Interview with
Johannes Roelof Maria (Jan)
Van Den Brink
Interview by
F. Duchêne
Hilversum 17/05/1989
Jean Monnet, Statesman of Interdependence
collection
J R M Van
den Brink/17.J.1989/1
Interview with Francois Duchene
Hilversum
17 May 1989
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J. R. M. VAN DEN BRINK
minister of Bconomic Affairs of the Netherlands
1948-1952
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FD Mr van den Brink, I would be grateful for a brief account of your career
in so far as it involve(1 you in the Schuman Plan and the politics of European
integration at that critical moment.
VB I studied political economy, and finished my studies just before the war.
I started as a young civil servant in the ministry of Economic Affairs a few
months before the war broke out. I enjoyed working there and prepared my
Ph. D. thesis at the same time. I had some difficulties. There were several
civil servants in the ministry who were influenced by the new ideas - there
were a few - and agreed to be members of NSB, which was the Dutch
National Socialist movement. But I had a chief who was an excellent man, Dr
Winsenius. He was the father of the minister of the Interior we had after the
war. 1 learned a lot from this gentleman. I mention his name, because after
the war, when I was minister of Economic Affairs, I inVlted this first chief of
mine to bet'Ome my director-general for industrialisation. And he did very
well indeed. But in those days, I got other chiefs and wanted to leave the
ministry. I did not feel at home there any more. Then, for some time, I wrote
articles for the underground press, for Ie maintiendrai, which was a well­
known underground paper, and also for some others. on economic problems.
In December 1942. I finished my thesis. and was invited to become a
professor at the university of Nijmegen. That was at the beginning of 1943,
But I could not accept it, because in those days you needed the consent of
the authorities in the Hague, and they did not give it.
FD The German authorities?
VB Dutch or German, it was the collaboration. I could only start, as professor
in the university of Nijmegen in 45. I was there only a short time before I
became minister of Economic Affairs. That was in 48.
FD YOli were only thirty-three then?
VB I was very young, yes.
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FD Were you a Keynesian?
VB I was very much influenced by the ideas of Keynes. I saw in Holland
enormous unemployment in those days. Then came that book. The General
Theory. I think I was one of the first in Holland to write an article on Keynes.
FD After the war, would you have been one of the very few people who were
K.eynesian. or would quite a lot of young economists have been K.eynesian by
then?
VB By that time, quite a lot. But before the war, it was rather exceptional.
Keynes was seen by well-known Dutch economists as a very dangerous
influence in economic thinking. But later I found out, and also made clear.
why the ideas of K.eynes were not practicable in Holland any more. Why?
Because the situation changed in which they could be apphed. But to go back.
during the war, I also had contacts with Verijn Stuart, who was one of the
members of the board of the Amsterdamschebank.
FD Was that the one who became one of the negoUators of the Common
Market?
VB Yes, I suppose so. Later on, in the 1950s. Verijn Stuart was also chairman
of the Social and Economic Council in the Netherlands. I had contact with
Verijn Stuart, and we cooperated on a plan on what should be done after the
war to restore the finances back to health again. I was invited by him in 45
to become a member of the Supervisory Council of the Amsterdamschebank.
I accepted that. but at the same time the Catholic labour organisation invited
me to become their economic adviser. As you know, in Holland you had not
one but several trade union organisations - the Protestant, the Catholic, and a
Socialist and a Communist one. I said: "That's difficult, because I'm on the
board of the Amsterdamschebank", and they said: "Yes, that is a difficulty",
and they thought it over. Then they said: "No, in the new circumstances, it's
not so bad to have somebody who knows what banking is". Then I told the
Amsterdamschebank, and they said: "No, you can't combine the two". But
after some time Stuart came back and said: "No, it's not so bad. We like to
have somebody who has social contacts", So I was perhaps the first person in
t.he modern style, who had a liaison also with labour. That was very new in
Holland, in those days. I was, umit 48 also a member of the First Chamber,
the Senate. Only thirty years old! Just the age-limit in our constitution. In the
Senate I came more or less into heavy discussion with Mr Lieftinck, who was
the minister of Finance. Lieftinck was in favour of a cheap money policy. I
understood that, because he had an enormous floating debt, and he wanted
to consolidate that, and a low interest rate would help. But I warned him
that afterwards. when interest rates rose to their natural level, the value of
all those bonds, in which pension funds and so on were invested, would go
down. There was an enormous discussion. I never had any intention to be
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involved in politics. I was not elected to the Senate, but appointed. In
Holland, after the war, the first parliament was not elected, but appointed by
Queen Wilhelmina. We had our first elections only in 46. Before that time, we
had a nominated Parliament. I was nominated because I had done something
(as a writer of articles) in the underground movement. That was, I suppose,
the reason Wilhelmina put me in the Senate. At that time I was a member of
the board or the Amsterdamschebank, I was adviser of the Catholic Trade
Union Federation, I was professor in the university of Nij megen, and
member of the Senate, a rather remarkable combination. Then the minister
of Economic Affairs, Huysmans, fell ill, and I came under pressure to accept a
nomination as minister of Economic Affairs.
FD What year was that?
VB That's the end of 47, the beginning of 48.
FD So from the end of 47, until September 1952, you are the minister of
Economic Affairs?
VB I started in January 48, as minister of Economic Affairs.
FD Nearly five years.
VB Nearly five years, in three cabinets. Because of the Indonesian problem,
there was often instability in the political field, and we had changes in the
cabinet. Mr Drees, the prime minister, played an important role in those
days. The first cabinet in which I took part was the Beel cabinet. That was
before Drees. After some months, there were elections, and I accepted a
place in the fol1owin~ cabinet, the Drees- Van Schaik cabinet. Lieflinck was
still minister of Finance, and Mansholt was minister of Agriculture.
FD Even then!
VB Yes, in the Beel cabinet too I worked alongside Mansholt and Lieftinck.
Lieftinck left the same day as I did. He went to Washington. I went to the
Amstcrdamschebank. this time not as an outside director but, after a short
advisory period, as a member of the board of management.
FD When you continued with the Amsterdamschebank, was it a completely
different life. or did you find yourself involved in some of these European
enterprises? You said just before the recording that you remembered going
to see Monnet in Luxembourg.
VB I did, yes. That was when I was back in the bank. We visited Monnet to
discuss the possibility of the Amsterdamschebank forming a syndicate of
banks to float a loan in guilders. If I remember aright, we did so.
FD But apart from that, your experience afterwards is strictly in banking?
You weren't, for instance, involved in the politics of the Common Market?
VB No. I had my contacts with everyone, and { was still very much
interested, but building up the bank and. after 1964, merging it with the
Rotterdamschebank was my main purpose. But I wrote an article in the
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quarterly review of the bank on European integration. That must have been
at the end of 52 '"
PD Perhaps before we go on, I'd be grateful if you'd explain to me a few of
the Dutch terms, so that I get them right. When you said the NSB, the
National Socialists, you don't mean the Dutch equivalent of the NSDAP?
VB Yes. the Nationaal Socialistische Beweging- that was the Dutch Nazi
organisation.
FD And you were saying that there were some Dutch Nazis in the ministry?
VB There were a few civil servants who were crypto (or not) NSBers
FD And that was part of the discomfort you felt, in that year?
VB That's right. I was not married, so I thought "what do I do?" I walked out.
FD I sec. Now you mentioned the underground paper you wrote for during
the war, but I'm afraid I did not catch it.
VB Ie Maintiendrai.
FD Ah. Is that the motto of the house of Orange 7
VB That is correct. It was the paper of the Nederlandse Volksbeweging. This
started in one of the camps where the Nazis brought together important
Dutchmen from before the war. It was a kind of clandestine political
movement. In that camp, Schermerhorn, who was prime minister after the
war, started this Volksbeweging. It aimed at a big progressive party after
the war. It never really played a political role as a party, but it had a great
influence on the renewal of Dutch politics after the war. The paper of this
Volksbeweging was Ie Maintiendrai. At the end of the war, Ie Maintiendraj
was merged with Vrij Nederland. Queen Wilhelmina addressed the
underground from London on the radio, and said that "now that in
Normandy we are starting our liberation struggle, the underground has to
merge in Holland". Then we combined this paper, Je Maintiendrai, with some
other ones. That was also what brought me into the political field. But I
always wrote only on financial and economic topics.
FD So when you entered the government, what was the main problem for
you, at the Economic Affairs ministry? And how did you combine what you
did with the Finance ministry?
VB When I entered the Dutch cabinet in January 48, Holland was in a very
unstable situation, because we had started after the war to distribute a
certain amount of food and so on. much above the level we could finance
with our own supplies of foreign currency. So we had to seek credits abroad.
FD America!
VB Yes, naturally. That was the way we started. But then it was clear. in 48,
that we would have to bring down our investment levels very substantially,
and our consumption, if we did not get Marshall aid or something of the
kind. That had just been announced, as you know. So I based myself from
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the beginning on the supposition that Marshall aid would come off. My
colleague at Finance. who professionally had to be much gloomier than I, as a
young man was, thought that my policy was far too optimistic. If Marshall
ai(1 failed to matertalise. we would have to restrict spending very heavily,
which was right.
FD But why should he think Marshall aid would not come through, when the
Americans had announced it would?
VB I mention it, because if you want to understand the problems around the
Schuman Plan. these factors are relevant. Lieftinck was an excellent minister
of Finance, a very capable man, who reconstructed the financial situation
after the war very well. But he was pessimistic, and always saw problems
and difficulties. 1 remember that before we had the discussion over the
Schuman Plan, I had already had a strong discussion on the Benelux Pre­
Union treaty. That treaty arranged for free trade between the three
countries. Liettinck said: ''You are far too optimistic. because the Belgians will
export far more to Holland than we to Belgium ", which was quite true, but
my thesis was: "That's true, but in the meantime there will develop a
multilateral payment system, so that we shall compensate our shortages
here with surpluses elsewhere".
FD There was barter trade still.
VB Naturally. But it was the beginning of the multilateral payments union.
and I held the view that we must fill up that way, or otherwise we would all
fall down. Hy nature, I am also a rather prudent man, and not a cowboy at
all. But in that situation, with Mr Drees and Mr Lieftinck, who were excellent
colleagues, I had to bring in the push, to take some risks here and there. I
mention it because it has something to do with the reactions of the Dutch to
the beginnings of the Schuman Plan. When I started as a minister. it was
clear to me that because the Dutch population was growing the fastest of all
western Europe - as fast as Poland - and it was clear already in 48 that we
were going to lose Indonesia - it was my task to lay a foundation for a
modern industry in Holland. We needed it if we wanted to give work to all
those young people who were coming onto the labour market, about 50,000
a year, which was a lot for this little country. I started the industrialisation
policy. I laid down industrialisation papers published as an annexe to the
budget every year. Every year came an industrialisation paper which
included an industrialisation scheme, a kind of plan. I didn't call it a plan ...
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Tape t Side 2
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VB I didn't call it a plan, because there was a fight between the supporters
of a state guided economy, and those who preferred to get the market
working again as soon as possible. I belonged to those who saw the market
as essential to the solution of our problems. but not as an end in itself. Like
Keynes, I saw the market as an instrument. I saw a task also for
government. At least government had to show the way. Planning for me was
not directive. but indicative. I tried to make clear what economic policy you
had to pursue to get to certain pOlOts you wanted to reach.
fn Were the negotiations for dollars with the United States an integral part
of the motivation of this plan?
VB Yes. Really, the plan had two basic reference points. One was the number
of young people coming up. They had to be prOVided with the means to
work. So we knew what amount we would have to invest during the period
of Marshall aid. The other basic was that at the end of Marshall aid, our
balance of payments had to be in equilibrium. My industnalIsation policy
aimed at these two goals. My idea was that when private enterprise did not,
or could not, do enough to develop certain parts of industry, the State should
step in. When the Schuman Plan was announced, on May 9 1950, it so
happened that the nelt day I was in Parliament, on the 10th and the 11 tho to
defend a bill in which the State was enabled to participate in the Dutch iron
and steel industry. This was a very good opportunity for me to express
myself on the Schuman Plan. To come back to the immediate point, though,
my planning was based on creating a situation in which market forces could
work, with as much free trade as possible. Holland, a little country with so
many people, had to trade with the whole world, and especially with Europe.
FD With Germany?
VB With Germany. One of my main purposes was to have as soon as possible
a commercial treaty with Germany. We had this in 49.
FU When the Federal Republic had already been set up, or when it was still
the Trizone?
VB No. just set up. I invited Erhard Lo the Ha~ue when he was still an
economics professor in Munich. We prepared the treaty after he was
nominated minister of Economic Affairs and we signed it in 49. about three
months before the Schuman Plan. This was my view of what I had to do, my
industrialisation policy.
FD May I ask about the means. because at that period the Dutch had an
extraordinarily corporatist policy, did you not? You had a policy Where the
employers and the trades unions and the government came together to
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determine wages. Macro·-economic policy was decided as a collective
operation at the top?
VB That is correct. All the important social and economic decisions of the
government were discussed with the so-called "social partners '.
FD Was it the Economic Affairs ministry that did this, or the Finance
ministry?
VB The Economics ministry did the PubHekrechtelijke Bedrijfsorganisatie,
that is the public law organisation of the economy. That was a bill put
forward during the time I was minister. But the ideas existed already before
that. They were already formed as a law proposal under the Schermerhorn­
Drees ministry. But the Socialists aimed at far too much directive planning
by the State, via these corporate organs. I changed that law, and made it into
what we call in Holland a cadre law Icf. French loi··cadrel.
FD A general enabling law IJiterally: framework law J
VH So that a plan could be carried out only when employees and employers
were both of the opinion that their sector was mature for it. Otherwise nol.
The main body which was created cje (~~tQ from the beginning was the Social
and Economic Council, the top of the pyramid.
fD Was your coming into office a conscious expression of a shift in political
power inside the country7 I can imagine that your attitude, coming after the
socialist attitude, at that time. would ha,ve appeared very controversial.
VB Yes, in the House, I had from the beginning a really heavy fight on that
item of whether or not there should be a guided central polley. But that fight
began already under my predecessor, Huysmans.
FD With whom did you have the fight? The Labour party?
VB With the Labour party.
FD Was Lieftinck 111 the Labour party?
VB He was Labour, yes. But before the war, he was a member of the
Christelijk Historische Unie. He was not a pre-war socialist. He was a convert
to a modern, more Labour-like, socialism. Socialism in the first years after
the war was different. The Socialists did not really accept, for example, the
class struggle. They were in favour of the monarchy and no longer anti­
reli~ious. They were different from before the war. Nevertheless, in the
economic field, 1 had, in the first years especially, to fight against the central
planning which was in the minds of all the Socialists. They were influenced
by Stafford Cripps and all those ideas.
FD So that there would have been a certain tension between the policy you
were pursuing, and the pressures upon Lieftinck as a socialist minister of
Finance?
VB My position vis-a-vis Drees was more influenced by that, but on the
whole, within the cabinet, controversies in the economic field were not too
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heavy. Lieftinck was different. My tensions with Lieftinck had to do with the
fact that my policy supposed the freest possible working of markets and
international trade. Lieftinck, especially after the outbreak of the Korean
war, wanted physical controls on imports, exports and capital.
FD That's a big difference.
VB It was a big difference. And I had always seen all ideas tending towards
European integration as favourable to my way of thinkmg. It was the only
way to get an atmosphere around us here in which industrialisation could
flower.
FD In effect, inside the coalition, there were considerable tensions, which
would come on top of the diviSIOns of responsibility between the Economic
Affairs ministry and the Finance ministry?
VB Yes, but Lieftinck was a very good economist and no extremist. Deep in
his heart, he was aware that my approach to industrialisation was not bad.
At my request, he cooperated in creating fiscal incentives for investment in
industry, such as rapid depreciation facilities.
FD That was the German system.
VB Like the Germans, but on top of rapid depreciation we also provided
certain investment credits, which cuuld be deducted from taxable Income,
and things liku that. So we cooperated well. There was some resistance
against my favouring liberalisation of trade. But things went not too badly. I
mentiuned the BenelUX treaty, which meant free trade between the three
countries. Lieftinck was not in favour, nor was Holtrop. the President of the
Bank of the Netherlands. But I was able to convince them that we had to
take the risk. So we went rather far down the road together. But it all
changed when the Korean war broke out. That was just the time that the
Schuman Plan was launched. You can only understand the tensions within
the Dutch cabinet over the mandate for Spierenburg and his negotiators tn
Paris, and the ideas about the Council of Ministers, and so on, if you are
aware of the tensions within the Dutch cabinet in those days over the
economic consequences of the Korean war.
pn What were these consequences?
VB First, the consequences for our industrialisation policy The balance of
payments had developed favourably. In 49, we were down to a deficit of
250 million guilders. It had been over a billion. But after the Korean war
broke out, in June 50, very soon the balance of payments was out of
equilibrium, and we again got a deficit on the trade balance of a billion
gUilders. That made Lieftinck and the President of the Nederlandsche Bank
very nervous. Lieftinck wanted to go back to a policy of physical controls ­
import contrOl, export control.
FD That doesn't fit in very well with the common market.
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VB No. Not with Benelux. Not with the OEEe. With nothing. In this situation, I
thought: "If I give in, that means the end of my industrialisation policy". I
was a young man, and ready if necessary to take some risks. And then came,
on May 9th· that was before Korea ...
FD Six weeks before.
VB But that makes a lot of things understandable. Because on May 9th, the
idea or the Schuman Plan was aired. At that time, Stikker was in Paris. and 1
saw here, in this article. that Hall-Patch, who was the British representative
at the OEEC, cabled to London that Stikker was obviously perturbed by the
Schuman proposal. Of course, Stikker was working on his Stikker Plan. which
was an idea of economic integration inside the OEEe. without delegations of
sovereignty, and includlOg the British. To include the British was for Stikker
very, very important. His policy was always within the OEBC, and with the
British. There was also in Holland an emotional aversion against a continental
Europe. with those southern Christian Democratic parties and countries as
main supporters of such cooperation.
FD Was that true in the Catholic party as well?
VB No. In Parliament, it was not that much the case. But in the cabinet, I felt
some hesitation on a continental approach.
FD Particularly with Drees?
VB ParticUlarly with Drees, yes. Stikker, his first reaction was as I have
described it. But I remember that after he had spoken to Schuman in
London. on 1 think the 16th [May) or so, he was very convince<.i that it was a
very new and perspective-offering approach which was being made here.
FD Schuman persuaded him 7
VB I think Monnet was with him, perhaps, ill London. I'm not sure. But on
May 16th, Stikker had a conversation with Schuman in London. After, he
came back and wrote his paper for the Council of Ministers, and that paper
was positive about the Schu man proposal.
FD On political grounds?
YH On political grounds. Slikker said this is really something new, it is an
imaginative approach. 1 had already expressed myself in the same way,
because, I told you, that on the 10th I was in Parliament for that speCIal law
on participation by the government in the Dutch steel industry, and I had to
speak abollt the Schuman Plan. And I called it - it says so here l - a "welcome
surprise". I said: "this is imaginative, it is a political- economical approach to
great century-old problems. It is also something which has body, substance.
J Kersten, Albert "A welcome surprise? The Netherlands and the Schuman Plan
negotiations", in Schvat>e, Klaus, ed., (1988), The Beginnings of the Schuman Plan"
Nomos, Baden Baden - Giuffre, Milano -L.G.D.j., Paris - Bruyiant.. Brussels, pp. 285-'304.
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and we have to be positive to that. I did not contact my colleagues in the
cabinet, but I had to say something, and I thought: "Let me say that now, in
general, and then we'll see!"
FD But were your reasons for speaking like that economic, or were you in
favour of economic integration?
VB They were primarily economic, because my industrialisation poiicy was
based on free international trade, and I had the feeling that HoJIand only had
a chance jf there were a great European market. We would not get it if
Germany were not to take part in the reconstruction of Europe. That could
only be done without danger via European integration in one way or another.
I knew about the preparation of the Stikker Plan, but I did not really much
believe in it.
FD Why not?
VB Because I could not see how it would be possible, within the OEEC, to
create a supranational institution where integration could really work.
FD You thought supranationality was necessary before the Schuman Plan?
VB Yes, and I was not the only one. The Dutch Parliament had already
passed one or two motions which said it would be necessary to introduce
supranational elements. That idea was alive in the Dutch Parliament already.
FD It was not reflected at all in the original Dutch memorandum on the
Council of Ministers?
VB No, not at all - that's true.
FD May I come back, though? You have made a very interesting statement
there. You said you thought the Schuman Plan was really something new.
Now, you'd been through al1 these exercises on customs unions, on Fritalux
and Finebel, the Stikker Plan ... What was new in the Schuman Plan vis-a-vis
Fritalux?
VB What was very new was this. Holland was normally rather suspicious of
any proposal from France. We always thought there was some ulterior
motive - "they want hegemony in Europe", or something. History did not
leave us too many good memories from that quarter. We were suspicious.
But when I heard that the French were ready to bring their own coal and
steel industry in a body which would have certain rights to decide upon the
execution of decisions '"
FD Ahl that was the key difference, psychologically?
VB The key difference was for me that this had body, flesh and blood.
FD And the flesh and blood was that there could be a European authority,
that could have authority over the French themselves, and that Fritalux had
none of this?
VB That's it. And that Stikker, after the 16th, also judged all that positively ­
which was, for him, more difficult than for me - and had the impression
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from Schuman - perhaps Monnet was also there, I do not know - that these
were honest people. It was not a French trick. This was something really
aiming for a very, very new and fundamental approach to European
problems. And that was also my feeling You could find it in the
parliamentary record. I made a rather long statement, on the 11 th of May,
the second day of the debate.
FD So this is an interesting case, where personal impressions can make a
difference. Very often, in international politics, personal impressions don't
come into it very much.
VD Yes, but here Stikker was positive from the l(,th, - he prepared his paper
for the Council of Ministers of the 22nd - and concluded that the government
had to participate in principle In these negotiations.
FD For him, this meant accepting that the United K.ingdom probably wasn't
interested?
VB He had the idea. at that time, of the Stikkf.f Plan. Essential to the Stikker
Plan was the idea that European integration, meaning Iiberalisation 01 trade,
wa~ achieved on a multilateral basis in Europe There was also the idea of a
common financing of reconstruction in certain sectors. So he saw the
Schu man Plan as a possible sector of his own, Stikker approach.
FD So he was thinking of a two·-speed Europe, in a sense?
VB Even in the beginning, when the instructions for the negotiators were
prepared, they played with the idea that there would not be a Council of
Ministers. to control the High Authority, but a Committee of the OEEC Council.
So that England, without taking part in the Schuman Plan, would
nevertheless be part of the control mechanism That was absolutely
impossible. I fought against it. That was a long story.
J:D But if you hadnt fought agamst it, it might have gone through?
VB I do not know. I was not the only one
FD Who else [ought against it?
VB I can't really say But it can be found.
Tape 2 Side I
fD You were talking abuut the debate over whether the OEEC Council of
Ministers should superVise the Schuman Plan.
VB I was saying that there was an Economic Committee of the Council of
Ministers [of the OEECl. I think the minutes of those meetings have now
become available and that you can consult them. That obviously is quite
important. Now, the interesting thing is that, on the 22nd of May, the short
paper of Stikker. in which he proposed that we participate in principle in the
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discussions, was put before the Council of Ministers, and accepted without
any discussion.
fD This short paper simply said: "We should go into the negotiations".
Nothing else?
VB In principle. The idea in principle was for us a basis for discussion. It was
com mitting, more or less, not too much.
FD Hut it did not say, we cannot accept the supranational principle l
VB That it did not say, anywhere. Neither did it say the opposite.
FD Nun-commital.
VB That we had no discussion had also to do with the fact that the Korean
war had not yet broken out. If the Korean war had already broken out, I am
sure we would not so easily have accepted. The later discussions we had in
that Economic Committee of the Council of Ministers. to draft the instruction
for Spierenburg and his people, Kohnstamm. and so on, was much more
difficLllt. because in the meantIme the Korean war had heavily influenced
our balance of payments We had almost no reserves in those days. In the
same months that we prepared these instructions, I had to fight to continue
to liberalise international trade, as a basis of my industrialisation policy
Lieftinck and Holtrop wanted to go back to physical controls, and Drees, in
the beginning, supported them.
FD Why did it not happen. then? Who were your allies?
VB One of my allies always was Manshult. Stikker was also of the opinion
lhat it should be given a chance.
FD He didn't change?
VB He dId not change. He had my view on economic policy. Mansholt was a
socialist. but an agricultural entrepreneur. He was very interested in as
much free trade as possible, to export our agricultural products. He was in
favour of every policy which opened up perspectives in that field. But he
was not, at that time - if I remember correctly, and you could find it in the
minutes of those meetings - really in favour of supranationality. He wanted
to run things himself, here in Holland in the agricultural field, and not to
hand over to somebody else elsewhere. And that was a bit the same also
with Lieftinck.
FD But in fact, if you had a full common market, it would affect the ministry
of Economic Affairs even more than Finance?
VB Yes, but my idea was always that if we would fight for a market
governed by basically free trade, and policies that conformed WIth it, Holland
could compete. I was sure that, for example, the Dutch coal and steel
industry was much more modern than the tlelgian - and than the French,
even. So, I thought, we always are in a good position if we have a free, big
market I have to accept every risk so long as that is sure. And I accept also
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supranationality, and all those things, if only it is sure that the market will
be in principle a free market. Of course, there can be special measures in
special circumstances - Q~purie~gr!euse, or over-'production- but not in the
normal situation.
FD But given this division in the cabinet, between people who accepted free
trade on the une hand, and supranationaJity un the other, and those who,
were particularly worried by the Korean war, and wanted to go back to a
more controlled economy, and were more suspicious of supranationality - in
other words, a very divided cabinet - why is the outcome the first proposal
on the Council of Ministers, which is so very intergovernmental in its
approach? Particularly since you say that there was strong supranational
feeling tn the Parliament?
VB Yes. But in the cabinet what was most important for me was to get my
colleague of Finance to let me continue with freeing international trade, that
we did not go hack to physical controls, and so on. So I was not an
unconditional supporter of supranationality. I knew that Big Brother can be
dangerous for a lillIe country. For example, I was not against the Council of
Ministers. 1 supported the idea of a Council of Ministers. But I was not in
favour of its being given rights, possibilities, to nullify the supranationality
of the High Authority.
FD In other words, you accepted the idea of the Council of Milllsters as it
finally emerged in the treaty?
VB Yes, that is correct.
PD But that is not the first step?
VB No. But that first step was necessary to get my colJeague of Finance on
board.
PD Why did that get him involved? When you say that you thought it was
very important to get your colleague of Finance first and foremost to accept
a policy of keeping trade open, having a Council of Ministers, an inter-'
governmental system for the Schuman Plan, where presumably, if there
were a Dutch veto, one could still have controls on the Dutch economy - why
did that bring Lieftinck in the direction of accepting a common market?
VB I think that's difficult to say. But after some time it was clear that the
approach to the Korean war, continuing with free international trade and
using old classical instrumenl:i of high interest rates, lowering credit, and
fiscal instruments was working That it was going to work became clear as
soon as the autumn uf SO. Then Lieftinck became somewhat more relaxed.
FD Yes, but the negotiation on the Council of Ministers happens befure the
autumn. It takes place in July and August.
VB That is true.
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FD So I don't quite see how Lieftinck was drawn in by agreeing to a very
tough Council of Ministers. and then was sufficiently persuaded by the
change of circumstances and the process of negotiation, to be satisfied with
the kind of Council of Ministers balanced by the High Authority's positions
which finally emerged?
VB I've nol looked into that. but did we not also have a change in cabinet in
that ilme?
PD I don't know.
VB I think we went over from the Drees- Van Schaick cabinet to the second
cabinet of Drees. I think 1t was at that time.
PD Did Lieftinck leave?
VB No, he was still there. But (I have also said that in my book 2 ) I had
made it clear that if onc reacted to the Korean war by going back to physical
controls and the end of my industrialisatiOn approach, I would walk out.
That was clear to everybody. So I had the impreSSIOn that Drees fell that, to
continue with the coalition, he had to find a compromise. Drees - I have said
that in Leyden, in a symposium on these years - tried in these difficull
negotiations within the Economic Comittee of the Council of Ministers, to find
a solution which would satisfy me and Lieftinck. It was a very subtle game.
FO Is it correct, what KHrsten says there,3 that at one point Spierenburg told
Monnet that the Dutch would leave the conference if the Council of Ministers
were not accepted?
VB That could be true.
PD If that was the case, why were you confident the threat would be
successful? Did you think you were essential to the negotiations? One could
have said the French, Germans and Italians could go along by themselves.
Not desirable - but they COUld. Presumably, if you were that strong on that
question, there was some implication that you thought you would win?
VB Yes, we had also the feeling - I do not remember precisely when I first
met Monnel '. but from the beginning, I had confidence in Monnet. I had the
impression: "Here 1 have to deal with a man of more than normal
imagination, and a very practical man, who sees what way to go to get at his
goals, and a man who is taking me and these little countries seriously. He
wants to have us in if possible". The Dutch are a strange people. Its a little
country and not of very much importance. But they think about things, and
they come up with ideas. They are 100 percent in when they cooperate with
2 JR.M. V8n den Brink, Zoeken nO&' een Heilshert, Elsevier, Amsterdam 1984, pp 448­
451.
3 [ersten, A., Qp-. cit.
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something. They still have something of their old Calvinist approach. Then
they want to fight for it, and they want to do what is necessary,
FD And that proved to be the case.
VB That worked here, in my opinion, more or less,
FD So there was a current of mutual confidence, Was this your feeling, or
was this more general in the Dutch ministers?
VB I thought that it was surely also true for Stikker, Stikker had really a
personal confidence in Schuman. I also had in Schuman. 1 had the feeling:
"This is an honest man, and we can do business with people lIke that. These
are not the old French tricks". That was my feeling,
FD But it's very important.
VB It's very important. And so I thought, it's worth while to fight for this.
And he {Kerstenl 4 is right when he says here: "The minister for Economic
Affairs, van den Brink, was the only all-out protagonist of supranational
Integration". That's true.
rD Even Mansho1t?
VB Mansholt in the beginning, if I remember rightly. was not. He liked free
trade, and he liked integration, but not supranationality. He wanted to be his
own boss .. so long as he was here, at the Hague (laughter I.
FD When he went to Brussels, that changed! So do you think that the debate
over the Council of Ministers, which wasn't very long, really, was accepted
almost immediately? There was hardly a discussion.
va Without any l1iscussion.
rD I mean, on the French side. There was very little discussion.
VB Oh, no, I meant the discussion in our Council of Ministers on the 22nd of
May. But the [ECSC! Council of Ministers was accepted rather easily also.
FD On the French side?
VB On the French side, yes. If you think it over, you need something to
control an enormously powerful body like that. If you think, what can it be?
it cannot be the OEEC - an idea which the Dutch had in the beginning to
satisfy the others.
FD Yes. It's gal to be a tandem.
VB Yes. And then you come to something like a Council of Ministers, don't
you? But you should nut make them too powerful.
FD So the Council of Ministers is settled in some time lIke August?
VB Yes, quite soon.
FD Once this is settled, are there still major crises, from the Dutch point of
view, III the Schuman negotiations(
4 hoer-sten,
v
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VB I didn't think so very much, no. I asked the chairman of the House to
create a special committee within the Parliament. There were members
taken from the committee on foreign trade. and members of the com mittee
on foreign affairs. and those together formed the Schuman Committee.
FD Of both houses?
VB Only the Second House. And I informed them very regularly. every four
weeks or so Often I took Spierenburg with me. I gave thema1l the
information. and told them why we did this or that, and so they felt rUlly ill!.
courant. That made them willing to cooperate. It worked very well.
FD Why was it you, and neither Lieftinck nor Stikker who did this?
VB Because the negntiators were from my minIstry - Spierenburg.
FD I suppose I'm asking, why was the negotiation given to you, and not to
Finance or Foreign Affairs, which might have been interested too?
VB International trade was always the field of the ministry of Economic
Affairs We had a special service for international trade. With Spierenburg
and Speekenbrink. Stikker always tried to get it within his mmistry also, and
to a certain extent that was understandable. But I was the one who had, very
regularly. every four weeks, contact with the committee of the House. We
had no problems at alL Parliament was much more in favour of these forms
of European mtegration than the cabinet.
FD Seen from outside or from a distance. that's one of the paradoxes of the
situation: you have a Parliament which is very favourable to this sort of
initiative. and you have a government that is pretty divided, and even. you
could say, rather sceptical. How could that be? Is that an accident or people?
VB Difrerent responsibilities. also. Parliament was much interested in
European federation and new deals after the war. The cabinet - Lieftinck and
Man~ho1t and Drees - wanted to pursue their policies, their views. Drees
especially in the social field, Lieftinck guiding capital and money streams.
Mansholt agriculture. I had only that part of business that was favoured by
these developments. •
FD If. say. the Dutch government, divided as it was. had happened to come
to the decision that they couldn't join in this, because it was too narrowly
based. and it ou~ht to be the Stikker Plan and the OEEC ...
VB I would never have accepted that.
PD But could the government have got away with it, vis-a-vis the
Parliament?
VB No. I think that would have been rather difficult.
FD If you'd resigned, for instance. on this. and then made a speech In
Parliament explaining why ...
:to
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VB That would have meant the end of the coalition, I think
FD So in other words, it was very difficult for the Dutch government to
refuse?
VB Also the Boogovens, Mr Ingen Housz, was in favour, His industry was
modern. The Dutch coal industry was also modern, much more modern than
others in Europe, They were in favour in principle.
1"D So the Dutch government's field for manoeuvre was actually rather
limited?
VB That's true.
FD Considering how ltmited it was, it is surprising it managed to impose its
view quite so much.
VB That's true, But r think there was also some reasonableness in the Dutch
approach. Not in the very beginning, but afterwards. A mitigated Council of
Ministers, well stipulated in the treaty, was not a bad solution.
FD No, it wasn't. Hut was that easy to obtain, internally, in the NetherJands 7
To have proposed a Council of Ministers which is all-powerful, and then to
accept a Council of Ministers which has a division of labour with the High
Authority i5 a very big step, politicaJJy.
VB Yes, but I think it had also to do with something else. It is a pity that you
cannot interview Spiercnburg, because he was a man Who very honestly and
without any ulterior motives thought: 'This a good thin~ for Holland. The
integration of Europe, a bigger market, is necessary. A reconstruction of
Europe without (jer many is impossible". This was also my idea, "We have to
introduce Germany into Europe again. That cannot be done without handing
over some sovereignty. So we have to go ahead."
FD And he thought that from the beginning?
VB We thought from the beginning: "This is a new approach, with body and
flesh, for this big problem, This can work. This is imaginative. This can
work." And Stikker was converted by Schuman, in effect, and saw it also as a
real possibility, He was in favour of it. Then I think that Lieftinck and Drees,
for example, after some time, when it got more and more dear that we
would control our problems of the Korean war, accepting also that they could
not get the full power they wanted for the Council of Ministers, accepted the
lesser position,
FD After all, I suppose one could say that if the French made a conceSSiOn on
it, so that the Dutch had rcaJly made an Impact, and proposed something
reasonable, it was rather difficult for the Dutch to go back again and say:
"Well, we don't accept that". A compromise was difficult not to accept.
VB That was difficult. That IS also what I remember. But I would advise you
to ask for the minutes of that Raad voor Economische AngeJegenheden. That
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is the committee of the Council of Ministers. which discussed economic
affairs together with the President of the Nederlandsche Bank.
Tape 2 Side 2
FU How much of a part di(j the English factor play in the Dutch cabinet once
the initial negotiatIOns on the Council of Ministers of the Schuman Plan had
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got under way?
VB It became clear rather soon that the British would not join. I shouldnt
dare to say that we really chose one way or another to make it possible for
the British still to join. No. I remember meeting Harold Wilson, then
President of the Board of Trade. I had the impression that, deep in his mind,
this kind of idea attracted him.
FD Really?
VB I had the impression.
FD Well. it's possible. Michael Pal1iser says that when he was private
secretary to Wilson, and Wilson was Prime Minister, it was quite clear to him
that Wilson was much more in favour of this European business than
appeared on the surface.
VB I had the impresslOn from my contact that he was interested in what was
going on. and even more than that. but that in his eyes a British participation
was just impossible. and not worth while to discuss seriously. That was my
impression. I think that the whole Dutch government had the feeling it was
also more and more dear that the Stikker Plan would not lead to anything in
the OEEC. and had the feeling. "Now, this [the Schuman plan] is something
real we have to pursue now, and a more far-reaching possibility that the
British will join is not available.
FD So you had to take the risk?
VB Yes. That was disappointing for the Dutch. We always liked - and still do
like - any form of European cooperation in which the British participate.
FD Two or three times, we've mentioned Ffltalux and Finebel. I'm wondering
if you could talk a little more directly about Fritalux. Was it. for instance,
taken seriuusly?
VB What date was it?
FD I think it starts in 1918, the first proposals. The most active negotiations
are during 1949. the end of 1949. I don't think they went very well.
VB I never had the impression that in Holland one really believed in a
solution along that line
FD Because of French protectionism 7
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VB I think so. We were very interested in a concrete possib iii ty to get freer
trade.
FD When the Beyen Plan came up in 1952-53, and then again with the
rclancc de Messipc whcn the common market was proposed - do you think
that this was in peoples' minds primarily a free trading issue, or that there
was a political element in it all the same?
VB In Holland, it is intermingled, hut we were mostly, and in the first place,
interested in free trade. This little country needs a big market, to live, to
breathe. !l's the only possibility. Beyen, after he left politIcs, was chairman
of our board at the Amsterdam -Rotterdam Bank after the merger.
PD Did you have the impression that his attitude was a political one as well
as a frce trade one. or essentially a free tf ade one?
VB No. Perhaps essentially. he liked games. you know. He was a man with a
lot of fantasy and he liked to play around.
FlJ You mean to say that the Beyen Plan was not very senous 7
VB Yes, it was serious. But it was not the interests of business in a narrow
sense which interested him. He had bigger views.
FD So it was political?
VB I think so, yes. More political.
1"0 And if it hadn't been political. It would have been quite possible. aftcr
the failure of the European Army, to say 'Let's go for free trade in the OEEC.
wouldn't it?'
VB Yes. But the firSt -€ xperience we had had with the StUcker Plan was not
too faVOurable.
FD That memory lingered?
vn Oh yes. I think so. One did not believe in a pos3ibility to solve problems
like these by such big institutions.
FD Yes. Without supranational powers.
VB No They are too big I remember the negotiation on the Schuman Plan,
when we were sitting together, Stikker and I for Holland, Adenauer and
Hallstein. and Schu man and Monnet. and Sforza for Italy, and Bech - a few
people round the table could discuss things. And that's the only possibility to
get something done.
FD In all this, I've failed to ask you what your impression was of Monnet?
You've mentioned him once or tWice.
VB My imprcssion of Monnet was that of an extraordinary man. Really an
extraordinary man, with much imagination. Looking upon things just from a
little bit higher view than many others. He made on me always the
impression of a very honest man, who also clearly said. "1 can't do this, for
this or that reason. But that is perhaps a possibility. I'll try it'.
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FD YOll found that situations were clear with him. You knew where yOll
stood.
VB That was my impression. I liked that man very much. You felt almost in
contact with a friend. Very remarkable. Because I did not have that very
much in my career. thal I felt attracted to a person for his spiritual
behaviour.
FD Spiritual behaViour?
VB Yes. I think so.
FD And did you have much contact with Schuman in all this?
V13 Not that much. But the times I met him. he made on me also the
impression of a serious and honest man. It was not at all the French tricks,
&c. the box or tricks we had in mind. when we heard - that was always in
Holland the firsl reaction on French proposals.
F'D More than with Germans?
VB Oh, yes. more than with Germans.
FD A box of tricks.
V13 Germans could be very bad, but not in the same tricky way (laughter'.
FD So the impact of Schuman and Monnel was all the greater because it was
simple? I mean, it was quite different from the French?
VB For that rcason, the impact was much greater, that is true. And not only
here, I think. Also in 13elgium, for example, the impact was great. in my
opmlOn.
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FU On people like whom 7
VB Like IPaul- Henri! Spaak, and [Gaston] Eyskens.
FD Was this your personal reaction, or was this a view that was widely held
in the Hague?
VB I think that there were more. Those who met Monnet and Schuman were
at leaRt convinced of the seriousness of the effort and the approach.
FD It was mainly Spierenburg who did the actual negotiating with Monnet?
But yuu saw him quite often?
VB Often. He came at least (~very week, for an hour or so. within my cabinet,
to discuss.
FD You mean Spierenbur~ did? You mean to the Hague?
VB Yes. Every week. I had long conversatlOns with Spierenburg, and he
accom panied me to the Parliamentary Com mittee, and to the Economic
Council of Ministers. I invited him to accompany me.
FD And when did you get this impression of Monnet as almost a friend,
then? when you met him at Councils of Ministers of the Six?
Vtl No. 1 met him also separately from that - I think via Spierenburg.
Spierenburg brought him to the Hague.
FD So you did have private conversations?
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VB I had conversations with him.
FD .lust round the table-,i
VB Oh yes.
Fl> You didn't have the impression you were negotiating on those occasions?
VB No, we discussed openly. He used to give his opinions about things
dearly.
FD All sorts of things.
VB All sorts of things.
FD So you heard the back of his mind as \velP
VB That~ what I thought.
FD When you said it's very rare you found that, have you got Olher
examples. or is Monnet unique in your expertence?
VB No, that IS very rare.
[Interruptionl
VB ... trying to gather solutions. [It's] that feeling you got. Discussions on the
Council of Ministers, and things like that You had the feeling, "he
understands the problem for LIS, and he is willing to look together if there is
a solution to be found'. A little bit like Lubbers, today.
FD Is he like that 11>0?
VB No, not the same type of man Lubbers is more cerebral.
FD Monnet was not particularly cerebral? It wasn t as an intellectual that he
Impressed?
VB No, not a real intellectual. 1 think. Happily not.
PD By not a real intellectual. you mean that he was a man of business?
VB Yes, with practical views, and a little bit of com mon sense, and what we
call in Holland lloerenverstand, peasant shrewdnes~~.
FD Did you think of him as a peasant?
VB No, but somebody who knew the country, and had a feeling for what is
growing, like every Frenchman, aJ most, no?
FD Well, not the tricky nnes, perhaps?
J-R.M. VAN DEN BRINK.
End of Interview
17 May 1989
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APPHNJ>IX
EItract from letter by
R. M. VAN DEN BR.INK.
J.
to F. Duchene
18 January 1990
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In those days. more than now. the Dutch Parliament tned not to get lost in
details. and to restrict itself to major issues and broad political guidelines
One of these was European integration. Parliament favoured it not only for
economic but for political reasons (the 'German problem' was still a hot issue
in Holland in those days. and a very delicate question; European integration
federation - was an acceptable way out). Already in March 1948 and in
1949, Parliament accepted motions on sectoral European integration on a
supranational basis. At the same time. the opimons of the main parties
differed strongly on the speed at which the necessary institutions should be
created. Government was fully aware of this general attitude of Parliament.
and of the differences between the parties. It was also aware of the fact thaI
all the "constructive" parties i i.e with the exception of the Com munistsi
realised how vulnerable the Dutch position stiJl was. Holland could not take
big economic or financial risks. In our trade with Belgium in Benelux, we sLiB
had a heavy deficit, and the European Payments Union did not yet exist. We
\vere not able to estahlish the Benelux "pre union" at the rate which we had
stipulated in uur last Benelux conferences. Holland had great diffiCUlties in
fUlfIlling the obligations for the liberalisation of trade it had underaken in
the OEEC. It was therefore understandable that the minister of Finance
wanted to remain as much as possible in control of financial developments.
Had it been asked, a majority in Parliament would also have understood the
wish to build in some fire brakes and safety valves within the framework of
European integration. But the government did not have to ask Parliament its
opinion. Negotiating international treaties is a government prerogative.
Ratification by Parliament is another matter!
However. in my eyes, the minister of Finance went too far when. at the
outset. he aSked for an all-powerful Council of Ministers in the Schuman
plan. But I became convinced that the negotiations would in fact produce an
acceptable compromise. My acceptance of the Dutch opening positiun in the
negotiations over the Council of Ministers was to a large extent tactical.
Hnd of AppendjI
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