Marius Mazziotti | CBEES Annual Conference 2014
The European Security Architecture 1990 – 2014: Old
Approaches to New Problems?
Introduction
Although the Cold War came to an end almost two and half decades ago, a brief glimpse at
European security institutions reveals that its legacy is still present. With the continued heavy
emphasis on the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and, at least in the last decade of
the past century, the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), one might
argue that the post-Cold War security architecture in Europe has continued to rely heavily on
institutions initially founded on Cold War premises. In order to answer to which extent this
emphasis on Cold War institutions allows Europe to provide and create security, we need to
understand the evolution of this architecture. To understand the roots of contemporary
European security this paper seeks briefly to shed light on the period between 1945 and 1990.
Thereafter, the development of the security architecture from the early 1990s onwards will be
dealt with. As will be shown, although the contemporary security structure relies on cold war
institutions, they are still essential and helpful in creating security in the current security
environment. Yet, how effective and sustainable this architecture still is, will rely upon the
conclusion of the current crisis over Ukraine vis-à-vis Russian-Western relations. This paper
does neither seek to give a prediction of its arguably unpredictable outcome, nor does it attempt
to lay out a detailed account of the latest events and most current affairs. It seeks to give the
reader an appreciation of the evolution of the European security architecture since the end of
the Cold War, by telling the story of “how we got here,” hoping that this strategy provides a
framework on which to formulate and, ultimately, answer the important questions regarding
future policy.
With austerity policies across Europe, one of the most pressing challenges facing policy makers
today is getting the best value from an ever shrinking revenue base, while maintaining the
relative safety the European continent enjoys today – even despite the Ukraine crisis. The
relevance of this question and the need for solutions was even more so evident with
Washington’s “pivot to Asia.” However serious and realistic one might see these pivot
ambitions - especially in light of the Ukraine crisis - it still illustrates the relatively growing
importance of Asia, indicating a shift from the times of the Cold War. Nonetheless, not all is
about austerity as the central problems well predate the financial crisis of 2008. The central
1|The European Security Architecture 1990 - 2014
issue revolves around the European notion of finding the right means to achieve aspirations.
That this problem existed before the economic turmoil is further underlined by Robert Kagan’s
(2004:1-2) dichotomy that on major strategic and international questions today ‘Americans are
from Mars and Europeans are from Venus.’
When the Second World War had finally ended, the continent was devastated after years of
bitter fighting. However, it was fool heartedly to assume that this would be the start of a
peaceful time to come. The breakup of the anti-Hitler alliance marked the beginning of the
Cold War. The Cold War was solidified in 1946, but had become policy with the Truman
Doctrine of 1947 (Applebaum, 2012:604). These events intertwined then made the Cold War
a reality. The rising tensions, mistrust and incongruities were eventually accelerated by the
beginning of the Berlin Blockade of 1948.This finally manifested the divide into East and West,
setting the stage for the foundation of NATO a year later, followed by the Warsaw Treaty
Organization (Warsaw Pact) in 1955.
But with the East-West conflict building up, it was not before long that doctrines of nuclear
deterrence became driving forces in international relations. Especially the experience of the
Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962, and the fact that it could only be solved through secret
backchannels, illustrated that more formal means of communication among opposing nations
were needed (Galbreath, 2007:12-13). Therefore, in an atmosphere of détente negotiations for
a pan-European gathering to deal with security issues were launched in the early 1970s. As a
result, the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) was established and
frequently brought together 35 member states outside the capacity of military alliances.
In short, by 1990 two organizations had been established in Europe (in addition to the Western
European Union - WEU) to deal with questions of security. Whereas the former was tackling
more hard issues between Western states, the latter addressed ‘soft’ issues crossing the iron
curtain.
2|The European Security Architecture 1990 - 2014
NATO – Now Almost Totally Obsolete?
Between 1949 and 1990, NATO maintained a paramount position being one of the, if not the,
main pillars of West European Security. Next to the European Recovery Program (Marshall
Plan) that offered European states financial aid in exchange for committing to a democratic
order, the spread of communism was contained to a large degree by the Alliance with Article
V of the Washington Treaty that gave signatories a hard security insurance against the Soviet
Union.
Thus, the old security environment was established by 1949 and further manifested with
ascension of Greece and Turkey in 1952, and West Germany in 1955.
However, changes came rapidly when the Berlin Wall began to crumble in November 1989.
With the subsequent reunification of Germany in 1990, NATO expanded its territory
eastwards. In hindsight, one of those in charge of the process, Robert D. Asmus (2002:4)
interpreted this development as ‘an early sign that NATO’s role in Europe was growing, not
shrinking.’ Indeed, facing the challenge of either going out of area or out of business, the choice
fell to the former.
Ambassador Wolfgang Ischinger (2009), now head of the Munich Security Conference,
concluded that ‘Europe’s existing [new] order was constructed in the 1990s, after the
reunification of Germany, the retreat of Soviet forces, and the end of the Soviet Union.’ This
string of unforeseen events put leaders on both sides of the Atlantic Ocean into zugzwang.
However, the chessboard in this metaphor was real - it was nothing smaller than Europe.
In July 1990, NATO’s Heads of State and Government agreed on the need transform the
Alliance to ‘reflect on the new, more promising, era in Europe’ (NATO, 1991). Surprised by
these developments, Washington was put at crossroads and had to raise the questions on which
to figure out whether they could afford to start pulling-out of Europe, or whether they would
need to maintain their presence. Obviously, the latter was decided on.
Despite all former enemies had ‘dismantled the Warsaw Pact and rejected ideological hostility
to the West’ (Ibid), the Alliance saw little necessity completely to rethink their strategy. This
becomes clear in Part IV of the new Strategic Concept where the members stated that: ‘The
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presence of North American conventional and US nuclear forces in Europe remains vital to the security
of Europe, which is inseparably linked to that of North America’ (Ibid).
Although the North American members in the declaration supported a higher responsibility
towards European security to be taken by Europeans, the question why they held on to NATO
has to be raised. For the alliance’s main enemy and raison d’être disappeared, the necessity for
remaining US presence could be questioned.
But only because the Soviet Empire has collapsed, that did not mean that Russia was
not posing a threat anymore. Its search for a new role also posed big uncertainties. And Russia
was; a) still a military power, and b) still in possession of a large nuclear arsenal, and c)
stationed forces in East Germany and Poland, reluctant to fully withdraw before 1994 (Hilz,
2005:97). Especially the newly independent Baltic states who had been part of the Soviet Union
longed for NATO protection vis-à-vis the new Russian Federation, a feeling that was shared
by Poland and other Central European states (Readman, 2004:139-45).
Another point shall also be expressed at this stage: Even though the Cold War was over and
the year 1990 created a big wave of optimism among both scholars and the public, policymakers knew that changes also evoked new uncertainties.
Nonetheless, the idealism that resulted from the end of the Cold War also made the idea of
disbanding NATO, just like the Warsaw Pact, a viable option for some scholars (Hilz,
2005:95). The scenario would be to build-up the CSCE as a pan-European security forum. This,
however, was rejected by most NATO members as well as opposed by Central and Eastern
European states undergoing transformation. The viability of this scenario will be further
explored later.
Despite other options could have been viable and many were hastily predicting the Alliance’s
end in the immediate aftermath of the Cold War order, we have to conclude that these
predictions have been proven wrong and acknowledge that NATO has somehow been able to
re-adjust to new security realities.
This task was managed through incorporating new strategic concepts (1991, 1999,
2010), acquitting new members, almost all of them former adversaries (despite Slovenia and
Croatia), and not at last, through the deployment of troops to theatres across the world.
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In 1993, the same year the United Nations deployed peacekeeping troops to BosniaHerzegovina, NATO enforced a no-fly zone that lasted until the Dayton peace agreement of
December 1995 (Holbrooke, 1999:316f), marking NATOs first ever combat mission.
These events were seminal in illustrating that it was in fact not the “hour of Europe”
but that the US was badly needed for regional conflict resolution. After steadily growing
tensions and almost a year of failed negotiations over the state of Kosovo NATO launched air
strikes against the Serbian capital in March 1999 (Lindley-French, 2007:81f). Despite the
inability to obtain a UN Security Council Resolution, due to Chinese and Russian objection,
and tensions between NATO and Russia, a modus vivendi was reached. Thereafter, NATO’s
Kosovo Force (KFOR) consisting of British, French, German, US and Italian troops could
occupy the territory of Kosovo (Ibid). Although this was a proof that solidarity and
commitment among NATO members could still be found in the post-Cold War order, there
have also been conflict dimensions. First, the US insisted that the war plan was to be devised
in the Pentagon. Additionally, General Wesley Clark’s leadership led to repeated tensions
(Betts, 2001). Furthermore, Washington criticised the European members of not having done
enough (Lindley-French, 2007:81f). On the bottom line, however, NATO has found a way to
work together when it mattered.
The year 1999 has marked not only the fostering of the alliance’s strategic role in Europe but
also the adoption of a new strategic concept, and the launch of a process of expansion that over
the following ten years incorporated twelve new members in three separate waves (Ivanov,
2011:155). Thus, the alliance sought to increase, not shrink its role in Europe. But by going out
of area rather than going out of business, NATO’s inherent nature has changed: from what used
to be a collective defence alliance, securing its members’ territories against a common threat,
the alliance was headed towards being a global guardian of liberal values, not necessarily
reluctant to use force against states that did not attack any of its members (at least not in a
traditional sense with conventional land forces).
In broader terms, the new Strategic Concept emphasized ‘multidimensional risks and
threats often difficult to predict’ (Martins, 2010). Thus, it reflected a geographic shift away
from Central and Eastern Europe towards the alliance’s southern borders which were identified
as containing more diversified risks.
The first major tests whether or not NATO was an enduring institution were successfully
passed. But its biggest tests and largest military operation was yet to come.
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Overwhelmed by the 9/11 attacks, it was announced that Article V would be invoked for the
first time in history a day later (Daley, 2001). After the picture got clearer throughout the
following days, and unsuccessful demands for the extradition of Osama Bin Laden through the
Taliban regime in Afghanistan, Washington decided to launch strikes against Afghanistan in
October 2001 as the first stage of ‘Operation Enduring Freedom.’
The US being endorsed by its allies in Europe and beyond, a meeting between Western leaders
and an Afghan interim government was organized in Germany. At this gathering it was decided
that an International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) should be established. It marked the
way into the NATO-led ISAF mission that continues to the end of this year
As previously experienced in Kosovo, diverging capabilities, interests and willingness
for contributions to the mission created an asymmetrical burden sharing. Unsurprisingly, this,
in addition to the issue of Iraq, led to repeated tensions. That this was the case is illustrated by
the warnings of a ‘two-tier alliance’ expressed by US Defence Secretary Robert Gates
(Sevastopolu, 2008) and Henry Kissinger in 2008 (Washington Post).
Some went even further than Kissinger, Gates, and others. Noetzel and Scheerer have argued
that the divisions among members are facilitated in a trend of disintegration towards a ‘multitier alliance’. In broad terms, diverging views on the role of military power in international
politics and the role of military alliances have caused a principal division. Thus, members find
it increasingly hard to agree on certain issues that have caused the ‘fragmentation of the
alliance’s membership into a tier-system’ (Noetzel and Scheerer, 2009:5f). They differentiate
between; the reformist-tier that includes the Anglo-Saxon countries who want NATO to take
on a broader set of (global-)challenges and argue its interests would be served best through
continued integration into US grand strategy. Second, the status-quo tier, including Germany
and France (and most West European countries), which is critical about a ‘globalized alliance’
as they see it interfering with the advancement of an autonomous European Security pillar, i.e.
CSDP. And finally, a reversal-oriented tier, that rosters the Central and Eastern European
countries which emphasize the importance of Article V, based on the perception of a resurging
Russian threat (Ibid).
The anxieties of member states belonging to the latter group have been fuelled by the
reservations of some of the Western allies to condemn Russia’s invasion of Georgia in 2008.
Whereas the UK, the Baltic States and Poland quickly demanded fast consequences, Berlin and
Rome remained rather lukewarm in condemning the Russian actions (Schiltz, 2008). And, most
obviously, the case of Ukraine and Crimea has been grist to the mill for these countries. In the
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reversal-oriented tier’s view, NATO should make substantial efforts to minimize the
possibility of any resurgence of a Russian threat and help post-Soviet states to stabilize their
acquired democratic and liberal values. Michaels (2011:5) suggested that ‘the Baltic states,
Poland, Romania and others view Russia as a more pressing security challenge than those
NATO is dealing with, or thinking of dealing with, outside Europe.’
On 31 March 2011 NATO took over the lead from the US Africa Command (AFRICOM) of
air and naval operations directed against forces loyal to the Libyan leader Gaddafi (Michaels,
2011:1). Although the mission began as an AFRICOM-led ad-hoc coalition of the willing,
Washington, heavily involved in Iraq and Afghanistan and under fiscal pressure, was reluctant
to maintain the lead indefinitely.
A nominally British-French-led mission run through the mechanisms of CSDP garnered little
support. Ultimately, NATO-lead was the only viable option that guaranteed the transatlantic
link (Michaels, 2011:3). Although countries like Poland and Turkey have expressed reluctance
to the mission and Germany abstained its vote in the UNSC (Horeld, 2011) they had no interest
of repeating the debate that so damaged the intra-alliance solidarity in 2003 (Michaels, 2011:3).
For the first time in alliance history, the European NATO members have, at least in
theory, taken the lead in an operation (Economist, 2011). This was driven to a large degree by
a belief in the Obama administration that Libya lies in Europe’s backyard and a problem first
and foremost for Europeans to solve, especially as European NATO members were pushing
for it (France and the UK, respectively) and were arguably presumed capable enough to take
the military lead (Michael, 2011:3). Whereas the strategic thought behind this from a US
perspective might have been to establish a predecessor for a model on which, if possible, to
base future operations, others have been speculating that this would be the alliance’s last
mission or even its end (Anne Applebaum, 2011; Francis, 2011; Kaplan, 2011). Others, for
instance, Daalder and Stavridis (2012), labelled it as a success case on which future operations
should be based.
Although many observers saw a NATO, or at least a US, move to get militarily involved in
Syria well underway, and Obama’s “red line” – as outlined in August 2012 (Kessler, 2013) as
having been crossed, open military action against the Assad regime has not been taken. This is
a delicate issue as NATO Secretary-General Rasmussen openly demanded an involvement in
September 2013, whereas the ambassadors of the 28 member states, while condemning Syria’s
apparent use of chemical weapons, have limited themselves to stressing that they see no wider
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role for the alliance in the civil war itself (Riegert, 2013). And as of yet, NATO underlines that
it is not affiliated with the US-led coalition against the Islamic State which is flying sorties in
both Syria and Iraq.
Under this context, it seems frankly impossible for the alliance to reach consensus on collective
action. As earlier mentioned, there has been a wide debate concerning the role of NATO:
Stavridis and Daalder see the Libya campaign as proof that the organization matters. Yet, even
the former NATO Secretary General Rasmussen found critical words. Acknowledging the
growing spending and capabilities gap, he proposed an emphasis on “Smart Defence”, NATOs
counterpart of the EU’s Pooling and Sharing as a lesson to be learned from Libya – a wake-up
call. (Rasmussen, 2011). Godzimirski and others (2010) have warned about a “NATO á la
Carte”, i.e. every member chooses from a menu of cooperation possibilities. By no doubt, this
would imply further challenges as well as probably leading to further fragmentation. On the
bottom line, if the coherence and the ability to act, that seems to have been lost over Libya and
Syria, will not be restored, even the greatest NATO enthusiasts will find it hard to predict an
enduring future for the alliance that “celebrated” its 65th anniversary this year. One might
hypothesize if the alliance is busy preparing for its retirement in the year the NATO-led ISAF
mission is coming to an end. In which case, it could be observed that NATO is well underway
of becoming obsolete.
The OSCE – A player that matters in today’s European Security,
or an obsolete Cold War artefact?
Like NATO the OSCE is an institution founded according the rule book of the Cold War.
Originally established as the Conference for Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE), its
successor still exists today. To understand to which degree it is embedded in the security
architecture in Europe, this section seeks to outline its history and achievements as well as
shortcomings and failures. Does the OSCE’s raison d’être today go beyond offering a “talk
box” between Russia and the West? If not so, what does it serve better than the Council of
Europe (CoE) which has Russia on board since 1996 as well as many post-Soviet states. Is its
Cold War Structure, as was argued (Berger, 2014), indeed useful in the Ukraine crisis?
8|The European Security Architecture 1990 - 2014
In the mid-1960s the members of the Warsaw Pact proposed a European conference to address
matters of security and (economic) co-operation. A similar move had already been rejected in
1954, when the Soviet Union proposed a 50-year treaty to be signed after implying demands
on the recognition of East Germany (GDR), precluding West Germany’s membership of
NATO and de-linking European and American security interests. These were demands
considered simply unacceptable by the Western Powers. Although NATO members were
highly cautious after the new move in the 1960s, principles on which to indicate their readiness
for further talks provided certain conditions were met have been found; full participation of
Canada and the United States, reconfirmation of the legal status of Berlin, a discussion of
conventional weapons disarmament in Europe, and the inclusion of human rights on the
conference agenda (OSCE, 2007:2).
The Ostpolitik of West German Chancellor Willy Brandt and the Strategic Arms Limitation
Treaty (SALT) talks between Nixon and Brezhnev being so advanced that they could sign the
Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty in 1972, a momentum was created that allowed for the
establishment of a Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (Ibid).
The first three stages of the conference then took place between July 1973 and August 1975.
The 35 participating countries came to the table and discussed questions concerning security
in Europe, co-operation in the fields of economics, science, technology and the environment,
and humanitarian and other fields. Remarkable is that each state was represented in its own
capacity, irrespective of their NATO and Warsaw Pact membership or their non-aligned or
neutral status. Thus, the CSCE provided a pan-European security forum for states from Europe
and those who saw their interests directly linked to it in the Cold War order. It also went beyond
hard notions of security and stressed issues revolving around humanitarian or soft security.
Or, a more “comprehensive” approach than both the Warsaw Pact and NATO sought to provide
for its members.
Just as NATO, the CSCE had to rethink its role on the eve of the Cold War. This question was
discussed at a meeting in 1990 and concluded in the ‘Charter of Paris for a New Europe.’ In
this charter the members declared mutual respect, a commitment to democracy based on human
rights, and security- and confidence-building measures among other things (CSCE, 1990).
Hence, it was an attempt to make the CSCE process matter in a new era to come. It is tempting
to argue that this was an attempt to maintain old methods in the new era. However, even if this
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argument is brought up, one must bear in mind that the commitment to democracy was an
unprecedented breakthrough evoked by the new European reality.
At the Helsinki Follow-up Meeting in 1992, it was decided to create Forums on Security Cooperation and Economic Co-operation and to establish a High Commissioner on National
Minorities (CSCE, 1992). Having undergone a comprehensive institutionalization, the
members decided that it was time to reflect these changes in their organizational set-up. At the
Prague meeting in 1994 it was agreed that:
The CSCE is the security structure embracing States from Vancouver to Vladivostok. We are
determined to give a new political impetus to the CSCE, thus enabling it to play a cardinal role
in meeting the challenges of the twenty-first century. To reflect this determination, the CSCE
will henceforth be known as the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
(CSCE 1994).
It was further decided that the OSCE will function as a “primary system for early warning,
conflict prevention and crisis management” and will enhance this role using “inter alia
peacekeeping operations and missions (Ibid).” Thus, arguably, decisive, comprehensive and
quick decisions were taken to reflect the challenges ahead and make the OSCE matter.
Therefore, the OSCE was working towards playing an important role in the European security
architecture and ‘establishing new tools to deal with new challenges’ (Italics added - Ibid).
However, one may question how successful the OSCE really has been in realizing its goals.
First, OSCE involvement in Kosovo and the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict will be briefly
investigated. Thereafter, the case of disbanding NATO in favour of a pan-European security
forum will be explored, raising the question if there might lie a missed chance. Ultimately, an
attempt to raise the question of the OSCE’s continuing appropriateness will be made: Is it still
playing an important role, or is it, in fact, busy being engaged in displacement activity, touching
issues that are not of major concern to European Security?
First missions to monitor the deteriorating human rights situation in the FYR were deployed in
1992 (Malmvig, 2006:45f). As the situation has become worse, and with Serbian atrocities in
Bosnia in mind, FYR’s CSCE membership was suspended in mid-1992. Being strongly
condemned for the human and political rights situation in Kosovo and the deteriorating climate
in Bosnia, the FYR then decided to expel CSCE monitoring staff and deny future access to the
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province of Kosovo. Over the following years, the situation became significantly worse. Under
UNSC Resolution 1203 an OSCE-led Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM) was deployed to
monitor the situation in Kosovo in late-1998 (UNSC, 1998). However, the situation flared up
again in early 1999 and on 20 March, KVM staff started pulling-out of Kosovo after facing
obstruction to the extent that they could not fulfil their mission. Two days later, a final
ultimatum was given but Milosevic was reluctant to comply still, and as a consequence the
NATO air campaign was initiated a day later (Walker, 1999).
The OSCE had to realize that it was not able to broker Serbian compliance, and NATO resorted
to the use of force. After the Serbian forces pulled-out of Kosovo and KFOR soldiers were put
on the ground, the OSCE decided that it was time to restore presence in Kosovo. As of today,
the mission is still present (OSCE, 2013). The OSCE mission complements the NATOinvolvement and enjoys a good record, despite flaring up tensions from time to time.
Nonetheless, it can only be speculated if this would at all have been possible without NATO’s
decision to resort to force.
The major bloodshed between Azeris and Armenians in the war over Nagorno-Karabakh has
been occupying the OSCE in the early 1990s. And despite the signing of a peace agreement in
1994, the situation among the two countries remains tense, causing well over 3,000 deaths
following skirmishes alongside the border of Nagorno-Karabakh since then. The OSCE set-up
the so called “Minsk Group” that consists of a troika of France, Russia and the United States
and is tasked for the settlement of the conflict. However, despite providing a platform for
discussions, it did not manage to mitigate these tensions that could still possibly spark another
war. Its efforts have thus been adhered to as a failure and an increased effort such as
peacekeeping forces could not be shouldered by the OSCE (Mazziotti, Sauerborn, Scianna,
2012).
In Kosovo, the OSCE benefited from collaboration with NATO and the EU that eventually
allowed the organization to complement these missions, by contributing assistance in fields
beyond their scope. Nonetheless, eventually the predecessor for this contribution was that
NATO provided security on the ground, not vice versa.
Additionally, the OSCE was involved in many other conflicts throughout the 1990s, including
Tajikistan, Latvia and Georgia (OSCE, 2007). In some cases, it provided important advice on
democratisation and the rule of law, or citizenship questions. In others, like Chechnya and
Kosovo it had to pull out, once the security situation began to flare-up again. Its record
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throughout the 1990s is thus a very mixed one, shaped by failures as well as achievements. It
served as a confidence-building and early consultation forum. But was often undermined by
other developments, such as the growing suspicions of Russia over the build-up of an
autonomous security pillar of the European Union, NATO expansion and missile defence
plans.
A scenario, yet highly hypothetical one, is whether or not it would have been viable to establish
it as the primary European Security forum in the 1990s. Although hypothetical, Wolfgang
Zellner (2005) argued that these ideas found traction. Russia’s hope was that the CSCE/OSCE
would provide a treaty-based security order, i.e. an all-inclusive NATO. Nonetheless, the desire
of the West to advance and enlarge its own institutions eventually toppled this hope. Years
later Ischinger (2009) raised the question if ‘OSCE summits could provide the overarching
political roof that some find to be missing in the current structure’ by strengthening the
organization’s role.
Could the OSCE really have provided a framework in the question of Ukraine, where both the
EU and Russia pursued individual interest, handing out sticks and carrots to Kiev?
What could the OSCE possibly have done to overcome the rifts running through Ukrainian
society? Especially given the fact that in 2013 it employed three staff, employing merely 41
locals and had a budget of €2,826 million (OSCE, 2013a)?
Although this might be a scenario that could have served for better relations between the West
and Russia as we experience these days, it seems to be unattainable. At the moment relations
between Russia and the West seem to be distorted over much more than simply just over
Ukraine. What is obvious, however, is that these tensions call for an overarching political roof.
But whether the OSCE could provide this at all, is highly doubtful.
The OSCE has since the Cold War undergone drastic changes. From what used to be a
conference process, it has developed into an entity that intends to be an international
organization of significance. Or, as it thinks of itself: ‘the world’s largest regional security
organization’ (OSCE, 2013b). It now rosters a total of 57 members and represents the many
new states that emerged in Eastern Europe, Central Asia and the Caucasus. It employs 2,690
personnel of which 2,119 serve in one of its 16 field operations (Ibid). But with its tiny budget
of a mere €145 million, its means seem rather limited. The OSCE must, however, be awarded
its due credit for doing much to address new security challenges in the fields of emphasizing
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human security, minority rights, democratisation and the rule of law. However, if it really has
much to offer in these fields is questionable.
I would argue that its current design provides far too little to offer a political roof to address
the important questions of Europe’s new security reality. Although it is not my intent to
marginalize or ridicule the role of the OSCE in countries in the Caucasus or Central Asia, it
seems that its often tiny staff and budget cannot play an important role in the respective human, political- or minority rights situation. It seems that it is trying to be busy addressing these
issues in different operations, while refraining from seriously touching pressing issues such as
revitalizing the role of the “Minsk Process” or Western-Russian relations, or trying to provide
a better framework for dialogue and trust-building among the Ukrainian population and outside
countries. Despite increasing its presence in Ukraine since early 2014, its efforts seem yet
questionable.
I adhere to underline the initial argument that the OSCEs current role can be described
as displacement activity, trying to engage with many small issues, rather than committing itself
to touching important and sensitive questions. Typically, this is an environment in which NGOs
focusing on few issues in many countries may provide good records. For an international
organization seeking to be of significance, this might be insufficient. However, many others
would disagree with this statement (Hallunaj, 2013; Liechtenstein, 2014). Galbreath
acknowledged in 2007 (:126f) that the OSCE made its biggest impact in areas where it worked
together with the EU and NATO but comes to conclude that the OSCE ‘will continue to hold
an important place in the European security architecture as long as there are both insiders and
outsiders in the Euro-Atlantic area.’ It is true that in order to make an impact the trend seems
to demand an engagement of either the EU or NATO that complements an OSCE mission. But
if this is an appropriate rationale for its continuing existence remains highly debatable.
ESDP/CSDP: Europe’s answer to new challenges?
The EU’s goal to establish its own “Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP)” was started
to be implemented with the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty, signed in 1992 and entered
into force a year later. One could assume that CFSP is thus a post-Cold War achievement,
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seeking to tackle the new challenges that lay ahead. However, this statement is misleading. For
one, the aspiration to formulate an “own security dimension” (to whatever extent) wellpredates the fall of the Soviet Empire. Second, its achievements in respect to being an
autonomous player in the global arena are still limited.
With the European Defence Community (1952), the ‘Fouchet Plan’ (1957), and the European
Political Cooperation (1969), European security policy aspirations have existed for a long time.
Yet, none apart from the WEU have materialised. And, indeed, the WEU was from the start to
be military integrated into the NATO framework and before long it became ‘NATO’s junior
sibling’ (Salmon and Shepherd, 2003:25-6). It therefore becomes clear that the idea of
European military organization well-predates CFSP ambitions from the early 1990s. Hence,
although today’s CSDP is a post-Cold War child, its notion is deeply entrenched in the trends
of the EDC and WEU.
The CSCE agenda has already expanded the notion of security to focus on human and political
rights. However, as long as the Cold War was on-going, the international security discourse
has been largely concerned with security between states (Deighton, 2006:22). As soon as the
Cold War vanished, the new environment allowed for a new kind of thinking. With the
Petersberg Tasks (1992) and the Common Concept (1995), in which it was argued that ‘security
is indivisible that a comprehensive approach should underline the concept of security’ (quoted
in Deighton, 2006:22), the WEU had contributed to these new concepts decisively.
Nonetheless, its role completely vanished since 2000 as most of its functions and staff were
taken over by the EU (Ibid). It seems that European “security” institutions were driven by
attempts to create security approaches and tasks that did not cut across NATO’s provisions.
Even though American officials frame their j’accuse around this perceived duplication of
institutions.
The loosely formulated CFSP pillar, was “upgraded” with the 1997 Amsterdam Treaty, which
‘for the first time envisaged the use of military resources for EU policy aims, albeit at this stage
via the WEU’ (Bailes, 2005:4). It also established the CFSP High Representative, a post Javier
Solana assumed once the treaty was put into force (Stivachtis, 2008:10). However, not much
content was behind this framework until the French-British meeting at St Malo. It concluded
with bilateral proposal demanding that the ‘Union must have the capacity for autonomous
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action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them and a readiness
to do so, in order to respond to international crises’ (Saint Malo Declaration, 1998).
Washington has been following the developments across the Atlantic closely from the onset
and offered its conditional support. The conditions for support of the Clinton and Bush
administrations have been laid out by Secretary of State Madeleine Albright as the ‘three –
D’s’: no discrimination against non-EU NATO members, no decoupling of European and
North American security, no duplication of NATO’s operational planning system or its
command structure (Hamilton, 2004:144).
The lessons from Kosovo fuelled ambitious efforts and advancements over the following years.
But at the same time, it also fuelled loaded discussions among those: who saw the pacific nature
of the European Union and its role in international relations endangered; Atlanticists, fearing
anything that might have undermined NATO; whereas nationalists categorically rejected the
idea of sharing national military assets with the EU (Deighton, 2006:26).
But especially in the post-9/11 environment it has become clear that for the US there
are more pressing regions such as South Asia, North Africa or the Middle East. This conclusion
will lead to a trend that the United States needs to further reduce its forces in Europe to freeup contingencies for operations beyond the continent or will just use Europe as a springboard
to Africa and the Middle East. The message is clear: Europeans should carry a greater burden
for security within their own periphery, whereas Washington maintains stability elsewhere in
the world.
But although the year 2003 was one shaped by bitter divisions not just within NATO but also
across the EU (with France and the UK leading the opposing camps), in many ways it was also
a year in which the EU made a leap forward.
For instance, the EU foreign ministers tasked CFSP High Representative Solana with the
drafting of a strategic concept in May 2003 (Biscop and Andersson, 2008:1). Over the
following months the first draft of the European Security Strategy (ESS) was widely discussed
and polished, and finally adopted in December 2003 (Stivachtis, 2008:11). A big matter of
debate was a collective stance on the transatlantic partnership. Eventually, however, the phrase
that the ‘transatlantic partnership is irreplaceable’, a point that caused disagreements when the
first draft was presented, was adopted in the final version (Jones, 2004:496).
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Overall, it appears that the 2003 document remains fairly vague in most of its parts, emphasizes
the importance of the transatlantic partnership, its commitment to international and regional
organisations and to act before surrounding countries begin to deteriorate.
Yet, it was by no doubt an important step to take and an attempt to mitigate the major rift across
the EU and NATO. It certainly must be acknowledged that given the tensions at the time, it
was an achievement to agree on a comprehensive strategic document that outlines common
threats all parties agreed on.
With Operation Artemis (Democratic Republic of Congo), the first ever military mission in the
framework of ESDP was conducted (Gourlay, 2003). The year also marked the first operation
under the ‘Berlin Plus’ agreement that allows the EU to draw upon NATO assets. Operation
Concordia took over a NATO operation that deployed around 300 peacekeeping troops
between March and December 2003 (Giegerich and Wallace, 2004).
However, these missions were fairly small and not much was yet achieved to establish
operational ESDP forces.
Five years after the ESS was adopted, a report on its implementation was conducted. Again, it
was pointed out that the partnership with Russia, the OSCE, UN and NATO must be further
strengthened. Next to adding climate change and cyber security to the agenda, the report does
not show much critical evaluation or novelties (European Commission, 2008). And yet, it
leaves unclear how crises should be dealt with beyond economic and political sanctions.
Preceded by years of negotiations and arguments, the final adoption of the 2009 Lisbon Treaty
signifies another leap forward in the teleological history of the ESDP. The foremost novelty
was a change from the denomination of ESDP into the Common Security and Defence Policy
in order to provide the EU with an operational capacity drawing on civil and military assets
provided by the member states (Grevi, 2009:62). It also extended the range of the Petersberg
Tasks to allow the CSDP to stretch its range to include: joint-disarmament missions, conflict
prevention and post-conflict stabilisation tasks. Also, a commitment to “progressively
improve” military capabilities was agreed between the members (Ibid).
Again, significant progress has been made, but yet, the Lisbon Treaty did not cause a breakthrough in regards to EU military capabilities. Also seem the military capabilities of the overall
Union declining rather than increasing.
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To this day, we are looking at one and a half decades of ambitious promises in operational
military capabilities that have shown little results. Initially, the EU set the Helsinki Headline
Goal (HHG) in 1999. The objective was to be able to deploy 60,000 troops plus supporting
aerial and naval assets within sixty days, self-sustainable in the theatre for at least a year, by
the end of 2003 (Shepherd, 2011:9). The goal was raised in 2000, aiming at 100,000 troops,
400 combat aircraft and 100 naval vessels (Ibid). Nonetheless, by late 2003 it was clear that
even the initial goal was not to be met. Consequently, a new Headline Goal (HG) for 2010 was
formulated in 2004. It initiated the European Defence Agency (EDA – formally established in
the Lisbon Treaty, although operational since 2004), that sought to improve military assets in
Europe and EU Battle Groups (Ibid). Battle Groups were to consist of around 1,500 personnel
each, deployable within five to ten days and able to fulfil the full range of the Petersberg Tasks
until 2007 (Lindstrom, 2007). Nonetheless, although the goal was met in 2007, Shepherd
(2011:10) points out that the quality of the battle groups varied substantially. As of today, no
such battle group has ever been deployed.
In 2010, the now 27 EU member states collectively spent around $200 billion on defence. By
comparison, the 2010 US defence budget amounted to a total of $663.8 billion. The EU
members allocated around 1.7 per cent of their GDP to defence, compared to the world average
of 2.4 per cent and the US spending amounting to 4.5 per cent of GDP. (Kern, 2009). The latest
figures show that most of the EU spending is declining, whereas only three EU-NATO
members have spent the agreed 2 per cent of GDP on defence (whereas Greece cannot afford
it), and the US still spending more than three times as much as all EU countries combined
(Petersson, 2013). Defence spending is now down to $194 billion annually for the now 28
member states. In a time when Russia and China seek to double their spending in 2015
compared to 2011 (Mahony, 2013). With further cuts almost ensured, military reforms such as
in Germany or the UK will show a drastic cut of forces are to be seriously accelerating the
trends. This also will dwindle into serious tensions with the United States, as the EU-NATO
members are falling far off their commitments – for instance, with Germany currently
allocating a mere 1.3 per cent on defence expenditures (World Bank, 2014).
The capabilities have been appallingly put to surface following the 2011 NATO Libya
campaign led by France and the United Kingdom. Less than a month into the European-led air
campaign, the UK and France ran short on ammunition, calling on to Washington to fill the
gaps (DeYoung and Jaffe, 2011). Additionally, the US supplied 80 per cent of the air-to-air
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refuelling, significant numbers of targeting staff as well as invaluable surveillance and
intelligence (Barry, 2011). It was thus still not an entirely European-led mission as Washington
was “leading from behind.” The even more obvious, yet frightening, lessons from Libya are
the realizations that running the mission through the mechanisms of CSDP was never a viable
option and the question of solidarity among European countries, given that Germany –
Europe’s most affluent country – did not even contemplate taking part at all.
The long awaited defence summit of the European Union in December 2013, the first of its
kind since five years, did not bring much remedy to the pressing questions. The bottom line
was that the President of the European Parliament Martin Schulz had to admit that the EU is
still militarily dependent on the US and France’s request to receive financial contributions from
EU coffers for a nationally planned mission in the Central African Republic was turned down
(Süddeutsche Zeitung, 19 December 2013).
Timothy Garton Ash (2004:218) once wrote that ‘Europe has a hundred left hands and none of
them knows what the right hand is doing.’ The current situation seems to proof him right.
The NH90 Helicopter – once a widely appraised common defence project – has been
ordered in 23 different versions, by 23 different EU members. The idea of either “Smart
Defence” through NATO, or CSDP’s pooling and sharing has been widely discussed and
acknowledged as the future for a capable Europe in an age of austerity. In respect to the latter
it was announced in 2011 that 300 projects would foster on increased cooperation in that
respect. By the end of 2013 this was realized in a total of eleven projects (Uken, 2013). Some
have already observed that rather than pooling and sharing, the EU members are heading
towards fooling and scaring. The lacking will to further co-operation in the defence market,
and pre-occupation by national interests have not at last been recalled by the failed BAE
Systems/EADS merger in 2012, where national interests led to Chancellor Merkel’s objection
(Milmo et al, 2012). This merger could have been a real break-through towards a European
defence market, yet failed on grounds of short-term national economic interests.
European decision-makers seem to take its benign security environment taken for granted and
thus do not see the necessity of investing, or at least maintaining, operational military
capabilities. This approach, however, is crucially dangerous. Following financial pressures, it
cannot be expected that Washington will altruistically continue shouldering Europe’s burden
to maintain security on the continent vis-à-vis protection of it. The end of the ISAF mission in
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Afghanistan by the end of 2014 will result in an overdue discussion and eventually lead the
United States to reassess the role of NATO. That US officials are dissatisfied with the
effectiveness of the indecisive EU foreign policy has been further underlined by the remarks
of the former US Ambassador to NATO and now Assistant Secretary of State for European
and Eurasian Affairs Victoria Nuland in February 2014. In a private call that was intercepted
and leaked to the Ambassador in Kiev she dismissively referred to slow-moving European
efforts to address the situation in Ukraine, saying ‘F—k the EU’ (Gearan, 6 February 2014).
This may or may not give an impression about the opinion of US officials on the merits of the
current state of CSDP and its effectiveness. It certainly is interesting what role the Ukraine
crisis will play in this respect. Will it have a similar effect like Bosnia played for the US’s role
in the 1990s? Or, will it necessitate the Europeans to “beef up” their respective military
capabilities? Or, to the very contrary, will the whole state of affairs in European security finally
be subject to questions that have long been overdue?
19 | T h e E u r o p e a n S e c u r i t y A r c h i t e c t u r e 1 9 9 0 - 2 0 1 4
Conclusion
All covered institutions showed a tremendous amount for change and adaptation over the
course of the Cold War and after the end of the bipolar period. Based on the evidence provided,
it is quite clear that although the current security architecture in Europe is still dominated by
its set up established during the Cold War - but this is not the problem as such.
While internally the countries in Europe are facing a great deal of safety, dangers and
non-traditional threats are rising beyond its borders. The Balkans seems to be the more stable
and promising than at any time in the past two decades. In terms of political and societal
security the members of EU and NATO have little to fear about, despite the current economic
troubles. Indeed, high figures in youth unemployment in the southern countries might raise
concerns, as repeated and often violent protests have occurred e.g. in Greece and Spain over
the past years. Yet, the scale is not alarming, nor do they pose an existential threat as they seem
to be a normal reaction in times of a temporary economic turmoil. Environmental security does,
unless for example an unlikely event of a nuclear accident occurs, not concern the European
continent as such. Still, the results of climate change could lead to a sharp influx of refugees –
which is already an issue harassing the Mediterranean countries. Nonetheless, the European
Union is capable and equipped to sufficiently meet and master these challenges, if the political
will is there.
More concerning issues lie outside EU borders; especially Ukraine but, amongst others,
also the Caucasus, where the tense situation between Armenia and Azerbaijan could still spark
another war. Such an event would not only destabilise the wider neighbourhood but also affect
oil- and gas imports. And in light of the Ukraine crisis the East-West relationship seems to be
at an all-time low. The on-going crisis in the Middle East and ISIS’ advance contains the
potential of further destabilisation of the wider-region and further atrocities in the EU’s own
periphery are (almost) guaranteed. Uncertainties in North Africa additionally create potentially
fertile ground for terrorist groups – a challenge yet to be adequately addressed. These
uncertainties are of big concern to countries in their immediate periphery like Malta, Greece,
Italy and Turkey. The problem this evokes is that these countries identify threats much
differently than the Baltic States or Poland for example.
Europe still enjoys the status of a “free-rider” benevolently covered on American expenses.
Yet, it is doubtful how long this can and will be the case, especially given the context that
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European states have been offering less and less in return. NATO structures are being
duplicated, or at least being attempted to reproduce, through the institutionalization of CSDP,
whereas the defence spending goal of its NATO members has been ignored for years, unlikely
to change in the following years. The investigation devoted to NATO shows, that it is
increasingly becoming more difficult to find collective stances in NATO as well as members
having different expectations of the alliance’s role. If the US’ interest in European Security
further declines, it can be assumed that without advancing its military capabilities, the EU’s
ability to maintain security within its periphery will eventually be both a paper- and a toothless
tiger.
Although a mutual defence clause is included in the Lisbon Treaty, this means little if it is not
backed by adequate capabilities. Thus far NATO has not been too big to fail, but too busy to
fail. This could change quite rapidly now that the Afghanistan mission comes to an end.
But the crucial question is not what NATO, the OSCE, and CSDP currently have to offer or
not. The important question is, if their absence leads to problems and with the lack of
alternatives or visions how to replace them, the answer would be: Yes. Which leads us to the
next question: is it the institutions that European security lacks or the right policies? This
question cannot be answered definitively. Nonetheless, the current institutional set-up allows
for more effective policies, but we have not experienced an increase of such policies. Therefore
it can be assumed that more effective policies would deliver better outcomes. Hence, the
biggest problem European security encounters is the struggle to formulate more efficient
policies.
The OSCE was an important organisation, whose considerable achievements in the 1990s must
not be dismissed. However, it seems to fall well short of contributing viable solutions where it
matters most, e.g. the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and NATO/EU-Russian relations, or the
current situation in Ukraine. It seems to be far too understaffed and underfunded to provide a
significant contribution to overall European security and its most recent action in Ukraine
seems like a belated and rather desperate attempt to be involved somehow. This is not to say it
has become obsolete, but to stress the importance to revise its role and to ask whether it can do
more, for which it would certainly need more access to funds and staff, let alone political
backing; or, if it should be disbanded and if a new institution should be established to cover its
tasks. Currently it is not offering the ‘overarching political roof’ missing. It would be
21 | T h e E u r o p e a n S e c u r i t y A r c h i t e c t u r e 1 9 9 0 - 2 0 1 4
worthwhile to think about higher frequency in meetings and extended membership of the CoE.
Many of the fields where the OSCE possessed valuable “niche-capabilities” have now been
duplicated by the ENP. ‘In the end’ Galbreath (2007:124) admitted, ‘two organizations doing
the same job means duplication, inefficiency and a waste of resources.’
Robert Cooper (2003:83) probably remains right when more than a decade ago he suggested
that ‘this is a dangerous world and it is becoming more dangerous.’ Complex problems, call
for complex and decisive solutions. The current EU answers fall far-short from delivering these
solutions, as long as the key questions are not being addressed. It would theoretically be
possible to get more value, for less money – however, to reach this, EU states must work
together and national interests should not interfere in this respect. A possible Brexit following
the referendum in 2017 would further hamper plans for a collective autonomous CSDP. If the
referendum succeeds, the EU could find itself in a situation where the only viable alternative
would be to revitalize NATO.
However, this would bring three problems: One would be the question of NATO-Russia
relations. Second, the question of fairer burden sharing, given descending military expenditures
and third, to find a way to maintain overall coherence in an alliance that seems to be heading
towards a multi-tier alliance. The question where the European security architecture is heading
and what can be done about it can thus not be answered once and for all and is certainly beyond
the scope of this paper, especially within the current environment where uncertainty seems to
be as evident as ever. What could, however, be achieved is to answer that the current situation
remains in the old Cold War legacy, yet hoping to answer new challenges. NATO’s continuing
role might be questioned, but establishing an effective alternative that would guarantee the EU
members a continuously safe existence and a role in the international system that matters,
would come at high costs. It is therefore hardly surprising that politicians and decision-makers
stress its importance and the necessity to work multilaterally. However, if this attitude does not
change, the EU can do little to escape the dilemma of being an economic giant but a political
pygmy. Overall, the current security architecture in Europe is unlikely to work effectively, if
pressing challenges are not addressed. Being a heterogeneous organisations, allows the EU for
more partnerships through more members, but is also not free from the danger of experiencing
rifts. Effective sub-regional co-operation is already being practiced, and if these show greater
merits than the overall CSDP, the Union may see itself break up into fragments.
22 | T h e E u r o p e a n S e c u r i t y A r c h i t e c t u r e 1 9 9 0 - 2 0 1 4
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