R v Charlie [2012] Charlie (who is deaf) and Sophie are boyfriend and girlfriend. They have just left College and are arguing with each other on the platform of Egham Rail Station. In a fit of temper, Charlie pushes Sophie onto the track only for her to be hit and instantly killed by the express that was doing 70 miles per hour. The Police arrest a distressed Charlie, and he admits killing Sophie, explaining that he did intend to assault her by pushing her onto the track, but he did not hear the express train coming and he did not intend to kill her. Judge Hangman feels no sympathy for Charlie and advises the jury that there is no need to consider the alternative charge of involuntary manslaughter, because the only issue for the jury to consider is that Charlie “must be found guilty of murder if they consider that he intended to kill or cause serious harm to the victim”. The jury subsequently find Charlie guilty of murder and Judge Hangman delivers a thirty-­‐year minimum life prison sentence. Charlie appeals on the following grounds: 1. The judge failed to direct the jury in accord with the law. The correct question of law to put to the jury was: ‘Did the jury believe that D recognised – beyond all reasonable doubt -­‐ that death or serious injury was a virtual certainty’. If the jury believe that D did so recognise, they can infer/find the necessary intent. If they believe that D did not so recognize, then he must be acquitted of murder. 2. While D should be acquitted of murder, there should not now be consideration of the alternative charge of involuntary manslaughter, because the jury rejected that approach in the first instance trial. 3. D should be acquitted. If not, the sentence of a thirty-­‐year prison sentence is inappropriate and far too harsh. It should be replaced with a much lesser sentence. Possible Moot cases: Woolmington v DPP, Vickers, Mohan, Moloney, Hancock and Shankland, Nedrick, Woollin, Mathews and Alleyne. Also, look at the issues and principles relevant to involuntary manslaughter. 1 R v James [2012] James is upset that his ex-­‐girlfriend, who is bisexual, has rejected him for a girlfriend called Simran. James is jealous and decides to shoot and cause serious harm to Simran. So, he buys a second hand gun and bullets and waits at the College car park for Simran to finish her Laws lesson. While waiting, he notices that the car window (of what he believes his her car) has been left slightly open, so he forces open the window and gets into the back of the car (which it subsequently turns out is not her car) waiting for Simran to turn up so he can shoot her. However, the security cameras are working and James is seen climbing into the car. The police are called and they find James hidden in the back of the car, with a gun and bullets. James is arrested and he admits that he intended to shoot and injure Simran, but denies that he intended to kill her. James was charged with attempted murder and/or attempted serious harm. At the first instance trial, Judge Hangman advises the jury that the evidence shows that D hid in the car intending to kill or cause serious harm to Simran, and his actions were, therefore, “clearly more than merely preparatory to the commission of the offence(s). Further, they are only entitled to find him -­‐ beyond all reasonable doubt -­‐ guilty of ‘attempted murder’ if he intended to kill. Alternatively, they could only find him guilty of ‘attempted serious harm’ -­‐ if he intended serious harm”. The judge further advised that: “… this applies not withstanding that it would be impossible to kill or cause serious injury to Simran because D was in the wrong car”. The jury find James guilty of attempted murder, and Judge Hangman delivers a 15-­‐year minimum life sentence. James appeals on the following grounds: 1. D cannot be found guilty of attempted murder because his actions were merely preparatory to the offence and this does not provide guilt as per Section 1(1) of the Criminal Attempts Act 1981. 2. There is no direct evidence for the jury to find that D intended to attempt murder. Even if he did, such an act was impossible because D was not in Simran’s car. So, D should be acquitted on appeal. 3.
The sentence, if any is appropriate, is far too harsh. Possible Moot cases: Woolmington v DPP, White, Whybrow, Gullefer, Jones, Campbell, Geddes, Mohan, and Shivpuri. 2 R v Joe [2012] Mary (17) and Joe (19) have been boyfriend and girlfriend for a few weeks. Joe invites her to an 'S&M assault and battery party'. Mary has never heard of such a party before, and had reservations – but agreed to go because she feared that Joe might go without her. Her reservations were eased when Joe assures her that it is a mild S&M party and any assault/battery must be mild and via clear consent – No means ‘No’. Under no circumstances must anyone experience serious physical harm or injury. Likewise, any sexual activity must by via clear consent. So very reluctantly, she agreed to go to the party. She enjoyed most of the party, but was frightened when Joe kept mildly slapping her as he showed off to his mates at the party. The next morning she has slight redness on her face and body, and her father (who is a police officer) notices it and learns of the party. He insists she reports matters to the police. As a consequence, Joe (who refuses to give the name of others at the party) is charged with an assault/battery and found guilty in the Magistrate’s Court. Joe appealed to the Crown Court on a point of law, arguing that Mary could have said ‘No’ or left the party at anytime. He argued: “She fully consented to the assault, so, as per Lord Lane in A-­‐G Ref (No 6 of 1980), I therefore cannot be found guilty of it”. Judge Softie agrees with Joe’s explanation, and to his appeal. The case is given wide publicity and there is a great deal of political and media criticism. The Crown Prosecution Service considers that it is not in the public interest to encourage such 'S&M assault and battery parties', so they further appeal. The Crown appeal on the following grounds: 1. The decision in R v Joe is inconsistent with the ratio of R v Brown and others. 2. It is not in the public interest for consent to be allowed, by such a young person at such a party. Possible Moot cases: Ireland, Smith v Chief Inspector of Woking Police Station, Constanza, Collins & Wilcox, Thomas, Clarence, Attorney General Reference (No 6 of 1980), Donovan, Brown, Wilson, Slingsby, Olugboja, and Dica. 3