S O C I E T Y
P L A T O
I N T E R N A T I O N A L
I3
DEZ 2013
ISSN 2079-7567
eISSN 2183-4105
Established 1989
http://platosociety.org/
Papers
William H.F. Altman
“The Missing Speech
of the Absent Fourth:
Reader Response and Plato’s
Timaeus-Critias”
David Levy,
“Socrates vs. Callicles:
Examination and Ridicule
in Plato’s Gorgias.”
Nathalie Nercam,
“En tout et pour tout
(Théétète 204a-210b)”
Matthew Robinson,
“Competition, Imagery,
and Pleasure in Plato’s
Republic, 1-91”
Scott J. Senn,
“Ignorance or Irony in Plato’s
Socrates?: A Look Beyond
Avowals and Disavowals of
Knowledge”
PLATO
JOURNAL
Société Platonicienne
Internationale
Associazione Internazionale
dei Platonisti
Sociedad Internacional
de Platonistas
Internationale
Platon-Gesellschaft
Imprensa da
Universidade
de Coimbra
Coimbra
Universiy
Press
2
| Enicaper ficaed susta nondin is es nonim et dolore
CREDITS
Editorial Board
Francisco Gonzalez
University of Ottawa
Irmgard Männlein-Robert
International Plato
Society Executive
Committee (2013-16)
President: Francisco Bravo
Universität Tübingen
Universidad Central de Venezuela
Angela Ulacco
President: Gabriele Cornelli
Albert-Ludwigs-Universität Freiburg
Universidade de Brasília
Scientific Board
Vice President: Tom Robinson
University of Toronto
Luc Brisson
Ex-President: Mauro Tulli
CNRS – UPR76 Centre Jean-Pépin, Paris
Università degli Studi di Pisa
Tomás Calvo
Next President: Luc Brisson
Universidad Complutense, Madrid
CNRS – UPR76 Centre Jean-Pépin, Paris
John Dillon
Next President: Olivier Renaut
Trinity College, Dublin
Université Paris Ouest – Nanterre-La Défense
Thomas M. Robinson
Next President: Arnaud Macé
University of Toronto
Université de Franche-Comté, Besançon
Livio Rossetti
Christopher Rowe
Representative for Europe:
Francesco Fronterotta
Durham University
La Sapienza – Università di Roma
Samuel Scolnicov †
Noburu Notomi
Representative for Europe:
Mary Margaret McCabe
King’s College, London
Representative for North America:
Verity Harte
Keio University, Tokyo
Yale University, New Haven
Università di Perugia
The Hebrew University of Jerusalem
Shinro Kato
Tokyo Metropolitan University
International Plato
Society Editorial
Committee
Representative for Latin America:
Raul Gutierrez
Universidad Católica del Peru
Franco Ferrari
Representative for Asia, Australia,
and Africa: Yuji Kurihara
Salerno – Coordinator
Tokyo Gagukei University
Filip Karfìk
Representative for the C. J.
de Vogel Foundation: Carlos Steel
Fribourg
Dimitri El Murr
Paris
Marcelo Boeri
Santiago de Chile
Lesley Brown
Oxford
Katholieke Universiteit, Leuven
6
| Enicaper ficaed susta nondin is es nonim et dolore
PAPERS
DAVID LEVY |
SOCRATES VS.
CALLICLES:
EXAMINATION &
RIDICULE IN PLATO’S
GORGIAS
David Levy
Abstract
The Callicles colloquy of Plato’s Gorgias
features both examination and ridicule. Insofar
as Socrates’ examination of Callicles proceeds
via the elenchus, the presence of ridicule
requires explanation. This essay seeks to
provide that explanation by placing the effort
to ridicule within the effort to examine; that is,
the judgment/pronouncement that something/
someone is worthy of ridicule is a proper part
of the elenchic examination. Standard accounts
of the Socratic elenchus do not include this
component. Hence, the argument of this
essay suggests a need to revise the standard
account of the elenchus, at least as it relates
to the use of that method within the Gorgias.
Insofar as a revised account of the elenchus has
implications for our understanding of Socratic
moral psychology, the argument of this essay
also suggests a need to reconsider the moral
psychological framework within which Socrates
operates in the Gorgias.
http://dx.doi.org/10.14195/2183-4105_13_2
27
I. Introduction
Plato’s Gorgias has been the focus of many
studies that seek to highlight some feature
or other of Socrates’ approach to philosophy.
In particular, commentators have used the
text to ground their discussions of Socratic
method (i.e., elenchus),1 of Socrates’ use of
shame, 2 and of Socratic moral psychology. 3
What is missing from these otherwise
excellent discussions is a phenomenon within
the dialogue that cannot be overlooked:
Socrates ridicules his two younger interlocu­
tors (Polus and Callicles), and ridicule is, in
some ways, an organizing theme of the entire
Callicles colloquy. I should like to argue that
understanding Socrates’ use of ridicule allows
us to understand how Socratic method, use
of shame, and moral psychology cohere.
The aims of this essay, however, are rather
less ambitious: to illustrate how, within the
Callicles colloquy, Socrates’ ridicule of his
interlocutor is connected to his elenchic
examination of him, and is the mechanism
by which Socrates seeks to shame him into
moral improvement. 4
Before I begin my detailed discussion of
ridicule within the Callicles colloquy, I wish
to clarify that the focus of this study is on
the dialogue’s explicit characterization of
individuals/acts as ridiculous. That is, I will
examine the dialogue’s uses of katagelastos,
rather than other ways in which an individual
might invite ridicule of another, such as
when one laughs derisively at another (as
occurs within the Polus colloquy, at 473e; see
Callicles’ characterization of this moment in
the dialogue at 482d). A more comprehensive
account of ridicule within the dialogue
would take into consideration these other
28
| Socrates vs. Callicles: Examination & Ridicule in Plato’s Gorgias
mechanisms, but it nonetheless is plausible
to lay the groundwork for such an account
by examining those moments when Plato is
explicit.
II. Callicles’ Uses of
Katagelastos in Relation
to His Axiology
All told, there are eight uses of katagelastos within Plato’s Gorgias.5 Each occurs within
the Callicles colloquy. Callicles is responsible
for the first four occurrences. These all occur
during his initial great speech, during which
he assesses the value of pursuing the practice
of philosophy into one’s adult years. More specifically, they appear in one 23-line section of
this speech (484e1-485c1). Immediately prior
to these lines, Callicles asserts that, although
philosophy is a ‘delightful’ (charien) thing, devoting too much time to it would bring about
the ‘ruin’ (diaphthora) of humanity (484c5-8).
In this way, the continued practice of philosophy is utterly incompatible with the satisfaction
of any condition necessary for consideration
as a kalon k’agathon. Instead, the philosopher
appears ridiculous in that he ends up wholly
ignorant concerning both private and public
matters of interest to human beings. In fact,
Callicles identifies such individuals as so vicious that they deserve to be beaten, for in
their continuing concern for philosophy they
resemble other ridiculous men whose speech
and mannerisms are appropriate for children.
The import of these occurrences of katagelastos is that those who devote too much
of their lives to philosophy suffer from some
moral failing. According to Callicles’ axiology, mastering those skills necessary for success in politics is the sine qua non of leading
the excellent life. Thus when Callicles claims
that continued devotion to the philosophical
way of life leads to humanity’s ‘ruin,’ he does
not simply mean that from a practical point
of view things would start to go poorly. His
worry is not, for example, that shoes would
not be repaired or that food would no longer be
produced, even if he is disposed to agree that
these consequences would follow. Instead, Plato
is exploiting an ambiguity in diaphthora. This
term can mean simply ruin or destruction, but
it also invites images of decay or corruption,
including morally. So Callicles’ position here
seems to be that the philosophers’ ‘ridiculous’
appearance is symptomatic of a more general
moral failure, one that also leads them to refrain from participation in politics and instead
relegates them to shadowy corners, where they
do nothing but whisper in the ears of impressionable youths (485d3-e2).
III. Socrates’ Uses of
Katagelastos
Socrates utters the final four occurrences
of katagelastos in Gorgias. My position is that
the first three occurrences (509a, 509b, 512d)
gradually draw out the connection between
appearing ridiculous as a symptom of moral
failure and the goals of Socratic philosophy.
The final occurrence (514e) then announces a
complete reversal of Callicles’ position on the
relative value of philosophy and politics: it is
not Socrates (qua philosopher) who is ridiculous and thus who suffers from some moral
failure; rather, it is Callicles (qua would-be politician) who is and thus who does. Moreover,
this announcement seems designed especially
to induce a feeling of shame in Callicles. Putting these together, Socrates’ position seems to
be that Callicles is ridiculous, and thus should
DAVID LEVY |
feel shame, precisely because he fails to pass
the elenchic test.
III.1 Being Ridiculous, Moral
Failure, and Failing the
Elenchic Test
Socrates first invokes the notion of being
ridiculous as he reviews the positions for which
he argued against Polus and asserts that those
arguments are held fast by bonds of iron and
adamant. Here is his full statement:
But as for me, the logos I give is always
this: that I do not know how these things
are in this way, but no one I’ve ever come
across (as is the case now) can argue
anything else without being ridiculous
(katagelastos einai). (509a4-7)6
Socrates here does not assert explicitly that
those who maintain positions that differ from
his believe falsely. We might expect him to do
this, given that the language that precedes this
statement virtually commits Socrates to the
position that the arguments he has offered in
support of his theses are conclusive. Instead, he
turns our attention to a characteristic of those
interlocutors who have attempted to maintain
different positions: they are ridiculous. Note that
in doing so he does not characterize how such
interlocutors appear to be; he claims that this
is how they are.
Moreover, the surrounding context for this
statement decisively connects it to the function
of elenchic examination. This statement initiates
a series of remarks that succeed in drawing
Callicles back into the discussion. Callicles
first signals his desire to leave the discussion at
505c.7 The process of drawing him back begins
29
with a review of the earlier discussions (506c5),
but is immediately preceded by an invitation to
refute (506c1: ἐξελέγχῃς) Socrates if Callicles
does not think he is speaking well (ἐαν τί σοι
δοκῶ μὴ καλῶς λέγειν). After reviewing and
expanding the positions that were secured
during the earlier stages of the discussion,
Socrates effects a transition to the specification
of the consequences of accepting his views (i.e.,
the views that he takes as established during the
earlier parts of the discussion). That transition
is achieved by presenting a choice: either the
argument must be refuted (508a8: ἐξελεγκτέος),
or they must consider what the consequences of
accepting it are. Socrates’ statement at 509a4-7
characterizes those who have sought to refute
this argument (i.e., those who have tried to
maintain a different position in order to avoid
accepting the consequences Socrates identifies
as required by accepting his position): they
are shown to be ridiculous precisely insofar as
expressing their position involves a failure to
speak well (509a4: καλῶς λέγειν).
Socrates follows up his first use of katagelastos by turning his attention to the moral
implications of taking seriously his position.
In doing so he draws a very strong connection
between acceptance of his theses and the ability
to care properly for one’s soul. So, he wonders,
if his positions really are correct—that is, if it
really is the case that injustice is the greatest
evil for the one who commits it, and if it really
is the case that it is worse to be an unpunished
perpetrator of an injustice than it is to be punished for an injustice—then what aid must
one provide for oneself to avoid truly being
ridiculous (509b1-5)?8
Although Socrates will not characterize anything as ‘ridiculous’ for another three
and a half Stephanus pages, using instead
30
| Socrates vs. Callicles: Examination & Ridicule in Plato’s Gorgias
this dialogue’s more familiar pair of apparent
contraries—admirable (kalon) and shameful
(aischron)—at the start of the response to his
wonder, he will cap off this portion of the discussion by once again leveling this charge. This
time that charge is more explicitly directed at
Callicles than it was in either of the first two
occurrences. Of additional note is that this
third use comes at the end of what appears to
be a rather straightforward elenchic argument.
This argument begins—at least from Callicles’ perspective—on a rather promising note.
Socrates announces that the technê one must
acquire if one is to avoid suffering injustice is
to become a ruler; short of that, the surest protection against suffering injustice is to become
like the ruling party (510a). This means that
one must train his desires from youth on to be
identical to the ruler’s; in this way, one maximizes his chances of becoming a friend of the
ruler (510d, with 510b). Such friendship serves
as a deterrent against the commission of injustice in that the one considering performing the
injustice has some reason to fear the retribution
of the ruler. Moreover, these conditions give one
license to commit unjust acts (510e). In this way,
one gains protection against suffering unjust
acts in the same way one acquires the ability to
commit unjust acts.
This, however, means that in gaining protection against suffering unjust acts, one brings
to bear upon oneself the greatest evil for oneself: a depraved (mochthêria) and mutilated
(lelôbêmenê) soul (511a). Callicles balks at this
implication, noting that the one who has gained
protection against suffering injustice through
his imitation of the ruler has the power to put
to death the one who refuses to imitate. Socrates
concedes this point, but he refuses to see this
as a point in favor of Callicles’ position. After
all, in order to see this as reason to engage in
the sort of imitation championed by Callicles,
one would have to believe that the good for a
human being is to make sure his life is as long
as possible.
It is Callicles’ commitment to this principle—that the good for a human being consists
in living a long life—that Socrates proceeds to
subject to elenchic testing. Callicles refuses to
grant that a scientific knowledge of swimming
is a grand (semnê) thing, yet such expertise does
allow people to prolong their lives (511c). Perhaps recalling Callicles’ earlier aversion to mundane, trivial concerns (see 490c-491b), Socrates
shifts to an examination of an apparently more
important expertise: that of the helmsman. The
helmsman’s knowledge of how to conduct passengers and their goods to safe harbor does not
lead him to become boastful; rather, he remains
unassuming (prosestalmenos) and orderly (kosmios). This is because, so Socrates supposes, he
realizes that the life he has prolonged by steering safely through the storm might not be a life
that is worth living—it might suffer from either
an incurable disease of the body or, worse, an
incurable disease of the soul (512a).9
Of course, Socrates knows that Callicles
won’t find anything truly admirable in what
the helmsman does; even this practice is too
mean for Callicles’ tastes. However, Socrates
works hard in this passage to get Callicles to see
that what the helmsman does is in important
ways analogous to what the orator does. Each
has the power to prolong life; each is indifferent
to questions concerning whether the life it is in
a position to prolong is worth prolonging. That
is, neither the helmsman nor the orator—to
count as an expert in his field—has any need
to consider whether he is applying his skills
to a worthy cause. Put somewhat differently,
DAVID LEVY |
neither need consider if he has identified an
appropriate aim; the methods are, in this way,
applied aim-independently.
Still, Callicles has already shown his affinity for those who have the skill to avoid
suffering the consequences of committing an
injustice. This is one of oratory’s great powers.10 But if this is reason to value the skills
of the orator, then Callicles ought to concede
that what the helmsman or the engineer does
is admirable after all. So Socrates concludes:
And yet, given your grounds for applauding your own activities, what just reason
do you have for despising the engineer and
the others whom I was mentioning just
now? I know that you’d say that you’re a
better man, one from better stock. But if
“better” does not mean what I take it to
mean, and if instead to preserve yourself
and what belongs to you, no matter what
sort of person you happen to be, is what
excellence is, then your reproach against
engineer, doctor, and all the other crafts
which have been devised to preserve us
will prove to be ridiculous. (512c-d, trans.
Zeyl)11
This passage is important for our understanding of how Socrates conceives of his own
activity. Note that Socrates does not issue as his
concluding judgment that what Callicles believes is false; nor does he conclude that Callicles is not in agreement with himself, language
we might take to mean merely that Callicles
holds inconsistent beliefs.
Moreover, it is not his position that the
thesis maintained by Callicles is itself ridiculous. Rather, Socrates’ judgment is that it
would be ridiculous for Callicles to continue
31
to issue apparently inconsistent judgments of
the value of practices that, although different, are relevantly similar in their objectives.
Importantly, these judgments seem to arise
on the one hand from a general principle of
the nature of value and on the other hand an
assessment of the value of various practices
vis-à-vis that general principle. In this way,
the argument that follows Socrates’ first two
uses of ‘ridiculous’ and that contains his third
use of it really does seem to connect the moral
objective of elenchus with something like an
epistemic test: if maintaining a (moral) position would involve one in appearing/being
ridiculous, then there is some good (epistemic)
reason for doubting that position. The revelation of the ridiculous status of the interlocutor who maintains inconsistent beliefs, and
so who acts and speaks in inconsistent ways,
is thus itself part of the elenctic examination.
For all this, however, we might still be
tempted to understand the elenchus more or
less as Vlastos does.12 After all, in the context
of this argument Socrates’ use of katagelastos
seems to indicate nothing other than an
inconsistency in Callicles’ beliefs. That is, the
concluding diagnosis of Callicles—that were
he to maintain his apparently inconsistent
beliefs he would be ridiculous—seems to
add nothing to the apparently more factual
claim that he holds apparently inconsistent
beliefs. Most directly, one might understand
this elenchic argument without mentioning
the role played by the use of katagelastos and
not miss anything important in the argument.
Insofar as Callicles holds inconsistent beliefs,
he ought to experience aporia, but nothing any
more psychologically disturbing than that.
Still, it should be noted again that it is
not the inconsistency in belief itself that is
32
| Socrates vs. Callicles: Examination & Ridicule in Plato’s Gorgias
characterized as ridiculous. What is ridiculous
is the activity of reproaching various individuals
for engaging in pursuits that Callicles
finds to be inferior. That is, actions Callicles
would continue to perform, now that the
elenchus has identified an inconsistency in
his beliefs, are found to be ridiculous.
Moreover, the dialogue includes one further
use of katagelastos, and an analysis of the term’s
function within the dialogue ought to cover all
the instances. I turn now to the final instance.
III.2 Callicles as Ridiculous
After Socrates announces at 512d that it
would be ridiculous for Callicles to continue to
issue judgments that appear to be inconsistent
with his beliefs, he exhorts Callicles to
reconsider one of these beliefs: that the good
for a human being just is preservation. In
particular, he exhorts Callicles to reconsider
his attachment to preserving himself and his
property by seeking power in the city’s political
affairs, especially if the way he intends to
pursue this is by merely conforming himself
to what the people expect (513a-b). After all,
the people will not be satisfied with a mere
imitator, but will seek out one who is genuinely
like them; this is the surest way of providing
themselves with the pleasure that comes from
hearing speeches that flatter.
Of course, underlying Socrates’ exhortation
of Callicles is his understanding of Callicles’
great disdain for the masses. Socrates knows well
that Callicles will not respond favorably to the
(ironic) suggestion that he win the friendship of
the Athenian people by ‘naturally’ (autophuôs)
being like them (513b3-6).13 But the point of this
exhortation is not to get Callicles to be more like
the Athenian people in his pursuit of political
power in Athens. Rather, it is to get him to give
up that pursuit because it is founded upon a
mistaken conception of what makes a man’s life
valuable.
Callicles’ response to Socrates’ exhortation
is particularly interesting. He says, “I don’t
know how it seems to me that you speak well,
but what happens to many has happened to
me: I’m not entirely persuaded by you.”14
That is, Callicles appreciates the logical force
of Socrates’ comments, and perhaps even
recognizes that the premises Socrates employs
are true (or reasonable to believe), but logic
alone is not sufficient to effect a change in his
attitude. As Dodds puts it in his commentary
on the Gorgias, “We may take this remark…
as expressing Plato’s recognition that basic
moral attitudes are commonly determined by
psychological, not logical reasons.”15
Though Dodds’s way of putting the point
is not entirely perspicuous, the next phase of
Socrates’ discussion with Callicles features yet
another elenchic argument that is designed to do
more than diagnose inconsistency in Callicles’
beliefs (or beliefs and subsequent actions): it is
designed to shame him. Toward this end, Socrates
utters the final use of katagelastos in Gorgias.
Socrates begins this instance of elenchus by
reminding Callicles of the earlier distinction
between pleasure and what is best, concerning
both body and soul, and between practices
that pursue one or another of these. He further
elicits Callicles’ (reluctant) agreement that the
proper political aim is to make the citizens as
good as possible (514a). He then reasons that
before one endeavors to conduct business in
important civic affairs, the proper thing to
do is to ‘look carefully’ (skepsasthai) at and
DAVID LEVY |
‘examine closely’ (exetasai) oneself in order to
see if one has learned the appropriate technê.
If the result of this self-examination is that
there is insufficient evidence to conclude that
one has learned the appropriate technê, then it
would be ‘utterly foolish’ (anoêton) to continue
the pursuit of the public business (514c-d).
Again, Callicles agrees to all of this.
Socrates next considers the specific
hypothetical case in which he and Callicles
would consider pursuing appointment to the
position of public physician. The appropriate
source of evidence of their qualifications in this
case would be testimony concerning whether
they have ever improved the health of anyone
by applying their putative medical expertise.
If no such evidence were to be found, then,
Socrates concludes, it would be ‘ridiculous’
(katagelaston) and ‘utterly foolish’ (anoêton) for
them to continue their pursuit. After all, these
affairs are too important to the well-being of
others to consider them merely an opportunity
for developing one’s skills (514d-e).
After getting Callicles to agree to his
characterization of such pursuits in the
absence of evidence that one is skilled enough
to warrant the people’s trust as ridiculous and
foolish, Socrates notes that Callicles himself is
at the start of his own pursuit of influence over
affairs of great importance to the city and its
citizens. Thus, the appropriate question to ask
Callicles is whether he has ever improved any of
the citizens. More specifically, since the proper
political aim is the moral improvement of the
citizens—i.e., the ordering and controlling of
the citizens’ desires—we must ask Callicles to
provide testimony that he has contributed to
the production of any one ‘admirable and good’
(kalos…k’agathos) citizen (515a).
Although Socrates does not state it directly,
the implication of this argument is clear.
33
Once again, it has been revealed that Callicles
issues (or is disposed to issue) inconsistent
judgments and to act on them. On the one
hand, he would judge that it is ridiculous
and foolish for someone to pursue important
business in the city without being positioned
to provide evidence that one is qualified to
do so. On the other hand, his own pursuit of
important business in the city would seem
to indicate that he judges himself positioned to
provide this kind of evidence. However, when
Socrates provides him with the opportunity to
do just this, he falls silent.16 Ultimately, he is
left to offer a rather hollow attack on Socrates’
intentions: “You love to win, Socrates.”17
The overwhelming sense one gets from
this argument is that Socrates is trying to
effect some change in Callicles not merely by
getting him to see that he holds yet another
inconsistent set of beliefs, but by doing so
in a way designed to shame him.18 This is a
feature of Socrates’ method for which Vlastos
and his ilk could not account: it is not at all
clear that the proper response to learning
that one’s beliefs are logically inconsistent
with each other is to experience shame. Yet
having Callicles experience shame seems to be
precisely what Socrates is after. Were Socrates
interested only in demonstrating the presence
of a logical inconsistency, he could have
refrained from using such derisive language;
were he not interested in bringing to bear on
his interlocutor public pressure to effect some
change, he could have pulled him aside and
“whispered” in his ear that he finds some of
his beliefs implausible. Given, then, that he opts
for a different approach, it seems reasonable to
ascribe to him intentions that go well beyond
what Vlastos’s analysis of his method would lead
us to expect.19 Socrates is no mere diagnostician
of logical inconsistency. In his pursuit of the
34
| Socrates vs. Callicles: Examination & Ridicule in Plato’s Gorgias
production of moral excellence, he recognizes
that shame can be a powerful tool.20
IV. Implications for
Socratic Moral
Psychology in the Gorgias
But this has implications for how we
understand the moral psychological framework
within which the examination of Callicles is
conducted. It is difficult to see how a purely
intellectualist moral psychology—such as
the one ascribed to Socrates by Terry Penner,
for example—could make sense of Socrates’
combining of examination and ridicule. Were
Socrates the sort of intellectualist described by
Penner, he would be content to seek to change
Callicles’ attitudes and actions by changing his
beliefs. Calling attention to the inconsistencies
in Callicles’ beliefs would thus be the strategy
he would adopt. As I have argued, however,
Socrates does something different from calling
attention to the inconsistencies in Callicles’
beliefs: he uses his diagnosis of inconsistency
to force Callicles to see himself as ridiculous
and utterly foolish.
Brickhouse and Smith have called attention
to some sort of connection between Socrates’ use
of the elenchus and his efforts to shame (some
of) his interlocutors. In that context, they have
also noted the difficulties involved in reconciling
Socrates’ efforts to shame with some forms of
intellectualism. They write, “Socrates makes no
secret of the fact that he often seeks to create
[an unpleasant emotional experience] in others,
and to use shame in such a way as to lead them
to change their ways. But the process…seems
to work in the opposite direction from the one
required by the standard interpretation [offered
by Penner, for example]: instead of shame
adjusting to reason, one’s reasoning seems to be
influenced by shame.”21
The analysis of Socrates’ examination
and ridicule of Callicles presented in this
paper, I believe, is consonant with Brickhouse
and Smith’s rejection of Penner’s reading
of Socratic moral psychology. At least with
Callicles, Socrates tries to initiate a process
of moral improvement by leading Callicles to
recognize that he is ridiculous, and to feel the
shame of being such. It remains to be seen if
Socrates’ efforts to effect moral improvement
in his interlocutors (at least in Callicles) are
successful. If they are not, it further remains
to be seen if this is because of some failing
in Socrates’ method, or if it is due to some
additional problem in his interlocutors (or at
least in Callicles). I suspect that the matter is
actually rather more complicated than either of
these options, but my arguments on that point
are best saved for another occasion. 22
END NOTES
1 The work of Gregory Vlastos remains the benchmark
against which all subsequent accounts of Socratic elenchus
are measured. See in particular “The Socratic Elenchus”
with “Afterthoughts on the Socratic Elenchus,” Oxford
Studies in Ancient Philosophy 1 (1983): 27-58, 71-74.
Vlastos himself recognizes that his account of the Socratic
elenchus represents especially the way in which it is
employed in the Gorgias. So in “Afterthoughts” he writes,
“I now see that a more appropriate title for section III of
‘The Socratic Elenchus’ would have been ‘The Socratic
Elenchus in the Gorgias.’” (page 74, n. 8; emphasis in the
original). Others who provide accounts of the Socratic
elenchus while remaining essentially within Vlastos’s
framework include Thomas C. Brickhouse and Nicholas
D. Smith, Plato’s Socrates (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1994) and Hugh H. Benson, “The Dissolution of
the Problem of the Elenchus,” Oxford Studies in Ancient
Philosophy 13 (1995): 45-112.
2 The importance of shame within the Gorgias has been
recognized by at least the following: W. H. Race, “Shame in
DAVID LEVY |
Plato’s Gorgias,” The Classical Journal 74 (1979), 197-202;
Charles H. Kahn, “Drama and Dialectic in Plato’s Gorgias,”
Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 1 (1983), 75-121 and
Plato and the Socratic Dialogue (New York: Cambridge
University Press, 1996); Richard McKim, “Shame and
Truth in Plato’s Gorgias,” in Platonic Writings/Platonic
Readings, ed. Charles L. Griswold (New York: Routledge,
1988), 34-48; Daniel Sanderman, “Why Socrates Mocks
His Interlocutors,” Skepsis 15 (2004), 431-41; and D. B.
Futter, “Shame as a Tool of Persuasion in Plato’s Gorgias,”
Journal of the History of Philosophy 47 (2009), 451-61.
3 Here, of course, the work of Terry Penner and of
Brickhouse and Smith has come to frame the discussion
of Socratic moral psychology. See Penner, “Socrates,” in
Cambridge History of Greek and Roman Political Thought,
ed. C. J. Rowe and M. Schofield (New York: Cambridge
University Press, 2000), 164-189 and now especially
Brickhouse and Smith, Socratic Moral Psychology (New
York: Cambridge University Press, 2010). Others have
offered more nuanced readings of moral psychological
issues as they play out specifically in the Gorgias. These
include Jessica Moss, “The Doctor and the Pastry Chef:
Pleasure and Persuasion in Plato’s Gorgias,” Ancient
Philosophy 27 (2007), 229-49 and Raphael Woolf, “Callicles
and Socrates: Psychic (Dis)Harmony in the Gorgias,”
Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 18 (2000), 1-40.
4 Sanderman (“Why Socrates Mocks His Interlocutors”)
discusses Socrates’ “mocking” of his interlocutors, but
assimilates it to some form of Socratic irony. As my
discussion will make manifest, there is nothing ironic
about the manner in which Socrates ridicules Callicles.
5 This is the greatest number of occurrences within any
of Plato’s dialogues (and Plato’s writings collectively
include more instances of the term than in any other
author’s writings). Republic includes seven instances,
and is a much longer text than Gorgias. Although there
are some dialogues in which this term appears with
greater frequency than it does in Gorgias (i.e., although
it occurs fewer times, the text is shorter—for example,
six occurrences in Lysis, which is only 20 Stephanus
pages long), the eight occurrences within Gorgias are
contained within two well-defined portions of text (four
within 484e1-485c1, and four within 509a7-514e3). This
“density” of occurrence warrants our attention. Further
justification for a focused study of these occurrences is
provided by the fact that these two portions of text seem
rather deliberately set in opposition to each other.
6 Unless otherwise noted, translations are my own. I
discuss this passage in “Techné &The Problem of Socratic
Philosophy in the Gorgias”, Apeiron 38 (2005): 185-227;
see esp. 209-214.
7 Is this desire to break off the discussion itself
symptomatic of Callicles’ being ridiculous? An
anonymous reviewer for this journal has suggested that
it is important to consider what precisely distinguishes
interlocutors who are ridiculous from those who merely
maintain ridiculous positions (i.e., theses). I agree that
drawing this distinction is important, but I’d like to
consider that there is at least a third category: those who
35
regard their position within the discussion with Socrates
(i.e., as interlocutor) as ridiculous. At 505c and following,
I think we see that Callicles has come to consider that
his position within the discussion is problematic in some
way, and I find it plausible that he would regard it as
ridiculous. The same reviewer addresses Thrasymachus
as a candidate ridiculous interlocutor, observing that
he “evidently change[s] [his] position without letting
others know ostensibly for the sake of winning the fight.”
Callicles admits to something similar at 505c5-6: he
gave the answers he did only for the sake of respecting
Gorgias. Perhaps there is something ridiculous about
not having fixed positions. If that is the case, then
participation in an elenchic examination by someone of
that sort would involve finding oneself in a ridiculous
position, insofar as one’s beliefs lack the logical structure
presupposed by the elenchus. Raphael Woolf’s discussion
of the examination of Callicles (“Callicles and Socrates:
Psychic (Dis)Harmony in the Gorgias”) discusses related
issues.
8 Note what is not said at this point: his question is
not about finding resources that will enable one to
avoid acting in inconsistent ways, or avoid asserting
inconsistent positions.
9 The presence of “incurables” within the Gorgias
is a challenge, especially for those who wish to
defend an intellectualist reading of Socratic moral
psychology. Briefly, if one ascribes to Socrates a form of
intellectualism with respect to motivation, then for a soul
to be incurable would be for it to be incapable of holding
true beliefs about what is (really) desirable. Brickhouse
& Smith (Socratic Moral Psychology, Chapter 4) offer
an account of the ways in which unrestrained appetites
can compromise the functioning of an agent’s cognitive
capacities. There is not room in this essay to explore the
notion of incurability within the Gorgias. However, an
anonymous reviewer for this journal has suggested that
ridicule of an incurable individual could function—not
to improve the condition of that individual—to instruct
others who witness the ridiculing. As I will observe
later, Socrates’ effort to induce feelings of shame within
Callicles includes the fact that this discussion is taking
place before an audience. Perhaps, then, we should
understand the ridiculing of Callicles primarily in terms
of the intended effects this will have on members of the
audience (including, of course, the readers of the text). I
think that considerations of the effects on the audience
are indeed relevant, but I resist allowing that relevance
to be identified to the exclusion of the intended effects on
Callicles himself. The only case in which the effects on
Callicles would properly be reduced to zero is the case in
which Callicles is thought (by Socrates) to be incurable.
I am not persuaded that Callicles is incurable, nor am I
persuaded that anyone else within the dialogue believes
that he is. Briefly, I am moved by the ways in which both
Socrates and Gorgias work to keep Callicles participating
in the discussion to accept that they at least believe that
he can benefit from the discussion. Moreover, I contrast
this concern shown for Callicles with the disregard
36
| Socrates vs. Callicles: Examination & Ridicule in Plato’s Gorgias
shown for Polus; see esp. 463a-e. In this way, I find it
more plausible to consider that Polus is the incurable one,
if anyone is. Finally, I’ll note that although Polus might
be shown to be ridiculous, Socrates never characterizes
him in this way (including by never using the term
katagelastos to refer to him). Perhaps, then, the reason
Socrates allows for and encourages the characterization
of Callicles as ridiculous is precisely that he is not
incurable. I investigate the challenges presented by the
notion of incurability in “On (In)Curability in Plato’s
Gorgias”, presented at the U.S. Regional Meeting of the
International Plato Society, Ann Arbor, MI, October 6,
2012.
10 Recall that Callicles becomes Socrates’ interlocutor
only after Socrates has concluded against Polus that the
only proper use of oratory is to convict oneself when one
acts unjustly or to make sure that one’s unjust enemies
never suffer retribution for their unjust actions. See
480a-481b.
11 καίτοι ἐξ ὧν τὰ σαυτοῦ ἐπαινεῖς, τίνι δικαίῳ λόγῳ
τοῦ μηχανοποιοῦ καταφρονεῖς καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὧν νυνδὴ
ἔλεγον; οἶδ᾽ ὅτι φαίης ἂν βελτίων εἶναι καὶ ἐκ βελτιόνων.
τὸ δὲ βέλτιον εἰ μὴ ἔστιν ὅ ἐγὼ λέγω, ἀλλ᾽ αὐτὸ τοῦτ᾽
ἐστὶν ἀρετή, τὸ σῴζειν αὑτόν καὶ τὰ ἑαθτοῦ ὄντα ὁποῖός
τις ἔτθχεν, καταγέλαστός σοι ὁ ψόγος γίγνεται καὶ
μηχανοποιοῦ καὶ ἰατροῦ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τεχνῶν ὅσαι τοῦ
σῴζειν ἕνεκα πεποίηνται.
12 Vlastos’s account of the elenchus continues to provide
the framework within which most subsequent accounts
are developed. See, again, the sources listed in n. 1.
I know of no account of the elenchus that explicitly
connects Socrates’ use of it with his efforts to induce
feelings of shame in his interlocutors. Brickhouse and
Smith (Socratic Moral Psychology) recognize some
connection—even calling a section of Chapter 5 of that
text “Elenchos as shaming” (136)—but their discussion
of the connection they find stops short of a recognition
of the fact that, at least sometimes (as with Callicles),
Socrates’ examination of his interlocutor is a shaming
experience.
13 I have said nothing to this point about Socrates’ use of
irony, whether restricted to the Gorgias or in general. I’m
not sure that I have anything compelling to offer, but an
anonymous reviewer for this journal has called attention
to the need to distinguish ridicule more clearly from
other notions, including irony. At least in relation to the
ironic suggestion Socrates makes at 513b, irony would
seem to function to remind Callicles to consider carefully
what his priorities (or axiological commitments) really
are. That is, Socrates’ use of irony at this point is designed
to get Callicles to say what he really believes. This is
quite different from what I am suggesting about the role
of ridicule as expressing the concluding judgment of an
elenchic examination.
14 Οὐκ οἶδ᾽ ὃντινά μοι τρόπον δοκεῖς εὖ λέγειν, ὦ
Σώκρατες, πέπονθα δὲ τὸ τῶν πολλῶν πάθος· οὐ πάνυ
σοι πείθομαι.
15 E. R. Dodds, trans. Plato Gorgias (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1959), note on 513c5, page 352.
16 See the implied pauses between Socrates’ questions at
515a7-b4.
17 Φιλόνικος εἶ, ὦ Σώκρατες (515b5).
18 Both Charles Kahn and Richard McKim also locate a
role for shame in Socrates’ efforts to effect moral change
in his interlocutors, at least within the Gorgias. Kahn
does so in his chapter on the Gorgias in Plato and the
Socratic Dialogue, 125-47; see esp. 133-42. McKim does
so in “Shame and Truth in Plato’s Gorgias.” I cannot here
distinguish fully my position on the role of shame from
their positions. I will merely observe that the emphasis in
my interpretation is on the way in which Socrates seeks
to shame his interlocutor (an interpersonal function),
whereas the emphasis in their interpretations seems to
be on Socrates’ efforts to characterize positions (theses)
as shameful (an impersonal—perhaps purely logical—
point).
19 Of course, we might well conclude that Callicles
himself “asked for” this kind of treatment. After all, his
opening maneuver seems designed to shame Socrates
in front of a crowd, all but encouraging them to slap
Socrates across the face. Moreover, he is the one who
impugns Socrates’ character by invoking the image of
whispering in dark corners. While I am moved by these
considerations, I hesitate to conclude that this is all Plato
is after.
20 But then why isn’t there a ninth instance of
katagelastos in the dialogue? Why doesn’t Socrates end
this stage of the discussion by simply asserting that
Callicles has been shown to be ridiculous? Perhaps this
has something to do with the fact that Callicles also
does not explicitly characterize Socrates as ridiculous,
even though what he does say encourages that
characterization. It strikes me that this, too, connects
with the issues surrounding the status of interlocutors
as curable or otherwise (see n. 9 above), as well as the
ways in which my reading of ridicule as shame-inducing
differs from the roles assigned to shame by Kahn and
McKim (see n. 18 above). Additional work in this area
could fruitfully be done to understand these issues in
relation to the ways in which Socrates and Callicles
might prove to be friends (see, for example, 487a-e, with
499c). Some discussion of related issues can be found
in Rachana Kamtekar, “The Profession of Friendship,”
Ancient Philosophy 25 (2005), 319-339, and in Roslyn
Weiss, “Oh, Brother! The Fraternity of Rhetoric and
Philosophy in Plato’s Gorgias,” Interpretation 30 (2003),
195-206.
21 Brickhouse & Smith, Socratic Moral Psychology, 59.
22 For an intriguing discussion of why Plato shows
Socrates failing to improve the character of his
interlocutors, see Julie Piering, “Irony and Shame in
Socratic Ethics,” International Philosophical Quarterly
50 (2010), 473-488.