Xuanzang’s proof of idealism (vijñapti-mātratā): The Origin and Controversies
Shigeki Moro (Hanazono Univ.)
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Dignāgean logic in Japan l
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Gakuryo 学侶 (scholar monk)
Rongi-e 論義会 (Buddhist service with Discussion)
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Oral examination for learned priests → chanting/a kind of recital (public reading)
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Both Buddhist philosophy and Buddhist logic
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November 13: Jion-e 慈恩会 at Kōfukuji or Yakushiji temple
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December 16: Hogo-e 方広会 at Hokke-dō, Tōdaiji temple
Numerous studies on Nyāya-praveśa and the commentary of Ji 基
Popular subjects:
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Four fallacies due to contradictions with the reason (四種相違因)
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Xuanzang’s proof of idealism (vijñapti-mātratā)
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2.
Form of Dignāgean logic l
Sample:
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Thesis (pakṣa): That mountain has fire.
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Reason (hetu): Because [it has] smoke.
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Example (dṛṣtānta): Like a kitchen.
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Similar example: [Whatever has smoke has fire,] like a kitchen.
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Negative example: [Whatever doesn’t have fire doesn’t have smoke, like a lake.]
General form:
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Thesis: P has S.
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Reason: Because [P has] H.
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Similar example: [Whatever has H has S,] like D.
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Negative example: [Whatever doesn’t have S doesn’t have H, like V.]
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Undervaluation of East Asian Buddhist Logic in Japan l
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Japanese modern scholars of Indian logic including NAKAMURA Hajime 中村元
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East Asian Buddhist logic is incomplete and/or partial (?)
Active studies in modern China
Re-evaluation in international meetings
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Proof of Idealism l
Based on Ji s 基 Yinming-ruzhengli-lun-shu 因明入正理論疏 (YRLS; Commentary on Nyāya-praveśa)
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Fallacy of contradiction to common sense (lokaviruddha, 世間相違)
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At Śīlāditya s 戒日王 Buddhist service in Kānyakubja (Kanauj) 曲女城
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For Non-Buddhists and Hīnayāna Buddhists
After traveling around India and completing his study, our master [i.e. Xuanzang], wanted to return to China. At
that time, Śīlāditya, who was the king of India, held a large and uninterrupted Buddhist service that lasted for
eighteen days and asked our master to spread his interpretation of Yogācāra all over India. The king chose those
who have wisdom and goodness, called them to the service. He sent non-Buddhists and Hīnayāna Buddhists to
dispute with Xuanzang. Our master had made the following inference and no one could make an argument
against it:
Thesis: In truth (真故, *paramārthataḥ), colors and forms (色, *rūpa), which are mutually accepted [by proponent
and opponent] (極成, *lokaprasiddha), are not separate from the visual consciousness.
Reason: Because, [based on the ground] I accept (自許), they are included in the first three [of the eighteen
dhātus], but are not included in the eye.
Example: Like as the visual consciousness.
4.1.
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Historical doubt of the Proof No records in Xuanzang’s biographies
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Variation of the biographies
Introduction in YRLS after Xuanzang’s death
Xuanzang’s Biographies
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Record of Travels to Western Lands (大唐西域記)
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Further Biographies of Eminent Monks (続高僧伝; XGZ)
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Old manuscripts version (Nanatsudera 七寺, Kongōji 金剛寺, etc…)
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Printed version (e.g. Taisho ver.)
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A Biography of the Tripiṭaka Master of the Great Ci’en Monastery of the Great Tang Dynasty (大唐大慈恩寺三蔵法
師伝; DDSFZ)
Differences between biographies
Buddhist Service in Kanauj
Debate with Non-Buddhists The Proof
and/or Hīnayāna Buddhists
Record of Travels to Western Yes
Lands
Old Mss of XGZ
Yes (very short)
Taisho Edition of XGZ
Yes
DDSFZ
Yes
YRLS
Yes
Development of the biography
Old Mss. of XGZ
Arrival at Nālandā
18-day Debate with Nālandā scholar monks
Debate with a scholar of Lokāyata
Debate with non-Buddhist scholars
Buddhist Service in Kanauj
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
Yes
Taisho ver. of XGZ + DDSFZ
Arrival at Nālandā
Sīlabhadra’s teaching
Debate with Siṃharaśmi of Madhyamaka
Debate with Prajñāgupta of Sāṃmitīya
Debate with a scholar of Lokāyata
Debate with non-Buddhist scholars
Buddhist Service in Kanauj
18-day Debate with Non-Buddhists and/or Hīnayāna
Buddhists
Sīlabhadra’s teaching
Return to China
Return to China
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The record of debate in Kanauj was rewritten from the record in Nālandā
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the change of plot, or the change of the role of Sīlabhadra
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More debates were added to the newer versions
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Based on the three turnings of the wheel of dharma (dharmacakra) from the Saṃdhinirmocana-sūtra?
4.2.
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Logical Problems Bhāviveka’s logic
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A Revision of Dignāgean logic for the proof of emptiness
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Characteritsitcs:
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Use of the restriction phrase “from the point of view of absolute truth (paramārthataḥ).”
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All negative sentences must be non-implicative negation (prasajya-pratiṣedha).
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No negative examples.
Bhāviveka’s proof of emptiness (in Dacheng-zhangzhen-lun 大乗掌珍論)
Thesis: In truth (真性; *paramārthataḥ), conditioned phenomena are empty.
Example: Like an illusion.
Reason: Because they are produced by causal conditions.
Thesis: [In truth,] unconditioned phenomena have no substances.
Reason: Because they don’t arise.
Example: Like flowers in the sky.
Relationship with Bhāviveka’s logic
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Effective only on the subject or the whole fomula?
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Meaning of the term “truth (*paramārtha)”
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Four types of twofold truth
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Ji’s inconsistency ?
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In YRLS, Ji introduces Bhāviveka’s proof as a valid formula
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In his commentary of Cheng-weishi-lun (Cheng-weishi-lun-shuji; 成 唯 識 論 述 記 ), Ji severely criticizes
Bhāviveka s proof
→Many discussion have occurred in East Asia.
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Ji’s interpretation of “In truth”
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Exclude rūpa peculiar to common sense ( non-Buddhist)
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Exclude rūpa peculiar to Hīnayāna
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e.g. rūpa separate from the visual consciousness
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Ji’s interpretation of “mutually accepted”
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Exclude rūpa peculiar to Hīnayāna
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e.g. Buddha’s contaminated body
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Exclude rūpa peculiar to Mahāyāna
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e.g. The bodies of Buddhas in other worlds
In truth
mutually accepted → Rūpas which are accepted both Hīnayāna and Mahāyāna
rūpa not separate from the visual consciousness
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Tautology?
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Thesis: In truth, colors and forms (*rūpa), which are mutually accepted [by proponent and opponent], are
not separate from the visual consciousness.
→ rūpas which are accepted both Hīnayāna and Mahāyāna are not separate from the visual
consciousness.
rūpas not separate from the visual consciousness are not separate from the visual consciousness.
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4.3.
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Relationship with other theoretical disputes Debates regarding emptiness and existence
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Dharmapāla vs. Bhāviveka
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Dharmapāla’s commentary of Catuḥśataka 大 乗 広 百 論 釈 論 has a formula very similar to
Bhāviveka’s proof of emptiness
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Are they same formula?
Confrontation between Sanron school and Hossō school in Japan
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The big debate between Saicho and Tokuitsu
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Debates whether all sentient beings can attain Buddhahood or not
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Buddha nature theory vs. Five gotra theory