War in the Contest for a New World Order

Journal of Global Faultlines
Publication details, including instructions for
authors:
http://www.keele.ac.uk/journal-globalfaultlines/
War in the Contest for a New World Order.
Peter Gowana
(1946-2009) was a Professor of International Relations at London
Metropolitan University.
a
Journal of Global Faultlines/ Volume 1/ Issue 1/ September 2013, pp.
34-49
Published online: 10 October 2013.
To cite this article:
Peter Gowan (2013) ‘War in the Contest for a New World Order’, Journal of
Global Faultlines, 1(1), 34-49.
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Journal of Global Faultlines, 2013
Vol. 1, No. 1, 34-49.
War in the Contest for a New World Order1
Peter Gowan*
Introduction
This paper relates to the session of the school devoted to War, the Crisis of Hegemony
and Unequal Development. This session’s title captures rather well the two main drivers
of contemporary war: the first is the effort by the American state to establish a new
imperial zone covering the main centres of capitalism; the second is the effort by the
American state, aided by some European powers, notably Britain, to manage the Global
South coercively in the context of the evolution of the micro-economic ‘globalisation’ of
the South since the 1980s and of its failure as a development project in Africa and Latin
America.
These two dimensions, the US effort to reorganise the centres of capitalism and the
US-led effort to manage the Global South intersect in complex ways and they also
intersect with other, distinct, contemporary trends:
1. the global Neo-Liberal social power movement and the political disorganisation
of the Left and Labour resulting which have been closely linked to the collapse of
Communism;
2. The turn of China and Russia to capitalism, outside the American security sphere;
3. The rise of China as an economic and political centre.
Only by tracing the intersections of all these elements can we adequately grasp the
political-military tendencies in the current period. The current political conjuncture is
marked by the fact that we are midstream in relation to all these central elements: none
is complete. Thus the conjuncture is marked by fluidity and uncertainty and rapid
changes. This type of context is itself one that can generate military conflicts as
unintended consequences of complexity.
But in order to have a compass for exploring the main elements in this fluid
conjuncture and their relationship to contemporary issues of war and peace, we will first
try to step back to explore certain deeper realities of the whole modern historical era.
One of these deeper issues is the problem of international order and conflict in modern
capitalist international society. By exploring that problem we will be able to situate the
current tendencies within a deeper historical perspective.
The mainstream tradition of thinking about war and strategy in the Atlantic
world – the tradition which includes such figures as Clausewitz and Liddell Hart – has
always stressed the internal link between war and politics. But if political drives and
goals lie behind war, we may also ask what lies behind these political drives themselves.
And the answer given in the classical tradition of strategic thought is usually simply
more politics: American neo-realists and many Neo-Weberians view inter-state politics
and war as realms whose basic logic is autonomous from other dimensions of social life –
purely political consequences of the existence of armed states in an anarchic inter-state
Peter Gowan (1946-2009) guided patiently hundreds of students through
undergraduate and postgraduate work at North London Polytechnic (now London
Metropolitan University), and from 2004, he was professor of international relations at
London Metropolitan University.
*
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War in the Contest for a New World Order
Peter Gowan
system or else a consequence of a ‘will to power’ among states.2 Idealist theorists of
international conflict may give greater weight to the roles of ideas, belief-systems and
values in shaping the nature and causes of conflict and war. But their stress on the
ideational side of politics is itself typically also bereft of deeper social determinations of
ideational movements.3
Without wishing to deny the dimensions of both power politics and clashes of
beliefs in the generation of conflict and war, we want to argue that both these
dimensions need to be situated in the social systems within which they occur.4
The aims for which force is projected and deployed are, we shall argue, deeply
connected to the characteristics of social systems. Different social systems have different
class and wealth-extraction structures and these profoundly affect the aims for which
they project and use force. The dominant social forces in feudal systems have gained
from power expansion to acquire land and serfs – classically in Medieval Europe.
Mercantile slave systems like those organised by Atlantic states from the 16th to 19th
centuries projected power to gain slaves, secure plantation lands in the tropics and
secure trade routes. And mature capitalist social systems have projected power to
protect and strengthen all and any of the moments in their circuit of capital – finance,
labour, raw materials, product markets – and to secure the necessary political and
market regimes for maintaining their reproductive circuits. At the same time these
differing social systems have generated very different kinds of political actors wielding
military power. Capitalist states, encasing capitalist class structures and fostering
capitalist international accumulation strategies have exhibited very different kinds of
political strategies from pre-capitalist political formations, embodying distinctive
relations between social classes and distinctive forms of class (political) control as well as
wealth extraction: thus capitalism is as much a distinctive state and inter-state order as it
is a purely productive and extractive order.
An obvious and striking historical characteristic of capitalist social systems has
been their readiness to use coercive violence against non-capitalist political systems. The
19th and 20th centuries are littered with examples of capitalist states using force and war
against pre-capitalist polities, often with a view to completely destroying them, as in
Africa, or with a view to transforming them into agencies of capitalist penetration and
extraction. And in the second half of the 20th century capitalist states were also heavily
engaged in force and war against socio-political movements and regimes embarking on
non-capitalist modernisation projects, notably communist and socialist movements but
also statist-nationalist regimes more or less delinked from the international circuits of
core capitalism. But at the start of the 2ist century we have a world in which precapitalist regimes have become a small residue and the Communist modernisation
movement has been marginalized.
Thus the question we face is an historically novel one: are there dynamics within
an overwhelmingly capitalist international social systems towards political projects that
can generate war and the use of coercive force by capitalist centres against others?
Part 1: Capitalist World Order Dynamics and International Conflict
We wish to highlight five aspects of the social dynamics of international capitalism
which have had a strong bearing on international conflict within capitalist international
relations. First, the strongly expansionist drive embedded in the capitalist mode of
accumulation. Secondly the tendency of leading capitalist centres to generate
hegemonic spheres of influence and their inability, so far, at , least, to construct normbased and thus juridical world orders for regulating relations amongst themselves,
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Vol. 1, No. 1, 34-49.
despite liberal claims to the contrary: the tendency, in other words towards hegemonic
rather than norm-based world political orders. Thirdly, the strong bias towards uneven
development within international capitalism, or in order words social power polarisation
within international capitalism between rich powerful centres and weak, poor
peripheries. Fourthly and partially contradicting this bias towards uneven development,
we have seen trends towards the emergence of new growth centres in international
capitalism. And finally, the tendencies within international capitalism towards sudden
shocks, crises and turns, a tendency whose war-inducing tendencies are exacerbated by
the intensification of social interactions within the international inter-state system in the
contemporary period and from the resulting complexity of causal chains.
We will argue that all these four tendencies lie at the basis of the distinctively
capitalist context in which wars are generated.
1. Capitalism’s expansionist dynamic
Within capitalism, wealth extraction and property take, first and foremost, a monetary
form as capitalists constantly strive to expand their monetary returns on their
investments. But these expanding monetary returns must then be re-invested in new
projects for further expansion of capital. Behind this expansionism lies the basic
extractive relationship within the capital-labour class system. This logic gives capitalism
a dynamic, expansive character, as well as threatening the social system with
overproduction crises.
Liberals like Hobson and Keynes offered ways of absorbing this expansionist
dynamic in social projects within advanced capitalist states and American Fordist
industrial capitalism, which turned workers into mass consumers as well as producers,
also offered a path towards what might be called the domestic absorption of the
expansive dynamic. The post-Second World War revival and expansion of capitalism in
Western Europe was in large part achieved through such domestic absorption and the
deepening of market demand within what we may call the domestic arena.
But as Hobson himself was aware, and as both Conant before him and Kalecki
after him pointed out, this domestic path to surplus absorption will have social power
consequences: it not only lifts the mass of the population out of grinding poverty, but it
also tends to strengthen the domestic social power of labour. (Hobson 1988; Conant
1898) As the state commits itself to social programmes for the mass of the population it
raises the spectre amongst the business class of what Hayek dramatically called ‘the road
to Serfdom’, a condition in which capital’s freedom and rights are constrained by the
‘social state’.5
Thus, as David Harvey has stressed there are strong incentives within capitalist
systems for what he calls a ‘spatio-temporal fix’ for capitalism’s expansionist dynamic
(Harvey 2005). Capitalist classes, supported by their states turn to expansion abroad for
the profitable expansion of accumulation, penetrating the markets of other states for this
purpose. This geo-economic expansionist drive gradually replaced the earlier mercantile
slave form of expansionism in the 19th century.6 Thus in the 19th and early 20th century
European empires were built and Europe’s business classes and states sought to
penetrate societies across the globe in search of profits and power, conducting, at the
same time, war after war in pursuit of this general project.
Such wars and coercive thrusts into the South were easy to pursue because
industrial capitalism gave Atlantic states military capacities greatly superior to political
formations in the South. This reality is still with us, despite the changes of the 20th
century in North-South military relations and we will return to it below.
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Peter Gowan
2. The Tendencies to Hegemonic Spheres of Influence and the Absence of any
Universalist Normative Principles for Regulating Capitalist World Orders.
Mainstream orthodoxy in the Atlantic world’s academic International Relations theory
imposes itself as an endless debate between realists and neo-Weberians on one side and
liberal idealists on the other on how order is established in international capitalism. Yet
neither school manages to capture an answer to this question.
The realist image of the main capitalist powers fighting each other for state
survival overlooks the fact that the victorious capitalist states in the two world wars did
not destroy their rival states: they allowed, or even encouraged their revival, for the
simple reason that the flourishing on one capitalist centre requires the presence of
others. More, the very rise of new power centres within international capitalism is the
result of inter-capitalist co-operation. What was at stake for the major centres of
capitalism was not state survival but the organisation of the terms of international cooperation between capitalist centres – the organisation of world order. Given the interpenetrating, inter-dependent characteristics of international capitalism, the terms of
international political and economic inter-change between centres assume very great
importance for the wealth and power of each centre. These terms of inter-change include
both the international political and economic regimes and the domestic political and
economic regimes of the main centres: in capitalism the internal and external are always
closely linked. The winners of the two world wars imposed entirely new political and
economic regimes on the vanquished – with fleeting success in the inter-war period, with
a great deal of success for the US after 1945.
On the other side of the coin of orthodoxy, liberals have argued that capitalist
centres can build co-operative orders provided that they subscribe to liberal values and
norms in international politics and economics. This argument rests on the notion that
liberal values and norms fit with the inner logics of contemporary international
economics and politics.
Critical to this liberal case are two claims: first, that international economics is a
depoliticised sphere in the double sense that power relations don’t operate in markets
and that state power has no relevance for optimal economic outcomes in markets; and
second, that within liberal democratic centres there are the political resources to resist
friend-enemy conflicts between liberal democracies. Neither of these claims seems
persuasive.
1. Power Struggles in Economics
1.
The liberal claim that market power does not exist – or is not economically
optimal within capitalism – rests on Neo-classical assumptions about empirical
realities in industrial economics, namely that industrial activity is marked by
constant or decreasing returns to scale. This assumption is then used to suggest
that firms face technical limits to their expansion, markets are always pluralistic
and competitive and new players from weaker centres can easily enter the race. It
also means that attempts by firms to gain control over markets through
expansion collapse as returns diminish. But in empirical reality modern industry
is mainly marked by economies of scale – increasing returns to scale – and thus
by an efficiency logic pointing towards monopoly with a few capitals exercising
enormous market power in the given sector. Thus as Chandler point out in his
history of industrial capitalism in the Atlantic world, first movers in a given
sector enjoy enormous advantages, enabling them to sustain their market
dominance and block new challengers. (Chandler 1990)
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Vol. 1, No. 1, 34-49.
2. Schumpeterian competition: while Neo-Classical economists focus on
competition between firms within given market sectors, Schumpeter rightly
stressed that the main significant forms of capitalist competition are battles over
the entire sectoral structure of capitalism, in which formerly leading sectors are
displaced by entirely new growth sectors, with those leading the way in new
growth sectors generating great swathes of ‘creative destruction’ and grasping the
lion’s share of new sources of profit. And such new growth sectors tend to be
generated either by market-based economies of scope on the part of existing
leading companies, or by state initiated or buttressed sectoral innovations.
These two tendencies politicise economic competition within international capitalism.
They also lead to strong tendencies towards the construction of regional ‘grossraums’ of
the main geo-economic centres of capitalism, reflecting the drive to give security to the
main markets of the given centre and to the appropriate regimes for these markets.
Major capitalist centres tend to draw other capitalisms under their sway and to merge
their accumulation strategies with matching and re-enforcing projections of justifying
ideologies and supportive power projections. Major capitalist centres thus tend
spontaneously to generate ‘grossraums’ – or ‘spheres of influence’ -- with both a geoeconomic and geopolitical dimension.
2. Power Struggles over Economics
The main centres share an interest in opening each others’ markets and in organising
genuinely world markets (as well as an interest in opening the markets of 3rd countries).
But these bargaining games over market opening are always politicised and the full range
of political instruments of leverage can be used or threatened in such bargaining. Thus
the political leverage of a state matters greatly in international economic diplomacy. The
political battles over market access, market design, monetary arrangements etc. are not,
in principle, different in kind from any other kinds of international political conflict.
They can thus escalate to higher and more intense forms of conflict, tending to become
transformed into clashes over political values and even into friend-enemy conflicts. This
tendency was evident in the American public sphere in the late 1980s and early 1990s in
the battle over industrial leadership with Japan.
Recourse to Neo-classical principles as a way of depoliticising economic
diplomacy cuts no ice because these principles lack empirical foundations. And the
premiums of hegemony – the capacity to shape the domestic and international regimes
of capital accumulation, in other words the structure of markets – are very large and
indeed increasingly large. Seemingly small shifts in legal rules governing market
structure increasingly decide the outcomes in international competition between
capitals.
3. Markets as superstructures based on class political relations
While liberal thought about economics naturalises markets as having their own
autonomous logic and strongly tends towards economistic determinism, actual market
organisations are created and enforced by political forces in conflict with other political
forces. This is true for labour markets, capital markets, product markets and foreign
exchange markets. The main political forces with the authority and coercive capacity to
shape markets are states and international institutions led by state executives. The
concrete conditions of capital accumulation are thus always politicised and never the
spontaneous result of the operation of autonomous supply-demand conditions. This has
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Peter Gowan
two corollaries: capital links itself closely to the political centres that shape its markets;
and market organisation always takes the form of positive law, not rules grounded in
liberal norms.
Here we have the source of the close link between economics and politics in the
international dynamics of capitalism and the source of the endemic tendency towards
the creation of ‘spheres of influence’ or ‘grossraums’ in the international relations of
capitalism. Liberalism cannot recognise, leave alone explain this phenomenon. And it
therefore also fails to recognise the very great premiums gained by a capitalist political
centre able to achieve its political hegemony over a sphere of influence or ‘grossraum’,
the premiums from being able to shape the market structures of a whole geo-economic
zone of accumulation.
Liberals and constructivists are right to insist on the importance of political
values and norms and of the discursive dimension of political integration within
capitalism. Grossraums must be suffused with meanings which also establish correct and
incorrect (acceptable and unacceptable) patterns of behaviour within the grossraum. But
what they miss is the fact that even when these norms appear to be liberal because they
use the language of liberalism they are actually the ideology of power-based hegemonic
orders, underpinned by coercive capacities.
Before the First World War international capitalism was structured as a set of
separate grossraums of individual capitalist centres: the rising American and Japanese
grossraums and the peculiar European pattern combining separate empires and also
mechanisms of West European co-ordination of the collective European centre. The
First World War irretrievably weakened and disorganised the European centre while
greatly strengthening the Japanese and American outlying centres. The Second World
War destroyed both the European and Japanese centres and turned the entire capitalist
core into a single American grossraum or ‘empire’. This was then politically homogenised
through being turned into an American centred security zone in militarised
confrontation with the Soviet Bloc. The collapse of the Soviet Bloc and the turn of China
towards capitalism then produced a political disorganisation of the American Empire,
challenging the US either to reconstruct its grossraum on a literally global level or to
accept the possibility of a new plurality of grossraums.
3. The Bias towards Cumulative Uneven Development within Capitalism.
A third and dramatic characteristic of modern capitalism has been its tendency towards
cumulatively uneven development in a geographical sense. The richest capitalist centres
at the beginning of the 20th century are the richest centres at the start of the 21st century
and the gap between them and the rest of the world in terms of wealth has grown
massively during the 20th century. This seems to be a structural feature of the social
dynamics of capitalism. It is all the more remarkable given that both the first and second
world wars entailed enormous destruction within the richest centres in Eurasia –
Western Europe and, in the Second World War, Japan.
The tendencies we have already noted in modern economics – increasing returns
to scale, economies of scope and Schumpeterian competition have all played a central
part in this tendency. But so too have learning economies and the non-market sources of
growth: one of the very odd features of Neo-Classical economies was that until the late
1980s, it lacked a convincing theory of economic growth. But when it did finally develop
a neo-classical theory of ‘endogenous growth’ it acknowledged that a central source of
growth derives from phenomena outside the market: learning economies and the
development of ‘human capital’. This implies that the wealthiest economies with large
state budgets for education, research and development and other infrastructures
facilitating the enhancement of ‘human capital’ – advantages outside the market -- enjoy
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Vol. 1, No. 1, 34-49.
enormous advantages within the market. This then becomes a means by which the
richest capitalist centres with the largest state budgets have great cumulative advantages
ensuring their continued ascendancy within the market. (And this ascendancy can be reenforced by international regimes ensuring monopolies on intellectual property).
Against this background, catch up or the reduction of geo-economic inequalities
becomes very difficult and strongly dependent upon the political capacities of social
formations outside the capitalist core countries: their ability to mobilise their
populations for independent development and to use their state resources to break into
industrial competition effectively. But given the nature of this capitalist competition, the
powerful centres have no incentive allow such a breakthrough except that of their own
capitals having access to the developing country’s own internal market. And they have
every incentive, then to restructure that internal market for the benefit of their own
capitals. Thus the path to catch-up has been both narrow and fraught with risks.
Against this background, the richest capitalist centres have also been the centres
with the most powerful political resources both for shaping the structure of international
markets and competition and also for imposing their political will on weaker states,
lower down the international division of labour.
The post-war period, marked by the end of the European Empires and the
emergence of about 150 new, independent states in the South, saw a great movement for
reshaping international economics to foster the independent development of the
political economies of the South, a movement centred on the Non-Aligned Movement
and de facto allied to some extent with the Soviet Bloc in, for example, UN bodies, which
culminated in the drive for a New International Economic Order in the late 1960s and
1970s. But this movement failed as the United States, in alliance with the main West
European states used macro-economic crises in the South in the 1980s to reorganise the
political economies of the South as passive support regions for the accumulation of
capital in the core.
4. Tendencies Towards the formation of New Growth Centres
The expansionist dynamic within capitalism, makes it extremely sensitive to both the
rise of new growth sectors and to new growth centres – zones whose rapid economic
growth make them powerful magnets for investment from other centres. In the late 19 th
century, the United States was a dynamic new growth centre, attracting very high levels
of investment from Europe (and particularly from Britain), as were ‘white Dominions
within the British Empire like Canada and Australia and also Argentina. In the
immediate post-1945 period, Western Europe became the new growth centre during its
recovery phase after the Second World War. Since the 1980s East and South East Asia
have become a new growth centre, now increasingly focused on the Chinese market.
But such new growth centres can also become the target for efforts by core states
to transform their internal regimes into passive fields for exploitation rather than new
entrants into the core. Such efforts by European powers vis-à-vis the United States were
impossible in the 19th and early 20th century for geopolitical reasons. In the case of
Western Europe and Japan in the post-war period, the United States leadership was
sufficiently confident of its capacity to maintain its hegemony over them that it allowed
them wide leverage to shape their own accumulation strategies (within the American
security zone, excluding them from strategies for penetrating the Soviet Bloc and China).
Today, the East Asian New growth centre centred on China stands at a crossroads of this sort: either incorporation into the core, or the restructuring of its internal
regimes to transform them into passive support zones for capital accumulation in the
Triad – the US, Japan and Western Europe. Russia also stands at a similar cross-roads.
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Peter Gowan
5. The tendencies towards shocks and crises in international capitalism and the
craving for security
Another historically obvious feature of international capitalism is its turbulent and
unpredictable character, marked by sudden economic shocks and political upheavals. At
the same time, a specific characteristic of capitalism as a socio-economic system is the
extraordinarily high level of socio-political and economic security which capitalists crave
for their investment activity. The source of this lies in the temporal characteristics of
capitalism: for capitalists to protect and expand their property they have to constantly
throw it forward into an uncertain future in the hope of future profits. The resulting
craving for security concerns not only social and economic threats but also political
threats.
Against this uncertain background, capitalists and their political leaders make
judgements as to which political and financial centres will come to their rescue in the
event of a sudden economic breakdown or political upheaval on a system-wide scale.
During the inter-war period, the European centre failed to deliver when such a crisis
struck. In the crisis of the 1970s, the United States managed to maintain the unity of its
grossraum, despite the great strains to which it was subjected. In the 1980s, when
American capitalism was itself in a serious crisis, the Japanese financial centre came to
its rescue. Yet when Japan itself and other capitalisms in East Asia plunged into serious
financial crises in the late 1990s, the United States adopted a more predatory than
supportive response. And there are now worries as to the capacity of an American-led
capitalist core to generate the financial and political resources to maintain its own
coherence and cohesion in the face of new systemic shocks and crises. In times of major
crises, these international commitments on the part of major states may be withdrawn or
breakdown, plunging international capitalism into major international crises.
Part 2: The American Post-War Solution to the World Order Problem
Against this background, order in international capitalism has not be based upon
normative principles of the sort that liberalism proclaims. It has been based upon various
kinds of social power relationships between capitalist centres, ensuring a strongly cooperative and stable core.
The pre-First World War Eurocentric world order rested on four pillars:
1. Geopolitically and to a large extent geo-economically, the European core was a
co-ordination of separate European Empire grossraums.
2. Economically, it was open with free movement of production factors (including
labour) and, to a great extent, goods.
3. Domestically it was built on integrating the domestic population through
nationalist and imperialist militarism, as an alternative to integrating labour via
democratic systems.
4. New growth centres outside the order (USA, Japan) did not decisively threaten it.
Once item 1 broke down into war, item three kicked in and the European powers’ elites
could not extricate themselves from mass slaughter without threatening their own
domestic rule and item 2 collapsed.
The inter-war Eurocentric order was a ruin from the start and disintegrated through
an attempt by the German state to rally, with some success, the continental ruling
classes around a German hegemonic project centred on:
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Vol. 1, No. 1, 34-49.
1.
Geopolitically, German leadership to crush the Soviet Union, while allowing the
various individual European empires to continue.
2. Economically, European integration under German leadership.
3. Domestically, authoritarian rule to crush labour and the left.
4. Globally, a link with Japan despite its threat to the eastern empires of France,
Britain and the Netherlands.
When that effort was broken by Soviet victories at Stalingrad and Kursk, the Eurocentric
world order project was destroyed as the USSR and the United States became the
masters of the continent. The American state then turned the whole of Western Europe
into part of its own new global, moncentric grossraum, embracing all the main capitalist
centres. Its key features:
1. Geopolitically, Western Europe became an American security protectorate. By
making security alliances with the USA, the West European states found that the
US took over direct management of their national security (in the German case)
or indirect control over their geopolitical operations (in the British and French
cases). Washington decided which parts of their empires could stagger on and
which parts should be destroyed. At the same time, by militarising confrontation
with the USSR it ensured that the whole of Western Europe was dependent upon
decisions taken in Washington on US-Soviet relations.
2. Economically, the US opened the West European economies to American capital
(mainly through FDI using the 1954 German American Economic Agreement as
the first gateway then using the EEC Treaty to provide a second gateway for
American companies based in Germany to sell freely across the EEC). At the
same time it took vigorous measures to ensure West European and especially
German economic revival took place in ways that integrated the region into the
Grossraum – restricting economic links with the Soviet Bloc.
3. Within the West European states, the US restructured mass politics along antiSoviet and Anti-Communist lines and in support of both capitalism and the
American alliance. It paid particular attention to ensuring a pro-American Social
Democratic movement and sought to isolate the Anti-American European Right,
replacing its nationalist ideologies with a pro-American version of Europeanism.
Only in France did this American effort fail, in the case of Gaullism.
This American protectorate system was legitimated as a negative reactive response to a
Soviet threat. But as Paul Nitze, one of the key architects of the new Grossraum
explained, the American project was a positive effort at world order construction in
politics, economics and culture. He criticised John Foster Dulles for sometimes not
seeming to grasp this. He insisted instead on a ‘positive and not merely negative and
defensive’ strategy, one that involved ‘the creation and maintenance of some form of
world order compatible with our continued development as the kind of nation we are
and believe ourselves capable of becoming.’ And ‘a unique role in this system had
continuously to be borne by the United States because we alone had the resources and
the will to tackle the job’ (Nitze 1959: 24-25).
The Nature of Capitalism and the Novelty of the American World Order Solution
Many authors have called the American Cold War world order an American Empire. This
is a potentially fruitful concept but it is also a potentially misleading one. It’s great
virtues lie in the following connotations of the term:
1. the idea of Empire embraces economics, politics and culture in a single system;
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Peter Gowan
2. it brings out the idea of hierarchy and of a state centre;
3. it implies a transformation not only of the external relations of other states, but
of their internal relations as well. All these elements of Empire apply to the
American Cold War order.
But this American Empire was quite different from the earlier European empires. It’s
only precedent was the German hegemonic ‘empire’ in Europe between 1940 and 1944:
1. The European and Japanese Empires stretched over pre-capitalist social systems,
while the American Empire embraced above all the other advanced capitalist
countries.
2. Did not end the juridical sovereignty and institutional autonomy of the states
within the Empire zone. Instead it transformed the external and internal political
relationships of its protectorates and simultaneously transformed their patterns
of capital accumulation. And in achieving these transformations, it gained the
support of the wealthiest and most powerful social groups within these
protectorates.
3. It required the other centres to abandon efforts to build their own autonomous
grossraums – geo-economic and geopolitical security zones – and to transfer
these previously central state functions to the US. At the same time it required
them to accept and integrate their populations into a normative order
legitimating the American empire project.7
4. Within this framework they could operate as autonomous capitalist centres.
Thus the American post-war Empire was a distinctive kind of empire for an advanced
capitalist zone.
Its creation was made possible by the very special circumstances of the 1940s:
1. The crushing military defeat of the two main capitalist industrial centres outside
the United States -- Germany and Japan. The ruling classes of these two states
had little option but to grasp at the American effort to revive their states, albeit
as security protectorates.
2. The Soviet Union’s victory over Germany and its coalition partners produced a
huge rise of a transnational Communist and pro-Soviet social movement, across
the globe, and not least in West European countries like France and Italy. This
challenge again gave the ruling classes of France and Italy powerful incentives to
turn to the United States for protection.
3. Thirdly, the capitalist classes of Western Europe and above all the British, were
deeply convinced in 1945 that their continued prosperity and centrality in the
world economy depended upon their ability to maintain and rebuild their
empires. Thus when the Roosevelt administration, and even more the Truman
administration indicated their readiness to contemplate the continuation of
these Empires (with various qualifications) this was seized upon, especially by
the British, as a basis for accepting American leadership in the long-term.
4. And last but not least, the American Fordist industrial model of capitalism,
combined with the West European turn towards the welfare state in the face of
the Communist challenge, proved to be a path towards genuine social
development for very large parts of the populations of Western Europe during
the post-war period.
But another feature of this robust system is worth stressing: Washington privileged a
handful of advanced capitalist states over all other capitalisms, namely those in the
South, in what World System Theorists call the periphery and semi-periphery gained far
less support from the United States, except in the case of a small number of key energy
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Vol. 1, No. 1, 34-49.
producers like Saudi Arabia and Iran under the Shah. Indeed the interests of the Global
South were frequently sacrificed in favour of those of the Atlantic states, particularly
once the economic crisis of the Atlantic world set in during the 1970s.
Part 3: Contemporary Sources of Coercive Force and War
The main sources of military intervention in the present period can be listed as follows:
1. The US drive to preserve its core-wide ‘empire’ by enlarging it to cover the whole
of Eurasia and by reconstructing the environments of the main centres to make
them want what Washington wants: a new Empire with new norms.
2. The US efforts to pursue ‘Enter-tainment’ vis-à-vis Russia and China to ensure
these new growth centres become passive markets.
3. The Atlantic efforts to maintain order in those zones in the South where the
Atlantic-centred GPE has generated regression and/or revolt.
4. Risks of disintegration of the American political-economy project of ‘Economic
Globalisation’.
We will briefly look at each of these sources in turn.
1. Rebuilding the Core-Wide Empire
The collapse of the Soviet Bloc and turn by Russia and China towards capitalism
threatened the withering away of the geopolitical and geo-economic boundaries of the
US grossraum as well as destroying the political culture and norms of the post-war
American grossraum. Japan and South Korea in the East and Germany and Western
Europe in the West could, in principle, build semi-autonomous spheres of accumulation
in Russia and China while simultaneously making new geopolitical arrangements with
these powers. This could threaten the unravelling of the US grossraum.
The risk of this dynamic unfolding was particularly strong in Western Eurasia,
given the possibilities of a new peace order across Europe and including Russia, thanks
to the way the Cold War ended with Soviet/Russian acceptance of the new regional
order – German unification, arms control treaties (CFE, etc) and EU expansion. There
were also signs of the main West European states wishing to gain greater autonomy from
the US within the European region and to generate an international diplomacy devaluing
militarised power politics and thus devaluing America’s main political asset, its huge
military power.
In East Asia, geopolitical risks to the Empire were much weaker but geoeconomic risks were higher because of the rise of China as a new growth centre,
threatening to act as a magnet for the capital accumulation patterns of the region with
the ultimate effect of hollowing out the US centred geopolitical arrangements.
The risk that the core allies of the US at each end of Eurasia would embark on
independent geopolitical and geo-economic paths was highlighted in the Defence Policy
Guidelines of 1992 and treated there as the main strategic threat to US vital interests.
During the 1990s, the Bush and Clinton administrations dealt with that threat by
concentrating on restoring its military-political ascendancy over Western Europe,
ensuring a division between Russia and Germany and building a geopolitical wall of
states, centred on Poland, between Western Europe (especially Germany) and Russia
allied to Washington. The Bosnian war marked a key step in this Washington strategy as
did the NATO attack on Yugoslavia in 1999. A further landmark was Washington’s
successful pressure for a big bang enlargement of the EU before the latter had acquired a
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Peter Gowan
cohesive decision-making system. Equally fundamental was Washington’s successful
drive to expand NATO Eastwards against Russia and its gaining the alignments of Poland
and the Czech Republic with the US, a drive now culminating in the decision to deploy
an anti-missile system in these states, thus ensuring that Washington can be the
geopolitical gate-keeper between Germany and Russia. The Bush administration has also
successfully blocked any autonomous spread of West European influence across the
Mediterranean and into the Arab world, deeply splitting the EU on geopolitical lines
through drawing a number of states, notably Britain, into its aggression in the Middle
East. This has demonstrated that the EU’s political unity depends upon American
approval.
Similar divide and rule policies have been pursued by Washington in East Asia,
with a view to blocking the emergence of a co-operative regional political system
between China and its main neighbours and ensuring that relations between Japan,
South Korea and China depend upon American decisions. Here too the development of
missile defence systems offers Washington the prospect of polarising the region in
confrontations with North Korea and China.
At the same time, the Bush thrust into the Middle East and the Gulf has been
articulated in such a way as to push forward a renorming of its protectorate along antiIslamist lines of a ‘war on terror’. By baiting the Islamic world with its aggression in the
region and by its strong backing for an aggressive Zionist policy on Israel’s part, the US
has gone some way towards establishing a polarising dynamic between significant forces
in the Middle East and the societies of Western Europe.
Finally, the Bush strategy has focused upon gaining geopolitical control over the
main centres of world oil production outside Russia and thereby making all the main
centres of capitalism dependent on US power for their oil supplies.
But the consequences of the US strategy for binding its allies into an enlarged
global protectorate system have been to produce a series of new wars in Eurasia and to
threaten others: the Bosnian war, the Yugoslav war, the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the
second Intifada and continuing barbaric military occupation in Palestine, the IsraelLebanon war of 2006. At the same time there have been the threats of other wars: with
North Korea, with Iran, Turkish invasion of Northern Iraq, the possibilities of renewed
conflict in and around Kosovo, dangerous confrontations in Ukraine and with Russia
over the Baltic states and confrontation with Belarus. The conflict in Moldova is also fed
by US strategy and Russia’s response.
2. The Enter-Tainment Projects towards Russia and China.
The American world order project implies ending the capacity of other major capitalist
centres to build their own autonomous grossraums. This has been achieved in the case of
US allies through the US directly taking over management of their geopolitical
orientations. But that is impossible to achieve in the case of China and Russia. Thus, the
US project implies that these two powers must be geopolitically contained: in other
words, the US must police their perimeters, drawing their neighbouring states into
security alliances with the US.
At the same time, the US must seek to ensure that the internal regimes of
Russian and Chinese capitalism are structured for the benefit of the US and its core
allies in Western Europe and East Asia so that these rising capitalisms do not become
autonomous new growth centres and magnets restructuring the economic and political
patterns of US allies. From this angle, Washington has sought to build alliances with
social groups within these two states likely to support types of capitalism favoured by
Washington. In this sense, Washington seeks to enter and internally restructure social
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power relations within these states. Hence the term ‘enter-tainment’ to capture
Washington’s strategic problematic in relation to both these states.
In the Russian case, the entry project was extraordinarily successful under the
Clinton administration during the Yeltsin period, with a network of oligarchs led by the
Chubais Clan acquiring the bulk of the key economic assets in the country and being
closely tied to Washington and Wall Street. But this victory rested on a devastating
economic collapse in Russia and it unravelled with the rouble collapse of 1998 and the
NATO attack on Yugoslavia in 1999, which was swiftly followed by the retirement of
Yeltsin and the rise of Putin. The Putin team has destroyed the US entry project and
seeks to build a nationally integrated Russian capitalism, using its mineral resources to
rebuild Russia as a modern industrial economy.
The US has responded to its internal defeat within Russia with a more aggressive
effort to pull Russia’s near abroad into the US geopolitical sphere while simultaneously
mounting a campaign against Putin’s alleged destruction of democracy and human
rights internally. The geopolitical push has combined colour ‘revolutions’ with the
spread of US military bases around Russia’s borders: attempts at colour revolutions in
Belarus, Ukraine, Georgia, Kyrgizstan, attempts at alliances with authoritarian regimes in
Azerbaijdan and Kazakstan as well as in Uzbekistan and Tadjikistan. But the results of
this US drive have not been impressive. Only in the case of Georgia can the US be said to
have achieved a breakthrough. Otherwise it has faced many set-backs and it has
provoked an embryonic Russian-Chinese sphere of influence through the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation in Central Asia.
In the case of China, US geopolitical pressure around its borders was already
widely established during the Cold War. But it is a militarily unstable system which
could generate unintended war with China, as was shown in the case of North Korea in
1994 and in the Taiwan case in 1996. An arms race with China is now underway on
military build-up around the Straits of Taiwan.
On the front of ‘Entry’, the US has failed to make decisive inroads into the
Chinese social formation. There is no sign of a strong capitalist social group in China
pushing for an opening of the Chinese political economy along American lines: the
Chinese state retains key levers of control for steering China’s economic development in
the direction of national integration. Loss of those levers of control could come only
through a major macro-economic crisis, especially a financial crisis. At the same time,
the Chinese state has so far failed to use those steering mechanisms for a decisive
breakthrough into the interior of the country and into domestic, demand-led growth,
centred on raising working class incomes. And although China is acting as an immensely
powerful magnet for the capitalisms of the region, it is doing so still largely as an labour
market for cheap labour processing and assembly – a system which does not offer China
a sustainable growth path.
There is every reason to expect that these various dynamics in and around China
presage great turbulence and volatility in the political field in coming years. If China can
sustain itself as an autonomous and integrated New Growth Centre, it will tend to
hollow-out the American alliance systems in the region. At the same time American
efforts to use military-political pressure on China may not work. The traditional
American approach in these matters is to demonstrate overwhelming military superiority
as a means of avoiding war while gaining concessions. But this depends upon the other
side believing that the US may be prepared for all out war: something that probably lacks
credibility in the case of Taiwan, particularly after the Bush administration lost its nerve
over its threat to attack North Korea and, it seems, to attack Iran.
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Peter Gowan
3. Atlantic efforts to maintain order in those zones in the South where the Atlantic-centred
GPE has generated regression and/or revolt.
With the onset of a deep economic crisis in the Atlantic world in the 1970s, The Reagan
administration led a major strategic shift on the part of the Atlantic states towards the
South. It ended any tolerance for Southern efforts to build nationally integrated
industrial economies geared towards catch-up and opted instead for opening the
economies of the South to the fullest possible penetration by Atlantic capitals. This turn
was first expressed with the shift by the IFIs towards the so-called Structural Adjustment
Programmes at their Seoul Conference of 1985. It was further radicalised by the
reorganisation of the UN apparatus in the economic field from 1992 onwards, then by the
WTO’s launch and by the OECD’s turn towards ending capital controls, etc. This general
project is typically termed ‘economic globalisation’.
While the East and South East Asian economies have largely survived this turn,
the economies of both Latin America and Sub-Saharan Africa have faced widespread
regression or stagnation. And in the case of the Arab world, while most of the countries
have not been economically globalised their geopolitical conditions and authoritarian
regimes have blocked dynamic growth. The one Arab country that has embraced
economic globalisation, Tunisia, has suffered substantial industrial decline.
As a consequence, much of Sub-Saharan Africa is not viably inserted in the world
economy and has faced political disintegration and war over the last 15 years. In the Latin
American case, there has been a widespread delegitimation of the IFIs and a significant
ideological and political revolt against the economic programme of Washington, a revolt
symbolised in the widespread acceptance of initiatives by the Chavez government in
Venezuela.
Against this background, there has been a strong acceptance in the Atlantic
world of the need for a new kind of imperial power projection into Africa in which West
European states as well as the UN apparatus and the US participate. There is every
reason to suppose that wars will continue in Africa along with the use of force there by
the Atlantic states or their proxies. In the Latin American case, the traditional US
method would involve US intelligence agencies staging coups with local allies to remove
regimes like that of Chavez. Yet the US has been unable, so far, to build an effective
coalition in the region for such projects.
4. Risks of disintegration of the American political-economy project of ‘Economic
Globalisation’
The United States capitalist class and the US state have gained extraordinary ideological
and political leverage from the collapse of Communism. That collapse was followed by a
great transnational neo-liberal social power movement in the 1990s to decisively shift
wealth and power into the hands of the capitalist classes and away from labour. The US
exploited this social movement to great effect, managing to closely associate it with the
distinctive American ‘globalisation’ project for the IPE, a project which overlaps strongly
with the neo-liberal social movement and which feeds off it but which is not identical
with it. This is the project which I have called elsewhere that of the Dollar-Wall Street
Regime, and the free flow of hot money, the turn towards a new Anglo-American finance
capitalism and the dominance of rentier interests, ensured through altering capitalist
social relations in the direction of shareholder capitalism, etc.
Both the neo-liberal movement and the American economic globalisation project
are vulnerable to shocks and upheavals and are already causing significant tensions.
In both Germany and Japan we have seen resistance to aspects of the American
drive as powerful groups in both centres seek to protect the integrity of their industrial
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Vol. 1, No. 1, 34-49.
structures. As we have seen resistance to American economic globalisation has also been
strong in Russia under Putin and in China, which has continued to retain effective
control over its financial sector and over the strategically important sectors of its
industrial economy. This amounts to a fundamental challenge to the American
globalisation project.
An unravelling of the American economic globalisation project through a major
economic crisis is far from ruled out and if it occurred it would tend to generate strong
dynamics towards a new regionalisation of the regimes of the world economy.
Such a project would mark a great strategic challenge for the United States. If it
accepted such a regionalisation, it would be abandoning its entire grand strategy since
the end of the Cold War. More than that, it would mark the end of the whole historical
period since 1945 during which the United States presided over a novel kind of Empire
covering the entire capitalist core. It would imply that geostrategically independent
states – Russia and China – could develop their own independent relations with other
capitalist powers in Eurasia, uncontrolled by the United States through its hegemonic
alliances.
The implications of this shift for the international political economy would also
be great. China and Russia could expect to be fully integrated into the management of
the world economy and strong regionalised patterns of capital accumulation would
emerge at each end of Eurasia, probably including regional monetary systems involving
the Euro at one end and, if the Renminbi became a key currency, a China-centred
monetary system in East Asia. If these two monetary systems were to co-ordinate their
policies, the dollar could rapidly decline as the world’s dominant currency.
This alternative option therefore seems to be one which the United States would
resist strongly. We could expect instead a tactical retreat following its debacle in the
Greater Middle East, but a continued strategic drive to combine the strengthening of its
existing hegemonic alliances with continuing efforts at ‘enter-tainment’ vis-à-vis both
Russia and China.
We can therefore conclude that world politics will be marked by continued
fluidity and turbulence in conditions where the successful consolidation of the American
globalisation project seems remote while at the same time the United States seems
unlikely to opt for a more co-operative, regionalised world order.
Notes
1
This paper is an unpublished manuscript retrieved from
http://www.scribd.com/doc/132781206/War-in-the-Contest-for-a-New-World-Order-PeterGowan
2
Others disconnect war from social structures through linking it with human nature. See, for
th
example, Hans Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations (7 ed. McGraw-Hill, London, 2006)
3
See, for example, the work of constructivist theorists like Ruggie and Spryut on the rise of the socalled Westphalian state and the critique of their work in Benno Teschke’s The Myth of 1648
(Verso)
4
For a critique of the mainstream tradition of strategic studies from this social system perspective
see Alexander Atkinson, Social Order and the General Theory of Strategy (Routledge and Kegan
Paul, 1981)
5
It is worth pointing out that there is yet another school of thought about how capitalism can
cope with the contradictions of its own expansionist dynamic: the argument by Barran and
Sweezy that the military sector is another way of absorbing the surplus capital, a way that avoids
the, for capital, negative social power consequences of welfare project absorption. We find this
argument persuasive and will return to it below.
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Peter Gowan
6
As Robin Blackburn has demonstrated, the mercantile slave system was a central mechanism in
the primitive accumulation of capital that made Britain’s domestic industrial capitalist revolution
possible. But its expansionist logic was not the same as that of modern industrial capitalism. See
Robin Blackburn, The Making of New World Slavery: From the Baroque to the Modern, 1492-1800
(Verso, London, 1997).
7
De Gaulle sought to reject this aspect of the regime, but was able to do so only in words, by and
large, not in practice.
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Blackburn, R. (1997) The Making of New World Slavery: From the Baroque to the Modern, 14921800. London: Verso.
Chandler, A. (1990) Scale and Scope: The Dynamics of Industrial Capitalism. Cambridge: Harvard
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Conant, C. (1898) ‘The Economic Basis of Imperialism’ North American Review 167 (502), pp.326340.
Harvey, D. (2005) The New Imperialism. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Hobson, J.A. (1988) Imperialism. A Study. London: Unwin Hyman.
Morgenthau, H. (2006) Politics Among Nations, seventh edition. London: McGraw-Hill.
Nitze, P. H. (1959) ‘Coalition Policy and the Concept of World Order’, in A. Wolfers (ed.), Alliance
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Teschke, B. (2003) The Myth of 1648. London: Verso.
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