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Truancy: New Compulsory
School Attendance Law, 6-18
CAROLYN CLAERHOUT
OAKLAND SCHOOLS
MPAAA SPRING CONFERENCE 2014
Compulsory School Attendance
 Age 6 to 16 if in 6th grade before 2009 or 11 before
12/1/09. (current 11th and 12th graders)
 Age 6 to 18 if in 6th grade in or after 2009 or 11 on
after 12/1/09 UNLESS parent/guardian provides
written permission to dropout at 16. (current 10th
graders, dob 12/1/98 or after)
 Parent, guardian or other person in state having
control and charge of a child must send child to
public school for the entire school year.
 Attendance must be continuous and consecutive.
MCL 380.1561(1), (5)
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Compulsory School Attendance
 Age 6 before December 1 must be enrolled on first
day of school year in which child 6th birthday occurs.
 Age 6 on or after December 1 must be enrolled on
first day of school in the next school year.
MCL 380.1561(2)
Compare to Right to Attend School in District; Right to
Enroll in Kindergarten
MCL 380.1147
Right to Attend School: Kindergarten
 A child, resident of a school district with NO
kindergarten, that is 5 years old on the first day of school,
has right to attend school in district.
 IF school district has kindergarten, a child resident of a
school district has right to enroll in kindergarten if 5 on
November 1 of 2013-14, or 5 on October 1 of 2014-15 or 5
on September 1 of 2015-16 and thereafter
 Unless parent notifies of intent to enroll child who is 5 on
December 1st of the school year. “Parent Notification
MCL 380.1147 & MCL 388.1606(l)(iii)
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Compulsory School Attendance - Exceptions
(a) Attending regularly and being taught in a state
approved nonpublic school – comparable subjects for
age/grade at public school.
(b) Child is less than 9 and doesn’t reside within 2.5
miles of public school and transportation is NOT
provided.
(c) Child is 12 or 13 and is in confirmation classes for 5
months or less.
CSA Exceptions Continued
(d) Religious instruction classes for not more than 2
hours per week off public school property during
public school hours BY written request of parent,
guardian.
(e) High school graduate.
(f) Educated at home by parent or guardian in
organized educational program in reading, spelling,
math, science, history, civics, literature, writing and
English grammar
MCL 380.1561(3)
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Homeschoolers
Child being educated at home by parent or legal
guardian can rely on:
Exemption a – in state approved private school
(registered with state)
Exemption f - by parent in organized education
program (no state registration required)
Or both
MCL 380.1561(4)
Nonpublic School Attendance Report
At the beginning of the school year, a nonpublic school
must furnish to the ISD Supt (or the district supt.
where the nonpublic school is located):
 name and age of each child enrolled at school
 number or name of school district and city,
township, county where parent/guardian resides
 name and address of parent, guardian
 name and age of each child not in regular attendance
MCL 380.1578
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School District Attendance Report
 School Board Secretary must provide copy of last
school census to School Supt and include name and
address of attendance officer.
 School Supt at start of school shall compare census
list with school enrollment and report to the
attendance officer the names and addresses of
parents of children not enrolled or in attendance at
MCL 380.1577
the public school.
Attendance Officers
 ISD must select 1 or more persons to act as
attendance officers for ISD.
 Attendance officer must file with ISD Board
secretary an “acceptance and oath of office” and a
$1,000 surety bond.
 A district having 1,000+ students may employ
attendance officers. $1,000 surety bond required.
If district doesn’t, ISD attendance officer covers.
 Attendance Officer (AO) has power of deputy sheriff
within the district or ISD.
MCL 380.1571
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Attendance Officer Role - Referral
AO must investigate nonattendance when notified by a
teacher, supt., ISD supt. or other person. If child is not
exempt then:
 If child is repeatedly absent without valid excuse or
failing school work or has behavior problems AND
attempts to confer with parent fail, Supt MAY request
AO to notify parent by registered mail to come to school
or other place at designated time to discuss child’s
irregular attendance, failing work, or behavior problems
with school authorities.
 Supt must provide information on nonattendance of
nonresident pupils to ISD Supt where nonresident pupil
resides and ISD AO must investigate.
MCL 380.1586
Attendance Officer Role - Notice
 If parent or other person in parental relation fails to
send child under his or her control to public school
or other school listed under Section 1561, the AO,
upon receiving notice from proper authority, must
give written notice in person or by registered mail to
parent requiring child to appear at the public school
or other school on the next regular school day and
continue regular and consecutive attendance.
 AO notify Supt of notice and Supt notify AO if parent
MCL 380.1587
fails to comply with notice.
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Attendance Officer Role – Court Petition
 AO determines whether parent complied with notice.
 If parent fails to comply with notice, AO shall bring a
legal complaint against parent in court having
jurisdiction in the county of residence for refusal or
neglect to send child to school.
 Court shall issue a warrant and proceed to hear and
determine case.
MCL 380.1588
AO - School Support
“School officers, superintendents, administrators and
teachers shall give assistance and furnish information
to aid an attendance officer in the performance of
official duties.”
MCL 380.1589
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Penalty
A parent or other person in parental relation who fails
to comply with this part is guilty of a misdemeanor
 Fine of $5 - $50 and/or
 Jail 2 – 90 days
MCL 380.1599
Compulsory School Attendance Law typically enforced
in District Court.
Probate Code – Ed Neglect
Family Court has jurisdiction over child and their
parents where a parent or other person legally
responsible for the care and maintenance of child
under age 18 “when able to do so, neglects or refuses to
provide proper or necessary support, education….”
MCL 712A.2(b)(1)
An educational neglect case is brought against the
parent in Circuit Court.
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Probate Code – School Truancy
 Family Court has exclusive jurisdiction over child
when a child “willfully and repeatedly absents
himself or herself from school or other learning
program intended to meet the child’s educational
needs.
 Have to show child, parent, school officials have met
and help sought.
MCL 712A.2(a)(4)
A school truancy case is brought against the child in
Circuit Court.
Probate Code – Home or School Incorrigibility
 Juvenile deserted home without sufficient cause or
refused alternative placement or juvenile and parent
have exhausted or refused family counseling
 Juvenile repeatedly disobedient to reasonable and
lawful commands of parent and court by clear and
convincing evidence finds court-accessed services are
necessary
 Juvenile repeatedly violated school rules and
regulations, court finds school, parent and juvenile
have met and services sought. MCL 712A.2(a)(2),(3),(4)
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The New Compulsory School Law:
16 and 17 Year Olds
 Family Court has exclusive original jurisdiction over
juvenile under 17 years of age – so 16 year old
covered but 17 year old? MCL 712A.2(a)
 Family court has jurisdiction over juvenile under 18
years of age for abuse and neglect BUT usually
school attendance becomes truancy rather than ed
neglect around middle school, age 11-13. MCL 6712A.2(b)(1)
 Family Court has wayward youth provision but does
that fit truancy???
Probate Code – Wayward Youth
Court finds voluntary services have been exhausted or
refused, Family Court can take concurrent jurisdiction over
juvenile between 17 and 18 if juvenile is:
 Repeatedly addicted to use of drugs or alcohol
 Repeatedly associating with criminal, dissolute or
disorderly persons
 Found (free will and knowledge) in house of prostitution,
assignation, or ill-fame
 Repeatedly associating with thieves, prostitutes, pimps,
procurers
 Willfully disobedient to reasonable and lawful commands
of parents and in danger of becoming morally depraved
MCL 712A.2(d)
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Options for 17 year old
 Family court jurisdiction not changed for school
attendance – juvenile under 17
 Family court has wayward youth provision for 17
year old but does it fit truancy?
 Compulsory School Attendance Law enforced against
parent and action brought in district court so one
option for 17 year old is to bring parent into district
court . . .
 Has to be a better option or strategy
Parent Involvement Contracts
 School districts encouraged to develop and implement.
 Voluntary, not mandatory.
 MDE Model Parent Involvement Contract.
 Includes parent “ensure pupil gets to school each day on
time, ready to learn.”
 Includes child “come to school each school day and be on
time.”
 Includes teacher “keep accurate attendance and inform
parent promptly if an attendance problem starts to
develop.
MCL 380.1295
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Parent Involvement MDE Info
 Parent Involvement = Student Achievement webpage
http://www.michigan.gov/mde/0,1607,7-140-523323090--,00.html
 MDE Model Parent Involvement Contracts
http://www.michigan.gov/documents/parentinvolvem
ent_26059_7.pdf
Consequences – Work Permits for Minors
 Minor is person under 18 years of age. MCL 409.102
 Work permit: can suspend and then revoke based on poor school
attendance – repeated erratic or unexcused absences which result in
lower school performance than before had job.
MCL 409.107(1)(a)
 Minors under 16 not employed more than combined school and
work week of 48 hours when school in session. MCL 409.110
 Minors 16 years or older can work 48 hours/week. MCL 409.111
 Not Apply if minor is 16 years of age or older and high school
graduate or 17 years of age or older with GED or emancipated.
MCL 409.116 & MCL 409.117
 Not Apply if minor is 14 years of age or older and WBE MCL 409.118
 If required by law to attend school, then work can only be outside
school hours unless part of work-based education. MCL 409.119(2)
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Consequences – Family Independence Aid
Each family receiving family independence assistance must
have a family self-sufficiency plan and plan must include:
 Each adult and child age 16 or older who is not attending
elementary or secondary school full-time must
participate in the work first program.
 Each minor parent who has not completed secondary
school to attend school.
 The recipient must enroll in a GED prep program, a high
school completion program or a literacy training
program IF department determines necessary to meet
self-sufficiency plan.
DHS must monitor each family’s compliance with the
family self-sufficiency plan.
Social Welfare Act MCL 400.57e
School Attendance And Student Status - DHS
Family Independence Program (FIP)
 Dependent children are expected to attend school full time and graduate
from high school or a high school equivalency program
 Children ages 6 - 17 must attend school full-time


Children between 6-15 not attending school full-time, entire family not eligible for FIP
Children 16 or 17 not attending high school full-time, not counted for FIP
 Child age 18 must attend high school full-time until graduates or turns 19
 Minor parents under age 18 must attend high school full-time; after
graduates referred PATH (Partnership, Accountability, Traning, Hope). If
not, minor parent and minor parent’s children not eligible for FIP
 Minor parents under age 16 must attend school full-time
 “High School” includes adult basic ed., alt ed., charter school, GED,
homeschool, nonpublic school, vocational/technical training
 “School” public school, registered nonpublic school, homeschool
DHS Bridges Eligibility Manual http://www.mfia.state.mi.us/olmweb/ex/bem/245.pdf
Federal Social Security Act, Section 419, Michigan Social Welfare Act) 400.57 et seq
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School Attendance and Student Status - DHS
 DHS verifies school enrollment/attendance at application and
redetermination for 7-17 year olds
 DHS requests schools verify on DHS-3380 for 16 and 17 year
olds on birthday; DHS calls school; DHS requests something
on school letterhead
http://www.michigan.gov/documents/dhs/VerificaitonOfStudentInformation
_DHS-3380_384550_7.pdf
 Under DHS Policy schools determine: Level of enrollment
(full-, half-, or part-time), Attendance Compliance
Suspensions (reasons for/duration)
 If 6-17 not enrolled/attending school, DHS must make
truancy referral to ISD Attendance Officer
 To regain FIP Eligibility need 21 consecutive calendar days of
full-time school attendance
Options 16-18 year old
 GED Exam Waiver of 1 year wait requirement if child is
between 16-18 (see GED testing procedure requirements
and modification doc)
http://www.michigan.gov/mdcd/0,1607,7-1221680_2798_46108---,00.html
 Consent to Withdrawal from School Form, one example
on Oakland Schools’ Truancy Dept. website Consent to
Withdraw from School Form
 Whatever it Takes Graduate Whatever It Takes Graduate
 Alternative Ed/Adult Ed Programs
 Seat Time Waiver Programs, Cyber Schools
 Section 23a Dropout Recovery Programs
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Ungraded School for Certain Juveniles
School Board may create ungraded school for juvenile
disorderly persons defined as a . . .
Child age 7-16 (or 18 if turned 11 on or after 12/1/2009 or
in 6th grade in 2009 or later) who resides in the district if:
 Habitually truant from school OR
 Incorrigibly turbulent, disobedient, and insubordinate or
immoral in conduct OR
 Not attending school and habitually frequents streets and
other public places with no lawful business, employment
occupation
MCL 380.1596
FYI: MDE/CEPI Tracking Truancy in SID
 MDE/CEPI tracks truancy in EOY SID where
districts report # of students with 10 or more
unexcused absences in a school year
http://www.michigan.gov/cepi/0,4546,7-113986_10482---,00.html
 MDE/CEPI intend to track truancy better in the
future with corresponding state aid penalty. MCL
388.1694a(9) but statute says each district defines
unexcused absences.
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Attendance Works: Chronic Absenteeism
 Chronic Absenteeism is the new buzz = missing 10%




of the School Year, 2 days per month, is too much
Attendance Works website with resources
http://www.attendanceworks.org/
Boost Up website and attendance tracker
http://www.boostup.org/
MDE looking at this 10% standard
State Aid Act intent language to look at truancy in
14-15 school year. MCL 388.1694a(9)
Questions ???
 Oakland School Truancy webpage
www.oakland.k12.mi.us
Department: Government and Community Services
Offices: Truancy
Direct Link:
http://www.oakland.k12.mi.us/Services/Government
CommunityServices/Truancy/tabid/267/Default.aspx
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
In the Matter of AREK NAPIERAJ, Minor.
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
FOR PUBLICATION
April 15, 2014
9:05 a.m.
Petitioner-Appellee,
v
No. 314305
Oakland Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 2012-796045-DL
AREK NAPIERAJ,
Respondent-Appellant.
Before: BORRELLO, P.J., and WHITBECK and K. F. KELLY, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Respondent, Arek Napieraj, appeals as of right an order of disposition following his
adjudication of guilt on one count of school truancy, MCL 712A.2(a)(4). Finding insufficient
evidence that respondent’s absences were “willful,” we reverse.
I. BASIC FACTS
Respondent had a history of frequent absences from school and in September 2011,
school officials met with respondent’s mother and respondent to discuss the fact that respondent
had already missed four days of school and the school year was just underway. Respondent’s
mother explained “I told them that it was an ongoing problem . . . from bullying, he felt he was
being bullied in school and he would actually be physically ill in the morning for several hours.
He would get up to start his day at like 6:00 a.m. and he would get sick.” School officials
responded that “[i]t wasn’t an excuse and that he needed to come to school and tell them if he
was being bullied and they would take care of it.”
Respondent and his mother were called for another meeting in February 2012 to discuss
respondent’s continued absences. They discussed the parameters of legitimate, excused
absences. Respondent’s mother was advised that respondent needed to improve his attendance
and that there was “zero tolerance” for unexcused absences. School officials told respondent’s
mother that all absences had to be accompanied with a doctor’s note. Respondent missed three
days of school following the February meeting, prompting school officials to request the
prosecutor’s office to send its standard warning letter, and ultimately, file a formal petition.
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At the hearing on the petition, school officials testified that respondent’s absences
persisted and were deemed unexcused because they were not accompanied by a doctor’s note.
Respondent’s mother testified that respondent’s attendance had improved and that he only
missed two days in March 2012 because he was competing at a dog show in Kentucky—an
activity recommended by respondent’s therapist. Respondent missed two or three days after that
due to “a stomach bug” and when he had a migraine headache, a symptom of his Asperger’s
disease. Respondent’s mother testified that she was hesitant to take him to the doctor’s office
because it cost between $50 and $200 per visit. She believed that only “cluster absences” – those
greater than two days – needed a doctor’s note.
The trial court adopted the referee’s conclusion that respondent was guilty of truancy.1
Respondent now appeals as of right.
II. ANALYSIS
On appeal, respondent argues that the trial court should have granted his motion for a
directed verdict at the close of petitioner’s proofs and that there was insufficient evidence to
support the resulting adjudication of guilt under MCL 712A.2(a)(4). We agree.
“In reviewing the denial of a motion for a directed verdict of acquittal, this Court reviews
the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution in order to determine whether a rational
trier of fact could have found that the essential elements of the crime were proved beyond a
reasonable doubt.” People v Gillis, 474 Mich 105, 113; 712 NW2d 419 (2006) (internal
quotation marks omitted). Similarly, a defendant’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence is
reviewed de novo, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution to
determine whether a rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime to
have been proved beyond a reasonable doubt. People v Meissner, 294 Mich App 438, 452; 812
NW2d 37 (2011). Finally, issues of statutory interpretation are likewise reviewed de novo on
appeal. People v Yamat, 475 Mich 49, 52; 714 NW2d 335 (2006).
The truancy statute, MCL 712A.2(a)(4), provides that a trial court may exercise
jurisdiction over a juvenile when the juvenile “willfully and repeatedly absents himself or herself
from school . . .” Respondent argues that his absences were not “willful” because they should
have been deemed excused.
“Willful” is not defined in the statute. “The fundamental rule of statutory construction is
to discern and give effect to the intent of the Legislature. If statutory language is clear and
unambiguous, the Legislature must have intended the meaning it expressed, and the statute must
be enforced as written.” People v Venticinque, 459 Mich 90, 99-100; 586 NW2d 732 (1998)
(internal citation omitted). “Undefined words are to be given meaning as understood in common
1
When the dispositional hearing was held, the referee, noting respondent’s improved grades,
placed respondent on probation. Respondent ultimately moved to Texas and the trial court
terminated jurisdiction in April 2013.
-2-
language, considering the text and the subject matter in which they are used.” People v Lanzo
Const Co, 272 Mich App 470, 473-474; 726 NW2d 746 (2006). However,
The Legislature has instructed that any “technical words and phrases” that “have
acquired a peculiar and appropriate meaning in the law, shall be construed and
understood according to such peculiar and appropriate meaning.” [MCL 8.3a; see
also Const. 1963, art. 3, § 7 (“The common law and the statute laws now in force,
not repugnant to this constitution, shall remain in force until they expire by their
own limitations, or are changed, amended or repealed.”).] And in the criminallaw context, common-law doctrine informs the meaning of a statute when the
Legislature uses common-law terms. [People v Smith-Anthony, 494 Mich 669,
676-677; 837 NW2d 415 (2013).]
Black’s Law Dictionary (9th ed) defines “willful” as “[v]oluntary and intentional, but not
necessarily malicious.” “[W]ilful involves design and purpose” and “means intentional.”
Jennings v Southwood, 446 Mich 125; 139–140; 521 NW2d 230 (1994). However, “[a] thing
may be done wilfully without bad faith.” Peters v Gunnell, Inc, 253 Mich App 211, 220 n 8; 655
NW2d 582 (2002). Importantly, “when a statute prohibits the willful doing of an act, the act
must be done with the specific intent to bring about the particular result the statute seeks to
prohibit.” People v Janes, 302 Mich App 34; 836 NW2d 883 (2013) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
At the conclusion of respondent’s case and in the face of the evidence presented by each
side, the referee announced its verdict:
THE COURT: Okay, I taught for ten years, you’re found guilty.
MR. TOMALA: I’m sorry?
THE COURT: He’s guilty.
MR. TOMALA: No, what—
THE COURT: He was—he’s found guilty, he had more than one
unexcused absence. There was a petition filed, I don’t have any re—just because
his attendance improved is –get me a case that says if attendance has improved I
don’t take jurisdiction. There is none cause [sic] that’s not the law. They may
have wanted his attendance to improve but I wanted him to be in school all the
time. He didn’t do it, he is guilty of school truancy.
MR. TOMALA: Just so I’m clear then, your—your statement is that any
absence, we’re talking strict liability, any absence results—
THE COURT: Any absence—
MR. TOMALA: —in a truancy?
THE COURT: —without a doctor’s excuse is school truancy.
-3-
This was clear error. Clear legal error occurs “[w]hen a court incorrectly chooses, interprets, or
applies the law.” Daily v Kloenhamer, 291 Mich App 660, 665; 811 NW2d 501 (2011). Here,
the referee distorted truancy from an act requiring repeated, willful conduct to one of strict
liability. “A strict-liability crime is one for which the prosecutor need only prove that the
defendant performed the act, regardless of intent or knowledge.” People v Adams, 262 Mich
App 89, 91; 683 NW2d 729 (2004). However, “Michigan courts must infer a criminal intent for
every offense in the absence of an express or implied Legislative intent to dispense with criminal
intent.” People v Janes, 302 Mich App 34, 53; 836 NW2d 883 (2013). MCL 712A.2(a)(4)
specifies that a juvenile must have willfully absented himself from school. The referee’s cryptic
statement fails to discuss the willfulness of respondent’s conduct. In addition, the referee’s
assumption of jurisdiction appears predicated merely on its experience as a former teacher, rather
than on the facts and the law presented in this case. Respondent was entitled to individual
consideration based upon the law and facts applicable to his case, not on anecdotal experiences
of the hearing officer. See Brausch v Brausch, 283 Mich App 339, 354; 770 NW2d 77 (2009).
Our review of the record compels a finding that respondent’s conduct in this case was not
willful as contemplated under MCL 712A.2(a)(4). Petitioner’s own witnesses admitted that
certain of respondent’s absences were attributable to illness and fear of bullying. Moreover,
petitioner’s own attendance record categorized many of respondent’s absences as “excused,”
although the school official testified, in essence, that “excused” did not mean “excused” for
purposes of the allegations made in the petition against respondent. The official testified that the
designation “E-P” on the attendance record indicated “excused, parent called [in],” and the
notation “E-IL” designated “excused for illness,” a circumstance where a parent called to report
that the student was home sick. The official was unsure what the “E-PC” designation
indicated—he speculated that it was a parent call-in—and that “R” indicated an absence due to a
school-related function, which absence would not be considered as truant. When asked about the
use of the word “excused” on the attendance record in light of the school’s position that, instead,
the referenced absences were in fact “unexcused,” the official said, “[y]ou know, I—excused is
an interesting term. It just means a parent called.” Thus, it appears that respondent’s attendance
record says one thing but means another and that certain “excused” absences were in reality
“unexcused.”
Respondent’s mother provided the reasons for respondent’s absences. Respondent was
being bullied in school and he would periodically become physically ill and vomit in the
morning for several hours; again, petitioner conceded it had received reports of bullying.
Respondent’s mother also provided a doctor’s note to the school excusing certain of the disputed
absences, and excused two days in March 2012 because respondent was competing at a dog
show in Kentucky—an activity recommended by respondent’s therapist. Respondent missed two
or three days after that due to “a stomach bug” and when he had a migraine headache, a
symptom of his Asperger’s disease. Finally, respondent’s mother explained that she was hesitant
to take her son to the doctor’s office because it cost between $50 and $200 per visit. This
evidence was not disputed, except by the school’s position that the absences noted as excused on
the attendance sheet were, in fact, apparently secretly unexcused, and that any absence needed a
doctor’s note. We conclude that, under these facts, respondent’s mother exercised reasonable
parental discretion and that the absences should have been deemed excused upon her request.
-4-
On this record, and contrary to the notion that respondent’s absences were “voluntary or
intentional,” the evidence militates against a conclusion that respondent’s absences were
“willful” within the meaning of MCL 712A.2(a)(4). The referee failed to address the evidence
presented on the record or make any reference to the “willful” element of the statute under which
respondent was charged. Indeed, the referee made no findings of fact or conclusions of law of
any kind and does not appear to have applied the law to the facts of the case in any way. It
appears rather that the referee substituted her personal experience and bias and failed to apply the
law to the facts; such a position is untenable.
Reversed and remanded for entry of an order of dismissal.
/s/ Stephen L. Borrello
/s/ William C. Whitbeck
/s/ Kirsten Frank Kelly
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