Is Devolution Universal? A Comparative Analysis of Regionalization and Subnational Governments
William E. Carroll
Sam Houston State University
Prepared for presentation at the 2012 Annual Meetings of the Western Political Science Association
Portland, OR
November 23, 2012
Is Devolution Universal? An Analysis of Regionalization and Subnational Governments
Introduction
Even ostensibly unitary systems like Japan, France, and Italy have devolved significant responsibilities
and new spheres of political representation to the sub-national level of government: regions, states,
provinces, prefectures. This paper describes these sub-national governments, their structures, degree
of representativeness and autonomy, precise relationship to central government – in the case of Europe,
representation of regional and local governments at the supra-national level, the European Union. The
comparative analysis encompasses cases from Western Europe (UK, France, Italy, Spain, Belgium and
the Netherlands), India, Japan, and South Africa. These cases include federal (with references to the
US), unitary, and intermediate systems that allows for comparisons – and “testing” whether the cases
truly conform to existing categories.
Great Britain/United Kingdom
If one is looking at the U.K., then Northern Ireland is included, and the latter – apart from the long
period of direct rule during the “Troubles” – has had its own elected assembly and executive since it
came into being. Even with its systemic discrimination against Catholics, the Northern Irish government
at Stormont was responsible – as it is now – for education, housing, jobs training, and economic
development. Following the Good Friday agreement – and now with a power sharing executive,
including Republican and Unionist – power and authority have been devolved to the assembly and
administration in Northern Ireland. It is true that national identity in Northern Ireland remains
conflicted – with 47% identifying themselves as British, 27% as Irish, and 26% don’t know (Rose: 84).
This simply accentuates the unique position of the province.
Even leaving Northern Ireland aside, Great Britain could only be described as unitary now with the
qualifications that follow. This will be done in the course of describing the devolved Scottish and Welsh
structures of “self-government” and the powers now accruing to them. A directly elected Parliament
sits in Edinburgh, with devolved responsibilities for: agriculture, education, criminal law, social welfare,
health care, and environment (Hancock: 18). Granted these are delegated and not “constitutionally
reserved” powers, but it’s very difficult to envision a government in London attempting to limit or
abrogate these powers. The situation is further consolidated by the presence of a Scottish Nationalist
Party (SNP), in fact heading a minority administration currently. Indeed fully three quarters of Scots see
themselves as Scottish as opposed to British (Rose: Ibid). One other measure of Scottish devolution is
the turnout for and the vibrancy of elections to the Scottish Parliament. Turnout has declined from its
highs in the 1970s and 1980s but continues to hover at 50 – 6-% ( ). And the presence of SNP in the
Parliament has grown from 35 in 1999 to 69 (out of 129) in the last election in 2011. It is interesting to
note that in addition to 73 single member constituency seats, 56 are elected by PR in 9 regions.
In the Welsh case, three fifths identify themselves as Welsh, manifesting the strength of Welsh identity
– but not separatism. And the Welsh Nationalist Party, Plaid Cymru, is considering changing its name to
English to broaden its appeal (BBC News). The devolved Assembly in Cardiff possesses fewer powers
and less autonomy than the Scottish Parliament. But power will continue to devolve to the Welsh
Assembly, including most recently housing, all housing powers including the ability to legislate on empty
homes, as well as private rentals, and the right to buy has been abolished (InsideHousing.co.uk). The
Assembly can now implement laws in the following areas: Most recently the Assembly has been given
the power to vary tax rates, thus increasing its ability to, among other things, foster economic
development (Inside Housing). Wales thus represents further devolution within the “unitary” British
system.
France
France is the quintessential unitary system, where all real power is said to reside in and emanate from
Paris. Its subdivisions have historically been administrative units of central government, governed by
centrally appointed prefects. There are the departments, both self-administered and administrative
sub-units of the central government (Safran: 141). Each department has a general council and a
President or chair and a prefect, now called a commissioner. The general council since 1986 is elected
and the President is chosen by the general council. The latter’s responsibilities include budget, local
taxes, laws on housing, roads, welfare services, cultural programs, and education services. Since 1972
departments have been grouped into 22 regions, each with an elected assembly (Ibid: 142). Its
responsibilities include fire protection, upkeep of schools, some social services, taxes, and public order.
Thus there is electoral accountability – and its attendant legitimation – at both the departmental and
regional levels of government. Since Mitterand in the 1980s more responsibilities have been “devolved”
to the departments and regions, part and parcel of a new committed to “decentralization” (Ibid: 165).
In fact by constitutional amendment in 2003 France is now a “decentralized republic” (Ibid: 143). This is
not federalism, but the decentralization is real and builds on traditional mutual dependency. National
ministries have the formal power to implement laws, rules, and regulations but need the cooperation of
local and regional officials who in turn depend on resources provided by the central government (Ibid:
169). There have always been the notables at the local level, whose cooperation was essential and who
frequently also held some national office. Now the system is more formalized, politically,
administratively, and constitutionally. Further powers will devolve to the regions, already the key
subnational level of economic development (Loughlin).
Germany
If France is the quintessential unitary system in Europe, Germany is the model federal system. The
sixteen states, or lander, have responsibility for education, media, internal security and police. The
lander are responsible for implementing most national laws (Conradt: 220-221). As in the US the lander
are disparate in size, population, and wealth – ranging from the most populous, North Rhine Westphalia,
to the city-states of Bremen and Hamburg, and Germany’s largest and capital city Berlin. It remains the
case that the eastern lander – Saxony, Saxony Anhalt, Brandenburg, Thuringia, and Mecklenburg West
Pomerania – are significantly behind the western lander in income: from just over 20,000 euros per
capita in the eastern lander to the high 30,000s and above in the west (Ibid: 222).
As with the states in the US, each lander has an elected parliament and an executive accountable
directly to the parliament (whereas Governors in the US are elected). Each lander is a separately
contested political entity, with the political parties organized at the lander level, as are parties in the US
states. Just as some states in the US are predominantly Democrat or Republican, so in Germany Bavaria
is staunchly Christian Democrat while Berlin is reliably Social Democrat and Left (the former PDS).
Otherwise party politics is competitive with occasional changes in power. Finally, as with all federal
systems, German federalism provides a sub-national level of representation and administration.
Italy
Italy is another ostensibly unitary system, but according to some it is neither federal nor unitary but
“quasi-federal” (Nanetti: 351). Like France there has been a gradual devolution of considerable
responsibilities to the sub-national levels of government: regions, provinces, and communes. The
Constitution of the First Republic called for power to be devolved to the regions, but this wasn’t
substantively begun until the 1970s (Ibid). Before then the prefect, appointed by the central
government, could annul and suspend any actions taken at lower levels, including the regions (Ibid:
352). But beginning in 1975 and continuing with a series of central decrees, regions have begun to
become more autonomous. For one thing, the prefect can no longer annul or suspend regional
legislation; now this requires instead an administrative tribunal elected by the regional council (Ibid).
The prefects are confined to controlling local governments. The regions now have exclusive powers in
the areas of agriculture, transportation, social policy, and development. They also have co-decision
roles over the budget, though they remain dependent on central finance (Ibid: 353). For example,
regions exercise responsibility for health and allocate funds, but these come from the central
government.
There are thus limits on regional devolution: regions cannot exercise their concurrent powers without
an enabling statute passed by a central agency; they have no original taxing power of their own; and
while a suspensive veto by the commissioner (formerly prefect) can be overturned , this can in turn be
blocked by the Constitutional Court or Italian parliament (Ibid: 352). Nevertheless the Italian system is
now a much more decentralized one, with considerable autonomy and responsibility at the local and
regional levels. Indeed the regions have been incorporated into the Office of National Representatives
in Brussels and the Council of Permanent Representatives (Ibid: 353). This attests to the established
status of the regions.
Spain
If Italy is a case of “quasi-federalism,” it might be more difficult to describe or characterize Spain. While
the Constitution speaks of the “indissoluble unity” of the Spanish state, it proclaims as well the right to
autonomy by the “nations” and the solidarity among them (Heywood: 21). Article 137 of the
Constitution also guarantees the right of self-government to municipalities, provinces, and “autonomous
communities” (Ibid). However there is no definition of autonomy but rather is left to negotiation
between the region seeking autonomous status and the central government (Ibid). Three of the regions
– Catalonia, Basque country, and Galicia – were granted automatic autonomy, although the exact terms
of autonomy were subject to negotiation (Ibid: 22). Catalonia and the Basque country have successfully
exacted terms of greater autonomy during both Socialist and Popular Party governments as the latter
depended on the support in coalition of the Catalan and Basque nationalist parties. By whatever
method - and the Constitution provided three: historic regions with automatic right to autonomy,
application under Article 143 which provided for a five year transitional period, and the “exceptional”
route following a referendum – by 1993 all seventeen Autonomous Communities were established
(Ibid).
Regarding the powers of the Autonomous Communities, they possess exclusive, shared and concurrent
powers (Ibid: 27-28). Exclusive powers encompass planning, public works, agriculture, tourism (actually
shared) and others. As noted with the other countries a region’s true autonomy is partly determined by
its sources of funding. The ACs depend on Madrid for half of their funding, as transfers and grants (for
example, health and human services). Still, they possess their own taxing powers, which has
accompanied the devolution of administrative responsibilities. Nevertheless the ACs do not have as
much control (except Catalonia and the Basque country) over revenue as the states in the US or the
Provinces in Canada (Ibid: 29-30). Negotiation and bargaining continue though, often through party
channels – parties are organized at the regional level (Ibid). Finally, as will be noted again later, the
regions (ACs) are responsible for implementing EU structural funds, environmental programs, and others
(Ibid). Furthermore regional leaders strongly support European integration, especially in the areas of
regional development, R and D, and regional cooperation. And since 1996 regional representatives can
participate in Spanish delegations on EC Commission Committees and working groups (Ibid: 34).
Belgium
The first article of the Belgian Constitution states that “Belgium is a federal state, composed of
communities and regions” (About Belgium). In addition to the Federal State, there are three
Communities and three Regions. Each has an elected Parliament and Executive (in Flanders the
Community and Regional institutions are merged so there is a single parliament and executive. The
three regions are the Flemish region, the Brussels-Capital region, and the Walloon region. The powers
of the regions have been extended through a series of reforms, giving them powers relating to the
economy, employment, agriculture, water policy, housing, public works, transport (not the Belgian
Railways), the environment, town and country planning, nature conservation, credit, foreign trade,
supervision of the provinces, communes, and inter-communal utility companies. A broad range of
powers indeed but what’s significant is the basis of Belgian regionalism: ethnic divisions between the
Dutch speaking Flemish and the French speaking Walloons. Even political parties have been organized
along ethnic-regional lines, with for example a Flemish Socialist party and a Walloon counterpart. The
Communities then are by definition based on the concept of language and culture, which is dependent
on the individual. The Communities have powers for culture (such as theatres and libraries), education,
the use of language, individual health care, social welfare, family assistance, and scientific research –
and international relations associated with their powers. The Belgian State retains powers in the areas
of foreign affairs, national defense, justice, finance, social security, and national health. Utilizing
quantitative measure of regional authority shows the Belgian communities and regions rating high on
the indicators of self-rule (Fabre: 8). Belgium then qualifies as a federal system by virtually any
measure.
Netherlands
“As an intermediary level between the state and the municipalities, the twelve Dutch provinces have
limited powers and largely carry out minor administrative duties and serve as links between the top and
lower echelons of government” (Wordpress). This is clearly the description of a unitary system. It is
interesting that provincial legislatures are responsible for electing the Senate or First Chamber, which
has the power to veto legislation. This gives importance to provincial elections.
Still, the Constitution is quite clear on the place of provinces in the Dutch political system: Article 123
states “provinces and municipalities may be dissolved and new ones established by Act of Parliament,”
by Dutch Civil Law. In fact the role played by provinces in the Dutch system has been characterized as
“invisible” (Toonen: 14). Nevertheless the provinces are responsible for implementing policies beyond
their scope, such as environmental management, physical planning, economic and social policy,
countryside policy, public and youth welfare, and culture. The provinces are tasked with implementing
EU policy and upholding European regulation, referring to the EU Cohesion Policy and agriculture. The
provinces also work together through the Association of the Provinces of the Netherlands (IPO) whose
responsibility is to promote provinces’ joint interests. Further the IPO maintains contact with the
Council of European Municipalities and Regions (CEMR), the Assembly of European Regions (AER), the
Conference of Peripheral and Maritime Regions of Europe (CPMR), and the European Industrial Regions
Association (EIRA). Finally the elected provincial councilors serve on the advisory Committee of the
Regions (COR) of the EU. The COR has become an important advisory and representative body in the EU
(Carroll).
European Union and Subsidiarity
Local and regional levels of government in the EU have received a boost from the establishment in the
Maastricht Treaty of European Union, and confirmed in the Lisbon Treaty, of the principle of
subsidiarity. Combined with the creation of the Committee of the Regions sub-national levels of
government are recognized as essential and enduring and in fact an increased role for them at both the
national and supra-national levels was foreseen. Subsidiarity was seen by those opposed (at Maastricht
and since) to a deepening of The EU as a “vindication of state sovereignty” (Newman). In this context
subsidiarity was seen an assertion by national governments against the supranational powers of Brussels
(Carroll: 348). Nevertheless the principle of subsidiarity is more than a guarantee of member states’
competence; the subnational level is recognized in the Lisbon Treaty (Ibid: 349). Impetus for the
creation of the CoR and for a greater role for subnational levels of government came from the German
Lander (Newman). The German Lander as well as the Belgian regions pressed their own governments to
allow them to participate in Council decisions or relevance to them (Carroll: Ibid). Regions had already
formed an Assembly of Regions which also pushed for a COR. The Assembly also supported the COR’s
position that the EU should not interfere with existing divisions of power among national, regional, and
local governments. Those regions with greater autonomy in their own systems – Bavaria, Catalonia,
North Rhine-Westphalia, Salzburg, Scotland, Wallonia and Flanders – expressed a desire for the EU to
compel member states to further empower regions and take their views into account on matters they
feel fall into their policy areas (Carroll: 350). The COR of course insists that local and regional
governments play a central role in EU decision making – and as noted it is the COR that represents local
and regional governments. For member states therefore they must address the question of how to
apply the principle of subsidiarity to their own divisions of responsibility between central, regional, and
local government (cor.europa.eu).
Japan
It’s possible to argue two sides of the question of power in Japan, centralized or decentralized. Meiji
abolished the feudal daimyo’s regional power with their armies and hereditary claims (Hoye: 87). The
daimyo were transformed into three hundred prefectures (later reduced to seventy two and then to the
current forty seven). Prefect governors were appointed by the central government. Taisho saw the
emergence of stronger local governments with more autonomy, for example governors appointed by
local councils, nor could the central government line-item veto prefectural budgets (Ibid). Such
autonomy was eroded during the war by the Imperial Rule Assistance Association. During the post-war
Occupation local governments were reinvigorated through greater autonomy in finance, elections,
public services, and public enterprises, all intended to increase citizen control and access to local
government at the prefectural and municipal levels (Ibid). Prefectural assemblies were given power to
override budget vetoes and greater power to approve gubernatorial appointments (Ibid: 88). In the
1960s and 1970s prefectures successfully resisted attempts by central government ministries to replace
prefectures with administrative regions (Ibid: 89). Nevertheless less room is left for local and
prefectural responsibilities by the creation of national government controlled public corporations, such
as the Highway Public Corporation and the Housing and Urban Development Corporation (Ibid).
Japan is usually referred to as a unitary system where sub-national governments possess no reserved
powers (Ibid: 90). Nor is local autonomy clearly defined in the Constitution in a way that would defend
it from central encroachment (Richardson and Flanagan: 55). But as seen above local autonomy was
increased in the decades since the Occupation, with successful local and prefectural resistance in the
1960s and 1970s. The forty seven prefectures collect taxes, have a say in police, education, and other
matters, and can pass laws and regulations of business, pollution control, and public and industrial
safety (Ibid: 56). Popularly elected governors and assemblies seek to balance national ministerial staff
in prefectural administrative offices. It is true that municipalities and prefectures cannot pass
ordinances that conflict with national law (nor can states in the US). Much of what they do is to carry
out national government functions; receive administrative guidance from central ministries; and are still
financially dependent on central government for local finances (Ibid: 57). Still, municipal policies vary in
response to local political conditions and there is a lack of complete congruence between local and
national spending priorities (Ibid). And there are growing signs of a more assertive and innovative role
for municipalities and prefectures in the policy making process (Ibid). This already in the 1990s was part
of a worldwide trend among advanced industrial unitary systems towards greater devolution of power
to lower and intermediary levels of government (Ibid: 58-59). Chapter 8 in the Constitution refers to
local government and states that “decentralization is the spirit of the times in all advanced democratic
states” (Hoye: 90).
India
India is a case of “quasi-federalism,” neither unitary nor federal but a combination of the two (Bijugaya).
To correct the presumed weaknesses in the US and Canadian systems, the central government is given
more power to intervene: for example, can fire state Governors (Ibid). No state can secede and if a
state’s legislature passes laws in concurrent areas of responsibility that conflict with national legislation,
the will of Parliament in Delhi prevails (Ibid). Such national supremacy obtains in the US. Quoting A. K.
Singh, Pathak refers to simultaneous unionization and regionalization processes (Pathak). Rao and Singh
(2004) describe a system of asymmetric federalism where power is unequally divided between the
Union (center) and the states. One aspect of Union control is finance, where low income states depend
on central government for two thirds of their revenue but high income states for only one third (Mitra:
92). At the same time there has been growing regional influence (Pathak; Mitra: 90). Mitra attributes
the latter to the decline of Congress and the rise of regional parties and the liberalization process which
has forced regional governments to shoulder more responsibilities on their own (Mitra: 98-99). Mitra
goes on to explain the growing federalization of India’s national politics with regard to four conditions:
“elite accommodation;” “public involvement;” “competition and collusion” between intergovernmental
agencies; and the role and impact of political parties, including the relations between branches at all
three levels of government (Ibid: 100).
Is India a federal system? Employing Wheare’s framework Mitra concludes India satisfies the four
conditions of federalism. These are: there are two level of government, with independent spheres of
administrative and legislative competence; independent tax bases; a written constitution clearly
demarcating boundaries; and a system of independent courts to adjudicate in disputes between the
central government and the states (Ibid: 95). Further the percentage of the population displaying
interest in and loyalty to regional (state) governments have grown and in the case of the latter (loyalty)
is now a majority (Ibid: 92-93).
South Africa
South Africa’s constitution establishes an undivided state with nine provinces (Olivier: 72). Provinces
are described in Chapters Six and Seven of the Constitution and their powers in Schedules 4 and 5.
Generally the provinces service the delivery of concurrent powers (dependent on revenue from the
central government for 95% of their revenue), though the constitution provides the potential for greater
revenue capacity (Forum of Federations). Thus they can raise their own revenues but cannot impose
broad business taxes, such as corporate income and profits, personal income, consumption and trade
taxes, but can raise fees on vehicles, licenses, gambling, liquor, hospital fees, and tourism (Mokate).
Provinces exercise concurrent powers in education, health, welfare, environment, public works, and
housing, transportation, development, trade, language and culture, and others (PEI). Exclusive power is
exercises only in the following areas: abattoirs, ambulance services, provincial archives, provincial
libraries, liquor licenses, provincial museums, planning, provincial sport, roads and traffic (Olivier: 88).
Obviously the concurrent powers encompass the most important policy areas.
Is South Africa federal? The constitution does not declare South Africa to be federal, but is federal in
form (Simeon). There are three “spheres” of government, each with assigned powers, each
independently elected, and each protected by the constitution, enforced by the Constitutional Court
(Ibid). South Africa’s is a highly centralized federalism. This goes back to the apartheid era’s abuse of
provincialism, as well as a fear of tribal and linguistic fragmentation. Another concern was that stronger
provinces might impede the national government (Ibid). Nevertheless the goal as stated in Chapter 3 of
the constitution is “cooperative government” (Ibid). The three spheres are to be “distinctive,
interdependent, and interrelated.” There are several bodies to further cooperation in the national
sphere, including a Budget Council for Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations, a Council of Education
Ministers, and most important the National Council of Provinces, NCOP (Olivier: 76). The NCOP has ten
delegates per province with proportional representation of the parties; its powers include participation
in amending the constitution and can pass legislation within the Schedule 4 categories of powers. It
takes a supermajority in the National Assembly to override the NCOP (Ibid). The NCOP was consciously
modeled on the German Bundesrat, that is, representation of provinces at the national level (Simeon).
Comparative Analysis
The question is whether from the above any trend can be discerned, tending to greater devolution of
power to sub-national regional governments. Do such entities exist even in the unitary systems? Do
they have significant powers and responsibilities? Do they possess an independently elected base? The
answers to these questions allow a preliminary answer to the broader question of devolution. As stated
in the Japanese constitution: “decentralization is the spirit of the times in advanced democratic states.”
Quoting Richardson and Flanagan earlier moves toward a greater provincial (regional) role in Japan is
part of a worldwide trend.
In every system studied there exist sub-national entities, whether regions, states, provinces,
prefectures, or autonomous communities. In each of these systems this regional government is
independently elected or has an elected assembly even where the executive is appointed. Even in
France executive power is now shared with a regional President chosen by the general council. The
power to raise revenues independently is one important mark of autonomy. Some degree of taxing
power is possessed by all, but varies in scope and degree. Spain’s ACs, Belgium’s Communities, and the
Scottish and Welsh parliaments have significant taxing and budget powers, compared to the greater
dependence on central funding in India, South Africa, Italy and the Netherlands. Powers and
responsibilities vary, but typically include agriculture, social welfare, transportation, development, and
education. Typically “high politics” are left to the central government: foreign relations, currency, and
macro-economic policy. This is no less true of federal systems than of unitary systems.
Placing each system in the unitary-intermediate-federal matrix produces the following Table:
Country
UK-GB
Formal System
Unitary
Regional Entities
Scottish Parliament
Welsh Assembly
Northern Ireland Assembly
Foundations
National
Category
Advanced
Intermediate
France
Unitary
22 Regions
Administrative Embryonic
Intermediate
Germany
Federal
Lander
Historical
Italy
Unitary
Regions
HistoricalIntermediate
Administrative Quasi-federal
Spain
Unitary
Autonomous
Communities
NationalLinguistic
Advanced
Intermediate –
Quasi-federal
Belgium
Federal
Communities
Regions
Linguistic
Federal
Federal
Netherlands
Unitary
Provinces
Historical
Unitary
Japan
Unitary
Prefectures
Administrative Embryonic
Devolution
India
Federal
States
LinguisticCultural
Quasi-federal
South Africa
Unitary
Provinces
HistoricalEthnicLinguistic
Embryonic
Intermediate
These categorizations approximate each country’s Regional Authority Index (RAI) rating as described in
Fabre (10-11). The highest rankings go to Belgium, Germany, and Spain and even Italy. Lower ratings
are obtained by France, the Netherlands, and the UK (Ibid). Scotland ranks high in self-rule, while the
Dutch provinces do rank lower (Ibid). Still, as seen, the regions in France are gradually, incrementally
emerging as “fully-fledged” subnational governments (Loughlin: 559). Even the Dutch system sees
increasing shared governance (Toonen: 3).
Conclusion
For every unitary system federal or embryonic federal features are present: this is no less true of France
and South Africa than Japan or even the Netherlands. It’s misleading then to refer to Italy and Spain as
unitary and leave it at that.
The obvious next step in this research id both to broaden it – more cases – and deepen it – more
detailed explication of local and regional governments, their structures and powers, and the
intergovernmental relations between them and their central governments. For example, in Europe
what are national governments doing to implement the principle of subsidiarity. At the theoretical level
it makes sense to bring in the literature on multilevel governance. This would also broaden and deepen
the comparative analysis.
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