Introduction
Data
Empirical Analysis
Conclusion
Appendix
Divide and Rule or the Rule of the Divided?
Stelios Michalopoulos and Elias Papaioannou
Tufts University and Dartmouth College and CEPR
July 2010
NBER SI - Income Distribution and Macroeconomics
Stelios Michalopoulos and Elias Papaioannou
Divide and Rule or the Rule of the Divided?
Introduction
Data
Empirical Analysis
Conclusion
Appendix
African History through Maps
Research Question
Literature
Identi…cation
Ethnic Homelands before Colonization - Murdock 1959
Stelios Michalopoulos and Elias Papaioannou
Divide and Rule or the Rule of the Divided?
Introduction
Data
Empirical Analysis
Conclusion
Appendix
African History through Maps
Research Question
Literature
Identi…cation
Pre-Colonial Institutions across Ethnicities
Stelios Michalopoulos and Elias Papaioannou
Divide and Rule or the Rule of the Divided?
Introduction
Data
Empirical Analysis
Conclusion
Appendix
African History through Maps
Research Question
Literature
Identi…cation
Berlin Conference Partitioned Africa Among Colonizers
Stelios Michalopoulos and Elias Papaioannou
Divide and Rule or the Rule of the Divided?
Introduction
Data
Empirical Analysis
Conclusion
Appendix
African History through Maps
Research Question
Literature
Identi…cation
The Design of African Borders
Berlin Conference 1884/1885 and subsequent treaties among Europeans in
1890s
Colonizers had not even explored most of Africa when borders were agreed.
No ethnicity-speci…c measure predicts which ethnicities were partitioned (see
appendix)
Drawing involved protectorates, large (free-trade) areas, and spheres of
in‡uence rather than potential states.
Stelios Michalopoulos and Elias Papaioannou
Divide and Rule or the Rule of the Divided?
Introduction
Data
Empirical Analysis
Conclusion
Appendix
African History through Maps
Research Question
Literature
Identi…cation
Upon African independence these
borders were respected creating
the boundaries of African states
Stelios Michalopoulos and Elias Papaioannou
Divide and Rule or the Rule of the Divided?
Introduction
Data
Empirical Analysis
Conclusion
Appendix
African History through Maps
Research Question
Literature
Identi…cation
Current National Institutions
across African Countries
Rule of Law Across African
Countries 1996-2004
Rule of Law 1996-2004
-1.912 - -1.459
-1.459 - -0.877
-0.877 - -0.294
-0.294 - 0.287
0.287 - 0.708
Ü
Stelios Michalopoulos and Elias Papaioannou
Divide and Rule or the Rule of the Divided?
Introduction
Data
Empirical Analysis
Conclusion
Appendix
African History through Maps
Research Question
Literature
Identi…cation
Questions
What are the Determinants of Regional Development
within Africa?
1
Do contemporaneous nationwide institutions a¤ect regional
economic performance across African states?
2
Do pre-colonial local institutional arrangements a¤ect
contemporary regional economic performance within Africa?
Stelios Michalopoulos and Elias Papaioannou
Divide and Rule or the Rule of the Divided?
Introduction
Data
Empirical Analysis
Conclusion
Appendix
African History through Maps
Research Question
Literature
Identi…cation
Questions
What are the Determinants of Regional Development
within Africa?
1
Do contemporaneous nationwide institutions a¤ect regional
economic performance across African states?
2
Do pre-colonial local institutional arrangements a¤ect
contemporary regional economic performance within Africa?
Stelios Michalopoulos and Elias Papaioannou
Divide and Rule or the Rule of the Divided?
Introduction
Data
Empirical Analysis
Conclusion
Appendix
African History through Maps
Research Question
Literature
Identi…cation
Related Literature
1
Importance of National Contemporary Institutions
(Acemoglu et al. 2001, 2002; La Porta et al. 1998, 1999)
Colonization (type or/and identity)
Persistence
2
Fundamental Role of Local Precolonial Institutions
(Herbst (2000); Gennaioli and Rainer (2006, 2007))
Limited penetration of nationwide institutions (poor infrastructure)
Colonization limited (in duration and regions)
Long-run persistence of historical features and inequality
(e.g. Guiso et al. 2008; Huillery, 2009; Banerjee and Iyer, 2005; Iyer, 2010; Dell,
2010; Acemoglu et al. 2008)
Stelios Michalopoulos and Elias Papaioannou
Divide and Rule or the Rule of the Divided?
Introduction
Data
Empirical Analysis
Conclusion
Appendix
African History through Maps
Research Question
Literature
Identi…cation
Related Literature
1
Importance of National Contemporary Institutions
(Acemoglu et al. 2001, 2002; La Porta et al. 1998, 1999)
Colonization (type or/and identity)
Persistence
2
Fundamental Role of Local Precolonial Institutions
(Herbst (2000); Gennaioli and Rainer (2006, 2007))
Limited penetration of nationwide institutions (poor infrastructure)
Colonization limited (in duration and regions)
Long-run persistence of historical features and inequality
(e.g. Guiso et al. 2008; Huillery, 2009; Banerjee and Iyer, 2005; Iyer, 2010; Dell,
2010; Acemoglu et al. 2008)
Stelios Michalopoulos and Elias Papaioannou
Divide and Rule or the Rule of the Divided?
Introduction
Data
Empirical Analysis
Conclusion
Appendix
African History through Maps
Research Question
Literature
Identi…cation
Other Explanations
Border Design - State Arti…ciality
(Englebert, Tarrango, and Carter (2002);
Alesina, Easterly, and Matuszeski (2010))
Slavery
(Nunn, 2008)
Geography-Health
(Je¤ Sachs)
Ethnic Fragmentation/Polarization
(e.g. Easterly and Levine 1997, Alesina et
al. 2003)
Human Capital
(e.g. Glaeser et al. 2004)
Stelios Michalopoulos and Elias Papaioannou
Divide and Rule or the Rule of the Divided?
Introduction
Data
Empirical Analysis
Conclusion
Appendix
African History through Maps
Research Question
Literature
Identi…cation
National Institutions and Development
1. Partitioning => identical cultures subjected to di¤erent countrywide
arrangements
Documenting Partitioned Ethnicities
(see appendix for a complete list):
2 countries: Anyi (Ghana (58%) and the Ivory Coast (42%);
3 countries: Chewa (Mozambique (50%), Malawi (34%), and Zimbabwe (16%))
Use partitioned ethnic groups to exploit within-ethnicity
across-country variation in institutional performance
Stelios Michalopoulos and Elias Papaioannou
Divide and Rule or the Rule of the Divided?
Introduction
Data
Empirical Analysis
Conclusion
Appendix
African History through Maps
Research Question
Literature
Identi…cation
Ethnic Institutions and Development
2. Exploit within-country across-ethnicity variation in tribal
pre-colonial institutional traits
Account for post-independence national characteristics and country
level unobservables
E¤ectively control for local geography
Stelios Michalopoulos and Elias Papaioannou
Divide and Rule or the Rule of the Divided?
Introduction
Data
Empirical Analysis
Conclusion
Appendix
How to Proxy for Regional African Development?
Regional Data (Country-Ethnicity)
Country Characteristics
Satelite Light Density Data: Merits
signi…cant problems on cross-country African GDP data
(measurement; unvailability; shadow economy)
paucity of high resolution regional data on development
Satellite Light Density: available at a very …ne grid (around 0.8 km
x 0.8 km)
strong correlation with income and consumption both across and
within countries (Henderson, Storeygard, and Weil, 2009)
light density => proxy for public goods provision
Stelios Michalopoulos and Elias Papaioannou
Divide and Rule or the Rule of the Divided?
Introduction
Data
Empirical Analysis
Conclusion
Appendix
How to Proxy for Regional African Development?
Regional Data (Country-Ethnicity)
Country Characteristics
Satelite Light Density Data: Merits
signi…cant problems on cross-country African GDP data
(measurement; unvailability; shadow economy)
paucity of high resolution regional data on development
Satellite Light Density: available at a very …ne grid (around 0.8 km
x 0.8 km)
strong correlation with income and consumption both across and
within countries (Henderson, Storeygard, and Weil, 2009)
light density => proxy for public goods provision
Stelios Michalopoulos and Elias Papaioannou
Divide and Rule or the Rule of the Divided?
Introduction
Data
Empirical Analysis
Conclusion
Appendix
How to Proxy for Regional African Development?
Regional Data (Country-Ethnicity)
Country Characteristics
Light Density and Income across Africa
Light Density and Income Per Capita Across African Countries
Light Density and Income Per Capita Across African Countries
Unconditional Relationship
2
9
Lesotho
Senegal
Benin
CoteGhana
D'Ivoire
Zimbabwe
Nigeria
Cameroon
Djibouti
SudanKenya
The Gambia
Liberia
Burkina Faso Rwanda
Angola
Uganda
Mozambique
7
Mauritania
Somalia
Mali
Central Af rican Republic
Namibia
Egypt
Morocco
Gabon
Swaziland
Algeria
Republic of Congo
Lesotho
Libya
Senegal
Ghana
Benin
Cote Nigeria
D'Ivoire
Mozambique
Zimbabwe
Rwanda
Cameroon
Kenya
Djibouti
The Gambia
Uganda Burkina Faso
Sudan
Liberia
Comoros
Malawi
Burundi
Somalia
Madagascar
Guinea-BissauEthiopia Mali
Mauritania
Angola
Togo
Zambia
Guinea
Tanzania
Central African Republic
Madagascar
Guinea-Bissau
Malawi
Zambia
Ethiopia
Guinea
Burundi TogoComoros
Tanzania
Niger
Chad
Sierra Leone
6
South Africa
Botswana
1
Libya
Congo (Democratic Republic of the)
0
8
Tunisia
Egypt
Morocco
Swaziland
Algeria
Republic of Congo
Equatorial Guinea
Tunisia
-1
South Africa
Gabon
Log (GDP per Capita in 2000)
Botswana
Namibia
Sierra Leone
Niger
Chad
-2
Congo (Democratic Republic of the)
5
Log (GDP per Capita in 2000)
Conditional on Population Density
Equatorial Guinea
-6
-4
-2
0
2
Log (1 + Average Light Density in 2007-2008)
Unconditional Correlation
Stelios Michalopoulos and Elias Papaioannou
-2
-1
0
1
2
Log (1 + Average Light Density in 2007-2008)
Conditioning on Pop. Dens.
Divide and Rule or the Rule of the Divided?
3
Introduction
Data
Empirical Analysis
Conclusion
Appendix
How to Proxy for Regional African Development?
Regional Data (Country-Ethnicity)
Country Characteristics
Light Density and Infant Mortality Across African Regions
Infant Mortality and Light Density Across African Regions
2
0
-2
-4
Kibungo
Umutara
Byumba
Kibuye
-6
Log Light Density Within an African Region
4
Conditional on Population Density
Spain
South
Sina
Matrouh
New Valley
Red Sea
Sud
Libya
North Sina
Gauteng
Suez
Ismailia
Ouest (inc. Libreville)
Mpumalanga
Aswan
Northern
Cape
Sud
NorthSouth
East
Northern
Province
East
Western Cape Tunisia
Free
State
North
West Quena
South
Seychelles
Behera
Harare
Central
FayoumMenia
Damietta
Giza
Beni-Suet
Sharkia
Kgatleng
Assyout
EstSuhag
Kgalagadi
Menoufia
Ouest
Kafr
El-Sh
Dakahlia
Mauritius
Conakry Swaziland
Centre
Central
Northern
Oriental
Ghanzi
Sud
North
West
Maputo
Cidade
Gharbia
Southern
Kweneng
Cape
Verde
Zone
Tensift
Nord
(G3)
Kalyoubia
Copperbelt
Centre
Est Alexandria
Nord-Ouest
Centre-Sud
Khartoum
Região Capital
Nile
River
Congo
Lusaka
Nouakchott
South
East
Eastern
Cape
KwaZulu
Natal
Greater
Accra
Port-Said Gazira
Centre-Nord
Equatorial
Guinea
Northwest
W. Kordofan
Maekel
South
West
Tome Nairobi
andCentral
Principe
Côte
Northeast
BrikamaRed
OuestSao
Cairo
Maputo
province
Sead'Ivoire
Atlantique
Western
Marities
Kigali Ville
(PVK)
Addis
Região Oeste
Nord
Região
Harari
Este
Ashanti
Mashonaland
Eastern
West
Lesotho
Dire
Dawa
White
Nile Oueme
Southern
Região
Centro
Sul
North-Western
Koulikoro
(inc.
Bamako)
Região Norte
Djibouti
Bulawayo
Central
Mashonaland
East
Volta
Coast
Kassala
Matabeleland
South
Central
Brong-Ahafo
Nord-Est
Central/South
(inc. Niamey)
Central
Sinnar
Central,
South,
&Tillaberi
East
Midlands
Centre
Gaza& Ouagadougou
Matabeleland North
Coastal
Sofala
Banjul
N.Kordofan
South
Kayes
Kigali Rurale
Inhambane
West & littoral
Northern
North
West
Blue
Nile
Central
Central
Mashonaland
Central
Tahoua/Agadez
Mono
West
Gadaref
North
Gao/Kidal/Tombouctou
Bangui
Zou
Northern HighlandsRift
Western
Manica
North/West
Grande
S.Kordofan
Comore
Valley
Tigray
Tete
Região
S.Darfur
LiberiaSul
N.Darfur
North
Borgou
East
Antananarivo
Upper
East
Gambela
Northern
Zone
Fleuve
(G2)
Upper
West
UpperEastern
Guinea
Anseba
RS
ISegou
Kerewan
Eastern
Debub
Nampula
Mansakonko
Lower
Guinea
Chad
Masvingo
Manicaland
Sud
North/
Extreme
north/Adamaoua
Dem. Rep. Of
Luapula
Kara
BasseCongo,Sikasso
Ben-Gumz
W. Darfur
Northwest
&Semenawi
southwest
Plateaux
Moheli
Niassa Mopti
Gash-Barka
KeihCyangugu
Bahri
Zone
Centre
(G4)
Centrale
LakeAtacora
Zinda/Diffa
East Oromiya
Central
North
Eastern
Affar
Antsiranana
Savanes
Gisenyi
Southern
Highlands
Guinea-Bissau
Zambezia
North
North/East
Western
Maradi
Dosso
Debubawi
Keih
Bahri Nyanza
Anjouan
Burundi
Sierra
Leone
MacCarthy
Somali
Island
Zone Sud (G1)
Cabo
Delgado
SNNP
RS II
Eastern
Toamasina
Southern
Mahajanga
Amhara
Central Guinea
ToliaryForest Guinea
RS IV
Gitarama
Western
Butare
Ruhengeri
RS V
Central/South
Northern
Fianarantsoa
RS III
-100
-50
0
Infant Mortality per African Region
50
100
Conditioning on Pop. Dens.
Stelios Michalopoulos and Elias Papaioannou
Divide and Rule or the Rule of the Divided?
Introduction
Data
Empirical Analysis
Conclusion
Appendix
How to Proxy for Regional African Development?
Regional Data (Country-Ethnicity)
Country Characteristics
Data on Geography
Distance of the centroid of each ethnic group (in each country for
partitioned ethnicities) to the capital city.
Distance of the centroid of each ethnic group to the sea coast
Land area of each ethnic region in each country
Land area under water (rivers, lakes, other streams)
Elevation (Ruggedness)
Land suitability for agriculture
Population density in 2000
Malaria Stability Index
Stelios Michalopoulos and Elias Papaioannou
Divide and Rule or the Rule of the Divided?
Introduction
Data
Empirical Analysis
Conclusion
Appendix
How to Proxy for Regional African Development?
Regional Data (Country-Ethnicity)
Country Characteristics
Other Controls
Natural resources
Diamond mine indicator
Petroleum/oil …eld indicator
Early development indicators
Major city in 1400
Also experiment with historical population density and the size of
precolonial settlements
Border Indicator
Stelios Michalopoulos and Elias Papaioannou
Divide and Rule or the Rule of the Divided?
Introduction
Data
Empirical Analysis
Conclusion
Appendix
How to Proxy for Regional African Development?
Regional Data (Country-Ethnicity)
Country Characteristics
Measures of National Institutional Development
World Bank’s Governance Indicators
Rule of Law Composite Index
Control of Corruption Composite Index
Caveats
experiment with alternative measures (ICRG risk of expropriation; Polity’s
executive constraints index; legal formalism, etc.)
results similar; unbundling institutions outside the scope of the current analysis
Stelios Michalopoulos and Elias Papaioannou
Divide and Rule or the Rule of the Divided?
Introduction
Data
Empirical Analysis
Conclusion
Appendix
Contemporaneous Institutions and Regional Development
Precolonial Institutions and Regional Development
Current National Institutions and Regional Development
Do contemporaneous nationwide institutions a¤ect regional
economic performance across African states?
Stelios Michalopoulos and Elias Papaioannou
Divide and Rule or the Rule of the Divided?
Introduction
Data
Empirical Analysis
Conclusion
Appendix
Contemporaneous Institutions and Regional Development
Precolonial Institutions and Regional Development
Empirical Speci…cation
yi ;c = a0 + IQLc + Xi0;c
+ PDi ;c + f (GEOi ;c ) + [aj + ai ] + "i ;c (1)
yi ;c : log light density at night of ethnic group i in country c.
PDi ;c : log population density of ethnic group i in country c.
IQLc : institutional quality of country c.
f (GEOi ;c ) : (regression discontinuity type) cubic polynomial in
distance to the capital city and distance to sea coast (Dell, 2009).
Xi ;c : vector of control variables.
aj : ethnic family …xed-e¤ects
Stelios Michalopoulos and Elias Papaioannou
(Murdock (1959); 96 ethnic clusters)
Divide and Rule or the Rule of the Divided?
Introduction
Data
Empirical Analysis
Conclusion
Appendix
Contemporaneous Institutions and Regional Development
Precolonial Institutions and Regional Development
Technical Remarks
Estimation:
Signi…cant fraction (around 30%) of the observations on regional
development takes on the value of zero.
Besides OLS we report Tobit estimates.
Inference:
"Standard" heteroskedasticity-adjusted standard errors unreliable.
Report double clustered s.e. with clustering at the country-level and
at the ethnic family level (Cameron, Gelbach, and Miller (2006))
1
2
Account for repeated observations (Moulton, 1986); also correlation of
precolonial institutions among ethnic families.
Account for spatial correlation.
Conley’s (1999) method yields similar (and if anything smaller) s.e.
Stelios Michalopoulos and Elias Papaioannou
Divide and Rule or the Rule of the Divided?
Introduction
Data
Empirical Analysis
Conclusion
Appendix
Contemporaneous Institutions and Regional Development
Precolonial Institutions and Regional Development
Cross-Ethnic Group Analysis
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
Rule of Law
0.1169**
(0.0465)
0.1321***
(0.0500)
0.0651***
(0.0214)
0.0596**
(0.0270)
adjusted R 2
0.153
0.241
0.521
0.528
Log Population Density
RD Geographic Polynomial
Ethnic Family Fixed-E¤ects
Geographic Controls
Observations
Yes
No
No
No
1190
Yes
Yes
No
No
1190
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
1190
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
1190
Stelios Michalopoulos and Elias Papaioannou
Divide and Rule or the Rule of the Divided?
Introduction
Data
Empirical Analysis
Conclusion
Appendix
Contemporaneous Institutions and Regional Development
Precolonial Institutions and Regional Development
Cross-Ethnic Group Analysis
Positive correlation between rule of law and regional development.
Correlation weakens when we control for culture and geography
(mimics evidence of cross-country works)
Cleaner identi…cation:
Focus on areas of the same ethnic group subject to di¤erent
national institutions
Stelios Michalopoulos and Elias Papaioannou
Divide and Rule or the Rule of the Divided?
Introduction
Data
Empirical Analysis
Conclusion
Appendix
Contemporaneous Institutions and Regional Development
Precolonial Institutions and Regional Development
Cross-Ethnic Group Analysis
Positive correlation between rule of law and regional development.
Correlation weakens when we control for culture and geography
(mimics evidence of cross-country works)
Cleaner identi…cation:
Focus on areas of the same ethnic group subject to di¤erent
national institutions
Stelios Michalopoulos and Elias Papaioannou
Divide and Rule or the Rule of the Divided?
Introduction
Data
Empirical Analysis
Conclusion
Appendix
Contemporaneous Institutions and Regional Development
Precolonial Institutions and Regional Development
Example of a Partitioned Group - Ababda
Stelios Michalopoulos and Elias Papaioannou
Divide and Rule or the Rule of the Divided?
Introduction
Data
Empirical Analysis
Conclusion
Appendix
Contemporaneous Institutions and Regional Development
Precolonial Institutions and Regional Development
Example of a Partitioned Group - Ewe
Stelios Michalopoulos and Elias Papaioannou
Divide and Rule or the Rule of the Divided?
Introduction
Data
Empirical Analysis
Conclusion
Appendix
Contemporaneous Institutions and Regional Development
Precolonial Institutions and Regional Development
Within-Ethnic Group Analysis
(1)
Rule of Law
Log Population Dens.
RD Geo Polynomial
Ethnicity FE
Geographic Controls
Observations
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
0.1129**
(0.0503)
Control of Corruption
adjusted R 2
within ethnicity R 2
(2)
0.1239**
(0.0629)
0.212
__
0.207
__
Yes
Yes
No
No
496
Yes
Yes
No
No
496
Stelios Michalopoulos and Elias Papaioannou
Divide and Rule or the Rule of the Divided?
Introduction
Data
Empirical Analysis
Conclusion
Appendix
Contemporaneous Institutions and Regional Development
Precolonial Institutions and Regional Development
Within-Ethnic Group Analysis
(1)
Rule of Law
0.1129**
(0.0503)
Control of Corruption
adjusted R 2
within ethnicity R 2
Log Population Dens.
RD Geo Polynomial
Ethnicity FE
Geographic Controls
Observations
(2)
(3)
(4)
0.0263
(0.0481)
0.1239**
(0.0629)
(5)
(6)
0.0259
(0.0511)
0.0453
(0.0660)
0.0432
(0.0745)
0.212
__
0.207
__
0.723
0.058
0.724
0.059
0.727
0.062
0.728
0.063
Yes
Yes
No
No
496
Yes
Yes
No
No
496
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
496
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
496
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
496
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
496
Stelios Michalopoulos and Elias Papaioannou
Divide and Rule or the Rule of the Divided?
Contemporaneous Institutions and Regional Development
Precolonial Institutions and Regional Development
Ethnicities Partitioned Across Countries: Does Rule of Law Matter?
1
Unconditional Relationship
GADAMES
KGATLA
ESA
GADAMES
THONGA
BANYUN
NGWAKETSE
.5
RUANDA
CHEWA
TEKE
BASHI
HAUSA
BARABRA
ABABDA
MINIANKA
RUANDA
TIGRINYA
BASHI
LAMBA
BWAKA
GURENSI
LAMBYA BWAKA
PUKU
MINIANKA
KANEMBU
KONGO
RUANDA
RUNDI
KAPSIKI
DIALONKE
MAMBILA
BIRIFON
TEKE
FANG
AZJER
GUSII DUMA
KUNDA
YOMBE
TLOKWA
NGUMBA
MANYIKA
RUNDI
BASHI RUNDI
ZIMBA
CHAKOSSI
KONO
HIECHWARE
BUSA
NGERE
TIENGA
DAGARI
TIENGA
TIGON
MALINKE
KONYANKE
SHAMBALA
MINIANKA
CHIGA
BOBOCHIGA
KPELLE
LOBI
BRONG
DENDINYASA
LUGBARA
SUBIA ATYUTI
TUBURI
BALANTE
TIGRINYA
HLENGWE
SONINKE
CHOKWE
KANEMBU
MENDE
SAMO
MALINKE
MAKONDE
NSENGA
MALINKE
AUSHI
HLENGWE
YOMBE
TOMA
GREBO
SHEBELLE
LAKA
(ADAMAWA
MATAKAM
BORAN
NAFANA
MALINKE
LUVALE
NUSAN
UDALAN
ANUAK
TENDA
GURMA
NYAKYUSA
IWA
KISSI
LAKA
(ADAMAWA
KOTA
KISSI
PANDE
SABEI
DZEM
UDALAN
MALINKE
KONKOMBA
LAKA
NUSAN
SANGA
(ADAMAWA
BAYA
KORANKO
YALUNKA
SAHO
GURMA
EGBA
BARARETTA
BARARETTA
YAO
MOMBERA
FOUTADJALON
BONDJO
BARARETTA
TABWA
ESA
KARA
AULLIMINDEN
NDEMBU
MBUNDA
YAKOMA
AZANDE
NUKWE
BONI
KOMA
SURI
TRIBU
NYANGIYA
DZEM
DIDINGA
NAUDEBA
AZANDE
AZANDE
KARAMOJONG
RESHIAT
DIDINGA
HOLO
KOMONO
DIDINGA
NALU
MUSGU
BATA
SONINKE
TAWARA
NYASA
NGAMA
MBERE
KOBA
NDUKA
NUKWE
GULA
DAZA
FUNGON
WUM
DIALONKE
BARGU
JIE
YAKA
BABUKUR
RESHIAT
MUNDU
BIDEYAT
TIENGA
MADI
AVATIME
KISSI
RESHIAT
NZANKARA
BANZIRI
MASHI
KARE
NUKWE
BIDEYAT
ALUR
DIGO
LUVALE
LAMBYA
RUNGA
UDALAN
ZAGHAWA
RONGA
KUNDA
SANGA
TAJAKANT
MBUKUSHU
NUSAN
SHUWA
TAMA
ANA
BAJUN
TAJAKANT
GURMA
MASINA
GRUNSHI
DARI
LUNGU
SANGA
FOUTADJALON
MALINKE
SONGHAI
MANGA
NDOGO
FOUTADJALON
KPELLE
BWAKA
LIGBI,
IMRAGEN
DEGHA
(SE)
GOMANI
GURMA
KUNG
SUBIA
CHEWA
LUGBARA
SUNDI
AFAR
NYASA
AMER
FANG
NSENGA
SONGHAI
MASINA
MANDARA
MENDE
ISHAAK
SONINKE
BIRIFON
MALINKE
BULOM
ZEKARA
BOKI
SHUWA
VAI
BARGU
BARGU
BARGU
MUNDANG
KONGO
BERTA
MALINKE
KRAN
NSUNGLI
HLENGWE
WANGA
EKOI
SUBIA
LUGBARA
AMBA
TAJAKANT
YOMBE
TEM
NDEMBU
ADELE
MPEZENI
NDAU
NDEMBU
BIRIFON
DIOLA
NGERE
MASALIT
FANGTAJAKANT
MASAI
KUNDA
WAKURA
MBERE
NAMA
AFAR
GURENSI
GADAMES
DIALONKE
TUKULOR
AFAR
KONJO SEKE
NGERE
TONGA
GIL
BUEM
TUMBUKA
KABRE
SUBIA
TIGRINYA
SOTHO LAMBYA
IMRAGEN RUANDA
YAO
SUBIA
EWE
ANYI
CHEWA
FON
ASSINI
CHAGA
GUDE
KOTOKO
NYANJA
RUANDA
SUBIA
KAONDE
0
NUKWE
MBUKUSHU
-.5
AMBO
KWANGARE
ESA
JERID
-1
Difference in Light Density Within Partitioned Ethnicities
Introduction
Data
Empirical Analysis
Conclusion
Appendix
-2
-1
0
1
2
Differences in Rule of Law Within a Country Pair
Stelios Michalopoulos and Elias Papaioannou
Divide and Rule or the Rule of the Divided?
Contemporaneous Institutions and Regional Development
Precolonial Institutions and Regional Development
Ethnicities Partitioned Across Countries: Does Corruption Matter?
1
Unconditional Relationship
GADAMES
KGATLA
ESA
GADAMES
BANYUN
NGWAKETSE
.5
RUANDA
THONGA
CHEWA
TEKE
BASHI
HAUSA
BARABRA
ABABDA
MINIANKA
RUANDA
TIGRINYA
LAMBA
BASHI
BWAKA
GURENSI
BWAKA LAMBYA
PUKU
KAONDE
MINIANKA
KANEMBU
KONGO
RUANDA
RUNDI
KAPSIKI
DIALONKE
MAMBILA
BIRIFON
TEKE
AZJER FANG
GUSII
DUMA
KUNDA
YOMBE
TLOKWA
RUNDI
NGUMBA
RUNDI
MANYIKA
BASHI
ZIMBA
KONO
CHAKOSSI
HIECHWARE
BUSA
NGERE
TIENGA
TIENGA
TIGON
KONYANKE
MALINKE
DAGARI
SHAMBALA
MINIANKA
CHIGA
BOBO
KPELLE
LOBI
DENDI
BRONG
LUGBARA
TUBURI
BALANTE
TIGRINYA
CHIGA
SONINKE
HLENGWE
CHOKWE
KANEMBU
MENDE
SAMO
MAKONDE
NSENGA
MALINKE
MALINKE
AUSHI
HLENGWE
NYASA
YOMBE
TOMA
GREBO
SHEBELLE
LAKA
MATAKAM
NAFANA
(ADAMAWA
BORAN
ATYUTI
MALINKE
LUVALE
NUSAN
UDALAN
ANUAK
NYAKYUSA
TENDA
LAKA
GURMA
IWA
(ADAMAWA
KOTA
KISSI
KISSI
SABEI
DZEM
PANDE
MALINKE
UDALAN
KONKOMBA
LAKA
NUSAN
(ADAMAWA
BAYA
SANGA
GURMA
EGBA
BARARETTA
SAHO
KORANKO
YALUNKA
BARARETTA
MOMBERA
FOUTADJALON
YAO
BONDJO
TABWA
BARARETTA
ESA
KARA
AULLIMINDEN
NDEMBU
KOMA
YAKOMA
AZANDE
SURI
AZANDE
BONI
KARAMOJONG
MBUNDA
NYANGIYA
HOLO
NAUDEBA
NUKWE
TRIBU
DIDINGA
DIDINGA
SONINKE
NYASA
KOBA
KOMONO
NALU
NGAMA
MBERE
MUSGUFUNGON
DZEM
BATA
RESHIAT
DIDINGA
DAZA
AZANDE
TAWARA
DIALONKE
NDUKA
BIDEYAT
WUM
GULA
NUKWE
AVATIME
JIE
MADI
MASHI
KISSI
TIENGA
YAKA
BARGU
BABUKUR
NZANKARA
MUNDU
RESHIAT
BANZIRI
RESHIAT
KARE
BIDEYAT
ALUR
LUVALE
DIGO
LAMBYA
RUNGA
UDALAN
RONGA
ZAGHAWA
TAJAKANT
SANGA
SHUWA
MBUKUSHU
KUNDA
TAMA
NUSAN
ANA
BAJUN
GURMA
TAJAKANT
MASINA
DARI
GRUNSHI
LUNGU
FOUTADJALON
FOUTADJALON
SANGA
NDOGO
MALINKE
SONGHAI
KPELLE
BWAKA
GURMA
LIGBI,
IMRAGEN
KUNG
DEGHA
GOMANI
(SE)
SUBIA
CHEWA
LUGBARA
SUNDI
NYASA
AFAR
AMER NUKWE
FANG
SONGHAI
MASINA
NSENGA
MANDARA
MENDE
ISHAAK
SONINKE
BIRIFON
MALINKE
BULOM
ZEKARA
BOKI MANGA
SHUWA
VAI
BARGU
BARGU
BARGU
MUNDANG
KONGO
BERTA
MALINKE
KRAN
NSUNGLI
WANGA
EKOI
SUBIA
LUGBARA
AMBA HLENGWE
TAJAKANT
TAJAKANT
TEM
YOMBE
ADELE
MPEZENI
BIRIFON
NDAU
NDEMBU
NGERE
DIOLA
MASALIT
FANG
MASAI
KUNDA
MBERE
WAKURA
NAMA
AFAR NDEMBU
GURENSI
GADAMES
DIALONKE
TUKULOR
AFAR
KONJO
SEKE
NGERE
TONGA
GIL
BUEMTUMBUKA
KABRE
SUBIA
TIGRINYA
SOTHO LAMBYA
IMRAGEN
RUANDA
YAO
SUBIA
EWE
ANYI
CHEWA
FON
ASSINI
CHAGA
KOTOKO GUDE
NYANJA
RUANDA
SUBIA
0
SUBIA
NUKWE
MBUKUSHU
-.5
AMBO
KWANGARE
JERID
ESA
-1
Difference in Light Density Within Partitioned Ethnicities
Introduction
Data
Empirical Analysis
Conclusion
Appendix
-2
-1
0
1
2
Differences in Corruption Within a Country Pair
Stelios Michalopoulos and Elias Papaioannou
Divide and Rule or the Rule of the Divided?
Introduction
Data
Empirical Analysis
Conclusion
Appendix
Contemporaneous Institutions and Regional Development
Precolonial Institutions and Regional Development
Sensitivity Analysis
Migration towards the country with the better institutions
(no
evidence; Table 3).
Heterogeneous E¤ects
E¤ect close and far from the capital city (Herbst, 2000)
Natural - Arti…cial Borders
Other sensitivity checks
Exclude North Africa (focus on Sub-Saharan) areas.
Large di¤erences in institutional quality across the border
(e.g.
Kenya-Somalia, Congo-Zambia, Botswana-Zimbabwe, Ghana-Ivory Coast)
Within same colonizer
Focus on the intensive/extensive margin of satellite light density
Stelios Michalopoulos and Elias Papaioannou
Divide and Rule or the Rule of the Divided?
Introduction
Data
Empirical Analysis
Conclusion
Appendix
Contemporaneous Institutions and Regional Development
Precolonial Institutions and Regional Development
Heterogeneous E¤ects: Far - Close to the Capital
Distance to the Capital
Rule of Law
adjusted R 2
within ethnicity R 2
Log Population Density
RD Geographic Polynomial
Ethnicity Fixed-E¤ects
Geographic Controls
Observations
Close
(1)
Far
(2)
Close
(3)
Far
(4)
0.2110**
(0.0852)
0.0221***
(0.0068)
-0.0056
(0.0904)
0.0072
(0.0219)
0.509
__
0.387
__
0.907
0.030
0.825
0.149
Yes
Yes
No
No
90
Yes
Yes
No
No
90
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
90
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
90
Stelios Michalopoulos and Elias Papaioannou
Divide and Rule or the Rule of the Divided?
Introduction
Data
Empirical Analysis
Conclusion
Appendix
Contemporaneous Institutions and Regional Development
Precolonial Institutions and Regional Development
Heterogeneous E¤ects: Natural - Arti…cial Borders
Border Type
Rule of Law
adjusted R 2
within ethnicity R 2
Log Population Density
RD Geographic Polynomial
Ethnicity Fixed-E¤ects
Geographic Controls
Observations
Natural
(1)
Arti…cial
(2)
Natural
(3)
Arti…cial
(4)
0.2029**
(0.0832)
0.0493**
(0.0216)
0.0510
(0.1164)
-0.0410
(0.0547)
0.455
__
0.327
__
0.887
0.0523
0.730
0.1854
Yes
Yes
No
No
170
Yes
Yes
No
No
122
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
170
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
122
Stelios Michalopoulos and Elias Papaioannou
Divide and Rule or the Rule of the Divided?
Introduction
Data
Empirical Analysis
Conclusion
Appendix
Contemporaneous Institutions and Regional Development
Precolonial Institutions and Regional Development
Local Ethnic Institutions and Regional Development
Stelios Michalopoulos and Elias Papaioannou
Divide and Rule or the Rule of the Divided?
Introduction
Data
Empirical Analysis
Conclusion
Appendix
Contemporaneous Institutions and Regional Development
Precolonial Institutions and Regional Development
So what matters for regional development within Africa?
Stelios Michalopoulos and Elias Papaioannou
Divide and Rule or the Rule of the Divided?
Introduction
Data
Empirical Analysis
Conclusion
Appendix
Contemporaneous Institutions and Regional Development
Precolonial Institutions and Regional Development
Local Ethnic Institutions and Development: The Argument
African historians have stressed the importance of ethnic institutions
(e.g. Herbst, 2000).
accountability of local chiefs; political centralization
property rights protection; communal societies vs. individualistic
Ethnic institutional structures persisted during colonization and post
independence
Cross-country correlation between local political centralization and
economic development (Gennaioli and Rainer (2006, 2007))
Stelios Michalopoulos and Elias Papaioannou
Divide and Rule or the Rule of the Divided?
Introduction
Data
Empirical Analysis
Conclusion
Appendix
Contemporaneous Institutions and Regional Development
Precolonial Institutions and Regional Development
Local Ethnic Institutions and Development: The Argument
African historians have stressed the importance of ethnic institutions
(e.g. Herbst, 2000).
accountability of local chiefs; political centralization
property rights protection; communal societies vs. individualistic
Ethnic institutional structures persisted during colonization and post
independence
Cross-country correlation between local political centralization and
economic development (Gennaioli and Rainer (2006, 2007))
Stelios Michalopoulos and Elias Papaioannou
Divide and Rule or the Rule of the Divided?
Introduction
Data
Empirical Analysis
Conclusion
Appendix
Contemporaneous Institutions and Regional Development
Precolonial Institutions and Regional Development
Ethnic Institutional and Cultural Traits
George Peter Murdock’s (1967) Ethnolinguistic Atlas
information on 534 groups in Africa before colonization
variables on ethnic cultural traits (monogamy, polygyny),
institutions (political centralization, slavery), societal structure
(class strati…cation), the economy (dependence on agriculture, size
of settlements), etc.
focus on:
"Jurisdictional Hierarchy above the Local Community Level"
"Class Strati…cation"
Stelios Michalopoulos and Elias Papaioannou
Divide and Rule or the Rule of the Divided?
Introduction
Data
Empirical Analysis
Conclusion
Appendix
Contemporaneous Institutions and Regional Development
Precolonial Institutions and Regional Development
Jurisdictional Hierarchy above the Local Level
Ordered variable, ranging from 0 to 4 indicating the number of
political jurisdictional hierarchies above the local community level
(village) for each society.
0 : stateless societies.
1 : petty chiefdoms.
2 : larger-paramount chiefdoms.
3 and 4 : groups part of large states.
Based on the number of jurisdictional hierarchy construct a binary
(0, 1) index of political centralization
centralized societies increase the accountability of local
administrators, restraining the arbitrariness of local elites,
Stelios Michalopoulos and Elias Papaioannou
Bates (1983).
Divide and Rule or the Rule of the Divided?
Introduction
Data
Empirical Analysis
Conclusion
Appendix
Stelios Michalopoulos and Elias Papaioannou
Contemporaneous Institutions and Regional Development
Precolonial Institutions and Regional Development
Divide and Rule or the Rule of the Divided?
Introduction
Data
Empirical Analysis
Conclusion
Appendix
Contemporaneous Institutions and Regional Development
Precolonial Institutions and Regional Development
Class Strati…cation
Ordered variable, ranging from 0 to 4 indicating the complexity of
the societal structure.
0:
1:
2:
3:
4:
absence of signi…cant class distinctions
some wealth distinctions
elite strati…cation
dual strati…cation
complex strati…cation
strati…ed societies are more likely to have some form of property
rights protection (Rudmin (1995))
link between historical inequality and development through property
rights (Acemoglu et al. 2008; Dell, 2010)
Stelios Michalopoulos and Elias Papaioannou
Divide and Rule or the Rule of the Divided?
Introduction
Data
Empirical Analysis
Conclusion
Appendix
Stelios Michalopoulos and Elias Papaioannou
Contemporaneous Institutions and Regional Development
Precolonial Institutions and Regional Development
Divide and Rule or the Rule of the Divided?
Introduction
Data
Empirical Analysis
Conclusion
Appendix
Contemporaneous Institutions and Regional Development
Precolonial Institutions and Regional Development
Empirical Speci…cation
yi ;c = ac + LOCINSTi + Xi0;c
+ PDi ;c + f (GEOi ;c ) + "i ;c
yi ;c : log light density at night of ethnic group i in country c
PDi ;c : log population density of ethnic group i in country c
f (GEOi ;c ) : (regression discontinuity type) cubic polynomial in
distance to the capital city and distance to nearest sea coast
Xi ;c : vector of control variables
LOCINSTi : proxy measure of ethnic institutional/cultural traits
ac : country …xed-e¤ects
Stelios Michalopoulos and Elias Papaioannou
Divide and Rule or the Rule of the Divided?
(2)
Introduction
Data
Empirical Analysis
Conclusion
Appendix
Contemporaneous Institutions and Regional Development
Precolonial Institutions and Regional Development
Precolonial Local Institutions and Regional Development
Jurisdictional Hierarchy
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
Ethnic Institutions
0.0631**
(0.0284)
0.0444***
(0.0151)
0.0375***
(0.0138)
0.0366***
(0.0138)
adjusted R 2
within country R 2
0.146
__
0.536
0.148
0.617
0.212
0.621
0.233
Yes
No
No
No
No
655
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
655
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
655
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
655
Log Population Density
Country Fixed-E¤ects
RD Geographic Polynomial
Geographic Controls
Additional Controls
Observations
Stelios Michalopoulos and Elias Papaioannou
Divide and Rule or the Rule of the Divided?
Introduction
Data
Empirical Analysis
Conclusion
Appendix
Contemporaneous Institutions and Regional Development
Precolonial Institutions and Regional Development
Precolonial Local Institutions and Regional Development
Class Strati…cation
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
Ethnic Institutions
0.0262*
(0.0136)
0.0250**
(0.0101)
0.0211***
(0.0081)
0.0209***
(0.0075)
adjusted R 2
within country R 2
0.132
__
0.568
0.162
0.655
0.221
0.661
0.255
Yes
No
No
No
No
578
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
578
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
578
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
578
Log Population Density
Country Fixed-E¤ects
RD Geographic Polynomial
Geographic Controls
Additional Controls
Observations
Stelios Michalopoulos and Elias Papaioannou
Divide and Rule or the Rule of the Divided?
Introduction
Data
Empirical Analysis
Conclusion
Appendix
Contemporaneous Institutions and Regional Development
Precolonial Institutions and Regional Development
The Rule of the Divided
Jurisdictional Hierarchy
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
Ethnic Institutions
0.0800***
(0.0303)
0.0579***
(0.0187)
0.0558***
(0.0162)
0.0544***
(0.0154)
adjusted R 2
within country R 2
0.168
__
0.564
0.174
0.662
0.234
0.667
0.277
Yes
No
No
No
No
303
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
303
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
303
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
303
Log Population Density
Country Fixed-E¤ects
RD Geographic Polynomial
Geographic Controls
Additional Controls
Observations
Stelios Michalopoulos and Elias Papaioannou
Divide and Rule or the Rule of the Divided?
Introduction
Data
Empirical Analysis
Conclusion
Appendix
Contemporaneous Institutions and Regional Development
Precolonial Institutions and Regional Development
The Rule of the Divided (cont.)
Class Strati…cation
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
Ethnic Institutions
0.0284*
(0.0157)
0.0239**
(0.0118)
0.0164*
(0.0091)
0.0174*
(0.0089)
adjusted R 2
within country R 2
0.110
__
0.610
0.170
0.705
0.225
0.715
0.275
Yes
No
No
No
No
255
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
255
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
255
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
255
Log Population Density
Country Fixed-E¤ects
RD Geographic Polynomial
Geographic Controls
Additional Controls
Observations
Stelios Michalopoulos and Elias Papaioannou
Divide and Rule or the Rule of the Divided?
Introduction
Data
Empirical Analysis
Conclusion
Appendix
Main Contribution
O¤ers a platform for testing standard cross-country correlates of
development
Exploit
within-ethnicity across-country variation in nationwide characteristics
within-country across-ethnicity variation in pre-colonial traits
Stelios Michalopoulos and Elias Papaioannou
Divide and Rule or the Rule of the Divided?
Introduction
Data
Empirical Analysis
Conclusion
Appendix
Results Summary
1
2
Current National Institutions and Regional Development
1
Positive correlation between institutional quality and regional
development;
2
BUT no e¤ect of national institutions on development within
ethnicities.
Ethnic Institutions and Ethnic Traits and Regional Development
1
Signi…cant positive e¤ect of precolonial local institutions and regional
development.
2
The positive within country e¤ect of precolonial institutions is
particularly strong in ethnic group areas at the border.
Stelios Michalopoulos and Elias Papaioannou
Divide and Rule or the Rule of the Divided?
Introduction
Data
Empirical Analysis
Conclusion
Appendix
Results Summary
1
2
Current National Institutions and Regional Development
1
Positive correlation between institutional quality and regional
development;
2
BUT no e¤ect of national institutions on development within
ethnicities.
Ethnic Institutions and Ethnic Traits and Regional Development
1
Signi…cant positive e¤ect of precolonial local institutions and regional
development.
2
The positive within country e¤ect of precolonial institutions is
particularly strong in ethnic group areas at the border.
Stelios Michalopoulos and Elias Papaioannou
Divide and Rule or the Rule of the Divided?
Introduction
Data
Empirical Analysis
Conclusion
Appendix
Results Summary
1
Evidence consistent with African scholars’view on the roots of
regional development.
2
Natural level of analysis within Africa is the ethnicity (rather than
the country).
Stelios Michalopoulos and Elias Papaioannou
Divide and Rule or the Rule of the Divided?
Introduction
Data
Empirical Analysis
Conclusion
Appendix
Future Research
Other Applications:
Re-examine the e¤ect of slavery on contemporaneous development
Examine whether the fact that Europeans used di¤erent ethnic
groups during the colonial phase has lingering e¤ects on regional
development
Do partitioned ethnicities fare worse than other groups? Public
Good Provision etc.
Does the ethnic origin of the African ruler matter for regional
development?
Stelios Michalopoulos and Elias Papaioannou
Divide and Rule or the Rule of the Divided?
Introduction
Data
Empirical Analysis
Conclusion
Appendix
Future Research
Other Applications:
Re-examine the e¤ect of slavery on contemporaneous development
Examine whether the fact that Europeans used di¤erent ethnic
groups during the colonial phase has lingering e¤ects on regional
development
Do partitioned ethnicities fare worse than other groups? Public
Good Provision etc.
Does the ethnic origin of the African ruler matter for regional
development?
Stelios Michalopoulos and Elias Papaioannou
Divide and Rule or the Rule of the Divided?
Introduction
Data
Empirical Analysis
Conclusion
Appendix
Future Research
Other Applications:
Re-examine the e¤ect of slavery on contemporaneous development
Examine whether the fact that Europeans used di¤erent ethnic
groups during the colonial phase has lingering e¤ects on regional
development
Do partitioned ethnicities fare worse than other groups? Public
Good Provision etc.
Does the ethnic origin of the African ruler matter for regional
development?
Stelios Michalopoulos and Elias Papaioannou
Divide and Rule or the Rule of the Divided?
Introduction
Data
Empirical Analysis
Conclusion
Appendix
Future Research
Other Applications:
Re-examine the e¤ect of slavery on contemporaneous development
Examine whether the fact that Europeans used di¤erent ethnic
groups during the colonial phase has lingering e¤ects on regional
development
Do partitioned ethnicities fare worse than other groups? Public
Good Provision etc.
Does the ethnic origin of the African ruler matter for regional
development?
Stelios Michalopoulos and Elias Papaioannou
Divide and Rule or the Rule of the Divided?
Introduction
Data
Empirical Analysis
Conclusion
Appendix
What Predicts Borders?
Sensitivity Analysis
Why National Institutions May Not Matter?
Why Local Tribal Institutions Matter?
Are Borders Random?
Border Indicator
(1)
(2)
(3)
Land Area
0.079*** 0.083*** 0.081**
(0.021)
(0.021)
(0.032)
Warer Area
0.161*** 0.156*** 0.142**
(0.048)
(0.044)
(0.055)
Split Indicator (10%)
(4)
0.038**
(0.019)
(5)
(6)
0.039**
(0.018)
0.053*
(0.028)
0.131*** 0.133*** 0.098**
(0.027)
(0.025)
(0.043)
Distance to Sea
0.004
(0.038)
0.007
(0.034)
0.003
(0.044)
-0.006
(0.031)
-0.015
(0.028)
-0.032
(0.041)
Elevation
-0.048
(0.101)
0.001
(0.106)
0.044
(0.117)
-0.051
(0.083)
-0.006
(0.087)
0.048
(0.108)
Agriculture Suitability
0.18
(0.120)
0.168
(0.119)
-0.033
(0.145)
0.174
(0.120)
0.176
(0.110)
-0.018
(0.159)
North Africa
0.014
(0.083)
0.038
(0.064)
-0.098
(0.069)
-0.162*
(0.098)
South Africa
0.150*
(0.087)
0.216*
(0.113)
0.118
(0.080)
0.106
(0.112)
West Africa
0.132
(0.110)
0.177
(0.119)
0.046
(0.091)
0.032
(0.099)
East Africa
-0.018
(0.074)
0.035
(0.100)
-0.096*
(0.052)
-0.1
(0.085)
Hist. Popul. Density
-0.008
(0.021)
-0.006
(0.020)
Agriculture Depend
0.061
(0.075)
0.021
(0.062)
Political Centralization
Slavery
-0.047
(0.063)
-0.023
(0.074)
Stelios Michalopoulos and Elias Papaioannou
-0.07
(0.064)
0.029
(0.090)
Divide and Rule or the Rule of the Divided?
Introduction
Data
Empirical Analysis
Conclusion
Appendix
What Predicts Borders?
Sensitivity Analysis
Why National Institutions May Not Matter?
Why Local Tribal Institutions Matter?
Migration Within Partitioned Ethnicities
(1)
Rule of Law
-0.6487*
(0.3668)
Control of Corruption
adjusted R 2
within ethnicity R 2
Log Population Dens
RD Geo Polynomial
Ethnicity FE
Geographic Controls
Observations
(2)
(3)
(4)
-0.0249
(0.2925)
-0.8149**
(0.4019)
(5)
(6)
-0.0122
(0.3109)
-0.0967
(0.3427)
-0.1067
(0.3731)
0.247
__
0.255
__
0.827
0.018
0.827
0.018
0.834
0.025
0.834
0.025
Yes
Yes
No
No
496
Yes
Yes
No
No
496
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
496
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
496
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
496
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
496
Stelios Michalopoulos and Elias Papaioannou
Divide and Rule or the Rule of the Divided?
Introduction
Data
Empirical Analysis
Conclusion
Appendix
What Predicts Borders?
Sensitivity Analysis
Why National Institutions May Not Matter?
Why Local Tribal Institutions Matter?
Sharp Discontinuities
Rule of Law
adjusted R 2
within ethnicity R 2
Log Population Density
RD Geographic Polynomial
Geographic Controls
Ethnicity Fixed-E¤ects
Observations
cross-sectional
(1)
within ethnicity
(2)
0.1562**
(0.0669)
0.0407
(0.0669)
0.450
__
0.891
0.0485
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
150
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
150
Stelios Michalopoulos and Elias Papaioannou
Divide and Rule or the Rule of the Divided?
Introduction
Data
Empirical Analysis
Conclusion
Appendix
What Predicts Borders?
Sensitivity Analysis
Why National Institutions May Not Matter?
Why Local Tribal Institutions Matter?
Intensive and Extensive Margin
Intensive Margin
cross-sectional
within ethnicity
(1)
(2)
Rule of Law
adjusted R 2
within ethnicity R 2
Log Population Dens
RD Geo Polynomial
Geographic Controls
Ethnicity Fixed-E¤ects
Observations
Extensive Margin
cross-sectional
within ethnicity
(3)
(4)
0.8422**
(0.3326)
-0.3889
(0.7622)
0.1257***
(0.0455)
-0.0293
(0.1210)
0.443
__
0.825
0.0774
0.416
__
0.733
0.0887
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
144
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
144
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
292
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
292
Stelios Michalopoulos and Elias Papaioannou
Divide and Rule or the Rule of the Divided?
Introduction
Data
Empirical Analysis
Conclusion
Appendix
What Predicts Borders?
Sensitivity Analysis
Why National Institutions May Not Matter?
Why Local Tribal Institutions Matter?
Why National Institutions May Not Matter?
Once cultural traits are accounted for then national institutions play
a lesser role
Measurement error
look close and far from the capital city where enforcement agencies are mainly
located.
National institutions are less relevant for the activities within
partitioned groups
Subnational variation of nationwide institutions makes the use of a
national averages less informative
currently collecting data on local formal institutions
National institutions a¤ect ethnicities di¤erentially
currently looking at the role of patronage politics and foreign aid.
Stelios Michalopoulos and Elias Papaioannou
Divide and Rule or the Rule of the Divided?
Introduction
Data
Empirical Analysis
Conclusion
Appendix
What Predicts Borders?
Sensitivity Analysis
Why National Institutions May Not Matter?
Why Local Tribal Institutions Matter?
Why National Institutions May Not Matter?
Once cultural traits are accounted for then national institutions play
a lesser role
Measurement error
look close and far from the capital city where enforcement agencies are mainly
located.
National institutions are less relevant for the activities within
partitioned groups
Subnational variation of nationwide institutions makes the use of a
national averages less informative
currently collecting data on local formal institutions
National institutions a¤ect ethnicities di¤erentially
currently looking at the role of patronage politics and foreign aid.
Stelios Michalopoulos and Elias Papaioannou
Divide and Rule or the Rule of the Divided?
Introduction
Data
Empirical Analysis
Conclusion
Appendix
What Predicts Borders?
Sensitivity Analysis
Why National Institutions May Not Matter?
Why Local Tribal Institutions Matter?
Why Local Tribal Institutions Matter?
Tribal institutions were enginneered locally so are bound to re‡ect
e¢ cient ways of solving local problems
Degree of class strati…cation has been shown to correlate with local
property rights
Centralized societies increase the accountability of local
administrators, restraining the arbitrariness of local elites,
Bates
(1983).
Stelios Michalopoulos and Elias Papaioannou
Divide and Rule or the Rule of the Divided?
Introduction
Data
Empirical Analysis
Conclusion
Appendix
What Predicts Borders?
Sensitivity Analysis
Why National Institutions May Not Matter?
Why Local Tribal Institutions Matter?
Summary Table
Appendix Table 2a - Summary Statistics for the Main Specifications
obs
mean
st.dev.
p25
p50
p75
min
max
Light Densiy
2007-2008
1269
0.13
0.27
0.00
0.02
0.11
0.00
1.73
Control of
Corruption
1264
-0.78
0.49
-1.05
-0.87
-0.47
-1.59
0.72
Rule of Law
1264
-0.85
0.58
-1.27
-0.89
-0.46
-1.91
0.71
Split10pc
Indicator
Distance to the
Capital City
Population
Density in 2000
1269
0.43
0.49
0.00
0.00
1.00
0.00
1.00
1269
0.64
0.62
0.27
0.43
0.74
0.01
3.17
1225
2.72
1.80
1.82
3.00
3.95
-6.67
6.22
Area
Water Area
1269
1269
1.84
0.26
1.93
0.42
0.87
0.00
2.07
0.09
3.12
0.32
-6.82
0.00
6.20
3.12
Sea Distance
1269
0.66
0.45
0.27
0.61
0.99
0.01
1.81
Mean Elevation
1269
0.62
0.44
0.30
0.49
0.94
0.00
2.18
Suitability For
Agriculture
1269
0.40
0.24
0.25
0.42
0.57
0.00
0.98
Centralization
Indicator
702
0.35
0.48
0.00
0.00
1.00
0.00
1.00
Jurisdictional
Hierarchy
702
1.21
0.95
0.00
1.00
2.00
0.00
4.00
623
1.37
1.41
0.00
1.00
3.00
0.00
4.00
Class
Stratification
Stelios Michalopoulos and Elias Papaioannou
Divide and Rule or the Rule of the Divided?
Introduction
Data
Empirical Analysis
Conclusion
Appendix
What Predicts Borders?
Sensitivity Analysis
Why National Institutions May Not Matter?
Why Local Tribal Institutions Matter?
Correlation Table
Light
Control of Rule Distance Population
Density Corruption of
to the
Density in
Law Capital 2000
Light Densiy
2007-2008
Control of
Corruption
Rule of Law
1.00
Split10pc
Indicator
Distance to
the Capital
City
Population
Density in
2000
Area
Water Area
Area Water Sea
Area Distance
Mean
Elevation
Suitability Centralization Jurisdictional Class
For
Indicator
Hierarchy
Stratification
Agriculture
0.27
1.00
0.24
0.91
-0.06
0.10
0.09
-0.18
-0.29
-0.37
1.00
0.29
-0.07
-0.05
-0.29
1.00
0.09
0.05
0.04
0.09
-0.19
0.08
0.10
0.08
0.02
-0.21
0.43
1.00
Sea Distance
-0.32
-0.29
-0.27
0.49
-0.28
0.06
0.08
Mean
Elevation
Suitability For
Agriculture
-0.08
0.06
0.15
0.06
0.05
0.03
-0.10
0.26
1.00
-0.05
-0.12
-0.01
-0.07
0.34
-0.28
-0.39
-0.08
0.25
1.00
Centralization
Indicator
Jurisdictional
Hierarchy
Class
Stratification
0.21
0.18
0.19
-0.06
0.07
0.11
0.13
0.00
0.12
-0.12
1.00
0.23
0.16
0.15
-0.07
0.08
0.10
0.13
-0.04
0.13
-0.10
0.86
1.00
0.14
0.11
0.10
-0.04
0.05
0.09
0.16
0.00
0.10
-0.10
0.59
0.63
1.00
1.00
Stelios Michalopoulos and Elias Papaioannou
1.00
Divide and Rule or the Rule of the Divided?
1.00