North American Philosophical Publications
The Moral Responsibilities of Scientists (Tensions between Autonomy and Responsibility)
Author(s): Heather E. Douglas
Source: American Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 40, No. 1 (Jan., 2003), pp. 59-68
Published by: University of Illinois Press on behalf of the North American Philosophical
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American
Philosophical
40, Number
Volume
Quarterly
2003
1, January
THE MORAL RESPONSIBILITIES
OF SCIENTISTS
(TENSIONS BETWEEN AUTONOMY
AND RESPONSIBILITY)
Heather
E. Douglas
in a causal
believe
I. Introduction
for moral
the general philosophical
literature, the
evokes
of
moral
question
responsibility
An
is?
of being about these general
scientists
the moral
of
responsibility
to professional
hinges on issues particular
The
boundaries
and knowledge
production.
sues,
(what kind of forces on a person
not their own, but due
make
their choices
re?
to someone
thus
else,
shifting moral
coercion
is what we should expect of sci?
question
in
entists qua scientists
in their behavior,
as scientists engaged
their decisions
in their
and causation
(what concep?
sponsibility),
tion of causality
allows
for both enough
so that we
free will and enough
foresight
life. As the importance
professional
ence in our society has grown over
so has the urgency
half-century,
can be considered
for the out?
responsible
Arnold
of our actions).
2001;
(See
and Ravizza
and Paul,
1993;
Fischer
of the
1999) The question
of
scientists,
however,
responsibility
does not hinge on these general
issues. Sci?
entists
moral
are assumed
agents;
we
to be generally
do not believe
as the rest of us, i.e.,
responsibilities
unencum?
"a
that scientists
enjoy
morally
to
bered freedom
from permanent
pressure
moral
self-reflection."
1986, 82)
(Liibbe
moral
capable
that sci?
entific
somehow
training
impairs moral
or
moral
sentiments.
Scientists
reasoning
This
be considered
ence
as
issue
of causation
scientists
it would
will
the
challenge
a basic framework
essay
view.1
First,
to assess
the moral
are not usually under threat of force to not
consider
certain moral
coercion
issues;
would
of sci?
the past
of this
The standard answer to this ques?
question.
of Science
tion, arising from the Freedom
movement
in the early 1940s, has been that
are not burdened
with
the same
scientists
and Paul
Miller,
moral
or you
Instead
of general
comes
responsibility
that allows
in general,
do not.
(when is a
competence
deci?
of making
person morally
capable
sions and thus being responsible
for them),
issues
structure
entists
as pathological
in sci?
else. And
the
anywhere
will
in which
of sci?
responsibilities
be developed.
This framework
concern?
that the basic
tensions
suggests
ing the moral
applies
just as well for
as for anyone
else; either you
traditional
arise because
of scientists
responsibilities
of a tension between
role re?
sponsibilities
and general
59
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responsibilities
60 / AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICALQUARTERLY
to the traditional
(defined below). Contrary
view, role responsibilities
do not, and can?
the
not,
trump
scientists
have
general
responsibilities
as human moral
agents.
are left with a choice:
either ac?
Scientists
cept
the burden
of general
lose much
or
themselves,
responsibilities
of their much
in allowing
prized autonomy
on the burden for them.
are
There
two
responsibilities
general moral
general
inmodern
bases
for moral
life: there are the
responsibilities
as humans/full
moral
us holds
to take
others
there are the role responsibilities
from our taking on particular
that each of
agents and
that arise
in
positions
in practice,
role respon?
our set of responsibilities.
society. Usually,
sibilities
expand
a person
For example,
ent takes on special
wards
their
who
becomes
responsibilities
but receives
children,
in other responsibilities
lessening
sult. Sometimes,
from both
weighed
however,
contraction
a par?
to?
no
as a re?
responsibilities
(arising
role and general bases) must be
against each other. In some cases,
role
of
responsibilities
call
for a
general
responsibilities.
to
lawyer is not obligated
criminal
that
learn
report past
they
activity
about from their client (it being protected
Thus,
under
whereas
a defense
lawyer-client
confidentiality),
the rest of us would have a moral
to report
such activity.
This
struc?
because
of the general
ture under which our justice system works.
obligation
works
only
Because
of the rigid adversarial
structure,
reduced general responsibili?
lawyers
to increased
ties in response
role responsi?
have
the rigid structure,
that
as
the defense
both defines
role
lawyer's
and assigns
to other parties
client advocate
bilities.
Without
the job of properly uncovering
crime, such a
reduction in general responsibility
would not
be possible.
It has been
entists
have
an argument
that sci?
argued or assumed
a similar
of
role.
Such
type
on an
has generally
centered
absolute
need
freedom
of
complete
As Percy Bridgman,
by scientists.
and
Nobel
Prize recipi?
physicist
inquiry
Harvard
for
in
ent, argued
atomic
age:
the
early
years
of
the
The challenge to the understanding of nature
is a challenge to the utmost capacity in us. In
accepting the challenge, man can dare to ac?
cept no handicaps. That is the reason that
scientific
and that the
is essential
of tools or subject mat?
(Bridgman 1947, 153)
freedom
artificial limitations
ter are unthinkable.
The
that scientists
is
knowledge
produce
so valuable
to society, Bridgman
suggests
in his essay, that we must
other
relinquish
on
responsibility
so that they can produce
this val?
under
this view, not
Scientists,
of social
claims
scientists
ued
only
end.
have
a need
to be
ability
in determining
but also
or moral
for autonomy
(i.e.,
the primary decision-makers
the direction
a need
have
the
of their work),
from con?
to be free
the potential
ofthat
consequences
sidering
the realm of science.
work beyond
the social role that scientists
Does
play,
and presentation
the development
of new
call for a release of
knowledge,
from general moral responsibilities
scientists
to think
the potential
of one's
consequences
actions
and choices? As will be argued be?
that
low, it does not. The social structures
about
would
for such
allow
a reduction
in gen?
in place,
almost elimi?
are not
eral moral
responsibilities
if they did exist, would
nate the autonomy
of scientists.
Because
of the nature
scientists
and
must
choose
of scientists'
work,
the re?
shouldering
and giving
themselves
up
to
allow
others
autonomy
between
sponsibilities
decision-making
to do so.
II. Negligence,
Recklessness,
and
Responsibility
Before
ties
of
the role responsibili?
examining
an
examination
of our
scientists,
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THEMORAL RESPONSIBILITIESOF SCIENTISTS / 61
is needed.
general moral
responsibilities
is
What do we mean when we say a person
or
some
for
action
morally
responsible
outcome?
The
distinction
first
is between
this examination
respon?
and moral
Moral
responsibility.
of
involves
the attribution
sibility
responsibility
blame or praise. This
on blame,
simplicity
there should be broad
what
to
central
causal
warrants
blame.
The
will
essay
praise
attribution
focus
for
in general
although
between
symmetries
and what warrants
of blame
is not
to the attribution
of cause.
equivalent
some kind of causal connection
is
While
we are not held morally
necessary,
respon?
sible for all the things in which we play a
causal role.
we are morally
Minimally,
responsible
for those things we intend to bring about.
we are not morally
However,
responsible
to
for those things we
intended
merely
respon?
bring about. We are also morally
sible to some extent for side effects of our
actions. While
a difficult
stances
and
gence.
be
used
here
follow
such
when
the risks involve
other
particularly
not
author?
given decision-making
people
there
Nevertheless,
ity, can be contentious.
of justified
risk (speed?
to get a seriously
injured
person to the hospital) and unjustified risk
on city
being negligent,
evaluate obvious
not
risks of harm,
or one does
of
consequences
potential
are
As Feinberg
there
noted,
to be negligent:
in which
think about
one's
actions.
many
ways
can consciously
the risk but
weigh
it, either because of hasty or oth?
or
erwise insufficient
scrutiny (rashness),
to
the
willful
blindness
magnitude
through
ex?
of the risk, or through the conscientious
One
misassess
ercise
can
of
bad judgment.
inherently
an
create
unintentionally
Or one
unreasonable
to attend either to
risk by failing altogether
what one is doing (the manner of execution)
or to the very possibility
sequences might ensue.
that harmful
(1970,
The difficulty with negligence,
a risk
con?
193-194)
in addition
of the agent. How much foresight
and care?
we expect
ful deliberation
the
should
should
a risk, one is negli?
one is reckless,
193). When
gent" (1970,
one is fully aware of the risks one is tak?
on others, and those risks
ing or imposing
are unjustified. What
justifies certain risks,
(speeding
When
is being negligent.
one does not bother
to
we
1970 and general
legal usage. As
cre?
Feinberg wrote: "When one knowingly
ates an unreasonable
risk to self or others,
one is reckless; when one unknowingly
but
are clear examples
ing on city streets
then one
aware,
extent
definitions
creates
If, on
that one
it is
accepted,
circum?
what
Feinberg
faultily
they are, in fact, justified.
the other hand, one is not aware
is risking harm, but one should be
whether
under
for unintended
consequences.
responsible
cover
Two general
unintended
categories
recklessness
and negli?
consequences:
The
mine
to determining
is to determine
this is widely
question
to what
The key point is that we expect moral agents
to carefully weigh
such risks and to deter?
streets
for the fun of it).
individual
whether
what
to have?
should
is justified,
be expected
this question
is
Often,
an examination
com?
of
answered
through
in terms of what
standards, couched
munity
a reasonable
would
have done in
person
like circumstances.
recklessness
and negligence,
Through
one can be held responsible
for unintended
both
when
consequences
things go the way
one expects
them to and when
things go
awry. Through
negligence,
things may go
as
as
far
(as
you planned
exactly
planned
and clearly
fore?
them), and still harmful
seeable
would be your fault.
consequences
would
be responsible
because
you
should have foreseen
the problems
and
further.
For
suppose you
planned
example,
set fire to a field one dry summer
to clear
You
it of brush. You
how
to control
didn't
bother
to think about
the fire, not recognizing
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the
62 / AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICALQUARTERLY
risk. Because
obvious
caused
of your negligence,
the fire raging beyond
by
is your moral
your property
responsibility.
If, on the other hand, you are aware of the
risks in setting the fire, decide not to care
damage
then you are respon?
and proceed
anyway,
when
the fire escapes,
the
sible for
damage
The distinction
of recklessness.
because
thus
and negligence
of the agent,
rests on the thought processes
con?
on whether
they reflect on potential
recklessness
between
both that events
go
sequences
(assuming
as planned
"errors"
and that unexpected
there was
and on whether
any
occur)
harms
that
of
acknowledgement
possible
arise
could
the agent's
from
action.
we might
from scientists.
expect
standard
the reasonable
person
Happily,
to
to
scien?
be
easier
apply
actually
might
tists than to the average
citizen,
particu?
larly with respect to the issue of foresight.
foresight
Reck?
Scientists
have
epistemic
fairly tight-knit
the po?
discuss
and routinely
It is rare
of their work.
implications
communities
tential
has not thought about some
of their ac?
of the potential
consequences
on the proper
tions as scientists. Reflecting
one's
and
papers to
crafting
methodologies
that a scientist
elicit
responses
for the relevance
guing
is part of the trade. Discussions
ing
risks
and negligence
How might
recklessness
that sci?
Let us assume
apply to scientists?
entists bear the full general moral
respon?
about before
for
(Reasons
below.)
should
ces
be
reckless
such
a view
or negligent.
are presented
mean
that
to not
sibilities
This
would
think about
their knowledge
new piece
some
ties. If
lead to both good
think about
scientists
consequen?
activi?
producing
could
of knowledge
and harm, then scientists
should
and goods,
that the good
those harms
to ensure
in ways
the harm.2 If the magnitude
outweighs
of
the harm is too great and
severity
and
act
or
the
probability too high to be compensated for
goods,
by the potential
less, imposing
unjustified
should also think about
sequences
are properly
sequences
of
pacts
of error,
To
not
go wrong,
things might
to
prevent
ably
possible
be negligent.
ror, would
In order
however,
Scientists
con?
the potential
and be sure that they
to prevent
those con?
acting
or to mitigate
error.
then the act is reck?
risks.
the possible
about
think
im?
how
and to act reason?
harms
due
communities,
certain what
a scientist
have thought
a risky experiment
as risky
perceived
should
performing
it was
(or even whether
than in the broader
by others)
con?
social
text. However,
scientists
may not be ac?
on potential
to full reflection
customed
that
of their work. Demanding
implications
the potential
of
journal
implications
of this aspect of scientific
to as?
easier
it is probably
Because
pages.
concern?
fill
and
is the acceptance
of unreasonable
is the failure to foresee and
risk; negligence
risk.
such
prevent
lessness
in ar?
(particularly
of one's research)
certain
to er?
to scientists,
to apply negligence
we must
what
level of
decide
shoulder
scientists
bilities
their general
responsi?
from
deeper reflection
may require
because
of
them. Nevertheless,
it could be fairly
communities,
to ascertain
forward
have
should
whether
should
social
broader
views
potential
even
consider
and other
im?
Under
the
to not
con?
implications
is contested.
of their work
pacts
standard
straight?
a scientist
certain
perceived
consequences.
scientists
Whether
scientific
of negligence,
sider foreseeable
opens
implications
and blame.
of negligence
do foresee
implications
one
to
attributions
If sci?
entists
for
case
particular
where
the apparent
outweigh
then proceed
the apparent
risks
and
benefits,
they
they can be held re?
anyway,
for consequences
sponsible
recklessness.
Thus, to what
should be held accountable
moral
requirements
a
imposed
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on the basis
extent
of
scientists
to the general
by recklessness
THEMORAL RESPONSIBILITIESOF SCIENTISTS / 63
and negligence
is crucial. And
this issue
on
role
whether
hinges
responsibilities
trump these general moral
responsibilities
to consider
unintended
III. The
Role
consequences.
is a time-consuming
seen as essential
nal
scientific
of
serve
is to de?
goal of science
about
then the
the
world,
velop knowledge
role responsibilities
of scientists
should be
structured
around
this goal. Not
surpris?
is largely
the case.
these responsibilities
surprisingly,
hotly contested
are
stead
Also
not
are not
but in?
scientists,
as
part of, or
accepted
a scientist and the proper
among
largely
essential
to, being
of science.
For example,
sci?
functioning
entists expect honest reporting of data, and
cases of dishonesty
are
in such reporting
as fraud
condemned
and dealt
universally
in the scientific
with harshly
community
on
is no debate
There
(once
proven).
whether
such dishonesty
is acceptable
to science.3
it is harmful
whether
an ac?
scientists
responsibility.
Finally,
for training the next
responsibility
of scientists
generation
properly.
These
all
role responsibilities
specific
If the primary
this
thus
and
standards,
accept
Scientists
ingly,
to maintaining
cepted
Responsibilities
job, but
inter?
and thankless
one
or
the general
(or reliable
truth
of
goal
the search
for
about
the
knowledge
clear
de?
that
this
world).4
goal
of scientists.
fines the role responsibilities
It seems
is at issue
What
here
this goal, obliterates
other re?
as human
scientists
have
sponsibility,
sponsibilities
and capable
moral
beings
IV. General
agents.
vs. Role
Responsibility
for
Responsibility
It has been
argued
Whether
Scientists
above
general
responsibility
tended and unintended
actions.
this re?
is whether
that we
to consider
have
a
in?
both
of our
consequences
are negligent
in con?
or reckless
consequences
we
sidering potential
in our disregard
for potential harms, we are
held responsible
for consequences
if our
also come with
responsibilities
a
It is expected
that sci?
scientist.
being
entists will
share important
results with
each other to further the field. (However,
are unjustifiable
or unreasonable.
are subject to such gen?
Whether
scientists
eral moral
reflection
is not clear. As
this
mentioned
Other
is being
chal?
directly
research
is being kept se?
cret because of business
interests. See, e.g.,
are also expected
Maker
1994.) Scientists
expectation
lenged as more
to respond
in some way to valid criticism.
It is unacceptable
to simply
in science
ig?
nore (over a long period of time) evidence
that runs contrary to one's views. One must
for it in some way, by finding
fault
or
with it
it, or calling for
accommodating
with greater accuracy.
further investigation
account
other
Simply
works
or
ignoring
people's
is not acceptable
in science.
In
when
it is expected
that
addition,
asked,
serve as peer reviewers
will
scientists
for
arguments
their
fellow
publication
scientists'
or for funding
work
(either
proposals).
for
This
actions
standard
been
in the introductory
section,
view of the past half-century
are not.
that
In this
they
be argued that this view
One way to protect
scientists
will
the
has
section,
is mistaken.
from
it
hav?
ing to think about the potential
impact of
their work
is to argue that scientists
pur?
sue new knowledge
(or truth), and that this
so
is
should get
pursuit
important, nothing
between
and their pursuit. This
scientists
argument
guments
freedom
seen many
forms, from ar?
free
to the
concerning
inquiry
in science movement
of the 1940s.
has
these views, what scientists
do is so
not
should
be
they
important,
by
hampered
or political
considerations.
social, moral,
Under
The
pursuit
of knowledge/truth
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trumps
all
64 / AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICALQUARTERLY
other
values,
their
general
responsibilities
role responsibilities.
their
and allows
scientists
to shed
in favor
Someone
of
else,
outside
or by framing
the pre?
programs,
some
sentation
of the results, emphasizing
over others.
implications
research
or ethicists
or society
politicians
of science,
should worry
about the impli?
but without
with
the
cations,
interfering
some of the choices
In addition,
scien?
occur
make
in
tists
pursuing
knowledge
in the fine tun?
deep in scientific
practice,
of scientists.
activity
This picture fails for two reasons. First,
(or the pursuit of truth) does not
knowledge
If it did, we would
other
values.
all
trump
the characterization
ing of methodologies,
of data, or the interpretation
of data. That
submit our children
happily
wished
to scientists
who
to use
them for biochemical
testing
limits on methodologies
would
to us
be in play. But truth is not so valuable
to do this, despite
that we are willing
the
and no moral
human
fact that controlled
the best
derstand
and perhaps
testing would be
only way to fully un?
the full biological
impacts of
chemical
for example.
That
substances,
are prices we are not willing
to pay
or the search
for knowledge,
for truth,
means
it is not an ultimate
value existing
there
on a plane above all others. The categorical
This does
pursuit of truth is unacceptable.
not mean that the pursuit of truth is not valu?
able, or that it is not one of preeminent
the scientist
makes
these choices,
po?
implications
of error, may not even
in the published
final
report
tentially
important
tential consequences
be
apparent
and
2000). The places of choice
(Douglas
control by scientists with
social
important
and ethical
the
go far beyond
implications
ostensibly
of science
must
publicly
in new
be responsible
potential
or
points,
controllable
technologies.
for thinking
consequences
the general
desirable.
the consequences
could
well be catastrophic.
One striking example
and successfully
of scientists
seriously
the potential
of sci?
Second,
implications
ence go well beyond
the applications
of
scientific
While
it
be
may
pos?
knowledge.
sible that those outside of science can con?
of the morality
of building
the test of the first plutonium
ties, and our view
to science
of research's
It
passive.
our
self
change
and responsibili?
of the world
(Sinsheimer
1979, Wachbroit
Outsiders
is not
1994, Johnson
cannot
control
choosing
Whatever
one may
think
such weapons,
bomb
was
not just a test of a new technology.
It was
a
some
test of
also
of the physical
decisive
went
that
into
the
principles
development
of the bomb, from the fissionability
to the calculations
tonium
behind
of plu?
the im?
by Kistiakowsky.
plosion device developed
It was also an experiment
about what hap?
an
chain
when
pens
you produce
explosive
one
in the atmosphere.
No
had
reaction
and there were
some wor?
done
worry
thought up well
on by Hans
the test, and worked
was
in the explo?
that the energy
Bethe,
an
sion might
chain re?
produce
explosive
and ethical
to pursue
to their general
responsi?
the development
of
during
1996).
epistemic
impact
the research
is complete.
Only scien?
tists (or other insiders) can exert such con?
by
arose
a piece
after
trol,
go
Indeed,
weapons.
out, knowledge
pointed
can, by its very existence,
our options
conception,
the
decision
responsibilities
atomic
in the form
of applied
science
the impact of knowledge
per
controllable.
As many
have
about
completely
neglected.
An abandonment
of these general respon?
nor
in science
sibilities
is neither warranted
attention
trol the uses
application
Someone
at these
paying
bilities
of technology,
se is far less
po?
and
It simply means
of our society.
that,
to be con?
in general,
other values deserve
sidered as well.
values
with
particular
this before,
that was
ries. One
before
action
in the
earth's
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atmosphere,
thus
THEMORAL RESPONSIBILITIESOF SCIENTISTS / 65
human
life on earth. Happily,
obliterating
the scientists
had not only thought of this
the pos?
Bethe pursued
outcome,
potential
itwas
and determined
sibility
scientifically
impossible (Rhodes 1986, 419). Who else
but
the scientists
could
have
in the project
this and determined
it
immersed
foreseen
was
burden
from sci?
of general responsibilities
The consideration
of non-epistemic
entists.
an after?
could be neither
consequences
a pro?
nor
to
the
research
thought
project
cess merely
at the start of the project
if the
are to properly
ful?
to be an inte?
general responsibilities
filled. Instead it would
have
to worry about?5
nothing
of scientists
Another
standard example
on
is
their
taking
general
responsibilities
involved
gral part of it, being
throughout
the research project. Those
the
shouldering
to
consider
social
general
responsibilities
the concern
of research
(or
consequences
in research) would
have to have
decision-making
authority with the scien?
binant
scientists
over
raised
DNA
recom?
and
the resulting
techniques
Asilomar
Culliton
conference.
(See
1979.)
In both these cases, scientists,
while doing
reflected
science,
tended consequences
Before
unacceptable.
were
either
unin?
the potential
and found the risks
with the
proceeding
of science,
and
they paused,
that the harmful
consequences
development
sure
made
out ways
on
or figured
nearly
impossible,
to make
them so.
It is doubtful that anyone could fully take
over
this function
scientists.
for
Because
primary goal is to develop knowl?
takes scientists
edge, this goal invariably
into uncharted
While
the science
territory.
science's
is being done, presumably
only the scien?
can
tist
the potential
im?
fully
appreciate
of the work,
and,
plications
equally
errors and uncer?
the potential
important,
in the work.
tainties
these
And
sources
potential
that could
consequences
that someone
must
it is precisely
of error, and the
result
from
think about. The
them,
scien?
and ethical
of errors
review
tists, in the same way that research
now have
to shape
boards
the authority
scientists
of
the
methodological
approaches
they are dealing with human subjects.
unlike
review
these
However,
boards,
whose
review
takes place at one stage in
the research project,
all
those considering
when
of the non-epistemic
of sci?
consequences
to be kept
have
entific
choices
would
abreast with
stage
would
choices
(where
have to have
those choices when necessary.
Otherwise
not be properly
the responsibility
would
not be able to keep
and would
fulfilled,
the developments
pace with
accompany?
Such
intensive
ing discovery.
oversight,
would
devastate
however,
any remaining
in science.
autonomy
In sum,
shield
the structure
scientists
sibilities
cal review
this function
with
boards
dealing
that scientists
and clear
human
standards
But
for
the more
subjects.
re?
their general
relinquish
must
the more
relin?
they
sponsibilities,
quish their autonomy.
In order to see why,
if we
consider
what would
a system
required
implemented
that provided
ethical oversight
of all sci?
entific
in order to remove
the
decisions,
be
from
of
science
cannot
their general
respon?
their au?
sacrificing
there are no adequate
tonomy. Currently,
social structures
that could fully take over
are usually
to do
the most
qualified
so. Partial sharing of general
responsibili?
as is now done with ethi?
ties is possible,
tists
at every
program
are being made),
and
to alter
the authority
the research
without
from
scientists,
if we
thought
it desirable to do so. And to fully develop
such a structure
involve a very high
would
of oversight
and possible
interven?
at every decision
tion in science,
point sci?
entists have. Such oversight
would
oblit?
erate scientific
not
does
This
autonomy.
level
mean
scientists
when
grappling
should be fully on their own
with these difficult
issues
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66 / AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICALQUARTERLY
raised
by
general
research
When
responsibilities.
are well-mapped
out
programs
of time, general
of
public discussion
can
scientists
the potential
help
impacts
the burden. But precisely
because
shoulder
of an ever-chang?
they are in the forefront
ahead
ing field, they cannot fully relinquish their
general
responsibilities
without
fully
los?
ing autonomy.
Because
of
the awesome
power of sci?
our lives,
to change both our world,
our
and
of ourselves,
the ac?
conception
ence
tual implementation
will
responsibilities
With
full
of scientists'
fall heavily
of science's
awareness
general
on them.
efficacy
and power,
think carefully
scientists must
and potential
about the possible
impacts
their
there
of
work.
Although
implications
no
between
is
difference
this
qualitative
and the responsibility
of au?
responsibility
to proceed with due care
tomobile
drivers
the quantitative
and caution,
burden
is
to do harm
greater. The ability
a scientist,
for
is
much
greater
good)
the terrain almost always
unfamiliar.
much
The
re?
such responsibility
slow
down
science, but such is
may
quires
behav?
the price we all pay for responsible
ior. The driver may need to take more
time
level
of reflection
(and
and
to his destination;
the sci?
similarly
getting
to take more
in
entist may
need
time
and
her
research
developing
determining
to present
the results.
itmust be emphasized
that the
However,
on
con?
to
reflect
responsibility
potential
how
of one's work
does not arise
sequences
science
has such power. The ba?
because
sis for this responsibility
is one all humans
share
excused
as moral
from
Scientists
agents.
this responsibility
searching
they are scientists
is not such a transcendent
because
for truth. Truth
good that only
the social structure that
truth matters.
And
could
scientists
relieve
are not
re?
of their general
in place (as itwould
is neither
sponsibilities
scientists
need to be before
could
give
up
nor could it ever fully
such responsibilities)
a complete
be in place, without
loss of sci?
must
shoulder
entific autonomy.
Scientists
some of this general
responsibil?
the
The
power of science
ity.
simply makes
ur?
more
fulfillment
of the responsibility
at least
with the power
gent. Thus, scientists,
they
must
their
show
wield
endeavors,
through
due care with the execution
of the general
or negli?
not
to
be
reckless
responsibility
to the tendencies
of the past
gent. Contrary
more
scientists
should
century,
place
into the consequences
of their ac?
thought
tions
as scientists
they are scien?
not
consequences,
because
social
tists, particularly
less.
V. Conclusion:
Difficult
Weighings
Ahead
the search
While
scendent
considering
good,
both
is not
truth
for
a tran?
is a good. When
intended and unintended
it still
of one's work,
the develop?
consequences
ment
and
of knowledge
is an important
must
it
for
scientists?but
be
worthy
goal
other goods,
weighed
including
against
basic human rights, quality of life, and en?
vironmental
health.
to weigh
From the responsibility
and find
it does not fol?
the right balance
of goods,
low automatically
that some
research
be forbidden.
should
scientists)
of developing
that might
be
goods
risks
scientists
will
(and non
the
carefully
Scientists
to weigh
need
decide
with
the
knowledge
involved.
Sometimes
that the good
of
the
knowledge to be gained will outweigh the
other
risks;
necessary
sometimes
And
ways
to mitigate
times
scientists
they will not.
will
figure out
the potential
risks become
risks
so that
acceptable
Because
devel?
DNA).
a
vast
the
is
oping
knowledge
good,
of
research
should
be
programs
majority
in
but the behavior
of scientists
continued,
unacceptable
(e.g., recombinant
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THEMORAL RESPONSIBILITIESOF SCIENTISTS / 67
their work
performing
modified.
may
need
to be
of justifying
we cannot
is because
This
re?
the picture
of the moral
scientists
here
of
sponsibilities
painted
no direct claim on whether
makes
pursu?
In addition,
ing a particular piece
be forbidden. What
the analysis
above
some
for
possible
forbidden
judged
Whether
to the occasion
because
of knowledge
should
should be clear from
is that it is theoretically
areas of research
to be
the risks
of harm
to outweigh
the potential
or not it makes
sense
are
benefits.
some
(and others) from pursuing
of
has
been
addressed
piece
knowledge
by
others
1996; Kitcher
(Johnson
recently
scientists
In the examples
2001, 93-108).
put forth
Johnson
and
it
becomes
Kitcher,
appar?
by
a case that
ent how difficult
it is to make
the pursuit of some knowledge
should be
forbidden.
social
cir?
Only very particular
cumstances
in which
the basis
of free
is threatened
itself
a research
inquiry
by
or some
(as in Kitcher's
program
example)
other
similarly
threatening
possibility
(such as knowledge
to produce
egregious
in a research program,
a
is
and there are so
value,
knowledge
other ways
of mitigating
the harm?
many
be discovered
might
ful
that can only be used
seems to rise
harms)
of knowledge.
this
Despite
at stake for
there is too much
effects
complexity,
the general
to
of scientists
responsibilities
be neglected.
Careful
reflection
and justi?
fication of scientific
is needed.
decisions
Nor
to forbid
a prohibition.
be sure what
does
this essay imply that scientists
their autonomy.
It is doubtful
up
give
an oversight
that
would
system
adequately
must
address
the general
be effectively
that
however,
on
profession
could
responsibilities
It does mean
implemented.
cannot
scientists
the basis
of
run
isolation
their
from
re?
accept their general
they must
are
an
that
sponsibilities
part
inescapable
society;
of theirwork andmeet them fully. Only by
meeting
be able
their responsibilities
will scientists
to maintain
the autonomous
deci?
sion-making
Second World
University
so hard
fought
for after
the
War.
of Pug et Sound
NOTES
The author would like to acknowledge
Lori Alward, Denis Arnold, Ted Richards, and JimWilson
for their invaluable assistance with the ideas and presentation
in this paper. Remaining muddles
are the author's alone. The author also gratefully acknowledges
and missteps
the National Sci?
ence Foundation
and the University
of Puget Sound's Martin Nelson
(SDEST grant #0115258)
Junior Sabbatical
1. This view
2. However
Fellowship
is also expressed
for their generous
inMerton
support, which made
1938, 261, andWueste
this work possible.
1994, 2, to be challenged
by both.
one weighs
those harms. While
utilitarian frameworks
for negligence
have been
1999 argues for deontological
in evaluating unjustified
frameworks
risk.
standard, Simons
3. The issue has been raised whether fraud in science is encouraged
arrange?
by institutional
ments that place too much emphasis on the pursuit of credit. There is also debate on the extent of
fraud in science. See Callahan
1994.
4. Some generally accepted responsibilities
do not serve the goal of knowledge,
but instead act
to protect the boundaries and autonomy of science. For
are
scientists
example,
expected to main?
tain the ethical standards of proper research, particularly when dealing with living subjects, and
scientists have agreed to come under systematic regulatory review in order to protect those ethi?
cal standards. Such review keeps scientists from having to shoulder this heavy burden themselves,
and also keeps unwanted scrutiny and interference out of science. While
this arrangement forces
scientists to give up some autonomy,
in the long run, it protects scientific autonomy.
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68 / AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICALQUARTERLY
one could
to shield scientists
is desperate
from their general moral responsibilities,
of their work when
argue that the scientists should only think about the potential consequences
Such methodological
considerations
would prevent scientists from
developing methodologies.
5. If one
and would perhaps keep scientists from inadvertently bringing
using unethical methodologies,
is set
in
the bomb case). Under this view, once the methodology
the
world
(as
upon
catastrophe
cease
to
their
think
of
work
of
its
should
about
the
and
scientists
up,
potential consequences
can
a
one
a
a
errors.
move
that
make
clean
between
methodol?
Such
distinction
requires
possible
ogy selected at the beginning of a study (when one would be required to think of consequences)
seems to me
and choices made later in the study (when one would not). Such a clean distinction
untenable. Studies rarely go perfectly as planned, and judgments must be made along the way on
whether to keep intact or modify original methodological
choices. In addition, events may occur
are in place. Why should only
that are unexpected
and for which no methodological
protocols
ones
events
and
in practice is too
receive
not? Science
full
considerations
unexpected
expected
fluid for such clean distinctions.
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