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M – Bilateral Measures – Russia-United States
Agreement Between the Government of the
United States Of America and the Government
of the Russian Federation Concerning the
Management and Disposition of Plutonium
Designated as No Longer Required for Defense
Purposes and Related Cooperation
5. “Immobilized forms” means disposition plutonium that has been
imbedded in a glass or ceramic matrix and encapsulated with highlevel radioactive waste in a can-in-canister system suitable for
geologic disposal, or any other immobilization system agreed in
writing by the Parties.
The Government of the United States of America and the
Government of the Russian Federation, hereinafter referred to as
the Parties,
6. “Disposition facility” means any facility that is constructed,
modified or operated under this Agreement or that stores,
processes, or otherwise uses disposition plutonium, spent
plutonium fuel, or immobilized forms, including any such
conversion or conversion/blending facility, fuel fabrication facility,
immobilization facility, nuclear reactor, and storage facility (other
than storage facilities specified in Section III of the Annex on
Quantities, Forms, Locations, and Methods of Disposition).
Guided by:
Article II
The Joint Statement of Principles for Management and Disposition
of Plutonium Designated as No Longer Required for Defense
Purposes, signed by the President of the United States of America
and the President of the Russian Federation on September 2,
1998, affirming the intention of each country to remove by stages
approximately 50 metric tons of plutonium from their nuclear
weapons programs and to convert this plutonium into forms
unusable for nuclear weapons;
1. Each Party shall, in accordance with the terms of this
Agreement, dispose of no less than thirty-four (34) metric tons of
disposition plutonium.
Taking into account:
3. The Parties shall cooperate in the management and disposition
of disposition plutonium, implementing their respective disposition
programs in parallel to the extent practicable.
[2000]
The Agreement between the Government of the United States of
America and the Government of the Russian Federation on
Scientific and Technical Cooperation in the Management of
Plutonium That Has Been Withdrawn from Nuclear Military
Programs, signed on July 24, 1998 (hereinafter referred to as the
Scientific and Technical Cooperation Agreement);
Continuation by the Parties of their cooperation within the
framework of the Scientific and Technical Cooperation Agreement
and the importance of that work for making decisions concerning
technologies for plutonium conversion and mixed uraniumplutonium fuel fabrication, as well as for reactor modification for the
use of such fuel;
The statement of the President of the United States of America on
March 1, 1995, announcing that 200 tons of fissile material will be
withdrawn from the U.S. nuclear stockpile and directing that these
materials will never again be used to build a nuclear weapon;
The statement of the President of the Russian Federation to the
41st Session of the General Conference of the International Atomic
Energy Agency, on September 26, 1997, on step-bystep removal
from nuclear military programs of up to 500 tons of highly enriched
uranium and up to 50 tons of plutonium released in the process of
nuclear disarmament; and
The Joint Statement by the Parties concerning non-separation of
weapon-grade plutonium in connection with the signing of this
Agreement;
Have agreed as follows:
Article I
For the purposes of this Agreement, the terms specified below are
defined as follows:
1. “Weapon-grade plutonium” means plutonium with an isotopic
ratio of plutonium 240 to plutonium 239 of no more than 0.10.
2. “Disposition plutonium” means weapon-grade plutonium that
has been
a) withdrawn from nuclear weapon programs,
b) designated as no longer required for defense purposes, and
c) declared in the Annex on Quantities, Forms, Locations, and
Methods of Disposition, which is an integral part of this
Agreement.
3. “Blend stock” means any plutonium other than disposition
plutonium that is received at a disposition facility for mixing with
disposition plutonium.
4. “Spent plutonium fuel” means fuel that was manufactured with
disposition plutonium and irradiated in nuclear reactors.
2. Each Party’s declaration on quantities, forms, locations, and
methods of disposition for disposition plutonium is set forth in the
Annex on Quantities, Forms, Locations, and Methods of
Disposition.
4. The reciprocal obligations set forth in paragraph 1 of this Article
shall not prejudice consideration by the Parties of what additional
quantities of plutonium may be designated by each Party in the
future as no longer required for defense purposes.
5. The Parties shall cooperate with a view to ensuring that
additional quantities of weapongrade plutonium that may be
withdrawn from nuclear weapon programs and designated in the
future by the Parties as no longer required for defense purposes
are:
a) brought under and disposed of in accordance with the terms
of this Agreement; or
b) subject to other measures as agreed by the Parties in writing
that provide for comparable transparency and disposition.
6. Each Party shall have the right to mix blend stock with
disposition plutonium provided that for nuclear reactor fuel
containing disposition plutonium the mass of blend stock shall:
a) be kept to a minimum, taking into account the protection of
classified information, safety and economic considerations, and
obligations of this Agreement; and
b) in no case exceed twelve (12) percent of the mass of
disposition plutonium with which it is mixed.
The resulting mixture of disposition plutonium and blend stock shall
be weapon-grade plutonium.
7. Each Party’s disposition plutonium shall count toward meeting
the thirty-four (34) metric ton obligation set forth in paragraph 1 of
this Article once the other Party confirms in accordance with
agreed procedures that the spent plutonium fuel or immobilized
forms meet the criteria specified in the Annex on Technical
Specifications, which is an integral part of this Agreement. Blend
stock shall not count toward meeting that thirty-four (34) metric ton
obligation.
Article III
1. Disposition shall be by one or more of the following methods:
a) irradiation of disposition plutonium as fuel in nuclear reactors;
b) immobilization of disposition plutonium into immobilized
forms; or
c) any other methods that may be agreed by the Parties in
writing.
2. The following are the nuclear reactors that may be used for
irradiation of disposition plutonium under this Agreement: light
water reactors in the United States of America and in the Russian
Federation; the BOR-60 at Dimitrovgrad and the BN-600 at
Zarechnyy in the Russian Federation; and any other nuclear
reactors agreed by the Parties in writing.
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Article IV
1. Each Party shall take all reasonable steps, including completion
of necessary technical and other preparatory activities and
feasibility studies, to complete construction and modification and to
begin operation of disposition facilities necessary to dispose of no
less than two (2) metric tons per year of its disposition plutonium in
accordance with Article III of this Agreement, if the assistance
specified in the multilateral agreement referred to in paragraph 8 of
Article IX of this Agreement for this disposition rate is being
provided for achievement of milestones in the Russian Federation
specified in the Annex on Schedules and Milestones, which is an
integral part of this Agreement.
2. Each Party shall seek to begin operation of facilities referenced
in paragraph 1 of this Article not later than December 31, 2007.
3. Pending conclusion of the multilateral agreement referred to in
paragraph 8 of Article IX of this Agreement for the disposition rate
specified in paragraph 1 of this Article, the Parties shall proceed
with research, development, demonstrations, design and licensing
activities under this Agreement, on the condition that assistance for
such activities is being provided pursuant to paragraph 1 of Article
IX of this Agreement.
4. Each Party shall notify the other Party whenever it reaches a
milestone set forth in the Annex on Schedules and Milestones or, if
not reached at the specified time, the reasons for that delay. If a
Party does not reach a milestone at the specified time, it shall
make every effort to minimize the delay. In these circumstances,
the Parties shall establish in writing a revised mutually-agreed
schedule of work for achieving the milestone.
5. Once facilities specified in paragraph 1 of this Article are
constructed or modified and begin operations, each Party shall
proceed to dispose of disposition plutonium to achieve a
disposition rate of no less than two (2) metric tons per year at the
earliest possible date.
6. If, prior to December 31, 2007, a Party begins to dispose of
disposition plutonium, such plutonium may count toward meeting
the thirty-four (34) metric ton obligation set forth in paragraph 1 of
Article II of this Agreement if:
a) the criteria specified in the Annex on Technical Specifications
are met; and
b) monitoring and inspection measures agreed in writing by the
Parties are applied to such disposition activities.
Article V
1. Promptly upon entry into force of this Agreement, the Parties
shall undertake to develop a detailed action plan, including efforts
with other countries as appropriate, to at least double the
disposition rate specified in paragraphs 1 and 5 of Article IV of this
Agreement at the earliest practicable date. The Parties shall seek
to complete this detailed action plan within one year after entry into
force of this Agreement. The development of the action plan and
the development of arrangements provided for in paragraph 7 of
Article IX of this Agreement will, for the Government of the United
States of America and the Government of the Russian Federation,
proceed in the channels that have negotiated this Agreement.
2. In developing the action plan pursuant to paragraph 1 of this
Article, consideration may be given to:
a) expanding the capability of existing nuclear reactors to utilize
mixed uranium-plutonium fuel or using such fuel in additional
nuclear reactors, including nuclear reactors outside the Russian
Federation, and using such fuel or other plutonium fuel in
advanced nuclear reactors within the Russian Federation, if they
prove practical in light of available resources within the time
frame of this Agreement;
b) consistent with the expansion of capabilities mentioned in
subparagraph (a) of this paragraph, increasing the capacity of
conversion or conversion/blending facilities, fuel fabrication
facilities and/or immobilization facilities, or constructing additional
facilities; and
c) any other approaches as the Parties may agree.
3. Each Party shall proceed at the earliest possible date to dispose
of disposition plutonium at the disposition rate specified in the
action plan referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article if the assistance
specified in the provisions supplementing the multilateral
agreement referred to in paragraph 8 of Article IX of this
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Agreement for this rate in the Russian Federation is being
provided.
Article VI
1. Disposition plutonium and blend stock, once received at any
disposition facility, shall not be:
a) used for the manufacture of nuclear weapons or any other
nuclear explosive device, for research, development, design or
testing related to such devices, or for any other military purpose;
or
b) exported to a third country, including for disposition, except by
agreement in writing of the Parties to this Agreement and
subject to international safeguards and other applicable
international agreements or arrangements, including
INFCIRC/274/Rev. 1, The Convention on the Physical
Protection of Nuclear Material.
2. Neither Party shall separate plutonium contained in spent
plutonium fuel until such time as that Party has fulfilled the
obligation set forth in paragraph 1 of Article II of this Agreement.
3. Neither Party shall separate disposition plutonium contained in
immobilized forms.
4. Disposition facilities shall be utilized only in ways consistent with
the terms and conditions of this Agreement.
5. Disposition plutonium and blend stock shall be the only
plutonium received at or processed by disposition facilities that are
conversion or conversion/blending facilities, or fuel fabrication
facilities.
Article VII
1. Each Party shall have the right to conduct and the obligation to
receive and facilitate monitoring and inspection activities in
accordance with this Article and the Annex on Monitoring and
Inspections, which is an integral part of this Agreement, in order to
confirm that the terms and conditions of this Agreement with
respect to disposition plutonium, blend stock, spent plutonium fuel
and immobilized forms, and disposition facilities are being met.
2. Disposition plutonium and blend stock shall become subject to
monitoring and inspection under this Agreement, in accordance
with the Annex on Monitoring and Inspections and procedures
developed pursuant to that Annex, either (a) after receipt but before
processing at a conversion or conversion/blending facility, or (b)
upon receipt at a fuel fabrication or an immobilization facility,
whichever (a) or (b) occurs first for any given disposition plutonium
or blend stock.
3. Each Party shall begin consultations with the International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) at an early date and undertake all
other necessary steps to conclude appropriate agreements with
the IAEA to allow it to implement verification measures beginning
not later in the disposition process than: (a) when disposition
plutonium or disposition plutonium mixed with blend stock is placed
into the post-processing storage location of a conversion or
conversion/blending facility; or (b) when disposition plutonium is
received at a fuel fabrication or an immobilization facility, whichever
(a) or (b) occurs first for any given disposition plutonium.
4. If agreed in writing by the Parties, the exercise of each Party’s
right set forth in paragraph 1 of this Article may be suspended in
whole or in part by the application of equivalent IAEA verification
measures under the agreements referred to in paragraph 3 of this
Article. The Parties shall, to the extent practicable, avoid duplication
of effort of monitoring and inspection activities implemented under
this Agreement and appropriate agreements with the IAEA.
Article VIII
1. Each Party shall be responsible within the territory of the United
States of America and the Russian Federation, respectively, for:
a) ensuring safety and ecological soundness of disposition
plutonium activities under the terms of this Agreement; and
b) effectively controlling and accounting for disposition
plutonium, blend stock, spent plutonium fuel and immobilized
forms, as well as providing effective physical protection of such
material and facilities containing such material taking into
account the recommendations published in the IAEA document
INFCIRC/225/Rev. 4, The Physical Protection of Nuclear
Material, or a subsequent revision accepted by the Parties.
Article IX
1. The Government of the United States of America shall make
available up to two hundred (200) million United States dollars in
assistance for the activities to be undertaken in the Russian
Federation pursuant to this Agreement and such other amounts as
may be agreed in writing by the Parties for these purposes in the
future, subject to the availability of appropriated funds and the
fulfillment of United States legal and administrative requirements.
Assistance provided by the Government of the United States of
America shall be for such activities as the research, design,
development, licensing, construction and/or modification of facilities
(including modification of nuclear reactors), and technological
processes, systems and associated infrastructure for such
activities. This assistance will be in addition to any other assistance
that may be provided by the Government of the United States of
America under the Scientific and Technical Cooperation
Agreement.
2. Assistance provided by the Government of the United States of
America may include research and development, scientific and
technical experimentation, design for facility construction or
modification, general and specialized equipment, replacement and
spare parts, installation services, licensing and certification costs,
initial operations and testing, aspects of facility operations, and
other assistance directly related to the management and
disposition of plutonium in accordance with the provisions of this
Agreement.
3. Equipment, supplies, materials, services, and other assistance
provided or acquired by the Government of the United States of
America, its contractors, subcontractors, and their personnel, for
the implementation of this Agreement in the Russian Federation,
are considered free technical assistance.
4. Assistance provided by the Government of the United States of
America for activities to be undertaken in the Russian Federation
pursuant to this Agreement shall be provided in accordance with
the terms and conditions set forth in this Agreement, including the
Annex on Assistance, which is an integral part of this Agreement.
5. The activities of each Party under this Agreement shall be
subject to the availability of appropriated funds.
6. Activities to be undertaken in the Russian Federation pursuant to
this Agreement may be supported by contributions by the
Government of the Russian Federation and by assistance provided
by the Government of the United States of America and, as may
be specified in the multilateral agreement referred to in paragraph 8
of this Article, by other countries or groups of countries (including
equipment, supplies, materials, services, and other assistance
provided by them). Activities may also be supported from other
sources, including non-government and private sector funds, under
terms and conditions agreed in writing by the Parties.
7. The Parties shall seek to develop near-term and long-term
international financial or other arrangements for the support of
activities to be undertaken in the Russian Federation pursuant to
this Agreement sufficient, in combination with contributions by the
Government of the Russian Federation and assistance provided by
the Government of the United States of America, to achieve and
maintain:
a) the two (2) metric ton per year disposition rate specified in
paragraphs 1 and 5 of Article IV of this Agreement; and
b) the disposition rate resulting from the action plan developed
pursuant to paragraph 1 of Article V of this Agreement.
8. For the disposition rate referred to in paragraph 7(a) of this
Article, the Parties shall cooperate with a view toward concluding
within one (1) year after entry into force of this Agreement a
multilateral agreement that documents the assistance
arrangements necessary for that rate. For the disposition rate
resulting from the action plan developed pursuant to paragraph 1
of Article V of this Agreement, the Parties shall cooperate with a
view to supplementing such multilateral agreement with provisions
recording assistance arrangements necessary for that rate.
9. As part of the multilateral agreement referred to in paragraph 8
of this Article, the Parties shall seek to provide for:
a) notifications, explanations and immediate consultations in the
event that a recorded assistance commitment is not fulfilled; and
b) those consultations to include consideration of resumption of
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assistance, measures to mitigate any consequences of such
non-fulfillment, including costs associated with nuclear safety,
physical protection and facility conservation, and other
measures as deemed appropriate by the participants in the
consultations.
10. If conclusion of the multilateral agreement referred to in
paragraph 8 of this Article for assistance arrangements necessary
for the disposition rate set forth in paragraph 7(a) of this Article is
not completed within eighteen (18) months after entry into force of
this Agreement for any reason, the Parties shall consult on whether
to adjust the schedules for their respective programs, including any
necessary adjustments to the milestones set forth in the Annex on
Schedules and Milestones, and any other steps, or whether to
terminate the Agreement in accordance with Article XIII of this
Agreement.
11. Pending conclusion of the multilateral agreement referred to in
paragraph 8 of this Article and conclusion of necessary
arrangements with the Government of the Russian Federation for
the disposition rate set forth in paragraph 7(a) of this Article, neither
Party shall be obligated to construct, modify or operate facilities to
dispose of disposition plutonium pursuant to this Agreement.
Notwithstanding this, each Party shall proceed under this
Agreement with activities in accordance with paragraph 3 of Article
IV of this Agreement necessary for construction, modification or
operation of disposition facilities.
12. If one or more parties to the multilateral agreement referred to
in paragraph 8 of this Article decide to terminate implementation of
their assistance commitments recorded in that agreement, and as
a result the Government of the Russian Federation is unable to
fulfill its obligations with respect to the achievement of a milestone
set forth in the Annex on Schedules and Milestones or of the
annual disposition rate specified in paragraphs 1 and 5 of Article IV
or paragraph 3 of Article V of this Agreement, whichever is
applicable, the Government of the Russian Federation shall have
the right, consistent with the requirements of paragraphs 13 and 15
of this Article, to suspend those implementation activities under this
Agreement that are affected by such termination.
13. If the Government of the Russian Federation intends to
exercise its right pursuant to paragraph 12 of this Article, it shall
notify the Government of the United States of America through
diplomatic channels at least fourteen (14) days prior to any such
suspension of implementation activities and identify what activities
are to be suspended, and the Parties shall immediately start
consultations. In the event implementation of the recorded
assistance commitments referred to in paragraph 12 of this Article
is not resumed within one hundred and eighty (180) days after the
start of consultations, the Parties will consider whether to resume
implementation of or to terminate the Agreement in accordance
with Article XIII of this Agreement.
14. In the event the Government of the Russian Federation
suspends any implementation activities pursuant to paragraph 12
of this Article, the Government of the United States of America
shall have the right to suspend proportionately its implementation
activities under this Agreement.
15. During the consultations referred to in paragraph 13 of this
Article, unless otherwise agreed by the Parties in writing, neither
Party shall take any action that:
a) could break the continuity in the other Party’s knowledge of
disposition plutonium or disposition facilities, that had become
subject to monitoring and inspection under this Agreement, in a
manner that would prevent that Party from confirming that such
disposition plutonium or disposition facilities are not being used
in ways inconsistent with the Agreement; or
b) would be inconsistent with the terms and conditions for
assistance that had been provided under this Agreement.
Article X
1. Under this Agreement, no United States classified information or
Russian Federation state secret information shall be exchanged,
except as may be agreed in writing by the Parties for purposes of
exchanging information pursuant to this Agreement related to the
quantities and locations of disposition plutonium and blend stock at
disposition facilities.
2. The information transmitted under this Agreement or developed
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as a result of its implementation and considered by the United
States of America as “sensitive” or by the Russian Federation as
“konfidentsial’naya” must be clearly designated and marked as
such.
3. “Konfidentsial’naya” or “sensitive” information shall be handled in
accordance with the laws of the state of the Party receiving the
information, and this information shall not be disclosed and shall
not be transmitted to a third party not participating in the
implementation of this Agreement without the written consent of the
Party that had transmitted such information.
a) According to the laws and regulations of the Russian
Federation, such information shall be treated as “limiteddistribution official information.” Such information shall be
protected in accordance with the laws and regulations of the
Russian Federation.
b) According to the laws and regulations of the United States of
America, such information shall be treated as “foreign
government information,” provided in confidence. Such
information shall be protected in accordance with the laws and
regulations of the United States of America.
4. Information transmitted under this Agreement shall be used
solely in conformance with this Agreement.
5. The Parties shall minimize the number of persons having access
to information that is designated “konfidentsial’naya” or “sensitive”
information in accordance with paragraph 2 of this Article.
6. The Parties shall ensure effective protection and allocation of
rights to intellectual property, transferred or created under this
Agreement, as set forth in this Agreement, including the Annex on
Intellectual Property, which is an integral part of this Agreement.
Article XI
1. The Parties shall designate Executive Agents for implementation
of this Agreement. The Executive Agent for the United States of
America shall be the U.S. Department of Energy. The Executive
Agent for the Russian Federation shall be the Ministry of the
Russian Federation for Atomic Energy.
2. With the exception of the notification referred to in paragraph 1 of
Article XIII of this Agreement, notifications between the Parties that
are provided for by this Agreement shall be transmitted between
the Executive Agents unless otherwise specified.
3. The Executive Agents may enter into implementing agreements
and arrangements as necessary and appropriate to carry out the
provisions of this Agreement. When appropriate, the Executive
Agents may utilize other agencies or entities to assist in the
implementation of this Agreement, such as government agencies,
academies, universities, science and research centers, institutes
and institutions, and private sector firms.
Article XII
1. The Parties shall establish a Joint Consultative Commission for
this Agreement to:
a) consider and resolve questions regarding the interpretation or
application of this Agreement;
b) consider additional measures as may be necessary to
improve the viability and effectiveness of this Agreement; and
c) consider and resolve such other matters as the Parties may
agree are within the scope of this Agreement.
2. The Joint Consultative Commission shall meet within twenty-one
(21) days of a request of either Party or its Executive Agent.
3. Each Party shall designate its Co-Chairman to the Joint
Consultative Commission. Each Party shall notify the other Party of
its designated Co-Chairman in writing within thirty (30) days after
entry into force of this Agreement. Decisions of the Joint
Consultative Commission shall be made on the basis of
consensus.
Article XIII
1. This Agreement shall be applied provisionally from the date of
signature and shall enter into force on the date of the last written
notification that the Parties have fulfilled the national procedures
required for its entry into force.
2. This Agreement may only be amended by written agreement of
the Parties, except that the Annex on Schedules and Milestones
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may be updated as specified in Section II of that Annex.
3. Except as provided in paragraph 4 of this Article, this Agreement
shall terminate on the date the Parties exchange notes confirming
that thirty-four (34) metric tons of disposition plutonium have been
disposed by each Party in accordance with this Agreement, unless
terminated earlier by written agreement of the Parties.
4. If additional quantities of weapon-grade plutonium are brought
under this Agreement pursuant to paragraph 5 of Article II of this
Agreement, this Agreement shall terminate on the date the Parties
exchange notes confirming that thirty-four (34) metric tons of
disposition plutonium and all such additional quantities of weapongrade plutonium have been disposed in accordance with this
Agreement, unless terminated earlier by written agreement of the
Parties.
5. Notwithstanding termination of this Agreement in accordance
with paragraph 3 or 4 of this Article:
a) neither Party shall use plutonium, once it is received at any
disposition facility, for the manufacture of nuclear weapons or
any other nuclear explosive device, for research, development,
design or testing related to such devices, or for any other military
purpose;
b) neither Party shall export to a third country plutonium, once it
is received at any disposition facility, except by agreement in
writing of the Government of the United States of America and
the Government of the Russian Federation and subject to
international safeguards and other applicable international
agreements or arrangements, including INFCIRC/274/Rev. 1,
The Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material;
c) neither Party shall (i) use any plutonium separated from spent
plutonium fuel for the manufacture of nuclear weapons or any
other nuclear explosive device, for research, development,
design or testing related to such devices, or for any other military
purpose, or (ii) export spent plutonium fuel, immobilized forms,
or any plutonium separated from spent plutonium fuel to a third
country, except by agreement in writing of the Government of
the United States of America and the Government of the
Russian Federation and subject to international safeguards and
other applicable international agreements or arrangements,
including INFCIRC/274/Rev. 1, The Convention on the Physical
Protection of Nuclear Material;
d) each Party shall continue to effectively control and account for
spent plutonium fuel and immobilized forms, as well as to
provide effective physical protection of such material taking into
account the recommendations published in the IAEA document
INFCIRC/225/Rev. 4, The Physical Protection of Nuclear
Material, or subsequent revisions accepted by the Parties;
e) the obligations set forth in paragraph 3 of Article VI of this
Agreement, Article X of this Agreement, paragraphs 6 and 7 of
this Article, paragraphs 5, 6, and 7 of the General Assistance
Section of the Annex on Assistance, and the Liability Section of
the Annex on Assistance shall remain in force unless otherwise
agreed in writing by the Government of the United States of
America and the Government of the Russian Federation;
f) the Parties shall consult concerning implementation of existing
contracts and projects between the Parties and settlement of
any outstanding costs between the Parties; and
g) for any activities under this Agreement and any importation or
exportation by the Government of the United States of America,
its personnel, contractors and contractors’ personnel of
equipment, supplies, materials or services that had been
required to implement this Agreement, no retroactive taxes shall
be imposed in the Russian Federation.
6. At an appropriate early date, but in any event not fewer than five
(5) years prior to termination of this Agreement, the Parties shall
begin consultations to determine what international monitoring
measures shall be applied, after termination, to spent plutonium
fuel, immobilized forms, and disposition facilities that are
conversion or conversion/blending facilities or fuel fabrication
facilities, as well as to any reprocessing of spent plutonium fuel. In
the event the Parties do not reach agreement on such monitoring
measures prior to the termination of this Agreement, each Party
shall:
a) make such fuel and forms available for inspection by the
other Party under established procedures, if the other Party has
a question or concern regarding changes in their location or
condition; and
b) unless it can be demonstrated that such facilities have been
decommissioned and can no longer be operated, make such
facilities available for inspection by the other Party under
established procedures, if the other Party has a question or
concern regarding the use of such facilities.
7. No spent plutonium fuel shall be reprocessed by either Party
after termination of this Agreement unless such reprocessing is
subject to monitoring agreed by the Parties pursuant to paragraph
6 of this Article.
8. Nothing in this Agreement shall alter the rights and obligations of
the Parties under the Scientific and Technical Cooperation
Agreement.
DONE at ___________ and ____________, the ___ and ___
days of __________, 2000, in duplicate in the English and Russian
languages, both texts being equally authentic.
For The Government of the
United States Of America:
For The Government of the
Russian Federation:
Agreement to Update 2000 Plutonium
Management and Disposition Agreement
[Office of the Spokesman, Washington, DC, 13 April 2010]
Overview
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The Plutonium Disposition Protocol represents an essential
step in the nuclear disarmament process.
The Protocol makes arms reductions irreversible by ensuring
that United States and Russia will transparently dispose
weapon-grade plutonium from their respective defense
programs, thereby preventing the plutonium from ever being
reused for weapons or any other military purpose.
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Existing nuclear arms reductions agreements have already led to
the removal of weapon-grade plutonium from the U.S. and Russian
defense programs. More is envisioned to be removed as further
reductions take place. The PMDA, as amended by the Protocol,
details the goals, monitoring and other conditions to ensure that
disposition of that plutonium is transparent and irreversible.
The Protocol enhances the rights, obligations, principles and
measures for monitoring and inspecting each side’s disposition
activities and their end products, thereby ensuring that this material
will never again be used for nuclear weapons or any other military
purpose. On March 12 the U.S. and Russian Co-Chairmen of the
PMDA’s Joint Consultative Commission also approved a number
of key elements clarifying how monitoring and inspections will be
developed and carried out.
Weapon-grade plutonium, unlike weapon-grade uranium, cannot
be blended with other materials to make it unusable in weapons.
But it can be fabricated into mixed oxide uranium-plutonium (MOX)
fuel and irradiated in civil nuclear power reactors to produce
electricity. This irradiation results in spent fuel, a form that is not
usable for weapons or other military purposes and a form that the
Protocol prohibits being changed any time in the future unless
subject to agreed international monitoring measures and only for
civil purposes.
The amended PMDA will provide that this weapon-grade
plutonium be disposed by irradiating it in light water reactors in the
United States and in fast-neutron reactors operating under certain
nonproliferation conditions in the Russian Federation. The U.S.
MOX fuel fabrication facility being constructed at the Department of
Energy’s Savannah River Site is planned to begin operation in
2016; Russia has already fabricated MOX fuel on a limited basis
and is in the process of constructing/modifying fuel fabrication
facilities capable of producing MOX fuel at levels required to meet
the PMDA’s disposition rate.
The Protocol, thus, exemplifies the Parties’ obligations under
Article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and their goals for
nuclear disarmament and nuclear security.
Both countries plan to begin disposition by 2018. The PMDA does
not call for strict linkages in the timing of their respective programs,
but both countries are to seek to proceed in parallel to the extent
practicable.
By updating the 2000 Plutonium Management and
Disposition Agreement (PMDA), each country will proceed to
complete and operate facilities that will dispose of at least 34
metric tons of this plutonium by using it as fuel in civil power
reactors to produce electricity.
Entry into force of the PMDA, as amended by this Protocol, and of
the 2006 Protocol containing liability protections, will enable new
cooperation to go forward between the United States and the
Russian Federation. The Protocol reflects the previous U.S. pledge
to contribute up to $400 million for Russian disposition program
activities. Up to $300 million may be used for construction and
development activities (including development of the monitoring
and inspection regime). At least $100 million would be allocated
over the disposition period on a fixed rate per metric ton of
confirmed disposed material.
Combined, this represents enough material for approximately
17,000 nuclear weapons.
The PMDA also provides that additional weapon-grade
plutonium declared excess, as arms reductions go forward,
should be disposed under the same or comparable
transparency and other terms.
Disposition activities on both sides will be subject to
monitoring and inspections, to provide confidence that the
Parties are disposing of weapon-grade plutonium in
accordance with the terms and conditions of the Agreement.
U.S. cooperation with the Russian program will be limited to
the $400 million pledged in 1999-2000 subject to future
appropriations, 25 percent of which will now be spread out
over the decades of verified disposition.
Russia’s implementation of its disposition will no longer be
contingent on additional U.S. and other donor funding.
Background
The Plutonium Management and Disposition Agreement (PMDA)
signed by Vice President Gore and Russian Prime Minister
Kasyanov in 2000 committed each side to dispose of no less than
34 metric tons of weapon-grade plutonium. The Protocol is
essential for full implementation of the PMDA since the Russian
program set forth in 2000 proved incompatible with Russia’s
nuclear energy strategy and was, thus, not financially viable.
Russia’s announcement of its nuclear strategy in 2006, and
clarification of its preferred disposition approach in 2007, provided
a basis for the two sides to update the PMDA via this Protocol in a
manner that coincides with that strategy.
Specific milestones for U.S. contributions will be agreed by the
Department of Energy and the Russian State Corporation for
Atomic Energy (Rosatom). The Department of Energy currently
has $17 million for this cooperation; the rest will be subject to the
availability of appropriated funds and the U.S. budgetary review
process. The Department is currently seeking $113 million for FY
2011 for Russian fissile materials disposition, $100 million of which
is included under the PMDA pledge.
The Department of Energy and Rosatom will, under the amended
PMDA, seek financial assistance from other countries. However,
the amended agreement, unlike the 2000 Agreement, makes clear
that Russian disposition will not be contingent on obtaining any
additional U.S. or other assistance.
Next steps include (1) fulfillment of each Party’s requirements for
and entry into force of the PMDA, as amended by the Protocol,
along with the Protocol of 2006 containing liability provisions; (2)
consultations and negotiations with the International Atomic Energy
Agency on verification measures under the PMDA; and (3)
development of mutually agreed milestones for the U.S. $400
million contribution and related contracts in anticipation of entry into
force.
Entry into Force of the U.S.-Russian Agreement
to Dispose of Excess Weapon-Grade Plutonium
[Office of the Spokesperson, Washington, DC, 13 July
2011]
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Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton and Foreign Minister
Sergey Lavrov today exchanged diplomatic notes bringing the
U.S.-Russian Plutonium Management and Disposition Agreement
and its 2006 and 2010 Protocols into force. This marks another
significant step in both countries’ efforts to eliminate nuclearweapon-grade materials and to reduce nuclear dangers.
Article III
The amended Agreement commits each country to dispose of no
less than 34 metric tons of excess weapon-grade plutonium, under
strict non-proliferation conditions. The initial combined amount, 68
metric tons, represents enough material for about 17,000 nuclear
weapons, and the Agreement envisions disposition of more
weapon-grade plutonium over time. Disposition of the plutonium is
scheduled to begin in 2018.
1. This Treaty shall be subject to ratification in accordance with
the constitutional procedures of each Party. This Treaty shall enter
into force on the date of the exchange of instruments of ratification.
Entry into force of the Agreement also represents a significant
milestone in U.S.-Russian cooperation on nuclear security
measures, and it marks an essential step in the nuclear
disarmament process by making these reductions in plutonium
stocks irreversible.
3. Each Party, in exercising its national sovereignty, may
withdraw from this Treaty upon three months written notice to the
other Party.
In addition, the Agreement breaks new ground on cooperative
transparency. Pursuant to a joint request by Secretary Clinton and
Foreign Minister Lavrov to International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA) Director General Amano last August, the two countries and
the IAEA are making progress on appropriate IAEA verification
measures for each country’s disposition program.
Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty
[Signed 24 May 2002, reproduced from
White House Press Release, 24 May 2002]
The United States of America and the Russian Federation,
hereinafter referred to as the Parties,
Embarking upon the path of new relations for a new century and
committed to the goal of strengthening their relationship through
cooperation and friendship,
Believing that new global challenges and threats require the
building of a qualitatively new foundation for strategic relations
between the Parties,
Desiring to establish a genuine partnership based on the principles
of mutual security, cooperation, trust, openness, and predictability,
Committed to implementing significant reductions in strategic
offensive arms,
Proceeding from the Joint Statements by the President of the
United States of America and the President of the Russian
Federation on Strategic Issues of July 22, 2001 in Genoa and on a
New Relationship between the United States and Russia of
November 13, 2001 in Washington,
Mindful of their obligations under the Treaty Between the United
States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on
the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of July
31, 1991, hereinafter referred to as the START Treaty,
Mindful of their obligations under Article VI of the Treaty on the
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of July 1, 1968, and
Convinced that this Treaty will help to establish more favorable
conditions for actively promoting security and cooperation, and
enhancing international stability,
Have agreed as follows:
Article I
Each Party shall reduce and limit strategic nuclear warheads, as
stated by the President of the United States of America on
November 13, 2001 and as stated by the President of the Russian
Federation on November 13, 2001 and December 13, 2001
respectively, so that by December 31, 2012 the aggregate number
of such warheads does not exceed 1700–2200 for each Party.
Each Party shall determine for itself the composition and structure
of its strategic offensive arms, based on the established aggregate
limit for the number of such warheads.
Article II
The Parties agree that the START Treaty remains in force in
accordance with its terms.
For purposes of implementing this Treaty, the Parties shall hold
meetings at least twice a year of a Bilateral Implementation
Commission.
Article IV
2. This Treaty shall remain in force until December 31, 2012 and
may be extended by agreement of the Parties or superseded
earlier by a subsequent agreement.
Article V
This Treaty shall be registered pursuant to Article 102 of the
Charter of the United Nations.
Done at Moscow on May 24, 2002, in two copies, each in the
English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.
Letter from the Permanent Representatives of
the Russian Federation and the United States of
America to the United Nations, Addressed to the
Secretary-General
[A/C.1/62/3 1 November 2007]
We have the honour to transmit herewith the text of the Joint
Statement on the Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate-Range
and Shorter-Range Missiles (see annex), issued on 25 October
2007 by the Russian Federation and the United States of America.
We would be grateful if the text of the present letter and its annex
could be circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under
agenda item 98.
(Signed) Vitaly I. Churkin
Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United
Nations
(Signed) Zalmay Khalilzad
Permanent Representative of the United States of America to the
United Nations
Annex to the letter dated 26 October 2007 from the Permanent
Representatives of the Russian Federation and the United
States of America to the United Nations addressed to the
Secretary-General
Joint United States-Russian Statement on the Treaty on the
Elimination of Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range
Missiles at the sixty-second session of the General Assembly
December 8, 2007 marks the twentieth anniversary of the signing
of the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union
of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their
Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles, which banned
ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles with ranges between
500 and 5,500 kilometres. It is hard to overestimate the historic
significance of this act: it marked an important, practical step in
meeting our NPT article VI obligation to pursue negotiations in
good faith on nuclear disarmament. By late 1991, the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States destroyed all
missiles of these two classes along with all supporting
infrastructure under strict verification procedures.
We would like to underscore the contribution of this Treaty to
decreased international tensions, particularly in Europe. The
Russian Federation and the United States take this occasion to
reaffirm our joint support for the INF Treaty.
We are concerned with the proliferation of intermediate- and
shorter-range missiles. An ever-greater number of countries are
acquiring missile production technologies and adding such missiles
to their arsenals. At the same time, the Treaty, being of unlimited
duration, is limiting the actions only of a few States, primarily
Russia and the United States.
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The Russian Federation and the United States call on all interested
countries to discuss the possibility of imparting a global character to
this important regime through the renunciation of ground-launched
ballistic and cruise missiles with ranges between 500 and 5,500
kilometres, leading to destruction of any such missiles and the
cessation of associated programmes. Such a renunciation would
serve to strengthen the international nuclear missile nonproliferation effort.
the reduction levels envisaged by the START Treaty were
achieved,
Today the Treaty retains its long-standing importance. We believe
that renunciation of ground-launched intermediate- and shorterrange missiles and their complete elimination in the world would
increase the role of the Treaty as a model for strengthening
international security.
Welcoming the implementation of the Treaty Between the United
States of America and the Russian Federation on Strategic
Offensive Reductions of May 24, 2002,
The Russian Federation and the United States will work with all
interested countries and continue to make every effort to prevent
the proliferation of such missiles and strengthen peace in the world.
Treaty Between The United States of America
and The Russian Federation on Measures for the
Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic
Offensive Arms
[Signed 8 April 2010 Prague;
Entered into Force 5 February 2011 Munich]
The United States of America and the Russian Federation,
hereinafter referred to as the Parties,
Believing that global challenges and threats require new
approaches to interaction across the whole range of their strategic
relations,
Working therefore to forge a new strategic relationship based on
mutual trust, openness, predictability, and cooperation,
Desiring to bring their respective nuclear postures into alignment
with this new relationship, and endeavoring to reduce further the
role and importance of nuclear weapons,
Committed to the fulfillment of their obligations under Article VI of
the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of July 1,
1968, and to the achievement of the historic goal of freeing
humanity from the nuclear threat,
Expressing strong support for on-going global efforts in nonproliferation,
Seeking to preserve continuity in, and provide new impetus to, the
step-by-step process of reducing and limiting nuclear arms while
maintaining the safety and security of their nuclear arsenals, and
with a view to expanding this process in the future, including to a
multilateral approach,
Guided by the principle of indivisible security and convinced that
measures for the reduction and limitation of strategic offensive
arms and the other obligations set forth in this Treaty will enhance
predictability and stability, and thus the security of both Parties,
Recognizing the existence of the interrelationship between
strategic offensive arms and strategic defensive arms, that this
interrelationship will become more important as strategic nuclear
arms are reduced, and that current strategic defensive arms do not
undermine the viability and effectiveness of the strategic offensive
arms of the Parties,
Mindful of the impact of conventionally armed ICBMs and SLBMs
on strategic stability,
Taking into account the positive effect on the world situation of the
significant, verifiable reduction in nuclear arsenals at the turn of the
21st century,
Desiring to create a mechanism for verifying compliance with the
obligations under this Treaty, adapted, simplified, and made less
costly in comparison to the Treaty Between the United States of
America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the
Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of July 31,
1991, hereinafter referred to as the START Treaty,
Recognizing that the START Treaty has been implemented by the
Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Russian
Federation, Ukraine, and the United States of America, and that
Deeply appreciating the contribution of the Republic of Belarus, the
Republic of Kazakhstan, and Ukraine to nuclear disarmament and
to strengthening international peace and security as non-nuclearweapon states under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons of July 1, 1968,
Have agreed as follows:
Article I
1. Each Party shall reduce and limit its strategic offensive arms in
accordance with the provisions of this Treaty and shall carry out the
other obligations set forth in this Treaty and its Protocol.
2. Definitions of terms used in this Treaty and its Protocol are
provided in Part One of the Protocol.
Article II
1. Each Party shall reduce and limit its ICBMs and ICBM
launchers, SLBMs and SLBM launchers, heavy bombers, ICBM
warheads, SLBM warheads, and heavy bomber nuclear
armaments, so that seven years after entry into force of this Treaty
and thereafter, the aggregate numbers, as counted in accordance
with Article III of this Treaty, do not exceed:
(a) 700, for deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs, and deployed
heavy bombers;
(b) 1550, for warheads on deployed ICBMs, warheads on
deployed SLBMs, and nuclear warheads counted for deployed
heavy bombers;
(c) 800, for deployed and non-deployed ICBM launchers,
deployed and non-deployed SLBM launchers, and deployed
and non-deployed heavy bombers.
2. Each Party shall have the right to determine for itself the
composition and structure of its strategic offensive arms.
Article III
1. For the purposes of counting toward the aggregate limit provided
for in subparagraph l(a) of Article I1 of this Treaty:
(a) Each deployed ICBM shall be counted as one.
(b) Each deployed SLBM shall be counted as one.
(c) Each deployed heavy bomber shall be counted as one.
2. For the purposes of counting toward the aggregate limit provided
for in subparagraph l(b) of Article I1 of this Treaty:
(a) For ICBMs and SLBMs, the number of warheads shall be
the number of reentry vehicles emplaced on deployed ICBMs
and on deployed SLBMs.
(b) One nuclear warhead shall be counted for each deployed
heavy bomber.
3. For the purposes of counting toward the aggregate limit provided
for in subparagraph l(c) of Article I1 of this Treaty:
(a) Each deployed launcher of ICBMs shall be counted as one.
(b) Each non-deployed launcher of ICBMs shall be counted as
one.
(c) Each deployed launcher of SLBMs shall be counted as
one.
(d) Each non-deployed launcher of SLBMs shall be counted
as one.
(e) Each deployed heavy bomber shall be counted as one.
(f) Each non-deployed heavy bomber shall be counted as one.
4. For the purposes of this Treaty, including counting ICBMs and
SLBMs:
(a) For ICBMs or SLBMs that are maintained, stored, and
transported as assembled missiles in launch canisters, an
assembled missile of a particular type, in its launch canister,
shall be considered to be an ICBM or SLBM of that type
(b) For ICBMs or SLBMs that are maintained, stored, and
transported as assembled missiles without launch canisters,
an assembled missile of a particular type shall be considered
to be an ICBM or SLBM of that type.
(c) For ICBMs or SLBMs that are maintained, stored, and
transported in stages, the first stage of an ICBM or SLBM of a
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particular type shall be considered to be an ICBM or SLBM of
that type.
(d) Each launch canister shall be considered to contain an
ICBM or SLBM from the time it first leaves a facility at which an
ICBM or SLBM is installed in it, until an ICBM or SLBM has
been launched from it, or until an ICBM or SLBM has been
removed from it for elimination. A launch canister shall not be
considered to contain an ICBM or SLBM if it contains a training
model of a missile or has been placed on static display.
Launch canisters for ICBMs or SLBMs of a particular type shall
be distinguishable from launch canisters for ICBMs or SLBMs
of a different type.
5. Newly constructed strategic offensive arms shall begin to be
subject to this Treaty as follows:
(a) an ICBM, when it first leaves a production facility;
(b) a mobile launcher of ICBMs, when it first leaves a
production facility;
(c) a silo launcher of ICBMs, when the silo door is first installed
and closed;
(d) an SLBM, when it first leaves a production facility;
(e) an SLBM launcher, when the submarine on which that
launcher is installed is first launched;
(f) a heavy bomber equipped for nuclear armaments, when its
airframe is first brought out of the shop, plant, or building in
which components of such a heavy ,bomber are assembled to
produce complete airframes; or when its airframe is first
brought out of the shop, plant, or building in which existing
bomber airframes are converted to such heavy bomber
airframes.
6. ICBMs, SLBMs, ICBM launchers, SLBM launchers, and heavy
bombers shall cease to be subject to this Treaty in accordance with
Parts Three and Four of the Protocol to this Treaty. ICBMs or
SLBMs of an existing type shall cease to be subject to this Treaty if
all ICBM or SLBM launchers of a type intended for such ICBMs or
SLBMs have been eliminated or converted in accordance with Part
Three of the Protocol to this Treaty.
7. For the purposes of this Treaty:
(a) A missile of a type developed and tested solely to intercept
and counter objects not located on the surface of the Earth
shall not be considered to be a ballistic missile to which the
provisions of this Treaty apply.
(b) Within the same type, a heavy bomber equipped for
nuclear armaments shall be distinguishable from a heavy
bomber equipped for non-nuclear armaments.
(c) Heavy bombers of the same type shall cease to be subject
to this Treaty or to the limitations thereof when the last heavy
bomber equipped for nuclear armaments of that type is
eliminated or converted, as appropriate, to a heavy bomber
equipped for non-nuclear armaments in accordance with Part
Three of the Protocol to this Treaty.
8. As of the date of signature of this Treaty:
(a) Existing types of ICBMs are:
(i) for the United States of America, the Minuteman 11,
Minuteman 111, and Peacekeeper;
(ii) for the Russian Federation, the RS-12M, RS-12M2,
RS-18, RS-20, and RS-24.
(b) Existing types of SLBMs are:
(i) for the Russian Federation, the RSM-50, RSM-52,
RSM-54, and RSM-56;
(ii) for the United States of America, the Trident 11.
(c) Existing types of heavy bombers are:
(i) for the United States of America, the B-52G, B-52H, BIB, and B-2A;
(ii) for the Russian Federation, the Tu-95MS and Tu-160.
(d) Existing types of ICBM launchers and SLBM launchers are:
(i) for the Russian Federation, ICBM launchers RS-12M,
RS-12M2, RS-18, RS-20, and RS-24; SLBM launchers
RSM-50, RSM-52, RSM-54, and RSM-56;
(ii) for the United States of America, ICBM launchers
Minuteman 11, Minuteman 111, and Peacekeeper; the
SLBM launchers Trident 11.
Article IV
1. Each Party shall base:
(a) deployed launchers of ICBMs only at ICBM bases;
(b) deployed heavy bombers only at air bases.
2. Each Party shall install deployed launchers of SLBMs only on
ballistic missile submarines.
3. Each Party shall locate:
(a) non-deployed launchers of ICBMs only at ICBM bases,
production facilities, ICBM loading facilities, repair facilities,
storage facilities, conversion or elimination facilities, training
facilities, test ranges, and space launch facilities. Mobile
launchers of prototype ICBMs shall not be located at
maintenance facilities of ICBM bases;
(b) non-deployed ICBMs and non-deployed SLBMs only at, as
appropriate, submarine bases, ICBM or SLBM loading
facilities, maintenance facilities, repair facilities for ICBMs or
SLBMs, storage facilities for ICBMs or SLBMs, conversion or
elimination facilities for ICBMs or SLBMs, test ranges, space
launch facilities, and production facilities. Prototype ICBMs and
prototype SLBMs, however, shall not be located at
maintenance facilities of ICBM bases or at submarine bases.
4. Non-deployed ICBMs and non-deployed SLBMs as well as
nondeployed mobile launchers of ICBMs may be in transit. Each
Party shall limit the duration of each transit between facilities to no
more than 30 days.
5. Test launchers of ICBMs or SLBMs may be located only at test
ranges.
6. Training launchers may be located only at ICBM bases, training
facilities, and test ranges. The number of silo training launchers
located at each ICBM base for silo launchers of ICBMs shall not
exceed one for each type of ICBM specified for that ICBM base.
7. Each Party shall limit the number of test heavy bombers to no
more than ten.
8. Each Party shall base test heavy bombers only at heavy bomber
flight test centers. Non-deployed heavy bombers other than test
heavy bombers shall be located only at repair facilities or
production facilities for heavy bombers.
9. Each Party shall not carry out at an air base joint basing of heavy
bombers equipped for nuclear armaments and heavy bombers
equipped for non-nuclear armaments, unless otherwise agreed by
the Parties.
10. Strategic offensive arms shall not be located at eliminated
facilities except during their movement through such facilities and
during visits of heavy bombers at such facilities.
11. Strategic offensive arms subject to this Treaty shall not be
based outside the national territory of each Party. The obligations
provided for in this paragraph shall not affect the Parties' rights in
accordance with generally recognized principles and rules of
international law relating to the passage of submarines or flights of
aircraft, or relating to visits of submarines to ports of third States.
Heavy bombers may be temporarily located outside the national
territory, notification of which shall be provided in accordance with
Part Four of the Protocol to this Treaty.
Article V
1. Subject to the provisions of this Treaty, modernization and
replacement of strategic offensive arms may be carried out.
2. When a Party believes that a new kind of strategic offensive arm
is emerging, that Party shall have the right to raise the question of
such a strategic offensive arm for consideration in the Bilateral
Consultative Commission.
3. Each Party shall not convert and shall not use ICBM launchers
and SLBM launchers for placement of missile defense interceptors
therein. Each Party further shall not convert and shall not use
launchers of missile defense interceptors for placement of ICBMs
and SLBMs therein. This provision shall not apply to ICBM
launchers that were converted prior to signature of this Treaty for
placement of missile defense interceptors therein.
Article VI
1. Conversion, elimination, or other means for removal from
accountability of strategic offensive arms and facilities shall be
carried out in accordance with Part Three of the Protocol to this
Treaty.
2. Notifications related to conversion, elimination, or other means
for removal from accountability shall be provided in accordance
with Parts Three and Four of the Protocol to this Treaty.
3. Verification of conversion or elimination in accordance with this
Treaty shall be carried out by:
(a) national technical means of verification in accordance with
Article X of this Treaty; and
(b) inspection activities as provided for in Article XI of this
Treaty.
Article VII
1. A database pertaining to the obligations under this Treaty shall
be created in accordance with Parts Two and Four of the Protocol
to this Treaty. Categories of data for this database are set forth in
Part Two of the Protocol to this Treaty.
2. Each Party shall notify the other Party about changes in data
and shall provide other notifications in a manner provided for in
Part Four of the Protocol to this Treaty.
3. Each Party shall use the Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers in
order to provide and receive notifications, unless otherwise
provided for in this Treaty.
4. Each Party may provide additional notifications on a voluntary
basis, in addition to the notifications specified in paragraph 2 of this
Article, if it deems this necessary to ensure confidence in the
fulfillment of obligations assumed under this Treaty.
5. The Parties shall hold consultations within the framework of the
Bilateral Consultative Commission on releasing to the public data
and information obtained during the implementation of this Treaty.
The Parties shall have the right to release to the public such data
and information following agreement thereon within the framework
of the Bilateral Consultative Commission. Each Party shall have
the right to release to the public data related to its respective
strategic offensive arms.
6. Geographic coordinates relating to data provided for in Part Two
of the Protocol to this Treaty, unique identifiers, site diagrams of
facilities provided by the Parties pursuant to this Treaty, as well as
coastlines and waters diagrams provided by the Parties pursuant
to this Treaty shall not be released to the public unless otherwise
agreed by the Parties within the framework of the Bilateral
Consultative Commission.
7. Notwithstanding paragraph 5 of this Article, the aggregate
numbers of deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs, and deployed
heavy bombers; the aggregate numbers of warheads on deployed
ICBMs, deployed SLBMs, and nuclear warheads counted for
deployed heavy bombers; and the aggregate numbers of deployed
and nondeployed ICBM launchers, deployed and non-deployed
SLBM launchers, and deployed and non-deployed heavy
bombers, may be released to the public by the Parties.
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verification of the other Party operating in accordance with this
Article; and
(c) not to use concealment measures that impede verification,
by national technical means of verification, of compliance with
the provisions of this Treaty.
2. The obligation not to use concealment measures includes the
obligation not to use them at test ranges, including measures that
result in the concealment of ICBMs, SLBMs, ICBM launchers, or
the association between ICBMs or SLBMs and their launchers
during testing. The obligation not to use concealment measures
shall not apply to cover or concealment practices at ICBM bases or
to the use of environmental shelters for strategic offen'sive arms.
Article XI
1. For the purpose of confirming the accuracy of declared data on
strategic offensive arms subject to this Treaty and ensuring
verification of compliance with the provisions of this Treaty, each
Party shall have the right to conduct inspection activities in
accordance with this Article and Part Five of the Protocol to this
Treaty.
2. Each Party shall have the right to conduct inspections at ICBM
bases, submarine bases, and air bases. The purpose of such
inspections shall be to confirm the accuracy of declared data on
the numbers and types of deployed and non-deployed strategic
offensive arms subject to this Treaty; the number of warheads
located on deployed ICBMs and deployed SLBMs; and the
number of nuclear armaments located on deployed heavy
bombers. Such inspections shall hereinafter be referred to as Type
One inspections.
3. Each Party shall have the right to conduct inspections at facilities
listed in Section VII of Part Five of the Protocol to this Treaty. The
purpose of such inspections shall be to confirm the accuracy of
declared data on the numbers, types, and technical characteristics
of non-deployed strategic offensive arms subject to this Treaty and
to confirm that strategic offensive arms have been converted or
eliminated.
In addition, each Party shall have the right to conduct inspections
at formerly declared facilities, which are provided for in Part Two of
the Protocol to this Treaty, to confirm that such facilities are not
being used for purposes inconsistent with this Treaty.
The inspections provided for in this paragraph shall hereinafter be
referred to as Type Two inspections.
4. Each Party shall conduct exhibitions and have the right to
participate in exhibitions conducted by the other Party. The
purpose of such exhibitions shall be to demonstrate distinguishing
features and to confirm technical characteristics of new types, and
to demonstrate the results of conversion of the first item of each
type of strategic offensive arms subject to this Treaty.
Article VIII
Article XII
In those cases in which one of the Parties determines that its
actions may lead to ambiguous situations, that Party shall take
measures to ensure the viability and effectiveness of this Treaty
and to enhance confidence, openness, and predictability
concerning the reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms.
Such measures may include, among other things, providing
information in advance on activities of that Party associated with
deployment or increased readiness of strategic offensive arms, to
preclude the possibility of misinterpretation of its actions by the
other Party. This information shall be provided through diplomatic
or other channels.
To promote the objectives and implementation of the provisions of
this Treaty, the Parties hereby establish the Bilateral Consultative
Commission, the authority and procedures for the operation of
which are set forth in Part Six of the Protocol to this Treaty.
Article IX
By mutual agreement of the Parties, telemetric information on
launches of ICBMs and SLBMs shall be exchanged on a parity
basis. The Parties shall agree on the amount of exchange of such
telemetric information.
Article X
1. For the purpose of ensuring verification of compliance with the
provisions of this Treaty, each Party undertakes:
(a) to use national technical means of verification at its disposal
in a manner consistent with generally recognized principles of
international law;
(b) not to interfere with the national technical means of
Article XIII
To ensure the viability and effectiveness of this Treaty, each Party
shall not assume any international obligations or undertakings that
would conflict with its provisions. The Parties shall not transfer
strategic offensive arms subject to this Treaty to third parties. The
Parties shall hold consultations within the framework of the Bilateral
Consultative Commission in order to resolve any ambiguities that
may arise in this regard. This provision shall not apply to any
patterns of cooperation, including obligations, in the area of
strategic offensive arms, existing at the time of signature of this
Treaty, between a Party and a third State.
Article XIV
1. This Treaty, including its Protocol, which is an integral part
thereof, shall be subject to ratification in accordance with the
constitutional procedures of each Party. This Treaty shall enter into
force on the date of the exchange of instruments of ratification.
2. This Treaty shall remain in force for 10 years unless it is
superseded earlier by a subsequent agreement on the reduction
M – Bilateral Measures – Russia-US
CSSS JMCNS NPT BRIEFING BOOK 2013 EDITION
M – Bilateral Measures – Russia-US
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CSSS JMCNS NPT BRIEFING BOOK 2013 EDITION
and limitation of strategic offensive arms. If either Party raises the
issue of extension of this Treaty, the Parties shall jointly consider
the matter. If the Parties decide to extend this Treaty, it will be
extended for a period of no more than five years unless it is
superseded earlier by a subsequent agreement on the reduction
and limitation of strategic offensive arms.
3. Each Party shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the
right to withdraw from this Treaty if it decides that extraordinary
events related to the subject matter of this Treaty have jeopardized
its supreme interests. It shall give notice of its decision to the other
Party. Such notice shall contain a statement of the extraordinary
events the notifying Party regards as having jeopardized its
supreme interests. This Treaty shall terminate three months from
the date of receipt by the other Party of the aforementioned notice,
unless the notice specifies a later date.
4. As of the date of its entry into force, this Treaty shall supersede
the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian
Federation on Strategic Offensive Reductions of May 24, 2002,
which shall terminate as of that date.
Article XV
1. Each Party may propose amendments to this Treaty. Agreed
amendments shall enter into force in accordance with the
procedures governing entry into force of this Treaty.
2. If it becomes necessary to make changes in the Protocol to this
Treaty that do not affect substantive rights or obligations under this
Treaty, the Par5ties shall use the Bilateral Consultative
Commission to reach agreement on such changes, without
resorting to the procedure for making amendments that is set forth
in paragraph 1 of this Article.
Article XVI
This Treaty shall be registered pursuant to Article 102 of the
Charter of the United Nations.
Done at Prague, this eight day of April, 2010, in tow originals, each
in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally
authentic
For the United States: Barack Obama
For the Russian Federation: Dmitry Medvedev
The Agreement between the Government of the
United States of America and the Government of
the Russian Federation for Cooperation in the
Field of Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy (The
U.S.-Russia 123 Agreement)
[Distributed by the Bureau of International Information
Programs, U.S. Department of State. Web site:
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2011/01/154318.htm
12 January 2011]
U.S. Ambassador to Russia John Beyrle and Russian Deputy
Foreign Minister Sergey Ryabkov today exchanged diplomatic
notes to bring into force the Agreement between the Government
of the United States of America and the Government of the
Russian Federation for Cooperation in the Field of Peaceful Uses
of Nuclear Energy, referred to as the U.S.-Russia 123 Agreement.
The agreement offers significant benefits to the United States: a
solid foundation for long-term U.S.-Russia civil nuclear cooperation;
commercial opportunities for U.S. industry; and enhanced
cooperation on important global nonproliferation goals.
The commitment to bringing the 123 Agreement into force was
highlighted in the July 6, 2009 Joint Statement on Nuclear
Cooperation issued by Presidents Obama and Medvedev. This
agreement provides the basis for joint efforts on innovative nuclear
energy systems and technologies, reliable nuclear fuel cycle
services, joint ventures in third countries, and other types of
cooperation.
The 123 Agreement is based on a mutual commitment to nuclear
nonproliferation. Over the last 12 months, the United States and
Russia have made significant accomplishments in this area,
including:
• The signing and U.S. Senate ratification of an historic New
START Treaty that significantly reduces the number of strategic
nuclear weapons both countries may deploy;
• The signing of a protocol to amend the 2000 Plutonium
Management and Disposition Agreement, under which both
countries will dispose of approximately 17,000 nuclear weaponsworth of excess weapon-grade plutonium; and,
• The establishment of both a Russian international nuclear fuel
bank and an IAEA fuel bank that provide incentives for other
nations not to acquire sensitive uranium enrichment technology.
Russia has also shut down its last remaining weapon-grade
plutonium production reactor. Taken together, these are significant
accomplishments made by both sides.
The U.S.-Russia 123 Agreement satisfies all applicable
requirements of U.S. law for agreements of this type with a
nuclear-weapon state, as defined by the Treaty on the NonProliferation of Nuclear Weapons. It has a term of 30 years and
permits the transfer of technology, material, equipment (including
reactors), and components for nuclear research and nuclear power
production.
The entry into force of the U.S.-Russia 123 Agreement will
advance key nonproliferation and commercial goals:
• Nuclear Nonproliferation Cooperation: The 123 Agreement will
create the conditions for improved cooperation on joint technology
development to support arms control and nonproliferation activities.
It will also provide the necessary legal framework for joint efforts to
convert research reactors from highly-enriched uranium to low
enriched uranium fuel. The 123 Agreement will aid cooperation on
forensic analysis, allowing us to better identify nuclear material and
prevent it from getting into the hands of terrorists, and it will set the
stage for expanded joint technical cooperation on next generation
international safeguards.
• Civil Nuclear Energy Cooperation: The 123 Agreement will
facilitate cooperative work on reactor designs that result in reduced
proliferation risk. It will create the conditions for advanced research
and development projects that partner U.S. national laboratories
and industry with Russian partners to explore new areas for
collaboration, including fuel fabrication, innovative fuel types, and
advanced reactor design.
• Commercial Opportunities: The 123 Agreement will support
commercial interests by allowing U.S. and Russian firms to team
up more easily in joint ventures and by permitting U.S. sales of
nuclear material and equipment to Russia. This will put the United
States and Russia’s nuclear relationship on a stronger commercial
footing. Russian and U.S. firms will be able to develop advanced
nuclear reactors, fuel-cycle approaches, and cutting-edge
technology that are safe, secure, and reliable.
• Civil Nuclear Energy Cooperation Action Plan: The 123
Agreement will allow long-term civil nuclear cooperation to proceed
under the U.S.-Russian Presidential Commission Working Group
on Nuclear Energy and Nuclear Security, specifically activities in
the Civil Nuclear Energy Cooperation Action Plan which relate to
reactor design, innovative nuclear energy technology options, and
developing the global civil nuclear energy framework.