POLYMATH: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY ARTS AND SCIENCES JOURNAL
Failures Marked in Black and White:
Contradictory Government Contingencies and Contaminated
Food Chains in the Aftermath of the Chernobyl Disaster
Marcus Bouterse
Marquette University
The Chernobyl disaster was a significant moment in history that raised questions
regarding the stability of nuclear energy, the ability of governments to properly
care for the safety of their people and its food chain, and the unpredictability of
the natural world. Yuri Shcherbak, a scholar who interviewed eyewitnesses of the
disaster, states that the Chernobyl accident, “separated lives into two parts, before
and after the accident.” It brought nuclear power, as a sustainable energy source,
into question. Mankind’s manipulation of nature and unnatural splitting of the
atom evoked unforeseen contingencies in state social-engineering designs. In
times of such distress, flexibility was integral; more often, though, governments
failed to acknowledge site-specific problems and failed to improvise when it was
in fact necessary for them to do so in response to an unpredictable natural world.
Political policies further fed discrepancies and double standards, which
overlooked the basic safety of citizens in the countries affected by the
contamination. Chernobyl proved that no matter how prepared a state was and
how thoroughly developed contingency plans for accidents and incidentals were,
their initial efforts to counter the unforeseen size and scale of nature were futile.
Failed government contingencies to properly protect its people, especially in
regard to possible contamination in the food chain, doomed not only the Union
of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), but also other European countries, a prime
example being the United Kingdom (UK). Both countries downplayed the full
extent of contamination in their food chain and, in the process, subjected their
citizens to direct, unnecessary risks. The accident stimulated large instances of
mistrust and mass hysteria in all the areas affected due to the slow and often
contradictory bureaucratic responses.
Much research focuses on the Soviet failures in this regard, but the
academic narrative lacks the connection and similarities between the USSR and
the UK after the Chernobyl disaster, especially pertaining to the damaged food
chain. The comparison between these two governments displays the importance
of government properly addressing the purity and sustainability of a community’s
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BOUTERSE “FAILURES MARKED IN BLACK AND WHITE”
food source. In reflection on these issues, this essay asserts that government
policies in response to catastrophic disasters must be expedient and consistent.
Time is of the essence and has a direct correlation to possible public distress and
higher probabilities for a contaminated food chain. Furthermore, an analysis of
government disaster relief, through a case study of the practices displayed by the
USSR and UK after Chernobyl, raises additional questions, such as: is the future of
mankind safe under current government contingency plans? Do failed policies
spread more skepticism and mistrust of the government? Moreover, what duty or
obligation does a government have to be completely transparent with its people
about potential danger? In addition, should a government be held responsible for
the unpredictability of Mother Nature? More importantly, at what point will
science lack an answer to rewind the consequences of mankind? For every strong
thrust toward sustainability within the natural environment, there are countless
incidents of abuse and misuse of the natural resources on this planet. More often,
the world strives for advances in “technology for technology’s sake;” as the world
progresses, the attempt to control nature continues to dance with unexpected
dangers.1
Prior to the Chernobyl disaster, many people were already skeptical of
nuclear energy. The Kommunist published outspoken concerns in October 1979
from academic Nikolai Dollezhal and economist Yuri Koryakin. They warned,
“nuclear power plants swallowed up too much land and water, nuclear waste was
difficult to store, and there was always a risk of radiation leaks.” They also asserted
that, because of the instability in nuclear energy, “nuclear power stations should
be built away from densely populated areas.” Public concern grew over the
following decade as scholars and specialists shed light upon the possible dangers
of atomic power. Incidents like that of the Three Mile Island (March 28, 1979)
nuclear accident in Dauphin County, Pennsylvania, confirmed such fears. As a
reassurance, the Soviet government announced in 1984 that “Soviet atomic power
plants are the safest in the world” and “Many years of Soviet experience have
proved that it is quite possible to guarantee the complete safety of nuclear power
stations.” The Soviet Life magazine even published an article just a mere two
1. The UK and the USSR were not the only nations affected by the Chernobyl
disaster; this essay focuses on these two areas as a case study to address government
polices in regards to environmental disasters; Yuri Shcherbak, Chernobyl: A Documentary
Story (Basingstoke: Macmillan in association with Canadian Institute of Ukrainian
Studies, 1989), xii, 23; For more information, see James C. Scott, Seeing Like a State: How
Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed (New Haven, CT: Yale
University Press, 1998).
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months prior to the Chernobyl accident that asserted, “a nuclear power plant
accident was impossible in the Soviet Union.” Although the public remained
uneasy and it was common for newspapers to have permanent columns on the
Chernobyl power station. An example was the Literaturna Ukraina “Eye on the
Power Station.” The Chernobyl disaster, unfortunately, confirmed the validity of
these fears. The accident permanently scarred the landscape and people in the
Soviet Union, both mentally and physically.2
On Saturday, April 26, 1986, at 1:23 am, an “uncontrollable release of
radioactive material” spread into the atmosphere from the Chernobyl nuclear
power plant. The explosion discharged an estimated “120 million curies of
radioactive materiel—more than one hundred times the radiation of Hiroshima
and Nagasaki combined.” As the Soviet government did not promptly notify the
adjoining areas of their calamity, problems mounted. It was not until two days
later that Sweden and Finland “detected raised radiation levels in the
environment” and warned the world of the “possibility that a major accident had
occurred.” The Soviet Union did not publicize the accident to the world nor did
they release the source of the excessive radiation levels until May 10. In response
to the Soviet lag in notifying the world, ABC’s Nightline anchor, Ted Koppel,
inquired about the “government’s tardiness in issuing a warning about the leak of
radiation;” the only answer he received from the Soviet government was, “official
offices in all countries were closed over the weekend.” The Soviet Union’s failure
to properly and expediently inform their own people, as well as the rest of the
world, of the leak placed mankind at risk. The accident, as a whole, spurred a
strong sense of confusion in the USSR. One Soviet observer stated, “The whole
day we knew nothing, and no one said anything. Well, it was a fire. But as for the
radiation that there were radioactive emissions, nothing was said about that.”
Another bystander declared, “The information arrived immediately. However, it
contained much that was contradictory and strange.” Chernobyl demonstrated a
“crucial proof of the inadequacies of [the Soviet Union’s] information system.” In
the midst of Cold War politics, the Soviet government regularly suppressed
information, especially from their people. It portrayed a fake sense of stability and
instilled an illusion of strength on the international stage. With that said,
“information systems” around the world were also left with many unanswered
2. Bohdan Nahaylo, “Leaking the Nuclear News," The Spectator (May 10, 1986):
12; Arthur T. Hopkins, Unchained Reactions: Chernobyl, Glasnost, and Nuclear
Deterrence (Washington, DC: National Defense University, 1993), 12; Shcherbak,
Chernobyl, 15.
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BOUTERSE “FAILURES MARKED IN BLACK AND WHITE”
questions. The inadequacies of the Soviet government to properly address the
situation ignited great mistrust and confusion among its people. A more
substantial issue, though, was that no one fully understood the consequences that
the fallout had in relation to the natural environment.3
The devastation to the landscape surrounding Chernobyl was substantial.
At first, citizens believed that simply a fire spread in “one of the buildings of the
fourth power-generating unit.” Mikhail Gorbachev, General Secretary of the
Communist Party of the Soviet Union, gave a statement two weeks later in
response to the accident and explained, “According to specialists, the reactor’s
capacity suddenly increased during a scheduled shutdown of the fourth unit. The
considerable emission of steam and the subsequent reaction led to the formation
of hydrogen, an explosion, damage to the reactor, and the resulting radioactive
discharge.” Although facility managers shut down the three remaining power
cores, temperatures exceeded stable levels and caused engineers to panic. This was
not a normal fire. Even though emergency crews were able to contain the blaze,
they were not able to extinguish it completely. It remained ablaze for days, as “It
could not be fought with water or chemicals. The high temperature would have
instantly vaporized anything that got into the fire zone.” Specialists determined
the best option to suppress and contain the radioactive fallout and fire was to
engulf it in a protective shield of natural minerals—a combination of sand, clay,
boron, dolomite, limestone, and lead. Helicopters dropped these materials and
created an “enormous cork weighing more then 5,000 tons” in an effort to solidly
seal the fallout. Their goal, as one physicist stated, was to “bury it in a thick
concrete case.” The Council of Ministers under the Ministry of Agriculture,
Fisheries, and Food (MAFF) stated on May 10 that the “Chernobyl nuclear power
station work continued to eliminate the effects of the accident. As a result of the
measures taken, the temperature within the reactor has fallen significantly. In the
opinion of scientists and specialists, this testifies to the virtual halt in the
combustion process in the reactor’s graphite.” Although specialists assumed that
they succeeded in averting disaster, there were substantial losses of life directly
3. Great Britain, Agriculture Committee Second Report: Chernobyl, the
Government's Reaction (London: H.M.S.O., 1988), xii; Tony Judt, Postwar: A History of
Europe Since 1945 (New York: Penguin, 2005), 597; Christopher Hitchens, "Chernobyl
Reactions," The Spectator (May 10, 1986): 12; “Chernobyl: Chernobyl Coverage
Continues,” The Current Digest of the Soviet Press XXXVIII, no. 28 (August 13, 1986): 1213. All subsequent references to this publication will use the abbreviation CDSP; Roy
Aleksandrovich Medvedev and Giulietto Chiesa, Time of Change: An Insider's View of
Russia's Transformation (New York: Pantheon Books, 1989), 39.
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connected to the accident. In Soviet attempts to contain the catastrophe, thirty
emergency workers died. In the aftermath and to the present, “some 30,000 people
have since died from complication caused by exposure to radiation from
Chernobyl, including more than 2,000 cases of thyroid cancer among residents in
the immediate vicinity.” These deaths were a direct reflection of the failures of the
Soviet government to properly bring “openness” to their people. Perhaps even
more damaging, they failed to predict the implications and wider impact of
Mother Nature’s unpredictable force and displayed a dismissive approach to the
potential dangers in nuclear power.4
Soviet demands for “openness” about the disaster channeled from earlier
promised policies from Gorbachev and his pursuit for glasnost or openness. He
gave this promise in his first speech as General Secretary in 1985. Based on the
Soviet government’s response to the Chernobyl accident, the Soviet people and
the entire world had just cause to question the earnestness in Gorbachev’s policy.
The citizens of Pripyat, an adjacent town to Chernobyl, were unaware of the true
magnitude of the problem. The day of the accident, rumors spread through the
town the morning of the accident, but townspeople had no substantial
information. One man recollected that:
I told my wife that something really bad had happened, from our
window you could see the ruined block. I said: “its advisable not to
let the children out anywhere. And the windows should be closed.”
My wife, unfortunately, didn’t do as I asked, she felt sorry that I
endured such a lot. I went to bed and she let the children out, so
there’d be less noise. She gave me a chance to rest . . . It would have
been better if I haven’t slept. On Saturday there was no instruction
not to let the children out, That came on Sunday. At around ten
o’clock a woman came and told us not to let the children out, not
to go out of the house, and to listen to the radio. At two o’clock the
evacuation began.
The Soviet people were completely clueless to the extent of the disaster.
Shcherbak affirms that the government’s lack of “timeliness and quality of the
4. “Chernobyl Disaster: First Soviet Reports,” CDSP, no. 16 (May 21, 1986): 1, 4;
Mikhail Sergeevich Gorbachev, Toward a Better World (London: Hutchinson, 1987), 229;
Shcherbak, Chernobyl, 113; “Chernobyl: More Details Come Out,” CDSP, no. 19 (June 11,
1986): 10; Judt, Postwar, 597-598.
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BOUTERSE “FAILURES MARKED IN BLACK AND WHITE”
measures taken to the people from the effects of the accident” agitated many
eyewitnesses to the incident. The witnesses claimed, in regard to the damages
from the disaster, that a “shameful silence has been drawn over it in the public
statements of leaders at the town, area and republican levels.” With many
unanswered questions and undoubtedly a lot of confusion, all the townspeople
could do was hope the Soviet government protected their best interest. They
simply followed in line, like cattle, to government jurisdiction.5
The Soviet Union’s lack of timeliness to evacuate Pripyat, in response to
the fallout at Chernobyl, illustrated a clear disregard for their citizens’ safety. It
took roughly a day and a half after the Chernobyl explosion for the government to
send buses and aid the evacuations at Pripyat. When help did arrive, those in
charge of the evacuation failed to explain the true dangers to the townspeople;
they simply broadcasted the statement, “Comrades, in connection with the
accident at the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Station we announce the evacuation of
the town. Have your papers, indispensible things, and, if possible, rations for three
days, with you.” Why would the townspeople think that the problem was
catastrophic if they were asked to only bring three days of rations? Many likely
assumed that it was only a “temporary” solution to a trivial incident and that their
lives would return to normalcy after a short period. Documents even stated that
some townspeople refused to leave because no one fully explained the severity of
the incident to them—the majority of those in opposition to evacuation were
elderly women. Many hid in cellars to stay in the town. One even responded, after
found hiding, “Look how nicely my orchard has blossomed! Whose care can I
leave it in? And who will feed my hens and ducks? They’ll be upset with me for the
rest of their lives!” Yet again, if the Soviet government had properly notified their
citizens of the gravity of the Chernobyl fallout, the townspeople in the direct
vicinity of the disaster would have understood the urgency and the danger of the
5. People began to criticize the Soviet policies of Gorbachev in respect to
Chernobyl. The Daily Report posted “last week we have seen that the Soviet Union has
very reluctantly given very few facts about the accident in Chernobyl both to its own
people and to the outside world; and with the rise to power of Mr. Gorbachev such has
been said and written in the Soviet Union about openness, the Russian word is Glasnost.
Now if this openness does not mean that the Soviet Union gives information like about
the accident which happened in Chernobyl both to the Soviet people and the rest of the
people in the world, then my question is: What does openness mean?” For more
information, see “Political and Social Developments: Latest Developments on Chernobyl
Accident reported,” Daily Report III, no. 86 (May 5, 1986): R1. The accident was an
impetus for the Soviet government to be more open with information to their citizens and
the world; Shcherbak, Chernobyl, 58, 73.
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situation. Although it took a day and a half for evacuation vehicles to arrive, one
must assert that the Soviet government response team did expediently empty the
city. The emptying of Pripyat citizens took roughly two hours; 1,100 buses left
with the entire population of the city—roughly 40,000 people—to areas outside of
the designated danger zone. The Soviet government initially closed off a “30kilometer ring around the atomic power station” for the safety of their people, but
they soon expanded this zone past Pripyat and into nearby provinces. The danger
zone quickly expanded and encompassed three districts in Gomel Province, far
past the Chernobyl Exclusion Zone—the 30-kilometer zone around the fallout
area.6
The decampment also included other “necessities” of the city aside from
its people; evacuation teams removed livestock and foodstuffs found within the
contaminated areas. The Soviet government acknowledged that radiation
exposure had potential to drastically damage the food chain and the future of their
agriculture. Hundreds of trucks installed makeshift pens to transport thousands of
heads of cattle. An eyewitness provided a vivid account of the mass exodus:
I can remember how in those days, in a solid stream toward those
who were going into the accident area, there came trucks loaded
with cows. The animals stood there indifferently in the backs, sadly
looking at the trees in blossom, the houses and plank fences
whitewashed for the festival, the dazzling green grass and the
springtime floods of the rivers.
The Soviet government made a strong effort to rescue all cattle in the
accident zone and they distributed the rescued animals among farms outside the
Exclusion Zone. Once removed, the Soviet government remained persistent in
their claim that these animals were safe and not contaminated; the State AgroIndustrial Committee insisted that “there were several factors at work here:
biological defenses, the fact that they were mostly in closed buildings, and the fact
that they were being fed last year’s feed.” One must note, though, that the Soviet
government misrepresented the purity of the meat to their population. For
example, the Current Digest of the Soviet Press noted, “the coat [of cattle] ‘took up’
quite a lot of radioactive dust. And those cows that managed to get into meadow
6. Shcherbak, Chernobyl, 64; “Increased Aid for Chernobyl Area,” 17;
“Chernobyl: The First On-the-Spot Reports,” CDSP, no. 17 (May 28, 1986): 4.
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and feast on fresh grass also took in radioactive iodine and caesium.” The Soviet
government, in relation to this concern, told meat-processing plants to place these
potentially “contaminated meats” in “specially prepared refrigeration depositories,
where it would gradually lose its radioactivity.” Radionuclides in meat do not
simply vanish. Although Iodine-131 (I-131) has a shorter half-life than Caesium137 (Cs-137), both radioactive isotopes were prevalent in sources of food and
brought grave risk to the consumer. The actions of the meat processing plants,
dictated by the Soviet government, directly contradicted the early safety
assurances given to the Soviet people. It led many Soviets to question whether the
meat was safe for consumption or not.7
The Soviet food supply was not the only vital resource affected by the
disaster. Strong concerns arose about the purity of Soviet water. The Soviet
government did demonstrate dire concerns over the possible contamination of its
potable water. The Soviet government instated almost immediate examinations on
its water source. Authorities stated, “There is a constant technical and radiometric
monitoring of all stages of the preparation of pure drinking water. Water quality is
also being checked in the water-supply system itself. Personnel of the republic’s
sanitary and epidemiological service test the drinking water nearly 900 times every
day.” This mass paranoia over the area’s water source was justified and continued
in the form of numerous other precautions. Specialists understood the direct
relation between the radioactive dust and contamination of the environment.
Although they confirmed that the consumption of tap water was not dangerous,
they did recommend “wells used for water supply should be covered in lids to
protect them from dust.” A main concern arose, though, with the residual
radioactive dust. Towns like Kiev mandated regular watering of the streets to help
alleviate the issue. They also suggested that excessive hygiene must be practiced
and dust must be “wiped off with damp rags” to limit tracking the dust indoors.
Towns with higher levels of radioactive isotopes in the atmosphere also mandated
that children stay indoors to help limit their expose to the radioactive dust. Now
although most children did not understand the full extent of the risk,
7. Shcherbak, Chernobyl, 85; Caesium-137 is a radioactive isotope produced by
nuclear fallout. It is highly water-soluble and spreads easy through nature. It has a halflife of roughly 30 years, the amount of time it takes for the radioactive levels to drop in
half from the initial reading. Exponentially, by these figures, remnants of radiocaesium
remain in the environment well over one hundred years; “Increased Aid for Chernobyl
Area,” 18.
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interestingly, they still realized the potential dangers from the radioactive fallout.
Shcherbak notes the reaction by children to Chernobyl:
As always happens, the children began to copy the
incomprehensible life of the adults . . . I had already seen children
running through the bushes with a stick, as if they were measuring
the background radiation with a dosimeter. They were playing
“radiation.” And one girl, wrapped up in a bedsheet, waled around
the entrance to her building and, making “terrifying” eyes,
prophesies in a voice from beyond the grave: “OO-oo, I am
radiation, hide from me. I am evil and terrifying…”
In actuality, radioactive dust was “the “evil and terrifying.” The Soviet government
did their best to be reactionary to possible environmental issues pertaining to the
vicinity’s water supply—its threat to drain into and contaminate bodies of water
was a serious concern. Unfortunately, they were unable to prevent excessive
contamination to the soil within close vicinity to Chernobyl.8
Because minerals in the soil function as the basic unit in a food chain, soil
contamination brought long- and short-term issues to the Soviet Union. These
nutrients in the earth served as the main fuel source for primary consumers.
Through the contamination of grazing animals, problems further compounded
contamination through the food chain. Soil contamination became widespread
through storm runoff, which dispersed radiation “fragments” into water sources
and leached into the soil. Radiobiologists suggested two methods to alleviate this
issue: grow crops that extract the radioactive substances from the soil or cultivate
crops that were impervious to the contamination in the soil near Chernobyl. The
first suggestion was problematic; it produced further radioactive waste to dispose.
The second option was inconceivable; there were few crop options that could
sustain such a high level of radioactivity in the soil. Although scientists argued
that tilling the soil with a combination of “lime, ground dolomite, and wastes
from open-hearth furnaces” had potential to help accelerate the natural process,
the final decision was to let nature repair the mistakes without the interference of
8. Shcherbak, Chernobyl, 91-92; “Further Chernobyl Coverage,” CDSP, no. 21
(June 25, 1986): 15; “Chernobyl: More Details Come Out,” CDSP, no. 19 (June 11, 1986):
10 and 17; “Chernobyl: Containing the Damage,” CDSP, no. 20 (June 18, 1986): 12; David
R. Maples, Chernobyl and Nuclear Power in the USSR (New York: St. Martin’s Press,
1986), 22.
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BOUTERSE “FAILURES MARKED IN BLACK AND WHITE”
mankind. Scientists concluded that the best option was to let the radioactive
fragments “decay by natural means.” Specialists suggested, “it would be advisable
to let certain areas lie fallow, to return to natural vegetation for a while: it will
build up the needed organic material in the soil. This is especially necessary
because in these areas the land is the poorest in the republic—this circumstance
was taken into consideration in choosing the site for the atomic power station.”
Put simply, the government consciously built nuclear plants in areas of poor
productivity and soil to limit the extent of future damage. In this consideration,
the Soviet government was, to an extent, forward thinking in its contingency plan
for possible dangers in nuclear energy.9
Public concerns and uncertainty remained high and forced further Soviet
government intervention. Authorities distributed iodine tablets to the population
as a preventative measure to those in the Exclusion Zone and also communicated
the “benefits of red wine as an antiradiation agent.” Yet, in spite of these cautions,
the government urged the public to continue their normal routines and to do
“what they did before.” The Soviet government insisted that agricultural yearly
production numbers remained strong in the ravaged province, even with the
exclusion of farmland in the roughly 1,000 square kilometers around the
Chernobyl station which was “taken out of production.” A June 4, 1986, edition of
the Current Digest of the Soviet Press supported this assertion with the statement,
“in the province as a whole, spring crops have been sown, in a better-quality
operation than last year, on 650,000 hectares. This is 100,000 hectares more than
was sown in the spring of last year. Potato planting has been completed
everywhere. Nearly 150,000 hectares of corn has been planted, or 40,000 hectares
more than last year.” Grigoriy Ivanovich Revenko, First Secretary of the Kiev
Province Party Committee, reaffirmed this assertion when he happily stated, “we
saw tractors in the fields; agricultural work is proceeding.” The Soviet government
tried their best to reassert stability in the Soviet people. They continued the
assertion that things were back to normal and that “life was good.”10
9. “Rehabilitation of Chernobyl Area Goes On,” CDSP, no. 34 (September 24,
1986): 15-16.
10. The Current Digest of the Soviet Press published “direct losses alone from the
accident amount to about two billion rubles.” “Politburo’s Postmortem on Chernobyl,”
CDSP, no. 29 (August 20, 1986): 1; “Chernobyl: Health Questions Linger,” CDSP no. 40
(November 5, 1986): 14; “Western Europe: Reportage on Eighth German Communist
Party Congress,” Daily Report III, no. 86 (May 5, 1986): G6; “Politburo’s Postmortem on
Chernobyl,” CDSP, no. 29 (August 20, 1986): 1; “Chernobyl: Soviet Coverage Expands,”
CDSP, no. 18 (June 4, 1986): 10; “Chernobyl: More Details Come Out,” 2.
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The Soviet government also provided a false sense of hope to consumers in
regard to the food available in the marketplace. Although people questioned the
origin and “merits of the goods on display” at Kievan provincial markets,
authorities asserted that food sold was completely safe. The Soviet government
claimed dosimeter operators examined all foodstuffs prior to sale and only
allowed the shelving of produce if it had an “OK” marked on it. To prevent any
chance of mishap, “street sales of piroshky, ice cream, juices and water by the glass
have been forbidden in Kiev.” This was because these products had a higher
probability of reaching the consumer without being checked. As an additional
safety precaution, authorities advised consumers that “vegetables, fruits, and
greens should be thoroughly washed in running water before use.” Problems
arose, though, when employees of district sanitation and epidemiology stations
started to refuse testing foodstuffs for the concerned public. Their only
justification was:
Just imagine what would happen if everybody brought in their
onion, milk, or sorrel! We don’t have enough manpower, technical
means or time to test all this. And, generally speaking, it isn’t even
necessary. Sample studies have been and are being conducted in
every district, and wherever a danger of contamination is found the
population is informed. Wherever no restrictions have been
imposed, all products of personal auxiliary farming operations can
be consumed as food.
It appeared as though, in an attempt to avoid mass public panic and an
unsustainable food supply, authorities used a proverbial broom to sweep a
possible contamination trail in the food chain and large-scale contamination of
Soviet people under the rug.11
The misleading Soviet government policies and their attempts to
extinguish public concerns over the contaminated food chain gave minor
justifications for Gorbachev’s statement that pertained to the damage from
Chernobyl. He asserted, “I have every reason to say that despite the full gravity of
what has happened, the damage turned out to be limited.” The Soviet government
supported this statement and continued to downplay the disaster’s full magnitude.
11. “Chernobyl: Radiation Fears, Rumors,” CDSP, no. 32 (September 10, 1986):
10; “Chernobyl: More Details Come Out,” 3-4, and 17.
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In the midst of Cold War politics, the Soviet government refused to look weak and
inept to the rest of the world. They also feared a loss of faith in the Soviet
economy and produce. A prime example was a June 4, 1986, headline in the
Current Digest of the Soviet Press that read, “Kiev doctors say higher radiation
level is not harmful to health” and the radiation level “is not an obstacle to regular
labor activity.” This type of rhetoric attempted to reaffirm the stability of the
Soviet Union. In the process, the Soviet government did their best to counteract
forms of orientalism and propaganda derived from Western politicians. Rumors
spread ranging from “you can’t go in the water” and “the river is poisoned” to “all
the livestock in Kiev Province and nearby provinces of Belorussia have been
destroyed because of the danger of contaminating people.” These concerns
motivated the European Economic Community (EEC) to temporarily blockade
the importation of fruits and vegetables from socialist countries. In response, the
Soviet Union claimed these fears derived from Western political and economic
motivations, and that radioactive contamination was “a fabrication.” In actuality,
though, there was legitimacy for worldly concerns over the Chernobyl disaster.
Even though the most heavily radiation-damaged soil was in unfertile localized
areas, the Soviet government failed to acknowledge the possible implications of
nature to spread the radioactive materials. An outcry from the Soviet Union’s
neighbors arose about the possible contamination in other areas of Europe; those
neighboring countries “to whom an ill wind had brought frightening levels of
radioactivity.”12
In response, the Soviet Union rejected any responsibility for Chernobyl,
outside the Exclusion Zone, and disregarded outside damages to the natural
environment due to the disaster. They went so far as to denounce any connection
to the hardships other countries faced in relation to the expelled radiation. Georgy
Arkadyevich Arbatov, Soviet political scientist and advisor, stated, “other
countries did not suffer.” He even narrowed the extent of the fallout to, “we had
radiation . . . it depends on the place . . . at the reactors there was very high
radiation . . let us say, 100 km from it there was no danger at all.” In the end, the
Soviet leadership’s persistence of false hope to their people and failures to
properly contain radioactive foodstuffs endangered the Ukrainian citizens. Soviet
12. Gorbachev, Toward a Better World, 232; “Chernobyl: Soviet Coverage
Expands,” 11-12; “Chernobyl: Radiation Fears, Rumors,” 12. “Chernobyl: The
Reassurances Continue,” CDSP, no. 26 (July 30, 1986): 18; “Heroism and Panic at
Chernobyl,” CDSP, no. 23 (July 9, 1986): 16; “Chernobyl: Major Setback for Soviet
Union,” Human Events 46, no. 19 (May 10, 1986): 1.
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disregard for long- and short-term effects from Chernobyl, especially on its
impact with the natural environment, also extended past the confines of the Soviet
population.13
The truth was that the natural environment played a significant role in the
contamination of areas outside the direct vicinity of Chernobyl. High altitude
winds substantially dispersed the “cloud of radiation” over northwest Europe and
parts of Scandinavia. By May 2, the poisonous cloud reached the British Isles,
some 2,400 kilometers away. Problems mounted because experts lacked the
technology to efficiently track the air concentrations in real time; the radiation
dispersion proved much more extensive than specialists had anticipated. These
unforeseen problems enabled the radioactive threat to expediently intensify.
Heavy rainfall released the pollutants from the atmosphere and extensively tainted
areas of Cumbria, Wales, Scotland, and Northern Ireland. The Meteorological
Office in England was unable to pragmatically determine the “quantity of
radioactive material deposited in the United Kingdom.” The radioactive deposits
contained high levels of I-131 and Cs-137. Long-term effects of these radioactive
isotopes, especially Cs-137, caused substantial consequences to the natural
landscape and local food chain in the United Kingdom.14
Similar to Soviet concerns, the radionuclides leached into the soil and were
subject to “uptake by plants.” The contamination had potential, then, to pass into
primary consumers, raising apprehensions of further radioactivity in the
environment. This spread of radioactive isotopes from Chernobyl drew concerns
related to the United Kingdom’s food chain. A prime example of this wideranging effect of Chernobyl radioactive isotopes was the contamination of sheep
in Scotland. These heavy grazing ungulates caused great anxiety for the British
government, which resulted in numerous restrictions on the animals. Noticed
through the monitoring of meat quality during processing in late May and early
June 1986, tests recorded high levels of radiocaesium, exceeding 1,000 becquerels
per kilogram (bq/Kg) in lamb. On June 24, Ministers enacted emergency authority
in Scotland under Part 1 of the Food and Environmental Protection Act 1985; this
13. “Political and Social Developments: Latest Developments on Chernobyl
Accident reported,” Daily Report III, no. 86 (May 5, 1986): R1 and R10.
14. Paul Simons, “Ill Winds Carried Chernobyl Poison,” The Times (London),
April 26, 2006, 69; Great Britain, Agriculture Committee Second Report: Chernobyl, the
Government’s Reaction (London, UK: H.M.S.O., 1988), xiv; G.R. Miller, A.D. Horrill, A.J.
Thomson, and G. Howson, Radioactivity in Scottish Soils and Grassy Vegetation
(Banchory: Banchory Research Station, 1989).
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BOUTERSE “FAILURES MARKED IN BLACK AND WHITE”
restricted the movement and slaughter of sheep in designated contaminated areas
that displayed levels of radioactivity above 1,000 Bq/Kg. Initially, the restriction
deemed 4.2 million sheep (roughly 17 percent) contaminated out of a national
flock of 24.6 million. Over the subsequent years, the containment of sheep “were
gradually lifted for those farms when monitoring of live lambs showed that levels
had fallen sufficiently to ensure that there was no continuing risk to public health
from the consumption of meat from sheep.” The lifting of the restrictions, though,
did not happen fast enough for many Scottish farmers.15
There was resentment pertaining to the government restrictions on the
sheep. The threshold of 1,000 Bq/Kg discouraged many ranchers as they “felt that
the limit was too high and pointed out that lower limits were adopted by other
European countries like Sweden.” Aside from the fact that 1,000 Bq/Kg was an
arbitrary limit, the method to determine levels of radioactivity in sheep was not
efficient. Early monitoring entailed in an analysis of tissues and organs, which
resulted in the death of the sheep; live monitoring was not available until a few
months after the fallout. On August 18, 1986, Ministers enacted a “Mark and
Release” policy for the contaminated sheep. This involved a distinctive paint,
which designated sheep that were “too contaminated” to graze on unrestricted
pastures. The purpose was to separate the radioactive sheep from mainstream
herds until their quantities of radiocaesium fell to a more acceptable level.
Malcolm Rifkind, Secretary of Scotland, gave reassurance in the policy and stated
“there was no danger to public health and no reason for consumers to refrain
from purchasing and eating lamb.” His statement downplayed that numerous
sheep were in isolation because of excessive radioactive levels and that there was a
breach in Scotland’s food chain. Rifkind, like Gorbachev, supported government
legislation over the issue and softened the potential risk of a contaminated food
chain in an attempt to curb public mass hysteria.16
15. Becquerel is a unit of measure that relates to the time one nucleus decays per
second; Great Britain, Agriculture Committee Second Report, xvi; Great Britain, Chernobyl
Accident: Monitoring for Radioactivity in Scotland (Edinburgh, UK: Scottish Office, 1990),
6.
16. Agriculture Committee Second Report, xvi; Many ranchers felt the threshold of
100 Bq/Kg was too high. Most other European countries had a threshold of 600 Bq/Kg.
To help ease public concern about potential food contamination, the Secretary of
Scotland, Malcolm Rifkind, claimed, “the most potentially vulnerable members of the
community, young children, a 10-year old who consumed more than ¾ of a pound of
lamb at the level of 1,000 becquerels every week for a whole year would still receive less
than 1/8 of the body dose at which by international recommended actions should be
considered.” For further information see “Order to Stop Movement of Lambs in
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The containment of radioactive sheep disturbed local markets. Areas in
Scotland, specifically Dumfries and Galloway, Arran, and Easter Ross, relied
heavily on the sale of lamb meat; many feared restrictions on the sheep could be
catastrophic to their economies. Research demonstrates that the fears of spoiled
lamb meat did affect the sales of lamb in the United Kingdom. The manager from
Dewhurst, a large chain of butchers in Britain, claimed their orders dropped
nearly 50 percent in the first month after the Chernobyl incident. The Meat and
Livestock Commission stated, “wholesale prices had dropped by more than 50
pence a kilogram to about £1.55 in Britain as a whole, and up to £1.37 in
Scotland.” The drop in prices directly hurt local farmers and the Scottish
economy. The connection between Chernobyl radioactive fragments and the
natural environment and food chain in the United Kingdom sparked questions
about public safety, which demonstrated that the British government direly
needed a contingency plan to address this type of incident. In the end, the British
government failed to properly contain or alleviate the radiation issues efficiently
and effectively. These failures spread a wave of mistrust and dissension from local
farmers toward the British government.17
Failure, on the part of the British government, is illustrated by their slow
reaction to the threat of contamination. Their unreliable contingency plan for
containing the livestock resulted in radioactive sheep, far past the 1,000 Bq/Kg
limit, entering the food chain. Sheep slipped through jurisdiction and were
brought to slaughter in the period between the arrival of the Chernobyl cloud
(May 2) and the first restrictions on sheep in Scotland (June 24). In addition, there
was a “recycling of radioacaesium” because known radioactive sheep carcasses
were processed and used for pet food and animal feed. The bodily functions of the
radioactive sheep also contributed to the recycling of radiocaesium in the food
chain. Contaminated feces and urine bled into the soil and spread through the
uptake of the pasture. Government policies further contributed to these failures.
The paint used in the Mark and Release program was faulty. One farmer stated
Scotland,” The Times (London), June 25, 1986, 4. Rifkind’s downplay of risk paralleled a
British study in 1990 that stated, “an adult who consumes sheepmeat, contaminated at
average levels, at the critical group rates would have received a yearly dose of less than
0.01 millisieverts or under 1 percent of the appropriate control level in each of the years
1987 to 1989.” For further information see Great Britain, Chernobyl Accident, xvi-xx, 6;
“Order to Stop Movement of Lambs in Scotland,” The Times (London), June 25, 1986, 4.
17. “Order to Stop Movement of Lambs in Scotland,” 4; John Young, “Ban on
Slaughter of Lamb Spreads to Scotland,” The Times (London), June 25, 1986, 5; John
Young, “Radiation Reports Hit Lamb Prices,” The Times (London), June 24, 1986, 2.
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BOUTERSE “FAILURES MARKED IN BLACK AND WHITE”
the paint was, “the worst paint I had ever used in my life. It had no tar in it and
was too watery.” It was too hard to distinguish between contaminated and clean
sheep because the paint did not create sufficient markings. This faulty system
added complications to an already confusing policy that continually changed the
boundaries and contaminated areas denoted for Mark and Release. This left local
consumers and farmers confused with the government plans and increased
probability for further radioactive nuclides to enter the British food chain.18
The largest failure of the Ministry, similar to the Soviet government, was
“the delay in making the order” to contain the spread of radioactivity and the lack
of communication to the British people of dangers in the food chain. This was
because the government “had no contingency plan for such an emergency.” This
was a weak excuse, especially since Britain previously conducted extensive
research on the ramifications and complications to the environment associated
with radionuclides. They tracked the deposition of Cs-137 and plutonium in
surface horizons from nuclear weapons fallout during 1961 and 1962. These
scientific examinations continued through the early 1980s and directly connected
the possibilities of food chain contamination to wind dispersion, rainfall, and crop
uptake. The National Radiological Protection Board (NRPB), established in the
Untied Kingdom 1970, published Derived Emergency Reference Levels (DERLs)
in March 1986 that delineated procedures to limit the contamination of food stuff
in the circumstances of an accident. It was ironic that such procedures were in
place less than three months before the Chernobyl accident, but the British
government still lacked a proper plan to contain nature’s spread of radioactive
material.19
The constant discrepancies in government policy left members of the
Scottish public puzzled and conflicted. They were told “on one hand that there
was no problem and in the next breath that there was going to be a ban on
slaughter.” This uncertainty continued to increase the year after the Chernobyl
accident, as the British government “re-imposed restrictions on the movement
18. Great Britain, Chernobyl Accident, xvi-xxi.
19. The testing concluded that “before the Chernobyl accident, mean caesium137 activity varied less than threefold amongst the Scottish regions.” See Miller, Horrill,
Thomson, and Howson, Radioactivity in Scottish Soils and Grassy Vegetation. This study
also proved that Scotland did have pre-existing issues with caesium-137 in the soil; John
Young, “Minister Denies Cover-up on Lamb,” The Times (London), June 23, 1986, 1;
Great Britain, Chernobyl Accident, xii-xv; P. A. Cawse, and A. D. Horrill, A Survey of
Caesium-137 and Plutonium in British Soils in 1977 (Harwell, Oxfordshire: United
Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority, 1986): 5.
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POLYMATH: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY ARTS AND SCIENCES JOURNAL
and slaughter of sheep because of high levels of radiation from the Chernobyl fallout.” This dictated sheep farms that were originally not restricted the year before
now be declared contaminated. The contradictory government policies stirred
public discomfort in lamb markets. The public complained that the government
defined contaminated meat in too “black and white terms.” Lamb meat was
labeled either contaminated or not contaminated. People criticized that, “sheep A
was contaminated because it showed such-and-such radiation reading” while
“sheep B was uncontaminated because it showed a lower reading.” The numerical
threshold of 1,000 Bq/Kg solely marked the ungulates “safe or not safe.” In
essence, this could allow lamb meat to reach the marketplace with a level of 999
Bq/Kg. For most people, this threshold was meaningless; any level of radioactive
contamination meant that the food was contaminated and unsafe. When asked
how soon the restrictions on sheep would be lifted, Mark Robinson,
Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State Welsh Office, responded, “we are not in
the business of gazing into crystal balls, we are in the business of safety.” The
MAFF implied, though, that the restrictions on sheep slaughtering and their
movement would not last long. Although, this “short” period of restriction
extended for some sheep farms for up to twenty-four years. As of February 2010,
“only two areas in Scotland remained under restriction” and required regular
monitoring.20
Many questions arise from all of this uncertainty. How safe were the
people of Scotland based on their possible contaminated food chain? How truthful
was the British government to the public? One could conclude that if sheep still
had excessive levels of radiocaesium over twenty-four years after the Chernobyl
fallout, other livestock in Scotland had similarly high levels of radionuclides.
Shiona Baird, a member of Scottish Green Party, stated in 2004:
Eighteen years on and the aftermath of Chernobyl is still being felt.
We don’t actually know how many acres are affected and what
other animals are affected—its not just sheep who live on this land,
but cattle and chickens. In the case of these Scottish farms, the land
20. “Order to Stop Movement of Lambs in Scotland,” 4; “Radiation Curbs Back
for Sheep,” The Times (London), August 13, 1987, 2; Great Britain, Agriculture Committee
Second Report, xii; “Restrictions on Movement of Sheep to be Continued,” The Times
(London), October 25, 1986, 2; The last farm was finally removed in June 2010 from
restrictions under the Mark and Release program. For more information, see “Last
Scottish Farm Released from Chernobyl Restrictions,” Veterinary Record 167 (2010): 112.
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BOUTERSE “FAILURES MARKED IN BLACK AND WHITE”
will be contaminated for our lifetime and probably for our
children’s and grandchildren’s too.
This statement clearly contradicts the damage control rhetoric stated earlier by the
Secretary of Scotland Rifkind at the time of the Chernobyl disaster. One is left to
wonder, then, what information did the British government base their decisions
on in the matter of potential contamination of the food chain as well as how much
responsibility did the British government have towards the incident and to their
people for the disaster?21
In the end, there were numerous parallels between the British and Soviet
responses to Chernobyl. Government policies, both from the Soviet and British
perspective, chose to downplay the full extent of danger that their public faced due
to the accident. Interestingly, both countries were highly dependent on nuclear
power and one may wonder if these governments put the safety of their own
people at risk to maintain the dangerous yet sustainable energy source. These
countries failed to properly address the connection between the radioactive fallout
and the natural environment and its food chain. This, in turn, allowed for high
probabilities of food contamination and stimulated public discomfort toward the
purity of their food. This article raises larger questions and leads one to ask: is any
level of radiation in foodstuff safe? Put simply, even if food measured 1 Bq/Kg, it
still contains radioactive nuclides. Would people feel comfortable eating food that
is only slightly contaminated?22
Logistically, government decisions are led by risk mitigation and statistical
information. Although, in the future, governments should additionally
acknowledge that there are instances in which “risk cannot be interpreted in
purely statistical terms because human beings do not think in purely statistical
terms.” There are times when statistical terms are too rigid and become arbitrary.
A clear example of the set-backs in data-driven regulations was the arbitrary 1,000
Bq/Kg contamination limit for sheep in Scotland. Governments must recognize
that during a catastrophic event the saliency of mitigation data is dependent on
21. Euan McColm, “Haunted by Chernobyl 18 Years On,” News of the World,
August 15, 2004, 6.
22. David R. Marples states “Gorbachev was apparently unwilling to say anything
that might appear to compromise the nuclear power build-up in the USSR and Eastern
Europe, which . . . is perceived as of the utmost importance to the future of the Soviet
Union.” For more information see David R. Maples, Chernobyl and Nuclear Power in the
USSR (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1986), 33.
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site-specific issues and more often this information is just one more layer of
support against the complexity of a catastrophic event. A combination of all of
these layers is integral to address a catastrophic event. Most importantly though,
governments “should also be wary of making categorical statements that no risk
exists;” even the slightest risk is still a risk. In an event such as the Chernobyl
disaster, it is imperative that governments adequately communicate the severity of
risk to the general public. Even more, governments must respect the
unpredictable, and therefore uncontrollable, quality of nature and be willing to
improvise in the face of such challenges. No matter how carefully a government
designs contingency plans for future accidents, the plans may be completely futile.
To counter this possibility, governments should take reactionary stances to
unforeseen incidents and attempt to alleviate concerns as expediently as possible.
Although it is good to have base “assumptions” for unexpected issues,
governments have to acknowledge that they may immediately need to adjust the
plan to match site-specific problems. In the process, governments also must
prioritize the safety of their citizens and food chain over world economic and
political clout. Urgency and consistency in a plan is the key for any contingency
plan’s success. Throughout history, governments demonstrated less-than-rapid
responses to disaster mitigation and opacity in relaying the true danger to its
people. The Soviet and British response to the contamination issues related to
Chernobyl are prime examples of such government failures. In the aftermath, the
Chernobyl disaster serves as a good reminder of the potential dangers in artificial
energy, especially in regard to nuclear power. Chernobyl is now a town “without
inhabitants, without the resonant voices of children, without the normal everyday,
provincial unhurried life . . . No domestic animals remained in the town, the cows
didn’t moo in the morning.” Unless mankind wants this image duplicated
throughout the world, people must be more conscience of the potential damages
that follow the control and manipulation of the natural world.23
23. Great Britain, Agriculture Committee Second Report, xii-xv. Shcherbak,
Chernobyl, 10.
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