
South-west: Ekiti, Lagos, Ogun, Ondo, Osun and Oyo
South-south: Akwa Ibom, Bayelsa, Cross River, Delta, Edo and Rivers
Figure 3 Ten poorest and least poor states in Nigeria ranked by poverty incidence, 2004
Source: UNICEF, Global Study on Child Poverty and Disparities, National Report: Nigeria, 2011
The effects of Nigeria’s income inequality on human development are profound. In 2011, Nigeria was
ranked 156 out of 187 countries and territories, with a human development index (HDI) of 0.459 –
in the ‘low human development’ category. But when adjusted to reflect inequality, Nigeria’s HDI
drops to 0.278 – a loss of 39.3% due to inequality in the distribution of the dimension indices. 17 The
average loss due to inequality for low HDI countries is 33.3%, and for sub-Saharan Africa 34.5%, so
Nigeria is clearly one of the worst performers.
However, the inequality-adjusted HDI only captures the impact of income inequalities on human
development. Other forms of group inequality, such as region, ethnicity or gender, are equally
influential in determining people’s vulnerability to poverty.
There are acute ethnic inequalities and religious differences in Nigeria, which reflect patterns of
regional inequality, highlighted above. Currently, there are 36 states and a federal capital territory
with different ethnic and sub-ethnic compositions. In addition, there are 775 local government areas
(an increase from 301 in 1976), which were created with the intention of mitigating ethnic tensions.
In reality, though, while “the creation of states and LGAs satisfied some ethnic groups it heightened
demands from others”. 18 In total, there are 374 ethnic groups 19 in the country that are broadly
divided into ethnic ‘majorities’ and ‘minorities’. The major ethnic groups are the Hausa-Fulani in the
north, the Yoruba in the south-west, and the Igbo in the south-east. These three ‘hegemonic’ ethnic
groups constituted 57.8% of the national population in the 1963 census. All the other ethnicities
constitute different degrees of ‘minority’ status. 20 Nigeria is also home to a variety of religions.
These have been seen to accentuate regional and ethnic distinctions and have been a source of
sectarian conflict among the population. According to a 2003 report, Nigeria’s population is
comprised of 50.4% Muslims (focused in the north) 48.2% Christians (concentrated in the south)
with 1.4% adhering to other religions, though this is likely to be an underestimate. 21
Ethnicity and religious identity have been heavily politicised since independence, as different ethnic
groups have “jostled for pre-eminence”. 22 The adoption of federalism (and the subsequent division
into three regions each dominated by one of the three ‘majority’ groups) was intended to address
this. But in reality, together with the 1979 Constitution and the subsequent creation of further
states, it has failed to fully address ethnic divisions. This is evident in the existence of ethnic militias
like the Oodua Peoples Congress, the restive Niger-Delta region, and the number of submissions by
various ethnic and regional groups to the Human Rights Violations Investigation Commission, set up
in June 1999 as the country returned to democratic politics after many years of military dictatorship.
The association between public entitlements and ethnicity has further intensified rural tensions in
recent years; “the Hausa-Kataf, Jukun-Tiv, Kuteb-Jukun, Hausa-Mambilla, and Ogoni-Adoni conflicts
are concrete examples”. 23
It is difficult to assess the effects of ethnic and religious division on children’s well-being, or the wellbeing of the general population, because of sizeable data gaps. National census information is not
disaggregated by religion or ethnic group. However, looking at well-being by state provides some
indication, since ethnic and religious groups are loosely concentrated in certain areas. According to
one study by Mancini, “Muslims live predominantly in the northern regions while Christians are
concentrated in the south. Ethnic groups have a strong regional base. In Nigeria, old ethno-regional
identities – the Hausa-Fulani in the Northern region, the Igbo in the Eastern region and the Yoruba
in the Western, to mention the three largest groups – remain very influential and deeply engrained
into the political discourse even after the division of the country into 36 states.” 24
According to Mancini’s analysis of Demographic and Health Surveys, Nigerian households witnessed
an increase in wealth (in terms of the crude number of amenities owned) between 1990 and 2003.
But when data are disaggregated by religious group, we can see that the average Christian household
had about 1.5 times the number of amenities available to the average Muslim household. This was
true in 2003 just as it was in 1990, despite the fact that during the same period, average household
wealth has increased and overall wealth inequality has decreased, both in the north and in the south
(see Figure 4).
"In Nigeria, three things are intertwined –
religion, politics and ethnicity – and the three
are beclouded with corruption, poverty and
insecurity."
Former justice minister, Prince Bola Ajibola,
Nigeria
Figure 4 Household wealth in Nigeria according to i) region ii) ethnicity iii) religion (contrasted
with Ghana)
i)
North/south, region,
Household wealth
ii) North/south, ethnicity,
household wealth
iii) Muslims/Christians
household wealth
Source: Mancini, 2009
Gender inequality is also pervasive in Nigeria, which is ranked 79 out of 86 countries in the
OECD Social Institutions & Gender Index (SIGI) 2012. Three years ago, it was ranked 86 out of 102
countries, suggesting minimal change. 25 Nigeria’s 80.2 million women and girls face inequalities in
terms of political representation, access to and control over land, credit facilities, technologies,
education and health. 26 For example, only 9% of those who stood for election in Nigeria’s April 2011
National Assembly elections were women. Government data also indicate a significant gender gap in
land ownership. For free use, women make up only 24% of landowners, and for distributed land,
women make up only 26% of owners. 27 Similarly, women’s access to bank loans is restricted by their
limited financial resources and the difficulties they have obtaining the necessary guarantees. In certain
cases, financial institutions demand prior consent of the woman’s husband before granting a loan. 28
Labour market inequalities are also apparent: women’s labour market participation rate is 39.5%
compared with 74.8% for men. 29 Employment in non-agriculture sectors stands at 67.5% of men
compared with 32.5% of women. Again, there is significant state variation, with Akwa-Ibom and
Ondo (south and south-west) the highest, at 59.5% and 56.5% of women, respectively, and Jigawa
and Zamfara (north-east and north-west) the lowest, at 4.3% and 3.7%. 30
3 THE IMPACT OF INEQUALITIES ON CHILD
WELL-BEING
More than half of Nigeria’s 170 million people are under the age of 18, and just over 40% of the
population is under 14. 31 Children are disproportionately represented in poor households.
For the majority of Nigerian children, growing up in poverty will have a major impact on their
healthy development and future prospects. According to the country’s 2008 Demographic Health
Survey, 50% of those children living in the poorest households (the bottom wealth quintile) are
stunted as a result of nutritional deprivations, compared with 24% of those living in the richest
households (see Figure 7). And it is well known that even short-term nutritional deprivations can
have acute effects on children’s cognitive development and subsequent productivity. 32 Similar
disparities are evident in under-five mortality rates: for children in the highest wealth quintile, the
rate is 87 deaths per 1,000 live births, compared with 219 deaths per 1,000 live births for children in
the lowest wealth quintile. 33
Compounding children's vulnerability is the fact that most children live in rural areas (three in every
four children) and/or the northern parts of the country (two of out of every three), where poverty
and deprivation are highest (for the reasons cited in Section 2). 34 Again, looking at trends in stunting,
45% of children living in rural areas are stunted compared with 31% of children in urban areas (albeit
still a very high figure).
Figure 7 Child nutrition in Nigeria, by gender, residence and wealth
Source: UNICEF, Child Info, Nigeria Country Profiles, Nutrition, http://www.childinfo.org/country_profiles.php?input=109
Other dimensions of child well-being are also strongly affected by the inequality between urban and
rural locations. For example, 49% of children are registered at birth if they live in an urban area
compared with only 22% of those born in a rural area (2000–10). Similarly, 65% of births in urban
locations have a skilled attendant present, compared with 28% of births in rural locations (2006–
10). 35
There is also substantial variation in child health and well-being between regions and states. For
example, the under-five mortality rate is 121 deaths per 1,000 live births in urban areas, compared
with 191 per 1,000 live births in rural areas. It ranges from 89 in the south-west to 222 in the northeast (infant mortality is also lowest in the south-west, at 59 deaths per 1,000 births, and highest in
the north-east, at 109). 36
With regards to gender, little variation can be observed in stunting measurements cited above, but
other indicators suggest persistent disparities. For example, although net enrolment in primary
education has improved in recent years, disaggregating the data by gender shows that girls are still
less likely to attend school. In 2005, the net enrolment rate was 48.4%, with 56% and 44% for boys
and girls respectively. Demonstrating the effect of overlapping regional and ethnic inequalities, the
ratio of boys to girls in basic education across the country is 1.28:1, while the ratio in some of the
northern states is as high as 1.57:1. 37 Hausa girls, for example, are 35% less likely to go to school
than Yoruba boys. 38
Girls are also considerably more vulnerable to harm in Nigeria. For example, the number of children
trafficked increased by more than 24 times between 2004 and 2007, with girls accounting for most
(92.6%) of those trafficked (see Table 1).
Table 1 People trafficked from Nigeria by gender and age group, 2004–07
Source: National Agency for the Prohibition of Traffic in Persons and Other Related Matters (NAPTIP), 2007
4 POLICY INTERVENTIONS
Since the late 1990s and the replacement of the military government by a new democratic political
leadership, some have argued that Nigeria has undergone a shift in social policy, with a new
orientation towards development and growth. The new policy arrangements have extended social
protection measures to those in the informal as well as formal sector. 39 In addition, by 2004, the
National Economic Empowerment and Development Strategy (NEEDS) was introduced. NEEDS
brought a new strategy for tackling poverty through creating wealth and jobs, expanding social safety
nets, and eradicating corruption. 40 The Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Program,
the Seven-Point Agenda, and the National Food Security Program were also important
developments. Other factors such as the cancellation of about 60% of Nigeria's debt ($18.0bn) owed
to the Paris Club in 2005, and greater macroeconomic stability (including increasing external
reserves and lower fiscal deficits) have allowed for more proactive investment strategies, including in
essential services.
However, in spite of the conditions being conducive to strong social investment, budget allocations
to social policy remain small; according to the World Bank, 68% of the population was living in
poverty in 2010, but in the same year, Nigeria’s social expenditure accounted for less than 1% of
GDP (0.6%). 41 In addition, NEEDS has been criticised for “poor targeting, lack of adequate funding,
adequate coverage and management capacity as well as lack of political will and ownership by subnational governments”. 42
Social policy allocations are further undermined by endemic corruption – a major development
challenge that is being vigorously tackled through institutions such as the Economic and Financial
Crimes Commission and the Independent Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences
Commission. But the sustainability of this undertaking and the re-direction of recovered public funds
looted by corrupt officials to the provision of basic goods and services remains a challenge. Law
enforcement is weak and the courts lack resources and administrative personnel.
5 POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
Overall, the evidence would suggest that the Nigerian government has yet to commit to a sound
strategy for poverty reduction and social development. But it could improve the well-being of more
than 77 million Nigerian children by tackling widespread inequalities. 43 We recommend that the
government considers the following policy reforms to achieve this goal:
•
Diversify budget revenue – industry and agriculture
Social policy allocations are jeopardised by a very narrow tax base that is heavily reliant on oil and
gas revenues (accounting for 75%–80% of total tax receipts), which are highly volatile. The non-oil
sector accounts for only 20%–25% of tax receipts. In January 2011, the government approved a
National Tax Policy with a shift in focus from direct to indirect taxation. It has also introduced
reforms to improve the efficiency of tax collection.
In order to identify a more sustainable and less volatile source of revenue for social policy
investments, as well as to stimulate job creation, the Nigerian government should consider
diversifying agricultural production and pursuing an active industrial policy, following the example of
China and certain Latin American countries. Non-oil exports should be promoted, as they have the
potential to stimulate employment opportunities in the industries engaged in direct production for
exports; they can have positive bearings and indirect effects on employment in feeder industries; and
they will increase the aggregate consumer expenditures of workers employed in all these industries.
To strengthen household incomes and provide greater economic opportunities, the government
should seek to diversify agricultural production, rapidly expanding credit facilities for small-scale
producers. Local governments also need to actively encourage diversification by supporting
entrepreneurship. 44
In addition, the numerous rural and agricultural policies that exist to aid food security and tackle
rural poverty should be synthesised and consolidated for greater effect and efficiency. 45
•
Improve budget transparency to tackle corruption
Transparency and accountability in the use of public funds are essential, and could be reinforced by
stronger anti-corruption laws, mechanisms and institutions. Sanctioning of corrupt officials will also
help to create a culture of accountability. However, to ensure full transparency in pubic revenues,
the Nigerian government also needs to encourage the oil sector (via the Nigerian National
Petroleum Corporation) to adhere to regulations set out by the Extractive Industries Transparency
Initiative, so that national oil receipts are regularly published. It should also work to implement the
long-awaited Petroleum Industry Bill, which stipulates that “in achieving their functions and
objectives under this Act, the Institutions and the National Oil Company shall be guided by
principles of the Nigerian Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative Act of 2007”. 46
•
Increase investment in social services and improve mechanisms for
disbursement
The government urgently needs to increase the total envelope for social policy, ensuring that
resources are distributed to the most marginalised groups and disadvantaged regions (particularly
the rural and northern states and geopolitical zones). This will require a review of the criteria used
to allocate the federal budget to key sectors, as well as parts of the country. 47
It is also critical to rectify the cumbersome and inefficient budgetary disbursement processes
(closely related to the three-part federal system). Currently, the minimal allocations to capital
expenditure (relative to recurrent) suffer from poor budget implementation due to delays in passing
of the budget by the legislature, as well as slow release of funds by the executive.
•
Reform the social protection system
Although Nigeria has two forms of social programming split between the formal and informal
sector, the division of social spending does not favour the poor. Only 25% of the labour force is
employed in the formal sector, yet the majority of social protection spending goes to this group,
mainly civil servant pensions. 48 For non-civil-servants a pension scheme exists in some states, but
only covers 4-5% of the formal sector. The Employers Compensation Bill covers those in the
workplace with accident and health compensation, as long as they are paying 1% tax to this scheme
– approximately 10 million people out of a population of 170 million. However, for those outside of
the formal sector, the poor and those households where the majority of children live, such national
social security insurance does not apply. The social protection system therefore needs urgent
reform to better support the poorest and most vulnerable.
•
Address gender inequalities and improve child protection mechanisms
In spite of robust policies and legislation, progress on gender inequalities in Nigeria remains weak.
To proactively redress gender inequalities, the government should take action in a number of key
areas:
o Pro-active engagement of women in politics – although the number of female ministerial
appointments has increased, the Independent National Electoral Commission should conduct a
focused drive on female voter registration and run specific voter education campaigns for
women during elections.
o The Nigeria Land Administration Act needs to be implemented and publicised, to expand
women’s access and entitlement to land.
o A national campaign should be mounted to tackle gender discrimination, particularly genderbased violence.49
o Incentives for all girls to complete primary and secondary education should be a priority,
alongside the abolition of user fees, levies and ‘rents’ for education and life-saving healthcare for
women and girls. 50
With regard to child protection, Nigeria has ratified the International Labour Organization
Convention on the Worst Forms of Child Labour and other related conventions. A Children’s
Rights Bill and a law against Child and Women Trafficking have been passed. In addition, anti-child
trafficking programmes are being operated in northern Nigeria, but in general, rule of law and
implementation is weak. There also needs to be greater investment in national and communitybased child protection mechanisms and services.
•
Improve data collection and programme monitoring
A considerable challenge for monitoring the impact of past and current policies is the absence of
credible and comparable demographic data over time; where there are data, there is often little
consistency between sources. By way of example, Nigeria’s Vision 2020 document sets out a
substantive social policy implementation plan, but in practice, there are just three small-scale,
government-led, safety net programmes in existence, 51 and it is difficult to gauge how successful
these programmes have been due to the lack of credible data.
Poor transparency and inadequate data also affects budgetary information. The amounts committed
to social policy, then budgeted and finally released, vary wildly, and more often than not, the public
only have access to information about allocated funds rather than actual funds disbursed.
Nigeria urgently needs to invest more resources in improving budgetary transparency as well as
project-level monitoring and the regular collection of demographic data, disaggregated by all forms
of horizontal inequality, including ethnicity.
ENDNOTES
1
There is now some indication that poverty rates may be declining moderately. See R Holmes and B
Akinrimisi with J Morgan and R Buck, 2012, Social Protection in Nigeria: Mapping Programmes and their
Effectiveness, ODI: London; African Development Bank, UK Department for International Development, US
Agency for International Development and World Bank, 2009, ̳International Development Association Country
Partnership Strategy for the Federal Republic of Nigeria (2010-2013), Washington, DC: World Bank.
2
‘Richest people in Africa 2012 – African billionaires’, 24 March 2012,
http://www.therichest.org/nation/richest-people-in-africa/
3
I Gary and T Karl, ‘Bottom of the Barrel: Africa’s oil boom and the poor’, Catholic Relief Services, 2003,
http://www.arts.ualberta.ca/~courses/PoliticalScience/474A1/documents/IanGaryandTerryLynnKarlBottomofthe
BarrelAfricaOilPoor.pdf
4
African Economic Outlook (AEO), ‘Nigeria 2012’,
http://www.africaneconomicoutlook.org/fileadmin/uploads/aeo/PDF/Nigeria%20Full%20PDF%20Country%20No
te.pdf
5
F Okunmadewa et al, ‘Human capital, institutions and poverty in rural Nigeria’, report submitted to the
African Economic Research Consortium (AERC), 2005; J Hagen-Zanker and R Holmes, Social Protection in
Nigeria, Synthesis Report, Overseas Development Institute (ODI): London, 2012.
6
African Economic Outlook, 2012, Nigeria 2012,
http://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Publications/Nigeria%20Full%20PDF%20Country%20N
ote_01.pdf
7
African Economic Outlook, Nigeria webpage, http://www.africaneconomicoutlook.org/en/countries/westafrica/nigeria/
8
The non-oil sector provides a livelihood for the majority of Nigerians. Driven by agriculture, manufacturing,
minerals and telecommunications, it has grown at more than 8% per year, accelerating to over 9% in 2007–08.
Improved fiscal management has been responsible for most of the recent macroeconomic improvements.
African Development Bank, UK Department for International Development, US Agency for International
Development and World Bank, 2009, ̳International Development Association Country Partnership Strategy for the
Federal Republic of Nigeria (2010-2013), Washington, DC: World Bank.
9
ActionAid, ‘Country and Community Information: Nigeria’, 2010,
http://www.actionaid.org.uk/doc_lib/nigeria.pdf
10
O Ojowu, H Bulus and B Omonona, Nigeria poverty assessment. Mimeo, National Bureau of Statistics,
Nigeria, 2007
11
Reports suggest that an estimated 50 million young people are unemployed. See B E Aigbokhan (2008)
‘Poverty, inequality and growth in Nigeria: a case study’, ACGS/MPAMS Discussion Paper 3, prepared for
UNECA; World Bank (2010) ‘Economic Overview and Performance. Country Brief: Nigeria’. Washington, DC:
World Bank; J Hagen-Zanker and R Holmes, ‘Social Protection in Nigeria: A Synthesis Report,’ 2012, ODI:
London. Unemployment in the 15–24 age group was 37.7%, and 22.4% among the 25–44 age group. See
African Economic Outlook, 2012, http://www.africaneconomicoutlook.org/en/countries/west-africa/nigeria/
12
J Hagen-Zanker and H Tavakoli, ‘An analysis of fiscal space for social protection in Nigeria’, ODI/UNICEF
Nigeria, 2012
13
UNICEF, Global Study on Child Poverty and Disparities, National Report: Nigeria, UNICEF, 2011,
http://www.unicef.org/socialpolicy/index_45357.html
14
World Bank, 2012
15
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), Human Development Report Nigeria 2008–2009: Achieving
growth with equity. Abuja, 2009
16
But we note that with high population growth and increasing rural to urban migration (47% of the population
now living in towns and cities), urban poverty is also increasing. See T S Osinubi, ‘Urban poverty in Nigeria: a
case study of Agege area of Lagos state’, WIDER Conference, 2003.
17
The 2010 Human Development Report introduced the ‘inequality adjusted HDI (IHDI)’, which takes into
account inequality in all three dimensions of the HDI by ‘discounting’ each dimension’s average value according
to its level of inequality. The HDI can be viewed as an index of ‘potential’ human development and IHDI as an
index of actual human development. See http://hdrstats.undp.org/images/explanations/NGA.pdf
18
U Ukiwo, ‘Policy levers in Nigeria’, Centre for Research on Inequality, Human Security and
Ethnicity (CRISE), 2003, http://www.qeh.ox.ac.uk/pdf/pdf-research/crise-pcp2
19
The sociologist, Onigu Otite, has provided an authoritative list of 374 ethnic groups. In A R Mustapha, Ethnic
Structure, Inequality and Governance of the Public Sector in Nigeria, United Nations Research Institute for Social
Development (UNRISD), 2004,
20
Ibid.
21
Pew Research Centre, ‘Global Restrictions on Religion’, 2009,
http://www.pewforum.org/newassets/images/reports/Muslimpop
22
Jike, 2002, in A E Ojie and C Ewhrudjakpor, ‘Ethnic diversity and public policies in Nigeria’, Anthropologist, 11,
1, 2009, pp 7–14
23
Jike, 2002, in A E Ojie and C Ewhrudjakpor, ‘Ethnic diversity and public policies in Nigeria’, Anthropologist, 11,
1, 2009, pp 7–14
24
L Mancini, ‘Comparative trends in ethno-regional inequalities in Ghana and Nigeria: evidence from
Demographic and Health Surveys’, CRISE Working Paper No 72, 2009,
http://www.dfid.gov.uk/r4d/PDF/Outputs/Inequality/workingpaper72.pdf
25
Social Institutions & Gender Index (SIGI), ‘Nigeria’, http://genderindex.org/country/nigeria
26
J Hagen-Zanker and R Holmes, 2012, p 7; British Council Nigeria/UK Aid, Gender in Nigeria Report 2012:
Improving the lives of girls and women in Nigeria, 2012, http://www.dfid.gov.uk/Documents/publications1/GenderNigeria2012.pdf
27
SIGI
28
Ibid.
29
UNDP, 2009
30
Hagen-Zanker and Holmes, 2012
31
Index Mundi, ‘Nigeria Demographics Profile 2012’,
http://www.indexmundi.com/nigeria/demographics_profile.html
32
Save the Children, Hungry For Change: An eight-step, costed plan of action to tackle global child hunger, Save the
Children UK, 2009,
http://www.savethechildren.org.uk/sites/default/files/docs/Hungry_for_Change_EVERY_ONE_version_2nd_1.p
df
33
National Planning Commission (NPC) and ICF Macro, Nigeria Demographic and Health Survey 2008: Key
Findings, 2009, NPC and ICF Macro.
34
UNICEF, Global Study on Child Poverty and Disparities, National Report: Nigeria, UNICEF, 2011, p.2
http://www.unicef.org/socialpolicy/index_45357.html
35
UNICEF, ‘At a glance: Nigeria’, 2010, http://www.unicef.org/infobycountry/nigeria_statistics.html#98
36
NPC and ICF Macro, 2009
37
UNICEF, 2011
38
British Council Nigeria/UK Aid, 2012
39
Holmes, R., B Akinrimisi with J Morgan and R Buck, 2012, Social Protection in Nigeria: Mapping programmes and
their effectiveness, ODI: London
40
Aigbokhan, 2008
41
Hagen-Zanker and Tavakoli, 2012
42
UNICEF, 2011
43
UNICEF, 2010
44
B Ekankumo and K Braye, ‘Stimulating internally generated revenue in Nigeria: the entrepreneurial option
revisited’, European Journal of Social Sciences, 23, 4, 2011
45
Hagen-Zanker and Holmes, 2012
46
The Petroleum Industry Draft Bill 2009, http://www.nnpcgroup.com/Portals/0/pdf/PIBDrapftBill2008.pdf
47
UNICEF, 2011; UNICEF, 2010
48
Holmes et al, 2012
49
British Council Nigeria/UK Aid, 2012
50
Ibid.
51
The three programmes are ‘In Care of the Poor’, a conditional cash transfer programme (Holmes et al,
2012); subsidised maternal and child health care; and the Community-Based Health Insurance Scheme.
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