Dynamics and factors of transition from armed struggle to nonviolent

Dynamics and Factors of
Transition from Armed Struggle
to Nonviolent Resistance
Dr Véronique Dudouet,
Book presentation
Washington, 10.02.2015
page 2
Outline of this presentation
Rationale and methodology
Actor-based approach:
resistance/liberation
movements
Action-based approach:
repertoire of contention
Conflict ‘demilitarisation’
patterns
Drivers of change
01 Rationale and methodology
Conflict transformation stages
page 3
01 Rationale and methodology
page 4
Edited book: Table of Contents
1. INTRODUCTION - Véronique Dudouet
2. Western Sahara: Nonviolence as a Last Resort - Jacob Mundy and Stephen
Zunes
3. From the Mountains and Jungles to the Villages and Streets: Transitions from
Violent to Nonviolent Resistance in West Papua - Jason McLeod
4. Evolution of Armed to Unarmed Resistance in Palestine - Mazin Qumsiyeh
5. South Africa: The Townships Rise Up - Stephen Zunes
6. From Armed Struggle to Interaction with Civil Society: Chiapas’ Zapatista
National Liberation Army - Guiomar Rovira Sancho
7. Two Sides of the Same Coin: Indigenous Armed Struggle and Indigenous
Nonviolent Resistance in Colombia - José Armando Cárdenas Sarrias and
Katrin Planta
8. Egypt’s Revolution and the Transformation of Armed Islamist Movements
towards Unarmed Activism - Omar Ashour
9. Nepal’s Maoists: From Violent Revolution to Nonviolent Political Activism Manish Thapa
10. CONCLUSION - Véronique Dudouet
02 Actor-oriented approach
page 5
Actor-oriented approach:
Resistance/Liberation movements
Three main types of movements:
National liberation movements striving for freedom through selfdetermination (Western Sahara, West Papua, Palestine + South Africa)
Organisational, geographic and strategic divisions
Movements representing an oppressed/marginalised ethnic community
advancing agendas for cultural, economic, or political rights – but with no
claims to seize central state power (Chiapas/Mexico and Cauca/Colombia)
Three concentric organisational circles, self-defense army at the service of a social
movement
Ideological/revolutionary armed movements (Nepal and Egypt)
Emerged from a pre-existing political party and developed cohesive underground
structures over the course of armed insurgency
03 Action-oriented approach
page 6
Action-oriented approach:
Armed vs. nonviolent resistance
Conventional action
•
•
•
•
Party politics
Advocacy or diplomacy
Dialogue and negotiation
Litigation
Non-institutional/Contentious action
-------------------------------------------------------------------------Unarmed resistance
Armed resistance
•
•
•
•
Protest and persuasion
Non-cooperation (civil
disobedience)
Disruptive intervention
Creative resistance
•
•
•
•
•
Sabotage
Protest violence
Guerrilla insurgency
Terrorist attacks
Conventional warfare
04 Transition patterns
page 7
Conflict demilitarisation trajectories
Types of transition from armed to unarmed resistance
A. Collective shift to (primarily) nonviolent struggle
while retaining use of violence or access to weapons,
Cases
•
African National Congress, South Africa (1980s)
•
Zapatista Army of National Liberation (EZLN), Chiapas
(Mexico) (1994)
followed/accompanied by negotiations with the state
•
Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) (2006)
•
Armed Movement Quintín Lame (MAQL), Colombia
B. Unequivocal demobilisation in a context of
dialogue/peace process, shift to institutional action,
(1990 onwards)
followed by a (re)turn to nonviolent resistance by
•
Gama’a Islamiya, Egypt (1997 onwards)
escalation of armed struggle within a broader
•
Polisario, Western Sahara
liberation movement, but with a geographical and
•
West Papua National Liberation Army (TPN-PB)
generational gap, and no clear-cut leadership
•
Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO)
some members
C. Progressive escalation of civil resistance and de-
endorsement
05 Transition patterns
page 8
South Africa: Anti-apartheid movement
1912: African
National
Congress
established
1990-1993:
Negotiations
and peace
accords
1970s: Black 1983: United
Consciousness Democratic Front
Movement
(UDF)
established
1950s: Defiance
Campaign
1961: Launch of
armed struggle
by ANC (MK)
1912
1950
1994: ANC
electoral
victory
1961
1970
1980s: ANC armed
activity in moral
support of nonviolent
resistance
1980
1990
1994
04 Transition patterns
page 9
Chiapas (Mexico): Zapatista movement
1994:
Dialogue
with the
state
From 1994 onwards: Nonviolent mobilisation
in Chiapas, greater Mexico, and abroad
1980s: Zapatista movement
organizes for armed action
1980
1994: 12-day guerrilla
insurgency, mutual
ceasefire declared
1994
Kept unused weapons as security
guarantee
04 Transition patterns
page
10
Nepal: Maoist movement
2006: Maoists
negotiate peace
accord with the
government
Parliamentary
politics
2006:
Participation
in nonviolent
revolution
1990:
Nonviolent
revolution
Electoral politics and state
governance; disarmament
and demobilization of
former combatants
'Hardliners'
remobilise for
nonviolent
struggle
1996-2006: Maoists wage 'people's war'
1990
1996
2006
2012
04 Transition patterns
page 11
Cauca/Colombia: Indigenous movement
1991: MAQL
negotiates a peace
accord with the
government
Remobilization of some
former combatants for
nonviolent resistance
1971: CRIC
established
1977-1990: MAQL wage a
guerrilla insurgency
1971
Formal and collective DDR, party
politics, and legal channels
1980
1990
04 Transition patterns
page
12
Egypt: Islamist group (GI)
1988-1993:
Mediation
attempts
From 1997 onwards: Dialogue
with the state and DDR
2011: Some
members participate
in nonviolent
revolution
From late-1970s
onward: GI engages in
violent Islamist
militancy (jihadism)
1980
1997: GI declares
unilateral ceasefire
1997
2013:
Mix of party
politics and
nonviolent
resistance
2002: Armed
wings
dismantled
2002
2011
2013
04 Transition patterns
page 13
West Papua (Indonesia): Liberation movement
1969: "Act of Free
Choice"
National and international lobbying for West Papua
1999-2000: Mass based
campaigns
From 1965 onwards: West
Papuan National Liberation
Army (TPN-PB) operates in a
network of decentralised
guerrilla groups
1965
2010-2011: Mass based
campaigns
Many groups demobilise (but do not become
active in nonviolent resistance),
while some TPN-PB groups remain
active
1998
President
Suharto is
overthrown
2000
2010
04 Transition patterns
page 14
Western Sahara: Liberation movement
1975-1991: UN/OAU diplomatic
efforts to resolve the MoroccoPolisario dispute
1991: Ceasefire
takes hold and
MINURSO
formed
2000-present: Successive UN
mediation attempts
2005: Protests
galvanize a new
2010: Largest
generation of
activists (Sahrawi mass
demonstrations
intifada)
1975-2005: Intermittent nonviolent resistance
(significant campaigns in 1987, 1995, and 1999)
1973: Polisario
founded against 1975-1991: Polisario wage war of
independence
Spanish
occupiers
1973
1980
and most
violent under
Moroccan
occupation
Since 1991 Polisario maintains a
standing army
1991
2000
2005
2010
04 Transition patterns
page 15
Palestine: Liberation movement
1974: PLO
diplomatic
engagement
1993: Oslo
agreement
From 1993 onwards: Negotiations and statebuilding by the Palestinian Authority
1987-1991:
First
intifada
From 1990s onwards:
Violent campaigns
launched by Islamist
groups
1965-1980s: Violent actions waged
on the international stage by various
armed factions
1965
1974
1987
1993
2000:
Second
intifada
From 2000
onwards:
Decentralized
nonviolent
resistance
2009: Fatah leaders
pledge support for
nonviolent
resistance
Armed struggle by Islamists
continues intermittently
2000
2009
05 Factors of transition
Drivers of transition from armed to nonviolent resistance
Levels of analysis
Intra-group
Group-society
Group-state
Groupinternational
Mechanisms of change
•
Shifts in the identity, belief systems and strategic choices of the leadership
•
Horizontal dynamics and power shifts
•
Vertical dynamics across the hierarchy (top-down/bottom-up)
•
Pressure from (existing) allies within a broader movement
•
Coalition-building with other socio-political forces
•
Mirroring a strategy that has been proved effective by other groups
•
‘Reversed outbidding’ to emphasise one’s distinction with competitors
•
Persistence or increase in power asymmetry in favour of the state
•
Level and nature of state repression to dissent
•
Selective state inducement and political opportunities
•
Loss of foreign support and search for new allies
•
Emulation of successful regional/international models
•
Cross-border transmission of techniques and skills
05 Factors of transition
page 17
1. Intra-group factors
Shifts in the identity, belief systems and strategic choices of the leadership:
Some leaders underwent behavioural shifts caused by a reassessment of the means (e.g.
Egypt, Palestine) and/or goals (e.g. Chiapas, Nepal) of the movement.
Some movements started using nonviolent resistance more intensively after the
emergence of a new generation of leaders (e.g. Western Sahara, West Papua)
Horizontal and vertical communication and power dynamics:
Some shifts to civil resistance were induced by internal power dynamics between
‘moderate’ and ‘hardliner’ leaders/branches of the movement (e.g. Nepal, Colombia)
Rank-and-file militants were able to take up active leadership roles in civil resistance
thanks to top-down political education and ‘socialisation’ (e.g. Colombia, Egypt)
05 Factors of transition
page 18
2. Group-society factors
Pressure and incentives from existing or potential allies:
Some armed groups become sensitive to ‘war fatigue’ within their community
(Colombia, West Papua)
Others become socialised to join broader civil society campaigns (Chiapas, Nepal) –
including in alliance with their opponents’ constituency (South Africa, Palestine, West
Sahara).
Relations with other socio-political actors operating in the same social
environment:
Armed groups might turn to civil resistance to mirror a strategy used effectively by
others (Palestine, Colombia, Egypt)
Or they might adopt unarmed means to distance themselves from their political
competitors (Colombia, Palestine)
05 Factors of transition
page 19
3. Group-state factors
Persistent power asymmetry and counter-effectiveness of guerrilla warfare:
Some armed groups realised that the correlation of forces with the state forced them to
adopt nonviolent struggle as an alternative methods of asymmetric conflict, and as ‘a
tool of necessity, not of choice’ (Western Sahara, South Africa).
Others first attempted to negotiate a peace deal and adopt conventional politics, before
turning to civil resistance as a more effective method to effect change (Palestine,
Colombia, Egypt).
Impact of state repression to dissent or political opportunity structure:
The impact of repressive state policies on their members and communities forced some
movements to reconsider the (ethical) benefits of armed vs. nonviolent methods of
struggle (West Papua, Egypt).
Some movements seized political openings (e.g. ceasefire, democratisation) to reinforce
their capacity for nonviolent mobilisation (Western Sahara, West Papua)
05 Factors of transition
page 20
4. International factors
Loss of support base for armed insurgency or search for new allies:
Global events such as the end of the Cold War or the post-9/11 War on Terror
convinced some opposition groups to adopt conflict strategies more likely to attract
international sympathy and support (South Africa, Palestine).
Some movements framed their struggle in line with existing transnational social
movements in order to gain support from global activism and networks (Chiapas).
Emulation of successful international models and cross-border transmission of
knowledge and skills:
Some activists looked to other movements regionally or internationally for inspiration
(West Papua and Chiapas vs. Colombia and Western Sahara).
A few movements expanded their ‘toolbox’ of tactics by being trained and exposed to
technical and empirical expertise on nonviolent action from abroad (West Papua,
Palestine)
05 Factors of transition
page 21
X
X
X
X
Intra-group vertical dynamics
X
Pressure from social allies
(Societal) coalition-building
X
(Societal) reversed outbidding
Societal mirroring
Group-state power asymmetry
X
State repression to dissent
Selective state inducement and political opportunities
Loss/lack of foreign support and search for new allies
Emulation of successful international models
Cross-border transmission of skills and knowledge
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
Nepal
X
Egypt
Colombia
X
Chiapas
Intra-group horizontal dynamics
X
X
South
Africa
Role of the leadership
Palestine
Western
Sahara
West
Papua
Comparison of main factors across the eight cases
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
page 22
Thank you for your attention!
For more information:
http://www.routledge.com/books/details/9781138019423/
http://youtu.be/4mERjp83pMI (recorded live webinar)