California Law Review
Volume 89 | Issue 5
Article 1
October 2001
Recycling Norms
Ann E. Carlson
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Ann E. Carlson, Recycling Norms, 89 Cal. L. Rev. 1231 (2001).
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California Law Review
VOL. 89
OCTOBER 2001
No.5
Copyright © 2001 by California Law Review, Inc.
Recycling Norms
Ann E.Carlsont
The recent explosion of legal scholarshipfocused on the role social
norms play in governing collective behavior has largely omitted intensive
exploration of one important issue: whether social norms can resolve
"large-number,small-payoff"problems of collective action. The resolution
of these problems requires heterogeneous groups of individuals with no
real connection to one another to change their behavior for little or no
economic gain. Many environmental problems are illustrative: energy
overuse, littering,and airpollution. In this Article Professor Carlson examines empirical evidence about a particularlarge-number,small-payoff
collective actionproblem, solid waste reduction through recycling, to determine whether and how social norms work to induce behavioral change
necessary to resolve the problem.
Professor Carlson concludes that despite the optimism among some
scholars about social norm management as a regulatory tool, our national
experiment with recycling suggests that norm creation or management is
by itself not likely to be terribly effective in resolving a large-number,
Copyright © 2001 California Law Review, Inc. California Law Review, Inc. (CLR) is a California
nonprofit corporation. CLR and the authors are solely responsible for the content of their publications.
t
Professor of Law, UCLA School of Law. I thank Rick Abel, Alison Anderson, Mike
Asimow, Steve Bainbridge, George Cardona, Joe Doherty, Bob Ellickson, Jody Freeman, Carole
Goldberg, Laura Gomez, Mitu Gulati, Joel Handler, Rick Hasen, Ken Karst, Russell Korobkin, Jim
Krier, Gillian Lester, Tim Malloy, Carl Moor, Kal Raustiala, Rick Sander, Seana Shiffrin, Kirk Stark,
Buzz Thompson, John Wiley, Steve Yeazell, Jonathan Zasloff and participants at the Stanford-Yale
Junior Faculty Forum, Stanford Law School's Environmental Workshop, the UCLA Law School
Workshop, and the UCLA Junior Group for their comments. I received generous financial support from
the Dean's Fund and the UCLA Council on Research. Lily Chinn, Tim Tree and Dan Hargis provided
extremely helpful research assistance, Wendy Haro provided superb editorial assistance and, as always,
the work of the UCLA Law Library staff was exceptional.
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small-payoff collective action problem if the desired behavioralchange is
relatively inconvenient or requires significant effort. Governments are
likely to have more success in solving such problems through reducing the
amount of effort requiredor by usingfinancialincentives to induce the behavioral change rather than by engaging in efforts to strengthen social
norms. Professor Carlson also concludes that norm management can have
some payoff where a collective action problem requires relatively higheffort behavioralchange if governments or other norm managers can succeed in converting some low or moderate believers in the norm to true believers. The Article shows that norm management efforts that involve faceto-face communication or individualfeedback can have some success in
inducing behavioralchange.
The Article should help governments and other agents of social
change who need to rely on the altruism of many individuals in order to
resolve a social problem by providing an understandingof the relationship
between effort, norms, and financial incentives. The Article also provides
evidence in the ongoing scholarly debate about what motivates compliance
with social norms.
INTRODUCTION
Across the country, hordes of people religiously separate their trash
from recyclable materials, and often their recyclables from one another,
and either place them at curbside or drive them to the nearest drop-off
center. In most jurisdictions their efforts are voluntary, and many (perhaps
most) recyclers receive no compensation for their efforts. In rational economic terms, most individuals probably should not recycle: the costs
(time, labor, storage space) surely exceed the monetary benefits. What,
then, motivates their behavior?
An intuitively appealing answer is that a social norm in favor of recycling is at work. Recyclers get either intrinsic satisfaction for doing the
right thing, approval from friends and neighbors for their environmentally
correct behavior, or both. At least one prominent legal scholar has offered
this explanation for recycling behavior,' and another uses recycling as an
example of the way in which social norms operate.2 And several scholars
embrace government "social norms management" as a promising regulatory tool for resolving problems of collective action like recycling: if governments can change the psychic cost or benefit of a particular behavior
without resort to formal law or financial inducements, and hence persuade
1. See Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 CoLUM. L. REv. 903, 906-07
(1996).
2. Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, Development, and Regulation of Norms, 96 MICH. L.
REv. 338, 350 (1997).
2001]
RECYCLING NORMS
large numbers of people to engage in or stop that behavior (wearing seat
belts, using condoms, quitting smoking, recycling solid waste), social
norms management might be a cheap and effective alternative to more tra3
ditional regulatory means.
The viability of norms management as a regulatory approach depends,
however, on the nature of the social problem, the context in which it arises,
and the availability of other regulatory tools. Although recent law and
norms scholarship has engendered optimism that social norms can change
behavior, this may be true only for certain subsets of social problems, such
as those that arise in small, homogenous groups. Indeed much recent law
and norms literature has focused on precisely these types of groups to
demonstrate the power of norms in governing behavior: cattle ranchers
and their neighbors in Shasta County,4 the diamond industry,5 academics in
biochemistry,6 and federal appellate judges.' Yet when resolving a social
problem that requires behavioral change by large numbers of people with
3. See Lawrence Lessig, The New Chicago School, 27 J. OF LEGAL STUD. 661 (1998) (arguing
that a new school of social norms theorists believes that social norms present an alternative form of
regulation that makes activist government more effective); Sunstein, supra note 1, at 918 (suggesting
that "[n]orms can be an especially cheap way of ensuring against the unfortunate consequences of
prisoner's dilemmas"). For an example of norms enthusiasm in the criminal context, see Dan M.
Kahan, Social Influence, Social Meaning,and Deterrence,83 VA. L. REv.349 (1997).
4. See ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHouT LAW: How NEIGHBORS SErrLE DisPtrFs
(1991).
5. See Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal System: ExtralegalContractualRelations in the
Diamond Industry, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 115 (1992).
6. See Arti K. Rai, Regulating Scientific Research: Intellectual PropertyRights and the Norms
ofScience, 94 Nw. U. L. REv. 77 (1999).
7. See Mitu Gulati & C.M.A. McCauliff, On Not Making Lawv, 61 LAw & CoN'rFIP. PROBS.
157 (1998).
The last fifteen years have seen a rather large outpouring of legal scholarship about norms. See,
e.g., Symposium, Law, Economics, and Norms 144 U. PA. L. R. 1643 (1996); Symposium, Social
Norms, Social Meaning, and the Economic Analysis of Law, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 537 (1998);
Symposium, The Legal Construction of Norms, 86 VA. L. Rav. 1577 (2000). As others have pointed
out, however, the interest in norms is hardly new. For early examples, see PHILIP SELZNICK, LAW,
SocrTY AND INDUSrEIAI JUSTICE (1969) (describing the ways in which internal workplace norms
influence collective bargaining); Stewart Macaulay, Non-contractual Relations in Business: A
PreliminaryStudy, 25 AM. Soc. REv.55 (1963) (evaluating relations among Wisconsin businesses and
the indirect ways in which contract law affected informal bargaining); Richard D. Schwartz, Social
Factors in the Development of Legal Control: A Case Study of Two Israeli Settlements, 63 YALE L.J.
471 (1954) (evaluating the forms of social control exercised by an Israeli community with no formal
legal system and comparing it with a community with more elaborate legal structures); June L. Tapp &
Felice J. Levine, Persuasion to Virtue: A PreliminaryStatement, 4 LAW & Soc'y Rav. 565 (1970)
(explaining the development of a norm of law abidingness). See also Mark Tushnet, "Everything Old Is
New Again ": Reflections on the "New Chicago School," 1998 Wis. L. REv. 579, 579 (noting that the
"new" focus on law and norms is "a familiar topic in law and society studies"). Other disciplines, too,
have long studied norms. See JAmEs COLEmAN, FOUNDATIONS OF SocIAL THEORY 241 (1994)
("[Norm] has not one but two entries in the Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences... and one of them
begins with this sentence: 'No concept is invoked more often by social scientists in explanations of
human behavior than "norm."'); McAdams, supra note 2, at 339 (recognizing that "[f]or decades,
sociologists have employed the concept of social norms to explain how society shapes individual
behavior").
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little economic incentive to do so, what I call large-number, small-payoff
collective action problems,8 the power of social norms management to deliver that change may prove more limited than social norms enthusiasts
suggest.
In this Article, I examine empirical evidence about recycling as an
example of a large-number, small-payoff collective action problem to illustrate whether, and to what degree, social norms can induce the behavioral change necessary for resolution of the problem. I argue that for largenumber, small-payoff problems, norms function effectively only under a
narrow set of circumstances. I also demonstrate how social norms can work
in conjunction with other measures to create behavioral change that norms
alone might not produce. While building on the law and norms scholarship,
my argument tempers the most ambitious suggestions of norms enthusiasts.
In addition, the empirical evidence presented here, and the analysis of the
conditions most conducive to effective norms manipulation, should provide
policymakers with a framework for disciplining their often unsystematic
attempts to alter individual behavior through social norms management.
Legal scholars are not alone in thinking that government social norms
management may work to induce behavioral change in order to resolve a
large-number, small-payoff collective action problem. In the recycling
context, for example, governments across the country have used various
means of persuasion to try to increase recycling behavior. Presumably,
these campaigns are meant to persuade people to care more or think
8. Russell Hardin labels problems of this sort "latent" because the individual gain to any
member of the group is likely to be smaller than the individual costs of contributing to the collectivity.
RUSSELL HARDIN, COLLECTivE ACTION 39-40 (1982). Christopher Schroeder uses the term "largenumber, small-scale" problems to describe the same phenomenon, and I borrow and modify it here. See
Christopher Schroeder, Reconsidering Public Choice (Oct. 5, 1999) (unpublished draft, on file with
author). It is worth stressing that I use "small" with respect to the payoff individuals experience from
helping resolve a collective action problem of this sort. The payoff to the collectivity as a whole could
be quite large.
Of course not all behavior at which social norms management is directed fits into either the largenumber, small-payoff category or the small-number, large-payoff category. A number of scholars are
clearly interested in large-number problems, sometimes with little individual payoff, sometimes with
huge individual payoff. Lawrence Lessig, for example, has written about norms and safe sex (large
numbers, big individual payoff), and norms and smoking (same). Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of
Social Meaning, 62 U. CIn. L. REv. 943, 1019, 1025 (1995). But different incentives are at work in the
large-numbers, big individual payoff context, and thus efforts to change behavioral norms are likely to
require different means and achieve different results. This is because the former problems, if resolved,
have direct and large benefits for the person making the behavioral change, including improved health,
reduced risk of contracting an illness, and reduced risk of injury. Moreover, with respect to smoking
and safe sex, those interested in shifting behavior through norm manipulation must contend with strong
internal drives to the contrary. The distinction between these problems and large-number, small-scale
problems suggests that government efforts to shape norms should differ depending on the type of
problem. See infra Part V.
2001]
RECYCLING NORMS
1235
differently about the ways in which they dispose of garbage.' In law and
norms terminology, the persuasive techniques are meant to change individual cost-benefit calculations about whether to recycle by giving people
added psychic benefit for doing the right thing (or added psychic pain for
failing to recycle). New York City, for example, uses ad campaigns featuring Oscar the Grouch and Yankee manager Joe Torre to encourage
household recycling; many states exhort their residents to recycle through
persuasive mailers sent to individual households; state recycling curricula
aimed at young children are commonplace. These government normshaping efforts are hardly new. At the turn of the twentieth century, New
York City engaged in an explicit norm-shaping campaign to persuade people to change their garbage habits by encouraging recycling, and during
World War II, a massive campaign encouraged individual households to
recycle for patriotic reasons.1 °
The enthusiasm for social norms management as a solution to largenumber, small-payoff collective action problems may stem from the fact
that other regulatory methods are often unsatisfactory. When numerous
people must act to solve a collective problem and lack the economic incentive to do so, traditional government regulation, such as formal law, may
be infeasible, ineffectual, or politically difficult. The costs of monitoring
and enforcement can be prohibitively expensive or may raise privacy concerns. Many environmental problems are illustrative: air pollution reduction through carpooling, stormwater pollution prevention, energy
conservation. Nonenvironmental problems such as ensuring higher levels
ofjury service, blood donation, and even voting raise similar difficulties.
Although social norms have developed to resolve collective action
problems among small, economically interdependent groups, social norms
are less likely to develop within large groups. The same characteristics that
make a large-number, small-payoff problem difficult to resolve also make
intergroup social norm development difficult: large numbers of people,
little economic incentive to act, and lack of homogeneity." Government,
9. See Timothy C. Brock et al., Getting a Handle on the Ax of Persuasion: An Introduction, in
PERSUASION: PSYCHOLOGICAL INSIGHTS AND PERSPECTIVES (Sharon Shavitt & Timothy C. Brock eds.,
1994) at 5 ("The key targets of persuasion are our attitudes and opinions.").
10. See supra discussion accompanying notes 91-97.
11. Indeed, several scholars have noted that norm creation itself is a problem of collective action.
Individuals can "free ride" on the benefits of a new norm without having to bear the costs of enforcing
the norm, and if someone tries to establish a norm his efforts may bear no fruit because others have
little incentive to enforce it. See, e.g., McAdams, supra note 2, at 352 (describing norm creation as a
"second order" collective action problem); Lessig, supra note 8, at 998. McAdams and others have
offered theories about why such collective action problems may be relatively easy to overcome. See
McAdams, supra note 2, at 342 (positing that withholding esteem in an effort to create a new norm is
relatively costless); Robert C. Ellickson, The Marketfor Social Norms, 3 AM. LAW & ECON. REv. 1
(2001) (offering a model for how norms emerge); Eric Posner, Symbols, Signals, and Social Norms in
Politicsand the Lmv, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 765 (1998) (positing that norm enforcers have incentives to
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then, may seem the obvious place to turn to create or strengthen social
norms that may the behavior necessary to resolve the problem.
Yet I conclude in this Article that social norms play a much less significant role in encouraging behavior necessary to resolve a large-number,
small-payoff collective action problem than social norms enthusiasts might
believe. Though social norms can, and sometimes do, play a role in encouraging cooperative behavior to resolve large-number, small-payoff
problems, if recycling is any indication, their force is fairly limited. Instead, reducing the effort required to engage in the desired behavior can
have far greater success in increasing the numbers of people who will cooperate over a long period of time than efforts to intensify social norms. In
fact, increasing convenience is so effective that individual commitment
toward the desired behavior bears little relationship to whether someone
will engage in it.
I draw upon empirical evidence to demonstrate the circumstances under which strong social norms can affect the behavior necessary to resolve
a large-number, small-payoff collective action problem. A norm's effectiveness appears to be a function of at least two characteristics: the amount
of individual effort required and how often the behavior must be performed. The strength of commitment to a social norm predicts willingness
to engage in high-effort behavior, and plays some role in the quality of
participation in low-effort behavior, including how often one engages in
the behavior. However, reducing the effort needed to participate in higheffort behavior creates higher gains in long-lasting participation than
strengthening social norms.
Finally, I conclude that governments can strengthen social norms.
Certain methods for doing so, however, will achieve greater success than
others. The most effective means for norm strengthening involve laborintensive, highly personal face-to-face contact, and detailed behavioral
feedback. The payoff from such intervention, nevertheless, remains significantly lower than efforts geared toward making the behavior easier. If my
analysis is accurate, then, resources directed toward norm creation may be
misdirected compared to funds directed toward increasing convenience.
The conclusions I draw from the recycling evidence suggest that significant contextual differences exist among the diverse array of collective
problems for which social norms might work as a solution. While social
norms may work well for certain small, homogenous, and economically
connected groups, and may play a role in resolving large-number, largepayoff problems like smoking and AIDS reduction, they play a much less
significant role in resolving large-number, small-payoff problems. A comprehensive understanding of how norms operate in the context of recycling
enforce to "signal" various messages about themselves to particular audiences and therefore no second
order collective action problem arises).
2001]
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1237
should lead to more effective strategies for intervening in different types of
social problems, strategies that require collective behavioral change for
their resolution, and to a richer, more nuanced theory of how social norms
influence human behavior.
The remainder of this Article proceeds as follows. I begin in Part II
with a definition of social norms, and then discuss why recycling presents a
classic problem of collective action. I also evaluate both empirical evidence finding that groups sometimes work to resolve collective action
problems without external intervention, and experimental evidence about
the circumstances under which people cooperate. Drawing upon this evidence, I describe how governments might shape norm-strengthening efforts. In Part I, I present a short history of recycling, both to give modem
efforts some historical context and to illustrate the ways in which governments have employed norm-shaping strategies to encourage recycling behavior for more than a century. I then describe the structure of recycling
governance and the tools various jurisdictions have adopted to encourage
recycling behavior. In Part IV, I turn to extensive empirical evidence about
why people recycle, and using the theoretical tools developed in Part II, I
evaluate the evidence to determine whether it is consistent with the theoretical literature. I determine that effort-reducing measures achieve by far
the largest increases in recycling behavior, that the strength of social norms
is relevant to whether one will participate in high-effort behavior, and that
norm-strengthening measures that provide face-to-face contact about how
well one is recycling achieve larger gains in participation than more traditional persuasive techniques. I also evaluate the effect of financial incentives on recycling behavior. I conclude in Parts V and VI by describing the
implications for related policy areas such as litter reduction, residential energy conservation, and blood donation, and I suggest directions for future
research.
I
SociAL NORMS,
RECYCLING, AND THE LARGE-NUMBER, SMALL-PAYOFF
COLLECTIVE ACTION PROBLEM
A.
What are Social Norms?
Most of the recent law and norms scholarship takes as its starting
point the widely influential rational choice perspective; law and norms
scholars assume that individuals seek to maximize utility by weighing the
costs and benefits of particular behavioral choices and then act only if the
benefits exceed the costs. 2 Norms enrich rational choice theory by
12. Several of the country's most prominent law and economics scholars, including Robert
Ellickson and Richard Posner, are now writing extensively about the role norms play in shaping
behavior. E.g., ELLICKSON, supra note 4 (1989); Robert C. Ellickson, Law and Economics Discovers
Social Norms, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 537 (1998); Richard Posner, Social Norms and the Law: An
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incorporating into the cost-benefit calculus the psychic costs and benefits
13
individuals experience from complying with or violating norms.
Scholars generally define social norms as nonlegal rules or obligations
that certain individuals feel compelled to follow despite the lack of formal
legal sanctions, whether because defiance would subject them to sanctions
from others (typically in the form of disapproval, lowered esteem, or even
ostracism) or because they would feel guilty for failing to conform to the
norm (a so-called internalized norm). 4 Put more positively, norms are
Economic Approach, AM. ECON. REv., May 1997, at 365; Richard Posner, Social Norms, Social
Meaning, and Economic Analysis of Law: A Comment, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 553 (1998).
There are, of course, significant variations in the definition of rational choice. For a clear
description of various "thin" and "thick" versions of rational choice, see Russell B. Korobkin &
Thomas S. Ulen, Law and BehavioralScience: Removing the Rationality Assumption from Law and
Economics, 88 CALiF. L. REv. 1051, 1060-67 (2000). A thin version of rational choice means simply
that an individual rationally maximizes her ends, whatever those ends may be; in other words, the ends
need not be wealth-maximizing. I assume here a thick version of rational choice, meaning that
individuals act in their self-interest or are wealth-maximizing. See id. at 1065 ("Such thick versions of
rational choice theory dominate the law-and-economics literature[.]"); Jennifer Arlen, Comment, The
Future of BehavioralEconomic Analysis of Law, 51 VAND. L. REv. 1765 (1988); Christine Jolls et al.,
A BehavioralApproach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REv. 1471, 1476 (1998).
Some commentators have suggested that sociologists, who have long studied the role of norms in
human behavior, have been less influential outside their own discipline in influencing norms scholars
"[p]artly because sociologists themselves have been unable to coalesce around a dominant paradigm,
[so that] the alien newcomers have had difficulty finding much worth borrowing" and also because
"these scholars are admired.., more for grubbing for facts than for building overarching theory."
Ellickson, supra note 12, at 542, 546; see also GARY s. BECKER, AcCOUNTING FOR TAsS 1 (1996)
("[W]ith a few exceptions... sociologists and anthropologists do not embed their analyses of social
forces and culture in a powerful analytical framework."); Lawrence M. Friedman, The Law and Society
Movement, 38 STAN'.L. REv. 763, 766, 779 (observing that "[tihe work [of law and society scholars,
including sociologists] does not, in general, build or grow; it travels in cycles and circles, round and
round[,]" and that "[within the law and society movement] there are no axioms, no 'laws' of legal
behavior; nothing cumulates"). Friedman's comment is meant to be praiseworthy and, it should be
noted, is focused on law and society scholars, not sociologists. Some sociologists, however, have
adopted a rational choice model to explain social behavior. E.g., JAMES COLEMAN, supra note 7, at 1418 (explaining his use of the rational actor model as the underpinning of his social theory).
13. Some law and norms scholars view the influence of norms on rational decision making
somewhat differently. Robert Cooter, for example, suggests that in order for a social norm to be widely
prevalent, a majority of those whose behavior is affected by the norm must have internalized it. E.g.,
Robert D. Cooter, Decentralized Law for a Complex Economy: 77ze Structural Approach to
Adjudicating the New Law Merchant, 144 U. PA. L. REv. 1643 (1996); see also discussion supra notes
17-19. His conception of norms would suggest, therefore, that an individual's preferences, which
rational choice theory assumes are stable, see Jolls et al., supra note 11, are shaped and can be altered
by social norms. For a view that the concept of preference is so fraught with ambiguity and complexity
as to be almost worthless for predictive purposes, see Sunstein, supra note 1, at 932-39. See also Mark
Kelman, Behavioral Economics as Part of a Rhetorical Duet: A Response to Jolls, Sunstein, and
Thaler, 50 STAN. L. REv. 1577, 1582 &n.13 (1998).
14. E.g., COLEMAN, supranote 7, at 242-43. As Coleman explains:
Social norms... specify what actions are regarded by a set of persons as proper or correct, or
improper or incorrect. Norms are ordinarily enforced by sanctions, which are either rewards
for carrying out those actions regarded as correct or punishments for carrying out those
actions regarded as incorrect... [A] norm concerning a specific action exists when the
socially defined right to control the action is held by others. It is ... an informal or socially
defined right.
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1239
nonlegal rules that certain individuals follow because they gain from doing
so, either through increased inner satisfaction from doing the right thing or
through approval they garner from others. t5 In rational actor terms, violating a social norm imposes a cost on the violator that can tip the cost-benefit
balance in favor of conformity with the norm.
To illustrate, if a social norm governs recycling behavior, then individuals deciding whether to recycle will factor in the esteem or pride they
will gain from recycling or the guilt or loss of esteem they will suffer if
they do not. If the norm to recycle is strong enough, the esteem or selfsatisfaction it provides may outweigh the costs of recycling and induce the
desired behavior. 6
Norms scholars differ in their theories about how norms emerge and,
as a result, exactly how they influence individual decision making. Robert
Cooter, for example, suggests that a large part of a community must
internalize a norm for it to direct behavior. 7 Richard McAdams believes
Id.; see also Robert C. Ellickson, supra note 12, at 549 n.58 ("[A] norm is a rule supported by a pattern
of informal sanctions[.]"); Robert Cooter, Expressive Law and Economics, 27 J. LECAL STuD. 585, 587
(1998) ("[A] norm exists when almost everyone in a community agrees that they ought to behave in a
particular way in specific circumstances, and this agreement affects what people actually do.");
Sunstein, supra note 1, at 915 ("We might, very roughly, understand "norms" to be social attitudes of
approval and disapproval, specifying what ought to be done and what ought not to be done.");
McAdams, supra note 2, at 340 (1997) ("[B]y norms this literature refers to informal social regularities
that individuals feel obligated to follow because of an internalized sense of duty, because of a fear of
external nonlegal sanctions, or both.") For an extensive discussion of six sanctions (and analogous
rewards) that can be used to help enforce norms, see Richard A. Posner & Eric B. Rasmusen, Creating
and Enforcing Norms, with Special Reference to Sanctions, 19 INr'L REV. OF L. & ECON. 369, 371-72
(1999).
15. Some disagreement exists over whether laws themselves constitute norms, or whether the
rules of tightly organized trade associations and other formal organizations constitute norms, or at least
whether such rules ought to be considered analytically similar to more spontaneously developed norms
governing less formal communities. See, e.g., David Charney, Illusions of a Spontaneous
Order: "Nonns" in ContractualRelationships,144 U. PA. L. REv. 1841, 1845 (1996); Eric A. Posner,
Law Economics, and Inefficient Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REv. 1697, 1700 (1996) (excluding from the
definition of norm "the rules self-consciously formulated and issued by private institutions, such as
trade associations"); Posner & Rasmusen, supra note 14, at 2 (suggesting that norms can overlap with
law so that, for example, we have a norm against killing people and laws against murder); cf Dan M.
Kahan, Gentle Nudges vs. HardShoves: Solving the Sticky Norms Problem, 67 U. CHI. L. REv. 607
(2000) (evaluating circumstances under which laws contradict social norms). I agree with scholars vho
believe that formal laws frequently constitute social norms. In the recycling context some jurisdictions
have mandated recycling, perhaps to incorporate an existing social norm, perhaps to create or intensify
one. I discuss the relationship between mandatory recycling laws and norms in more detail infra Part
III.D.2.
I also agree with most norms scholars who exclude from the definition of norm behavior that
which may be ordinary or commonplace, but which is done for a reason other than obligation. As
Robert Cooter points out, a man may remove his hat when he comes inside because it is hot, not
because a norm obligates him to do so. By contrast, he may remove his hat when entering a church out
of a sense of obligation and respect. The latter is a norm, the former is not. Cooter, supra note 13, at
1656.
16. See McAdams, supranote 2, at 350 (using recycling to illustrate how norms operate).
17. Cooter, supra note 13, at 1665. Under Cooter's theory, then, a norm complier would gain
inner satisfaction from her behavior rather than care about the approval of others. Gary Becker shares
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that internalization is not necessary because people react to and desire the
esteem of others, whether or not they believe in the correctness of a norm.
Thus, a norm can emerge if enough individuals: (1) share a consensus
about "the positive or negative esteem worthiness of engaging in
X"; (2) can at least in some instances detect noncompliance with X;
and (3) can communicate to the relevant community their opinions about
the esteem worthiness of X." Under such circumstances, a norm can
emerge "if the esteem benefits exceed, for most people, the costs of
engaging in X' even if most people never internalize the norm."9 Eric
this view. BECKER, supra note 12, at 225 ("Norms are those common values of a group which influence
an individual's behavior through being internalized as preferences."). Cooter describes conflicting
psychological theories about how norms come to be internalized, contrasting the ideas of psychologists
such as Piaget and Kohlberg, who suggest that children gradually become capable of internalizing
norms as they gain the capacity for general reasoning, with Freudian theory, which suggests that "the
internalization of morality ingrains new impulses in a child through emotional experiences." However,
he takes no position about who is correct. Cooter, supranote 13, at 1662.
18. See McAdams, supra note 2, at 358.
19. Id. at 355, 358. The distinction between McAdams and Cooter is similar to a distinction
recognized in social psychology literature as the difference between social norms and personal norms.
Social norms are, according to Shalom Schwartz, general and rather abstract "values and attitudes of
significant others; we expect others to act in the morally proper way, and they in tum expect the same
of us. By themselves, however, these norms are far too general and detached to govem behavior."
Joseph R. Hopper & Joyce M. Nielsen, Recycling as Altruistic Behavior: Normative and Behavioral
Strategiesto Expand Participationin a Community Recycling Program,23 ENV'T & BEHAV. 195, 200
(1991). Personal norms, though derived from social norms, "are adopted by each of us on a personal
level[, and] the consequences of violating or upholding them are tied to one's self-concept." Id. at 200
(describing Schwartz's theory of altruistic behavior).
Robert Ellickson has recently offered a model to describe how norms might emerge. As he
describes his model,
Change [in a prevailing norm] is triggered by a shift in either cost-benefit conditions or group
composition. Because individuals are heterogeneous in important respects, they respond
differently to these triggering events. The first persons to supply new norms generally are
individuals who have either superior technical knowledge of cost-benefit conditions, superior
social knowledge of group dynamics, or special endowments that provide them with
unusually high tangible benefits from norm reform. Members of the social audience observe
the competing efforts of these norm suppliers and reward the most meritorious ones by
conferring either esteem or, according to an alternative conception, new exchange
opportunities.
Ellickson, supra note 11, at I. Though I find Ellickson's theory plausible, it seems less likely to be true
in the case of large-number, small-payoff collective action problems. His theory rests in part on an
assumption that those who are willing to supply new norms gain significant tangible benefits from
norm reform. In the case of large-number, small-payoff problems, the tangible benefits to individuals
are by definition small, particularly in relation to the costs of engaging in collective behavior. Thus, the
incentives for any individual to act as an agent of norm change are smaller than in other cases, and the
difficulties in producing significant behavioral change necessary to solve the collective action problem
are particularly high. This is not to say that norm change could not occur in the large-number, smallpayoff context due to the work of individuals who stand to gain from the resolution of such a problem.
In the recycling context, for example, the recycling industry could attempt to spur such change and
presumably gain financially from widespread recycling activity. Nevertheless, the organizational
obstacles are much higher than with small-group, large-payoff problems, and thus the individual payoff
needs to be particularly high to provide adequate incentives to act as a norm agent (Ellickson's term).
The history of recycling in this country, which I discuss in Part III, suggests that efforts to develop a
social norm in favor of recycling independent of governmental intervention have not succeeded.
RECYCLING NORMS
20011
Posner offers a third model of norm creation. He posits that at least in some
contexts norms of behavior emerge as the result of numerous individuals
signaling their propensity to cooperate by engaging in the same behavior.20
If the signaling behavior becomes commonplace a norm may emerge. People give gifts, for example, not to be nice but to signal to the gift giver that
they are a "good type" to deal with and hence worthy of a long-term relationship. 2 The gift giver is "investing" in the long term by purchasing the
gift in the hope that her investment will pay off. Like McAdams, Posner
suggests that individuals may gain something valuable from others when
complying with a particular norm, and thus need not internalize the norm
for compliance with the behavior to become widespread.22
Though it is difficult to test empirically how norms are created, these
theories suggest how norms may affect an individual's cost-benefit calculus in deciding whether to recycle. To the degree social scientists and others have been able to measure and determine recycling motivation, their
findings shed light on which factors, such as esteem, guilt, reputation signaling, or some combination, are at work in triggering the behavior necessary to solve large-number, small-payoff problems. Understanding what
motivates norm compliance may help those who seek to create or intensify
social norms, "norms managers," develop more effective strategies for addressing these problems.
B.
Recycling As a Collective Action Problem
If governments and other organizations interested in increasing
household recycling wish to rely on social norms to induce individual recycling, however, they must contend with a major problem. The act of recycling, including separating garbage into recyclable and nonrecyclable
goods, storing the recyclable ones and then either taking them out to the
curbside for pickup or to a drop-off center, is not typically financially remunerative.23 Drop-off centers occasionally pay for recyclable materials,
20. EPic PosNER, LAW AND SocIAL NoRIis 24-25 (2000).
Id. at 19.
21.
22. The mechanics of Posner's model are quite complex, and I describe them only briefly here.
For a thoughtful review of his book as well as an explanation of the difference between Posner's theory
and McAdams's theory, see Richard H. McAdams, Signaling Discount Rates: Law, Norms and
Economic Methodology, 110 YALE L.J. 625, 680-82 (2001); see also Ellickson, supra note 11, at 20.
23.
Of course, for some individuals taking recyclable materials out of others' garbage or out of
recycling bins placed at curbside does make economic sense, particularly in states with bottle bills. See
Gary Langer, And Many Happy Returns, SIERRA MAGAZINE, March/April 1988, at 19 (describing
prevalence of scavenging for recyclables in bottle bill states and quoting two New York men who
together can make S100 on an exceptional day from collecting cans and bottles). In addition, many
households, particularly low-income ones, benefit from money earned either from recycling centers or
from bottle deposits. Still, given the relationship between the effort (or cost) of recycling versus the
benefits in financial terms, most individuals most likely do not recycle because of the financial rewards.
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but both the price per ton 4 and the volume of material most households
bring in are low, making the actual payoff to most recyclers almost minuscule. Some states also pay recyclers who return certain beverage containers, but the amount they pay (ranging from 2.5 to 10 cents per container) is
again quite low when compared with the effort.
Despite these obstacles, in the past decade the number of individual
households engaged in recycling has increased dramatically: the editor of
Resource Recycling magazine claims that "'in the first week in November
1992, more adults took part in recycling than voted."' 25 Robust theories of
rational choice would predict that such recycling behavior should not occur. Rational individuals seeking to maximize utility or wealth should not
undertake the effort to sort papers, cans, bottles, and newspapers and take
them out to the curbside or to a drop-off center. Indeed, recycling presents
a classic collective action problem: assuming that recycling produces environmental benefits such as reduced landfill use, fewer emissions and less
potential for leaching (with the attendant risks of contamination) from
landfills, fewer emissions from incinerators, increased energy conservation,
reduced litter, and lower use of virgin natural resources, it remains the case
that these are generalized benefits to the collective not typically viewed as
producing any substantial, immediate benefit at an individual level.26
24. Recycling centers generally pay per ton of material. For example, prices on average in
California are $59 per ton for newspaper, $104 per ton for refundable glass and $32 per ton for
nonrefundable glass, $1950 per ton for refundable aluminum, $428 per ton for nonrefundable
aluminum, $103 per ton for white paper, $28 per ton for tin, and $81 per ton for cardboard. These
average prices come from phone calls to twenty-one recycling centers during the month of June, 2000.
See Memorandum Summarizing Phone Calls (on file with author).
25. FRANK ACKERMAN, WHY Do WE RECYCLE: MARKETS, VALUES, AND PUBLIC POLICY 8
(1997).
26. A quite vigorous debate about whether recycling is in fact an environmentally productive
activity is taking place both in the media and in more academic circles. The most famous (or infamous
to recycling advocates) article suggesting that recycling is a huge waste of individual resources with
little environmental benefit was published in the New York Times Magazine in 1996. John Tiemey,
Recycling Is Garbage,N.Y. TIMES MAGAZINE, June 30, 1996. For harsh critiques of Tierney's article,
see ACKERMAN, supranote 25, at 13; Richard A. Dennison & John F. Ruston, "Anti-Recycling Myths,
Commentary on 'Recycling is Garbage'," (Environmental Defense Fund, July 18, 1996), available at
http://www/edf.orglpubs/Reports/armythfin.html. For additional critiques of recycling, see JUDD
ALEXANDER, IN DEFENSE OF GARBAGE (1993); Jeff Bailey, CurbsideRecycling Comforts the Soul, But
Benefits Are Scant, WALL ST. J., Jan. 19, 1995, at Al; Christopher Boemer & Kenneth Chilton, False
Economy: The Folly of Demand-Side Recycling, 36 ENVIRONMENT, Jan.-Feb., 1994. For a thoughtful
effort to evaluate rigorously the social costs and benefits of recycling, see ACKERMAN, supra note 25.
Ackerman concludes that the answer to whether the benefits of recycling (particularly curbside
programs) outweigh the costs is "it depends." Numerous variable factors, including the market for
recyclables at any given moment, the tipping fee (or price per ton of garbage) at landfills in the
particular region studied, and the efficiency of curbside collection efforts can effect the cost-benefit
calculus. See id.at 63-83.
Though most of the critiques of recycling have been perceived as antienvironmental, some ardent
environmentalists are critical of recycling for another reason. Anthropologist Kris Hardin states the
criticism nicely: "What has often passed as concern and activity is merely symbolic action, action that
does not fundamentally aid us in rethinking our relationship with the natural world but merely allows us
RECYCLING NORMS
2001]
1243
Though the terminology of this collective action problem is undoubtedly familiar, some definitions are still helpful. The problem of collective
action was first identified over thirty years ago, in Mancur Olson's classic
book The Logic of Collective Action. 7 Olson argued that groups frequently
fail to work in their collective interest to achieve group benefits because
individual self-interests get in the way.28 As with today's law and norms
theorists, Olson's insights draw from rational choice theory. A rational individual reasons that if others engage in the behavior necessary to achieve
the collective good, she can free ride on their efforts and still gain the benefits of their behavior. 9 The inverse can also be true: a rational individual
reasons that if she behaves in a manner consistent with the collective good,
her behavior will be meaningless unless other members of the group also
participate. The size of the group is often related to the depth of the collective action problem;3" the greater the numbers, the more difficult it is likely
to be to solve the problem, particularly given that "if one member does or
does not help provide the collective good, no other one member will be
significantly affected and therefore none has any reason to react."3 1 Recycling provides an excellent example. To achieve the widespread benefits of
recycling, a significant portion of the population must participate. Yet each
individual knows that her individual behavior, standing alone, makes little
difference; if I throw my junk mail into the trash can rather than taking it
out to the recycling bin, I can easily rationalize such behavior by questioning whether, in the scheme of things, my contribution to the overuse of
landfills is really worth the effort to recycle. Moreover, if many people recycle, the benefit to me individually is likely to be relatively small. Although I care intellectually about whether available landfill exists ten years
from now, my daily life probably will not change much as long as the garbage truck continues to show up.
to feel good about our participation in issues of preservation or to be recognized as an environmentally
concerned person." Kris L. Hardin, Symbols, in SACRED TRUST 27 (Michael Katchin ed., 1993).
My aim in this Article is not to answer the complex question of whether recycling is or is not
environmentally beneficial. Instead I aim to analyze whether and how governments can solve collective
action problems among huge numbers of individuals by helping them to engage in cooperative
behavior. I assume for the sake of my analysis that recycling is a worthwhile activity that creates
environmental benefits, and hence something governments (or other actors) wish to encourage.
27. MANcUm OLSON, THE Locic OF COLLECTIVE AcTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF
GROUPS (2d ed. 1971).
28.
29.
Id. at2.
ELINOR Os'mos,
GOVERNING THE COMMONS, THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS FOR
ACTION 5-7 (1990) (offering a cogent explanation of the collective action problem).
30. See OLSON, supranote 27, at 23; OsTROM, supra note 29, at 183.
31.
OLSON, supra note 27, at 50. As Russell Hardin explains, the most likely group to face a
collective action problem is a large one where the individual gain to any member of the group from
contributing to the collectivity is smaller than the costs. Small groups can also have collective action
problems, but their smaller size makes it easier to overcome the problem. HARDIN, supra note 8, at 3940(1982).
COLLECTIVE
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The theory of the tragedy of the commons, the famous phrase coined
by Garrett Hardin in his article of the same name, explains why collective
action like recycling is necessary in the first place. 2 Recycling aims to
protect "commons" resources: clean air and water, open space, and energy
resources. No one in particular owns commons goods, and thus, the theory
tells us, they tend to face abuse because no one has an incentive to conserve them. The incentive to abuse commons resources is parallel to the
lack of incentive to engage in collective solutions: individuals reason that
if they conserve these resources someone else will simply step in and take
what they have conserved (or "free ride" on their moderation).3 3 Returning
to recycling, individuals have little incentive to control the amount of trash
they generate and throw away because their conservation is likely to result
in very little improvement in available landfill or cleaner air relative to the
effort required, unless everyone pitches in. Absent resolution of this collective action problem, individuals fail to organize to combat the depletion
of commons resources. 4
Solving large-number, small-payoff collective action problems such
as recycling can prove especially daunting because the behavior required of
any individual to resolve the problem is often modest (and thus difficult to
detect), whereas the numbers of individuals required to act is huge. Monitoring and enforcement thus can often be extremely difficult, expensive, or
impossible. Simply mandating a reduction in garbage disposal, for
example, can turn government officials into garbage snoops; illegal garbage dumping and garbage burning are common, unwanted side effects of
32. Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 Sc. 1243 (1968).
33. Economists also recognize that market failures can occur in the provision of public goods, a
concept related, though not identical to, the tragedy of the commons. Public goods share two
characteristics: no one can be excluded from their use and their consumption is nonrivalrous (that is, if
A consumes some of the public good, no less of it remains for B and C). Clean air and national defense
are examples. See Thomas S. Ulen, Rational Choice and the Economic Analysis of Lmv, 19 LAW &
Soc. INQUIRY 487, 492-93 (1994). Commons goods, by contrast, can be exclusionary and depletable.
Fisheries are the obvious example. See Carol M. Rose, Rethinking Environmental
Controls: Management Strategiesfor Common Resources, 1991 DUi LJ. 1, 2-5. In the recycling
context, some of the benefits from recycling could constitute public goods, including cleaner air.
Because the incentives to underproduce a public good are essentially identical to the incentives to abuse
a commons resource, behavioral experimental evidence about the willingness of individuals to
contribute to public goods is relevant to whether they will willingly protect commons resources. Indeed
the terms often get used interchangeably. See, e.g., Elinor Ostrom, A Behavioral Approach to the
Rational Choice Theory of Collective Action, 92 Am. POL. ScI. REv. 1 (1998) ("Social dilemmas are
called by many names, including the public-good or collective-good problem... [and] the tragedy of
the commons."). For a discussion of how behavioral experiments suggest that individuals produce more
public goods than rational choice theory would predict, see discussion infra Part II.C.2.
34. Numerous scholars have written about these concepts. See, e.g., Russell Hardin, supra note 8;
Ostrom, supranote 33; Rose, supra note 33, at 2-5. For a helpful explanation of the importance of the
theory of collective action to public choice theory, see Schroeder, supra note 8. For a recent
examination of the difficulty in resolving commons problems, see BARTON H. THOMPSON, TRAGICALLY
DIFFICULT: THE OBSTACLES TO GOVERNING THE COMMONS (Stan. L. & Econ., Olin Research Paper
No. 187, 2000).
2001]
RECYCLING NORMS
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limits on garbage disposal,35 that are difficult to verify without snooping
through garbage thrown into common dumpsters. Imposing financial incentives like deposits on recyclable containers can be extremely divisive
due to strong opposition from organized interests like grocery stores, who
oppose collecting containers and redeeming deposits; no state has enacted a
bottle bill in almost fifteen years despite strong evidence that glass recycling is much higher in bottle bill states than in those without them.36 The
difficulties in resolving large-number, small-payoff collective action problems may explain why some legal scholars, and many governments, share
enthusiasm for using social norms management as a regulatory tool.37
C.
Can Norms Solve Large-Number, Small-Payoff Collective Action
Problems?
Several areas of scholarship offer a starting point for determining
whether social norms can help resolve large-number, small-payoff collective action problems. Empirical research examining how social norms have
emerged to manage certain commons resources, and behavioral experimental research illustrating how social norms of cooperation operate in the
production of public goods, lead to a common set of conclusions: people
are inclined to resolve collective action problems, but they only do so on a
sustained basis if they have face-to-face contact with other potential cooperators. Cooperation is also more likely if individuals can sanction one another, and may be more likely if cooperators stand to benefit economically
from their collective behavior. The research suggests, therefore, that social
norms are not likely to solve large-number, small-payoff collective action
problems unless norms managers can replicate the circumstances that produce sustained cooperation.
1. Research Involving Homogeneous Groups, Small Common Pool
Resources
A number of empirical studies demonstrate that social norms are most
likely to emerge and resolve problems of collective action among small,
relatively homogeneous groups who have repeated interactions with one
another and whose economic interests often will be served by the emergent
norms. Robert Ellickson's study of the norms that have emerged to govern
relationships between cattle ranchers and farmers in Shasta County,
35. DON FULLERTON & THOMAS C. KiNNAmAN, HOUSEHOLD DEMAND FOR GARBAGE AND
RECYCLING COLLECTION IvrrH THE START OF A PRICE PER BAG 2 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research,
Working Paper No. 4670, 1994).
36. See supraPart III.D.2.d.i.
37. See Posner & Rasmusen, supra note 14, at 380 ("Norms are particularly effective devices for
social control, relative to law, when individual violations (though perhaps not aggregate violations) are
too trivial, or the difficulty of proving guilt too great, to justify the expense of trials, police and
prisons.").
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California, in cases of animal trespass is an example,38 as is Lisa
Bernstein's study of the norms that govern transactions among diamond
merchants.39
Unlike recycling, studies such as Ellickson's and Bernstein's do not
address problems involving commons resources; work by political scientist
Elinor Ostrom, however, does. Ostrom's work is centrally concerned with
the circumstances under which norms have successfully resolved collective
action problems involving common pool resources ("CPR"). Ostrom collected and analyzed numerous empirical studies of relatively small-scale
common pool resources such as fisheries and groundwater management
systems. The largest of her CPRs involved 15,000 users, all located in the
same country and all economically dependent on a continued flow of the
common pool resource at issue. The success stories she studied, defined as
those CPRs that succeeded in maintaining a balance between the consumption of the resource and its replenishment, involved little centralized governmental regulation. Instead, these CPRs all developed systems of group
norms that were respected and relied upon to produce group benefits at the
expense of individual self-interest. The successful management of the
commons included the development of elaborate monitoring and sanctioning systems, and relied on the fact that a reputation for honesty and fair
dealing was a valuable asset among CPR users.40 As with the groups studied by Ellickson, Bernstein, and others, Ostrom's success stories involved
tightly-knit and relatively small groups whose social interactions likely
contributed to the development of group welfare-maximizing norms.4
38. See ELLICKSON, supranote 4, at 177. Ellickson describes his reasoning about why norms may
emerge among small, tight-knit groups as opposed to large diffuse ones as follows:
The hypothesis predicts that welfare-maximizing norms emerge in close-knit settings but is
agnostic about whether such norms can emerge in other social settings. This qualification is
necessary because an informal-control system may not be effective if the social conditions
within a group do not provide members with information about norms and violations and also
the power and enforcement opportunities needed to establish norms.
Id.
39. Bemstein, supranote 5. Bernstein's work suggests that although homogeneity and small size
may have been necessary (or at least extremely helpful) conditions for social norms to emerge in the
diamond bourser industry, the rise of information technology has allowed the norms to persevere even
in the face of increasing ethnic heterogeneity. Id. at 143-45. What role our increased technological
interconnectedness will have on social norm creation is an interesting and largely unexplored question,
though at least some game theoretic evidence exists to suggest that face-to-face human contact is more
likely to produce cooperative norms than technological interaction. See, e.g., Ostrom, supra note 33, at
6 (summarizing game theory findings).
40. For a collection of essays describing additional empirical studies of successful private
commons management, see THE QUESTION OF THE COMMONS: THE CULTURE AND ECOLOGY OF
COMMUNAL RESOURCES (Bonnie J. McCay & James M. Acheson eds., 1987).
41.
Ostrom's principal mission is to determine the circumstances under which successful
commons management occurs. OSmoM, supra note 29, at 211. For a critique of the view that individual
commons users may be superior managers of small common pool resources, at least in efficiency terms,
see Posner, supra note 15, at 1740-42 (arguing that group management of common pool resources is
2001]
RECYCLING NORMS
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Moreover, the individual users of the resource all depended on successful
management of the resource for their economic livelihood. Even more
troubling for social norms enthusiasts, Ostrom found that the CPRs that
failed in their attempts to control consumption of the commons resource
through informal means such as norms lacked the characteristics of the
success stories, such as small size, homogeneity, and opportunity for communication.
2. ExperimentalEvidence About CooperationandPublic Goods
Ostrom concludes that social norms have much less force in circumstances where "no one communicates, everyone acts independently, no attention is paid to the effects of one's actions, and the costs of trying to
'
change the structure of the situation are high."42
Yet every day experience
seems to belie her conclusion. People vote, contribute to charity, refrain
from littering, donate blood, and tip waiters even in restaurants to which
they have no expectation of returning, all in substantial numbers. These
commonplace experiences provide hope that social norms may help resolve
large-number, small-payoff collective action problems because people appear to behave "irrationally" all the time. Behavioral experiments about
whether people will voluntarily contribute to public goods43 suggest that
many individuals seem willing, at least initially, to act in favor of their
collective rather than individual self-interest. Yet the public goods experiments also show that the initially cooperative behavior falls off dramatically over time if individuals playing the game cannot communicate with
one another. In short, achieving short-term cooperation to resolve a collective action problem may be easier than rational choice theory would predict, but achieving sustained behavioral change is much more difficult.
The logic of collective action, which predicts that for self-interested
reasons everyone will attempt to take advantage of the cooperative behavior of others, suggests that public goods should not be produced absent
some external coercion.' Experimental evidence, however, indicates far
more cooperation than collective action theory would predict. Public goods
experiments ask participants to play games in which they can contribute
vulnerable to quick technological change, opportunistic behavior by wealthy and powerful members,
and envy, resentment, and morality).
42. OsToROt, supra note 29, at 183.
43. For a definition of public goods, see Ulen, supra note 33, at 492-93 (characterizing public
goods as nonrivalrous, meaning people can consume them simultaneously, and nonexclusionary,
meaning no one can be excluded from their use). Clean air and national defense are often cited as
prototypical examples. See id.
44. Some rational choice theorists predict a "strong free rider hypothesis" in collective action
dilemmas, under which virtually no one will contribute anything to the public good. Others predict a
weaker hypothesis, under which many, though not all, people will free ride. See RicHARD H. THALER,
THE WmNNER's CURSE: PARADoxEs AND ANoMALms OF EcNoNuc LIFE 10 (1992). As Thaler notes,
the weak free rider hypothesis "does not yield very precise predictions." Id.
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"money" to the public good or keep it for themselves. The games are meant
to replicate the collective provision of a public good by making the benefits
from cooperation exceed individual self-interest, while creating the same
incentives for free riding that exist in real public goods circumstances.
Yet experiment after experiment shows that individuals contribute between
40 and 60% of their initial sum to the group exchange.46 This is true even
for participants who have played the game before. 47 Thus, many individuals
seem willing, at least initially, to act in favor of their collective rather than
individual self-interest, at least in experimental settings.
This experimental evidence seems promising because it suggests that
individuals might contribute voluntarily to the resolution of collective action problems. However, the promise proves limited. The 40 to 60% of cooperation exhibited in the first round of the public goods games described
above do not last in repetitions of the game, at least so long as communication among players is prohibited. When participants play numerous
rounds, public goods investment falls off dramatically over time; by the
end of play, three-quarters of all players contribute nothing to the public
good and those who do invest contribute close to zero.48 In other words, by
the end of play, individuals act almost entirely in their individual selfinterest. Richard Thaler suggests that this initial cooperation, and consistent decline, occurs because many people enter the game possessing a norm
of cooperation; they initially assume that cooperation is a good thing. They
stop cooperating once the evidence tells them that others are not
reciprocating. 49 Elinor Ostrom calls this norm one of reciprocity rather than
45. To play the game, participants are given tokens or money in equal amounts. They are told
they have two options: invest some or all of their money in a group pool or invest individually. Their
investment decisions are confidential, as are the decisions made by others in the group, so that no one
knows whether anyone else is contributing. The amount of money contributed to the group exchange is
then increased by some amount by a group operator (to make the collective good greater than the
individual gain) and divided equally among all participants regardless of whether they contributed to it.
Those who contribute to the group exchange therefore gain less by contributing than those who choose
not to contribute, because the noncontributors receive a group share without having to contribute at all.
See Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 12, at 1140-41, for a clear and thorough description of the game. See
also Ostrom, supra note 33, at 5 (summarizing conclusions to be reached from extensive number of
public goods games); Ernst Fehr & Simon Gichter, Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods
Experiments, Am. EcoN. REV., Sept. 2000, at 980, 984-93 (summarizing the extensive number of
experiments that have been conducted). The public goods games extend the classic prisoner's dilemma
game beyond two players. See ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUrION OF COOPERATION (1984)
(foundational work on prisoner's dilemmas).
46. THALER, supra note 44.
47. Though researchers initially thought that the large rates of contribution might occur because
participants misunderstood the game, that hypothesis has been discredited by follow-up experiments
involving experienced players. Even those players who have played the game before and whose rates of
contribution in later rounds of the game have fallen off will contribute at the same high rates in the
initial rounds of a new game. See THALER, supranote 44, at 12 (1992) (citing studies).
48. See Emst Feher & Klaus Schmidt, A Theory of Fairness,Competition, and Cooperation, 114
Q.J. EcoN. 817, 836-39 (1999) (analyzing the results of twelve public goods experiments).
49. THALER, supra note 44, at 14.
2001]
RECYCLING NORMS
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cooperation, perhaps to capture the notion that people will cooperate if others do, but they will not be "suckers" for too long. She suggests that the
norm of reciprocity is a core one, used routinely by large numbers of people in collective action (or social dilemma) situations, and thus should be
incorporated into rational choice analysis.5 0
The finding that cooperation falls off in repeat rounds of the public
goods game is problematic for those hopeful that social norms can help
resolve large-number, small-payoff collective action problems, particularly
those that require repeat behavior for resolution. Recycling, for example,
depends on individuals repeating environmentally cooperative behavior
over and over again, on sustained behavioral change, for success. For a
norm to work in recycling's favor, in other words, the norm needs real durability."' Recycling is not alone in sharing this characteristic. To the degree that the resolution of problems like overconsumption of energy and
water and excess air pollution depends on long-term individual behavioral
change, the game theoretic evidence is troubling.
Game experiments do provide some evidence, however, that under the
right circumstances participants will cooperate to provide public goods on
a more sustained basis. One of the most striking findings is that if players
are allowed face-to-face contact and communication between rounds of
play, the level of cooperation increases dramatically, by more than 45%.11
The same level of cooperation does not occur if participants communicate
only via computer. 3 Human contact thus seems to induce cooperative behavior.
Communication becomes less useful in achieving cooperation in
games where individuals stand to gain substantially through cheating.
When individual players have a large stake, the incentive for cheating increases, causing more participants to renege on agreements achieved faceto-face. 4 Thus face-to-face communication seems more helpful in resolving small-payoff collective action problems than large-payoff problems, if
such communication is feasible. These findings suggest that if recyclers
can communicate with one another they may sustain their behavior over a
longer period of time."5
50. Ostrom, supranote 33, at 4.
51.
See Jp.Ms E. KRmR & EDMUND URSlN, POLLUTON AND POLICY 273 (1977) (suggesting that
"the peculiar satisfaction of doing one's duty wears thinner the more often duty must be done").
52. See Ostrom, supranote 33, at 7.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. See Fehr & Gachter, supra note 45, at 2. Research also suggests that if participants are
allowed to punish non-cooperators (by, for example, fining them), sustained levels of contributions to
the public good occur at relatively high levels. And if participants can both coordinate through
communication and punish noncooperators, 82% of participants will contribute their full amount of
money to the public good by the final round of a game, and the remaining participants also make
substantial contributions. Id.
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The experiments are, of course, only that. But to a great extent they
parallel the findings of empiricists who have studied common pool resources. In situations where common pool users can communicate and
sanction one another, typically small, relatively homogenous groups, they
often develop their own system of social norms to manage the resource
efficiently. In the context of recycling, then, the experimental evidence indicates that a large percentage of people may be willing to recycle initially,
but absent opportunities for face-to-face communication with other potential recyclers, the norm of cooperation is not likely to have a great deal of
staying power. The fact that recyclers generally have little opportunity to
sanction non-recyclers also makes sustained cooperation less likely.
Recycling and other cooperative behavior necessary to resolve largenumber, small-payoff collective action problems may face an additional
problem. Even if a background norm of cooperation is at work in both the
public goods context and the CPR situation, does such a background norm
work when the payoff is not economic or monetary? In both the public
goods context and the CPR situation, the individual payoff for cooperation
is obvious. In the public goods games, everyone earns more money or tokens if large numbers of participants cooperate. In the CPRs, the long-term
economic livelihood of particular resource users is dependent on effective
management of the resource. With respect to large-number, small-payoff
collective action problems, by contrast, the payoff is by definition small.
And where the payoff is an environmental benefit (clean air, clean water,
preservation of natural resources) the benefit may seem less tangible than
direct economic gain. Thus, the norm of cooperation may not be enough by
itself to resolve a large-number, small-payoff problem. An independent
social norm in favor of resolution of the collective action problem may also
be necessary to motivate individual cooperative behavior. Put differently,
individuals may need to believe independently that they should recycle, or
donate blood, or vote, or turn out the lights when they leave a room. When
the payoff is non-monetary, individuals may need additional reasons to
cooperate. Intervention from the state or other organizations may be necessary to provide such additional incentives.
3.
The Role of State Norm Management
The public goods experiments and the empirical evidence about CPRs
demonstrate the circumstances under which groups will cooperate to resolve collective action problems in the absence of state intervention. Neither area of research sheds light on whether external efforts to strengthen
norms can improve cooperative behavior. Several legal scholars suggest
that such norm management might work: if governments can change the
individual calculus about whether to engage in or abstain from a particular
behavior, by increasing the pride or esteem they experience for doing the
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RECYCLING NORMS
right thing (or, conversely, the guilt or disapproval for failure to comply),
then the state might avoid other expensive or draconian measures to regulate behavior. 6
In this section, I suggest that two distinct fields of research provide
guidance for thinking about the most effective methods for governmental
norm management of large-number, small-payoff problems. The public
goods and empirical CPR research offer direction about how to capitalize
on the seeming human instinct for cooperative behavior. Theories about the
development and operation of social norms offer guidance on whether to
focus on attitude-strengthening, opportunities for esteem-enhancement, or
both. Drawing lessons from each field of research should maximize the
likelihood that governmental norm management will succeed.
The public goods and CPR research suggest that if governments can
adopt strategies that intensify human contact and communication among
potential cooperators, then their strategies will more likely achieve the
sustained behavioral change necessary to resolve collective action problems. In the recycling context, for example, door-to-door persuasive campaigns may be more successful at increasing recycling than mass mailing
of informational brochures. Such a strategy is designed not so much to
strengthen a social norm in favor of recycling but to trigger an independent
norm of cooperation.
Theories about the development and operation of social norms also
lead to conclusions about how to engage in norm-strengthening campaigns. 7 Of course successful government norm management may depend
on the accuracy of these various theories. If many members of the relevant
community must internalize a norm, then norm management efforts should
aim at strengthening attitudes in favor of a desired behavior. If esteem or
reputation enhancement motivates behavior like recycling, then governments should make clear that others in the relevant community engage in,
and care about, widespread compliance; governments might even provide
opportunities for visible compliance to facilitate signaling. If each of these
theories about norms helps explain norm compliance, then governments
should engage in an approach toward norm management that incorporates
56. See Sunstein, supra note 1, at 907 ("[c]hanges in norms might be the best way to improve
social well-being; and ... government deserves to have, and in any case inevitably does have, a large
role in norm management."); see also Lessig, supranote 2, at 661 (contrasting the Chicago school, with
its faith in market forces as a regulator of human behavior, with what he dubs the "New Chicago
School" and its emphasis on norms). Lessig explains:
From the fact that forces outside law [namely the market] regulate, and regulate better than
law, the old school concludes that law should step aside. This is not the conclusion of the new
school. The old school identifies alternative regulators as reasons for less activism. The new
school identifies alternatives [e.g., norms] as additional tools for a more effective activism.
The moral of the old school is that the state should do less. The hope of the new is that the
state can do more.
Id.
57. See discussion on theories of norm creation, supra notes 17-21 and accompanying text.
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multiple strategies. Thus, governments might manage norms through, for
example, straightforward information campaigns designed to persuade and
strengthen attitudes simply by informing (for example, telling people about
problems with energy overconsumption) in order to induce people to internalize a norm or to believe in it more strongly. Governments might deploy
more persuasive campaigns exhorting people to recycle by making them
feel guilty if they do not. Governments can also use indirect efforts, trading
on the social capital of celebrities by identifying them with a particular position, just as advertisers rely on Michael Jordan to sell Gatorade ("I want
to be like Mike"), to indicate that important members of the community
recycle and care whether others do the same. 8 Of course, other modes of
government regulation, such as mandating or banning particular behavior,
taxing or subsidizing groups or behaviors, can also create indirect or direct
effects on norms, a point to which I return in the next section.
Not surprisingly, some scholars are skeptical about whether governmental efforts at norm management can succeed.5 9 Even proponents of
norm management acknowledge the difficulty government might confront
in figuring out how to shape norms. Many potential cooperators may see
norm management as nothing more than a government propaganda campaign." Yet governments try such norm management regularly, sometimes
quite extensively: examples include antilittering campaigns (for example,
"Give a Hoot, Don't Pollute" and "Keep America Beautiful") and recycling.6 The theoretical insights combined with empirical evidence about
why people recycle should help them do so more effectively.
4. The RelationshipBetween Law, Norms, Markets and Architecture
It is difficult to evaluate social norms management efforts without
considering other modes of regulating collective behavior. Law and norms
58. Lawrence Lessig calls this "tying." Lessig, supra note 8, at 1009. Lawrence Lessig and Dan
Kahan have written extensively on the role of government in changing the social meaning of behavior.
Dan M. Kahan, Social Influence, Social Meaning, and Deterrence, 83 VA. L. REv. 349 (1997)
(suggesting methods for regulating the social meaning of various behaviors in order to reduce crime);
Lessig, supra note 8, at 1008-14 (describing techniques for changing social meaning, including tying,
in order to influence social norms). Government efforts to manipulate social norms and social meaning
surreptitiously can, of course, backfire if revealed. The federal government found itself under attack
recently when the media learned that the Office of Drug Policy provided financial incentives to
networks for inserting antidrug messages into popular television shows, presumably an extreme form of
tying.
59. Ellickson, supra note 11, at 48-50 (describing only limited circumstances in which
government has a comparative advantage in norm shaping).
60. Lessig calls this reaction the "Orwell effect." Lessig, supra note 8, at 1016-17.
61.
Recent examples also include Governor Gray Davis's recent allocation of millions of dollars
for a "public education" campaign about the need to conserve energy, Robin Fields & Miguel Bustillo,
DavisApproves S850 Millionfor Energy Conservation Plan, L.A. TiMEs, April 12, 2001, at A3, and a
program funded by the Santa Monica Bay Restoration Project to persuade people not to throw motor oil
down area storm drains, Santa Monica Bay Restoration Project, Automotive Maintenance, at
http://www.smbay.org/bmp/221.htm (last visited Aug, 13, 2001).
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1253
scholars typically seek to understand the relationship between social norms
and law.62 Two other behavioral influences, market forces and "architecture," also shape human behavior and affect how social norms operate. 3
Formal law constrains behavior in any number of ways: by prohibiting or requiring certain behavior and punishing violations, either through
fines and penalties, jail, prison, or even death.' Norms, as we have already
seen, constrain behavior by imposing private or reputational sanctions for
noncompliance. Markets constrain behavior through price. If the price of
gasoline rises dramatically, people will drive less. And architecture constrains behavior by imposing limitations through "the [physical] world as
[we] find it."' 65 A building with no handicapped ramp constrains some
people's ability to enter.66 A city with no recycling program limits its residents' ability to recycle. Government can alter architecture to facilitate de62. McAdams puts it nicely: "Norms matter to legal analysis because (1) sometimes norms
control individual behavior to the exclusion of law, (2) sometimes norms and law together influence
behavior, and (3) sometimes norms and law influence each other." McAdams, supranote 2, at 347. As
McAdams further notes, norms are irrelevant to legal analysis only when law controls behavior
exclusively "because there is no preexisting norm governing such behavior, no norm that arises as a
consequence of the legal rule, and no norm influencing what legal rule is adopted." Id. at 347 n.38. Law
and norms scholars, not surprisingly, part company about the extent to which law does and ought to
influence norms, and vice versa. Robert Ellickson suggests that in many circumstances law is beside
the point, and norms develop to govern collective behavior regardless of the law. In addition to his
most well-known example involving cattle ranchers, Ellickson provides others. For example, he
suggests that relationships between landlords and tenants were not transformed, as most legal scholars
suggest, by the adoption of protenant doctrines like the implied warranty of habitability, because
landlords and tenants had already adopted informal norms that significantly protected tenants by
providing them with habitable dwellings. By overlooking the importance of norms in governing this
and other behavior, Ellickson believes that legal scholars often vastly overstate the importance of law in
governing behavior. Ellickson, supranote 12, at 543-44.
Other scholars focus on the extent to which the law ought to incorporate norms that have already
developed, particularly in the business community, independent of the formal legal system. Robert
Cooter suggests that courts should enforce norms in specialized business communities if they can
identify the actual norms, "identify the incentive structure that produced those norms," and determine
whether the incentive structure is efficient. Cooter, supra note 13, at 1656. Cooter's proposal, in
focusing on the process of norm formation rather than on the norm itself, conflicts with the more classic
law and economics position suggesting that lawmakers weigh the costs and benefits of various rule
choices and choose the more efficient one. Lisa Bernstein, by contrast suggests that in many business
settings, parties to a particular transaction "do not necessarily want the relationship-preserving norms
they follow in performing contracts and cooperatively resolving disputes among themselves to be used
by [courts] to decide [rules]," such as relying to the greatest extent possible only on the explicit
language of a contract rather than looking to custom and trade practices to sometimes vary express
contractual terms. Lisa Bernstein, Merchant Law in a Merchant Court, 144 U. PA. L. REv. 1765, 1770
(1996). Instead, she advocates that in some instances courts should rely on formal doctrine rather than
industry custom or norms in resolving contractual disputes. Id.
Lawrence Lessig uses these categories, and I borrow them here. See Lessig, supra note 2, at
63.
662-63.
64. Of course, simply because the government prohibits or requires something does not
automatically mean that behavior will shift in the manner intended. Nevertheless, governments
routinely rely on formal laws as a mechanism to constrain behavior, with varying degrees of success.
65. Lessig, supranote 2, at 663.
66. See id. at 669.
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sired behavior; for example, the government can require handicapped accessibility or provide recycling containers for pickup at curbside.
If the government acts to change laws, norms, markets, or architecture, the changes can take on a life of their own; a change in law or architecture, for example, could end up affecting social norms or vice versa.67
Because of the difficulty of norm management, it might be easier to ask
"what, on the margin, a given action by government will do both directly
and indirectly to the behavior being regulated"?68 If the government attempts to shape and strengthen norms about recycling, what is that action
likely to produce? What if government provides financial incentives to recyclers, or changes the architecture of recycling to make it easier?
In the next section, I describe the regulatory structure that governs
recycling and the various policies governments have implemented to promote it. I then use the analytic tools found in the empirical, game theoretic,
and norms literatures to evaluate the available empirical evidence about
recycling. I follow with conclusions about how and when norms and other
behavioral constraints, including architectural changes and market incentives, help solve large-number, small-payoff collective action problems. I
begin with a short history of residential recycling efforts in the United
States.
II
RECYCLING IN HISTORICAL AND CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVE
The history of recycling demonstrates that for more than a century
governments have experimented with shaping and managing norms to encourage behavior for the collective good. At various times over the past
century, norms-shaping efforts to encourage recycling have succeeded in
encouraging some recycling behavior, but until recently recycling has
never taken hold for a sustained period of time. Recycling is by no means a
new enterprise. In his account of the history of American garbage, Martin
Melosi describes the evolution of garbage handling in this country. 69 The
history of recycling is inextricably tied to the history of garbage, of course,
because recycling is by definition about using something again in lieu of
throwing it away.
A. The Nineteenth Century
For decades prior to the end of the nineteenth century, attempts by
American cities to deal with growing amounts of garbage could be de67. See id. at 685 ("Architecture might regulate individuals directly, but it also affects norms.
Norms regulate directly, but changing norms will obviously affect markets. The market constrains
directly but also indirectly affects the constraints of architecture.").
68. Id.
69. MARTIN V. MELOSI, GARBAGE IN THE CITIES (1981).
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1255
scribed as haphazard at best. Many cities had no garbage policies at all and
individuals handled their own trash disposal. As one government report
described: "[s]ome bum [garbage], while others wrap it up in paper and
carry it on their way to work and drop it when unobserved, or throw it into
vacant lots or into the river."7 Disposal, however, was not the only means
of handling trash. Resourceful households in the 1700s recycled much of
what they did not use, including bones (sold to peddlers for grease, gelatine
and knife handles) and rags (made into paper and cloth). 7 1 And when rags
were thrown away scavengers picked apart refuse piles and sold their finds
to junk dealers.72
Though the garbage practices of the 1700s were undoubtedly problematic, the Industrial Revolution turned the practices into an environmental catastrophe. Both the industrial processes themselves and the
products that resulted vastly increased the quantity of garbage. Although
garbage historian Susan Strasser's comment that "[m]ost Americans
produced little trash before the twentieth century" 73 may be overstated,74
the emergence of a serious industrial economy in the latter half of the
nineteenth century created a consumer culture, and its accompanying trash,
at levels never before seen. Melosi suggests that it wasn't until the
Industrial Revolution that "urban America discovered the garbage
problem" 75 when "[h]eaps of garbage, rubbish, and manure cluttered alleys
and streets, putrefied in open dumps, and tainted the watercourses into
76
which it was thrown.
The emergence of garbage as a major social problem resulted in the
collectivization of garbage disposal. What had previously been an individual responsibility became the charge of municipalities. Governments responded in part by encouraging and even mandating citizen recycling. New
York City's Commissioner of Streetsweeping, Civil War hero Colonel
George Waring, led the movement. In addition to dramatically improving
the street sweeping and snow removal operations of the city, Waring
mandated the separation of organic garbage, ash, and rubbish in the mid1890s (a policy known as "source separation")7 7 to produce revenue for the
70. Boston, Mass., Joint Special Committee on the Disposing of City Offal, Report of the Joint
Special Committee on the Disposing ofCity Offal (1893), reprinted in MELOSI, supranote 69, at 28.
71.
SUSAN STRASSER, WASTE AND WANT 13 (1999).
72. See FRANK AcKEmAN, WHY Do WE RECYCLE?: MARKETS, VALUES, AND PUBLIC POLICY
15-16 (1997).
73. STRASSER, supra note 71, at 12.
74. Melosi describes the refuse and offal that cluttered colonial streets as well as the streets of
cities in the mid-1800s: "In eastern cities, where crowding became a chronic problem as early as the
1770s, the streets reeked with waste .... As late as the 1860s, Washingtonians dumped garbage and
slop into alleys and streets .... MELOSI, supra note 69, at 14.
75. Id. at21.
76.
77.
Id.
MELOSI, supranote 69, at 69.
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city.78 Ash could be recycled for use as landfill and would be tainted and
unusable if mixed with organic waste,79 food waste (organic garbage) was
used to produce grease for soap products, and rubbish was sorted through
to find paper and other reusable items.8" The city gave Waring forty police
officers to help enforce the garbage separation laws, both through education of the populace about the importance of garbage separation and
through the issuance of fines for violators.8'
In an ambitious attempt to garner the cooperation of the citizenry in
implementing his garbage and street cleaning policies, in 1896 Colonel
Waring created a group called the Junior Street Cleaning League, his most
obvious attempt at shaping norms in favor of his garbage laws. By the end
of his tenure in 1898, Waring had successfully recruited 5,000 school-age
participants and used them to "act as eyes, ears, and noses in discovering
unsanitary conditions and their perpetrators."82 The children took a civic
pledge, wore white caps and badges, marched in citywide parades, and
sang songs like the following (sung to the tune of the Battle Hymn of the
Republic):
There's a change within our city, great improvements in our day;
The streets' untidy litter with the dirt has passed away.
We children pick up papers, even while we are at play;
And we will keep right on.83
Waring was engaged in norm shaping on an impressive scale. He believed
that if he inculcated children with a belief in his policies they, in turn,
would influence their parents. 4 Waring also engaged other civic groups in
78. Id. at 63-69. Along with more traditional methods, Waring used quite unconventional tools to
promote his garbage policies, which were predicated largely on the belief that the littering of public
streets and indiscriminate disposal of garbage were public health problems. In a move that resonates
with Lawrence Lessig's suggestion that government ought to attempt to shift the social meaning of
certain acts in order to change behavioral norms, see Lessig, supra note 8, at 1019, Waring required his
street sweeping crews (whose principal aim was to rid the streets of huge amounts of litter, food and
animal waste, animal carcasses, and other detritus) to wear white. He apparently hoped to get the public
to associate the workers with members of the health professions in order to begin to think about
garbage as a public health problem. According to Melosi, he was wildly successful. MELOSI, supra note
69, at 65-66.
79. See STRASSER, supranote 71, at 128.
80. See Recycling in NYC, at http://www.ci.nyc.ny.us/htm/dos/htmVbwrecy/3body.html (last
visited Feb. 15, 1999).
81. See STRASSER, supra note 71, at 128.
82. MELOSI, supra note 69, at 74-75.
83. MELOSI, supra note 69, at 75 (quoting GEORGE E. WARING, JR., STREET CLEANING AND THE
DISPOSAL OF A CITY'S WASTE: METHODS AND RESULTS AND THE EFFECT UPON PUBLIC HEALTH,
PUBLIC MORALS, AND MUNICIPAL PROSPERITY (1898)).
84. See MELOSI, supra note 69, at 74. Waring's efforts were based in part on a view that poor
immigrants were particularly likely to create public health problems through their garbage disposal
practices and particularly unlikely to follow the sanitary code requirements of garbage separation. See
id. at 74 (citing WARING, supra note 83, at 177-186). Many of the members of the Junior Street
Cleaning League were immigrant children. SUELLEN M. Hoy & MICHAEL C. ROBINSON, RECOVERING
THE PAST: A HANDBOOK OF COMMUNITY RECYCLING PROGRAMS 1890-1945 6 (1979). Susan Strasser
2001]
RECYCLING NORMS
his efforts, particularly women's groups that began to campaign for sanitary garbage conditions as part of their civic efforts.
Waring's legacy was long-lasting. The professionalization of garbage
collection that he began in the mid-i 890s spread across the country. By the
turn of the century, about 80% of cities with populations over 25,000 required some form of garbage separation to foster recyclingY5 Many smaller
cities made money by selling organic garbage for hog feed and collecting
the garbage daily during the summer months.86 Cities around the country
even replicated Waring's Juvenile Street Cleaning League.87
Though the separation of garbage accompanied by the recycling of
ash and organic garbage continued to have adherents well into the twentieth century,88 the rise of the sanitary landfill as the most commonly accepted disposal option by American municipalities largely displaced
separation and recycling in the middle of the century.89 In most parts of the
country, cheap and abundant land made landfilling a very economical disposal option.9
B.
World War II
During World War II the federal government undertook a massive
effort to engage the citizenry in recycling, with a particular emphasis on
creating social norms in favor of recycling for patriotic reasons. Norm
management seemed particularly necessary because war-era recycling programs called on individual households to join the effort. The recycling efforts ostensibly sought to replace certain raw materials in short supply by
canvassing individual households for recyclable goods.
During the war, the salvage division of the War Production Board9"
enlisted numerous groups, including the steel industry, aluminum scrap
collectors, charitable groups like the Boy and Girl Scouts, and individual
households, to recycle everything from aluminum (for bayonets, incendiary
bombs, helmets, and guns)92 to household fat (from which glycerine could
be extracted and used to make nitroglycerine, an ingredient of certain ex-
suggests that this view about "class and trash" was widely held among urban sanitary reformers and is
reflected in the inscription on the Statute of Liberty (inscribed in 1901): 'Give me your tired, your
poor... The wretched refuse of your teeming shore."' STRASSm, supra note 71, at 136.
85. STRASSER, supranote 71, at 128-29.
86. Id.
87. ME.osi, supranote 69, at 76.
88. Between 1902 and 1924, 59 to 83% of American cities practiced some sort of garbage
separation. Id. at 157.
89. Id. at 168.
90. See Martin V. Melosi, Down in the Dumps: Is There a Garbage Crisis in America?, 5 J.
POL'Y Hisr. 100, 107-08 (1993).
91.
Hoy & RoarNSON, supranote 84, at 4.
92. STRASSER, supranote 71, at 261.
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plosives). 93 Collection efforts varied widely but seemed cleverly designed
to maximize face-to-face contact among potential participants, taking advantage of what modem public goods experiments tell us about how communication increases cooperation. The Board enlisted Boy Scouts to go
door-to-door in some communities collecting aluminum pots and pans; local businesses sponsored contests to see who could collect the largest
amounts of scrap; housewives served as "Minute Women," in charge of
disseminating information about salvage activities to their neighbors; and
17,000 "fat salvage" committees around the country organized collection
efforts aimed largely at housewives. 94 Newspaper publishers met with the
War Production Board chairman to assist in the salvage campaign and
contributed slogans like "Slap the Japs with the Scrap!" and "Hit Hitler
with the Junk!"95 Children were mobilized across the country to collect
iron, rubber, rags, and steel. Scholastic Magazine exhorted its juvenile
readers that "[in] every room of every school, you students will be the active soldiers and non-commissioned officers of the scrap drive."96
Yet in an argument that rings familiar in contemporary debates about
the efficacy of household recycling, Susan Strasser suggests that household
scrap drives were much more important for propaganda purposes than for
supplying war materials. Most of the usable scrap came from industry, and
"the cost of household scrap collection was high and the volume of
97
material collected minor.
C. The 1960s and 1970s
The 1960s and the birth of the environmental movement saw a renewed effort to engage individuals in recycling activities. Recycling programs in the early decades of the modem era consisted largely of local,
nongovernmental recycling drop-off centers that collected newspapers,
glass, and aluminum cans. 98 Some municipalities started programs during
this era as well: Frank Ackerman estimates that more than one hundred
communities had programs by 1974.99
The recycling programs of the 1960s and 1970s were the first to be
motivated by a concern that the amount of material generated and disposed
of is problematic in and of itself: Suellen Hoy and Michael Robinson call
93. Id. at 229-63. Strasser interviewed a physicist who suggested that household fat collection
had far more use as a propaganda tool in favor of the war than for use as a component in explosives
production. Id. at 253.
94. Id. at 245, 251, 253.
95. Id. at 249.
96. Id. at 256 (citing What You Can Dofor Your Country: Get in the Scrap!, SCHOLASTIC, Sept.
28-Oct. 3, 1942, at 3).
97. STRASSER, supranote 71, at 262.
98. ACKERMAN, supranote 25, at 16-17.
99. Id. at 17.
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1259
this motivation "environmental patriotism... led by individuals who perceive that the separation, recovery, and reuse of waste is essential to the
long-range stability and well-being of this nation."'0 0 More specific concerns about landfills and their potentially deleterious environmental effects
and concern about litter also led to the establishment of drop-off recycling
programs.' 01 Recycling programs in the 1960s and 1970s planted the seeds
for more widespread efforts in the future, but recycling in these decades
never amounted to much of an alternative to conventional landfilling."32
Many recycling programs languished in the latter part of the 1970s and
early 1980s as market and political forces put recycling on the back
burner.0 3 These early failures seem consistent with empirical and experimental evidence, and with my hypothesis about how effective norms are
likely to be in solving large-number, small-scale collective action problems. Norms may be able to generate an initial burst of cooperative efforts,
but on their own cannot contribute substantially to the resolution of such
problems when the necessary behavior requires significant effort and ongoing behavioral change. Without large expenditures to ease the effort,
local recycling programs never made a significant dent in the way garbage
was handled.
D.
Recycling Today
In the 1980s and 1990s recycling experienced a renaissance. A per-
ceived crisis in available landfill has spurred this resurgence. Most dramatically, in 1987 a single incident, the aimless wandering of the garbage
barge Mobro after numerous jurisdictions rejected its New York-generated
cargo, and the accompanying media attention, signaled to the American
public that its garbage habits had to change." 4 The Mobro incident arose
when incineration of garbage (once thought a promising landfill alterna100. Hoy & ROBINSON,supra note 84, at 23. The individuals leading the charge might be viewed,
in Ellickson's terminology, as "change agents." Ellickson, supra note 11, at 11.
101. See AcK mAN,supra note 25, at 16.
102. See Tom Watson, Recycling in the 1990s: New Horizons, Fast Pace, in RECYCLING
SOURCaBOOK 3 (Thomas J.Cichonski & Karen Hill eds., 1993).
103. See ACIRmAN, supra note 25, at 72-75. Ackerman describes in some detail the volatility of
the market for scrap and recycled material. In 1974-75, many scrap prices peaked and then crashed,
leading to the demise of many municipal programs. The scrap market continues to be volatile and,
indeed, scrap prices bottomed out again in the early 1990s, but recent recycling programs have had
much more staying power. See discussion infra Part lII.D.
104. Jeff Bailey, Curbside Recycling Comforts the Soul, But Benefits Are Scant, WALL ST. J., Jan.
19, 1995, at Al. The Mobro sailing was just one of many forces that together led to the dramatic
increase in recycling programs. Many landfills had been declared Superfind sites, so the public may
already have been primed for action. Baby boomers, who were only teenagers or in their early 20s
during the first Earth Day, had become home owners and may have been particularly receptive to
govemment-funded recycling programs. Markets for recyclable goods, too, may have been improving
as manufacturers got better at producing recycled products. See AcKERMAN, supra note 25, at 72-75,
for historical data on the market for scrap. Regardless of the cause, however, recycling took off in the
late 1980s and early 1990s at an unprecedented rate. See infra notes 110-112 and accompanying text.
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tive) had become controversial," 5 and the Environmental Protection
Agency ("EPA") had listed landfills around the country as Superfrnd sites.
Moreover, landfills closed in record numbers while many communities
challenged proposed new sites.10 6 Pundits predicted that we would run out
of landfill capacity in a matter of years, 0 7 and the press and public assumed
that a shortage of landfill capacity led to the rejection of the Mobro's
cargo. I's Recycling seemed an obvious alternative.
Though it turns out that observers overstated the perceived landfill
crisis, 109 enthusiasm for recycling has continued. And although some states
already had extensive recycling programs prior to the Mobro incident,"0
state programs have grown rapidly since the barge's journey. One statistic
105. Incineration of garbage became a popular alternative to landfilling in many states in the
1970s and 1980s, in part because of its environmental promise: incinerators were intended to convert
waste to energy, thus making garbage a replacement for more conventional energy sources. But
incineration created its own environmental problems, most significantly the creation of a highly toxic
ash that had to be disposed of in special landfills. ACKERMAN, supra note 25, at 18. Community
opposition to new incinerators began to escalate, making their siting increasingly difficult. Louis
BLUMBERG & ROBERT GOTTLIEB, WAR ON WASTE: CAN AMERICA WIN IS
BATTLE WvITH GARBAGE?
(1989) (chronicling the derailment of a proposed incinerator in East Los Angeles). As a result, despite
earlier predictions, incinerators have not displaced landfills as the most common garbage disposal
option, and the amount of garbage incinerated each year has remained flat during the 1990s. Glenn, The
State of Garbagein America, BIOCYcLE, April 1998, at 32 [hereinafter Glenn, State of Garbage 1998].
106. Peter S. Menell, Beyond the Throwaway Society: An Incentive Approach to Regulating
Municipal Solid Waste, 17 ECOLOGY L.Q. 655, 656-67 (1990). The opposition to new landfills gained
steam when environmental justice advocates argued that low-income communities of color included a
disproportionate share of solid and hazardous waste sites. See, e.g., Vicki Been, What's FairnessGot to
Do with It? EnvironmentalJustice and the Siting of Locally UndesirableLand Uses, 78 CORNELL L.
REV. 1001, 1003 (1993); Richard J. Lazarus, Pursuing 'Environmental Justice': The Distributional
Effects ofEnvironmental Protection, 87 Nw. U. L. REv. 787 (1993).
107. See OFFICE OF SOLID WASTE, EPA, THE SOLID WASTE DILEMMA: AN AGENDA FOR ACTION
8 (1989) [hereinafter SOLID WASTE DILEMMA] (predicting that one third of the country's landfills
would close by 1992).
108. The Wall Street Journal reports that the jurisdictions that rejected the Mobro's cargo did so
not because of a lack of landfill capacity, but first in Louisiana over concerns that the barge might have
been hauling hazardous materials and then by other jurisdictions because of a fear of negative publicity
once the media began chronicling the Mobro's journey. See Bailey, supra note 104, at A8. To be fair,
however, New York City does face what might be termed a landfill crisis. Its only remaining landfill,
Fresh Kills, is scheduled to be permanently closed at the end of 2001. See Benjamin Miller, Fat of the
Land: New York's Waste, 65 SOCIAL RESEARCH 75 (1998). Mobro's garbage was eventually
incinerated in Brooklyn. See Bailey, supra note 104, at A8.
109. Though many landfills did close, those that remain open have greater capacity and are
maintained in a more environmentally responsible manner than their predecessors that were shut down.
See ACKERMAN, supra note 25, at 19; Glenn, State of Garbage 1998, supra note 105, at 32; Bailey,
supranote 104, at Al, A8. As of 1998, only the state of Vermont reported having less than five years'
capacity remaining in its available landfills. See Glenn, State of Garbage 1998, supra note 105, at 32.
Part of the reason that landfill capacity today is more abundant than early predictions suggest is
attributable, however, to the success of recycling programs. See, e.g., Tom Gorman, Desert Landfill
Plans in the Dumps, L.A. TIMES, June 22, 1999, at BI (describing how desert landfill plans are
languishing because stringent recycling laws have cut need for new landfills); infra Part IV.A
(outlining empirical evidence about the increase in recycling and the decreased reliance on landfilling).
110. By 1988, for example, the state of Washington was already recycling (by its own estimate)
22% of its municipal solid waste. See Glenn, State of Garbage 1998, supra note 105, at 34.
2001]
RECYCLING NORMS
is illustrative: BioCycle magazine, which has surveyed states about their
recycling progress annually since 1989, estimates that in 1990 the country
recycled approximately 8% of its municipal solid waste; by 1998 that figure had leapt to 30%, an almost fourfold increase in less than a decade."
1. The Structure of Recycling Governance
Recycling of municipal solid waste occurs at record levels today in
every region of the country."' And though we use landfills more than any
other method of solid waste disposal, over the past decade recycling has
become the dominant alternative to landfill." 3 While recycling has increased, the federal government plays only a small role in recycling policy.
As in Colonel Waring's day, garbage disposal remains a municipal activity.
Since 1976, when Congress enacted the Resources Conservation and
Recovery Act ("RCRA"), the federal government has played a significant
role in the regulation of landfills and in the generation, transport, storage,
and disposal of hazardous waste." 4 But with respect to the regulation and
disposal of nonhazardous waste, which includes most municipal solid
waste, the federal government's role includes only a few activities. It provides technical assistance to states and local governments in establishing
and managing solid waste policies and programs. In the mid-1980s, it provided some funding for solid waste management. And in 1988, the EPA
established an unenforceable goal that 25% of the nation's municipal solid
waste be recycled by the year 1992,' a goal the agency recently increased
to 35% by the year 2005.26 The federal government also collects and
analyzes data about municipal solid waste, including data that reflects the
111. Id. at 32-33.
112. Municipal solid waste, very generally, includes "durable goods, nondurable goods, containers
and packaging, food wastes and yard trimmings, and miscellaneous inorganic wastes" from
"residential, commercial, institutional and industrial [not including process wastes] sources." OFFICE OF
SOLID WASTE, EPA, CHARACTERIZATION OF MUNICIPAL SOLID WASTE IN THE UNITED STATES
(1997) [hereinafter CHARACTERIZATION OF MUnIcIPAL SOLID WASTE].
17
113. BioCycle magazine estimates that in 1999, 61% of America's municipal solid waste was
landfilled, 31.5% recycled, and 7.5% incinerated. In contrast in 1990, 84% of the country's municipal
solid waste was landfilled, 8% was recycled, and 8% was incinerated. See Jim Glenn, The State of
Garbage in America, BIOCYCLE, Apr. 1999, at 48 [hereinafter Glenn, State of Garbage 1999]. The
EPA estimates a somewhat more conservative rate of recycling and recycling growth, but agrees with
the upward trend. See infra notes 166-180 and accompanying text.
114.
42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6922(k) (1994).
115. See SOLID WASTE REmOVAL, supranote 107, at 22.
116. RCRA sets forth various objectives for managing solid waste, including recycling, and directs
that "[s]uch objectives are to be accomplished through Federal technical and financial assistance to
States or regional authorities for comprehensive planning pursuant to Federal guidelines designed to
foster cooperation among Federal, State, and local governments and private industry." 42 U.S.C.
§ 6941 (1994). The federal government appropriated funding for local assistance grants for municipal
waste energy, materials conservation, and recovery planning between 1978 and 1988, see 42 U.S.C.
§ 6948(a)(1), but has provided no additional funding since that time. The 35% goal by the year 2005
has been increased from a 25% goal for recycling by 2000. Municipal Solid Waste Programs, at
http://vwwv.epa.gov/epaoswer/non-hw/muncpl/programs.htm (last visited Sept. 17, 1999).
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extent to which the nation's states and municipalities are complying with
the percentage recycling goal."' The EPA has made clear that diversion of
municipal solid waste from landfills through recycling is a top priority, and
its leadership on the issue has probably contributed to the extensive recycling activities taking place at the state and municipal level. Nevertheless,
the contemporary regulatory structure limits the EPA's role largely to one
of advice and encouragement. Therefore, the process of developing recycling programs historically has largely fallen to states and municipalities;
as it turns out, these state and local programs have evolved into a complex
mix of law, norms management, market incentives, and architectural
changes.
2. State and Local Tools to EncourageRecycling
In this section, I explain various regulatory programs state and local
governments have adopted to achieve widespread individual recycling
rates. ' I categorize them according to whether the programs represent attempts to modify law, norms, markets, or architecture, though some efforts
do not easily lend themselves to categorization." 9 These categories allow
me to evaluate more broadly whether and how each category has worked,
to provide a framework for analyzing empirical evidence about recycling
behavior, and to determine the relative success of each category. I then turn
to empirical evidence about the extent to which each of the various tools
works in encouraging environmentally cooperative behavioral change in an
117. See, e.g., CHARACTERIZATION OF MUNICIPAL SOLID WASTE, supranote 112.
118. Though beyond the scope of this Article, the political alignment of various groups likely
affected by a jurisdiction's choice of recycling tools is not entirely obvious. Garbage collectors stand to
increase their ranks if curbside programs are adopted because of the increased work load from picking
up recycling materials in addition to garbage; state departments of education gain resources if asked to
develop school recycling curricula; advertising agencies or even nonprofit environmental groups might
win contracts to develop ad campaigns to shape recycling norms. It would be interesting to know
whether the strength of the interest groups affected by recycling policies plays a role in the mix of tools
state and local governments adopt in their efforts to increase recycling behavior.
119.
I intentionally concentrate only on those policy options either aimed specifically at individual
households, or whose intended effect is to encourage individual household recycling. States and the
federal government have adopted numerous additional measures that may affect individual behavior
indirectly. For example, a number of states require that certain products contain a minimum percentage
of recycled materials: newsprint is the most prominent example. See Mark Fitzgerald, States Ax Strict
Recycling Laws, 131 EDITOR & PUBLISHER 20-22 (Nov. 28, 1998) (reviewing various state
requirements and noting that many states have either repealed or scaled back their requirements).
Minimum percentage requirements may affect demand for recyclable materials, and hence make
recycling more profitable for individuals. I exclude an analysis of these measures primarily because
recycling behavior at the household level, unless done for financial remuneration, tends not to be
directly affected by such efforts. Although the profitability of recycling programs is affected by
governmental attempts to boost the market for recyclables, once the program is in place, individual
recycling participants generally are unaffected by or are unaware of such efforts. I also exclude efforts
by nongovernmental actors, including commercial recycling buyback centers, because my interest is in
determining how governments can marshal various tools to help solve large-number, small-payoff
collective action problems.
2001)
RECYCLING NORMS
1263
attempt to shed light on the role of each, law, norms, markets and architecture, in accomplishing that end.
a. Direct Legal Mechanisms: MandatoryRecycling
The most obvious and direct example of reliance on formal law to
induce behavioral change is mandated citizen recycling. Several states, including South Dakota and Wisconsin, have adopted mandatory recycling
laws, as have several local jurisdictions, from large (New York City) to
small (Winona, Minnesota, pop. 26,000). New York City, for example,
requires its residential citizens to separate glass, metal cans, plastic bottles
and jugs, beverage cartons, aluminum foil products, metal, newspapers,
magazines, catalogues, phone books, cardboard, and other paper from garbage. "' New York accompanies its mandatory law with curbside recycling
to facilitate compliance with the law.
Though mandating recycling constitutes the use of formal law to
achieve behavioral change, such laws may be directed as much at norm
change or norm strengthening as at increasing the direct price of noncompliance. Robert Cooter, Cass Sunstein, and others have pointed this out in
other contexts.'12 For example, Sunstein suggests that formal laws that
mandate behavior with little threat of enforcement serve an important expressive function and can "reconstruct norms and the social meaning of
action."'" When jurisdictions impose mandatory recycling laws unaccompanied by real enforcement efforts, they may attempt to make noncompliers feel more psychic pain from failing to participate by signaling to their
citizenry that recycling is important.
Mandatory laws also may serve an important function in suggesting to
recyclers that their cooperative behavior will be reciprocated. Recall the
findings from public goods experiments that people will cooperate as long
as others do. Given that solid waste reduction through recycling is a largenumber, small-payoff problem, making communication and sanctioning
difficult without outside intervention, mandatory recycling laws may effectively substitute for the difficulty in communicating and sanctioning
even without enforcement. Mandatory laws also encourage cooperation by
2
taking advantage of a more generalized norm of law abidingness.l 1
120. 16 RCNY § 1-08(a) (2001).
121.
See Cooter, supranote 13, at 1674-75; Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law,
144 U. PA. L. REv. 2021, 2034-35 (1996).
122. Sunstein, supranote 121, at 2032.
123. See Jolls et al., supra note 12, at 1497 (explaining the development of a norm of law
abidingness); Tapp & Levine, supra note 7, at 566 (same). Unfortunately, no good empirical evidence
exists about the effect mandatory recycling laws have on recycling behavior. In a somewhat related
context, however, mandatory laws requiring voting seem to produce large increases in turnout even
when enforcement is nonexistent, see Richard L. Hasen, Voting Without Law?, 144 U. PA. L. REv.
2135 (1996), and smoking bans in public places have produced large drops in smoking even with little
enforcement, see Jolls et al., supra note 12, at 1497. For an economic model predicting that the
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b. IndirectLegal Mechanisms: Waste Diversion Goals
One of the most popular tools for encouraging the recycling of solid
waste also relies on formal law, though less directly. Numerous states have
established goals for the diversion of waste out of landfills and into recycling efforts (consistent with the EPA's stated goal of a national recycling
rate of 35% by the year 2005). Forty-two states and the District of
Columbia have such goals, ranging from a low of 25% to New Jersey's
ambitious goal of 65%.124
Seven states make the goals mandatory for local governments, though
even in most mandatory states there is little consequence for failing to meet
the goal. 115 The remaining states simply establish diversion goals for the
state as a whole with no penalties for noncompliance. 26 The establishment
of these goals, whether through local mandates or statewide, is not an attempt to regulate individual behavior directly via law by, for example, requiring recycling. Instead, in the mandatory states, these goals require
municipalities to adopt policies that divert garbage out of landfills (typically through recycling, source reduction and composting), and leave it to
the localities to establish mechanisms for doing so. In the nonmandatory
states, localities and the states work together to achieve the goal through a
variety of behavior-altering tools like the promotion of recycling, but again
the goal itself does not mandate individual behavioral change. Thus, one
might categorize these efforts as aimed at norm change, where the percentage goal is designed to get municipalities, and ultimately individuals, to
think differently about how to dispose of garbage. But it is unclear
whether, absent additional mechanisms for behavioral change, the goals
would have any force. States typically, therefore, accompany these landfill
diversion goals with additional policy tools to meet the targets.
Another indirect method of encouraging recycling by relying on formal law is to ban certain materials from landfills. Bans on lawn trimmings
are common, as are bans on tires,' 27 vehicle batteries (which contain
enactment of new laws can lead to large increases in the targeted behavior, see Robert Cooter, Do Good
Laws Make Good Citizens? An EconomicAnalysis of InternalizedNorms, 86 VA. L. REV. 1577 (2000);
for a view that law can channel behavior by providing a focal point around which individual behavior
can coalesce, see Richard H. McAdams, A FocalPoint Theoy of Expressive Law, 86 VA. L. REV. 1649
(2000).
124. See Glenn, State of Garbage 1999, supra note 113, at 71.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. California, for example, has an elaborate permitting procedure for tire storage and disposal
and limits the number of landfills authorized to accept tire waste. CAL. PUB. REs. CODE
§§ 42800-42895 (West 1999). Thirty-seven states ban tires from landfills. Jim Glenn, The State of
Garbage in America, Part 11, BIOCYCLE, May 1998, at 48, 52 [hereinafter Glenn, State of Garbage
Part11].
2001]
RECYCLING NORMS
1265
hazardous waste), 12 motor oil,1 29 and even plastic. 3 A few states, including Connecticut, Massachusetts, South Dakota, and Wisconsin, now prohibit materials like glass and newspaper that are the target of mandatory
recycling laws.13' In addition to encouraging proper disposal of some of
these items, the aim of these laws is often to encourage the recycling of the
banned materials, but without a direct mandate that consumers actually
recycle them.
c. ArchitecturalMechanisms: FacilitatingRecycling Behavior
Perhaps the most popular mechanism to encourage recycling has been
to "change the architecture" of recycling to facilitate the behavior. The
most popular means of doing so has been to institute curbside pickup of
recycled materials. 3 2 Under such systems, residents separate their recyclable garbage into different containers and place the containers on the curb
for pickup with their regular garbage. In most jurisdictions, residents have
no legal obligation to participate in recycling; rather the goal is to make
recycling easier and more convenient. Many of the mandatory jurisdictions
also provide curbside recycling to make compliance easier. 33
Curbside municipal programs have grown over the past decade from
approximately 1,042 in 1989114 to 9,349 in 1999.131 Curbside recycling
serves 54% of the American public, 36 and only the state of Hawaii has no
such program. Regional access to curbside pickup varies widely, and not
surprisingly, the most densely populated regions of the country, the
Mid-Atlantic and New England states, have the highest access at 82 and
73% respectively. By contrast, only 27% of the populace in the Midwest,
37
and 23% in the Rocky Mountain states, has curbside pickup.
Jurisdictions use commingled curbside recycling to make recycling
even more user-friendly. Under such a system, residents separate their
recyclables from other trash, but need not separate different types of recyclable material (for example, to separate aluminum from paper and paper
128. Car batteries are the most commonly banned items. Forty-three states prohibit their disposal
in landfills. Glenn, State of GarbagePart II, supranote 127, at 49.
129. Id.
130. See Wis. STAT. ANN. § 287.07 (West 1999).
131.
See Glenn, State of GarbagePartII, supra note 127, at 52.
132. See Glenn, supranote 113, for a description of the rapid rise of curbside programs.
133. See New York Recycles, at http://www.ci.nyc.us/htmlldostpdf/recyr.recyrpt3.pdf (last visited
Apr. 16, 2001).
134. Glenn, State of Garbage 1998, supra note 105, at 32-33.
135. Glenn, supranote 113, at 63.
136. Id. at 64.
137. Id. Densely populated regions are likely to have more curbside pickup both because such
programs tend to be more economical when houses are closer together and because landfills tend to be
less available and more expensive, making recycling a more attractive disposal option. For example,
tipping fees (the per ton cost charged to haulers for nonhazardous solid waste) at landfills across the
country vary widely, from a high of S60 in New Jersey to a low of$10 in Vyoming. Id. at 66.
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from plastics). This practice appears to be growing in popularity. Still other
municipalities have established or contracted with existing recycling dropoff centers. BioCycle magazine reports that 12,699 drop-off programs
existed in 1998, with the Great Lakes and Southern states reporting the
38
highest number of programs.
Each of these programs (curbside separated, curbside commingled,
and drop-off) simply removes barriers to recycling by making it more convenient, typically with no formal law requiring the behavior. If either the
signaling theory or esteem-gathering theory of norms is correct, 39 the programs also may work on another level. Curbside programs in particular,
with their easily identifiable recycling bins, provide participants an opportunity to make a visible statement about their environmentally proper behavior and, in turn, to see who is failing to cooperate. Thus, one could dub
these architectural changes norm-strengthening efforts as well.
d. Market Mechanisms: FinancialIncentives40
i. Bottle Bills
Between 1972 and 1986, ten states enacted some version of a container deposit law (popularly known as a "bottle bill"), 4 ' which requires
consumers to pay a deposit on certain drink containers. Upon return of the
container the consumer receives her deposit back. 4 2 These laws explicitly
change the market for recycling beverage containers by making it more
expensive, by as much as ten cents per bottle in Michigan and as little as
138. BioCycle believes that the statistics about available drop-off centers are highly inaccurate.
Some states lump together for-profit and public facilities so that the 1998 survey showed a 20%
increase over 1996, a jump BioCycle thinks is highly suspect. See Glenn, State of Garbage 1998, supra
note 105, at 69-70. Regardless of the actual number, drop-off programs represent a significant part of
the recycling story.
139. See supranotes 19-22 and accompanying text.
140. No American jurisdictions have taken the path of Germany and some other countries, which
require industry to accept the packaging of its products or provide for its collection and recycling. For
an interesting account of the German experience, see ACKERMAN, supra note 25, at 105-22.
141.
These states are California, Connecticut, Delaware, Iowa, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan,
New York, Oregon, and Vermont.
142. Actually, Vermont passed a bottle bill in 1953, and at the same time banned nonrefundable
bottles, but its statute expired in 1957 and was not reenacted. See id. at 126; see also Harvey Alter, Cost
ofRecycling Municipal Solid Waste with and Without a Concurrent Beverage ContainerDeposit Law,
27 J. CONSUMER AFFAIRS 166 (1993); Jeffrey B. Wagenbach, The Bottle Bill: Progressand Prospects,
36 SYRACUSE L. REv. 759, 761 (1985). For a brief time Florida charged an "advance disposal fee" of
one cent on plastic containers not recycled at a 50% rate, see Menell, supra note 106, at 678, but the
law was repealed in 1995. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 403.7197(6a) (West 1999).
The history of throwaway drink containers is interestingly recounted in ACKERMAN at 124-25. As
he describes, though disposable cans first appeared in the 1930s, they did not gain in popularity until
World War 11, when the Busch family attempted to counter anti-German-American sentiment by
sending more than one billion disposable cans and one-half billion disposable bottles of Budweiser to
soldiers at domestic and overseas camps. After the War, veterans "helped keep the beer can alive" by
purchasing over a third of all beer sold in cans. See ACKERMAN, supra note 25, at 125.
20011
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1267
two and one-half cents in California, to throw a bottle or can away rather
than returning it to be recycled. 43 The impetus behind bottle bill legislation
was led as much by antilitter sentiments as recycling sentiments, but the
mechanism adopted clearly results in the recycling of beverage containers.1" No American state has enacted a bottle bill since California did so in
1986, though Bill Clinton proposed a national bottle bill as part of his 1992
election platform.'45 Although part of the explanation for the lack of growth
in bottle bill states comes from continued opposition from the beverage
industry, many curbside recycling proponents question the efficacy of
container deposit laws because they remove from curbside pickup the most
valuable recyclable146material, and thus reduce municipal revenues from
curbside programs.
ii. Unit Pricingfor Garbage
Historically, local jurisdictions have not charged variable rates for the
disposal of their trash. Instead municipalities have typically charged a flat
fee for garbage pickup services, or have incorporated garbage pickup
charges directly into the overall property tax.147 This pricing strategy arose
because the costs of landfilling, the dominant mode of garbage disposal in
this country for most of the century, were quite low historically, and the
marginal cost for additional amounts of trash resulted in only small
marginal cost increases. For decades landfills set the dumping price
(known as the tipping fee) at just a few dollars per ton of garbage, and jurisdictions therefore had little incentive to control the amount of garbage
143. Most of the bottle bill states require a five cent deposit per container, though some vary their
deposits based on size or on whether the container can be reused by more than one bottler. See
Wagenbach, supra note 142, at 761-62 n.15. California's statute is somewhat different. After voters
rejected a more traditional bottle bill via initiative after a nasty campaign in which the container
industry spent millions to defeat the measure, the California legislature enacted a compromise version
that imposes a tvo and one-half cent redemption value on containers, an amount that increases if the
redemption rate of a particular container type drops below 65%. The state collects the redemption
amount from bottle distributors and then reimburses them for their administrative costs out of the
redemption proceeds. See CAL. PuB. REs. CoDa §§ 14501-14599 (West 1999).
144. Ackerman also describes some of the ancillary benefits from bottle bill legislation. The year
after Massachusetts enacted a bottle bill "[o]utdoor glass-related injuries treated at Children's Hospital
in Boston fell by 60%... while other childhood accidents remained constant or increased slightly."
AcKNitmAN, supranote 25, at 130. A federal General Accounting Office study indicated that bottle bills
lead to a 10 to 40% decline in litter by weight and a 40 to 60% decline by volume. Id. Interestingly,
farmers are often supportive of bottle bills because of the costs they experience from broken glass
litter: damage to farm equipment tires, downtime from damaged equipment, crop contamination from
broken glass, and animal injury or death from broken glass consumption. See id. at 130-31.
145. See id. at 127.
146. Id. See infra notes 250-252 for a more thorough discussion of this point.
147. See RoBN R. JENKINs, THE ECONOMICS OF SOLID WAsTE REDUcTION (1993), at 1; see also
Menell, supranote 106, at 657 ("A major cause of the solid waste crisis is that the costs of solid waste
disposal are largely hidden from American consumers."); AcKanmmAN, supra note 25, at 32 (discussing
pricing of solid waste disposal).
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CALIFORNIA LA W REVIEW
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going into landfills. Today, by contrast, landfills in many of the
Mid-Atlantic and Northeast states charge between $50 and $60 per ton,
with New Jersey leading the country with a $60 per ton tipping fee.' 48 The
other dominant mode of garbage disposal, incineration, is on average
slightly more expensive than landfilling, with a high of $80 per ton in
Alaska and a low of $27 in Indiana.'4 9
As landfill and incineration rates have grown more expensive, and as
states have adopted goals to reduce the amount of solid waste going into
landfills, municipalities have looked to alternative ways to price garbage
collection. Rather than imposing a flat fee for garbage pickup, more than
4,000 jurisdictions across the country now impose variable fees on garbage
disposal based either on volume or weight. 5 ° The mechanisms for socalled unit pricing (or "pay as you throw") vary: some jurisdictions impose
a flat fee for garbage up to a set amount and then a variable amount for
garbage in excess of the set amount; others sell special bags that can be
used for garbage disposal or special tags that must be affixed to garbage
bags. In Perkasie, Pennsylvania, for example, residents pay $1.75 for each
bag, which holds up to forty pounds. In still other jurisdictions, residents
may pay a variable fee only for certain disposable items, like yard waste.',
And in still other jurisdictions, residents can buy different sized garbage
cans and pay a different amount per month for garbage pickup based on
can size. For refuse that exceeds the can volume, residents must purchase a
special sticker or refuse bag. 5 Each program shares a similar aim: to get
the price charged to residential households for garbage collection to reflect
148. See Glenn, supra note 105, at 40. Tipping fees are lowest in Wyoming, at $10 per ton. Id.
There are several reasons for the increase in tipping fees. Historically, landfills had few environmental
controls placed on them so that garbage and hazardous waste were just dumped onto open land. See
Menell, supra note 106, at 664. In 1976, Congress passed the Resources Conservation and Recovery
Act ("RCRA"), which placed extensive regulatory requirements on landfill operators and required
hazardous waste to be disposed of separately. See RCRA, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 6901-6921 (2001). As a
result of these new requirements, landfills are significantly more expensive to design, build, and
operate. See Menell, supra note 106, at 665. Moreover, local opposition to the siting of new landfills
has become increasingly common, see AcKamzAN, supra note 25, at 21-22, including in low-income
communities of color. See, e.g., Been, supra note 106, at 1003; Lazarus, supra note 106, at 790. The
number of landfills has been declining steadily over the last decade, to an all time low of 2,216 in 2000,
down from more than 7,900 in 1989. See Nora Goldstein, The State of Garbagein America, BIoCYCLE,
March 2000, at 30. Tipping fees have stabilized in the past several years and have actually dropped in
some areas. Mark Fritz, Recyclers Are Saying: 'Bin There, Done That,' L.A. TIMEs, Jan. 6, 2000 at Al.
Nevertheless, they remain significantly higher than they were in the early 1980s.
149. See Glenn, State of Garbage1998, supra note 105, at 40.
150. See EPA, Pay As You Throw Communities: Unit-Based Pricingin the United States: A Tally
of Communities, at http://www.epa.gov/epaoswer/non-hw/payt/comminfo.htm (last visited Dec. 6,
1999).
151.
See Greg Harder & Linda Knox, Implementing Variable Trash Collection Rates, BIOCYCLE,
Apr. 1992, at 33, 66-67.
152. See Marie Lynn Miranda & Joseph E. Aldy, Unit Pricing of Residential Municipal Solid
Waste: Lessonsfrom Nine Case Study Communities, EPA Office of Policy, Planning and Evaluation, at
5-6 (Mar. 1996) (on file with author).
2001]
RECYCLING NORMS
1269
its cost more accurately, and to make that price a part of an individual's
decision about whether to throw something away or recycle it.'53 Unit
pricing, as with many of the other tools to encourage recycling, is an indirect mechanism to encourage behavioral change, one focused on the market as a modality of regulation.
e. Norm Mechanisms: PersuasiveTechniques
Governments across the country frequently use persuasive techniques
to encourage household recycling. Many programs are meant simply to
educate households about recycling programs and how they operate.'54 A
city might, for example, send pamphlets to each household to which curbside recycling is provided enumerating the types of materials that can be
recycled and the categories of materials that should be separated.'55 These
straightforward informational campaigns may seem less oriented toward
norm change or norm strengthening than more explicit communication
methods, like celebrity advertising and persuasive brochures, but they
surely are meant to convey the importance of recycling. While reliable statistics measuring municipalities' use of education as a strategy to promote
recycling do not exist, the technique appears to be widespread. Virtually
every state with a website devoted to solid waste issues, for example,
includes a section devoted to promoting recycling;' 56 in studies of localities' pricing of garbage services, jurisdictions seem routinely to send out
written information about recycling;'57 and state-developed recycling curricula commonly appear. 5 '
153. See id. at 4-5.
154. See Sunstein, supra note 1, at 948-49 (describing education of this type as "simple statements
of fact designed to ensure accurate beliefs," often "in order to persuade people to do something new or
different"). Nongovernmental organizations, too, have encouraged recycling behavior through similar
techniques. For an example, see http:A/Iwv.environmentaldefense.org/issues/Recycling.html (last
visited Sept. 3, 2000).
155. E.g., New York Recycles, supra note 133, at 8-12 (describing recycling advertising campaign
educating households about different color containers and what to put in them).
156. E.g.,
California Integrated Waste Management Board, "Recycle" Page, at
http:lvww.cimwb.ca.govlRecycle (last visited May 3, 2001); Massachusetts Department of
Environmental Protection, "Recycling" Page, at http:lvww.state.ma.us/dep/recyclelrecycle.htm (last
visited May 3, 200 1) (containing links to waste management websites).
157. See Miranda & Aldy, supra note 152, at 14-16.
158. See, e.g., California Integrated Waste Management Board, "Classroom Curriculum" Page, at
http:IIwv.ciwmb.ca/gov/Schools!Curriculum/default.htm (last visited May 3, 2001); Massachusetts
Department of Environmental Protection, "Recycling" Page, "Teachers and Schools," at
http://vww.state.mafus/deplrecycle.htm#schools (last visited May 3, 2001); Oregon Department of
Environmental
Quality,
"Waste
Prevention
and
Management"
Page,
at
http:/Avww.deq.state.or.usvmclsolwaste/edu.html (last visited May 3, 2001).
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CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW
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Governments have also devised more explicitly persuasive programs
in their attempt to promote recycling.'59 Some are straightforward persuasive attempts. The U.S. EPA Office of Solid Waste web page on recycling,
for example, exhorts people to recycle by extolling the environmental
benefits society will reap from reduced reliance on landfilling."6 O Other
programs employ more classic advertising techniques, such as using celebrities and other attractive figures in an attempt to transfer the "social
capital" of the celebrity to recycling. 6 ' New York City, for example, has
used the Dance Theatre of Harlem, Sesame Street's Oscar the Grouch, Law
and Order's Jerry Orbach, New York Yankee Manager Joe Torre, and
Mayor Rudolph Giuliani to promote its recycling campaign. 62 California
has created Rex the Dinosaur (with the help of the Walt Disney Company)
to teach children about the virtues of recycling, presumably both to encourage long-term recycling behavior and to influence their parents at home.' 63
The EPA provides a recycling curriculum to school teachers, which includes games like "Environauts' Mission to Earth" and "The Case of the
Broken Loop."'" These persuasive techniques surely are meant to make
recipients see the importance of recycling, whether by providing arguments
in its favor or by signaling its importance through trusted, well-liked public
figures. As a result, individuals may feel more compelled to recycle, or
more guilty if they do not.
159. In Sunstein's words, this is education aimed at "persuasion,understood as a self-conscious
effort to alter attitudes and choices rather than simply to offer information." Sunstein, supra note 1, at
949.
160. See EPA, "MSW Management" Page, "Reduce,
Reuse, and Recycle," at
http://www.epa.gov/epaoswer/non-hw/muncplreduce.htm (last visited Apr. 15, 2001).
161.
See Lessig, supra note 8, at 1009. Lessig terms this technique "tying" and suggests that its
use can be a powerful tool to alter the social meaning of the particular behavior to whom a prominent
figure's name or image is attached. By using Joe Torre, for example, New York is presumably trying to
trade on both his notoriety as the manager of the wildly successful Yankees (a painful admission for
me, a Dodger fan), and the stature and respect he has gained for his perseverance through long years of
waiting to manage a world champion team. Lessig argues that a focus on changing the social meaning
of behavior, rather than on attempting to change the norms about that behavior, may be a less onerous,
more successful strategy.
162. See New York City Recycles, supra note 133, at 36-38.
163. See Recycle Rex, California Department of Conservation, CALIFORNIA RECYCLING REVIEW 3
(1993).
164. See EPA Office of Solid Waste Kids Page, at http://wvw.epa.gov/epaoswer/osw/kids.htm
(last visited Aug. 13, 2001). The focus on educating children about recycling is reminiscent of Colonel
Waring's Junior Children's League, which was intended to use children to persuade their parents about
the importance of sanitary garbage practices. See discussion supra notes 82-84.
2001]
RECYCLING NORMS
III
EVALUATING THE METHODS TO ENCOURAGE RECYCLING
A. EmpiricalEvidence About Who Recycles and Why
An impressive amount of empirical information exists about who recycles and under what circumstances. The empirical evidence falls into two
categories, which I use to organize this section. First, the federal government and BioCycle magazine have collected extensive data, estimating
both the amount of municipal solid waste diverted from landfills and the
amount recycled. Furthermore, these entities collect numerical information
about the types of programs various governments have adopted to meet
diversion goals. This information, however, tends not to focus on the relative success of various mechanisms to encourage recycling, but rather on
6
long-term trends in waste handling. 1
Second, numerous academic studies, when combined with government data, are quite useful for determining the success and failure of various approaches to encouraging recycling behavior. These academic studies
can generally be divided into two categories: those focused on the personal
characteristics of recyclers and nonrecyclers (for example, gender, age,
status as homeowner or renter, and attitudes toward environmental protection), and those focused on the effectiveness of various mechanisms designed to promote recycling (for example, informational campaigns,
curbside pickup access, and unit pricing of garbage). Some studies look at
both personal characteristics and program design. Still others focus on the
interrelationship of policy options, by evaluating, for example, whether
curbside recycling is more effective when accompanied by an education
campaign, or whether market incentives work more effectively in concert
with mandatory recycling laws. The data on long-term recycling trends
provide a way to assess the effectiveness of architectural changes, social
norms interventions, and financial incentives on recycling behavior. The
data also provide evidence to evaluate theories of social norm compliance
and, in turn, facilitate an understanding about how to intervene most effectively to strengthen social norms.
165. Governments do, however, sometimes support academic research into the efficacy of various
recycling and solid vaste management policies. See, e.g., Scott Bauer & Marie Miranda, The Urban
Performance of Unit Pricing: An Analysis of Variable Rates for Residential Garbage Collection in
Urban Areas, EPA (Report Prepared for Office of Policy, Planning and Evaluation) (1996) (prepared
by professors from Duke University's School of the Environment); Angela Ebrero et al., Reducing
Solid Waste: Linking Recycling to Environmentally Responsible Consumerism, 31 ENV'T & BmAv.
107 (1999) (prepared by academics from various institutions with funding from the Illinois Office of
Solid Waste Research).
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1. Government and BioCycle Data
Each year the EPA issues a voluminous report describing the handling
of solid waste across the country.'66 The annual reports show that the
amount of municipal solid waste generated more than doubled between
1960 and 1998.167
Both the EPA reports and BioCycle magazine, a publication focused
almost exclusively on recycling issues, also estimate annual recycling levels. These estimates are different because they are based on different methodologies, 168 but both reach the same overall conclusion: recycling activity
has increased steadily over the past decade. The EPA reports that in 1960
we recovered approximately 6.4% of the waste stream for recycling or
composting. By 1970, we recovered only 6.6%, and by 1980, ten years after the first Earth Day, which drew attention to recycling, the rate had risen
to just 9.6%. In 1990, the rate jumped to 16.2%, and in the following eight
years, the climb has been most dramatic, reaching 28% in 1998.169 These
166. The report was first issued in 1986, but even prior to that date the EPA, and before that the
U.S. Public Health Service, collected data and reported extensively on solid waste issues. See
CHARACTERIZATION OF MUNICIPAL SOLID WASTE, supra note 112. For examples of EPA and Public
Health Service publications prior to 1986, see Arsen Damay & William E. Franklin, Tile Role of
Packagingin Solid Waste Management 1966 to 1976 (Bureau of Solid Waste Mgmt., Public Health
Service Publication No. 1855, 1969); OFFICE OF SOLID WASTE MGMT.. EPA, SECOND REPORT TO
CONGRESS: RESOURCE RECOVERY AND SOURCE REDUCTION (1974).
The annual reports include information about the total amount of municipal solid waste generated,
and on a per capita basis, the total amount of waste landfilled, incinerated, and recycled. It breaks down
the municipal waste stream by material (for example, paper, plastics, metals, and glass) and the manner
in which the municipality disposed of each category of material. The report also provides long-term
trends for each of the above categories and makes projections for the future.
167. The 1998 report shows that the amount of municipal solid waste generated has increased
fairly dramatically over time, from 88,000 tons in 1960 to 217,000 in 1998. In per capita terms, perhaps
a better point of comparison, the daily solid waste generation rate per person in 1997 was 4.4 pounds,
compared with 2.7 pounds per person in 1960. Since 1990, the per capita daily generation rate actually
decreased from 4.5 pounds in 1990 to 4.3 in 1996 before rising back to 4.4 pounds per person in 1998.
See EPA, MUNICIPAL SOLID WASTE GENERATION, RECYCLING AND DISPOSAL IN THE UNITED
STATES: FACTS AD FIGURES FOR 1998, at 2 (on file with author) (hereinafter 1998 FACTS).
168. The EPA report is based on what its authors term a "material flows methodology." The
recycling estimates are made by category of materials and rely on estimates of the amount of a
particular category of material (for example, paper and paperboard) generated in a given year and
reports by national industry groups about the amount recovered, with some adjustments. See
CHARACTERIZATION
OF MUNICIPAL SOLID WASTE AND
DISPOSAL IN THE UNITED STATES: 1998
UPDATE [hereinafter 1998 SOLID WASTE REPoRT];1998 FACTS, supra note 167, at 22. BioCycle uses a
different methodology to calculate recycling rates by relying on state reports of their recycling rates.
Relying on state recycling rates has some serious limitations, as BioCycle acknowledges. States vary in
how they define recycling rates, what they count as municipal solid waste and how they convert
volume estimates to tonnage estimates. See Hope Pillsbury, Striving for Consistency, Standardizing
Recycling Measurements, at http://www.epa.gov/epaoswer/non-hw/recycle/recmeas/docstarticle2.htm
(last visited Aug. 13, 2001). To increase the consistency of state reporting, the EPA issued a standard
methodology in 1996. Application of the methodology led to a 3% reduction in Washington State's
reported recycling rate and a 6% increase in Pennsylvania's rate for the 1996 year. Id. at 2-3. The EPA
methodology is voluntary and it is unclear how widely it has been adopted.
169. See 1998 FACTS, supra note 167, at 1.
2001]
RECYCLING NORMS
1273
rates correspond with a rapid decline in the landfilling of solid waste. 7 °
The difference in percentages landfilled can be accounted for almost entirely by increases in recycling. 7 ' BioCycle estimates that in 1990 (its first
survey year) the country recycled 8% of its garbage, compared with the
EPA's 16.2% rate. The magazine estimates the 1998 rate at 31.5%, slightly
higher than the EPA rate.'72 Though BioCycle estimates a much more rapid
increase in the recycling rate over the past nine years than the EPA, both
agree that recycling is steadily increasing.
The EPA reports include very little information about why recycling
rates have increased so dramatically, except to note that curbside recycling
programs have risen in number to nearly 9,000 in 1997, serving a bit more
than half of the U.S. population. 73 And yet, though the correlation between
increased curbside recycling programs and increased recycling might seem
obvious, there are good reasons not to make such a causal connection absent additional evidence. First, while curbside programs have expanded
dramatically, so have the number of jurisdictions adopting other measures
that can influence the rate of recycling: unit pricing of garbage,'74 mandatory recycling laws,'75 bans on materials from landfills,' and extensive
educational efforts. 7 7 Moreover, a significant percentage of municipal
solid waste (between 35 and 45%) comes from non-residential sources'
and, according to the EPA, the commercial sector recycles the largest
quantity of materials.'79 Localities do not provide the commercial sector (or
170. The percentage of solid waste landfilled peaked in 1986-87 at 83.2% (prior to that time a
large percentage of garbage was taken to landfills and then burned), and by 1997 only 55.1% of
municipal solid waste was landfilled even though incineration rates have remained steady over the past
fifteen years. See 1998 SOLID WASTE REPoRT, supranote 168, at 107.
171.
Some of the decrease in landfilling is attributable to source reduction, defined by the EPA as
"any change in the design, manufacturing, purchase, or use of materials or products (including
packaging) to reduce the amount or toxicity before they become municipal solid waste." Id. at 91. The
EPA reports do not separately quantify reductions in the solid waste stream due to source reduction. Id.
Examples of source reduction include creating high-mileage tires and purchasing in bulk to reduce
packaging generation. Id. at 93. While composting lawn trimmings fits the EPA's definition of source
reduction, the various reports include composting of lawn trimmings within the recycling category.
172. See Glenn, supranote 113, at 60, 62.
173. The EPA relies on BioCycle for its estimate. 1998 SOLID WASrE REPORT, supranote 168, at
14.
174. See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, PAY As You THRow COMMNIurrIEs: UNrr-BASED PRICING
IN THE UNITED STATES: A TALLY OF COMUNITIES, at http:I/www.epa.gov.epaoswer/non-hw/payt/
comminfo.htm (last visited Dec. 6, 1999) (finding that more than 4,000 communities have adopted
some form of variable fee pricing for garbage disposal).
175. See supratext accompanying notes 120-123.
176. For example, twenty-two states and the District of Columbia now either ban or discourage
la%.n clippings from landfills, and lawn clippings make up the second largest component (after paper
and paperboard) of municipal solid waste. 1998 SOLID WASTE REPORT, supra note 168, at 47-48. At
least in part because of these state laws, the percentage of yard trimmings in municipal solid waste has
declined from 17.1% in 1990 to 12.8% in 1997. See id. at 2.
177. See supratext accompanying notes 154-164.
178.
1998 SOLID WASTE REPORT, supra note 168, at 12.
179. Id. at 167.
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most multi-family dwellings) with curbside service.18 If the increase in
recycling is due to increases in commercial recycling, therefore, the provision of curbside service would not be a contributing factor to this increased
rate. Thus, I rely on other sources to determine whether, and how, the various government mechanisms for increasing residential recycling work.
2. Suiveys of Recyclers and Nonrecyclers
Surveys of recycling behavior conducted in the last fifteen years provide a wealth of information about who recycles, when they do so, and
why. 8 ' The surveys vary, of course, in their focus. Some researchers have
conducted written surveys in an attempt to discover links between various
demographic variables (for example, age, income level, education level,
and gender) and recycling behavior, or links between attitudes toward recycling and actual behavior. Others have attempted to correlate various
demographic and attitudinal variables with households whose recycling
habits they have observed. Still others have compared recycling rates
across different types of programs.
A number of the studies contain methodological flaws, some of which
are worth noting at the outset. A common shortcoming of the studies is that
they often concentrate on whether someone recycles (either by observation
or self-report) without attempting to measure how much they recycle, or
how frequently. Thus, researchers often consider one who carefully recycles every bit of recyclable material for curbside pickup behaviorally equal
to someone who throws a single bottle into a curbside recycling bin. Studies also sometimes rely on self-reported recycling behavior, which may
produce inflated results.' A final problem with most of the studies is that
they focus largely on programs targeted at single-family households. Many
studies of curbside programs limit the scope of eligibility to single-family
180. See, e.g., CITY OF Los ANGELES, 1995 DISPOSAL BY SECTOR (on file with author) (showing
that the city's residential recycling program, which includes curbside pickup, does not service
commercial and industrial businesses or apartments with more than four units).
181.
For the most part I have confined my review of empirical recycling studies to those
conducted after 1986. A fair amount of recycling research was conducted in the 1970s, but conditions
have changed sufficiently during the past 20 some years, both in terms of the nature of recycling
programs and in public awareness about and attitudes toward garbage disposal, that the recent literature
seems far more likely to be illuminating about why and under what circumstances people recycle.
182. See Raymond J. Gamba & Stuart Oskamp, Factors Influencing Community Residents'
Participationin Commingled Curbside Programs,26 ENV'T & BEHAV. 587, 597 (1994) (comparing
self-reporting rates with actual rates and finding a 9% overstatement); Stuart Oskamp et al., Predicting
Three Dimensions of CurbsideRecycling: An ObservationalStudy, 29 J. ENVrL. EDUC. 37, 41 (1998)
(finding significant overreporting of recycling behavior in a curbside program); see also Kathleen
Barker et al., Comparison of Self-Reported Recycling Attitudes andBehaviors with Actual Behavior, 75
PSYCHOL. REP. 571, 574 (1994) (finding in a survey of college students that 88% reported that they
"make an effort to find and use recycling bins," but when observed only 14% of the students actually
recycled a flier despite close proximity of recycling bin); but see James D. Ward & Dennis W. Gleiber,
Citizen Response to Mandatory Recycling, 16 PuB. PRODUCTIVITY & MGMT. REV. 241, 251 (1993)
(finding no self-reporting bias in recycling of newspapers).
2001]
RECYCLING NORMS
1275
household neighborhoods; as a result, researchers have paid little attention
to commercial recycling habits and to recycling among residents of multifamily units. One should view my conclusions, therefore, with an understanding of the data's limitations.
In addition to some of the methodological weaknesses, I could not
always make clear-cut comparisons among the studies. Some studies report
percentage of households engaged in recycling, while others report volume
recycled, and still others report amounts diverted from landfills. Nevertheless, the studies in combination offer a remarkable picture of residential
recycling. They provide detailed and striking evidence about the relationship between recycling behavior on the one hand, and convenience, attitudes, knowledge, and demographic characteristics on the other. The
studies also show how financial incentives affect recycling behavior, and
whether and how various persuasive techniques succeed.
B. Evaluating VariousArchitecture, Norms, and Market Strategies to
Promote Large-Number,Small-PayoffParticipationin the Recycling
Context
1. The Effect of ChangingArchitecture
One of the most consistent findings in the empirical literature on recycling is that, not surprisingly, more people will participate in recycling
when it is convenient to do so. What may be less obvious is that increasing
the convenience of recycling results in larger increases in recycling behavior than virtually any other policy option. And while empirical evidence
on changing the architecture of recycling helps explain why people recycle,
the picture remains incomplete absent further evidence. Despite the fact
that more people will recycle when convenience is increased, large variations still exist in the amounts of material people will recycle, and the characteristics of the most active recyclers. Moreover, the literature becomes
complicated when evaluating the effectiveness of architecture changes
made in concert with other policy options, such as unit pricing of garbage
or educational programs aimed at increasing recycling. Therefore, I first
discuss those studies that evaluate the effectiveness of various recycling
architecture changes, and then analyze the more complicated studies that
introduce additional variables, including demographics, attitudes, and interactions with other policy options.
a. Changingthe Architecture to Make Recycling EasierIncreases
Participation
Empirical studies suggest that the most architecturally friendly residential recycling program, commingled curbside pickup, produces incredibly high participation rates and large increases in the volume of materials
recycled. For example, Professor Stuart Oskamp and his colleagues studied
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household recycling behavior across a two-year time frame by comparing
two socioeconomically and historically similar communities, the cities of
La Verne and Claremont, California. 18 3 La Verne has a separated curbside
pickup program and Claremont has a commingled program.'84 Overall recycling levels, defined as the percentage of households that utilized their
recycling bins at least once during eight weeks of observation, were high in
183. See Stuart Oskamp et al., Commingled Versus Separated Curbside Recycling: Does Sorting
Matter?, 28 ENV'T & BEHAV. 73 (1996). The Oskamp study is particularly valuable for several
reasons. First, it looked systematically at recycling behavior in the commingled program over a twoyear period rather than over a much shorter time frame, thus allowing an assessment of whether
recyclers sustained their participation levels across a long period of time. Second, it evaluated the
amount recycled in addition to evaluating the frequency of recycling behavior. Third, it evaluated two
programs simultaneously, which provides a nice comparison of the two programs.
I recognize that the communities studied in the research I describe in this section may differ socioeconomically, racially, ethnically, and otherwise from other communities. Generalizations about the
findings thus require some caution. For example, Claremont and La Verne are somewhat wealthier than
the average California city. Id. at 88. Yet Claremont, La Verne, and another close-by community,
Ontario, have probably been the subjects of more empirical research on recycling than any other
jurisdictions on the continent: Professor Stuart Oskamp and his graduate students have produced
studies on the communities since at least the mid-1980s. See, e.g., Shawn M. Bum and Stuart Oskamp,
Increasing Community Recycling with Persuasive Communication and Public Commitment, 16 J.
APPLIED Soc. PSYCHOL. 29 (1986) (studying Claremont). California may also differ from other states in
its attitudes toward environmental issues, though support for recycling seems widespread across the
country. See infra notes 198-201 and accompanying text. The state also has a bottle bill, see discussion
supra notes 143, which can affect recycling behavior, though presumably a bottle bill would lower the
amount residents would include in a curbside program, since they do not receive their deposits back on
bottles the city picks up. California also has mandatory landfill diversion rates for its local jurisdictions,
which may provide an impetus for local officials to run particularly effective recycling programs. See
David H. Folz & Joseph M. Hazlett, Public Participationand Recycling Performance: Explaining
Program Success, 51 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 526, 527 (1991). Most states, however, also have such
diversion rates, though not all of them are mandatory. See discussion supra notes 124-126. In this
section I attempt to account, at least to some extent, for these differences by evaluating empirical
studies of demographic differences in recycling rates, studies of the effect of attitudes on recycling, and
research into the interaction between other recycling policies like bottle bills or unit pricing and
curbside programs.
184. La Verne began its separated recycling program in 1989 and provided its residential
households with four different colored crates in which newspapers, glass, plastic, and tin and aluminum
cans could be placed for recycling on a weekly basis. Claremont started its commingled program in
1991, and gave each of its residential households a single ninety gallon container with wheels. The
program began with biweekly pickup and then expanded its service to weekly pickup by the time of
Oskamp's study. Claremont residents could place into their recycling containers more types of
materials than La Verne residents, including magazines and junk mail, cardboard, milk cartons, and
plastic containers labeled one through seven. Oskamp selected three areas within each city containing
approximately 200 homes based on socioeconomic status ("SES"): one high, one middle, and one low
SES from each city. He did so based on four criteria: median household income, percentage owner
occupied, mean value of owner-occupied homes, and percentage Hispanic, using 1990 census data. See
Oskamp, supranote 183, at 78-79. He and his researchers then observed each of the areas by household
for eight consecutive weeks to determine household participation, quantity of recyclable materials, and
amount of "contamination" (placing nonrecyclable material in recycling bins). As Oskamp notes in his
results, the contamination results are likely to be the least reliable. Contamination of recyclables,
particularly in the large Claremont bins, was often quite difficult to see. Id. at 83
("Contamination... was the least reliable variable that we measured..."). Given this limitation, the
difference in contamination levels between the two cities was statistically insignificant. Id. at 84.
2001]
RECYCLING NORMS
1277
both cities, but significantly higher in Claremont: 90% for Claremont and
77% for La Verne. Sixty-one percent of the Claremont households utilized
their recycling bins at least four out of eight weeks and 45% did so in La
Verne; 22% of Claremont households utilized their bins every week, as
compared to 13% of La Verne residents. 85
While the commingled program generated higher levels of participation, even larger differences occurred in the volume of recycled material.
In many ways, volume may be the more relevant measure given that a
principal goal of recycling programs is to reduce the landfilling and incineration of solid waste. Unfortunately, though, the numbers are not directly
comparable because Claremont recycles a number of items that La Verne
does not. The volume differences seem worth noting, nevertheless, because
they are so large that, even discounting for the difference in acceptable
material, they suggest that commingled programs vastly increase the
amount people will recycle. Households recycled an average of 32.1 gallons of material weekly in Claremont, while households in La Verne averaged only 5.5 gallons. 6
Oskamp's study also provides useful longitudinal data about participation rates in commingled programs. He and a colleague had previously
studied Claremont's recycling program in 1991, finding consistent overall
participation rates (91% in 1991, 90% in 1993), as well as substantial stability among individual households in their average participation rates. 7
Thus, the commingled curbside program not only produced very high levels of participation, but durable, sustained behavioral change.
The Oskamp study is consistent with several other studies, each of
which suggests that commingled curbside recycling programs produce very
high participation rates, unmatched by other programs. For example, in an
experiment in Rice County, Minnesota, researchers provided households
different recycling methods that varied in level of convenience. Research185. The average level of participation also varied: each week 58% of Claremont households
utilized their bins, whereas only 42% of La Verne residents did so. See Oskamp, supra note 183, at 8081. Of course frequency (and volume) of material recycled may also be related to the number of people
in each household and their socioeconomic status, both of which may be related to the amount of trash
and recyclables generated. I return to this point infra notes 232-234. The intercity comparisons in this
study should account for this, however, by using similar neighborhoods in each city for comparison.
186. Though I have already noted that I do not attempt in this Article to resolve the complicated
question about whether recycling is profitable, it is worth noting that the cost differential between
commingled and separated programs in additional labor to sort the materials is relatively small. The
large costs of each program are in truck equipment costs and labor for drivers. See Rebecca Judge &
Anthony Becker, MotivatingRecycling: A Marginal Cost Analysis, 11 CoNtrEblP. POL'Y IssuEs 58, 64
(1993) (finding that "... sorting materials.., does not add appreciably to the labor charge [of weekly
curbside pickup]"). Thus a large increase in quantity of recyclable materials collected probably more
than offsets the increased labor required to separate materials.
187. The 1991 results are contained in a different article. See Gamba & Oskamp, supra note 182.
The results of the comparison between 1991 and 1993 are contained in Oskamp, supranote 182, at 8485.
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CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW
[Vol. 89:1231
ers then observed how much each household recycled. Households with the
most convenient options recycled the most material.' 88 A survey of residents in the Halton, Ontario area showed similar results. 8 9 The number of
studies focused on commingled programs is admittedly small, probably
because commingling has only recently emerged as a popular method of
residential recycling. Nevertheless, the results of studies focused on commingled programs are consistent with other evidence that increasing convenience produces significant increases in recycling rates.
b. Households with SeparatedCurbsideService Recycle More Than
Those with Access to a Drop-OffProgram
A few empirical studies have compared the recycling behavior of
those who are provided with a curbside separated program with those who
must take their recyclables to a drop-off center. These studies consistently
show that curbside service increases recycling rates significantly above
drop-off center participation, a finding that is consistent with my earlier
hypothesis that making recycling more convenient increases recycling participation. In a telephone survey of households in Fairfax County, Virginia,
where 26% of the households surveyed had access to a curbside program,
researchers found that access to a curbside program was far and away the
strongest predictor of recycling behavior. 9 ° In a survey of households in
Edmonton and Calgary, Alberta, researchers found that curbside access in
Edmonton led to household recycling at rates more than 100% higher than
188. See Judge & Becker, supra note 186, at 63. In the Rice County study, some households were
required to separate their recyclables while others were not, some were given weekly service whereas
others received biweekly service, and some households were allowed to leave their recycling bins
anywhere on their property, rather than at curbside. The authors concluded that "[i]ncreased recycling
has a predictable effect on household recycling behavior. Allowing residents to commingle recyclables,
offering weekly collection, and permitting a household to put the recycling bin at any convenient
location on the property increases the amount of recyclable material that a household diverts ....
Id
189. See Daniel Scott, Equal Opportunity, Unequal Results: Determinants of Household
Recycling Intensity, 31 ENV'T & BEHAV. 267 (1999). Halton allows the commingling of twelve items
and has weekly curbside pickup. Researchers sent a survey to six separate neighborhoods in an attempt
to reflect the socioeconomic diversity of the area and asked questions about recycling practices,
attitudes toward recycling, and demographic information. A remarkable 99% of those surveyed
indicated they participate in the curbside pickup program. These results, however, are not entirely
comparable with the other studies. Halton has mandatory recycling and unit pricing for garbage, both of
which may contribute to the very high recycling rates. Moreover, it is unclear whether Canada and the
United States are comparable enough culturally and politically to draw comparisons between the two.
Nevertheless, I include the results of the Halton study because it is a well-executed survey, exhibiting
results that are consistent with studies of American communities. Furthermore, Canada and the U.S. are
close enough geographically, and in terms of access to media, such that the comparison seems
appropriate.
190. Gregory A. Guagnano et al., Influences on Attitude-Behavior Relationships: A Natural
Experiment with Curbside Recycling, 27 ENv'T & BEHAV. 699, 712 (1995). Unfortunately, these data
are presented in such a way that it is impossible to determine the exact correlation between curbside
access and participation.
2001]
RECYCLING NORMS
1279
in noncurbside households.1 9l And in a national survey of 450 municipal
recycling coordinators, cities with curbside pickup estimated they had a
48.6% participation rate compared with a 24.6% rate in cities with only a
drop-off program. 192 In related research, three studies conducted in the
1970s found that increasing the proximity of drop-off locations significantly increased recycling participation by as much as 47%.193 The studies
of various methods for encouraging recycling are remarkably consistent: the easier recycling is, the more people will participate.
The correlation between ease of recycling and increased recycling
behavior can be understood in rational choice terms: by making it easier
for individuals to recycle, governments can reduce the cost of the behavior.
However, an alternative, or at least additional, explanation may also be at
work. Curbside programs, whether separated or commingled, allow households to display their compliance with a recycling norm very visibly to
their neighbors. To the extent that garnering neighbors' esteem or signaling
one's reputation motivates a potential recycler, visible curbside recycling is
a wonderful tool. Curbside recycling may therefore not only lower the cost
of recycling by reducing effort, but may increase the benefits to recyclers
by allowing them a more effective means for signaling, or gaining esteem,
than less visible recycling methods.194 The flip side may also be true.
Those who do not recycle are visible noncooperators. Curbside recycling
may create increased opportunities for informal sanctioning. A neighbor,
for example, who sees her neighbor's garbage container, but no recycling
bin, might comment offhandedly about her failure to recycle. Thus curbside recycling may increase the cost for noncompliance at the same time it
makes compliance easier and less costly. Visible recycling bins may also
reinforce recycling norms simply by reminding those already in favor of
recycling to participate.
Reducing the effort involved may work on yet another
level: increasing the convenience may alter the signal one sends in failing
to recycle. It is one thing not to recycle when the costs of doing so are quite
high. It is quite another to flout the convention when compliance would
191.
The Alberta researchers looked at types of items recycled as opposed to whether a household
recycled and found that Edmonton households with access to a commingled curbside program recycled
2.25 items (for example, newspaper, bottles, and milk cartons), whereas Calgary households with no
access to curbside pickup recycled 1.35 items on average. See Linda Derksen & John Gartrell, The
Social Context of Recycling, 58 Am. Soc. REv. 434,438 (1993).
192. See Folz & Hazlett, supranote 183, at 527.
193. See P. Wesley Schultz et al., Who Recycles and When? A Review of Personaland Situational
Factors, 15 J. ENVrL. PSYCHOL. 105, 115 (1995) (describing proximity studies in mobile home parks,
college dorms, and New York City).
194. Drop-off recycling programs may or may not provide for the same signaling or esteemgathering opportunities. In small communities where one is likely to run into friends and neighbors at
the drop-off center, signaling and esteem gathering may work. See Sunstein, supra note 1, at 906
(describing East Hampton residents lined up in their expensive cars to drop off recyclables). In larger
communities these opportunities are likely to be less available.
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take little effort. Thus the commingled curbside recycling may both reduce
the absolute cost of engaging in the behavior and increase the opprobrium
one may experience for failing to comply.
Though it is difficult to disentangle the effects effort-reducing activities have on social norms, some limited empirical research casts light on
the degree to which participants use the commingled programs as signaling
and esteem-gathering opportunities. The research suggests that convenience is a much greater motivation than either esteem enhancement or
reputation signalling. Both commingled curbside recycling and separated
curbside recycling provide virtually identical opportunities for signaling or
esteem-gathering. Yet commingled programs produce both higher participation and dramatically higher volumes of recycled materials. Convenience, then, seems to be the most important motivator. Moreover, in the
Rice County, Minnesota study, recall that researchers gave residents increasingly convenient options for recycling, and increased convenience
correlated with increases in the amount of material recycled. One of the
methods for increasing convenience was allowing households to leave their
recycling bins anywhere on their property, rather than strictly at curbside.
This method increased the amount of material recycled.'95 Presumably,
more convenient places on one's property are less visible than curbside, so
convenience seems more important than visibility in spurring recycling
activity.
There is some evidence, however, that signaling or esteem-gathering
may matter in the promotion of recycling behavior. In one of the few studies to focus on apartment complexes, researchers studied the effects of
complex size on recycling behavior. Each apartment complex provided
residents with recycling containers that had to be taken to a central garbage
location, and employed various persuasive techniques designed to increase
recycling behavior. Researchers found that units with fewer than ten
apartments recycled three times more than larger complexes, regardless of
whether they were also subject to a persuasive intervention. 9 6 Several explanations could be at work, but one that seems plausible is that in smaller
complexes apartment residents may have less anonymity. Opportunities for
visible recycling behavior therefore may matter more than in a larger complex. Anonymity in larger complexes may decrease any sense of community the neighbors share and may, therefore, lead to a lower commitment to
collective action like recycling.'97
195. See Judge & Becker, supra note 186, at 63 ("[P]ermitting a household to put the recycling bin
at any convenient location on the property increases the amount of recyclable material that a household
diverts .... ).
196. See Raymond de Young et al., Recycling in Multi-Family Dvellings: Increasing
Participationand DecreasingContamination, 16 POPULATION & ENV'T 253, 254 (1995).
197. A third explanation may also be in order. It is unclear from the findings by de Young et al.
whether the common recycling areas are less convenient for larger complex residents due to the larger
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2. The Effect of Norms and Norm ManagementEfforts
a. The RelationshipBetween Attitudes, Norms, and Recycling Behavior
A fair amount of research focuses on whether attitudes toward recycling predict positive recycling behavior. In evaluating these studies, I assume that the strength of one's prorecycling attitude is indicative of
whether, and to what extent, one has internalized a prorecycling norm. The
attitude and compliance evidence thus provides insight into whether one
has internalized a norm of recycling, how intensely she holds it, and what
effect the intensity of the norm has on behavior.
Before presenting the studies, it is worth emphasizing, as a background matter, that recycling enjoys enormous popular support across the
country. Virtually every poll measuring recycling attitudes reports that in
all parts of the country large majorities of Americans support recycling
programs. In a recent statewide poll of Wisconsin residents, 90% supported
the continuation of recycling programs, and more than half said they were
willing to pay a small amount to continue such programs. 98' In a Tulsa,
Oklahoma, city council district, 72% of the residents surveyed supported
the imposition of a curbside recycling program.'9 9 Eighty-two percent of
New Yorkers support recycling, as do 73% of Americans surveyed by
Gallup.20 0 And this support is not new. For the past fifteen years or more,
polls measuring recycling support have shown consistently high results. 20 '
The empirical studies described in this section, however, offer insight
into how the strength of such prorecycling attitudes affects recycling behavior. Unlike the polling data, the studies reported here measure not just
whether people support recycling, but also the intensity of such beliefs.
Their measurements of attitudes are, therefore, more nuanced than the poll
results in that someone who answers a general poll question may support
recycling only weakly, but only the empirical studies will appreciate the
weakness of such support. But it remains an interesting and unanswered
complex sizes, making the act of recycling more difficult. If so, effort may again be the most important
variable in determining recycling behavior. This explanation is somewhat undermined by data in the
study indicating that not only do residents of small complexes recycle more, but they are less likely to
throw nonrecyclable containers into the common recycling bin. Id. at 261.
198. Spencer Black, Don't Let GOP Trash Our Award-Winning Recycling Program, CAPrrAL
TIMEs, June 26, 1999, at 9A; hcreasedHomeowner Feesfor Recycling Backed, PR NEwswma, July
15, 1999.
199. Curtis Killman, ResidentialRecycling Pushed,TULSA WORLD, Jan. 14, 1999.
200. Bruce Lambert, Expansion of Programfor Recycling Is Announced, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 18,
1988, at B8; Jim Motavalli, 2000: Planet Earth at the Crossroads;Environment and the Future of
Mankind, 10 EARTH ACTION NEmvoR, INc. 28 (Jan. 1999).
201.
For example, a national sample of respondents in 1987 found that 62% of the public said they
believe that recycling contributes a lot to the quality of life; 87% of New Jersey residents in 1987 said
they favored a recycling plan that required households to separate trash and recyclables; 64% of Texas
residents supported mandatory recycling in 1990; and 93% of South Carolina residents supported
mandatory recycling in 1990.
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question whether the empirical studies would turn out differently in a
world without such widespread background support. Put a different way,
would attitudes matter more in a highly convenient program, for example,
if the baseline of public support was much lower? Could the government
simply institute curbside recycling programs and expect widespread participation if the public was not already supportive? Given that almost all
the benefits from recycling are diffuse, it is unclear whether anyone would
recycle absent a social norm in its favor. Thus caution seems due in extrapolating my conclusions to problems whose resolution lacks similar
widespread support. 2
With that caveat in mind, the empirical evidence regarding attitudes
seems to support at least three conclusions. First, if recycling is highly
convenient, then the strength of attitudes in favor of recycling or in favor of
environmental protection appears to be of little predictive value in determining whether someone will recycle. Those with weak beliefs in recycling or in attitudes toward environmental protection are just as likely to
recycle as those who are not.20 3
Second, even in a highly convenient program, attitudes matter in predicting the volume of material recycling. At least three studies confirm this
point. In the Oskamp survey of Claremont recyclers, frequent recyclers,
defined as those who recycle four or five times over a five week period,
indicated that they recycle either out of concern for the environment or be-
202. On the other hand, the resolution of many large-number, small-payoff problems, such as
reduced energy consumption, cleaner air and water, and an ample blood supply, probably generate
similarly positive survey responses. See, e.g., ROPER CTR., UNIV. OF CONN., PUBLIC OPINION ONLINE,
Waste Not Want Not: A National Survey on Energy Policy (Sept. 1988) (reporting that 97% of those
surveyed believe that energy conservation is either extremely or somewhat important in meeting
America's future energy needs); ROPER CTR., UNIV. OF CONN., PUBLIC OPINION ONLINE, Americans
Talk Issues #19 (1992) (reporting that 72% of those surveyed think using carpooling and public
transportation more would help us meet our energy needs); ROPER CTR., UNIV. OF CONN., PUBLIC
OPINION ONLINE, Environment: Public Attitudes and Individual Behavior(reporting that 44% of those
surveyed think litter of streets, parks, highways, and the countryside is one of our most serious
environmental problems). It also seems likely that straightforward information campaigns will be most
effective in encouraging behavior to resolve a collective action problem when public awareness is low.
In Los Angeles, for example, local agencies recently began running television spots asking people not
to pour used motor oil down storm drains. The ads also informed viewers that storm drains lead directly
to the ocean. Public awareness of storm water pollution may be much lower than awareness of more
visible or publicized environmental problems.
203. For studies in support of this proposition, see Gamba & Oskamp, supra note 182, at 607
(finding no correlation between strength of belief in recycling and participation in commingled
program); Guagnano et al., supra note 190, at 713 (finding no correlation between attitudes toward
recycling and participation among curbside recyclers); P. Wesley Schultz & Stuart Oskamp, Effort as a
Moderatorof the Attitude-Behavior Relationship: General Environmental Concern and Recycling, 59
Soc. PYSCHOL. Q. 375, 380-81 (reviewing several empirical studies of recycling behavior and
concluding that "[w]hen the amount of effort required to recycle is low... a small or moderate
environmental concern may provide enough impetus to produce the behavior").
2001]
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1283
cause they perceive recycling to be effective.3 4 By contrast, infrequent
recyclers, defined as those who recycle zero to two times over a five week
period, perceived recycling to be inconvenient. °5 These correlations, while
statistically significant, are still relatively weak. In two Canadian studies,
one in Ontario and one in Calgary and Edmonton, researchers made similar
findings. The Calgary and Edmonton study of curbside programs found a
large correlation between recyclers who had a strong concern for environmental issues and the number of materials they recycled. Recyclers who
had a strong concern for the environment recycled 4 different types of materials, while recyclers who exhibited less environmental concern recycled
only 2.25 types. 2 6 In the Ontario study, researchers surveyed residents
about their recycling habits and attitudes. Specifically, Ontario residents
were asked about which of twelve recyclable items they recycled. 20 7 The
author did not find that strong attitudes toward recycling predicted greater
recycling intensity. However, he did find a significant and positive correla-
tion between whether an individual feels especially proud about being environmentally responsible and her level of recycling intensity (defined as
how consistently one recycled each of the twelve recyclable materials).2"8
Finally, empirical research finds that attitudes in favor of recycling are
important if recycling is inconvenient and requires a significant amount of
effort (for example, taking materials to a drop-off center). In one survey of
129 college students, those who scored higher on a test measuring recycling attitudes were significantly more likely to recycle white paper.2 9 The
same researchers also surveyed college students to determine the amount of
effort they would expend to recycle, and again found a correlation between
strong attitudes in favor of recycling and willingness to expend effort. 210 A
204. More specifically, those who scored high on a scale of one (not important at all) to four (very
important) in agreeing that their reasons for recycling relate to environmental concerns (including
satisfaction in saving natural resources, reducing the amount of litter, decreasing landfill use, saving
energy, and helping to solve a national problem) were more likely to recycle frequently. See Gamba &
Oskamp, supra note 182, at 600-04.
Of course, frequency of recycling does not necessarily translate into volume recycled. Those
households that put out their bins more often may be recycling less per week than those recycling less
often. In that respect, the Gamba-Oskamp study is somewhat less useful for determining the
relationship between attitudes and volume of recycling.
205. Id. at 599-600. Strong attitudes in favor of recycling had no statistical significance in
predicting whether one recycled or did not, but given that 91% of Claremont residents participate in the
commingled program, the lack of correlation does not seem surprising.
206. See Derksen & Gartrell, supra note 191, at 439.
207. Once again it is worth noting that these studies are not absolutely comparable, both because
the surveys differ and because the area surveyed can differ in significant respects. Halton, for example,
mandates recycling and is in an area that for several years had to ship its garbage to New York because
of the absence of an available landfill. See id. at 270-71.
208. See Scott, supra note 189, at 284. As with all of the surveys that rely on self-reported
recycling behavior, these results should be viewed with some caution.
209. See Schultz & Oskamp, supra note 203, at 377.
210. Id. at 377-78.
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survey of Fairfax County, Virginia, residents found similar results: those
who exhibited a strong belief in the importance of recycling were much
more likely to take recyclables to a drop-off center, a relatively high-effort
activity. 21 Finally, researchers reviewing seven empirical studies consistently found that "[w]hen the amount of effort required to recycle is high,
2' 2
only people with strong pro-environmental attitudes are likely to do so."
These studies suggest two ways in which norms matter in determining
how much effort an individual will exert in engaging in environmentally
cooperative behavior. First, if an individual feels strongly about recycling,
then she is likely to experience greater satisfaction from engaging in the
recycling behavior than if she cares only moderately, or not at all, about
recycling. Conversely an individual with strong feelings about recycling
may feel especially guilty if she fails to recycle. In rational choice terms, if
a recycler gains more psychic benefit from recycling, she is more likely to
tolerate higher costs in effort than one who gains only modestly or not at
all.
Second, if governments (or other opinion-shapers) can increase the
strength of social norms in favor of recycling, then convenient recycling
programs will benefit from increased volume and less convenient recycling
programs will benefit from increased participation. The calculus for the
government should be quite similar to the calculus for the individual. The
less money the government is willing to spend on making recycling convenient, the stronger its efforts must be to shape the attitudes of its citizenry in favor of recycling, and vice versa. But even if a government is
willing to make recycling highly convenient, some effort at attitude
strengthening is likely to increase the volume of material recycled.
211.
Guagnano et al., supra note 190, at 711-12.
212. Schultz & Oskamp, supra note 203, at 380. It is worth noting, however, that these studies do
not tell us how frequently those with strong attitudes in favor of recycling will engage in the high-effort
activity.
A few studies disagree with the hypothesis that those with stronger recycling attitudes will exert
more effort to recycle. In her survey of recyclers in Calgary and Edmonton, Linda Derksen found no
correlation between general concern for the environment and the number of items recycled by Calgary
residents and others surveyed who had no access to a curbside program. Her survey did not, however,
ask questions about specific recycling attitudes; instead it focused on more general environmental
concern. The different focus of her question may account for her findings. See Derksen & Gartrell,
supra note 191, at 439. Vining and Ebrero, who surveyed residents of Champaign-Urbana, a
community with no curbside program at the time of the survey, found that recyclers and nonrecyclers
shared common attitudes about recycling. On the other hand, these survey results suggested that
nonrecyclers found recycling to be a greater nuisance than recyclers did. This response suggests that
nonrecyclers are less willing to exert effort to recycle, a finding consistent with the other research. See
Joanne Vining & Angela Ebrero, What Makes a Recycler? A Comparison of Recyclers and
Nonrecyclers, 22 ENV'T & BEHAv. 55, 64-65 (1990); see also John A. McCarty & L. J. Shrum, The
Recycling of Solid Wastes: Personal Values, Value Orientations,and Attitudes about Recycling as
Antecedents of Recycling Behavior, 30 J. BuSINEss REs. 53, 57 ("[T]he inconvenience of recycling had
a much stronger relationship with whether one engaged in recycling than did the importance of
recycling.").
2001]
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1285
These studies, however, leave several questions unanswered. They tell
us nothing about how the norm in favor of recycling emerged in the first
place. It is not clear, for example, what role government has played in
creating or shaping recycling attitudes in the communities studied. Furthermore, the studies do not indicate how governments might go about
strengthening attitudes. Other related research provides some guidance in
answering the latter question.
b. The RelationshipBetween Knowledge, PersuasiveTechniques, and
Recycling
In the following sections I evaluate whether persuasive techniques can
alter behavior. I first describe the relationship between knowledge about
recycling and propensity to engage in the behavior. I then provide evidence
that, consistent with public goods experiments, intervention designed to
persuade people to recycle works most effectively when performed face-toface. I also discuss how the empirical evidence about persuasive interventions casts light on theories about how social norms influence behavior.
i. Knowledge of the ProgramMay IncreaseRecycling Behavior
As I have already described, one method to strengthen norms may be
to provide potential recyclers with straightforward information about recycling programs. Information campaigns may increase knowledge and signal the importance of desired behavior."1 3 Several empirical studies about
recycling conclude that such information campaigns can increase recycling
behavior.
Prior to his Claremont and La Verne study, Stuart Oskamp examined
Claremont's commingled program separately. The first Oskamp study involved both a written survey of selected Claremont households and weekly
visual observations of those households' recycling behavior. The survey
measured self-reported recycling behavior, knowledge of how the recycling program worked (for example, the types of recyclable items), attitudes about the environment generally, attitudes about recycling, and
motivations for or against recycling.214 Because the recycling rates in
213. See Sunstein, supra note 1, at 948-49 (describing straightforward information as "simple
statements of fact designed to ensure accurate beliefs," often "in order to persuade people to do
something new or different").
214. See Gamba & Oskamp, supra note 182, at 601-04. The survey also asked for demographic
information, which I describe infra. The 600 households surveyed were selected using the same
socioeconomic criteria described above for the Claremont and La Veme study. The observations
included five weeks of watching whether the studied households put their recycling containers out and
one week of measuring how much material the bins included. As I have already noted, Claremont
residential households participate in the commingled program in very high numbers: 91% of all
observed households put out their recycling bins at least once during the five weeks studied, and the
average participation rate during any given week was 68%.
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Claremont were extremely high, very few variables discriminated between
nonrecyclers and recyclers. The variable with the most predictive significance was the residents' knowledge of what was recyclable.
The first Oskamp study also evaluated the frequency of recycling behavior, with frequent recyclers defined as those who utilized their bins four
or five times during the observed period and infrequent recyclers defined
as those who utilized their bins zero to two times. Knowledge about the
recycling program was the best predictor of recycling frequency, though
the correlation again was relatively small.21 Oskamp's findings are consistent with three other surveys finding a correlation between knowledge
and recycling behavior, including one in Champaign-Urbana, Illinois,"l6 the
Halton, Ontario survey,1 7 and one in La Verne, California.2 18
These studies suggest that in order to increase recycling activity recycling proponents should inform residents about how their recycling program operates. However, these studies can be interpreted in at least two
other ways. Frequent recyclers may reinforce their knowledge because they
recycle, so that reading a government pamphlet is only one step in knowledge accumulation. Frequent recyclers may also be more receptive to information campaigns. Presumably, all of the surveyed households in
Claremont received informational material the city provides to its residents
(though the Gamba-Oskamp study does not describe the nature of those
19
materials), as did the Halton residents. Some read it and some did not.
How to impart information to non- or low-level recyclers, therefore, is
probably a more important question than whether to do so. The empirical
evidence again provides some direction about how to close the gap between recyclers and nonrecyclers by demonstrating the most successful
ways to get nonrecyclers to participate.
215. Id. at 601, 604.
216. See Vining & Ebrero, supra note 212, at 62-64. In the Champaign-Urbana survey, residents
in each community had access only to a drop-off program. Residents who recycled knew more than
nonrecyclers about what could and could not be recycled, though the level of knowledge for certain
items like glass and newspaper approached 100%.
217. Scott, supra note 189, at 284-85. In the Halton, Ontario, survey, researchers also found a
correlation between knowledge and recycling behavior. Those surveyed who had read a "Waste
Management Calendar," a written document containing information about what could be recycled,
tended to recycle more types of eligible material than those who had not. There was no correlation
between reading the waste calendar and the consistency with which the household recycled each of the
twelve items. Id. at 276-77.
218. See Oskamp et al., supra note 182, at 41. This study of a curbside program found a
correlation between knowledge and quantity of material recycled, but found no correlation between
knowledge and participation in the program. Id.
219. See Vining & Ebrero, supra note 212, at 62-63 (noting that more frequent recyclers gained
their knowledge about recycling from more sources (an average of 3.7 sources compared with just
under 3 for nonrecyclers), and were much more likely to know of recycling opportunities from radio
and from friends than were nonrecyclers).
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1287
ii. Persuasive Communication Techniques May IncreaseRecycling Rates
Several studies of curbside recycling programs have evaluated
whether various forms of persuasive communications increase recycling
rates. These studies demonstrate remarkable similarity with the public
goods experiments: if governments can introduce face-to-face communication among potential recyclers or provide feedback about recycling behavior, individuals will recycle more, at least in contexts where
governments have adopted curbside recycling (and therefore have significantly reduced the effort required to recycle).
At least three studies have focused on residents who have access to a
separated curbside program, but fail to use it with any regularity. In a 1989
study of Claremont, several years before the city instituted its commingled
program, researchers studying households that were not participating in the
city's curbside and separated program divided those households into five
groups. Except for the control group, each group received a different type
of intervention. At the end of the eleven-week study, the control group had
a mean weekly recycling rate (defined as the percentage of households that
put their recycling bags out at curbside, regardless of volume) of 3%.
Twenty percent of the control households recycled at least once during the
observation period. The experimental groups received various interventions, ranging from exhorting residents in writing to being contacted by a
"block leader," who explained the virtues and ease of recycling. The group
that received the "block leader" intervention showed the most significant
increase in recycling rates, to a mean rate of 28%, with 58% of the households recycling at least once during the study. The written plea group also
showed higher recycling rates than the control group, with the mean
weekly rate rising to 12%, and 38% of all households in this group recycling at least one time during the study.22 °
An earlier study in Claremont evaluated households that had not recycled during a six-week observation period. Three groups received interventions while a fourth did not. The interventions ranged from written
persuasive communications to "commitment" interventions, where households signed recycling pledges. Each of the groups receiving some intervention increased their recycling rate to approximately 40% (that is, 40%
of the households recycled at least once during a six-week observation period), while the control group had an 11% recycling rate. The weekly mean
participation rate for the intervention groups was 15% for the communication alone, 17.7% for the combined approach, and 18.8% for the commit-
220. Shawn M. Bum, Social Psychology and the Stimulation of Recycling Behaviors: The Block
Leader Approach,21 J. APPLIED Soc. PSYCHOL. 611, 619-23 (1991).
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ment intervention alone. 221 Thus, the various intervention techniques had
nearly equal effects on increasing participation rates.
Two additional studies focus on how intervention techniques can be
used to increase both participation and volume rates among all recycling
households, not just those residences that fail to participate. The first study,
conducted in 1982 and 1983, involved a "middle-to upper-middle class"
community in Denver, Colorado. Researchers split residents into groups
that received four types of interventions, ranging from block leader contact
to informational brochures. The block leader group experienced the largest
increase in recycling rates, but the other interventions also boosted participation.22 2
Finally, Wesley Schultz used the data collected by Stuart Oskamp and
his colleagues in their study of La Verne, California, and assigned households to five experimental groups. Each of the five groups received different types of intervention techniques, including information campaigns
about La Verne's recycling program, written pleas to recycle, written feedback about household recycling habits, and face-to-face "group feedback"
regarding the weekly recycling rate of 200 contiguous households. Those
receiving written and group feedback saw their rates rise the most, though
still relatively modestly, from roughly 43 to 50%.223 The groups receiving
221. See Bum & Oskamp, supra note 183, at 36. The authors do not indicate how many
households included in the "commitment" or "combined" treatment group elected to sign the
commitment form.
222. See Hopper & Nielsen, supra note 19, at 204-17. Researchers divided the observed
households into five groups depending on the intervention they received. Group A already had a system
of active block leaders in place who encouraged recycling in the area. Group B was assigned block
leaders (from within the neighborhood) who met face-to-face with households in the group once, and
then delivered monthly prompts prior to each pickup date. Group C received an informational brochure
and then monthly prompts, all delivered by the experimenters. Group D received informational
brochures twice, just prior to being observed and then halfway through the experiment. Group E served
as the control group with no interventions. After the interventions the households were surveyed again
on the same issues.
Groups B through E had extremely low participation rates prior to the interventions: on average
they almost never put their recyclables out at curbside. After the interventions, Group B, the block
leader group, saw the largest increase in participation, rising to a mean of about twice during a seven
week period. This translates into somewhere between a 17 and 36% participation rate among Group B
households. Group C, the information and prompts group, had the next largest participation rate, at a
mean of about one and one-half times during the seven-week observation period. Group D, the
information-only group, had a slightly lower participation rate, and Group E, the control group,
underwent little change in recycling rates.
The one oddity in the Hopper data is a close to 0% participation rate prior to the interventions. The
authors do not explain why participation was so low prior to their study. It is unclear whether the
program was new, ineptly run, unpublicized, or some combination thereof. The program was unusual in
having only monthly pickup, which may have contributed to the low participation rates. Whatever the
cause, as a result of the extremely low participation, the results of the study should be viewed with
some caution in comparison with programs sharing a higher baseline recycling rate.
223. See P. Wesley Schultz, ChangingBehavior with Normative Feedback Interventions: A Field
Experiment on Curbside Recycling, 21 BAsic & APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL., 26-27 (1998). The
researchers observed each of the households for nine weeks, one week prior to the interventions, four
2001]
RECYCLING NORMS
1289
straightforward information, however, increased their rates only slightly,
while those receiving the plea alone saw no change.224 The group and individual feedback interventions had a much more dramatic effect on "low
baseline" households (those whose participation was quite low in the initial
observation) than on "high baseline" households, which actually exhibited
a slightly negative effect from the interventions.22
In short, intervention techniques can improve participation rates, particularly among low-level recyclers, when a community already has a curbside program in place. It is not clear, however, whether the behavioral
changes will endure given that all of the studies are of relatively short time
frames. Moreover, the studies are not entirely comparable; the Denver
study was conducted in a community with an extremely low overall participation rate, whereas the La Verne study already had a very high 77%
participation rate. Thus, it seems wise not to make too much of any individual study, but instead to note results that are consistent across more than
one community. In aggregating the data, then, it seems fair to conclude that
the more intense intervention techniques, such as block leaders and written
feedback, produce the largest gains, while written pleas and informational
materials produced only modest or negligible gains.
The most effective intervention techniques seem to work on principles
learned from the public goods experiments. First, in public goods games,
face-to-face contact significantly increases cooperation, particularly when
individual payoffs from collective cooperation are relatively low, as with
recycling.226 The block leader experiments introduce face-to-face communication to the household groups, and result in greater cooperation in the
form of increased recycling. Second, public goods experiments show that
individuals seem to share a norm of cooperation that governs their behavior
if they perceive that others too are cooperating. The feedback mechanisms,
which demonstrate to individual households how they measure up to others, work best for those who are not carrying their weight. When houseweeks during the intervention period and four weeks after the intervention. Observers looked for
frequency of participation, amount recycled to the nearest quarter of a bin and level of contamination.
The mean participation rate for the individual and group feedback groups in the weeks following the
intervention rose from 43 and 42%, respectively, to 49 and 50%. The amount recycled also rose an
almost identical amount for the two groups, from about 42% to 58% of a bin. But the patterns were
somewhat different for the two forms of feedback. Individual feedback recipients exhibited the largest
rise in participation and volume during the intervention period but then dropped a few percentage
points in the four weeks that followed; the group feedback recipients had a steady rise during the
intervention, and the rise continued for the postintervention weeks.
224. Id. at 29. The participation rates for the information group rose by a smaller amount: from 42
to 46% for participation, and from 51 to 56% of a bin. Those households that received the plea only,
exhorting them to recycle more, exhibited virtually no change, nor did the control group. There was no
discemable change in contamination level among all the groups.
225. Id. at 31. Schultz did not provide data for the effect of the other interventions based on
baseline levels.
226. See discussion supranotes 52-55 and accompanying text.
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holds learn they are cooperating less than their neighbors, a norm of cooperation may trigger increased cooperative behavior. Alternatively, households may feel competitive with other households and want to best, or at
least equal, their neighbors' performance. Either way, feedback seems to
work.
Empirical evidence about persuasive interventions also sheds light on
how esteem or reputation signaling may work to induce cooperative behavior. When confronted by a neighbor or by evidence that one's recycling
performance is subpar, many households respond positively. They respond
less dramatically when confronted only with written pleas urging increased
recycling. The evidence suggests that esteem matters; many individuals
care what others think of them. Cooperative behavior typically increases
when opportunities to communicate esteem (or lack of it) increase through
programs such as the block leader intervention. Thus, feedback and faceto-face communication appear to help create the conditions (smaller communities with opportunities for communication) that Elinor Ostrom has
found help groups resolve collective action problems without outside intervention.2 This explanation is consistent with research finding that in a
curbside program, 95% of reported recyclers say that their friends and
neighbors recycle, whereas only 67% of nonrecyclers reported the same.
Face-to-face communication and feedback interventions may make nonrecyclers more aware of the recycling behavior of their neighbors, and thus
may encourage cooperation. 228 In other words, face-to-face communication
and feedback may make large-number, small-payoff collective action
problems more like small-number, small-payoff ones.
Some research suggests that block leader interventions may also affect
the degree to which individuals internalize a recycling norm. In the previously discussed Denver study, the authors surveyed respondents before and
227. Not everyone, of course, responds well to face-to-face contact, and some evidence suggests
that overzealous persuasion can backfire. Two studies suggest that those who report feeling social
pressure are less likely to recycle. See Gamba & Oskamp, supra note 182, at 601 (less frequent
recyclers were more likely to report feeling social pressure); Scott, supra note 189, at 281-83 (finding
that the most significant predictor of behavior among twelve variables studies was "social pressure"
and that the correlation with recycling intensity was negative). Of course asking households whether
they feel social pressure to recycle may produce biased answers. This is what social scientists call
"social desirability" responses. See Barker, supra note 182, at 572 (expressing concerns that "when
people are asked about socially proscribed behaviors such as recycling, social desirability may tilt
self-perceptions about attitudes and behaviors in an inaccurate direction").
228. It is interesting to speculate about whether social norm-strengthening efforts might work
differently in different countries. Germany and Japan, for example, have made very strong
commitments to residential recycling and would provide interesting points of comparison. See, e.g.,
Nakajo Hiroshi, Recycling Society, LOOK JAPAN, Aug. 1998, at 4, 5 (describing Japan's approach to
solid waste, which includes mandatory recycling of paper, plastic, and glass); Steven P. Reynolds, The
German Recycling Experiment and Its Lessonsfor United States Policy, 6 VILL. ENVrL. L.J. 43, 46-60
(1995) (describing the German system, which includes "take back" requiring those who introduce
packaging into the market to take it back and recycle or reuse it).
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after their persuasive interventions, both about how guilty one feels for
failing to recycle ("personal norms"), and about their expectations regarding whether friends and neighbors should recycle or expect recycling
("social norms"). The only group whose social norms scores increased
dramatically was the block leader group. This group also exhibited a large
increase in their mean scores for guilt when failing to recycle.2 29 Face-toface techniques, then, may work on multiple levels, by increasing norm
internalization, increasing esteem and reputation-signaling opportunities,
and drawing on a background norm of cooperation.
One more study merits mention because it indicates the limits of intervention techniques. In their study of multifamily dwellings, University
of Michigan researchers tried interventions similar to the block leader approach. They divided apartments into various groups and assigned different
interventions to each. These groups included a control group, a group that
signed written pledges committing to recycle, and a group that was visited
by a volunteer coordinator who handed out recycling information and
asked questions. These interventions had virtually no effect on recycling
volume, though they had some effect in medium-size complexes. The size
of the apartment complex had more effect on recycling behavior than any
other variable in this study.230 This suggests that face-to-face communication may have much less impact in the context of multifamily living. The
reasons for this result are not altogether clear. Apartment living may be
more anonymous, and therefore less susceptible to attempts to build community; alternatively, the demographics of apartment residents may affect
their recycling behavior, or the particular apartment complexes studied in
Ann Arbor, Michigan, may be anomalous. 3 1
c. Income and Single-FamilyHome Ownership Limitations on Norm
Management
Researchers have correlated several other demographic variables with
recycling activity as well, including age, income level, education level, and
gender. The results show that income level and single-family homeownership have the only predictive value, with higher income households recycling more than others.232 Level of education may predict recycling
behavior (again the higher the education, the more likely one is to recycle)
233
but the studies are more mixed.
229. See Hopper & Nielsen, supranote 19, at 195,200,215-17.
230. See Raymon De Young et al., supranote 196, at 263.
231.
The study is the only one I found that focused on interventions in apartment buildings, so
more research is clearly needed in this area.
232. See P. Wesley Schultz et al., supranote 193, at 108.
233. See id. Curiously, virtually no studies estimate whether race or ethnicity correlates with
recycling behavior.
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Assuming that homeowners of different socioeconomic levels generate similar amounts of trash, this demographic data may have two implications for norm management. 234 First, norm-strengthening efforts should be
targeted at lower socioeconomic households, rather than jurisdiction-wide.
Second, current norm-strengthening efforts may be working well with
higher-income groups and less well with lower-income groups. The demographic data suggest the need for additional research into whether norm
management efforts have the same effects across socioeconomic categories.
5. The Effect of FinancialIncentives
a. Unit PricingMay IncreaseRecycling Rates
Norm-strengthening and architectural changes are not the only tools
available for resolving large-number, small-payoff collective action problems. Governments also rely on market mechanisms to induce recycling
behavior. Most researchers who have studied recycling find that by charging residents even a small fee per bag of garbage, 235 communities can increase their recycling rates. One comprehensive study that examined the
effects of unit pricing on landfill diversion and recycling rates concluded
that recycling volume in a city with an already existing curbside program
would increase 14% by using a unit pricing plan.236 In a second study of
unit pricing, researchers found that communities experience a 15% decline
in waste generated for garbage truck pickup when they impose a one dollar
fee per thirty-two gallon trash bag.237
Unit pricing, however, may cause a particularly noxious side effect. A
study of the unit pricing system in Charlottesville, Virginia, estimated that
234. High-income households may generate more trash, and thus have more material to recycle.
For a provocative study of trash generation by income level, see JENKINS, supra note 147, at 27 (citing
William L. Rathje & Barry Thompson, The Milwaukee GarbageProject, Report for the Solid Waste
Council of the Paper Industry (1981)). Rathje and Thompson sorted the garbage of households in five
neighborhoods in Milwaukee, divided the households into three income groups, and found that lowincome households produced the highest amount of packaging waste. In another study, researchers
found a positive relationship between income and green glass, newspapers, grass, and total waste
discarded, and a negative relationship between income and aluminum, textiles, and plastics. See
JENKINS, supra note 147, at 27 (citing Robert A. Richardson & Joseph Havlice, An Analysis of the
Generation ofHousehold Solid Wastesfrom Consumption, Purdue Research Bulletin No. 920).
235. See Miranda & Aldy, supra note 152, at 12 (finding that a fee ranging from SI.00 to S1.50
per thirty gallon bag of garbage is common).
236. See FULLERTON & KINNAMAN, supra note 35, at 2. These conclusions are made using unit
pricing rates somewhere around S 1.00 to S 1.50 per bag. These rates are meant to capture the true cost
of garbage collection. See id. Raising the unit price significantly could substantially increase recycling,
even without a curbside program. For an analysis of the price elasticity of unit pricing, see AcKERNAN,
supranote 25, at 30-34.
237. See JENINS, supra note 147, at 15. Jenkins developed a particularly sophisticated and
elaborate model based on data from nine cities with unit pricing, a model that predicts how much
various cities can reduce their waste stream by accounting for variations in city size, weather, median
age, income, and other factors.
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at least 28% of the garbage diverted out of the city's landfills was illegally
disposed of through illicit burning, use of commercial dumpsters, road side
dumping, or leaving garbage with charities like Goodwill and the Salvation
Army.- 3 Other cities using unit pricing programs cite illegal burning and
dumping as common problems. 39
Though unit pricing appears to increase the amount recycled, two
studies have concluded that a curbside recycling program without unit
pricing may be more effective in increasing recycling rates than imposing
unit pricing in the absence of a curbside program. 4 Reducing barriers to
recycling, in other words, proves more effective than increasing the cost of
garbage disposal. Thus, instituting both curbside and unit pricing programs
may be more effective than a curbside program alone.
b. Bottle Bills May Increase the Amount of Glass Recycled
Interestingly, bottle bills (under which consumers leave a deposit of
ten cents or less) may be the single most effective way to encourage recycling. States with bottle bill programs have glass recycling rates of between
85 and 90%, and account for a disproportionate share of glass recycling
nationwide. 4' Bottle bill legislation appears to be effective even when the
financial reward is as low as 2.5 cents, as it is in California, where redemption rates for aluminum and glass containers have hovered around
80% or higher for most of the past decade.242
238. See FULLERTON & KINN AN1,supra note 35, at 2-3; see also Miranda & Aldy, supra note
152, at 26 (noting that in one city with unit pricing, Goodwill disposes of 50% of "charitable"
donations, and the Salvation Army disposes of 25%). Miranda and Aldy suggest that illegal disposal
can be minimized through a variety of steps, including providing locks for commercial dumpsters,
increasing education about illegal disposal, and fining offenders. Id.
Fullerton and Kinnaman note another common reaction to unit pricing. Because unit pricing is
virtually always based on volume rather than weight, many households "stomp" their trash in order to
fit it into the containers provided by the city. Volume reductions are of no value to cities seeking to
reduce landfill or incineration, however, because tipping fees are based on weight or compacted
volume. See FULLERTON & KINNAMAN, supra note 35, at 2, 14-15 (noting a 37% reduction in garbage
by volume after the imposition of unit pricing and only a 14% reduction in weight).
Germany has experienced similar problems. Many German communities have adopted unit pricing
for garbage, and the country as a whole requires manufacturers to collect and recycle packaging
material. Consumers can place recyclable material marked with a green dot in special collection bins.
As much as 40% of the material placed in the green dot bins is nonrecyclable municipal trash,
apparently placed in the bins by households seeking to avoid paying for garbage disposal. See
Reynolds, supra note 228, at 53.
239. Miranda & Aldy, supra note 152, at 26.
240. See FULLERTON & KINNAMtAN, supranote 35, at 29; James D. Reschovsky & Sarah E. Stone,
Market Incentives to EncourageRecycling: Payingfor What You Throw Away, 13 J. POL'Y ANALYSIS
& MGrr. 120, 132 (1994).
241. See AcKERmAN, supranote 25, at 129.
242. See CAL. DEP'T OF CONSERVATION, STATISTcAL REPORT OF REDEMPTION AND RECYCLING
RATES, available at http://www.conserv.ca.gov/dor/dor/o20notices/statisti.htm. (last visited Mar. 1,
1999).
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In rational economic terms, bottle bills may increase the market benefits of recycling sufficiently to tip an individual's cost-benefit calculus in
favor of recycling. Nevertheless, from a strictly economic point of view it
may make little sense for many people to recycle for the few cents per
bottle that they receive. Norms may help explain part of this behavior: the
deposit money, combined with the psychic benefit of recycling, tips the
cost-benefit equation.
Insights from behavioral economics may also help explain the success
of bottle bill programs. Empirical evidence suggests that individuals value
what they have more than what they merely desire. This is known in behavioral economic parlance as the "endowment effect." 43 A variation on
this insight could explain a recycler's willingness to cart heavy containers
back to a grocery store in order to collect a relatively small amount of
money. Individuals may value the money they deposit when purchasing the
beverages more than they would if they simply got the same amount of
money for recycling the containers without making a deposit in the first
place.2" The visibility of returning recyclable containers also provides people with good reputation-signaling or esteem-enhancing opportunities.245 A
third explanation is also available. Collecting discarded containers from
trash cans and recycling bins to collect the deposits is an important economic activity for some residents of bottle bill states, and may account for
a significant share of the higher recycling rates of these containers.246
Despite high recycling rates in states with bottle bill programs, bottle
bills remain politically contentious. California's battle over a 1982 bottle
bill initiative was legendary both for the amount of money opponents spent
to defeat it and for the slippery advertisements run against the initiative.24 7
No state has enacted a bottle bill since the mid-1980s. 24 8 Part of the stagnation in bottle bills can be accounted for by the alliance between curbside
recycling advocates, bottlers, and grocery stores in resisting container de-
243. See Korobkin & Ulen, supranote 12, at 65.
244. Without more empirical evidence, it is difficult to know whether consumers perceive bottle
bills in this respect. It is also plausible that at least some consumers view the deposit amount as part of
the price of a beverage and perceive money they receive from returning a container as a windfall.
245. Cf Gertrud M. Fremling & Richard A. Posner, Market Signaling of PersonalCharacteristics
26, available at http://www.law.uchicago.edu/lawecon/index/html (last visited Aug. 14, 2001) (positing
that the willingness to pay and willingness to accept experiments may be explainable because
participants in the experiments are signaling various reputational qualities to other participants and
experimenters).
246. See Kevin Fagan, Cart-Pushers Recycle Tons of Bottles and Cans, S.F. CHRONICLE,
November 27, 1999 at A19 (estimating that "cart-pushing recyclers" contribute approximately twenty
tons per week of cans and bottles to San Francisco recycling centers and quoting California Department
of Conservation employee as saying "I've never heard anyone keeping statistics about how much trash
gets recycled by homeless people... [b]ut I do know this: What they collect is significant").
247. See ACKERMAN, supra note 25, at 126.
248. Id.
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posits.24 9 If people can get a few cents back per container when they go to
the grocery store, they discard far fewer glass and aluminum containers in
their recycling bins. Yet these containers are the most valuable part of the
recycling waste stream for municipalities, because glass and aluminum are
worth more than many other recyclable materials."'
At least one study has determined that in areas of the country with
high landfill tipping fees, bottle bills do not undermine curbside recycling
programs to a point where they lack financial viability. But in areas of the
country with lower tipping fees, bottle bills may well make curbside programs financially insolvent. 5 California has adopted a solution that significantly minimizes the financial harm its deposit law might otherwise
cause curbside programs by allowing recycling programs to sample their
waste streams for container deposits and receive credit for the deposits
based on the sample. The increased revenue from the redemption amounts
apparently more than makes up for the loss of containers that a bottle bill
otherwise causes. Other jurisdictions require recycling programs to separate out all deposit containers in order to receive deposits back, and the
added cost often is not worth the increase in revenue from the containers.252
Despite the effectiveness of deposit laws, the movement in the United
States, at least at the moment, is clearly away from their adoption. Moreover, no American jurisdiction has extended the bottle bill concept to other
recyclable materials such as paper and plastic. As a result, the related research about other means to accomplish recycling is particularly salient.
IV
IMPLICATIONS
The empirical evidence about recycling suggests a considerable
amount about the circumstances under which individuals will engage in
cooperative behavior to resolve large-number, small-scale collective action
problems. These findings have significant implications both for norms theory and for the pragmatic problem of selecting appropriate tools to resolve
this particular category of social problems.
A.
ArchitecturalandNorm-StrengtheningMechanisms: Relationship
Between Convenience and Commitment
The recycling studies suggest that an inverse relationship exists between the convenience of a behavior necessary to resolve a large-number,
small-payoff problem, and the attitudes individuals have about that behavior. If the desired behavior is very convenient, then commitment to a norm
249.
250.
251.
252.
Id. at 127.
See supra note 24 for average prices in California.
See AcKRNtwart, supranote 25, at 127-29.
Id.
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in favor of the behavior has little bearing on whether people will participate. Put a different way, the more convenient the behavior, the less important a moral commitment to the behavior is in encouraging
participation, and the greater the number of people who will participate.
For instance, a heavily trafficked lunch area will remain relatively clean if
it has numerous conveniently located trash cans, regardless of whether the
lunch crowd cares about littering.
Commitment to a norm is nevertheless important in the resolution of
some large-number, small-payoff collective action problems because
strong attitudes in favor of the desired behavior increase the effort one will
exert to participate. Thus, for high-effort behavior, such as recycling dropoff centers, commitment to a norm is extremely important. But, even for
low-effort behavior that requires a steady level of participation (getting
people to turn out the lights whenever they leave a room), the quality of
participation is likely to be better for individuals with stronger beliefs than
for those with weaker beliefs.
The empirical evidence suggests another important conclusion. Increasing convenience seems more effective than most persuasive techniques aimed at increasing participation. In the recycling context, even the
most effective norm-strengthening interventions did not achieve the levels
of participation reached in communities with more convenient recycling
programs, which had participation rates approaching 100%.
The evidence about increased convenience also raises a related,
though unanswered question: if policymakers can make behavior that
contributes to a large-number, small-payoff collective action problem more
difficult by increasing the effort required to engage in that behavior, could
they significantly reduce the bad behavior? For example, installing water
faucets that turn off automatically after a short while, thus requiring those
who waste water to turn the faucet on repeatedly, may work more effectively than admonitions to conserve water.
Finally, increasing convenience appears to result in sustained behavioral change: participants in one commingled curbside program maintained their participation levels over a two-year period, and participation in
the program bore little relationship to the strength of commitment to recycling. 3
B.
Efforts to Encourage Behavior Through Information Provision and
Persuasion
Knowledge of the behavior required to resolve a large-number, smallpayoff collective action problem correlates with increased participation.
This correlation suggests that efforts to impart information about a program
253.
See supra notes 187, 203 and accompanying text.
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1297
may have some payoff, though it is not clear whether participants already
inclined to engage in the behavior are more likely to be receptive to information campaigns than those who are not. Instead, intervention techniques,
such as face-to-face communication and feedback mechanisms, produce
higher levels of norm compliance than do straightforward information provision and written pleas. These techniques may take advantage of what we
know from public games experiments by triggering a norm of cooperation
among participants.
C.
The Effect of Market Mechanisms on Recycling Behavior
In addition to the findings about architecture and norm-strengthening
mechanisms, the empirical evidence about recycling leads to some tentative conclusions about market forces. First, making the "bad" behavior that
leads to a large-number, small-payoff collective action problem more
costly tends to reduce the bad behavior and increase the good behavior. In
the recycling context, increasing the unit pricing fee for garbage can lead to
more recycling. At the rates most jurisdictions have imposed, however, the
increases in recycling are not as large as those produced by making recycling more convenient through architecture changes, such as curbside
pickup programs. Second, deposit laws that require people to pay for containers unless the containers are returned seem to be more successful than
any other policy options thus far studied. It is unclear why deposit laws
work so well. Perhaps these bottle bills take advantage of the "endowment
effect" (because people value what they have more than what they do not);
if so, it may be possible to emulate bottle bills in other contexts. For example, energy users could receive rebates for energy-efficient behavior rather
than being charged for excessive use.254
D.
OtherLarge-Number, Small-Payoff Collective Action Problems
There may be limits to the generalizability of the recycling data.255
Recycling may differ in significant ways from other large-number,
254. More research, however, is required to determine what spurs bottle bill compliance (for
example, whether some individuals who rely on bottle bill deposits as a source of income contribute
significantly to the very high return rates).
255. The evidence about recycling is also not without gaps and weaknesses. Multifamily dwellings
are clearly understudied in many respects. We know little, for example, about whether measures to
reduce the effort required to recycle work as well in the multifamily context. Not only would such
studies allow us to determine whether apartment residents and single-family residents respond similarly
to comparable interventions, but they might also cast light on the degree to which signaling or esteemgarnering is at work in the single family home context. This is because apartment recycling does not
lend itself well to single, readily identifiable containers for each unit; instead, several units typically
share one large bin. Additional research into the effectiveness of various persuasive techniques in
multifamily settings would also allow us to determine whether the one study suggesting that face-toface communication is ineffectual is anomalous.
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small-payoff collective action problems. For example, blood donation requires physical pain and discomfort, but need not take place on a daily or
weekly basis. Carpooling requires very inconvenient activity on a regular
basis. Household energy conservation may be more susceptible to financial
incentives because wasteful energy consumption costs money. Although
scholars have clumped these problems together for decades, subtle distinctions between these examples may exert an enormous effect on behavior.
Recycling evidence, however, offers a valuable starting point for designing effective government intervention into large-number, small-payoff
problems. This evidence highlights the sensitivity of particular behavior
characteristics required to resolve large-number, small-payoff collective
action problems. Does the problem involve high effort? Does it require
long-term behavioral change? Must individuals engage in the behavior repeatedly or only periodically? A few examples are illustrative. For a higheffort behavior like carpooling, the recycling evidence suggests that governments should spend less on exhortations to carpool and more on building carpool lanes or otherwise providing for convenient carpooling.
Moreover, if carpooling can be made easier, norm strengthening may then
improve the quality of participation (because stronger believers are likely
to carpool more frequently). To strengthen norms, more intensive persuasive techniques, such as having workers urge their colleagues to carpool,
may succeed better than more generalized campaigns such as radio ads exhorting drivers to carpool one day a week.
Similarly, litter reduction can be turned into a low-effort activity by
placing trash cans in areas with high foot traffic. Norm strengthening may
not be terribly important here because, unlike recycling, throwing trash in a
garbage can is an either-or proposition that does not require "quality" participation. However, if an activity is already convenient, such as residential
energy conservation, but requires sustained behavioral change, then individual feedback about energy usage may increase compliant behavior, as
may rebates for energy efficient behavior. For inconvenient activities like
voting or blood donation, some combination of effort reduction and interpersonal norm strengthening may work best. Since blood donation can
never be made a very low-effort activity given the physical discomfort it
causes, bringing blood donation sites to the workplace coupled with faceto-face pleas for participation is likely to increase participation more than
We also know little about other important issues. For example, do persuasive techniques work well
for encouraging high-effort recycling behavior? Almost all of the recent studies focus on curbside
rather than drop-off programs. Do the techniques work equally well regardless of the demographics of a
particular neighborhood? Do they provide lasting changes in recycling behavior or only short-term
gains? What role does race or ethnicity play in predicting recycling behavior? Do responses to unit
pricing differ depending on demographic characteristics? Do laws mandating recycling increase
participation and the quality of such participation? Does enforcement of mandatory laws make a
difference? Each of my questions suggests areas that would benefit from additional empirical research.
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providing less convenient donation sites accompanied by written pleas.
Voting, too, requires a fair amount of effort regardless of where it is
performed, so again a combination of effort-reducing and normstrengthening efforts may be most successful in increasing participation.256
My aim in presenting these examples is not to suggest that my conclusions lead to perfect predictions about the right blend of policy choices for
every large-number, small-payoff collective action problem. However, they
should provide preliminary guidance to policymakers attempting to devise
the most effective solutions to such problems. The conclusions should also
provide an analytical framework for evaluating, and finding solutions to,
other large-number, small-payoff collective action problems; and should
suggest areas for future research into effective intervention techniques to
solve such large-number, small-payoff problems.257
E. Implicationsfor Social Norms Theories
The recycling evidence also provides data with which to assess contemporary legal scholarship on social norms. First, it suggests that, as
Mancur Olson, Elinor Ostrom, and others have theorized, large-number,
small-payoff problems are unlikely to be resolved without external intervention. Moreover, these problems are unlikely to be resolved even if governments can shape and strengthen social norms in favor of resolution of
the problem absent additional regulatory mechanisms. The evidence suggests instead that we need to factor in not just whether we can persuade
people to do the right thing, but whether we can make it easier or more financially beneficial for them to do so.
Second, the data casts light on theories about how social norms affect
human behavior. The recycling evidence shows that norm internalization
matters in predicting compliance with a norm for high-effort behavior: the
stronger one believes in a norm the more effort she will exert. Yet competing theories about how esteem-gathering or reputation-signaling may
trigger norm compliance also get a boost from the recycling evidence. The
most effective techniques for increasing norm compliance, face-to-face
contact and behavioral feedback, play on the human desire to be well256. Market incentives for voting and blood donation raise problems that may not occur with other
large-number, small-payoff collective action problems. For a provocative examination of the rationales
against vote buying, see Richard L. Hasen, Vote Buying, 88 CALIF. L. REv. 1323 (2000).
257. An analysis of the empirical evidence that exists about large-number, small-payoff collective
action problems other than recycling is beyond the scope of this Article. For representative samples, see
David Brownstone & Thomas F. Golob, The Effectiveness of Ridesharing Incentives: Discrete-Choice
Models of Commuting in Southern California,22 REGIONAL ScI. AND URB. ECON. 5 (1992); Robert B.
Cialdini et al., A Focus Theory of Normative Conduct: Recycling the Concept of Norms to Reduce
Littering in PublicPlaces, 58 J. PERSoNALITY & SOc. PSYCHOL. 1015 (1990); Gordon H.G. McDougal
et al., ConsumerEnergy Research: A Review, 8 J. CONSUMER REs. 343 (1981); J.A. Piliavin, Why Do
They Give the Gift of Life? A Review of Research on Blood DonorsSince 1977, 30 TRANSFUSION 445
(1990).
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regarded by others. These techniques seem then to work on both levels by
increasing the opportunities to signal or gather esteem, while simultaneously increasing attitudes in favor of the behavior.
CONCLUSION
Large-number, small-payoff problems of collective action present a
particular conundrum to policymakers and social norms theorists. The difficulty in resolving these problems, combined with recent studies demonstrating the power of norms in resolving collective problems among
members of small, homogenous groups, may have led to undue optimism
that social norms can, on their own, provide solutions. The recycling evidence I have presented here should dampen the enthusiasm among those
who advocate norm management as a solution. Yet it should also provide a
means for developing more nuanced approaches to the resolution of largenumber, small-payoff problems, one that recognizes that the characteristics
of the behavioral changes needed matter deeply in choosing the appropriate
mix of regulatory tools, one that looks not just to the persuasive power of
government but to its role as a facilitator of behavior, and one that enhances the ability of government to persuade by understanding the role
norms play in inducing desired behavioral. change.