Nationhood and the Nationalities in Pakistan
Author(s): Hamza Alavi
Source: Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 24, No. 27 (Jul. 8, 1989), pp. 1527-1534
Published by: Economic and Political Weekly
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SPECIAL ARTICLES
Nationhood
and
the
Nationalities in
Pakistan
Hamza Alavi
lWhereasin Europe nations were constituted into states, in post-colonial societies the problem is invertedstates have to be transformed into nations. This problem tends to be less acute where national liberation has been
achieved through a long-drawn mass struggle, but the'movement for Pakistan had a trajectory which did not
include such a process. Political debate and conflict in Pakistan have revolved around the question: what is the
legitimate place of sub-national aspirations and demands within a larger concept of Pakistani nationhood? The
wbrst contradictions of the politics of ethnicity have been concentrated and have taken violent forms in Sindh.
MORE than four decades after the state of
Pakistan was created.it is still a country in
searchof an identity.That is not becausethe
issue of our nationhoodhas not preoccupied
our minds. To'thecontrary,it is one that wt
have been obsessed with. Much blood has
'OFFICIAL NATIONALISM'
Up to a point, it might be said that'
Pakistan is not alone among third world
countries in this predicament; among countries where state power lies in the hands of
one dominant ethnic group, alienating the
been spilt just on that ground. Political
debate and conflict has revolvedaround the rest. In Europe, where sub-national groups
have also come forward in recent times with
question: What is the legitimate place of
sub-national aspirations and demands demands for autonomy and national selfwithin a larger concept of Pakistani na- determination, the historical perspective
tionhood. There is a tension and a dialec- nevertheless has been rather different. There,
by and large, national unification movetical opposition between these two levels of
political identity, which has never been ments preceded formation of nation states
resolved, for those in power have tended to so that the resulting states embraced peoples
look upon sub-national movements as a who, in the course of such movements, had
developed a sense of common purpose and
threat to 'the nation' and subversive of
comnion identity that brought them together
national unity.
as nations. In post-colonial societies such
In the eyes of the articulateleadershipof
sub-national groups, the Pakistan 'nation' processes, that weld peoples together, have
has been appropriated by Punjabis who tended to be rather tenuous. So it was, to
dominate the ruling bureaucracyand the a degree, in the case of the Pakistan movemilitary that has effectively been in power ment. Whereas in Europe, nations were conin Pakistan since its inception; in partner- stituted into states, in post-colonial societies
ship, they might say, until the mid-seventies the problem is inverted: to transforrh states
with Muhajirs who were relatively well into nations.
This problem tends to be less acute where
representedin the Punjabi dominated state
apparatus.Membersof the under-privileged national liberation has been achieved
regionshavetendedto see themselvesas sub- through a long drawn mass struggle for inject peoples who have not been given their dependence and self-determination, which
rightful place in the nation. In their eyes, has brought peoples together to constitute
with a subtle inflection of meaning, the 'na- nations, in their march towards a common
tion' is transmutedinto 'country'.They exist destiny. The Pakistan movement has had a
within its boundaries and are subject to its trajectory that has not included such a pro-.
laws and institutions. But the 'concept of *cess. In any case the whole issue becomes
'country' is not evocative like that of the more problematic where a single ethnic
nation. It does not draw upon a deeply group finds itself in control of the state
embeddedsense of identification;it does not apparatus, through its disproportionate
have the same emotive and legitimising representation in the state bureaucracy and
charge.It does not give 4uite the same sense the military, as in Pakistan. There ruling
of belonging and commitment, as that of military bureaucratic oligarchies, having apthe nation. The peoples of Pakistanhavenot propriated state power, identify the state and
yet fused into a single community.The story the nation narrowly with their own partiof the Bengalimovement,culminatingin the cular purposes and interests.
liberation of Bangladesh, is a manifest exIf, in the circumstances, it were to be
ample of this-Pakistan-has yet to become claimed that Pakistan is a unified nation that
what Benedict Anderson speaks of as the would be tantamount to what Anderson
imagined community which, as he puts it, speaks of as "official nationalism". a nais "conceived as a deep horizontal com- tional identity that is not spontaneously
radeship"that cuts across boundaries and generated from below, but is imposect from
social groups and penetrates with varying above by those at the heart of the power
degreesof consciousness, a great variety of
structure in the country, in reaction to
social terrains LAnderson,1983: 161.
powerful sub-national movements that evoke
Economic and Political Weekly
a far more powerfulpopular responsein all
regions outside the Punjab. The rxation,in
that context, is made into a propertyof the
privileged groups. Repression of subnational movements by the ruling bureaucracyand military,in the name of 'national
unity' in the circumstances,is self-defeating
for that only deepens their sense of alienation; their sense of being a subject people.
THE SALARIAT
There is one class which has been central
to this problem, both with regard to the
Pakistan movement as well as regional nationalism within Pakistan after independence. This is a'section of the urban middle.
class, those with educational qualifications
and aspirations for jobs in the state apparatus, the civil bureaucracy and the
military. I have called it the salariat [Alavi,
1987].This class has a particularsalience in
colonised societies with a predominantly
agrarianproductionbase wherethe colonial
(and post-colonial) state apparatus has a
dominating presence in the urban society
and is the principal employer. Associated
with the salariat are urban professionals,
lawyers and doctors, as well as the intelligentsia,writers,poets, teachersand journalists, who share the life experiences and
many of the aspirations of the 'salariat'.It
is from amongst these that an articulate
component of the political leadershipis also
drawn.
The Indian salariat, in its contemporary
form, originated in the 19th century when
the colonial regimemade changes in the administrative and the legal system that was
now to be workedby those who had received
an anglo-vernaculareducationratherthan a
classical education in Persian, Arabic and
Sanskrit. Those who acquiredthe requisite
educational qualifications were recruited
into the colonial state apparatus as clerks
or bureaucrats.These 'westernisedoriental
gentlemen' as they were contemptuously
referredto by British civil servantsin India
were to play a key role in shaping the style
and direction of early Indian nationalist
politics and they wereat the centre,throughout, of the Pakistan movement.
The salariatis internallydifferentiated,for
July 8, 1989
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1527
speakers,were both patronised and looked
down upon by the ruling Unionists of the
Punjab and their leaders like Sir Fazli
Hussain, founder of the Unionist Party.
By contrast Bengali Muslims were much
under-representedin salariat jobs, despite
their relatively higher educational levels
[Basu, 1974.. In Sindh the urbanpopulation
before the partition was -overwhelmingly
Hindu, as indeedwas the Sindhisalariat,the
Amils. But Hindus were driven out of the
country, following well organisedrioting in
Karachi in January 1948, leaving a social
vacuum which was filled by incoming Urdu
speaking Muhajirrefugees from India. Sindhi Muslimswereoverwhelminglyruraland'
the SindhiMuslim salariatelementwas very
small at the time. Likewisethe Baluch ana
INDIA AND PAKISTAN:THE DIFFERENCES Pathans were under-represented,although
the latter were well established in the
Lines of ethnic cleavages within the south
military.The relativelywell educated Urdu
Asian salariat are in large part a reflection
speaking Muslims of northern India were
of historical occupational specialisation in
traditionallywell establishedin salariatposiIndia by communities, as well as by uneven
tions and after the partitionthese Muhajirs
regional extension of the process of the colshared control over state power as junior
onial transformation of Indian society.
partners of the dominant Punjabis. Given
Some communities have traditionally been
that source of patronage and support,
associated with state employment. Under the
Muhajirswerewith the Punjabisin supporseveral hundred years of Muslim rule, many
ting
the notion of an indivisiblePakistannaHindu communities nevertheless occupied
tion. But their position was shatteredby the
a key role in the state apparatus, such as the
weakeningof bureaucraticpowerby Bhutto's
Kayasthas and Kashmiri Brahmins in noradministrativereforms,and decisivelyso by
thern India or Amils in Sindh. It was much
the Zia regime that followed. Against that
later that members of other. communal, occupational, groups begn to be drawn towards background Muhajirs abandoned their
earlier position and declared themselves to
salariat careers and it is not surprising
be another disadvantaged ethnic grouptherefore that they found themselves greatly
giving rise to a new movement,the Muhajir
under-represented in' state employment.
Qaumi Mahaz (MQM), the Muhajir NaThe factor that influenced an uneven
tional Front. Ethnic politics in Sindh have
regional development of the salariat in India
followed an uneven course because at one
was early proximity to or distance from the
level the small and weak Sindhi speaking
nodal points of colonial rule in India which
salariat in that province has found itself in
fanned out from its intitial bases in Calcutta,
directcompetition at the local level with the
Madras and Bombay and later Delhi. Those
Urdu speaking Muhajirs while at the nacommunities that were established in these
places had an edge over those who were tional level they both find common ground
by virtue of Punjabi domination from the
more distant and who had poorer access to
centte.
the new educational institutions and salariat
While the salariat has been at the centre
positions. This was affected too by the areas
of concentration of missionary activity, a of ethnic politics in Pakistan, it does not
channel through which the new education
standalone in this. This appliesin particular
was purveyed.
to sons of landownersor rich peasants for
As far as Pakistan is concerned an imporexample, who can afford to put their sons
tant factor in the regional equation was the
through higher education so that they may
move into salariat positions which has not
patronage bestowed by a grateful colonial
been their traditional occupation. In such
regime on Punjabis for their help to the colQnial regime in putting down the so-called
cases we can say that thereis an organiclink
'Indian mutiny', the first Indian war of inthat ties the salariat with the classes from
which they originate.Beyond directorganic
dependence. Punjabis, whether Muslims,
Sikhs or Hindus, were rewarded in many difbonds, by virtue of kinship, there are also
ferent ways, including land grants in the
other kindsof linkagesthat mobilisebroader
sections of society behind salariat politics
newly created canal colonies of the Punjab.
But that included special attention to educathat.dominatesour political life. This is partion. This was availed of by urban Punjabis
ticularly an effect of the pervasive role of
who by virtue of being drawn into the
governmentin our society and its personalissalariat followed the political leadership of
ed character. Linkages that create possithe Muslim League rather than the Unionist
bilitiesof personalaccess to the bureaucracy
are much valued, sought after and cultiParty that Was in power in the Punjab, the
party of landownersof the Punjab,a multi- vated. Personswho come withinwidersocial
ethnicpaty that defendedlandlordinterests. networksthat potentiallyprovidesuch conUrban Punjabis, 'predominantly Urdu tacts and connections with actual and prothose in its upper echelons, senior bureaucrats and military officers, hold positions of
power. Their position is qualitatively different from that of lower level functionaries.
But they share a common goal in a struggle
for access to the limited opportunities for
state employment. In that struggle the
salariat has a tendency to divide and align
along ethnic lines in order to draw wider
support and solidarity in their struggle for
a greater share of the available jobs as well
as the limited places in institutions of higher
education, the source of credentials for
future jobs. Students, aspiring occupants of
salariat positions, are therefore aligned with
the respective salariat groups and play an active role in salariat politics.
1528
spective members of the salariat, such as
fellow villagers or even those who can invoke their shared ethnic identity, will tend
to identify themselvesas such and give their
backingto the ethnic politics of the salariat.
They have a stake in their installation in
public office and their promotionsto higher
positionswithinthe bureaucracyfor theycan
then hope to invoketheirmediationand help
that would providefor them a point of fruitful access to the bureaucraticmachine.
In the case of sub-nationalmovementsfor
regionalautonomy,ambitiouspoliticiansare
also drawninto the game of ethnic politics.
Wherethey havelittle hope of gainingpower
at the centre,an alternativeis to profit from
possibilities of acquiring influential public
office at a local or provinciallevel.They have
a stake in the goal of greater provincial
autonomy which would put greater power
and more resourcesat their disposal. They
resortto chauvinisticrhetoricas a powerful
means of mobilisingsupportwhen they have
little else to offer to the common people. On
the other hand, one can see the logic of the
politics of membersof privilegedand dominant ethnic groups who hold key positions
in the bureaucracyand the military, and
thereby are in control of state power, who
feel threatenedby politics of ethnicity and
denouncesuch politicalappealsas parochial'
and particularistic.They invokeinstead appeals for loyaltyto largerentitiessuch as the
'Pakistan nation' or the 'brotherhood of
Islam' in the name of which they try to delegitimise regional ethnic demands. They
invoke an 'official nationalism'.
Finally, in considering the reasons for
Pakistan politics being overshadowed by
politics of ethnicity we must consider our
long historyof authoritariangovernmentby
a bureaucraticand military oligarchy,seen
to be predominantly Punjabi. There have
been few opportunities, therefore, for the
common people to participatein democratic
processes. They feel alienated from the
political system with no sense of participation in it. Pakistan and India provide contrasting cases of this. In India the plurality
of salariat groups in the higher reaches of
governmentand the absence of dominance
by any single one of them has necessitated
a political system through which those who
are in positions of power in the state are
obliged to operate a process of negotiation
with different sections, groups and regions
of Indian society, in a wide varietyof ways,
in order to aggregateauthority in their exercise of state power. Such processes of
negotiation operate both withih th? ruling
Congress Party and between the Congress
and regionally powerful political parties.
There is therefore a wider degree of participation in the process of government. In
Pakista:q,by contrast,thereis the dominance
of a single salariat group, the Punjabis, in
the military and the bureaucracyand the
tenuous characterof democracyin the country, even when it has been allowed formally
to exist. As a result there is an absence of
Economic and Political Weekly July 8, 1989
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political negotiation under authoritarian that Muslims made up in quality what they
rule, which has heightened the sense of lacked in overall numbers! Aligarh and
alienation and exclusion of the under- Lucknow were the main political bases of
privilegedregionalgroups, who are made to the Muslim salariat who hijacked the Muslim
feel as outsiders in their own country.
League as soon as it was founded [cf Alavi,
SALARIAT-BASED
NATIONALMOVEMENT
The salariat was at the heart of early
Indian nationalism whose main slogan was
not yet independencebut rather'Indianisation' of governmentserviceand 'self-government' witlrinthe empire. Under conditions
of colonial rule the salariats from different
parts of India were, initially, united in that
'common goal. Yet even at this early stage
ethniccompetitionwithinthe Indiansalariat
was beginning to make its appearance.The
movement of the Muslim salariat that ultimately culminated in the formation of
Pakistan was -.only one of several such
movements.Othersincluded the Scheduled
Castes Federation, the Brahmin vs nonBrahminmovement in south India and the
unsuccessful movement led by E V RamaswamyNaicker,the Periyar(greatsage) who
gave a call for the formation of a separate
state of Dravidisthan, a state of the nonBrahminpeople of south India. Naickersupportedthe Pakistanmovementand wasgiven
a seat on the platform at the Madras session of the MuslimLeague.Naicker'sdream
and also his failureto mobilisethe different,
putativelyDravidian,people of south India
behind his Tamil-led movement illustrates
very well the character and the limits of
politics of the salariat. This limitation is
reflectedin the historyof the MuslimLeague
too. It did verybadly in the electionsof 1937
and, ironically, it was at its weakest in
Muslim majority provincesof India. It was
by virtue of certain special circumstances
that surfaced when independence was in
sight, that broughtabout a swingin political
alignments of powerful landlord groups in
the Muslim majoriMyprovinces, that the
Muslim League was able to muster forces
that lay behind the creation of Pakistan.
The heartof Muslim nationalismin India
was in the UP and Bihar, Muslim minority
provinces. Muslims there had held a lion's
share of government jobs. But with thee
switch to an Anglo-vernacular system of
education and changes in the colonial administrativeand legal systems as well as the
very rapid expansion in the size of the
salariatin the latterhalf of the 19thcentury,
parallel with the construction of a new
colonial economy in India [cf Alavi, 1989],
there was a relativelygreaterincreasein the
non-Muslim component of the salariat.
Muslims saw themselves losing their preeminence. Their share in the highest ranks
of governmentservice declined f-rotn64 per
cent in 1857 to about 35 per cent in 1913.
This was a remarkabledecline in privilege,
for Muslims were only about 13 per cent to
15 per cent of the total population of the
UP inrthat period. Under the leadershipof
Sir Syed Ahmad Khan they demanded a
parityin quotasfor governmentjobs, arguiing
Economic and Political Weekly
Pakistanmovementweredefinedand unified
by a religious ethnic criterion namely,
'Muslim'. Pakistan was not created, as is
ideologically representedby some interests
in Pakistantoday,to createan 'Islamic'state
1987]. Jinnah, a leader of the Indian National
[cf Alavi, 1987]. The Pakistan Muslim
League was held to be the champion of
Congress, was invited to joint them in 1913.
Muslim nationalism. But the social roots of
It is component of the Muslin salariat that
was later to come to Pakistan as Muhajirs.
Muslim nationalism were quite shallow. It
is quite remarkablethat the PakistanmoveIn the Punjab the Muslim salariat was also
ment was at its weakestin Muslim majority
quite sizeable, for about 32 per cent of those
provinces.As has been pointed out political
educated in English in the Punjab were
power in the Punjab lay in the hands not of
Muslims, rather less than their share of the
the Punjabisalariatbut, rather,in the hands
total population which was over 52 per cent
of powerfullandownerswho wereorganised
(Census 1931). The Punjabi Muslim salariat
behind the right wing landlord party, the.
joined that of the UP and Bihar in the
Unionist Party,the partyof Hindu and Sikh
Muslim national movement, declaring that
as well as Muslim landownerswho despised
they were under-represented by way of their
the urban salariat groups even when they
proper share of government jobs. These
patronised them.
relatively more advanced components of the
Muslim salariat in India were the, main base
In Sindh the pattern was virtually idenfor the Pakistan movement. It was a very
tical exceptfor the fact that an ethnic Sindhi
limited base.
speaking Muslims salariat was virtually,
non-existent. Muslim in Sindh were either
The salariat based Indian national movelandlordsor peasants,the waderasand haris.
ment was able to extend its base both by virSindhi urban society was overwhelmingly
tue of getting the backing of the Indian naHindu, except for a certain numberof nontional bourgeoisie, anxious to get the colonial
Sindhi Muslims who had migratedto cities
regime off its back and also by virtue of
of Sindh in the wake of colonial developpolitics of mass mobilisation inaugurated by
ment. It is only in relativelyrecenttimes that
Mahatma Gandhi which triggered off the acSindhi speaking Muslims, who were pretive support of the subordinate classes behind
dominantly rural, have begun to come forthe movement for independence. That was
ward to claim their share of salariat posinot the style of politics of the Muslim League
tions. Muslimsof Baluchistanwerelikewise
leadership. Mass mobilisation being absent
backwardas also those of Sarhad,although
in this case, the requisite political weight was
secured only when a deal was made by Jinriah some sub-regional variations existed. In
these regions the Muslim League was to be
with landlord leadership of the Muslim
at the mercyof landlordsand tribal leaders.
majority provinces, especially in the Punjab
and Sindh. That secured, nominally at least,
The claim of Muslimnationalismin India
the adoption of the Muslim League label by was that Indians were divided into two naright wing landlord dominated governments
tions, the Hindu nation and the Muslim nathat were in power in those provinces and
tion. The moment that Pakistan was estagave the Muslim League some kind of manblished Muslim nationalismhad fulfilled its
date on the basis of which it was able to
objective and had outlived its original pursecure the final result. But the Muslim
pose. There were two interestingresponses
League's dependence on landlords of Sindh
to this new situation. FirstlyJinnah himself
and Punjab for securing its goals and its inburiedthe two-nationtheoryin his inaugural
ability to mobilise the Muslim masses was
speechgivenon August 14, 1947to the newly
to have far reaching consequences 'for the
established constituent assembly of
state of Pakistan.
Pakistan.In that historicspeech he declared
in the clearest possible terms his commitPolitics of ethnicity, based on the proment to the idea of secular citizenship in
blems and aspirations of different salariat
Pakistan. From the principal forum of the
groups, have developed differently in India
new state he declared:
and Pakistan in two respects. Firstly ethnic
movements in Pakistan have taken the form
You may belong to any religionor creed.
primarily of sub-nationalism, although a
Thathas nothingto do with the businessof
secondary theme of localised ethnic conflicts
the state... We are startingwith this funand competition has not been absent. In
damentalprinciple,that we are all citizens
of one state... I thinkwe shouldkeepthat
India, by contrast, politics of ethnicity have,
in frontof us as our idea and you will find
by and large, been displaced on to local
that in courseof time Hinduswill cease to
arenas, taking the form of communalism
be Hindus and Muslims will cease to be
and inter-commun'al conflict over quotas for
Muslims,not in the religioussense because
jobs and places in institutions of higher
that is the personalfaith of each individual
education that lead to salariat and profesbut in the politicalsense,as citizensof the
sional careers.
state [Choudhury,1967:21-22].
Secondly, we find that in the case of
Jinnah's speech was a clear declaration of
Pakistan there has been a succession of
ethnic definitions and re-definitions,ac6cor- secularcitizenshipin the new state, a speech
ding to changingcontexts of ethnic politics. that ideological vested interestsin Pakistan
To begin with the salariatgroupsbehind the have a hard time explaining away.
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1529
ASSERTION OF REGIONAL IDENTITIES
A rather different response to the creation
of Pakistan was the affirmation of their own
regional identities, as against the common
identity of 'Muslim', by under-privileged
regional salariat groups in Pakistan vis-a-vis
the dominant Punjabis. There was a fresh
reckoning of the distribution of privilege and
deprivation. Virtually overnight there were
ethnic re-definitions. The salariat groups of
East Bengal, Sindh, Sarhad and Baluchistan
promptly re-defined their identities as
Bengalis, 5indhis, Pathans and Baluch and
demanded fairer shares for themselves in
jobs in the state apparatus. The respective
regional, sub-nationalist, movements exploded into view the day after Pakistan came into
being. The state of Pakistan was now represented by them as an instrument of Punjabi
domination, with their control of the
bureaucracy first under secretary-general
Choudhry Muhammed Ali and later under
governor Ghulam Mohammed. The fact that
neither general Iskandar Mirza nor general
Ayub Khan, who held the reins of power
after them were Punjabis made little difference to that perception, for given the Punjabi positions within the bureaucracy and the
military power was seen to be securely in
Punjabi hands.
The articulation of Bengali and Pathan
identities, respectively, on the basis of both
region and language, was relatively unproblematic. The first expression of the
demands of the East Bengal salariat came
when Shaikh Mujibur Rahman, as a young
student leader, put the aspirations of the
people of East Pakistan before Jinnah when
he visited Dacca. The powerful Bengali
language movement, symbolically so, for
language is above all the instrument of the
pen-pushing salariat, was triggered off by
the announcement in 1952 that Urdu would
be the national language of Pakistan. The
Bengali movement demonstrated its power
in the East Pakistan election of 1954 when
the 'ruling' Muslim Party secured no more
than 10 seats out of a total of 309. Here the
Bengali salariat was far more effective in the
political arena than the Muslim League had
been in the. 1937 elections. In 1937 the social
base of the victorious Krishak Proja Party
in Bengal was.made up of rich peasants and
jotedars, who demanded abolition of zamindari, to get rid of the overlords who
dominated their lives. That objective was
achieved by zamindari abolition in East
Bengal in 1951. In the elections in East
Bengal in 1954 and subsequently, the leading
issues were salariat demands. The rich
peasants and jotedars, whose sons made up
the East Bengal salariat, were solidly with
them. Hence their landslide victories. These
were solid votes against 'Punjabi' domination.
The problem of ethnic identity is rather
more complicated in Sindh and Baluchistan.
tiating criteria of ethnic groups, a number
of separategroupscan be demarcatednamely Baluchproper,Brahuis(or Brohis),Lassis,
Makranisand in the north-easterndistricts
Pushtuns who are Pathans rather than
Baluch.The literatureof Baluchnationalism
repudiates angrily attempts to fragment
them on the basis of such criteria. Instead
they have produced historical accounts of
convergentoriginsof these differentsections
of a singlepeople,the Baluch.It is the dominant Punjabirulinggroups,they argue,who
emphasiseand try to exploitsuch differences
to disrupt Baluch unity. The Baluch on the
other hand resist such attempts to divide
them and stridentlyproclaimtheirunity.The
only exception that some of them are
preparedto make is in the case of Pushtuns
and they accept the idea of Pushtun areas
of Baluchistanbeing amalgamatedwith the
neighbouringSarhadprovince.Affirmations
of BaluchunityaredirectedagainstPunjabis
and other outsiders who monopolise jobs
and most profitable occupations in
Baluchistanto the exclusion of the Baluch.
CASE OF SINDH
It is in Sindhthat the worstcontradictions
of the politics of ethnicity in Pakistan are
concentrated and they take violent forms.
Sindh is truly a multi-ethnic province. In a
sense it has always been so, for historically
it has been inhabited by a substantial
number of Baluchi speaking people who,
although they may speak Baluchi at home,
are neverthelessregardedas Sindhi;some of
them areSindhinationalistleaders.Likewise,
there are migrants from Cutch in India
(business communities) who have lived in
Sindh (mainly Karachi) for many generations and have played leadership roles in
Sindhi politics. For example Mahmood
Haroon, who is from such a background,
was among prominent delegates at a conference organised at Sann, the home of
G M Syed, when the Sindh Natiornal
Alliancewas foundedin 1988.FerozAhmad,
a militant Sindhi extremist, who is an
Ismaili, also belongs to this category.Hence
we can see that Sindhi identity is a mixture
of many different elements, a product of
historical evolution.
But a distinction is made in the case of
those who havecome to Sindh after the partition. They are not categorised as Sindhis
although they have lived in Sindh for
decades. These include Muhajirs speaking
refugeesfrom India who came in at the partition and also Punjabis and Pathans who
have mjgratedto Pakistan since then. Forty
yearsago whena flood of refugees,uprooted
from India poured into Pakistan (similar
numbers of Hindu and Sikh refugees were
uprooted from Pakistan areas and were
driven over the border across to India), the
Punjabidominatedrulingoligarchyensured
In Sindh, especially, it is an explosive issue that refugees from East Punjab andMnthe
that has torn that province apart in violent main only those, weresettledin WestPunjab
c,onflict. In Baluchistan if cultural criteria so that ethnically and linguisticallyPunjab
wereto be interpretedtoo rigidly,as differen- remainedhomogeneous; only a handful of
1530
refugees from other parts of India found
their way into that province. All refugees
other than those from East Punjab, i e,
mainly the Urdu speaking refugees from
northern and central India, were settled in
Sindh,althoughPunjab,beinga muchlarger
province, had a greater capacity to absorb
these refugees and offer them a livelihood.
With Sindhi Hindus, the predominantelement of Sindhi urban population having
been driven out and the influx of Muhajirs
into Sindh, the ethnic composition of Sindh
was radically altered.
Some of the Urdu speakingrefugeesfrom
India who were funnelled into Sindh settled on the land. But the bulk of them took
the place of urban Sindhi Hindus, either as
tradersor professionalsin the big cities and
small towns of Sindh. The Urdu speaking
Muhajirsalso initially providedthe bulk of
the urban working class in Sindh. Sindhi
speaking urban population in Sindh thus
became quite minute. Whereas before the
partition Sindh'scities were predominantly
non-Muslim now they are predominantly
Urdu speakers. As Sindhis started coming
up in salariat they found that they had not
only to deal with Punjabidominationof the
state apparatusbut also to competewith the
relatively more advanced Muhajirs.
Although initially (after the partition) the
populationof Sindh'scities was overwhelmingly Muhajir in composition, their ethnic
composition changed substantiallywith the
influx of Pathan and Punjabi workerswho
providedadditions to the working force for
the growing inciustries.
As a result according to the 1981Census
only 52 per cent of the population of Sindh
consisted of those whose first language was
Sindhi.Urduspeakersweremorethan 22 per
cent of the total. But they predominatedin
the urban areas of Sindh where they were
reckonedto numberover 50 per cent of the
population. The Muhajirurbanmajority is
less pronounced as one moves to smaller
towns which, after all, are mere extensions
of the ruralsociety.But along with Punjabis
and Pathans they are an overwhelmingmajority of the three major industrial cities,
namely Karachi, Hyderabadand Sukkur.
In Karachi, the capital of Sindh, a
metropolisof over8 million people, 54.3 per
cent of the population (in 1981)were urdu
speakers,i e, mainly Muhajirs.13.6per cent
were Punjabi speakers and 8.7 per cent
Pushto speaking Pathans from the Sarhad.
In that capital of Sindh, those whose first
language was Sindhi numbereda mere 6.3
per cent. That is the grievance of Sindhi
nationalists.They have become strangersin
their own land. However,it might be said
that the census figures probably underestimate, as some experts believe, the
numbersof Pathansand Punjabisin Karachi,
manyof whom live in katchiabadis or shanty towns where there has been under-enumeration. An estimated 40 per cent of the
population of the city live in these slums.
By contrast Sindhis who live in Karachi
Economic and
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belong to the lower middle class and above,
many of them being absenteelandlordsand
their retinues. Likewise in the other major
cities of Sindh, Hyderabad and Sukkur,
native Sindhi speakers are in a very small
minority.
A rather different kind of complication
in the ethnic composition of Sindh arises
from the influx of privileged groups from
outside. These are mostly Punjabis. Large
tracts of land in Sindh, brought under irrigationsince independence,wereallottedby
the rulingbureaucraticmilitaryoligarchyto
senior officers of the bureaucracyor the
military or their relatives, rather than to
Sindhis. These new landlords-inSindh tend
mostly to be absentee landlords and they
brought with them Punjabi tenants or
labourers,whom they could better control
and rely upon than local Sindhis. So this is
a double deprivation, of lands as well as
jobs. In urban areas too valuable land and
propertyhas been allottedto personsin these
categories. Punjabis are taking over industries and large businesses also from the
(mainly) Cutchi businessmen of Sindh.
Becauseof proliferationof state controls of
a variety of kind, over the operation
especially of industrial enterprises, the
established businessmen have found it increasinglymore difficult to cope with them,
the more so during the eleven years of Zia's
military dictatorshipwhen rule of law gave
way to arbitrarydecisions by military officers. As a result many of the traditional
businessmen have retreatedinto trade and
many have transferred their operations
abroad. In their place a new class of Punjabi capitalists has taken shape. These are
not just any Punjabis but rather they are
close kinsmen of senior bureaucrats and
militaryofficers. Their kinshiplinks play an
important part in their ability to negotiate
bureaucratichurdleswhich the old established bourgeoisiefound it difficultto negotiate.
Both Sindhis and Muhajirs have found
themselvespushedinto the backgroundand
resent these developments.
MUHAJIR POLITICS
The ethnic orientation of both Sindhis
and Muhajirs has undergone significant
changes in recent years, dramaticallyso in
the case of Muhajirs.At the time of the partition Muhajirswere well establishedin the
bureaucracy,though not in the armed services which is estimatedto be around85 per
cent Punjabis,most of the restbeing Pathans
(these are not confirmed or verifiable
figures).It must be said, however,that there
do exista number,though a diminishingone,
of very seniorMuhajirofficersand generals.
general Mirza Aslam Baig, Zia's successor
is, for example,a Muhajir.However,as the
significant alignments in the military are
those amongstPunjabiofficersand generals,
Muhajir officers do not representa power
base on their own. They are ratheroften the
'least evil' choice of powerful rival groups
of Punjabi officers.
Economic and Political Weekly
Muhajirpresencein the bureaucracywas
an importantsourceof patronagefor them.
In-thecircumstancesthey identifiedpolitically with conceptsof Pakistannationhoodand
some evenwith Islamicideology and opposed demands of regionalethnic groups. That
ideology was in continuity with their
political orientation in the past for, along
with urban Punjabis, Muhajirs were the
bulwark of Muslim Nationalism in India
and providedmany of the principalleaders
of the Pakistanmovement.In Pakistanthey
werelargelynon-political, for their linkages
with the bureaucracywerepersonaland particularistic.Insofar as they weredrawninto
the political arena they tended to back
Islamic ideological parties such as the
Jamaat-i-Islami or the Jamiat-i-Ulama-iPakistan,
The bureaucracy, with its important
Muhajir component, used to be presided
over by the tightly organisedCSP, the Civil
Serviceof Pakistan,successorto the colonial
ICS, the so-called 'Steel Frame'of colonial
rule. For two and a half decades after independence, it was the senior partner in the
bureaucratic-militaryoligarchy that ruled
Pakistan [cf Alavi, 1983]. It was powerful
enough to keepthe militaryat bay evenduring the martiallaw regimeof GeneralYahya
Khan. The situation changedradicallyafter
Bhutto'sadministrativereforms,that broke
its back and the bureaucracyceased to be
the powerful entity that it used to be.
Ironically that opened the way for unrest-rainedmilitary rule under General Zia for
the one great barrierin the way of military
hegemony was removed. With the collapse
of bureaucraticpower, it was also the case
that the Muhajirs lost their patrons in the
structureof state power which now passed
into unchallenged Punjabi hands.
It took a little time for these changes to
manifest their effects in Muhajirpoliticsalthough it must not be forgotten that
Muhajirs played a big role in movements
againstAyubKhanwhichled him to transfer
the capital awayfrom Karachi,the principal
Muhajir centre. Soon Muhajirs were to
abandon their pre-occupationwith affirmations of Pakistani nationhood and they
abandoned,in the process,their supportfor
Islamic fundamentalistparties. They lined
up behind politics of ethnicity.
Hitherto Muhajirs had agitated against
the quota system for jobs and admissions
into institutionsof highereducation, which
are at the core of ethnic politics. As late as
December 1986 a Jamaat-i-Islami Urdu.
weekly,readmostly by Muhajirs,carriedan
article entitled: 'Quota System: Denial of
Justiceand the Swordof Oppression'( Kota
Sistam: Adal ki Nafi Aur Zulm ki Talwar
in Takbeer,December 24, 1986). But the
Muhajirs were to change this stand. The
quota system in Pakistan dates back to the
1950s when it was introduced in deference
to East Bengali ethnic demands. Unlike the
system in India where quotas are based on
local communalcriteriaand areleft to local
authorities to work out and implement, in
Pakistanthey areregional, 10per cent of the
places being awarded'on merit',50 per cent
for the Punjab, and 19 per cent for Sindh,
of which 11.4per cent was for 'ruralSindh'
and thus for predominantlySindhispeakers,
and 7.6 per cent for urban Sindh, mainly
Muhajir.A quota of 11.5per cent was fixed
for Sarhad and 3.5 per cent for Baluchistan
and the rest for Azad Kashmirand Federally
Administered Territories. However, there
were problems with implementationof the
quota system. Given Punjabi control over
the administrativemachinery,it has not been
too difficult for a Punjabi to poach places
from the other groups by obtaining false
'Certificates of Domicile' in say Quetta in
Baluchistanor Hyderabadin Sindh, depriving the locals.
With the total collapse of bureaucratic
powerand consolidationof the powerof the
Punjabi dominated army, Muhajirs began
to feel that they were losing ground heavily
and their bureaucratic patrons were no
longer able to help them quite as much as
before.They had littleto gain, they felt, from
agitating for abolition of the quota system.
In March 1984a new movement, called the
Muhajir Qaumi Mahaz (MQM), i e, the
MuhajirNationalFront,was set up, its main
impetus deriving from a Muhajir students'
organisation. They now demanded that
Muhajirs be recognised as the fifth nationality of Pakistan and that they should
be allotted a 20 per cent quota at the centre
and between 50 per cent and 60 per cent in
Sindh. They also want it to be ensuredthat
quotas in Sindh reservedfor Sindhispeakers
and Muhajirs, respectively,are not poached by Punjabis. The MQM took the urban
centres of Sindh by storm.
EMERGENCEOF MQM
The MQM has emergedthroughthe 1988
elections as the third largest party in the
country-one might even say that in effect
it is the second largest, for the Islamic
Democratic Alliance, reckoned second, it
itself no more than a precariouspatchwork
of 9 parties,cobbledtogetherunderpressure
from above, to present a viable opposition
to the PPP. The MQM was founded in
March 1984 by some Muhajir students'
groups. Its rise as a major force on the national scene was quite dramatic. That was
precipitatedby certain events in September
1986when a plannedMuhajirprotestmarch
from Karachito Hyderabadwas stopped by
the police at Sohrab Kot, the 'gateway'to
Karachiand the participantsbeatenup. That
was the catalytic moment in its subsequent
meteoric progress.
The emergenceof the MQM as a major
political force was not merely a matter of
Muhajirsgettingorganisedas such. It marked a sea change in their political attitudes.
So far Muhajirshad championed the cause
of Pakistan nationhood and were a major
support for extremeright wing Islamic fundamentalist parties such as the Jamaat-i-
July 8, 1989
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1531.
Islami. But now the national identity was
dropped.Only a few monthsearlierit would
have been thought to be unbelievablethat
Muhajirswould rally behind a slogan that
said: "We have not signed a contract to
uphold Pakistan and Islam!" (Ham nain
Pakistanaur Islam ka thekanahin liya hat).
Havingfor decadesdeclaredquite militantly
that theiridentitywas Pakistaniand Muslim
and that they opposed all ethnic movements
as communal, they now decided to pursue
communal politics. Overnightthere was an
ethnic redefinition for now they declared
themselves to be Muhajirs rather than
Pakistanis. Instead of moving towards an
end to communalismand to ethnic conflict,
the rise of the MQM, in the face of strident
Sindhinationalism,furtherconsolidatedthe
hold of communalism in Pakistan politics.
Sindh politics, however,have been in a
state of flux. In 1983 the Movement for
Restorationof Democracyin Pakistan was
to launch a nationwideprotest against Zia.
In the event, it was in Sindh that an exclusivelySindhimovementarose,with great
fury and power.Based on Sindhi speakers,
it turned out to be narrowlya rural movement for it failed to rally the urban population, mainly Muhajirs, because of its sectarian Sindlhislogans. Neverthelessit was a
most powerfulmovementthat stretchedthe
repressivestate apparatusto the limit in trying to contain it and put it down. Attempts
were made by the Zia regime to turn that
movementinto communal rioting and there
was plenty of evidence of agents provocateurs at work. The leadership of the
Sindhi movementsucceededin securingthe
help of local level Muhajirleadersand prominent members of their community to
stand with the Sindhis on their platformsin
order to preventtheir struggle against the
centralgovernmentfrom degeneratinginto
an inter-communalconflict. That experience
had some impact on the thinking of some
sections of the Sindhi leadership,especially
its more radical sections. They began to
realise that their movement had failed
because of their inability to rally the urban
population without which no movement in
Sindh could succeed; and that if they had
managed to involve the Muhajirs, their
movementwould havebeen irresistible.They
began to see that Muhajirs were a part of
the peoples of Sindh, indeed a part of the
Sindhi people.
An important and influential section of
the Sindhi leadershipbegan to redefineSindhi identity.HistoricallySindhiidentityhad
alwaysbeen ratherproblematicin that multiethnic province. Many people from other
regions have settled in Sindh, such as the
Baluch who still speak Baluch at home but
are recognised as Sindhis-many Baluchis
are in fact in positions of leadership in
Sindh. There are also Cutchis in Sindh.
Cutchis a bridgebetweenSindhand Gujarat
(in India)and the Cutchilanguageis cognate
with Sindhi. Thereare other gsroupsof early
migrantsin Sindhi.That includesthose who
are (putatively)of Arab origin, the Syeds,
1532
who came with the Arabconquerorof Sindh
in the eighth century AD, Mohammad bin
Kassim. Apiongst these would be counted
G M Syed, the fatherof Sindhinationalism.
EXTENDING SINDHI IDENTITY
In 1986one found Sindhi leaders and intellectualsengaged in discussingcriteriaon
the basis of which Sindhi identity might be
redefinedso as to includealso Muhajirswho
are now an integralpart of the population
of Sindh, whom they would like to carry
with them in their struggle for provincial
autonomy. One can recognisethat achievement of greaterprovincialautonomywould
benefitthe ruralSindhispeakersmoredirectly because of the rural bias in the political
system and the franchise. If unity *with
Muhajirsbroughtthem nearerto that goal,
it is the Sindhi speakers who would stand
to gain most, even if the benefits wereto be
sharedwith Muhajirs.Togetherthey would
get the dominant Punjabis off their backs.
At that time many Sindhi leaderswerekeen
to extendthe concept of Sindhi identity,accordingly,althoughtherewerea chauvinistic
few who campaignedvigorously against it.
In the cse of at least one of these in the latter category,suspicions werevoiced that he
was an employee of the ubiquitous interservices intelligence, the notorious ISI
(which was reportedby the London based
Financial Times to have 1,00,000 persons
working for it). Such a possibility is not at
all unlikely and cannot be ruled out. It
would have suited the interests of the Zia
regimeto generateconflict betweenSindhis
and Muhajirsand evennow that would serve
the purposes of those who would like to see
a weak governmentin power even if it is a
democraticallyelected one.
Sindhileaderswho favouredextendingthe
concept of Sindhi identity, argued that being a Sindhi was not a matter of place of
origin or one of language that one spoke.
If that were so, how could the Baluch in
Sindh be accepted by them for so long as
fellowSindhisand so manyof them acknowledgedand honouredas Sindhileaders.They
argued that the Baluch in Sindh were Sindhis because they had roots in Sindh. They
would extend that principle to Muhajirs.
Muhajirs, they argued, were uprooted 'by
fate and the forcesof history'fromtheirown
soil in India and deposited in Sindh. They
had struckfreshroots in Sindhas the Baluch
and the Cutchis had done before them.
These Sindhi leaders and intellectuals
repudiatedquite forcefullythe paternalistic
designation of Muhajirsas 'new Sindhis',a
term that was widely used in the past but
which, implicitly,deniesMuhajirsfull status
as Sindhis. They insisted that they are full
Sindhis, without any qualification. Descent
they said, was no criterion of ethnicity nor
was it religion or language. It was a question of roots.
Applying that criterionof rootedness, to
other groups in Sindh, they took the view
that Punjabisin Sindhwould not qualify for
inclusion within the expandednotion of being Sindhi.Thesearemostlybureaucratsand
membersof the armed forces or their close
relatives who have secured large grants of
land from the government, and who have
brought with them their retinueof Punjabi
sharecroppersand labourers. These Punjabis, the Sindhi leaders and intellectuals
argued have come to Sindh as conquerors
and usurpers,on the strengthof statepower.
They remain Punjabis for they have their
roots in Punjab which is exploiting the
resourcesof Sindh. They should therefore
be expelledfromSindhand the land restored
to Sindhi hands, the sons of the soil.
Such Sindhi ethnic redefinitions, impelled,. by recognition of need for political
realignments,are most interestingto see. It
was likewise in the case of Muhajirs,
responses to some degree to re-alignments
to Sindhi positions, but also, and especially,
to changes on the national scene. This included the change in the ethnic selfdefinition of Muhajirsand the dramaticrise
of the MQM in the mid-1980s.The Muhajirs now abandoned their opposition to the
very conceptionof sub-nationalities.Earlier
Muhajirshad repudiatedthe idea of ethnic
identityor nationalityin favourof Pakistan
nationhood and Islamic brotherhood for
which such divisions were repugnant. The
MQM demandedinsteadthe recognitionof
Muhajirsas the fifth nationalityof Pakistan
and virtually overnight Muhajirs rallied
around it overwhelmingly.The process of
ethnic redefinitioncontinued further.In the
face of SindhimoderationMuhajirsrealising
that their own future is tied up with the
future of Sindh as a whole, which cannot
be resolved except in company with Sindhi
speakers, changed tack once again. More
confident after their resoundingsuccess in
the local elections of Spring of 1987, they
reoriented their approach, to prepare the
groundfor closer politicalco-operationwith
Sindhi speakers. Now they declared that
Muhajirs were not a nationality by themselves. They were only a sub-nationality
within the largerSindhi nationality, Sindhi
speakersbeing the other sub-nationalgroup.
Togetherthey constituted Sindhi nationality. Given Sindhi reorientations too, for a
time it looked not at all unlikelythat the two
would move closer in the political arena
towards some kind of a United Front in
order to win concessions from the centre.
However, the political situation was to
change once again, after the death of Zia
and the electionsof 1988.The self-definition
of Muhajirsas a sub-nationalitywas thereforeshort-lived.With the new re-alignments,
they revertedto their claim to be the fifth
nationality of Pakistan.
STRANDSIN SINDHI LEADERSHIP
Sindhi re-alignments were taking shape
also. A conference was held in Sann, the
home of G M Syed, the grand old man of
Sindhi nationalism, where the Sindh National Alliance was founded. It was a very
broad-based conference where delegates
Economic and Political Weekly
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July 8, 1989
comprised the whole political spectrum
among Sindhi speakers. A central issue in
the debate turnedout to be the name of the
alliance, whether it should be Sindh National Alliance or Sindhi National Alliance.
The former would leave the door open for
Muhajirs to be invited in, and several
speakerssuggestedthat they should be. The
latter alternativewas designed to close the
doors on Muhajirsbeing brought into the
Allianceat all. It is significantthereforethat
it was the former option that was adopted.
There are elements within the Sindhi
leadership who have resorted to extreme
chauvinistic rhetoric vis-a-vis Muhajirs.
Some of them speak of 'Muhajir Separatism' which is both an absurdand also a
mischievousnotion. It is intendedto arouse
Sindhifearsthat Sindhwill be dismembered.
This is nonsense because the cities in which
Muhajirspredominatecannot be lifted out
of their ruralenvironmentin order to constitutea Muhajiristan.Moreover,a verylarge
proportion of Muhajirs do not live in the
three large cities but are dispersed
throughoutSindhin small ruraltowns where
their livelihoods depend on their relationships with Sindhispeakerswho predominate
there. Indeed these Muhajirs, now in their
third or even fourth generation in Sindh,
have learnt Sindhi at school and have been
undergoinga process of Sindhification. In
the 1983movementdespite attemptsto promote Sindhi-Muhajir riots, to split and
disrupt the powerful Sindhi movement,
Muhajirs and-Sindhis stood united, a fact
which does much credit to both the Sindhi
and Muhajirlocal level leadership.But it is
sad, in the circumstances,to find scholars
such as Feroze Ahmed fanning the fires of
Sindhi chauvinismand progressivejournals
'publishingsuch material.
On the otherhand thereareSindhileaders
whose eyes are focused on the problem of
getting the authoritarianhand of the central governmentoff their backs and to win
a greaterdegree of regional autonomy for
Sindh.These morepragmaticleadersof Sindhi speakerscannot be unawareof the fact
that, given the rural bias in our political
system, it is they ratherthan the Muhajirs,
who would predominatein the government
of Sindh, as is the case at present.They have
nothing to lose by an alliance with Muhajirs and indeed much to gain vis-a-vis the
centre.
Motivesof leadersof Sindhispeakerswho
resort to an extreme chauvinistic rhetoric
and violent anti-Muhajirslogans must remain much more suspect. In the case of
many of them, leaders whose political fortunes have waned, this strategy of outbidding more 'moderate'leadershipby extreme
sfogans would, hopefully for them, revive
discreditedpolitical fortunesand foster personal political ambitions. There is at least
one Sindhi chauvinistic leader who is
preachingwhat is tantamountto fascism.He
has been demandingthat all those who are
not nativeSindhispeakersshouldbe expelled
from Sindh. In the case of non-Sindhi inEconomic and Political Weekly
dustrialworkershe declares:'Let them take
they industrieswith them. We do not want
them here:Likewise,he demandsthat Muhajirs should be expelled from Sindh. When
asked wherethey might go-for by now we
have third and fourth generation Muhajirs
who know no other home than where they
are-this leader replies that this should be
no concern of his or the Sindhi people.
"Hand them over to the United Nations
High Commissioner for Refugees. He
should find some place for them somewhere
in this world. That is his job' This is a
variant 9f the 'final solution' of the Nazis.
This mischievousand vicious campaign offers nothing concrete to the Sindhis. Those
who know the political leaderswho are conducting such a vicious campaign see the
hand of the centralgovernmentin this and
are able to point out concrete examples of
patronageand positionsof veryconsiderable
profit that have been bestowed on such individuals and their close relatives by a
grateful central government for such campaignsdirectlybenefitcentralpowerby causing disruption, divisions and conflict
amongstthe peopleof Sindhand undermine
possibilities of united action on their part
in the interest of the region as a whole.
LEFT'S NAIVETY
Paradoxically,objectivelyat any rate,the
authoritariancentre is helped ideologically
in this by groups on the Left, mainly in the
Punjab, who tend to take utterly naive and
quite misinformed positions vis-a-vis the
Sindhi movements. They feel ideologically
committed to the right of oppressed nationalitiesto nationalself-determinationand
regional autonomy. But when they look-at
Sindh, they see only the movement of Sindhi speakersas a legitimatemovement.They
have not yet overcome their suspicion of
Muhajirsto recognise that they too are an
oppressednationality,standingside by side
with Sindhis. Their suspicions of Muhajir
politics are grounded in the fact that until
the mid-eighties, Muhajir politics were
hostile to the idea of natioinal selfdeterminationin the name of Pakistaninationhood and Islamic unity. Muhajirs had
supported central authoritarian rule and
Islamic fundamentalism.When the MQM
appearedon the scene they were taken unpreparedfor it and they havenot yet figured
out how to evaluateit. They haveyet to come
to terms with the sea change in Muhajir
politics, their abandonmentof Islamic fundamentalismand their emergenceas a subnational group whose claims, hardly less
valid than those of Sindhinationalism,need
to be located justly and fairly within the
overall picture.
At this point one might add that the ethnic
problemin Sindh does not involveonly the
contending claims of the rival salariat
groups, although that class has been at the
core of ethT -"'litics. It concerns also a
complexrn._,re of ethnic groupsthat make
up the industrial working class in Sindh,
concentratedmainlyin Karachi,Hyderabad
and Sukkur. Ethnic divisions have been
exploited to break up the unity of the industrialworkingclass whereasin periodsof
militantworkingclass action, as in the early
1970s,ethnic conflicts amongst workershas
tended to recede into the background and
lost from sight.
Industrialworkersin Sindhare,almostentirely,non-Sindhis.Beforeindependence,the
workingclass in Karachi,engagedmainlyin
transport (railways,the docks and various
forms of urban transport) were overwhelmingly Baluch (Makrani)migrantworkers.
Immediately after the partition, Muhajirs
made up the bulk of the working class in
Sindh'sindustrialcities Karachi,Hyderabad
and Sukkur.As industrialisationprogressed in the 1950sand 1960s,moreworkerswere
pulled in from densely populated
agriculturalregionsof Sarhadand the Punjab (i e, its extreme north-westerndistricts
in the Potowararea)wherefarmsweresmall
and fragmented, incapable of providing a
livelihood, so that traditionally there has
been a 'pusheffect' forcingmembersof farm
familiesto look for employmentoutside. In
Sindh, by contrast, there was no such push
effect so that membersof farm families did
not seek outside work and the workingclass
in Sindhthereforewas not recruitedfromthe
immediate hinterland. It is only in very recent years that farm mechanisationby Sindhi landlords is causing eviction of Sindhi
sharecroppers,the haris,who arebeing forced to look for urbanemploymentin a period
of relative industrial stagnation.
Powerful vested interests are at work in
Karachiwhichhavegeneratedethnicconflict
between working class ethnic groups,
notably Pathans,against Muhajirs.Rioting
has become endemic in Karachi and the
people areterrorisedby gangs equippedwith
automatic weapons, transportedaround in
trucks. Some brilliant investigative journalists, especially those who have contributedto the monthly Herald, haveexposed the hand of well organ-iseddrugs mafia
and those engaged in trade in illegal arms
and, not least, racketeersin urbanland, who
were behind these so-called ethnic riots.
Karachi has large areas of vacant land
around it, areas into which the rapidly expanding city has been pushing. Vacantland
is seized by the racketeers,developed as
housingprojectsand the houses sold at great
profit to themselves.The city administration
has been able to do nothing for it is itself
under the control of the mafia. Given extraordinarylevelsof official corruption,the
mafias also control the agenciesof 'law and
order',both the police and also the military
at the local level. In the circumstancesthey
have a relatively free hand. They do not
tolerate any official projects that might interferewith their own very profitableoperations. The organisedviolenceof thesemafias
has sometimesbeen explainedawayas ethnic
conflict that masks its real purposes -on
behalf of powerful interests. But once
violence begins, inevitably, in the wake of
su.chconflicts ethnic antagoqisms escalaste.
July 8, 1989
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1533
1988 ELECTIONS
More recently,in the context of the 1988
elections, some remarkable changes in
alignments lhavetaken place. Despite the
powerfulthrustof Sindhinationalism,it was
the PPP that got solid supportfrom the Sindhi speaking part of Sindh's electorate.
Those Sindhi nationalistcandidateswho insisted on standing in the elections were
routed.
The PPP and notably its Sindhi leadership had consistently distanced itself from
Sindhi nationalism. When approached by
some chauvinisticSindhi nationalistleaders
in 1987, who invited the PPP to join them
in sponsoring the Sindh National Alliance,
the PPP Sindhi leaders spurned them saying that they were a 'national' party and
could not thereforeespouse regionalcauses.
The PPP refused to align itself with particularistic Sindhi demands. The PPP also
kept out of the Sindh National Alliance.
There is an understandable logic in the
PPP's anti-communalposition. If it was to
come to powerat the centre,it had to carry
the electorate of the Punjab. Punjab was
hostile to regionalist movements that
challenged Punjabi domination.
Despite that consistent position of the
PPP leadership,already in 1986 there were
clear indications that if general elections
were to be held, Sindhi votes would go to
the PPP. In my discussions with Sindhi intellectuals and Sindhi nationalist leaders in
1986 in Hyderabad, they all put it in
somewhat emotive language legitimising
their decision to abandon, temporarily at
least, their Sindhi nationalist cause. They
said that "We have a debt of blood to
discharge.Thereforethis time it will be the
turn of the daughterof ZulfiqarAli Bhutto.
Our turn will come the next time' Bhutto
had given his life for them, they said. That
debt must be repaid by voting for his
daughter.
Behind that ideological justification for
their electoral tactics, practical reasons for
taking such a coursewerequite evident.Sindhi nationalists could have no hope of forming a governmentat the centre and without-thatnothing would be delivered.Voting
for Sindhi nationalist candidates would
thereforebe an empty gesture.On the other
hand Sindhileadersoccupiedpowerfulpositions in the PR not least Benazir Bhutto
herself.Even if in deferenceto her 'national'
positionshe wouldnot go quiteso far as they
might wish, it would not be unreasonable,
they thought, to expect that she would go
some little way at least to redress Sindhi
grievances.
Ethnic strategies were re-'assessedin the
context of the 1988 elections. Despite the
more florid rhetoric of some Sindhi nationalists, in the face of the consistent position of the PPP in distancing itself from
them, Sindhis,nevertheless,voted solidly for
the PPP. Those few Sindhi nationalist
leaders who insisted on standing on a nationalistplatform,facedignominiousdefeat.
Half a loaf was still something,as far as the
1534
Sindhi electorate was concerned. Just protest would achievenothing. Thereare so far
few signs that Sindhi nationalists will get
eventhe few concessionsthat they hoped for
and their disaffection is already making
itself felt.
Defeated and discreditedSindhi nationalist leaders are using this to try and stage a
come back. Their rhetoric has taken on a
more chauvinistic tone. A wave of rioting
has been sweeping through the cities of
Sindh, followingattacksby motorisedarmed
gangs, equippedby automaticweapons,who
have driven, with impunity, through wards
of cities of Sindh, killing indiscriminately.
As the history of communalism in the subcontinent has shown, once such violence is
unleashed, it becomes self-generating and
communal riots escalate with mutual
reprisals.
Against such a backgroundof inter-communal tension and indeed bloody violence,
a demonstration was organised in Karachi
in the name of the Sindh National Alliance,
"the first big demonstrationof its kind",as
was reported (Jang Daily, April 3, 1989).
This would not be quite true, for in 1987an
even bigger demonstration, in the form of
a Peace March, was organised in Karachi,
after some extremely vicious communal
rioting. That demonstrationand procession
was led by leaders of all communities, Sindhi, Muhajir, Pathan and Punjabi, and to
good effect.
HOPEFUL SIGN
Be that as it may, the recent Sindh National Alliance demonstration was led by
defeated and discreditedright-wingleaders
such as Hamida Khuro and Hafeezuddin
Pirzada in company with ultra-chauvinists
such as Rasool Bux Palejo. But it was addressedalso by saner voices such as that of
Abdul WahidAresar,chairmanof the largest
of the Sindhi nationalist parties, the Jiye
Sindh Mahaz. The demonstration was
organised against continued immigration
and settlementof outsidersin Sindh but for
the chauvinistsit was clearlyan anti-Muhajir
event. On the other hand Aftab Meerani, a
seniorministerin the PPP-ledSindhgovernment, declaredthat the demonstrationwas
a conspiracyagainstthe democraticgovernment of the PPP.
The speechof Abdul WahidAresar,chairman of the JiyeSindh Mahazwas in marked
contrast to that of some of the others mentioned above. He said that just as the people of Sindh, while voting for the PPP on
pragmaticgrounds, nevertheless,could not
be identified with the PPP, so also the fact
that the Urdu speaking Muhajirshad voted
solidly for the MQM did not mean that they
did not havetheirdifferenceswith the MQM
or that they should therefore be identified
with that party.The fact that therehad been
an electoral polarisation did not mean that
these two peoples of Sindh were therefore
aligned against each other in rival camps.
He continued that political conditions do
not remain constant and fresh alignments
would emerge.He appealedto both Sindhis
and Muhajirsto stand shoulderto shoulder
in their struggle to solve the collective problems of Sindh and he was confident that
they would do so. The solution of problems
of Sindh did not lie in rioting and conflict
between Sindhi and Urdu speaking people
of Sindh. It was a courageous speech in the
context of attempts to arouse Sindhi
chauvinistic feelings. What is significant is
that this speech from the leaderof the most
important of the Sindhi nationalist parties
(and groups) was receivedwith enthusiasm.
It is a hopeful sign for the future.
References
Alavi, Hamza, 1983: 'Class and State in
Pakistan' in Hassan Gardezi and Jamil
Rashid (eds), Pakistan: The Roots of Dictatorship, Zed, London.
-, 1987: 'Pakistan and Islam: Ethnicity and
Ideology' in Fred Halliday and Hamza
Alavi (eds), State and Ideology in the Middle East and Pakistan, Monthly Review
Press, New York.
-, 1989: 'Formation of the Social Structure of
South Asia under the Impact of Colonialism' in Hamza Alavi and John Harriss
(eds), Sociology of Developing Societies:
South Asia, Monthly Review Press, New
York.
Anderson, Benedict, 1983: Imagined Communities, Verso, London.
Basu, Aparna, 1974: Growth of Education and
Political Development in India: 1898-1920,
OUP, Delhi.
Choudhury, G W (ed), 1967: Documents and
Speeches on the Constitution of Pakistan,
Dacca.
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Economic and Political Weekly
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July 8, 1989