MODELS, PERSPECTIVES, AND SCIENTIFIC REALISM:
ON RONALD GIERE'S PERSPECTIVAL REALISM
A thesis submitted
to Kent State University in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the
Degree of Master of Arts
by
Brian R. Huth
May, 2014
Thesis written by
Brian R. Huth
B.A., Kent State University 2012
M.A., Kent State University 2014
Approved by
Frank X. Ryan, Advisor
Linda Williams, Chair, Department of Philosophy
James L. Blank, Dean, College of Arts and Sciences
ii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS................................................................................................. iv
INTRODUCTION............................................................................................................... 1
CHAPTER
I.
FROM THE RECEIVED VIEW TO THE MODEL-THEORETIC
VIEW........................................................................................................... 7
Section 1.1.................................................................................................... 9
Section 1.2.................................................................................................... 16
II.
RONALD GIERE'S CONSTRUCTIVISM AND PERSPECTIVAL
REALISM.................................................................................................... 25
Section 2.1.................................................................................................... 25
Section 2.2.................................................................................................... 31
Section 2.3.................................................................................................... 34
Section 2.4.................................................................................................... 37
III.
PROBLEMS WITH RONALD GIERE'S PERSPECTIVAL REALISM AND
SUGGESTED REVISIONS......................................................................... 50
Section 3.1.................................................................................................... 51
Section 3.2.................................................................................................... 55
Section 3.3.................................................................................................... 61
Section 3.4.................................................................................................... 66
BIBLIOGRAPHY................................................................................................................ 70
iii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I would like to thank my thesis advisor Dr. Frank X. Ryan for so diligently taking
up this project with me midway through its completion. I would also like to thank my
former thesis advisor, Dr. Gene Pendleton, for his generous time and assistance.
Additionally, I extend thanks to my committee of readers, Dr. Pereplyotchik, Dr. Byron,
and Dr. Crawford for their time, honesty, and consideration of this thesis. Finally, thank
you to my grandmother June Eisenmann for her never ceasing support.
iv
INTRODUCTION
"If any problem in the philosophy of science justifiably can
be claimed the most central or important, it is that of the
nature and structure of scientific theories, including the
diverse roles theories play in the scientific enterprise."
(Frederick Suppe, 1977.)
Frederick Suppe's claim that the most important question for philosophers of
science is that of the nature and structure of scientific theories was written in the
introductory section of his 1977 work The Structure of Scientific Theories. There can be
little doubt that philosophers have given great emphasis and attention to the inquiry into
the nature and structure of scientific theories (see Chapter 1); however, as recently as
1989, there has been a domineering theoretical approach about the structure and nature of
scientific theories that has won prevalence throughout the philosophical community: the
so-called semantic conception of theories in science.1
Frederick Suppe (1989) has traced the origins of the semantic conception of
scientific theories back to the work of von Neumann, however, the common view seems
1
See Suppe 1989, p.3. Here, Suppe claims that the semantic conception has become the most widely held
analysis of the structure and nature of scientific theories espoused by philosophers of science. Suppe also
claims that there has, as of 1989, yet to be any significant challenges made to the semantic conception in
the literature. However, in the last decade or so, there have been several attempts to argue against the
semantic conception as the correct way of conceptualizing scientific theories. For more on opposition to the
semantic conception, see Portides 2005.
1
2
to be, according to Paul Thompson (1988), that the semantic conception of scientific
theories was first proposed in the works of Evert Beth and Patrick Suppes in the late
1940s and 1950s as a reaction against the syntactic accounts of scientific theories of the
logical positivists. Syntactic accounts of theories identified scientific theories with a body
of theorems stated in a singular and particular language chosen for the theory, while
semantic accounts identified theories by identifying a class of structures or models which
could be described in radically different ways in various languages (van Fraassen, 1980:
44). The semantic conception is then an attempt to characterize the structure of scientific
theories as being clusters or families of models, while the syntactic conception of theories
presented an axiomatic theory system which formulated scientific theories as a set of
theoretical laws written in a particular language (the language of first-order predicate
logic).
Since the semantic conception is an approach that utilizes models -- which are (in
the sense they are here being used) concrete, mathematical, or computational devices -- it
is also referred to as the model-theoretic approach to scientific theories. 2 Within the
model-theoretic conception ('MTC' henceforth) the models of a scientific theory are of
paramount importance, for it is the models of the theory that provide the means, but not
necessarily the mode, of representation. The models of which constitute scientific
theories within MTC are usually characterized as being abstract and, often, non-linguistic
2
Mauricio Suárez has pointed out that the name 'semantic conception of scientific theories' is perhaps a
misnomer, for it suggests a kind of syntax/semantics distinction in linguistics -- a distinction of which is
often not present within certain model-theoretic approaches to the structure and nature of scientific theories
(See Suárez, 2005: 35). Bas van Fraassen is one such model-theoretician. In order to avoid being
ambiguous about whether or not I am speaking of a model-theoretic approach that incorporates partial
linguistic entities ( e.g. Suppes, 1961), I will thus refer to the semantic conception as the model-theoretic
conception from now on.
3
entities whose sole purpose is to function as items of representational value: One uses a
model or group of models to represent a domain of phenomena.
In recent years, MTC has gained influence not only within the field of philosophy
of science (see Chapter 1), but a thinned-out version of the approach has also found its
way into commercial pop-science books such as in Stephen Hawking and Leonard
Mlodinow's book The Grand Design, where the two scientists claim to advocate an
approach of which they call "model-dependent realism." Additionally, Bailler-Jones
(2009) recently published a rather interesting and varied series of interviews involving
practicing scientists' own accounts of the use of models in science, further escalating the
interest of how models fit into the structure and nature of scientific theories.
In this paper, I will be addressing one issue that has recently surfaced as a
criticism of MTC, viz. the topic of scientific realism. I am not, however, concerned with
whether or not there can ever generally be any adequate kind of scientific realism within
MTC. After all, many proponents of MTC do not even classify themselves as realists: van
Fraassen is classified as an anti-realist, Suppe calls himself a "quasi-realist," etc. Neither
is it my intention to argue whether or not MTC can sustain an adequate representation of
scientific theories as it claims to do. I am solely here concerned with one variation of
MTC and whether or not there can be a scientific realist account within the framework of
that specific variation. The variation of which I am referring to in the preceding sentence
is Ronald Giere's so-called constructive realism or perspectival realism.3
3
Giere calls his approach "constructive realism" in 1988 and in 2006 refers to it as "perspectival realism"
(which is, as Giere notes, nothing more than a continuation of his constructive realism).
4
Ronald Giere presents an account of MTC that claims scientific realism due to its
capacity to represent, in some respects and to some degree, aspects of a mindindependent world instead of favoring some non-representational virtue of scientific
theories such as problem-solving effectiveness (Giere, 1988: 7). I will later argue that
Giere's way of utilizing models as representational is entirely dependent upon the virtue
of whether or not the models being used to represent a particular phenomenon are solely
explanatorily successful, hence, solely effective problem-solvers. Thus, Giere's claim to
scientific realism cannot be supported based upon his own definition of scientific realism.
Further, I will draw upon two arguments first made by Anjan Chakravartty in which
Chakravartty accuses Giere of the following: (1) that Giere's model-theoretic approach is
instrumentalist, i.e. Giere values theories -- and evaluates theories by -- how effectively
they conform to scientists' intention to explain and predict phenomena as opposed to how
accurately they describe a mind-independent reality; and (2) that Giere's perspectivist
account of science is a "philosophically controversial" version of perspectivism, meaning
that in Giere's account there are only perspectival facts that are conditioned and evaluated
solely from constructed frameworks. Taking off from Chakravartty's criticisms, I contend
that Giere's methodological approach to science ultimately seeks to "save the
phenomena," i.e. Giere's MTC approach fails to represent a mind-independent reality by
means of scientific theories, but instead seeks to be an effective problem-solver -- a
position which places Giere, by his own definition, firmly in the anti-realist camp.
In order to complete the task of denouncing Giere's realist claim, all of the
relevant background information must first be explained. As MTC is a somewhat less
5
familiar characterization of the structure and nature of scientific theories than is the wellknown (mostly for historical reasons) received view of the logical positivists, a brief
historical introduction to the topic is warranted in order to familiarize the reader with the
technicalities of MTC. Thus, the rest of this chaptered essay is outlined as follows.
Chapter 1 will be divided into two sections. First, MTC will be introduced from within its
historical context, that is, as an alternative account to the received view of the structure
and nature of scientific theories. This introduction will serve as a kind of preparatory
guide, allowing the reader to transition from the well-known doctrines of the logical
positivists into the somewhat less known domain of the model-theoreticians. Section 1.1
of Chapter 1 is thus devoted to a general account of the received view, while section 1.2
of Chapter 1 provides both the reasoning for favoring MTC over the received view as
well as an historical platform from which the structural aspects of MTC can be
explicated.
Chapter 2 covers Giere's methodological approach within MTC, which will
include the following: Giere's account of constructivism and his naturalistic
methodology; the manner in which models operate within Giere's method; the importance
and role of theoretical hypotheses in Giere's method; the heuristics of Giere's
perspectivism; and, finally, the manner in which Giere ties his methodology and
perspectivism together with his realist claim.
Chapter 3 will be the final one, from which there will initially be a brief
summarization of Chakravartty's criticisms of Giere's account of MTC followed by my
own expansions upon this criticism, and finishing with a criticism of Giere's
6
constructivist approach. The first section deals with the notion of scientific realism in
comparison to external-world or common-sense realism. Here, Chakravartty's first
criticism that Giere is an instrumentalist will surface, and I will look to both defend and
expand this criticism. The second section attacks Giere's perspectivism, where
Chakravartty will again be present, as I will make avid use of his accusation that Giere is
committed to a "philosophically controversial" version of perspectivism. Finally, the last
section adds further reflections and qualifications about Giere's version of MTC and ends
with an overall consideration of possible alternatives to Giere's solution.
CHAPTER I
FROM THE RECEIVED VIEW TO THE MODEL-THEORETIC VIEW
MTC began as a response to the then prevalent account of the structure and nature
of scientific theories: the Received View ('RV' hereafter). The main features of RV owe
their genesis to the hard work of the logical positivists of the Vienna Circle. The
members of the Vienna Circle, having been quite taken in by the then recent
developments within the field of mathematics and logic, specifically the work done by
Frege, Russell, and Cantor, developed a conception of the structure and nature of
scientific theories within the framework of mathematical logic (Suppe, 1977: 12). As a
result of this influence, the logical positivist movement looked to reduce all arithmetic to
logic and, subsequently, all of science to mathematical logic. RV thus incorporated the
values adhered to by the positivists: There are two sources of knowledge, logical
reasoning and empirical experience; the former is analytic, while the latter is synthetic.
The values inculcated into scientific theorizing by the positivists resulted in the assertion
that a statement is meaningful if an only if one knows the conditions under which that
statement is true or false. This assertion became known as the principle of verifiability.
Scientific theories were thus characterized by RV in the language of first-order
predicate logic with identity, whereby scientific theories would be axiomatized. Keeping
in consideration the principle of verifiability, the positivists divided the language in
which a scientific theory was axiomatized into three disjoint vocabularies: a vocabulary
7
8
of logical constants, a vocabulary of observation terms, and a vocabulary of theoretical
terms. All terms of the observational vocabulary were interpreted as directly referring to
observable objects or observable properties of those objects. Theoretical terms, on the
other hand, were given an empirical interpretation through appropriate statements called
correspondence rules, which attempted to give an explicit definition of some theoretical
term 'F' by linking F to some observational term 'O' in the following manner: x (Fx
Ox) (Suppe, 1977: 16). All theoretical terms were thus given phenomenal definitions by
means of being materially equivalent to some corresponding observational term of the
observational language.
Since MTC first arose as an alternative to RV, the earliest literature containing
variations of MTC consists mostly of different accounts and characterizations of MTC
accompanied by arguments about how and why these so-called semantic accounts were
superior characterizations of the structure and nature of scientific theories than the
accounts given by RV.4 However, as MTC began to gain momentum and mature, and as
RV began to fall from its lofty heights, philosophers of science began to expand and
restructure the accounts given by MTC. These new accounts began to focus not on
overcoming RV, but on explicating and producing a competent version of MTC of which
could be said to be the most satisfactory account of MTC. Additionally, MTC had begun
as merely an account of mechanics, however, upon the further maturing of the theory,
4
Most of the accounts given by model-theoreticians in concern to the superiority of MTC over RV focus
on MTC's ability to bypass the structural syntax of RV. For more on this topic, see section 1.1 and 1.2 of
this chapter.
9
MTC began to expand to other fields such as nuclear physics, cosmology, and even
biology.5
SECTION 1.1
The original formulation of RV, as it was constructed by the logical positivists,
was constantly revised throughout its course. In the following presentation of RV, it is
my intention to preserve this general overall approach within RV without paying specific
attention to the historical development of RV.6 This means that there will be features of
RV of which have been omitted for the sake of brevity. Unfortunately, when giving a
general account of a particular theory that underwent decades of transitions such as RV,
omissions are necessary evils. The scope of this section will thus include only the
elements of RV that are so often criticized in the literature. Thus, the important elements
to a general account of RV that will be scrutinized here are the same ones focused on by
Frederick Suppe (1977 and 1989): the distinction between observational terms and
theoretical terms; the distinction between synthetic and analytic statements; the
distinction between theoretical axioms and rules of correspondence; and the deductive
nature of scientific theories.
Recall the brief characterization of RV outlined in the introductory section of this
chapter. As mentioned there, RV axiomatized scientific theories in a language L of
mathematical logic, and L was divided into three different vocabularies: a logical
vocabulary; an observational vocabulary; and a theoretical vocabulary. The terms
5
6
See Thompson (1988) and Lloyd (1988) for MTC's application in evolutionary theory.
See Suppe (1977) for a full historical account of the development and decline of RV.
10
contained in the observational vocabulary were terms that could be interpreted as
directly, i.e. as non-mediately, referring to some observable object or observable attribute
of an object. In addition, all the terms of the theoretical vocabulary were given explicit
definitions in terms of the observational vocabulary by way of correspondence rules.
Now, since it is the case that RV construed scientific theories as being axiomatized
syntactic systems formalized in language L, and since it is the case that all theoretical
terms were given their meaning by the syntactical and logical relationship between
observation terms, theoretical terms, and correspondence rules, the resulting scenario for
RV is that the semantics of a scientific theory are given directly by the syntax of the
theory (Thompson, 1988: 288 - 289). Indeed, if any element of RV can be called the "key
element," it is that it is a syntactic conception of scientific theories (whereas, for
comparison, MTC originated as a semantic conception of scientific theories).
Most of the proponents of RV were not interested in developing any kind of
descriptive account of science, but were instead concerned with attempting to provide
science with logical and epistemological foundations. As Ronald Giere writes,
proponents of RV had a primary goal, and it was to “…justify, or legitimate, science, not
merely to explain how it works” (Giere, 1988: 23). Thus, RV set about attempting to
legitimate science within the framework of first-order predicate logic. However, the focus
of RV on linguistic, i.e. syntactic, elements soon led to difficulties within the overall
conception of RV.
Let us now then move to our first point of contention concerning RV: the
distinction between observational and theoretical terms. The distinction between
11
observational terms ('Vo' henceforth) and theoretical terms ('Vt' henceforth) depends
directly upon the principle of verifiability (Suppe, 1977: 18). Recall that the principle of
verifiability asserted that a statement is meaningful if and only if one could know the
circumstances under which that statement was true or false. Since, according to RV, the
semantics of a theory are given by the logical syntax of L, and since the meaning and
interpretation of a statement ultimately answer to the principle of verification, every
interpretive account of a theoretical term as being materially equivalent to some
observation term is an integral piece of the scientific theory itself.
There are several problems which arise in concern to the Vo/Vt distinction;
however, I will here discuss only two of the more prominent difficulties: the problem of
interpretation in highly theoretical sciences, e.g. quantum mechanics, and the
methodological problem of multiple theory interaction. Let us begin with the former. A
quick list of theoretical terms, viz. 'electron' and 'wave function', will serve as examples.
In order to preserve the principle of verifiability, as well as the Vo/Vt distinction, RV
must construct a statement which identifies both 'electron' and 'wave function' as being
materially equivalent to some observational term; this would both allow us to know the
conditions under which 'electron' and 'wave function' are verifiable as well as preserve
the empiricist doctrine of RV.
Electrons can be observed in a cloud chamber, meaning that the positivists could,
in principle, construct a reduction sentence such as x (Ex Ox), where 'E' stands for 'is
12
an electron' and 'O' stands for 'is observable in a cloud chamber'.7 This provides us both
with a material identification of the theoretical term 'electron' with an observational term
'observable in a cloud chamber' as well as stipulates the conditions under which the
statement can be true or false, viz. the formal conditions under which the valuation of the
universal biconditional is true. However, when dealing with cases of so-called "highly
theoretical terms" such as the wave function in quantum mechanics, reducing the
theoretical term 'wave function' to some observation term becomes nearly impossible
(Suppe, 1977: 80, 83).
The wave function, often symbolized as 'Ψ', is a variable quantity describing the
quantum state (position and time) of a particle and how that particle behaves. In order to
predict the probability of a particle's spatial location at a given time, one multiplies the
wave function of that particle with itself, i.e. Ψ2.8 As Suppe (1977) contends, the Vo/Vt
distinction can be maintained in such a situation if we look to characterize the wave
function and other highly theoretical terms by way of their function instead of the
observable circumstances under which statements containing these highly theoretical
terms could be known to be true or false.9 However, constructing a formal
characterization of the wave function in accordance with the principle of verifiability
7
Obviously, many other factors would actually need to be considered in order to accurately conclude that
'x (Ex Ox)' characterizes electrons, such as the trajectory space of the electron, the conditions of the
appearance of the electron, the fact that what is being observed is a subatomic particle, etc. Otherwise, one
might as well be observing an α-particle (also observable in a cloud chamber). However, for simplicity's
sake, let us say that 'x (Ex Ox)' is all that is required for the moment.
8
This is to say, simply, that the probability of finding the particle described by a specific wave function Ψ
at a given point and time is proportional to the value of Ψ2.
9
Suppe is still partial to the Vo/Vt distinction; however, his approach does not involve reduction sentences
or the principle of verifiability. For more on Suppe's approach to the Vo/Vt distinction, see Suppe (1977)
pp. 80 - 90 and Suppe (1989) chapter one.
13
seems outright impossible due to the dispositional nature of the wave function, its
particularity to any given particle, and the overall problem of equating an entity
expressing mathematical probability with an observable entity or property.
A further problem with the Vo/Vt distinction, and the last one of which we will
here be concerned with, is the problem that arises from the axiomatization of scientific
theories and the conjoint employment of multiple theories. Paul Thompson (1988) claims
that in syntactic conceptions of scientific theories, two or more theories cannot be "easily
or naturally" employed conjointly because the conjoint employment of theories requires a
simultaneous axiomatization of all theories being employed into one single theory.
Thompson argues that the reason for axiomatizing multiple theories as a single theory
stems from the role correspondence rules play, viz. as providing a "global meaning
structure for an axiomatized formal system" (Thompson, 1988: 289). As separate
theories, Thompson argues, certain theories will have different global meanings as
provided by the set of correspondence rules, making interaction between theories difficult
to employ. However, since science often does employ theories in a causal sequential
manner, without axiomatizing the component theories as a single theory, Thompson
argues that RV does not provide an accurate account of the way in which scientific
theories are explanatorily used in scientific practice. Allow me to present an example
from Thompson.
Take the theoretical term 'chromosome' in a theory about chromosomal
segregation during meiosis. Now, 'chromosome' will, in RV, be linked (via
correspondence rules/reduction sentences) to specific entities having such properties as
14
the following: staining properties, cell location, behaviors, etc. (Thompson, 1988: 289).
The problem arises when one takes into account the method of observation. The
properties listed above, viz. staining properties, behavior, etc., are all properties that need
to be observed under the assistance of a microscope. In order to explain why it is that
these properties should be linked to anything called 'chromosome', one would have to
provide a causal account of the microscope, which thus requires the introduction of
outside theories such as optics and subatomic physics (ibid: 289). Now, according to
Thompson, the interaction between chromosomal segregation, optics, and subatomic
physics presents problems in RV, for some terms of one theory will indubitably not occur
in other theories, making those terms either meaningless in those other theories, or
whatever meaning they can be given will be different from the meaning given in the
term's origin theory because the term will be given meaning from within a different
global meaning structure. In order for chromosomal segregation, optics, and subatomic
physics to have the same global meaning structure, they must be axiomatized as a single
theory with a single set of correspondence rules, which is, according to Thompson, just
not accurate of how science actually operates.10
The distinction between analytic and synthetic statements is a further consequence
(and problem) for RV's principle of verification. The analytic/synthetic distinction is also
directly linked to the Vo/Vt problem as well as the problem of the deductive nature of
science. Analytic statements had two uses in RV: as correspondence rules (synonymy)
and as mathematical/logical theorems (deductive/logical truth). The former kind of
10
If one's goal is to justify a methodological approach such as scientific investigation, then one's account
should preserve the actual practice of that method.
15
analyticity was vehemently assailed by what has become known as the quintessential
attack against the analytic/synthetic distinction: Quine's Two Dogmas of Empiricism,
where Quine argued that the analytic/synthetic distinction is untenable due to the fact that
the various explanations of analyticity as employed by the logical positivists (and others)
are circular. I will not here go through the entirety of all six sections of Quine's Two
Dogmas, however, since Quine's attack was so very influential, and since it is
simultaneously an attack on the principle of verifiability, the argument should be given
some attention.
According to Quine, analytic statements can be one of the following forms: (1)
analytic statements are true by their logical form, e.g. 'No unmarried man is married'; and
(2) analytic statements are true by way of meaning, i.e. analytic statements are analytic
on the basis of synonymy, e.g. 'No bachelor is married' (Quine, 2003: 274). Notice that
RV attempted to do something very similar to the second kind of analyticity, that is,
reduce a theoretical term to an observational term by way of synonymy. However, as
Quine notes in Two Dogmas, one cannot say that (2) is an adequate way of defining
analyticity without providing a definition for synonymy, for the definition of 'analyticity'
provided by (2) rests on the presupposition of synonymy. Of course, Quine goes on to
analyze different kinds of synonymy and whether or not any of those variants can be an
adequate account of analyticity. We need not go into an account of that here; suffice it to
say that there have been significant challenges to the idea that one can equate two
logically non-equivalent predicates and consider the reduction to be analytic (without
circularity). Quine's challenge ultimately proved to be disastrous to RV, who relied upon
16
the reduction of Vt terms to Vo terms as an a priori analytic move requiring no synthetic
justification.
Quine's challenge ultimately showed two very important flaws in RV: (1) that
every method which presumes analyticity where one term is being reduced to a material
equivalence of another (logically non-equivalent term) presumes synonymy; and (2) that
the analytic/synthetic distinction being employed by RV in concern to correspondence
rules is untenable due to the circularity of the characterization of analytic synonymy
(Suppe, 1977: 75 - 76). The analytic/synthetic distinction is thus not a veridical means of
justifying the usage of correspondence rules and, further, the reduction of Vt to Vo is
unsupportable as RV has conceived of it.
We have now considered some of the main objections to RV, namely, the
problem of the Vo/Vt distinction and the analytic/synthetic distinction. In discussing
these two objections, we have also mentioned the problems associated with the deductive
nature of RV and the relation between correspondence rules and the theoretical axioms of
theories. We will now proceed to an account of MTC and look at how MTC sought to
avoid the pitfalls of RV.
SECTION 1.2
In order to explain how it is that MTC is able to bypass the problems associated
with the theoretical/observation distinction -- specifically, how MTC avoids the problems
associated with reduction sentences (e.g. x (Fx Ox)) -- we need to have a general
account of what MTC is. Unfortunately, there exists a wide variety of different versions
17
of MTC; thus I will once again attempt to give a generalized account of a method that has
undergone decades of development. However, even though I will here be presenting a
general account of MTC, it is my intention to focus on the versions of MTC that are most
relevant to Giere's own position.
Despite the various formulations of MTC, there are several elements of which all
variants of MTC seem to share to some degree. I will call these elements ''Suppe's
elements'' in honor of Frederick Suppe who was the first (that I know of at least) to give a
characterization of the elements (see Suppe 1989). Suppe's elements are as follows: (i)
theory structure/model structure: either a single model or a group/set/family of models,11
(ii) physical system12: the intended scope of a theory, i.e. the data which a model is
representing, (iii) mapping relationships: the manner in which models represent physical
systems and physical systems represent phenomena (e.g. isomorphism), and, finally, (iv)
theoretical hypotheses: (often) linguistic entities making claims about the nature of the
mapping relationship as it pertains to theory structure and some physical or real
system.13A scientific theory is thus, according to MTC, a theoretical structure 'T' from
which scientists can construct theoretical hypotheses making claims about the models of
T -- specifically, how those models map onto some physical system. A physical system is
11
Recall from the introductory section of this chapter that there are, in general, three types of models:
concrete, mathematical, and computational. For a very good and clear classification of various model-types
and various notions of what model-types are, see van Fraassen (1980 and 2006) as well as Weisberg
(2013), esp. Weisberg (2013) pp. 15 - 23.
12
Physical systems (also known as models of data) are often optional, as they are usually laboratory
experiments or simulations meant to model real-world phenomena. Testing theories against physical
systems thus results in a model-to-model comparison. See Giere (2006) pp. 68 - 69.
13
Note here that for philosophers such as van Fraassen (1980), there doesn't necessarily need be any
mapping relationship between phenomena and the physical system in the strong sense of a relationship. The
relationship between phenomena and the physical system could be one of mere empirical adequacy.
18
merely an idealized account of some target real-world phenomena, such as a laboratory
simulation of the formation of a black hole.
The preceding paragraph is something of a skeletal sketching of the most basic
elements of MTC. We need to now turn to a more thorough investigation of these
elements. It seems proper then to begin with the most important of Suppe's elements -the "center stage" of MTC (as van Fraassen 1980 is wont to say): the concept of a theory
structure, i.e. the family of models. Thus, in order to truly get an understanding of how
MTC operates, we must now turn to a discussion about scientific models and the role and
operation of these models within MTC.
Demetris Portides (2008) rightfully claims that the concept of a model in science,
due to the various meanings of the term 'model', is a notoriously difficult concept to
discern. Indeed, Portides suggests that since models are fundamentally linked to the
notion of representation that the best way to understand what a model in science is
should be through an analysis of what the referred to model intends to represent
(Portides, 2008: 385 - 386). Models are intended to represent phenomena in various ways
depending upon the type of model and the intended mapping relationship between the
model and the physical system being modeled. Here, I will briefly sketch various kinds of
models and how they might represent phenomena.
Let us first begin with the basics. A model, in general, is often an abstract entity
of which is meant to represent a physical system. Philosophers use models in a variety of
ways and for various purposes. As mentioned previously, Michael Weisberg (2013)
classified three basic categories of models. These three categories are as follows: (i)
19
concrete models: "physical objects whose physical properties can potentially stand in
representational relationships with real-world phenomena;" concrete models are then
often physical iconic (even canonical) models, meant to stand, usually, in an isomorphic
relationship with their intended representation;14 (ii) mathematical models: "abstract
structures whose properties can potentially stand in relations to mathematical
representations of phenomena"; such as, for example, the model for universal gravitation,
of which can be characterized in mathematical English as 'F = Gmm'/r2'; and, finally,
computational models: "sets of procedures that can potentially stand in relations to a
computational description of the behavior of a system;" for example, Thomas Schelling's
segregation model shows a series of bitmap sequences of which show how racial
segregation can occur over time even when there isn't any overt racism present .15 Here,
then, we have three different kinds of models, each with its own capacity for
representation: concrete models represent in physical, often isomorphic, similarity;
mathematical models can represent in a variety of abstract ways, such as through
abstraction and idealization; computational models represent via comparison between an
ideal, often localized, system and a set of computations.16
In MTC, models provide the semantics17 for a scientific theory; thus, by
classifying a set of models, proponents of MTC are able to draw their semantics from a
14
See Suppe (1977) p. 97 for an example contrasting mathematical and iconic models.
The preceding quotes of this sentence can be found at Weisberg (2013) p. 7.
16
As we will see in Chapter 2, Giere claims that all models represent by way of similarity.
17
Specifically, in the typical account of MTC, the semantics of a theory are provided by defining a class/set
of/cluster of/family of models. Typically, one defines this class via set-theoretic types or state
space/topological structures. Ronald Giere, whose own unique version we will be looking at later in this
paper, seems to take a very non-typical approach by claiming that the cluster of models is defined by a
15
20
domain of which is not bound by necessity to linguistic formalisms as is the syntactic
account given by RV. Paul Thompson characterizes this differentiating feature of the
semantic view as opposed to the syntactic view as follows:
...an adequate... approach to the structure of scientific
theories consists in the direct specification of the models
(i.e. semantics) and not in the specification of a linguistic
axiomatic-deductive system (i.e. syntax). The significant
differences, therefore, between syntactic and semantic
accounts are the nature of adequate semantics of a scientific
theory and of an adequate (logically and heuristically)
formalization of a scientific theory.
(Thompson 1988: 287).
Where RV views scientific theories to be axiomatized entities characterized by
syntactical features, MTC views scientific theories as being groups of extra-linguistic
entities (i.e. models) describable by a number of different linguistic formulations. Merely
examining the linguistic formulations of a theory is not enough for understanding theories
in MTC but must additionally include the specification of a group of extra-linguistic
models which are meant to represent certain types of systems, e.g. mathematical,
concrete, and computational.
The semantic capacity of MTC, viz. its ability to draw semantics from a pool of
extralinguistic abstract models, allows for proponents of MTC to avoid characterizing
constructive approach whereby the community of scientists construct exemplary models of whose linguistic
characterization can be found within the canon of standard texts. More on Giere's conception later.
21
theoretical terms vis-a-vis reduction sentences. Thus, when one does wish to attempt to
characterize a model by way of a linguistic formalization, since models are themselves
extralinguistic, one is free to structure said formalization within any "sufficiently rich"
language (Giere, 1988: 48). This "sufficiently rich" language is also the language in
which theoretical hypotheses are often formulated, however, not all theoretical
hypotheses are conceived of as purely linguistic entities in MTC. Since it is the case that
Giere considers theoretical hypotheses to be purely linguistic entities, we shall pay more
attention to the version which formulates theoretical hypothesis purely within the theory
formation language ('FL' henceforth). Since it is the case that theories need to be spoken
about/written about, and since it is often the case that certain theories are often
characterized from within distinct syntactical traditions (e.g. Lagrangian versus
Hamiltonian), the malleability of the FL of a theory allows for any of these sufficiently
rich syntactical traditions to characterize models, i.e. refer to the models and mapping
relationships, while allowing for the possibility of mutually compatible translations (e.g.
from Lagrangian to Hamiltonian18).
When it is the case that theoretical hypotheses are linguistic entities, their only
two roles are (1) the assertion of some sort of relationship between models and
physical/real systems, and (2) the characterization of some theory structure as formulated
in FL. Thus, when asserting a theoretical hypothesis, one asserts an intention to use suchand-such sets of models and the proposed mapping relationship between the models and
real system (French, 2008: 272; Giere, 1988: 48; Suppe, 1989: 82). The mapping
18
As in taking the Legendre transformation.
22
relationship being expressed varies depending upon which model-theoretician you ask.
For example, in van Fraassen's case (esp. van Fraassen 1980), models represent
phenomena by way of an isomorphism relationship (one-to-one and onto), whereas
Frederick Suppe (1989) claims that models represent phenomena by way of idealization
and abstraction, and Ronald Giere (1988 and 2006) claims that models have a
relationship of similarity with phenomena. For example, Giere (1988) usually uses
mathematical English as his FL. He will then have a target phenomenon to be explained,
and selects groups of models as his theory structure. The theory structure is then what is
intended to explain the target phenomenon (this is the second role theoretical hypotheses
play). Next, Giere postulates the relationship of similarity of which is to hold between his
selected theory structure and the target phenomenon (this is the first role theoretical
hypotheses play).
We know that in MTC a theory is identified with a class of models. Now, these
models may, indeed, employ various model types such as Weisberg's three model types
listed above. For example, cognitive scientists often employ the usage of visuals such as
neural synapses scans (concrete models), localized computational assessments of neural
responses to various stimuli, e.g. vision (computational models), as well as complex
quantitative theories of cognition (mathematical models). Now, of course, there can be
overlap between models, i.e. models can be applied together in a conjunctive fashion.19
Thus, models can be built out of other models, making a kind of super model. For
example, Newton's universal gravitation law is built up out of the classical mechanics
19
Indeed, according to Thompson (1988), the flexibility of the same model to be used in various theories
and in relation to various models is one of the most attractive features of MTC.
23
models for mass, force, the gravitational constant, and the geometrical relation of
distance. These smaller models, mass, force, etc., are atomic models in classical
mechanics: they are some of the fundamentals of classical mechanics. When models are
combined to make new models, and a collection of these models are characterized as a
single entity, we call that entity a theory structure. The relationship of representation
between models and phenomena is called a mapping relationship; and the theoretical
conjectures espousing the theory structure and the manner (or manners) in which the
models of the theory structure map on to physical systems are the theoretical hypotheses.
Thus, whenever a theory is proposed, that theory propounds a family of models (theory
structure) as well as theoretical hypotheses claiming some kind of mapping relationship
between the family of models and a targeted physical/real system.
In order to be explicit about how MTC differs from RV, allow me to
present an example. In RV, we define a set of axioms A such that A is the set of reduction
sentences of which define some theoretical term F. Now, we have already seen how such
sentences as those contained in A would appear, and have also discussed the problems
associated with this approach, viz. reduction sentences as formalized in first-order
predicate logic are not an adequate means for a robust account of the semantics of
theoretical terms. The alternative account is then the one presented by MTC. In MTC,
one proposes a theory T by characterizing a family of models M of which is definitional
of T. The relationship between T and M is thus a trivially true one, since T is the theory
defined by the set M and M is the set of models of which defines T. Now, the syntactic
sentences of which are used to classify the set M as being the models of which define T is
24
a set of sentences S formulated in FL (whatever sufficient language FL is, e.g.
Mathematical English, set-theoretic types, etc.). Thus, a scientific theory might utilize S
as its FL, where S is, say, mathematical English, or French, or Latin, or Peano arithmetic.
As long as the FL is sufficiently rich enough to characterize the models of the theory
structure, a scientist is free to choose his/her FL. A theory is thus free to use any
sufficiently rich set of sentences in any sufficiently rich language in order to characterize
its set of models. However, one must keep in mind that whatever set of sentences is being
used to characterize M, that set of sentences falls short of the actual semantics of the
theory: it is merely a kind of place-holder or heuristic of which allows us to sufficiently
characterize the set of models of which T employs. In MTC, S is not reducible to M (as it
would be in RV), since S can be sundry languages all of which are used as a means of
communicating about theories.
In summary thus far, we have gone over the historical development of MTC as a
competing alternative to RV. From this historical development, we have learned that the
most important element of MTC is the notion of a scientific model. However, as noted,
scientific models are notoriously difficult to discern, thus making their explication rather
difficult. I hope to have presented a general and well-rounded account of what models are
and how they relate to phenomena from within a theory structure. With a working
knowledge of what exactly MTC is, we must now turn to the real matter at hand: Ronald
Giere's constructive realist account of MTC. In the following chapter, I will present
Giere's specific account of MTC and then, more scrupulously, analyze the foundations
for Giere's claim to realism.
CHAPTER II
RONALD GIERE'S CONSTRUCTIVISM AND PERSPECTIVAL REALISM
In order to understand how Giere's version of MTC operates, we need to first
break it into its basic constituents. There are six important elements that must be
elucidated in order for us to grasp Giere's version of MTC. Those elements are as
follows: Giere's account is a constructivist account; Giere's account adopts a naturalistic
approach to scientific theories; Giere's account demarcates between theoretical models
and exemplary models; Giere's account gives an explicit description of theoretical
hypotheses; Giere's account also has a unique method of representation, viz. similarity;
and, finally, Giere's manner of explanation in MTC is perspectival, meaning that different
theories adopt different perspectives toward the target phenomenon to be explained. We
need to also keep in mind that Giere's ultimate goal is to construct a "science of the
sciences" (Giere, 1988). This means that Giere is attempting to analyze the structure and
nature of scientific theories in a naturalistic and scientific manner. The goal of philosophy
of science, Giere contends, should be to construct a theory of science of which would
"...serve to explain the phenomenon of science itself in roughly the way that scientific
theories explain other natural phenomenon" (Giere, 1988: 1).
SECTION 2.1
In this section, I will be dealing with two aspects of Giere's constructive realism:
Giere's constructivist claim as well as his naturalist claim. Giere (1988) repeatedly makes
25
26
the claim that constructivists are intrinsically naturalists; however, Giere's own version of
constructivism is not to be confused with the "strong version" of constructivism such as
the kind of constructivism that is associated with Bruno Latour and Steven Woolgar.20
Indeed, as Matthew Brown rightly notes, Giere's project seems to aim for a "middle
ground" between the strong constructivist positions of sociologists of science and
objectivist realism (Brown, 2009: 213). Further, Giere's naturalistic approach to science
is not thesis-based but is methodological. This is to say that Giere opts to abandon the
doctrine of naturalism as an epistemic thesis and instead adopts an approach that utilizes
naturalism specifically as a method.
A naturalist, according to Giere, invokes specific domains of information in order
to account for phenomena; these domains each contain information that can be appealed
to without relying on any overt appeals to a transcendent realm, essences, or any a priori
intuitions in order for their justification. Further, once a naturalistic explanation is found
for some phenomenon x, there is no need to pursue a non-naturalist explanation of x.
Naturalism is, of course, a stance that one can take in connection to various domains
outside of the philosophy of science, e.g. naturalistic epistemology, naturalistic language
theory, etc. Depending on one's domain of interest, the naturalist doctrine operates in
slightly different manners and invokes separate domain specific information. For
20
Latour and Woolgar's constructivism is based upon a laboratory setting, where they argue that the daily
activity of the laboratory leads to the construction of facts from statements and the deconstruction of facts
into statements: "Argument between scientists transforms some statements into figments of one's subjective
imagination, and others into facts of nature. The constant fluctuation of statements' facticity allowed us
approximately to describe the different stages in the construction of facts, as if a laboratory was a factory
where facts were produced on an assembly line" (Latour and Woolgar, 2000: 203). Latour and Woolgar
thus argue the position that scientific facts are arbitrarily constructed, whereas (as we shall see later) Giere
attempts to push the idea of perspectival facts. For problems with Giere's attempted amelioration, see
Chapter 3 of this essay.
27
example, in the philosophy of science -- specifically, within Giere's account of a
naturalistic account of the philosophy of science -- the naturalist invokes information
from within the domains of cognitive science, evolutionary theory, and the sociology of
science (Giere 2008: 215). Contrast the domain specificity of a naturalistic approach in
the philosophy of science with a naturalistic approach in the philosophy of language.
When dealing with language, a naturalistic approach might invoke information from the
domains of linguistics and hermeneutics.
To adopt naturalism as a method rather than a doctrine is, according to Giere, to
abandon traditional epistemology, i.e. to abandon the idea of Cartesian skepticism, forgo
any appeals to a priori justification, and dismiss the idea that rationality is solely a
categorical conception (Giere, 1988: 8 - 13). Instead, one should focus on natural causes,
empirical experimentation, and, further, consider rationality as being simply "effective
goal-directed action" (ibid: 9). Giere claims that naturalism as a method need not be
justified in the traditional sense; its utility and problem solving capability are justification
enough for its use.21
As mentioned above, a naturalistic philosophy of science, in Giere's account,
often utilizes three resources for naturalization: evolutionary theory, cognitive science,
and the sociology of science. Now, as pertains to evolutionary theory, Giere wants to
argue that science evolves in a manner that is similar to the manner in which natural
organisms evolve (Giere, 2008: 216). It is important to note, however, that the selection
21
See Giere (2006) p. 12. Giere's account of naturalism as a method invites obvious charges of circularity. I
will not here go into deep detail about this charge, but will simply direct the reader to his reply on pp. 10 12 in Explaining Science.
28
process involved in Giere's evolutionary account of science is a social process. This is to
say that people select one theory over another. Theory structures are proposed and last for
as long as their utility and problem-solving effectiveness is greater than the utility and
problem-solving effectiveness of competing theory structures. As Giere says, "if each of
several options is satisfactory [i.e. their utility and problem-solving effectiveness are
roughly equal], it makes no difference to the agent which it chooses" (Giere 1988: 158).
Further, since theory structures can adopt new models and/or replace older models, a
certain model might be "selected" by scientists to replace an older model within some
theory structure. An example of how theories are selected might best be parsed through
example.
Let us say that there are three cosmological theories about the movements of the
heavenly bodies: a, a geocentric theory in which each body revolves in a circular fashion
around the earth; p a geocentric theory in which the observable bodies rotated around the
earth in epicycles; and c a heliocentric theory that explained the rotation of the heavenly
bodies by including the Earth as one of the rotating bodies. The proposal of a is found to
have difficulties in accounting for certain celestial phenomenon, such as the retrograde
motion of the planets. a then finds itself in competition with theory p, where the rotation
of the planets is described as being epicyclical instead of circular. Now, p is found to
describe the retrograde motion of the planets much better than is a, and thus p is
(socially) selected to persevere. However, after a while longer, p now finds itself in
competition with theory c. Since c is found to be intuitively simpler, and thus less
cumbersome to employ than p, c is eventually selected to persevere over p.
29
This process of social selection is compatible with Giere's version of naturalism in
science, for it is the social setting of the community of scientists of which not only selects
which scientific theories will persevere, but also constructs these theories based upon
information gathered via instrumental and experimental means.22 According to Giere,
scientists construct theories and, over time, select which theories will persevere by
observation and judgment. This is the sociological aspect of Giere’s naturalist account of
science; however, Giere's version of social construction and selection is not to be equated
with the kind of laboratory social construction espoused by Latour and Woolgar. Where
Latour and Woolgar argued for the construction and deconstruction of facts based upon
laboratory observation (see note 21 above) ,23 Giere extends the world of discourse to
involve what Giere (2006 and 2008) refers to as the "total distributed cognitive system,"
which will ultimately involve not only laboratory scientists, but the measuring
instruments used by those scientists as well as the entire community of scientists and the
entirety of peer reviewed journals pertaining to the topic under investigation.
According to Giere (who is here invoking the notion of a distributed cognitive
system from the domain of cognitive science) the natural process of cognition is
something that is distributed throughout the entire framework of the system (Giere, 2008:
217 - 218) . For example, let us say that there is a set Σ of which includes as one of its
members the set S of each and every scientist employed by CERN. Now, Σ also contains
as one of its members the set H of which is the set of all active and fruitful non-human
22
See Giere (1988): pp. 4 - 5, 59 - 60, esp. 78 - 79.
Giere (1988) does give an account of construction within the laboratory, however, his version is radically
different than Latour and Woolgar's version. See Giere (1988) Chapter 5 "Realism in the Laboratory."
23
30
devices associated with the Large Hadron Collider (LHC). In Giere's account, set Σ is a
local system, whereby local information concerning specifically the outputs of LHC is
part of the entire cognitive process. Yes, that includes set H as well. However, Σ is indeed
a member of a much larger set Γ of which contains the member P -- the set of all
published and peer-reviewed scientific journals pertaining to the research being done at
LHC. It is, in Giere's view, set Γ which is constitutive of the entire cognitive process, and
this includes both human and non-human inputs and outputs. Of course, the final
judgments are made by humans, but the cognitive process of which leads to those
judgments is naturally constituted by the interaction of the members of Γ. In this manner,
then, we can now see how Giere accounts for a naturalistic account of the entire process
of scientific model construction and selection.
We are now in a position to comment on Giere's version of constructivism. Giere
contends that the manner in which scientific models are presented and formatted is
entirely constructive. Let us return to our cosmology example of the models a, p, and c.
Now, in Giere's account, a is first constructed by means of observation and social
interaction. This means that some group of individual(s) (the group could merely have
one member after all) made some observations and constructed a model, or models, of
which represent those obervations. The collected set of these models is theory a, and
theory a's veracity will then be judged by the system's community of satisficers. Theories
are then social constructs of which are first built up out of the representational models of
an initial group of scientists. Once the theory has been sufficiently constructed, it is
31
opened up to judgments from within the whole system (usually by way of publication in a
peer-reviewed journal).
We have now covered Giere's approach and method within the philosophy of
science (i.e. naturalism) and have explained why it is that he considers himself to be a
constructivist. We must now turn to the fundamental pieces of Giere's account of MTC:
his notion of what a model is and the difference between exemplary models and
theoretical models.
SECTION 2.2
Recall our discussion about models from Chapter 1; and recall the three kinds of
models given as an example (concrete, computational, and mathematical). Now,
whenever Giere refers to a model, what he intends is reference to any kind of entity
which can be properly characterized as one of the three types of models outlined in
Chapter 1. Note here, however, that Giere does not himself make the categorical
distinction between mathematical, concrete, and computational models that Weisberg
does. In Giere's theory, the term 'model' is a general word for mathematical, concrete, or
computational models. Giere (1988), though committed to the notion that models have
concrete, computational, or mathematical content, does not care to distinguish between
models on the basis of their content: a model is simply a model in Giere's theory,
regardless of the content of the model. However, Giere does find it appropriate to
distinguish models on the basis of a hierarchical order. According to Giere's theory,
models can be better characterized as being either exemplary models or theoretical
32
models. All exemplary models are theoretical models, but not all theoretical models are
exemplary models. Let us examine what Giere has to say about this distinction so that we
might parse out a better understanding of what Giere has in mind when he refers to
models in general.
Let us first begin with Giere's naturalistic approach. Now, as the type of
methodological naturalist that Giere is (as outlined above), Giere does not want to fall
back on any sort of non-trivial a priori justification for the validity of his models.24 Giere
thus needs to appeal to some naturalistic basis in order to justify the basics, or first
principles, of model construction. This feat is accomplished by an appeal to scientific
textbooks (Giere, 1988: 63). Giere argues that all scientists begin their training by being
inundated with simple models -- e.g. what a force is in Newtonian mechanics, or the
difference between vector and scalar quantities -- and from these simple, atomistic
models, complex/composite models are built, e.g. the linear oscillator. The question is
now, where do these atomic models come from? Giere's response is to argue that the
atomic models are constructed and promoted by scientists, allowing us to appeal to them
as primary or basic constituents from which more complex models are built out of. The
method remains naturalistic due to these atomic models being constructed socially by
means of a complex cognitive network that exists as a relationship between communities
of scientists as well as individual scientists themselves (see above).
Since all exemplary models are, in Giere's account, theoretical models, it makes
sense to begin with the broader class, viz. theoretical models. A theoretical model is,
24
By 'non-trivial justification' I mean justification that is not a mere appeal to syntactic structures.
33
simply, nothing more than a model of which is applicable to a theory structure. All
models, good and bad, are theoretical models so long as they can be used within a
scientific theory and are socially selected to do so by the community of scientists. So, in
addition to exemplary models such as scientific laws, models such as the Lotka-Volterra
model of predation and even the hue circle in color theory are (purely) theoretical
models. We now turn to exemplary models.
Certain models, sometimes complex and sometimes atomic, are considered, by
Giere, to be exemplary models. Exemplary models are those models that are so often
found in the standard introductory science texts. These highly idealized systems, such as
the simple harmonic oscillator, are models of which are generalized to a very high degree
in order for them to ideally be applied to a wide variety of possible situations. Thus, the
simple harmonic oscillator can be idealized to fit into any system that has elasticity and
inertia (e.g. a mass connected to a rigid foundation by means of a spring) and can be
subsequently used in conjunctions with Newton's Second Law.
All models are abstract and idealized, for if they were not, then we would need to
construct new models for each and every system being represented (this includes
temporal parameters) which is just not a feasible endeavor. This does not, however, mean
that all models are exemplary models; for an exemplary model is something of which is
an exemplar of models, and this is to say that exemplary models are the models that
scientists look at when they aim to construct new, context-dependent models such as the
Foucault Pendulum of which has a very specific and patterned oscillation.
34
SECTION 2.3
Since it is the case that models are abstract entities whose only linguistic
characterization is merely definitional, it follows that models themselves are not
linguistic entities; however, in Giere's account, theoretical hypotheses are linguistic
entities. Theoretical hypotheses are "...statement[s] asserting some sort of relationship
between a model and a designated real system (or class of systems)" (Giere, 1988: 80).
Theoretical hypotheses are then statements, which can be true or false, that assert that
some model m stands in relation R to some real world system x. Now, the question is the
following: what kind of relationship do theoretical hypotheses claim exists between a
given model m and a real world system x? Giere tells us that the relationship cannot be
one of truth valuation for the following reasons: no model is literally true of its intended
real system,25 expressions of truth between models and real systems would constrain
what models could be used in various situations,26 and, as concerns the notion of
approximate truth, there can be no such thing as approximate truth! In Giere's system,
there is only a bivalent truth system, either the valuation of R is false or the valuation of R
is true: there is no in-between. In Giere's own words, "Approximately true implies "not
exactly true," which means false..." (Giere, 1988: 106).
25
Indeed, as noted above, Giere claims that scientists are aware of this point and that they are not
concerned with constructing literally true models.
26
For instance, scientists will often use Newtonian mechanics when dealing with kinematics that do not
approach near light speed, while the mechanics of Einstein must be employed for any speeds reaching near
light speed (See Hawking and Mlodinow 2010). Giere's claim is that if the relationship between models and
real systems is one of truth values, then either one or the other scenarios presents itself: either what is really
true changes from low-velocity kinematics to high-velocity kinematics, or scientists are using at least one
blatantly false theory.
35
So, if R is not claiming a representational relationship between m and x as truthfunctional, then what is R claiming? In Giere's system, R is asserting a similarity
relationship between m and x. Now, a theoretical hypothesis can be true or false
dependent upon whether or not the claimed similarity relation R obtains between m and x;
however, the valuation of R is not objective: Giere admits that any system x can be
considered similar to any model m (Giere, 1988: 93). Prima facie, Giere's admission that
any system may be similar to any model by some account makes his similarity
relationship seem vacuous. 27 Thus, in an attempt to ameliorate this problem, Giere
imposes specific qualifications upon his notion of similarity in an effort to restrict
nonsense applications of the similarity relationship. These qualifications are the respects
in which m can be similar to x and the degree in which m is similar to x. The respects in
which a model can be similar to some physical system are what allow Giere to avoid the
accusation that similarity is a vacuous relationship.
Giere defines 'respects' as follows: "The respects in which similarity may be
claimed can only be those represented in the model. One cannot claim... that a
mechanical system is similar to a classical model with respect to color simply because
there is nothing which represents color in any classical model" (Giere, 1988: 93). The
respect in which a model can represent phenomena is the manner in which a model can
represent phenomena. Thus the respects in which a model can be similar to a real system
are determined by the content that the model expressively claims to represent. This is to
27
Giere's admission seems particularly influenced by Nelson Goodman. For example, what is the similarity
between a model of light propagation and the planet Mars? Answer: Mars is an entity and the model of
light propagation is an entity. The similarity between the two is completely arbitrary and vacuous.
36
say that the respects in which a model can be similar to a real system are inherently
contained within the model: if the model claims to represent phenomena x1, x2, x3, then it
cannot be claimed to have similarity with phenomena x4, x5, x6, and so on.
Now, the degrees to which a model can be similar to a real system are not
inherently expressed in the model's characterization. The degree of similarity is the
measurement of how similar m is to x based upon how well m "fits" with x (Giere, 1988
and 2006), as determined by scientific experiments, observations, and judgments. 28
Theoretical hypotheses assert just how much degree of similarity there is between the
model m and real system x. For example, a theoretical hypothesis may claim that there is
a "high" or "low" degree of similarity between m and x.
I have explained Giere's attempt to maneuver around the problem of ambiguity in
his notion of similarity, however, I would like to now point out that, though Giere has
proposed a notion of theoretical hypotheses that seems, perhaps, intuitively friendly
toward our common conception of scientific theories, he has not done anything to avoid
ambiguity in reference to similarity. The problem still remains: how do scientists
adjudicate between models? The notion of similarity here espoused by Giere seems
overly vague as a means of deciding between competing theories. Giere gives us little to
assuage our fears. He merely claims that as long as one model "fits" better in a certain
context than another, then the former theory is favored over the latter (Giere, 2006: 64 -
28
Giere's notion of fitness is not very well defined in any of his works, and, indeed, he has been charged
(by Chakravartty in particular) with being overly vague about what exactly "fitness of models" is. See
Chapter 3 below.
37
65). Giere's notion of a similarity relationship leads to his scientific perspectivism, to
which we will now turn.
SECTION 2.4
Giere's stance on realism has shifted slightly from his 1988 work Explaining
Science to his 2006 work Scientific Perspectivism; the former being an account of what
Giere calls "constructive realism" and the latter being, as Giere tells us in a footnote to
Scientific Perspectivism, a further extension of constructive realism: a perspectival
realism. The goal of Giere's perspectival realism is to mediate between what Giere calls a
"strong objectivism" or "hard realism" and the constructivist accounts commonly found
within sociological accounts of science. 'Hard realism', or 'objective realism' in the sense
that Giere has in mind, refers to any stance of which claims that there are objective
scientific truths, that there is a single unified scientific account of reality, or that scientific
laws are descriptions of reality simpliciter, etc.29 Giere's overall goal is to present a
perspectival realist account of science by characterizing science in terms of different
perspectives, of which are intersubjectively objective.
I want to begin my account of Giere's realism by appealing to Matthew Brown's
(2009) work, where he outlines six of the major claims of Giere's 2006 perspectivism.
Brown's six points will serve as a kind of springboard into Giere's perspectival realism
from which I will elucidate the overall structure. Brown's six points are as follows:
29
See the first chapter to Giere 2006.
38
1. Human and scientific observation and scientific theories
are all perspectival.
2. Perspectives are an asymmetric interaction between
human (biological, cognitive, social) factors and the world.
That is, humans and science have perspectives on the world
while the world has no perspective on us.
3. Perspectives are partial and of limited accuracy.
4. Perspectives are neither objectively correct nor uniquely
veridical: they are "intersubjectively objective."
5. Scientific truth-claims are relative to a perspective and
are about the fittingness of perspectives.
6. Representation is a quadratic, not dyadic relation.
(Brown, 2009: p. 214)
(1) and (2) are Giere's attempts to avoid both scientific objectivism and pure
constructivism and of which, when taken in conjunction with (3), lead to (4) which
removes any possibility that there might be an objective perspective that is "better than"
any other perspective. (5) further limits the strength of any objectivism while (6) is an
account of how (1) - (5) all fit together.
Here, I want to further elaborate upon each individual point above, beginning with
point (1). Since Giere gives an account of his perspectivism as analogous to color
perspectivism, I will here present Giere's account of perspectivism as a series of
analogies with color perspectivism.
39
1. Human and scientific observation and scientific theories are all perspectival.
First, we have to explain how human and scientific observation is perspectival in
Giere's account. Giere (2006) asks his readers to consider the empirical fact that color
identification is ubiquitous among human beings, the exceptions being those unfortunate
individuals born blind or color-blind. Now, as color identification is ubiquitous among
humans, it follows that, according to Giere, humans ubiquitously have a colored
representation of the world. However, when Giere claims that humans experience the
world as being colored, what he means is that our biological makeup results in our ability
to distinguish between colored things. We do not experience the world as a series of
various colors, but "...perceive aspects of the world itself, which aspects being
determined by our particular sensory capacities" (Giere, 2006: 36). Color is, then, not an
intrinsic property of the world in the sense that any creature with ocular capacities will
experience color as we ourselves do, but is a phenomenon of which is a result of the
process of a set of physical properties interacting in a particular way: Sets of physical
properties are ordered by our ocular and cognitive apparatai, constructing colors as we
perceive them. Our biological makeup thus determines the perspectival range in which
we can comprehend the color of the received electromagnetic reflectance profile. Thus,
my Cleveland Indians ball cap is not objectively blue and red, but is blue and red within
my perspective.
The paragraph above brings obvious intonations of the seventeenth-century
primary/secondary distinction of color. Giere cares very little for the distinction between
40
primary and secondary qualities in respect to color (perhaps even in general), 30 however,
Giere does say the following: "It is generally scientifically correct that... the physical
constitution of the light together with the physical operations of the human visual system
determine the color experience of a normal viewer." (Giere, 2006: 37). However, if one
considers primary qualities to be objectively true of the object, then there cannot be such
a thing as primary qualities, for all statements derive their truth valuation from within a
unique perspective. In order to illustrate Giere's position, let me present an example in
my own words that Giere (2006) gives comparing trichromats and dichromats.
Let us say that I am a trichromat (having color vision based on three primary
colors, e.g. red, green, blue), while one of my roommates, let's call him Bob, is a
dichromat (someone who has color vision based on two primary colors, e.g. blue and
red). Now, let us say that there is a green rug with a red pattern on it. I, being a
trichromat, see the rug as being green with a red pattern; however, Bob sees the rug as
being an overall faded blue.31 Now, I am a trichromat, and Bob is a dichromat. This
means that Bob's disposition toward color perception is biologically different from mine,
and, thus, according to Giere, that one cannot adjudicate in terms of
correctness/incorrectness between my perception of the rug and Bob's perception of the
rug. Indeed, Giere claims, the rug itself is not objectively green with a red pattern, but is
only green with a red pattern from the perspective of the trichromat. From the perspective
30
Giere cites the phenomenon of metamerism as an example that colors are not necessarily objective.
Humans have relatively poor color discrimination, and a monochromatic light with wavelength around
580nm will produce the same color experience as will an "appropriate mixture" of two monochromatic
wavelengths of 540nm and 640nm respectively. Additionally, the class of metamers for single-wavelength
color includes various, and often radically different, electromagnetic reflectance profiles. See Giere (2006:
21 - 22) and his influence: Churchland (2005).
31
This example is taken from Giere (2006) p. 33.
41
of the dichromat, the rug is intersubjectively a faded blue. Thus, it makes no sense to talk
about the truth of one type of perspective over another. There is no objective framework
from which to say that certain primary qualities are objectively so-and-so without
observation, and observation always imports some kind of perspective (Giere, 2006: 48).
Color vision is then, at best, intersubjectively objective.
We have discussed perspectivism in concern to human observation, now we must
transition to scientific perspectivism. Recall our earlier discussion about models and
constructive realism in Chapter 1 and section 2.1, specifically in concern to theory
structure. Now, a theory structure is the family or cluster of models that compose a
specific scientific research program. Giere's perspectivism, as far as I can tell, takes its
"view" from the perspective of a given theory structure. This is to say that when one has
the intention of utilizing the theory structure of Newtonian mechanics to explain some
phenomenon x, then one has a Newtonian perspective of x. However, say that for some
reason one wanted to view phenomenon x (where x is some kind of light phenomenon) as
being a wave entity instead of a ballistic-particle entity; one might then wish to take a
different perspective of x that does not involve a ballistic-particle interpretation of x (as
would Newtonian mechanics). Giere here makes a helpful analogy to maps, where he
states that the intentional use of a given scientific perspective (as determined by the
relevant theory structure) is akin to selecting a map (Giere, 2006: 77 - 80). Certain maps
show more topography, and are more helpful when considering backpacking trips or
vacation destinations to the mountains. However, certain maps focus more on roadways
and highways, allowing one to better plan one's travel. Depending on one's intentions,
42
one selects a given map that better represents the target phenomenon (or task). According
to Giere, science is very much the same in that it adopts a certain perspective that has a
"better fit" to explain the target phenomenon. However, a scientific perspective can draw
upon various research programs at one time (the perspective can utilize and combine the
models of different theory structures in order to create a new perspective for whatever
intention the perspective is needed for). One could, then, use Darwinian evolutionary
models within a cosmological theory structure, thus altering the traditional cosmological
theory structure and slightly changing the perspective of the inquiry.
2. Perspectives are an asymmetric interaction between human (biological, cognitive,
social) factors and the world.
This point is actually quite simply illustrated: humans have a perspective of the
world, but the world has no perspective on humans (Giere, 2006: 32). The asymmetry is
then from humans to world without the relationship being reciprocal. The world neither
attempts to compute us humans in any kind of cognitive sense, nor does it have any
intention of attempting to represent humans in any sense. The world, in Giere's view, just
doesn't care about us at all. We, on the other hand, very much care about the world. We
have intentions that help us form specific representations about the world and, in
addition, these intentions are computed in various fashions. The computations referred to
in the preceding sentence are what provide our perspectives, and they are mostly
influenced by our biological dispositions, the distributed cognitive systems we participate
in (like the one referred to in the previous section), and the social interactions of which
we partake.
43
3. Perspectives are partial and of limited accuracy.
Giere contends that perspectives are always partial (Giere, 2006: 48), that is, that
any given perspective at any given time is only a partial representation of all that is going
on around the perceiver. Giere contends that there is no scientific perspective that can
possibly encompass and explain everything in its scope. Indeed, Giere goes as far as to
call for an abandonment of the search for absolute truths.32 Instead, what science can do
is give a partial and perspectival representation of a limited range of phenomena at any
given time, depending upon the intention of the agent or agents responsible. What this
means is as follows below.
I want to again appeal to the notion of a theory structure as being that from which
a perspective is derived. When a theory structure is applied with the intention of
explaining a given phenomenon or set of phenomena, the perspective is automatically
constrained by the exemplary models. This constraint allows scientists to select a theory
appropriate for the representational task at hand. Now, there are sundry exemplary
models which characterize theory structures, however, there is no fact or absolute truth
behind them: they are, at best, very good approximations (Giere 1988 and 2006). If one
wants to represent the kinematics of a certain class of relatively low-speed ballisticparticle phenomena as traveling through otherwise empty space, then one can easily
implement the perspective of Newtonian mechanics, which includes all of the classical
laws of mechanics. However, if one is attempting to represent a class of ballistic-particle
phenomena traveling near or at light speed, then Newtonian mechanics no longer
32
See Giere 2006 pp. 15 and 16.
44
becomes the "best fit" or "best map" for the job, but, instead, a theory structure
characterized by its ability to express ballistic-particle phenomena at near light speed
becomes the best fit.
In every instance of representation in science, the intended phenomenon or
phenomena to be represented is a finite set, either a singleton {x1} or a finite set or class
of entities {x1, x2,..., xn}. Of course, each member of each set can also be seen as itself
being a set, so that when one intends to represent {x1}, where 'x1' is the future trajectory
of space travel of the Andromeda Galaxy, then 'x1' is here itself a set {y1, y2,..., yn} of all
the stars and planetary objects, etc. of the Andromeda Galaxy. However, scientific
representation does not, according to Giere (1988), represent any given phenomenon xi
in its totality. What is meant by this is that when science aims to represent some xi, it is
not the case that science is actually representing the sum total of the class of phenomena
that make up xi, but often what is represented is an idealization or generalization of xi
(Giere 1988: 90 - 91). This is the kind of partial representation that is important to Giere's
theory: the phenomenon being represented is never the phenomenon in its totality.
Further, the phenomenon being represented is being represented from a particular
perspective, while other perspectives will represent the phenomenon differently.
This account of partial representation means that we can only have a limited
amount of accuracy in scientific predictions, for as we represent a phenomenon in an
ideal or generalized way and from within a particular perspective, we limit how much
information is actually put into any theoretical predictions, thus making much of science
45
a matter of approximation.33 Since models represent by approximation, abstraction, or
generalization, and since models are the means in which phenomena becomes represented
within a certain perspective (the perspective of the model), it follows that models only
partially represent phenomena, and in a limited way.
4. Perspectives are neither objectively correct nor uniquely veridical.
and
5. Scientific truth-claims are relative to a perspective and are about the fittingness of
perspectives.
Points (4) and (5) are intimately connected, thus I will here deal with them
together. Recall the above example about Giere's stance on the perspectival domains of
the trichromat versus the dichromat. Recall that, as I worded the example, I was a
trichromat and saw the rug as being both green and red. Even though in the example my
perspective of color was delimited to a certain range (due to my biological disposition),
that range holds intersubjectively among all of my fellow trichromats. This is to say that
if you are a trichromat, then you can see, for the most part, the same spectrum of colors
that I can see. Now, let us presume that one of my roommates (not Bob) who is a
trichromat walks into my room and asks what color my Cleveland Indians ball cap is.34 I
respond that it is blue and red. My roommate, if he is telling the truth that is, will most
likely agree with me that the ball cap is indeed blue and red. Presuming that the lighting
in my room is adequate and that both my roommate and I are standing in a position that
33
See Giere (1988) pp. 80 - 82, and 102 -103. Notice that although Giere does not approve of the notion of
approximate truth (see section 2.3), he is more than fine utilizing the notion of approximation in concern to
similarity. More on this in Chapter 3.
34
I am here continuing to take on Giere's stance on the philosophy of color, though must note that Giere's
stance is not my own.
46
allows us to view the ball cap with equal lighting, there should be little controversy
between my roommate and I about the color of my ball cap. This kind of objective
agreement between two agents of whom are dispositionally similar in that (i) their ability
to perceive some phenomenon x is fundamentally the same and (ii) there are no
contingent factors of which might alter the mechanism for perceiving x (such as lighting
source) is what Giere means by intersubjective objectivity. If I were to get every single
individual within the graduate department that I belong to, and place my Cleveland
Indians ball cap on a desktop under a singular white incandescent bulb and ask each
person to write down the color of the ball cap on a piece of paper, wouldn't it be rather
surprising if one of the individuals wrote something like ''pink and green"? It indubitably
would, and this kind of objective agreement from within a shared perspective is the kind
of intersubjectivity that is important to Giere's notion of perspectivism.
Perspectives are indeed not uniquely veridical nor objectively correct. Thus, the
method of selecting a certain perspective or theory structure depends not upon unique
truth claims formulated by hypotheses, but upon how well a theory structure "fits" the
phenomena it is intended to represent.35 Thus, Giere's notion of similarity comes into
play.
Scientists select a theory structure, or perspective, that is closest in similarity to
the phenomenon it is intended to represent. Recall the previous example above about
maps; we select a certain map with the intention for it to represent a target phenomenon.
35
As mentioned earlier, Giere gives no real criterion for fitness. Indeed, Giere writes "Representing aspects
of real systems... does not require the existence of a general measure of similarity... I doubt that there exists
any uniquely justifiable measure of this type" (Giere 2006: 64).
47
The same is true for theory structures (or at least this is Giere's claim). Recall our earlier
example about representing light as a ballistic-particle phenomenon or a dynamic wave
phenomenon. The debate about whether light is a particle or wave has gone on since at
least the time of Newton and Huygens, however, one might ask which better
characterizes light. Typically, in contemporary science, one represents light relative to the
system being employed, e.g. electromagnetic spectrum, photoelectric effect, etc. Now,
when dealing with light in terms of the electromagnetic spectrum, light commonly acts as
if it is a wave, and thus we utilize the models of light as a dynamic wave phenomenon.
Whereas, as Einstein did with the photoelectric effect, when electrons are emitted from
solids, liquids or gases when they absorb energy from light, the resulting photoelectrons
are projected as ballistic-particle phenomena. Thus, depending on what degree of
similarity is desired, one selects a representational perspective of a given phenomenon
that is best "fitted" for the type of representation needed.
6. Representation is a quadratic, not dyadic relation.
Point (6) has been hinted at this entire section: the manner in which scientific
representation occurs is quadratic, not (as is traditional) dyadic. What this means is that
there is a four-place relationship between agent, model, phenomenon/phenomena, and
intention: "S uses X to represent W for purposes P" (Giere, 2006: 60). This brings back
constructivist elements of Giere's theory, for it is the agent, i.e. the scientist or group of
scientists, doing the representing who constructs the actual representation. The
scientist/agent S constructs a model X within a certain perspective/theory structure h for
the intention P of representing a particular phenomenon W. Thus we might say that "S
48
uses X as a model of h to represent W for purpose P." It is still a quadratic relation, but
now also emphasizes that X is a theoretical model from within some perspective h.
Representation thus begins with scientists and their intentions to represent some
phenomenon/phenomena (Giere, 2006: 60 - 63). The perspective from which the
phenomenon/phenomena will be represented is thus determined by the intention, or
purpose, of representation. If one intends to represent blackbody radiation, one typically
resolves to use the photoelectric effect in which photoelectrons are ballistic-particle
phenomena. Mutatis mutandis for the electromagnetic spectrum being represented as
waves. Now, as Giere emphasizes, whichever or whatever way scientists choose to
represent a given phenomenon x does not make one perspective concerning x more
uniquely correct than another. Indeed, much like the example of trichromats and
dichromats, the perspective from which we represent x is merely a different perspective:
neither is more correct than the other. Since theory structures, and thus perspectives, are
constructions created by scientists, and since any and all truth claims made about the
theoretical models of a theory structure are true or false only from within the perspective
of the relevant theory structure, there is no situation where one perspective can be
uniquely more true than another. Instead, the focus shifts to mapping the similarity of a
particular perspective onto a physical system. If one perspective p1 is more similar to
represent x than is another perspective p2, then p1 is the more appropriate choice. Again,
the criterion for choosing fitness and judging similarity is vague in Giere's account, yet
his method of model selection (see section 2.3) favors instrumentalist values. Thus we
have what Giere claims to be his stance on realism: Scientists have a target phenomenon/
49
phenomena to be represented; the perspective in which the target
phenomenon/phenomena is represented depends upon the fit of a constructed theory
structure; a theoretical model is designed and hypotheses about that model are then
formulated; a collection of test data is collected as model data to which the predictions of
the relevant model can be compared against relative to the perspective being used (the
theoretical model will itself be constrained by the theory structure being utilized); and
finally, scientific claims are made based upon the resulting information from the model
data and its comparison to the predictions of the model, from which one can say that from
within the perspective of such-and-such theory structure, this-and-that is true. What Giere
hopes makes him a realist (a moderate/non-objectivist realist) is that Giere is committed
to the idea that there is an independent and external world (Giere, 2006: 88), and that
science aims to represent that world to certain degrees and respects (Giere, 1988: 7) from
within a perspectival context.
The next chapter will focus on issues concerning what exactly scientific realism
is, including an analysis of external-world realism versus scientific realism. In the next
chapter, I will be arguing that Giere is not, indeed, a scientific realist; though he may be a
common sense realist about the external world, his account of the structure and nature of
scientific theories leans him far more onto the side of the relativist than the realist.
CHAPTER III
PROBLEM WITH RONALD GIERE'S PERSPECTIVAL
REALISM AND SUGGESTED REVISIONS
The last chapter outlined Ronald Giere's version of MTC as well as presented
Giere's version of realism within his conception of MTC. In this chapter, I will attempt to
scrutinize Giere's realist stance in the following ways. To begin, the sundry variants of
versions of scientific realism calls for a brief conceptual analysis of what scientific
realism is, with particular attention being paid to Giere's version of scientific realism. 36
The argument which I will push in concern to Giere's version of scientific realism is as
follows: that Giere's own requirements for scientific realism are indeed conducive toward
a naive external world realist position; however his actual approach -- that is, his version
of MTC -- fails to satisfy his own requirements for scientific realism.
Several issues of Giere's MTC conception will be analyzed in relation to the
above argument, specifically the following: the manner in which theoretical models are
constructed and used as well as their continuity of usage within Giere's conception of
MTC; the manner in which models are used as partial representations of real/physical
systems as well as the relationship of similarity Giere posits to adhere between models
and the physical world; and, of course, Giere's perspectivism. What I hope to convince
36
Indeed, Anjan Chakravartty (2007) jokes that it is not the case that there are as many versions of
scientific realism as there are scientific realists, but that there are probably as many versions of scientific
realism as there are both scientific realists and anti-realists alike! Chakravartty's jest comically puts forth
the difficulty in characterizing exactly what it is to be a scientific realist.
50
51
the reader of is that although Giere advocates a (moderate) realist position, his version of
MTC is actually far more conducive toward a relativistic position given the fact that (1)
Giere's own criteria for scientific realism are not satisfied by his own account, (2) the
relationship between the perspective of a theory structure and a real system is far too
vague under Giere's current usage of the similarity relationship, and (3) that Giere's
encapsulated perspectivism creates a system of relative perspectival dependency of
concern to factual claims made about real systems.
SECTION 3.1
Let us then begin our inquiry by briefly examining the notion of scientific realism.
In order to examine what scientific realism is, we must first demarcate scientific realism
from what Michael Devitt (2008) refers to as common-sense realism. This conceptual
distinction between scientific realism and common sense realism is a rather important
point that I think is often overlooked by many philosophers of science. Michael Devitt
(2008) rightly makes the point that before one can accept scientific realism, one must first
accept external world realism or, as he calls it, "common-sense realism" (Devitt, 2008:
226). I agree heartily with Devitt's claim, however, I would like to put more emphasis on
the distinction than does Devitt. The reason for the emphasis on this distinction will
become clear as we examine Giere's own criteria for scientific realism against his actual
methodology.
52
What I am here referring to as external world realism is nothing more than the
metaphysical doctrine of accepting the existence of a sensible37 world that is not
dependent upon the mind. However, scientific realism, at least as how I am using it,38
requires the addition of at least three more steps: (1) scientific realism also implies that in
addition to the mind-independent existence of a sensible world, the scientific realist is
also committed to the existence of a non-sensible world of phenomena, e.g. the subatomic
world; (2) scientific realism must also be committed to the idea that, to quote Anjan
Chakravartty (2007), "scientific theories correctly describe the nature of a mindindependent world... a [nature] that does not depend on minds, human or otherwise"
(Chakravartty, 2007: 4. Italics are my own)39; (3) scientific realism cannot be (entirely)
committed to relativism.
Thus, in order for one to be a scientific realist, one must be committed to the idea
that there is indeed a mind-independent world and that this world is describable by
scientific theories. The real question is then "how does science describe this mindindependent world?" Many philosophers claiming to be scientific realists have developed
extensive answers to this question, and the crux of their answer always, not surprisingly,
hinges upon the relationship of which they posit to hold between scientific theories and
the external world.
37
By 'sensible' I here mean anything that can be humanly sensed without instrumental aid.
I am here using a notion of scientific realism that is mostly influenced by Michael Devitt and Anjan
Chakravartty. From Devitt (2008) I draw (1), from Chakravartty (2007) I draw (2).
39
To qualify Chakravartty's statement, when he says "correctly describes a mind-independent world" he is
couching the statement within the practice of approximate truth. One could instead replace Chakravartty's
statement with the following: "scientific realists aspire to theories that describe the mind-independent world
to at least a high degree of approximation."
38
53
Given the above account of scientific realism, one can easily see how it is
possible for one to be a realist without being a scientific realist. The scientific realist is
committed to the idea that science aspires to represent a mind-independent reality. One
could instead accept common-sense realism and deny the representational role of science
in concern to a mind-independent world, favoring instead a different method of
explanation. Further, there are theoretical, directly unobservable, entities postulated by
science to which the radical empiricist might deny on the basis of the seemingly occult
nature of these entities. This is to say that one might accept the representational role of
scientific models purporting to describe observable entities (e.g. rocks and chairs) yet
reject those models purporting to represent objects on the basis of non-observable entities
(e.g. the Higgs boson, electrons, germs, etc.).40 However, this is not to say that the
scientific realist need be a reductionist in concern to the structure of reality; it does mean
that the scientific realist must be committed to the representational role of models
projecting the existence of unobservable entities: unobservable phenomena are at least a
part of the mind-independent world.
Giere gives his own version of what scientific realism is. In his 1988 book
Explaining Science, Giere tells us that scientific realism is the view that "...when a
scientific theory is accepted, most elements of the theory are taken as (in some respects
and to some degree) [representing] aspects of the world" and that an anti-realist view of
science is when "...theories are accepted for some nonrepresentational virtue... or for very
limited representational virtues such as "problem solving effectiveness"" (Giere, 1988: 7).
40
A radical empiricist such as Nelson Goodman or Bas van Fraassen is most often compelled toward an
instrumentalist conception of science.
54
What Giere has in mind as being a kind of nonrepresentational virtue, or a very limited
kind of representational virtue, is the kind of empiricist line espoused by van Fraassen in
The Scientific Image, where van Fraassen perpetuates the notion of empirical adequacy, a
doctrine of which makes no commitments to the truth or a belief in the reality of
scientific theories but instead values scientific theories for their ability to "save the
phenomenon," i.e. to simply explain the phenomenon consistently and in an operationally
acceptable manner.41 We shall see in this chapter a strong similarity between Giere and
van Fraassen, which again brings into question the veracity of Giere's scientific realist
stance.
Giere's definition of scientific realism is somewhat vague: after all, what is the
demarcating line between adequate means of representation? The claim that scientific
realism is a stance in which scientific theories are seen as representational of aspects of
the world needs to be further qualified than Giere's usage of "to some respects and to
some degree."42 Since Giere is advocating some kind of demarcating line between
adequate means of representation and inadequate means of representation, and since
operational and instrumental values are not efficient enough to be representational in
Giere's account, it follows that Giere needs to qualify the degree of representation in
science.
In principle, scientific realists should, indeed, be committed to the idea that
scientific theories do represent the external world in some respect and to some degree,
however, the problem is to qualify what exactly respects are and, even more so, what the
41
42
For more on Giere's stance toward van Fraassen, see Giere 2005.
The problem of respects and degree of representation will become more apparent in section 3.2.
55
degree of representation is. (The degree of representation, in Giere's account, is the
degree of similarity between a model and real system.). Further, given that Giere's modus
operandi in using similarity as his relation of representation, and given the vagueness of
the relation of similarity, one must ask whether or not Giere's MTC theory actually does
value the representational role of theories or whether he actually values their problem
solving capability. This question shall be the topic of the next section.
SECTION 3.2
Anjan Chakravartty (2001 and 2010) has two rather cogent and compelling
criticism of Giere's MTC approach. 43 Chakravartty (2001) claims that Giere's omission
of an informative, non-arbitrary, and meaningful relationship between models and
language must be supplemented with a relationship that is less ambiguous than Giere's
cryptic usage of similarity. Indeed, Chakravartty contests that it does not matter how
many models one stacks in-between a theory structure and a real system, ultimately some
meaningful form of linguistic valuation must come into play (Chakravartty, 2001: 335).
One cannot merely say that the valuation of hypothesis h is true in that h claims model m
represents phenomenon x in such-and-such respects and to such-and-such a degree of
similarity as is stated by the hypothesis.44 The vagueness of degrees of similarity allows
for ambiguity when evaluating whether or not the hypothesis is indeed true. A hypothesis
43
The first of Chakravartty's criticisms will be relevant here in section 3.2. The second criticism has been
saved for Section 3.3, where I discuss Giere's perspectivism and its tendency toward relativism.
44
Recall that the respects in which a model can represent phenomena is determined by the model itself.
This is to say that a model about predator-prey relations cannot model electromagnetic waves, for the
predator-prey model says nothing about electromagnetic waves. The degree of similarity is then how much
or little similarity the model has in its relevant respect of representing the target phenomenon.
56
might say that m has a high degree of similarity to x, but Giere never tells us what that
means!
Giere (1988) is actually rather ambiguous about the importance of theoretical
hypotheses. He claims that theoretical hypotheses are "statement[s] asserting some sort of
relationship between a model and a designated real system" but that the relation itself of
which holds between model and real system is not linguistic and thus cannot have a truthvalue (Giere, 1988: 80). According to Giere, the role that truth-valuation plays in regard
to theoretical hypotheses is a role of characterization. Imagine a scientist who has
formulated the following hypothesis: "Model m represents phenomenon x in certain
respects and to a high degree of similarity." Now, briefly setting aside the problem of
vagueness in concern to similarity, let us imagine that the valuation of the scientist's
hypothesis is true. What does that mean to Giere? The valuation of the scientist's
hypothesis is affirming or denying an existence claim about the relationship between the
model and the phenomenon, that is, the scientist's hypothesis is stating nothing more than
that there is (or is not) some kind of similarity between m and x: "To claim a hypothesis
is true is to claim no more or less than that an indicated type and degree of similarity
exists between a model and a real system. We can therefore forget about truth and focus
on the details of the similarity" (ibid, 81). The role of the truth valuation of a theoretical
hypothesis is then nothing more than allowing one to characterize, i.e. allow one to talk
about, the fact that there exists a relationship between model and real system, and that
relationship is one of such-and-such respect to such-and-such degree of similarity. The
57
hypothesis is asserting the scope of the representation as well as the degree of similarity.
The real problem is, then, how to make sense of Giere's notion of similarity.
The greatest threat to Giere's notion of similarity is indeed its opaque and vague
nature. Giere's (2006) attempt to ameliorate this problem comes by way of his
introduction of agent intention. Recall that, for Giere, scientific representation is a
quadratic relation: S uses M to represent X for purposes Y. Now, 'M' is some model or
conjunction of models of which is meant to represent a real system. The intention of the
agent/scientist -- signified by the 'Y' in the above quadric -- is meant to hone the degree of
similarity to hold between M and X. Giere wants to leave the representational
relationship between M and X (the phenomena being targeted) as being directly
dependent upon the degree of similarity between M and X. Theoretical hypotheses, in
Giere's system, are the tools which scientists use to characterize what degree of similarity
they are intending to use M to represent X.
Giere's emphasis on agent intention seems to import some importance to
theoretical hypotheses above characterization, since the representational force of the
similarity relation is now joined with the agent's desire to represent. The role of similarity
is now qualified as the role of similarity according to the intention of the agent doing the
representing. The degree of similarity between a model and real system might
(presumably) actually be higher than the intention of the agent. However, the truth of the
hypothesis is only evaluated relative to the agent's intention to represent the target
phenomena to such-and-such degree as specified by the agent.
58
The problem with introducing agent intention as a means of qualifying similarity
is, as Chakravartty argues, that without some kind of objective manner of adjudication
between degrees of similarity, Giere's system falls into either relativism or
instrumentalism, the former case being an account in which degrees of similarity vary
and are evaluated relative to the intention of individual scientists, the latter case being
that all we are here doing is affirming that the model is adequately successful based on
the intentional performance criteria set by the agent -- in a sense saving the phenomena,
which is exactly what Giere does not consider to be a realist stance from his own
definition as given above (Chakravartty, 2001: 335). The degree of similarity is either
relative to the intention of the agent (and would thus not be completely independent of
theoretical hypotheses) or the degree of similarity is being valued for the representational
role desired by the agent, meaning that what becomes important when testing the
hypothesis is that the resulting data is explanatorily successful within the intentional
scope of the agent.
The problem with Giere's claim is that the measurement of similarity between a
model in relevant respect to a class of targeted phenomena as a degree of "highs" and
"lows" cannot be resolved by the inclusion of agent intention as Giere has argued. Indeed,
the inclusion of agent intention as a way of attempting to hone degrees of similarity
might actually make the case worse off in concern to scientific realism. The agent is the
one who constructs the hypothesis claiming that M is similar to X to such-and-such a
degree. Imagine a scientist who is trying to represent a game of pool. That scientist must
construct a hypothesis which specifies his/her intention to represent the game of pool to
59
such-and-such a degree of similarity: that such-and-such models represent the physics of
the game of pool to such-and-such a degree of intended similarity. However, what
models would best map a game of pool, Newtonian or Einstein's relativity? Both
Newtonian mechanic's and Einstein's mechanics can account for ballistic-particle
phenomena, so the respects of either group of models is consistent with the target
phenomena. How does one measure which group of models has the highest degree of
similarity in Giere's system? The answer is that there cannot be a way to tell which theory
structure is best suited to represent a game of pool in Giere's system, because agent
intention doesn't actually resolve the problem of which group of models is really most
similar to the target real system. The degree of similarity is actually relative to the agent's
intention. In order to be a scientific realist, Giere needs to either give us a satisfactory
(non-linguistic framework) account of the manner in which one adjudicates degrees of
similarity between models and the real world, or Giere needs to invoke some kind of
linguistic framework that explicitly spells out the valuation rules that compel one to
select model M1 over model M2 when attempting to represent some phenomena X.
Chakravartty's dubiety about the plausible tenability of Giere's notion of similarity
is a reasonable challenge lobbied against Giere. The rigor and diligence of the logical
positivists in their attempt to construct correspondence rules linking observational terms
to theoretical terms ultimately fell apart partially due to the very rigor and diligence that
the positivist program demanded. Giere, who is well aware of the shortcomings of the
positivist program, perhaps tries to remove his system too far from some kind of
meaningful syntactical valuation. Giere is more than justified in rejecting the positivists'
60
syntactic-semantic structure; however, the alternative MTC program which Giere has
proposed is far too loose, and as a consequence slips into new pitfalls of his own digging.
An interesting note to make before I close this section comes from Stathis Psillos
(2003) who, for his own reasons, translates Giere's idea of similarity into approximate
truth. Psillos does not actually give an argument for this, and prima facie I am inclined to
disagree with Psillos on the basis of Giere's rejection of approximate truth as well as
Giere's insistence that theoretical hypotheses play a more restricted role in his system.
However, if Giere were to introduce a form of approximate truth as a means of
adjudicating similarity, then he may perhaps be able to dig himself out of the pit he put
himself in. Anjan Chakravartty's treatment of approximate truth in his book A
Metaphysics For Scientific Realism presents a form of approximate truth where he
develops a notion of approximate truth as being realized "...by means of different
representational relationships, involving true descriptions of concrete structures in some
cases, and little more than successful reference in others" (Chakravartty, 2007: 234).45
Though the point is at best speculative for the moment, Giere could perhaps implement
the notion of similarity within different ranges of descriptions from successful reference
to true descriptions of phenomena. This would allow Giere to utilize his similarity
relation as a kind of guiding principle from which he might go on to add more rigorous
and realistic criteria. If Giere could indeed restructure his notion of similarity to involve
true descriptions as well as successful reference, then the problem of selecting between
45
To qualify, when Chakravartty is here speaking of "successful reference," what he is speaking about is
predictive success, abstract reference (it is true that there are entities that behave as do quarks), etc.
Chakravartty's claim is that there are "...different sorts of truth... within different sorts of scientific
representation" (2007: 231), which does not limit scientific representation to one notion such as similarity.
61
competing models could perhaps be assuaged (though perhaps not entirely fixed). One
might say that one group of models successfully refers to more phenomena and/or truly
describes certain concrete phenomena within the targeted domain than do competing
models.
Although Giere's account of similarity is ultimately inadequate as a scientific
realist description of the relationship of representation between models and the real world
-- and is also prone to a strong relativist interpretation as Chakravartty has suggested -- it
is a problem that Giere could at least potentially overcome (by introducing some kind of
linguistic valuation directly linking to the concrete world). However, we have one aspect
of Giere's MTC approach that still need touched on: his perspectivism. In the next
section, I will attempt to show that Giere's perspectivism is, as Chakravartty would call it,
a "philosophically controversial" kind of perspectivism of which lends itself toward
relativism.
SECTION 3.3
Chakravartty's second criticism of Giere's MTC approach comes from
Chakravartty's (2010) work "Perspectivism, Inconsistent Models, and Contrastive
Explanation." In this paper, Chakravartty distinguishes between what he calls
"philosophically controversial perspectivism" and "philosophically non-controversial
perspectivism." The former is characterized by Chakravartty as being restricted to the
claim that perspectival facts are "all that can be known" (Chakravartty, 2010: 406). This
is to say that philosophically controversial perspectivism claims either that there are no
62
non-perspectival facts in the world, or that non-perspectival facts are simply beyond our
grasp in any way, shape, or form. 46 Either case of controversial perspectivism ('CP'
henceforth), Chakravartty argues, debases into a form of anti-realism or relativism. The
former case constructs the world as conditioned and determined in-itself by perspectival
facts, while the latter restricts knowledge claims to the conditions of encapsulated
perspectives while denying our ability to escape the encapsulated perspectives and
achieve objective knowledge about the actual world. Both cases of CP deny the idea that
there can be any objective truth about the world.
There is, however, according to Chakravartty, a non-controversial version of
perspectivism ('NP' henceforth) which utilizes the idea of isomorphically extensional
perspectival truths to obtain non-perspectival, i.e. objective, truth values. We will expand
upon the third version later in this section; however, presently I want to motivate the
claim that Giere's perspectivism is a kind of CP.
Giere contends that "...truth claims are always relative to a perspective" (Giere,
2006: 81). Further, in regard to multiple perspectives, Giere adds the following: "The
knowledge that we get comes from one perspective or another, not from no perspective at
all" (ibid: 92). Recall that in Giere's version of MTC theory structures provide distinct
and separate perspectives of which are incapable of being adjudicated against one
another. Further, all claims made by theoretical hypotheses have their truth valuations
considered solely in respect to agent intention and to the perspective from which the
theoretical hypotheses are invoking. For example, let's say that we have two different
46
'Facts' here as Chakravartty is using the word, denotes any true proposition (Chakravartty, 2010: 407).
63
theory structures T1 and T2. Now, each of these theory structures consists of a set of
models; we can shorthand the set of models for T1 as M1 and the set of models for T2 as
M2. As Giere (1988) tells us, a theoretical hypothesis asserts redundantly true valuations
as specified by the models. This is to say that for some model mi that belongs to either M1
or M2, mi will have innate restrictions on what could possibly be true or false within the
model. Further, any set of claims which do not map onto relations between or among
models and real systems are neither true nor false in respect to their mapping relation;
they are nonsense from within the given context.
Given the above information, it is not hard to see how Giere has set up a version
of CP. Remember that CP claimed that there were either no non-perspectival facts or that
science does not have access to non-perspectival facts. Now, the important point to
remember is that we are here examining Giere's scientific realism, not his external world
realism in general. Recall from the first chapter that Giere explicitly denies that science is
a search for objective truth, that indeed the scientific enterprise cannot and should not
even entertain the idea that there is an objective truth to be found but that all scientific
knowledge is derived from within a scientific, model-theoretic, perspective. Since it is the
case that Giere contends that there cannot be any form of objective truth in science, and
since it is the case that knowledge is instead delimited to encapsulated model-theoretic
perspectives -- again, recall the fact that perspectives have their own unique truth
valuations and that they cannot be adjudicated with one another -- it follows that Giere's
MTC theory is philosophically controversial; for, regardless of whether or not Giere does
64
believe that there is a world of objective facts independent of scientific scrutiny, scientific
knowledge, in Giere's theory, is bound to encapsulated perspectives.
What Giere has then is a system that is delimited to perspectival knowledge in the
sense that any and all claims of knowledge coming from scientific contexts can only
come from one perspective or another. There are, then, no non-perspectival kinds of truth
in Giere's system. After all, recall that Giere wants to do away with the idea that truth
claims are relevant in scientific contexts and instead replace it with his notion of
similarity (which, as we saw in Section 3.2, ended up being a rather untenable approach
as formulated). Further, Giere's contention that scientists intend to represent a target
phenomenon by means of a selected perspectivism, coupled with the idea that truth
claims are only warranted relative to whatever perspective they are being formulated
within, and that science represent the target phenomena from within the partial scope of
the relevant perspective means that there is no scientific knowledge that is not
perspectival.
The partiality of scope of a theory structure, i.e. the intentional target of which a
theory structure is being used to represent, sets limits on what can and cannot be known,
and Giere's claims that truth valuations are always and necessarily linked with a given
perspective further sets limits on what can possibly be known in science. There is no
scientific knowledge beyond a scientific perspective for Giere, thus making Giere an
adherent of the kind of CP as outlined above.
Giere's stance easily slips toward relativism, as perspectives are incomparable,
truth relative, scope-dependent, and unassertive of any possible non-perspectival
65
knowledge. However, even though Giere's perspectivism does orient his position toward
relativism, there is still the possibility of saving Giere's MTC from being a full-blown
relativist approach, and that possibility actually comes in the form of what Chakravartty
calls a "non-philosophically controversial version" of perspectivism.
Chakravartty (2010) attempts to motivate a kind of perspectivism that allows for
cross-perspectival fact evaluation by means of the modal dispositions of scientific
properties. Chakravartty claims that in the case where non-perspectival facts underlie
perspectival facts, perspectivism is uncontroversial, i.e. it does not lend itself toward
relativism (Chakravartty, 2010: 406). Chakravartty gives the example of he and another
observer who are oriented to observe a man named Peter from within separate spatial
perspectives. This is what Chakravartty has to say:
...there are non-perspectival facts of the matter about the
dimensions of Peter in our inertial reference frame that, in
conjunction with facts about optics and my visual sensory
apparatus, underwrite the differences in the appearance of
his size. There is a height that he is, and then many ways he
may appear to be from different perspectives.
(Chakravartty, 2010: 406).
Chakravartty's claim is that, in addition to the perspectival knowledge that Peter
seems short to one observer, there is also the non-perspectival knowledge of how tall
Peter actually is. Now, by removing encapsulation from perspectives and considering a
kind of isomorphism, one can adjudicate, according to Chakravartty, between
66
perspectives. Chakravartty states that "[a] non-perspectival fact about a target system is
thus a proposition that is true, independently of any particular perspective one may take
with respect to it; it is true across perspectives" (Chakravartty, 2010: 407). There is then a
division of the perspectival world, which has any propositions about Peter as dependent
upon the relevant perspective, and a non-perspectival world that can be given to us by the
combined facts found within the sciences. According to Chakravartty, the agents and
instruments of science have limited/partial scopes due to their innate dispositions,
however, even though these agents and instruments have only a partial scope from which
they can intend to represent some phenomenon, like Peter's height, this fact does not
preclude the fact that there is, indeed, a definite way in which the target phenomenon
actually is. Further, as Chakravartty goes on to say, science reveals these dispositional
facts about the target phenomenon (Chakravartty, 2010: 409). These dispositional facts
have, according to Chakravartty, the same truth value across perspectives. This is to say
that if some thing x is fragile then it has certain dispositional factors of which make it
fragile from whatever perspective that is being used. It is this kind of cross-perspective
agreement that Chakravartty wants to see from Giere in order for him to label Giere as a
(moderate) realist.
SECTION 3.4
In Sections 3.1 and 3.2, we saw relativistic tendencies within Giere's notion of the
similarity relationship he posits to hold between models and the real world as well as his
version of perspectivism which has left him floating in waters too close to the Charybdis
67
of relativism. However, I have briefly suggested some variations -- inspired by Anjan
Chakravartty -- to both Giere's notion of similarity as well as his notion of perspectivism
of which might be able to save Giere from relativism and bring him into the household of
the scientific realists where he wants to be. Let me then summarize what we have gone
through so far.
Giere's notion of similarity was an attempt to alleviate the importance of truth
valuation in concern to the relationship between model representation and real systems.
However, we found that Giere's notion of similarity is far too vague and, as a response to
the vagueness of his similarity relation, Giere imported the notion of agent intention as a
means of clarifying degrees of similarity. The problem, of course, with Giere's revision is
that it leads toward relativism. Since truth is evaluated solely within the context of the
intention of the scientist and the perspective the scientist is choosing to work from, what
ends up being true in scientific discourse is relative to the perspective of the agent's
intention.
The suggested revision of which I proposed was to adopt a notion of approximate
truth instead of utilizing similarity as well as adopt a version of NP, i.e. philosophically
non-controversial perspectivism . Instead of adopting agent intention, and thus making
truth values relative in the manner mentioned above, one might instead adopt a notion of
approximate truth that is accepted across perspectives. A non-perspectival truth is then a
proposition that is true regardless of which relevant perspective is adopted. For instance,
one might take several perspectives regarding a particular phenomenon. The collected
data in concern to that phenomenon would serve as a kind of observable fact (at least
68
until more data or contradictory data turns up). The several perspectives representing the
phenomenon could then perhaps be judged by some kind of representational role such as
extensional isomorphism.
As an example, if each of the above mentioned perspectives adequately and
equally represents the target phenomenon by means of extensional isomorphism, then one
might say that those perspectives are all equally approximately true about the
phenomenon in terms of extensional reference. If one of the theories fails to be
extensionally isomorphic with the phenomenon or has a smaller range of extension than
do the other models, then we might say that such a model is less approximately true in
terms of extensional isomorphism. Further, extensional isomorphism need not be the only
means of representation in science. Indeed, scientific theories might represent in a variety
of ways with different successes. For instance, Newtonian mechanics might be
approximately true in terms of predictive representation of low speed ballistic-particle
phenomena, while it would be less approximately true in representing near light-speed
ballistic-particle phenomena.
What does this all mean for Giere's version of MTC? Is it doomed to relativism,
or can it be revised and brought back to the table of the scientific realists? Whether or not
the suggestions I have given are adequate measures to save Giere from relativism, the
fact remains that Giere has two very important issues he needs to address before he can
legitimately claim scientific realism: (1) the vagueness of the similarity relation; and (2)
the relativism of his perspectivism. Abandoning, or at least revising, the role that
similarity plays in relation to models and real systems is of utmost importance, for it is
69
from the problem of Giere's similarity relation that the charge of relativism begins to take
form.
Indeed, Giere might be able to claim that he is an external world realist, and I
would not look to contest Giere on that point, however, Giere is claiming that he is a
scientific realist, meaning that he must make some kind of commitment to science being a
non-relativistic means of accurately representing the world. Unfortunately, due to Giere's
insistence on a vague notion of similarity as well as his CP stance on perspectivism,
Giere ends up falling firmly into the relativist camp.
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