CountingWomen’sBallots:
FemaleVotersafterSuffrageintheU.S.
ChristinaWolbrecht
AssociateProfessorofPoliticalScience
UniversityofNotreDame
NotreDame,IN46656USA
[email protected]
PaperpreparedforpresentationattheEuropeanConferenceonPoliticsandGender,heldin
Uppsala,Sweden,June11‐13,2015.Thispaperreportsonworkco‐authoredwithJ.KevinCorder
(WesternMichiganUniversity,USA)andsettoappearinCountingWomen’sBallots:FemaleVoters
fromSuffrageThroughtheNewDeal,undercontractwithCambridgeUniversityPress.Wegratefully
acknowledgedthesupportoftheFacultyResearchProgramattheUniversityofNotreDame,the
ResearchDevelopmentAwardProgramatWesternMichiganUniversity,andtheNationalScience
Foundation(SES‐9905843and9905307).Someofthedataemployedweremadeavailablebythe
Inter‐universityConsortiumforPoliticalandSocialResearch(ICPSR);theConsortiumbearsno
responsibilityfortheanalysesorinterpretationspresentedhere.Theauthorsaresolelyresponsible
forthecontentofthispaper.Thisconferencepapershouldnotbecitedwithoutpermission.
CountingWomen’sBallots:FemaleVotersafterSuffrageintheU.S.
OnAugust18,1920,Tennesseebecamethethirty‐sixthstateintheuniontoratify
the19thAmendmenttotheUnitedStatesConstitution.Afteramorethan70yearbattle,
womenthroughouttheU.S.securedtherighttovote.Thenationalenfranchisementof
womenrepresentedthelargestexpansionoftheelectorateinAmericanhistory,nearly
doublingthesizeofthevotingagepopulation.1Millionsofcitizenswhohadnevercasta
ballotbecameeligibletodoso.
Justfourpresidentialelectionslater,theU.S.wouldexperienceoneofthemost
dramaticelectoraltransformationsinitshistory.Republicanshadbeenascendantsincethe
endoftheCivilWar,butthecrisisoftheGreatDepression—andtheparties’divergent
responsestoit—transformedpartisanalignmentsintheU.S.andusheredinaneraof
Democraticdominanceformuchofthe20thcentury.The“NewDealrealignment”ofthe
1930sestablishedanewDemocraticcoalitionwhichwouldpersistfordecades.
ThecausesandconsequencesNewDealrealignmenthavereceivedconsiderable
attention.Scholarshavehadfarlesstosayaboutthecontributionofwomentothisprocess.
Yetwehavereasontoexpectwomenmayhaveplayedakeyroleintheenormousvoter
mobilizationduringthisperiod.Alargenumberofstillelectorallyinactivewomenwere
amongthosemostavailableformobilizationintotheDemocraticpartyinthe1930s.Atthe
sametime,womenwhohadvotedinthe1920swere—asaresultoftheirrelativelyfewer
opportunitiestohavereinforcedtheirpartisanshipbycastingballots—amongthosemost
availableforconversionfromonepartisanallegiancetotheother.Thispaperasks:Did
womenandmenrealignviathesameordifferentprocesses?Whatwasthecontributionof
womentoNewDealrealignment?
Previousscholarshasbeenhinderedintheconclusionstheycouldreachregarding
theelectoralbehaviorofthefirstfemalevotersbecausewepossessverylimitedusefuldata
onhowwomenvotedaftersuffrage.Withrareexceptions,officialrecordsreportonlythe
totalnumberofvotescastoverallandforeachcandidate.Whetherwomencastballots,for
whichcandidates,andwithwhatconsequencescannotbedirectlydeterminedfromofficial
recordsalone.Reliablepublicopinionpolls—themodernsolutiontothisproblem—are
virtuallynon‐existentduringthisperiod.Earlyresearchersattemptedtodrawconclusions
fromtheavailableaggregateelectionandcensusrecords,butsinceRobinson(1950)social
scientistshaveunderstoodthedangersofwhatisknownastheecologicalfallacy(see
below)andgenerallyshiedawayfromsuchanalysis.
1Wesay“nearly”becauseelevenstatesallowedwomentovoteinthe1916presidentialelection.Ontheother
hand,restrictiveinterpretationsofregistrationrules(ratificationoccurredafterregistrationdeadlinesina
numberofstates)systematicallydeniedwomenaccesstotheballotinArkansas,Georgia,Mississippi,and
SouthCarolinain1920,delayingtheirparticipationinpresidentialelectionsuntil1924(Gosnell1930).
Togetherwithblackmen,manyblackwomencontinuedtoexperiencesystematicexclusionfromthe
franchiseuntilthesecondhalfofthe20thcentury.Forthatreason,weassumethatourconclusionsaboutthe
votingbehavioroffemalevoterslargelydescribewhitefemalevoters.
1
Thispaperreportsonresultsfromaprojectwhichseekstoovercomethesedata
andmethodologicalchallengesandindoingso,deepenandimproveourunderstandingof
animportantperiodinAmericanelectoralhistoryandAmericanpoliticaldevelopment.
Combininguniquehistoricelectiondataandrecentmethodologicalinnovations,weare
abletoestimatetheturnoutandvotechoiceofnewfemalevotersinthefivepresidential
electionsfollowingwomen’snationalenfranchisement(1920‐1936)foralargerandmore
diversesetofplaces—tenAmericanstates—thanhaspreviouslybeenpossible.Inthis
paper,weemploytheestimatesforthepresidentialelectionsof1932and1936toexamine
thecontributionsofwomentotheprocessofNewDealrealignment.
ExpectationsforWomenandNewDealRealignment
Theelectoralrealignmentthatoccurredbetween1928and1936hasbeenthe
subjectofaremarkablevolumeofscholarlywork.Aquestionofparticularinterestisthe
extenttowhichtheshiftfromRepublicantoDemocraticdominancewascharacterizedby
themobilizationofpreviouslyinactivecitizensortheconversionofthosealreadyactive.
TheconversionstorypositsthatwidespreaddissatisfactionwiththeRepublicanresponse
totheeconomiccrisispersuadedpreviousRepublicanvoterstosupporttheDemocratic
nominee,FranklinD.Roosevelt(FDR),in1932,andthenreinforcethatpreferenceby
votingforFDRinsubsequentelections,resultinginalong‐termshiftfromRepublicanto
Democraticloyalty(Brown1988).ThoseparticularlyhardhitbytheDepression—e.g.,
farmersandurbanindustrialworkers—werebelievedthemostlikelycandidatesfor
conversion(Gourevitch1984;Sundquist1973).
Others,however,haveemphasizedtheconsiderableevidenceofindividual‐level
stabilityofpartisanattachment,afindingdatingfromtheinfluentialearlyvotestudies
(Berelson,Lazarsfeld,andMcPhee1954;Campbelletal.1960,1966;Lazarsfeld,Berelson,
andGaudet1948)andapersistent,ifcontested,thesistoday(e.g.,Green,Palmquist,and
Schickler2002).Ifpartisanshipisan“unmovedmover”(Johnston2006),thenDemocratic
gainslikelycamelessfromparty‐switchingbyRepublicans,andmorefromthe
mobilizationofneworpreviouslyinactivecitizens,suchasthemassivenumbersofnew
immigrantsenteringtheU.S.intheprecedingdecades,respondingtotheappealofthe
Democraticparty(seeSalisburyandMacKuen1981).
Amidstdebatesovertheoryandmethod,scholarshavefoundsupportforboth
mobilization(Andersen1979;Campbelletal.1960;Campbell1985;Prindle1979;Wanat
1979)andconversion(Burnham1970;EriksonandTedin1981;HawleyandSagarazu
2012;LaddandHadley1975;Sundquist1983)asthemechanismsforNewDeal
realignment.Differentelections,groups,andplacesmayhavebeencharacterizedby
differentkindsofprocesses(e.g.,Andersen2014,Brown1988,Gamm1989;Nardulli
1995).
Wehavereasontoexpectthatwomenwerebothmorelikelytoconvertfrom
previousRepublicansupportandmorelikelytobemobilizedintotheemergingDemocratic
majorityduringtheNewDealelections.Sincewomenhadbeenlesslikelythanmentoturn
outtovoteintheelectionsofthe1920s,morewomenthanmenwereavailablefor
2
mobilization—thatis,thereweremorewomenwhowerenotalreadymembersofthe
activeelectorate.Indeed,intermsofsheernumbers,therewerelikelymorewomen
availableformobilizationthananyotherdemographicgroup.Atthesametime,women
whohadvotedduringthe1920smayhavebeenmorelikelytoconvertsincetheir
relativelyshortexperienceatthepollsprovidedlessopportunitytoreinforcepartisan
preferences.Inotherwords,womenboastedlowerlevelsof“politicalimmunization”
(McPheeandFerguson1962),theresistancetodisturbanceaccumulatedfromrepetition
andreiteration.
Yet,manyofthemostprominentrealignmentandpartisanshipscholarshavebeen
silentonthepotentialcontributionsoffemalevoters.Inhisinfluentialbook,Critical
ElectionsandtheMainspringsofAmericanPolitics,Burnham(1970)notesthelikely
differentialmobilizationofnativeandimmigrantwomenpriorto1928butdoesnot
implicatethemintherealignmentthatfollowed.Likewise,inSundquist’s(1983)important
statementonpartyrealignment,DynamicsofthePartySystem,thechapteronNewDeal
realignmentdoesnotmentionwomen.Kleppner(1982,89)identifies“immigrant‐stock
voters,theyoung,thosetowardthebottomoftheeconomicladder,theunemployed,
reliefers,andcitizenswhohadchosentoabstaininthe1920s”asthoseresponsiblefor
increasedturnoutduringtheNewDealperiod;whilemanywomenfellintothelast
category,hedoesnotdiscusswomenspecificallywithregardstotheNewDeal.Similarly,
Gosnell(1942,23),describingthesix‐foldincreaseinDemocraticvotersbetween1928and
1936inPennsylvania,concludesthattheDemocratsattracted“ahugearmyofnew
voters—theyoungvotersandthosewhohadformerlybeennon‐votersthrough
indifference.”Again,wemightexpectmanywomentofallintothatsecondcamp,butthey
gounmentioned.Finally,andperhapsmostimportantlyintermsofestablishingthe
conventionalwisdom,intheirclassicbook,TheAmericanVoter,Campbellandhis
colleagues(1960,153)implicate“theyouth,theeconomicallyunderprivileged,andthe
minoritygroups,”butnotwomen,assourcesofthenewDemocraticmajority.
Afewscholarshaveatleastallowedforthepossibilityofaroleforfemalevotersin
theNewDealelections.DrawingexplicitlyonMcPheeandFerguson’s(1962)conceptof
politicalimmunization,Andersen(1979)identifiestheenfranchisementofwomenasa
centralcontributortothelargenumberofnon‐immunizedvotersinthe1920swhowere
subsequentlyavailableforDemocraticconversionandmobilizationduringtheNewDeal
period.Inotherwork,Burnham(1974,1015)pointstotheheavymobilizationofwomen,
especially“ethnicwomen,”duringthe“1928‐1936realignmentsequence.”Usingdatafrom
Bostonwards,Gamm(1989)findsthatwomenweremobilizedasDemocratslaterthan
men;increasesinDemocraticsupportbefore1934werearesultofsupportfrommen,but
afterthattime,women’sgainssurpassedthoseofmen.
ThegeneralinattentiontowomenasafactorinNewDealrealignmentcanbe
attributedtoatleasttwofactors.First,theconventionalwisdomthatfemalevotershad
failedtomaterializeasauniquevotingblocortodiffermuchfrommenintheirpolitical
preferenceshadbeenlargelyacceptedasconventionalwisdombythetimeKey(1955)had
calledattentiontocriticalelectionsandtheNewDealperiodinparticularhadbecomethe
3
subjectofwidespreadscholarlyinterest.Asaresult,fewscholarslikelyviewedwomenas
potentialcontributorstotheprocessofelectoralchangeinthe1930s.
Second,thedearthofattentiontowomeninthepreviousliteratureonNewDeal
realignmenthighlightsthemethodologicalchallengestostudyinggenderdifferencesin
electoralbehaviorpriortotheadventofsurveyresearch.MuchoftheliteratureonNew
Dealrealignmentischaracterizedbymeticulousdataworkinwhichscholarscarefully
identifiedcountiesandothergeopoliticaldivisionswithdemographicpopulationsthat
allowedreasonable(inmostcases)inferencesabouttheturnoutandvotechoiceof
particulargroups(Andersen1979;Gamm1989;Key1955;Kleppner’s1982;Nardulli
1995).Racial,ethnic,andimmigrantresidentialsegregationmakesisolatingsuchgroups
geographicallyfarmoretenablethanidentifyingfemalevotersseparatefrommale.This
empiricalchallengedoesnotjustifythefailuretosomuchasspeculateastothepossible
distinctivecontributionofwomentoNewDealrealignment,however.Rather,thislacunae
inthescholarlyliterature(withfew,importantexceptions)pointstoamoregeneralfailure
torecognizewomenashavingapotentiallyuniqueelectoralimpactduringthisperiod.
ResearchDesign
ThemethodologicalchallengeforthisresearchisdescribedbyOgburnandGoltra
(1919,413):“women’sballotsarenotdistinguishedfromthoseofmenbutaredepositedin
thesameballotbox.”Invirtuallyallcases,ballotsarenotdistinguishedbythesexofthe
voterwhocastthem,andthusofficialrecordscannottellushowwomenandmenvoted.
Publicopinionandexitpolls,themodernsolutiontothisproblem,areunavailableor
unreliableduringthisera.
Someearlyscholarscorrelatedavailableinformationaboutthegendercomposition
ofthepopulationandaggregateelectionreturnstomakeinferencesabouttheelectoral
behaviorofwomenandmen(e.g.,OgburnandGoltra1919;RiceandWilley1924).This
processofinferringindividual‐levelrelationships(suchasbetweensexandturnout)from
aggregate‐leveldata(suchastheproportionofthepopulationthatisfemaleandthe
proportionofthepopulationthatturnsouttovote)isknownasecologicalinference.
However,Robinson(1950)explainshowthesecorrelationsarecharacterizedbywhathe
termstheecologicalfallacy.Apositiverelationshipbetween,forexample,theproportionof
thepopulationthatisAfrican‐Americanandtheproportionthatturnsouttovote,doesnot
necessarilymeanthatAfrican‐Americansaremorelikelytoturnoutthanothercitizens.
Indeed,suchapositivecorrelationwasoftenfoundincountiesintheAmericanSouthinthe
firsthalfofthe20thcentury;ratherthanindicatinghighAfrican‐Americanturnout,that
correlationwasdrivenbythepropensityofwhitestoturnoutathigherrateswherethe
African‐Americanpopulationwaslarger(Key1949).
Ecologicalinferencetodeterminegenderdifferencesinbehaviorisparticularly
challenging.Eveninsmallgeographicunits,wedonotobserveextremelyhigh
concentrationsofwomenormen.Thisdistinguishesourapplicationfromthosethatfocus
onotherpolitically‐relevantdivisions,suchasrace,class,orimmigration,whereresidential
segregationresultsinhighconcentrationsofvariousgroupsinparticulargeographicareas
4
(often,ofcourse,notbychoice),permittingthedirect(orneardirect)observationof
behaviorforthatgroupinsomeespeciallyinformativegeographicunits.Thatis,
observationswithextremelylopsidedconcentrationsof,e.g.,whitecitizens,producevery
narrowboundsofthepossibleelectoralbehaviorofwhites.If90%ofthepopulationina
geographicunitiswhite,thelogicallypossibleturnoutandvotechoiceratesofwhite
citizensinthatunitmustbeverysimilartooverallturnoutandvotechoiceinthatunit.
Givenarelativelylimitedrangeforthevariationinpercentagefemaleandgiventhetypical
concentrationofthatpercentagearound50percent,thelogicallypossiblecombinationsof
maleandfemaleturnoutrangeacrossaverywideinterval.
Recentresearch,however,haspioneerednew,morereliableapproachesto
ecologicalinference(seeespeciallyKing1997).Weemployanapproachdescribedin
Wakefield(2005)whichbuildsonalargebodyofrelatedworkinbiostatisticsand
epidemiology(seeRichardsonandMonfort2000)todevelopacomputationally
manageableBayesianstrategyfor2x2tables.WeextendWakefield’sapproachintwo
ways.First,weapplyWakefield’sapproach—developedfor2x2tables—tothemore
complex2x4problem,estimatingDemocraticvote,Republicanvote,otherpartyvote,and
abstention(fourpossibleoutcomes)formenandwomen(twopopulationgroups).Second,
weintroducetheuncontroversialassumptionthatmaleturnoutwillexceedfemaleturnout
ineachgeographicunitduringthisperiod.Asweshowbelow,thisapproachpermitsusto
generatereliableestimatesoffemaleandmaleturnoutandvotechoiceintheseelections.
(OurmethodandestimationstrategyaredescribedingreaterdetailinCorderand
WolbrechtN.d.).
Wethenemploythismethodologytoestimatetheturnoutandvotechoiceof
womenandmeninasampleofAmericanstates.Dataconstraintslimitedustoasample,
ratherthanthefullpopulation.Weconstructedoursampleofstateswithtwoobjectives:
(1)toobtainasmanyobservationsaspossibleineachstate(preferablyinexcessof100),
and(2)toproduceasmuchcross‐statevariationinpolitically‐relevantvariablesas
possible.Dependingonthedataavailable,weobservepopulationcharacteristicsand
electoraloutcomesforvarioussub‐stategeographicunits,includingcounties,wardsof
majorcities,andMinorCivilDivisions(MCDs),thetermtheU.S.Censususestodescribethe
politicalsub‐unitsofcounties(usuallytownshipsandvillages).County‐leveldatawere
madeavailablebytheInter‐universityConsortiumforPoliticalandSocialResearch(ICPSR
1992,1992;seeCorderandWolbrechtN.d.forfurtherinformationonthedata).Election
returnsandcensus(population)dataformultipleobservationsineachstateandelection
producessufficientvariationtopermitsuccessfulestimation.Variationacrossstatesin
politically‐relevantfactorspermitsustoexamineanumberofhypothesesregarding
contextualeffects.OurresultingsampleoftenstatesisdescribedinTable1.
5
Table1
Samplestatesandcharacteristics
DateofPresidential
Electoral
Restrictions
Women’s
CollegeVote
Party
on
1
2
Region Share(1920)
Competition Voting3 State
Suffrage Connecticut 1920
Northeast
1.3
One‐partyRepublican
High
Illinois
1913
Midwest
5.5
One‐partyRepublican Minimal
Iowa
1919
Midwest
2.5
One‐partyRepublican Minimal
Kansas
1912
Midwest
1.9
One‐partyRepublican Minimal
Kentucky
1920
Border
2.5 CompetitiveDemocratic Minimal
Massachusetts 1920
Northeast
3.4
One‐partyRepublican
High
Minnesota
1919
Midwest
2.3
One‐partyRepublican Minimal
Missouri
1919
Midwest
3.4 CompetitiveRepublican Minimal
Oklahoma
1918
Border
1.9
One‐partyDemocratic Minimal
Virginia
1920
SolidSouth
2.3
One‐partyDemocratic
High
1.Source:Keyssar(2000).
2.Source:Burnham(1981)for1914‐30.Seetextforcategorydefinitions.
3.Source:Blakey(1928),Key(1949),andKeyssar(2000).
Ourtenstatesamplepermitsustoobservethebehaviorandimpactoffemalevoters
overafarbroaderandmorediverserangeoftimeandplacethanpreviousresearch.
However,wedonotclaimthatthesampleisrepresentativeofthebroaderU.S.electorate.
Oursamplewasconstrained,sometimessystematically,bythelackofelectionandcensus
returnsforasufficientnumberofsub‐stateobservationsinmanystates;suchdataare
unavailablethroughthewestinthisperiod,forexample.Asaresult,oursampledoesnot
fullyreflecteachregionofthecountryandbothdiffersfromandissimilartothe
populationasawholeonanumberofdimensions.(Foracomparisonofoursampleandthe
broaderAmericanelectorate,seeCorderandWolbrechtN.d.).
WeemployMCMCsimulationtoproduceestimatesoffemaleandmaleturnoutfor
eachofoursamplestatesinthefivepresidentialelectionsbetween1920and1936(see
CorderandWolbrechtN.d.).Whileourestimatessatisfyanumberofdiagnostictests,the
bestindicatoroftheaccuracyoftheestimator,inourview,istherecoveryoftheknown
(true)Illinoisoutcomesin1916and1920.ThestateofIllinoisenfranchisedwomenfora
subsetofofficesin1913,andthuswomenreceiveddifferentballotsthandidmeninthe
presidentialelectionsof1916and1920(seeGoldstein1984).Thiswasnotunusualin
statesthatenfranchisedwomenpriortothe19thAmendment;whatwasunusualisthat
Illinoisalsoreportedtheoutcomes—numbersofvotescastandvotechoice—separatelyfor
menandwomen.TheIllinoisdatathusprovideusauniqueandvaluableopportunityto
validateourestimates.
Figure1reportstheactualandestimatedquantitiesforIllinoisin1916and1920.
Thetablerevealsboththepromiseoftheapproachandafewhazards.Despitethe
significantchallengesofecologicalinference,particularlyforsexdifferences,estimatesof
turnoutandpartisanvoteshareareremarkablyclosetotheobservedreturns.Indeed,the
6
errororuncertaintyassociatedwiththeestimateiscomparabletothemarginoferrorin
thesortoflargepublicopinionsurveythatformsthebasisformostcontemporaryelection
research(+/‐3%for1920Republicanvoteshare,forinstance).Withtheexceptionof
turnout,eachoftheobservedquantitiesisinthe90%Bayesiancredibleinterval—the
rangeofuncertaintyassociatedwiththeestimatedparameters.2Inbothelections,
estimatesofoverallturnoutareveryclosedtotheobserved,butbiasedslightlydownward
forfemaleturnoutandslightlyupwardformaleturnout.Thissmallbias,while
problematic,doesnotpreventusfromreachinghighlyaccurateconclusionsaboutchanges
inturnoutandvotechoiceacrossthetwoIllinoiselections.
Figure1
Observedandestimatedvotechoiceandturnout,Illinois,1916and1920
WomenandNewDealRealignment
Wenowturntowhatourestimatesofturnoutandvotechoicecantellusaboutthe
roleofwomeninthetransformativepresidentialelectionsof1932and1936.Mobilization
2The90%Bayesiancredibleintervalistherangeofestimatedvaluesin90%ofthesimulations.TheBayesian
approachpermitsustobefairlyspecificabouttheconfidencewehaveinparticularconclusionsthatwe
reach.Inthetextweclaimtobeconfidentofafindingofdifference(e.g.,femaleRepublicanvoteshare
exceededmaleRepublicanvoteshare)if90percentormoreofthesimulationssupporttheconclusion.We
maynoteadifferenceinwhichasmallerproportionofsimulationssupporttheconclusionsbutwe
acknowledgelessconfidenceinsuchresults.ThechoiceofathresholdofthistypeintheBayesiancontextis
notoriouslydifficult(seeRafterty1996),sowedisclosespecificprobabilitiesassociatedwithimportant
claims.
7
oftheelectoratein1932and1936isexceptional,particularlygiventhelong‐termtrends
towarddecliningelectoralparticipationattheturnofthecentury(seeBurnham1965).
Acrossoursampleasawhole,men’sturnoutaverages75%in1932and78%in1936.
Women’sturnoutaverages48%in1932(a27pointturnoutgendergap)andby1936,
morethanhalfofthewomeninoursamplestates(54%)turnouttovote,a24point
turnoutgendergap.Thestate‐levelestimates,reportedinFigure2,3highlightthis
remarkablemobilization.Inourtensamplestates,morethan70%ofthemalevotingage
populationturnsouttovoteineverystatesaveone(Virginia)in1932and1936.Female
turnoutisalsohigh:above50%inhalfofthestatesinoursamplein1932andin6of10
statesin1936.Indeed,weestimatefemaleturnouttoexceed60%infourMidwestern
statesin1936,alevelofmobilizationonpartwithhighturnoutelectionsintheU.S.today.
Figure2
Turnoutofwomenandmen,1932and1936
1932 3Becauseregionandpartycontextarecentraltoouranalyseselsewhere,weorganizestatesinthefiguresby
thosecharacteristics:Westartwithourone‐partyDemocraticSouthernstate(Virginia)onthefarleft,then
reportonourtwoBorderstates,withtheone‐partyDemocraticstate(Oklahoma)followedbythe
competitive(Democratic‐leaning)state(Kentucky).WethenmoveontoourMidwesternstates,startingwith
theonecompetitive(Republican‐leaning)state(Missouri)andthenthefourone‐partyRepublicanstates
(Kansas,Iowa,Minnesota,andIllinois).Finally,tothefarrightwepresentourtwoone‐partyRepublican
statesintheNortheast(ConnecticutandMassachusetts).Bothregionandourpartycontextmeasureare
indicated,alongwithstatelabel,onthex‐axis.
8
1936 Figure3showsthat,acrossoursampleasawhole,Democratswerehugely
successfulin1932and1936—particularlyinlightofRepublicandominanceinthe1920s.
Intheelectionsleadingupto1932,weobservedapersistentRepublicanadvantageamong
womeninone‐partyRepublicanstatesintheMidwest.Thisdifferenceislargely
responsibleforthesmallRepublicanadvantageamongwomeninoursampleasawholein
thefirstthreepresidentialelections,1920through1928.Theelectoraldisruptionsof1932
and1936erodethisadvantage—andperhapsevenreverseitslightly—withtheendresult
thatwomen’sandmen’ssupportforDemocraticnomineesettlesataboutthesamelevelby
1936.Specifically,Democraticsupportinboth1932and1936averages57%amongmen
comparedto60%amongwomeninourtensamplestates.
9
Figure3
Democraticvoteshareofwomenandmen,1932and1936
1932 1936 10
Thefiguressofarhavegivenusageneralsenseoftheturnoutandvotechoiceof
womenandmenintheseelections.Whatissignificantabouttheseelectionsisthedramatic
shiftfromaconsiderableRepublicanadvantageamongtheelectorateinelectionspriorto
the1930stoaDemocraticadvantagebeginningin1932.Howdidthatcomeabout,and
whatroledidwomenplay?Wecanbestanswerthatquestionwithourestimatesby
examiningthenumberofballotsgainedandlostbetweenelections.Aswehavediscussed,
thecontributionsofmobilizationandconversiontoNewDealrealignmenthavebeenof
keeninteresttoscholars.Theprocessesappeartovaryacrossthesetwoelections—with
littleturnoutchangeandlargeDemocraticswings(conversion)in1932,andsignificant
newmobilizationandlittlechangeinpartisandistribution(mobilization)in1936—sowe
discusstheoverallandpartisanmobilizationpatternsinthe1932and1936electionsin
sequence.
TheElectionof1932
Figure4summarizesthetotalnumberoffemaleandmalevotersaddedtothe
electoratein1932,providinganindicationofthesizeofthemobilizationofmenand
women.WiththeexceptionofVirginia,thesizeoftheactiveelectorateexpandedinevery
state,althoughsometimesonlyveryslightly,over1928.Giventheextraordinarylevelof
newvotermobilizationin1928,bothmaintenanceandespeciallyexpansionofthesizeof
theactiveelectorateshouldbeconsideredanimpressivefeat.Inahandfulofstatesinthe
Midwest(i.e.,Missouri,Kansas,andIllinois),weestimatethatnearlytwiceasmanynew
femalevotersareaddedtotherollsasmalevotersin1932,althoughonlyinIllinoisare
morethan90%ofthesimulationsconsistentwiththeconclusionthatfemalemobilization
outpacedmalemobilizationin1932.Intheotherstates,thenumberofnewvotersiseither
similarortherearejustslightlymorenewfemalevoters;wecanonlyconcludewith
confidencethatthesestatesaddedsimilarnumbersofnewmaleandfemalevoters.
MassachusettsandConnecticut,bothofwhichexperiencedadramaticexpansionofthe
electoratein1928,standoutasstateswithalmostnonewvotersin1932;hereagain,the
simulationssuggestthisconclusionholdsforbothmaleandfemalevoters.Thus,withthe
exceptionofIllinois,weestimatethatroughlyequalnumbersofnewmenandwomen
enteredtheelectoratein1932.
11
Figure4
Changeinnumberofvotescastbywomenandmen,1928to1932
DemocratsovercameaconsiderableRepublicanadvantagetobecomethemajority
partyin1932.Figure5displaysthechangeinthenumberofvotescastfortheDemocratic
presidentialnomineebetween1928and1932.OutsideoftheNortheast,thenumberof
Democraticvotesgainedisextraordinaryineverysamplestate.Innearlyallofthestates,
menaccountforalargernumberofnewDemocraticvotersthandowomenbutinmost
cases,thedifferencesaresmall.Illinoisistheexception:Nearly80%ofthesimulations
indicatethatwomenaccountedformorenewDemocraticvotersthandidmeninIllinoisin
1932despitethefactthat,asineverystate,women’sturnoutlaggedthatofmen.Thereare
twoothersstatesinwhichgenderdifferencesdoappear,bothintheSouthern/Border
region:InOklahomaandVirginiamorethan90%ofthesimulationsareconsistentwiththe
conclusionthatDemocratsgainedmorenewmalethanfemalevoters.Thesefindingsare
consistentwithevidencethatNewDealrealignmentunfoldedinuniquelylocalways,and
thattheexperienceandcontributionsofwomenwereasmuchafunctionoftheirlocal
contextasthefactoftheirgender.
12
Figure5
ChangeinnumberofDemocraticvotescastbywomenandmen,1928to1932
Notsurprisingly,thedeclineinRepublicanballotsineachstate—summarizedin
Figure6—tellsthesamestory.ThedeclineinthelevelofsupportfortheRepublican
candidatewasroughlysimilaramongmenandwomeninmostsamplestates.InOklahoma
andVirginia(whereDemocratsgainedmorementhanwomen),Republicanlossesamong
menweremuchlargerthanlossesamongwomen,aconclusionsupportedbymorethan
90%ofthesimulations.Morethan70%ofthesimulationssupportthesameconclusionin
KansasandMinnesota.Wethusarebeginningtoseesomeevidenceconsistentwith
differingpatternsofmobilization(women)andconversion(men)asexplanationsfor
partisanchangeamongmenandwomenin1932.
13
Figure6
ChangeinnumberofRepublicanvotescastbywomenandmen,1928to1932
WerewomenandmenmobilizedasorconvertedtoDemocratsinthesamewayin
moststatesorbydistinctpaths?Ourestimatesdonotpermitustosaywithcertaintyhow
newvoterscasttheirballots,orwhethervoterslostbyRepublicansin1932stayedhomeor
casttheirballotforDemocrats.Wecan,however,makereasonableinferences(with
appropriatecaution)fromthepatternsobserved.Overall,ourgeneralconclusionisclear:
WiththeexceptionoftheNortheasternstatesandIllinois,turnoutgainsaremodestornon‐
existentin1932whiletheshareofvoteswonbyDemocratsincreasesdramatically,
suggestingasignificantportionofthosenewDemocraticvoteslikelycamefromvoterswho
casttheirballotsfortheRepublicancandidatein1928;inotherwords,weconclude,as
othershave,thatconversionwaslikelythedominantmechanismoverallin1932(cf.,
Brown1988;HawleyandSagarzazu2012).
Theminimumnumberofconvertsrequiredtogeneratetheobservedlevelof
Democraticvotes4ineachstatein1932issummarizedinFigure7.Thenumberreportedin
thefigureisthenumberofnewmaleorfemaleDemocraticvotersminusthenumberof
newmaleorfemalevoters.Thedifferencebetweenthesenumbersistheminimumnumber
ofconverts(previousRepublicanvoters)whomusthaveswitchedpartisanvotechoiceto
accountforobservedsupportfortheDemocraticcandidatein1932.Sincethenumberof
additionalvotesforDemocratsissolargerelativetothenumberofnewvotersinevery
4ThefiguresummarizesdefectionsfromtheRepublicanPartyin1932,whichcouldresultinincreasing
supportfortheDemocraticcandidateorathirdpartycandidate.Thirdpartysupportisfairlylowinthe
samplestatesin1932,about2.5%,sotheoverwhelmingnumberofRepublicanconvertssupportedthe
Democraticcandidate.
14
state,itisextremelylikelythatthereweremanyconvertsfromtheRepublicantothe
Democraticparty.(Thisisanestimatebasedontheassumptionthatvirtuallyallnew
voterswereDemocraticsupporters.IfsomenewvoterssupportedtheRepublicans,the
numberofrequiredconvertswouldbehigher.Ifsomeestablishedvotersshiftedfromthe
DemocratstoorthirdpartiestotheRepublicanparty,thenumberofrequiredconverts
from1928Republicanswouldbehigher.Ontheotherhand,ifmanyRepublicanvoters
from1928stayedhomeandthesevoterswerereplacedwithnewDemocraticvoters,then
theconversionnumberswouldbelower).Whiledifferencesinmanystatesaresmall,in
moststatesthereweremoremaleconverts(1928RepublicanvoterswhocastDemocratic
orthird‐partyballotsin1932)thantherewerefemale.
Figure7
Minimum*numberofRepublicanconverts,1928to1932
*AssumesnonewvotersarecapturedbytheRepublicans
Overall,giventheestimatednumberofnewfemaleandmalevotersin1932inour
sample(411,000newwomenand290,000newmen),andacceptingthecrudeassumption
thatnonewvotersareRepublicans,weestimatethat,acrossourtensamplestates,about
656,000womenwhovotedRepublicanin1928votedforFDRin1932,andapproximately
828,000menwhohadvotedRepublicanin1928castDemocraticballotsfouryearslater.
Asaresult,conversionaccountsforabout62%ofthe1.06millionvotesgainedby
Democratsamongwomenin1932inthesamplestates,andperhaps75%ofthe1.11
millionvotesgainedbyDemocratsamongmen.
15
Thus,conversiongenerallyappearstoaccountformore,andmobilizationrelatively
less,ofthenewDemocraticvotescastbymenthanbywomen.Thisisnotparticularly
surprising;thelargernumberofmenalreadyvotingin1928impliesthatmoremenwere
availableforconversionand,lessso,mobilization.Whatmightbesurprisingisthatthe
relativelylargernumberofmaleconvertsoccursinspiteofthefactthatwomenaremore
likelytodefect.Thatis,womenwhovotedRepublicanin1928weremorelikelytocast
Democraticballots(defect)in1932thanweremenwhovotedRepublicanin1928.The
minimumnumberofconverts(fromabove)asapercentageoftheavailable1928
Republicanelectorategivesasenseoftherateofdefection.Forexample,inMinnesota,we
estimate89,000ofthe213,000womenwhocastRepublicanballotsin1928didnotdoso
in1932,foradefectionrateof41%amongwomen.Incontrast,weestimate108,000ofthe
347,000menwhocastRepublicanballotsin1928didnotdosoin1932,producingamale
defectionrateof31%.ConsistentwiththeestimatesfromMinnesota,women’srateof
defectionexceedsmen’sineverystate.Insomestates,likeOklahomaandIllinois,the
genderdifferencesindefectionratesarequitesmall.Inotherstates,likeMinnesotaand
Kentucky,thedefectionrateforwomenwasclearlyhigher.Sinceeachofthenumbersin
thecalculationisestimatedwithuncertainty,theconfidenceintervalsforthesequantities
arewide.Summingacrossallofthesamplestates,about80%ofthesimulationsare
consistentwiththeconclusionthatfemaledefectionratesexceededmaledefectionratesin
oursamplestates.Inonestate,Minnesota,over85%ofthesimulationsareconsistentwith
theconclusionthatthepercentageofRepublicandefectorswashigheramongwomenthan
men.Therearenostateswhereevenmorethan50%ofthesimulationsareconsistentwith
ahigherminimumdefectionrateamongmen.
16
Figure8
Minimum*percentageof1928Republicanballotsconverted(defectionrate),1928
to1932
*AssumesnonewvotersarecapturedbytheRepublicans
Thus,whilein1932mobilizationwasresponsibleforabiggerportionofnew
Democraticballotscastbywomen,thanitwasfornewDemocraticballotscastbymen,the
percentageofwomenwhochangedtheirvotechoicefrom1928to1932(defection)was
likelylargerthanthesimilarpercentageamongmen.Onceagain,thisfindinghighlights
howourconclusionsareshapedbythedataandmeasuresweexamine,andparticularly
theinteractionofturnoutandvotechoice.WhilemoreoftheDemocraticgainsamongmen
wereattributabletoconversionthanmobilization,manyfewerwomenvotedin1928.Asa
result,evenwithfewerconvertsin1932overall,thelikelihoodthata1928voterchanged
hervotefromRepublicantoDemocraticin1932waslikelymarginallyhigheramong
womenthanmen.Substantively,wenotethatthegreaterlikelihoodthatwomenwould
defectin1932isconsistentwithclaimsthatwomen’slesserelectoralexperiencewould
meanweakerpartisanties(e.g.,Converse1969,1976).
TheElectionof1936
In1936,themobilizationofnewvotersisclearlymoreextensivethanin1932and
inmoststatestherearemorewomenaddedtotheelectoratethanmen.Overall,acrossour
tensamplestates,868,000morewomenparticipatein1936thanin1932,and570,000
moremen.Figure9showsthatthispatterngenerallyholdsatthestatelevel;innearlyallof
ofoursamplestates,therearemorenewfemalevotersthanmale.Wecanbeconfidentof
17
thesedifferencesinIllinois,wheremorethan90%ofthesimulationssupportthe
conclusionthatfemalemobilizationwaslarger,andsomewhatconfidentinConnecticut
andKansas(wheremorethan80%ofthesimulationsshowmorenewfemalevotersthan
male.(Inanotherthreestates—Iowa,Missouri,andOklahoma—75%ormoreofthe
simulationsarealsoconsistentwiththisconclusion).Thus,inmoststates,theexpectation
thatthelargernumbersofinactivewomenavailableformobilizationwouldmeanwomen
wereresponsibleformorenewballotsthanmenduringtheNewDealperiodisconfirmed
inanumberofstatesin1936,whennewmobilizationwasconsiderable.
Figure9
Changeinnumberofvotescastbywomenandmen,1932to1936
WiththeexceptionofKentucky,Democratstendedtogainvotersin1936(see
Figure10).MoreofthenewDemocraticvotescomefromwomenthanmenineightofour
tenstates,althoughagain,differencesaresmallinanumberofcases.Sincetheuncertainty
associatedwiththeseestimatesarelarge,wecanonlybeconfidentaboutthesedifferences
inConnecticut;over90%ofthesimulationsindicatethatDemocratspickedupmorevotes
fromwomenthanfrommen.Thelargemobilizationofvotersin1936generatedgainsfor
theRepublicanpartyaswell(seeFigure11).Thedifferencesbetweenmenandwomenare
small,however,soouroverallconclusionisthatin1936,inplaceswhereRepublicans
gainedmalevotes,theygainedasimilarnumberoffemalevotes.5
5Massachusettsstandsoutasanexception,butthesimulationfailedtoconvergeforMassachusetts,1936,so
wehavelessconfidenceinthatestimatesassociatedwiththatelection.
18
Figure10
ChangeinnumberofDemocraticvotescastbywomenandmen,1932to1936
Figure11
ChangeinnumberofRepublicanvotescastbywomenandmen,1932to1936
19
Wehaveahardertimeinferringthemechanismsfortheallocationofpartisanvotes
gainedin1936,comparedto1932,sincethenumberofnewentrantstotheelectoratewas
quitelarge(over1.4million),butthegainsforDemocratsweresmaller(900,000),and
Republicansexperiencedgainsaswell.Asaresult,avarietyofpossiblemechanismscould
beatworkbetween1932and1936:MobilizationofRepublicans,mobilizationof
Democrats,conversionfromDemocratictoRepublican,and/orconversionfrom
RepublicantoDemocrat.Itisnotpossibleforustosaywithmuchconfidencewhich
mechanisms,andtowhatextent,explainelectoralchangein1936,orifdifferent
mechanismscharacterizemenandwomen.Althoughtheyremainpossible,theestimates,
intheaggregate,revealnostrikinggenderdifferencesinthesedynamics,exceptforthe
evidenceofgreaterturnoutgainsamongwomencomparedtomen.
TheContributionofWomentoNewDealRealignment
Overall,wefindmenandwomencontributedinroughlyequalnumbers,butin
differentways,toNewDealrealignment.Inboth1932and1936wefindevidencethatthe
numberofnewfemalevotersenteringthesystemexceededthenumberofnewmale
voters:Inoursample,120,000morewomenthanmenenteredtheelectoratein1932
(almostexclusivelyattributabletoIllinois)and300,000morewomenthanmenentered
theelectoratein1936.Aspreviousscholarshaveexpected(e.g.,Andersen1979),women’s
under‐mobilizationrelativetomentranslatedintomorenewfemalethanmalevoters
duringtheNewDealrealignmentperiod.Atthesametime,wefindthatwomeninthe
electoratepriortothe1930sweresomewhatmorelikelytodefectfromtheirpre‐NewDeal
partisanship(i.e.,womenwhovotedRepublicanin1928weremorelikelytovote
Democraticin1932thanweremenwhovotedRepublicanin1928),consistentwiththe
expectationthatpartisanshipwouldbelessstableamongfemalevoterswhohadbeenin
theactiveelectorateforashorterperiod(e.g.,Andersen1979,Converse1969,1976).
However,becausetherewerefewerwomenintheactiveelectorateoverall,mobilization
accountedformorenewDemocraticvotesamongwomenthanitdidamongmen.
Despitethefactthatmorenewwomenthannewmenweremobilizedinthese
elections,thenumberofnewDemocraticvotesoverallthatcanbeattributedtowomenis
notsubstantiallydifferentthanthenumberofnewDemocraticvotesthatcanbeattributed
tomen:Inourtensamplestates,weestimatethatjustoveronemillionfemaleDemocratic
voteswereadded(1.07million)in1932andalittlemorethanonemillionadditionalmale
Democraticvotes(1.11million),plusabout550,000additionalfemaleDemocraticvotes
andabout320,000additionalmaleDemocraticvotesin1936.Whilemorenewfemalethan
malevotersenteredtheactiveelectoratein1932and1936,morenewmaleDemocratic
votesweregeneratedbyconversion(menwerelesslikelytodefect,buttheirdefections
camefromalargerbaseofestablishedvotersandthusgeneratedmoreDemocratic
ballots).Thus,thecombinedeffectsofmobilizationandconversionallowedtheDemocrats
todrawnearlyequalnumbersofnewvotersfromtheranksofthemaleandfemale
electoratein1932and1936:1.4millionadditionalvotesfrommenand1.6million
additionalvotesfromwomen.
20
Conclusions
ConventionalnarrativesofNewDealrealignmentoverlooktheimpactofnew
femalevotersonthefortunesoftheDemocrats.Bothmechanismsofrealignment—
mobilizationandconversion—appeartohavecharacterizedwomen’scontributiontoNew
Dealrealignment:Duetolowerturnout,manywomenwereavailableformobilization,and
thosewhohadvotedpreviously(mostlyforRepublicans)lackedthereinforcementof
partisanshipofferedbylong‐termpoliticalparticipation.Andindeed,manywomeneither
convertedfromRepublicansupport(particularlyin1932)orwerenewly‐mobilizedby
Democrats(especiallyin1936).
Interestingly,althoughtheshiftinsupporttotheDemocrats—measuredasthe
changeinDemocraticvoteshare—wassmalleramongmen(in1932),themaleelectorate
waslargersothenetresultisthatDemocraticgainscameinroughlyequalnumbersfrom
menandwomen—about1.6millionadditionalwomenand1.4millionadditionalmen
acrossbothelections.Inourtensamplestatesover4.5millionmenand3.3millionwomen
supportedtheDemocraticcandidateRooseveltin1936.GiventhatDemocraticcandidate
Smithreceived3millionvotesfrommenandonly1.7millionvotesfromwomeninthe
samestatesin1928,thejointimpactofmobilizationandconversiononthefemale
electorateacrossthe1932‐1936periodisclearlyverylarge.By1936,Democratshad
attractedanimpressive95%morefemalevoters(from1.7millionin1928to3.3millionin
1936)comparedtoabout50%moremalevoters(from3.0millionto4.5million).
AccountsofNewDealrealignmentthatignorethegradualandpersistentincreasein
women’sturnoutmissanimportantelementofmobilizationthataccountsforahuge
numberofnewvotersinthe1930s.Insomestates,womenwereclearlywellincorporated
intoelectoralpoliticsbytheendoftherealignmentera—therateofturnoutforwomenin
severalsamplestateswasnearly65%by1936.Thislevelofmobilizationwouldbe
consideredremarkableinourcurrentera.
Womenshapedthesize,pattern,andoutcomeofNewDealrealignment.The
massivechangeintheelectoralfortunesoftheDemocraticpartyinthe1930swasdue,in
roughlyequalmeasure,totheballotsofmenandwomen.Only16yearsaftertheextension
ofsuffragetowomenandafterearlyaccountsdismissedwomen’ssuffrageasa
disappointmentorfailure,womenwerealargeandincreasinglyimportantsourceof
electoralsupportfortheemergingDemocraticmajority.
21
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