EBHA, Geneva 2007 Conference, 13-15 September
Generating Fashion Cycles: the role of international trade
fairs since the creative destruction of Parisian Monopoly
CONTACT DETAILS
SHINOBU MAJIMA
ESRC Centre for Research on Socio-cultural Change, University of Manchester
and Faculty of Economics, Gakushuin University
1-5-1 Mejiro, Toshima-ku, Tokyo 171-8588
[email protected]; [email protected]
BRIEF BIOGRAPHY
SHINOBU MAJIMA is Associate Researcher at the ESRC Centre for Research on
Socio-cultural Change, at the University of Manchester, currently preparing a book
manuscript, entitled Fashion Fever: Clothing the Mass Consumer in Post-war Britain.
She also holds Associate Professorship in Economic History at Gakushuin University,
Tokyo.
1
EBHA, Geneva 2007 Conference, 13-15 September
Generating Fashion Cycles: the role of international trade
fairs since the creative destruction of Parisian Monopoly
This paper examines supply-side explanations for the increase in fashion in the global
mass market over the last half century, especially since the youth rebellion of Parisian
designers in the 1960s. It identifies the changes in design innovation patterns which
took place in response to the growing market. It focuses on the concepts of ‘design
monopoly’ and the coordination of innovation among designer firms, in the context of
the increasing power of mass manufacturers. Evidence for changes in design
innovation processes is found in commercial information from industry sources on
designer associations, trade exhibitions and international fashion shows. This paper
aims to offer a holistic account of interrelationships between Haute Couture and High
Street and how the world of fashion is constructed.
Little has been debated over the socio-economic organisation of fashion shows or
exhibitions, although horizontal cooperation among firms has been considered a major
factor of technological innovation in many industries. 1 Competitors often build
horizontal relationships in order to share information and social exchanges. Medieval
craft guilds were an obvious example from the past. Such a relationship, however, has
not been analysed to the same extent as vertical relationships which entail more
obvious economic exchanges.2 The recent interdisciplinary literature on fashion has
2
successfully probed beyond the traditional boundaries of costume studies, but the
structure of the industry as a whole from fibre production to garment distribution
channels has not yet been analysed systematically. 3 This paper aims to provide an
alternative perspective by addressing the organisation of the collectively constituted
fashion industry - the institutional framework which embraced design innovation.
Fashion today is a global enterprise, which exhibits a most powerful system of trendcreation that other commodity markets, such as automobiles and electronics, have
keenly followed.
Theorists with an interest in socio-economic aspects of fashion, i.e. those of
the Simmellian tradition, have provided a few tentative trajectories, focusing on the
role of fashion shows and fashion cycles. The system of fashion in the western world
has shifted over the twentieth century: (1) from ‘class differentiation’ to ‘collective
selection’; (2) from closed fashion to open fashion; (3) from the elitist model to the
egalitarian model of fashion diffusion. Despite the differences in labelling, American
sociologist Blumer (1969), French philosopher Lipovetsky (1987) and American
socio-economist Pesendorfer (1995) all pointed to the coordinating role of the fashion
cycle, which formed the fundamental infrastructure for the oligopoly of the fashion
business.4 They envisaged that there was a linear trajectory in the changing system of
fashion innovation and diffusion. This accords well with the ‘democratization of
fashion’ thesis, claimed by Wilson and Taylor (1989) and Crane (2000). 5 Firstly,
Blumer argued that design selection systems had been transformed from those that
signalled ‘class differences’ to those that were selected by retail buyers who had
developed common sensitivity to be the ‘unwitting surrogate of the fashion public’.6
Lipovetsky also saw a shift from ‘closed’ to ‘open’ systems of fashion in the 1960s,
i.e. from Paris domination to multiplicity of fashion centres. 7 In a more rigorous
3
attempt at socio-economic modeling, Pesendorfer examined a shift from elitist to
egalitarian fashion diffusion: In the earlier stage, fashion monopolists seasonally
introduce new designs and lower the price of the old to make it obsolete; but in the
later stage, they have difficulty keeping the monopoly and thus allow the designs to
diffuse more quickly.8
Taking these theories into account, we can explain the fundamental role of
fashion shows and fairs as venues where capital-poor designers (the seller) and
capital-rich mass producer/marketers (the buyer) form a reciprocal relationship. The
sellers can first play the role of a ‘design monopolist’ by coordinating the introduction
of new design at fashion shows. Then secondly, the buyers play a crucial role of
‘collective screening’ as they make decisions based on their competitors’ behaviour in
an attempt to find the right design to adopt. Being held at fixed timing, the fashion
shows orchestrate the cycle of design creation and obsolescence. The existing theories
explain the historical shift in the process of orchestration reasonably well, but this
paper casts doubt over the pendulum-like periodisation suggested by Pesendorfer in
particular, i.e. the resurgence of the ‘design monopolist’ model in the 1990s, as
mentioned later. This paper, in stead, places a particular emphasis on the increasing
role of the intermediary, the role of the buyers and their ‘collective screening’ in
explaining the evolution of the global fashion system.
PESENDORFER’S MODEL
As mentioned above, Pesendorfer applied the model of a durable good monopolist to
the case of the supply of fashion design. While there has been a general absence of
theory on the supply of apparel, Pesendorfer’s model has provided an economic
analysis closest to the conceptual framework in this paper.
4
9
Let us revisit
Pesendorfer’s thesis here in more detail. He first assumes two different types of
individual consumers, high and low, and explains design innovation cycles with a
matching model where the price of a good gives information about the type of the
purchaser of that good. By periodically introducing new goods and lowering the price
of the old good, a ‘design monopolist’ regenerated demand for the good which was
used as a signal. Pesendorfer examined two levels of human capital distribution, elitist
and egalitarian, for the case of monopoly:10
(1) In the elitist case, the latest design was sold only to the high types initially.
Once all the high types had acquired the design, the designer sold it at a zero
price to the low types, and at the same time introduced a new design.11
(2) In a society with a relatively even distribution of human capital, fashion cycles
could be egalitarian, and fashion spread over the whole population before a
new innovation occurred. Consumers purchased fashion in this case because
the penalty of not owning it, i.e. probability of being matched with low type,
was large.12
Although the model of the ‘design monopolist’ helps explain the price cycles, the pure
monopoly model does not apply to the fashion industry in the historical context. The
fanshion industry appears exhibit the characteristics of collusive oligopoly by a group
of interdependent firms. The sociologists Blumer and Lipovetsky, as mentioned above,
identified the coordinating role of the fashion show, with the former’s particular
emphasis on ‘collective selection’. 13 Through a coordinated introduction of new
design at the fashion show, competing designer firms can together effectively play the
role of a ‘monopolist’, while competing buyers together keenly select the ‘in’ designs.
This paper extends Pesendorfer’s framework to include the game of cooperation
5
among competitors in order to account for the logic and the history of fashion
innovation cycles.
While Pesendorfer assumed two agents, i.e. the designer monopolist and the
consumer, this paper assumes the presence of imitation by the firms outside the
‘designer oligopoly’, who specialise on mass reproduction of designs at low price.
The key role is found in the buyers of the mass market retailers who behave
interdependently among themselves, resembling a herd of sheep, in an attempt to find
the right design to imitate. This paper considers three cases of co-ordination among
competing fashion firms. First, in the elitist case, the timing of the introduction of new
designs is coordinated by a closed institution, whose members only include the
designers of rare talent and originality. The closed institution controls the flow of
design information by setting the timing for the provision of designs to selected (i.e.
foreign) mass marketers and by keeping out pirates, and uses its rigid membership
regulation as a commitment device and an entry barrier.
Secondly, as the fashion market expands, the existing monopoly is destructed
by the new competitors. In the egalitarian case, the designer who manages to spread
design rapidly over the whole population holds a temporal monopoly, which, however,
is unsustainable due to unregulated imitation and competition. The mass marketers act
rapidly to get on the bandwagon of elusive design monopoly and to flexibly control
production batch size facing the fashion uncertainty. The cycle of creation and
imitation is shorter, and frequency of price changes is high. An alternative
institutional form would emerge as the mass marketers attempt to coordinate their
selection of design in a free-entry open market. Just like the majority of fashion
consumers, the potential design monopolists and imitators try to spot the trend by
observing each other’s actions and by copying the behaviour of those who are
6
believed to be better informed.14 Because the size of the herd determines the winning
design, it is efficient for the fashion firms to bet on the same design, so that they will
all be selling the ‘in’ design, knowing the a priori winner. A bandwagon coordination in an open market works as an effective and efficient means of
informational processing in a society where the boundaries between high types and
low types, originals and imitations are not clearly defined.15
TABLE 1. Two conceptual cases: elitist and egalitarian
Environment
Agent
Consumer
Firm
Type
Strategy
Structure
Institution
Human capital distribution
Elitist
Egalitarian
Discriminating
Snob
Oligopoly
Closed
Impatient
Bandwagon
Monopolistic competition
Open
Table 1 summarises the two conceptual cases of the elitist and the egalitarian design
diffusion. These cases correspond to the expansion of the market and the development
of the fashion industry in the twentieth century, which first emerged around Paris
Haute Couture and later destructed by the youth rebellions.
The third case appears, then, as a swing back to the elitist model. The designer
who has enough capital to coordinate consumer demand through advertising would
internalise the function of the mass marketers, and produce for both segments of the
market, by periodically transferring the design from high-type to low-type
production. 16 Although such a designer-manufacturer firm fits Pesendorfer’s model
the best, I would argue that such a designer firm tends to achieve the same result more
commonly by using a trademark, which artificially create a monopoly over the
production of a good.17 In order to increase mass production and mass distribution of
7
low-type goods with the brand name, firms employ coordinated fashion shows as a
means of advertising the imaginary elite consumers, associated with the logo.
THE STRUCTURE OF THE PAPER
The present analysis is limited to the supply of fashion designs to the British mass
market in the post World War Two period. Let us start with the beginning of ‘design
monopoly’ by Paris designers in order to understand the nature and the scale of this
global enterprise, in which British mass retailers also played a part. First, we discuss
the reciprocal relationship between the two sectors of Haute Couture and ready-made
clothing, and then consider the external factor, i.e. the market expansion, which led to
the collapse of the hierarchical fashion system. The main part of this paper explores
the development and the function of the new set of open market arrangements, which
took the form of a series of trade exhibitions. A further development of the coordination mechanism and the ‘logo monopoly’ which were caused by further
expansion and diversification of the market are then discussed. The final section reexamines the transition from ‘closed fashion’ to ‘open fashion’ and considers the
linear trajectory of the ‘democratization’ thesis against the fashion pendulum
hypothesis.
This paper traces these developments using evidence from a fashion trade
journal Drapers Record. 18 This weekly journal has been regarded as the authoritative
source of information on fashion and retail in Britain since 1887. Although the
principal readers were independent fashion retailers, the circulation extended further
to all sectors of the fashion business, including multiple retailers, department stores
and the fashion press. This journal has been essential for retailers because of its
extensive coverage of, and advertisements for, fashion shows, exhibitions and fairs,
8
where buyers order and purchase their seasonal fashion stock. Using directories,
reports and advertisements in this trade journal, a comprehensive database of trade
fairs and fashion shows was compiled. The changes in organisational form of the
trend-creating industry are evidenced in terms of the increased number and the
quickened timing of shows and exhibitions, although not all of them were of equal
importance.
CLOSED FASHION
The development of the British fashion industry was synchronic to that of the
international market in fashion design. This emerged in Paris in the nineteenth century
and grew rapidly during the interwar years. Fashion did exist long before the starting
point of this analysis. However, in terms of the birth of the fixed cycle of design
innovation, which provided the infrastructure of the global design market, it is
appropriate to start from around the 1920s. This is when the ready-made clothing
industry started to threaten the bespoke industry on the quality end.19 The issue of
periodization is important here. The modern origin of fashion has been attributed to
the launch of Haute Couture by Charles Frederic Worth in the late nineteenth
century.20 However, the essence of the modern fashion system, namely the seasonal
cycles of fashion creation and presentation, only became fixed by the end of the Belle
Époque. The biennial fashion showings became a matter of course not only due to the
social calendar of the local high society elites, but particularly in order to cater for the
increasing demand from American professional buyers. They had to coordinate the
production cycle at home with design acquisition across the Atlantic, thus especially
benefited from the fixed seasonal showings. Collections were presented at a fixed
hour of the afternoon in the fashion houses in late January and late August. They were
9
first shown to the foreign buyers, who shipped the couture models, toils and paper
patterns for reproduction, and then to private clientele a few weeks later.21
Haute Couture grew to become the second largest export sector in France by
the mid-1920s. Parisian couturiers created commercially-viable designs and fabrics
which were reproducible in this export drive. Straight and short daywear by Chanel
was a good example.22 The innovation in the transatlantic telegraph played a role in
globalization. With this American manufacturers were given up-to-the-minute
information from Paris showings in the 1920s. Telegraph also provided opportunities
for Paris designers, such as Jean Patou, to self-promote to the American market.23
There were twenty couture houses presenting at the 1900 World Fair. The number
grew to seventy-two by 1925.24 Fashion became an organised enterprise because of
this export drive and the international market for intangible fashion ideas. The need
for a regular supply of fashion change to match the production cycle was the key for
this development.
France has long had a tradition of instituting trade associations, such as
Appellation D’Origine Contrôlée in the food sector. The trade association which
developed to co-ordinate and enforce co-operation among the couture houses in Paris
was called the Chambre Syndicale de la Couture Parisienne. The couture firms were
facing a dilemma between restricted production and unrestricted mass production –
the former of which would sustain the scarcity value of their creation and high
monopoly, and the latter would boost profit in the short run but would quickly
deteriorate the exclusivity of the design. The cooperative solution to this dilemma was
to restrict the use of the classification, Haute Couture, to those firms that met the
requirements set by the Chambre Syndicale.25 The requirement was to make a large
investment up front. This functioned as a pre-commitment not to distort the reputation
10
and the exclusive image of Haute Couture. This also created an entry barrier to new
designers with small capital. The option of mass reproduction was restricted to
overseas traders. This deterred design diffusion by domestic imitators at least for one
production cycle. For those exclusive couture firms, the Chambre Syndicale arranged
horizontal co-operation. It coordinated the fashion show timetables and dealt with
piracy of styles and foreign relations.26 The association also ran promotional activities
to raise the reputation of the Haute Couture ‘brand’ in the export drive. International
expositions, such as the Exposition Universelle in Paris and the World Fair in New
York, were used as an advertising opportunity, although there was a fine balance
between promotional benefit and the risk of piracy.27
The Second World War created a gap in the design monopoly market as
French couture houses temporarily stopped their creation during the Nazi occupation.
This provided an opportunity for other European and American couturiers to enter the
international design market. They formed their own trade associations modelled on
the Chambre Syndicale. In Italy, Mussolini’s regime set up the Ente Nazionale della
Moda Italiana in Turin. It imposed Italian materials on the industry and prohibited the
use of French models in 1936.28 In Britain, under the central control of the wartime
National Government the Incorporated Society of London Fashion Designers was
launched in 1942. 29 Its aim was to control domestic consumption by encouraging
British couturiers to design utility dresses. Rationalisation was focused on reducing
basic yardage per garment. 30 In the United States, designers also paid effort to
produce utility-orientated designs, which were called ‘Victory Suits’ to enhance
morale. 31 The influence of simple, modern and functional designs from American
designers continued during and after the war under austerity.
11
The competition among European couturieres to promote the export of high
fashion to the United States was intensified following the sensational presentation of
the ‘New Look’ by Dior after the war. The glamour of the couture world was brought
back into the social calendar in Paris, which was desperate to regain the market
position and its authority as the fashion capital. The couture openings were once again
used as a promotional device. Important guests and the press attended them wearing
evening gowns and gloves.32 The Chambre Syndicale organised a travelling exhibition
in the United States, aggressively targeting the prime market for luxury goods. 33 In
London, while domestic consumption was still restricted by the Utility Scheme, the
Incorporated Society followed the Paris initiative, and organised a celebrity tie-up
with the Sadler’s Wells ballerinas for their 1949 world tour. 34 In Italy, the couture
showings started in 1951 by a Florentine aristocrat in his villa and continued in the
successive years in the historic Pitti Palace.35 In the capital Rome, designers’ interests
became represented by the Camera Sindacale della Moda Italiana. London developed
a campaign to lure American fashion journalists and department store buyers in 1954
by holding receptions at heritage venues in London.36 In co-operation with Florence
and Rome, London co-ordinated the dates for couture showings to coincide with Paris
in January for the spring collections and in July for the autumn. However, it was more
common for the American buyers to by-pass London to come to Paris, Florence or
Rome.
The American buyers, instead, came to London in May and November for the
ready-to-wear collections, held by the London Model House Group, which was
established in the export drive in 1947 for ladies’ tailoring. The international market
for Haute Couture was saturating, with a massive entry of new designers right after
the war. Supply of designs outpaced the growth of demand from the American new
12
rich and Hollywood actresses. With the spread of aspirational consumption patterns to
the wider market in the US and Europe after the economic recovery, the ready-towear industry inevitably became the focus in the following decades. The Incorporated
Society ceased meetings by 1960, leaving a skeleton organisation until 1970. The Alta
Moda houses ceased to show at Pitti Palace in Florence by 1967. The Chambre
Syndicale became a subsidiary of the Fédération Française de la Couture du Prêt-àPorter from 1973.
The number of Haute Couture houses peaked in the mid-century and
decreased in the latter half (Table 2). The reports from Paris couture showings, which
used to be the season’s highlight since the ‘New Look’, reduced its column space
from a full five-page coverage to just a few lines from the 1970s onwards.
TABLE 2. NUMBER OF HAUTE COUTURE HOUSES
Total Haute Couture Houses
1900
1925
1946
1952
1997
2002
20
72
106
60
18
12*
* With Saint Laurent’s retirement there are only 11 haute couture houses remaining. Although Valentino and
Versace have shown since the late 1980s, they can only be called Correspondent Members, according to the strict
rule of the Chambre Syndicale. Drapers Record, February 9, 2002.
Source: Brewer, Fashion.
The closed institution i.e. the Chambre Syndicale, worked well for the elitist market
in a society with marked class divisions. It protected the intellectual property of
designers and ensured patrons to be socially distinct. However, as the fashion market
expanded, new competitors opened up market niches outside the existing monopoly in
the form of international competition.
13
OPEN FASHION
The challenge to the Paris monopoly came not only from abroad but more
destructively from a new generation of designers, who created for younger clientele
and directly for the ready-made market, ignoring the exclusive system regulated by
the designer associations. The sensation of miniskirts rippled the fashion world. Yves
Saint Laurent, Pierre Cardin and Andre Courrèges were among the rebels against
Chambre Syndicale in the 1960s.37 .In London, Mary Quant’s boutique was credited
as the epicentre, although the evolution of the clothing industry cluster was already
happening by that time.38 The independent boutiques by young designers epitomised
the fall of the existing hierarchy. It was, however, not the strength of the individual
boutiques but the corporate power of large fibre manufacturers which effectively gave
a final blow to the existing fashion system. They backed the growth of young fashion
which expanded into the inexpensive yet highly profitable mass market.
What was happening in the 1960s was not a simple expansion of the fashion
system. The system transformed from two-tiered design allocation with Paris
couturieres as monopolists, to open market diffusion with buyers’ selections being
increasingly important. While the Paris couturieres prescribed the limited fashion
designs to the buyers until the 1950s, the American buyers keenly selected the designs
en masse in the 1960s. As the market for the teenage fashion expanded, the store
buyers turned to art colleges for a new breed of design talents. They were particularly
keen to discover teenage cult trends in London. Student designers could easily enter
the design market, ‘cutting out clothes on the kitchen table and taking collections to
American manufacturers in no time’. Stock houses and showrooms for small-scale
manufacturers in London proliferated in the late 1960s and the early 1970s. The
14
buyers frequented them for the latest trend and cash-and-carried ‘instant fashion’ in a
frantic ‘hand-to-mouth way’ of buying.39 Fashion could be started from anywhere and
could be picked up by professional buyers.
This opening up of the market for inexpensive fashion also gave opportunities
for the man-made fibre conglomerates, such as ICI and Courtaulds. They were the
fastest growing force in the fashion industry.40 With high stock commitment, however,
they had natural disadvantage with fast fashion. The long lead time was the norm in
mass production. Garment with a-year-old couture design had been produced, risking
a complete change of style at the beginning of the new season. This uncertainty in
fashion changes led to a building up of the ‘layered collective selection process’.
Sociologist Blumer, above mentioned, witnessed the shift to ‘collective selection’ by
the buyers in the mid-1960s. The ‘layered process’ was comprised of a series of
seasonal shows from fibre to fabric to finished garment in which such ‘collective
screening’ happened at every stage.
Fibre Firms and Fabric Fairs. During the 1950s and 1960s, the European
market gradually established a series of fibre, fabric and fashion trade fairs, while
Paris dominated at the couture level. Although trade shows had the basic function of
selling ready-made products, they started to have a whole new meaning – i.e. ‘trend
orchestration’. As the influence from Paris couture declined, the fibre and fabric
manufacturers took the lead in ‘trend orchestration’ in a challenge to institutionalise
‘collective screening’. Backed by their monopolistic position in the fibre market, they
took the lead in colour forecasting and fabric exhibitions. They changed the design
diffusion process upside down. Colour trends became especially important. The
International Commission for Fashion and Textile Colors （ Intercolor ） was
launched in Paris in 1963 to select the ‘in’ colour through discussion among
15
representatives.41 The selection committee was held biannually in Paris two years in
advance of the actual selling season. It became the first trend-setting event in the
international fashion production calendar. 42 This coincided with an innovation in
colour matching technology. In 1963 a paint company Pantone became the
monopolist in the colour coding market selling a book of standardized colours.43 It
used computers to sort and match numerically coded colour data and to print out
chemical formulas for reproducing the hues.44
Fabric shows became a playground for the powerful fibre conglomerates. The
first large-scale international fabric trade show, Interstoff, was held in Frankfurt in
1959, and quickly became an important venue. 45 Trade fairs were primarily a place
to sell and buy products in a concentrated time period, but the secondary purpose of
gathering trend information became more important as Interstoff became wellestablished by the late 1960s. In Paris, the private trend forecaster, Promostyl started
its service in 1967. 46 Promostyl sold information to manufacturers on the coming
lifestyle changes and buying preferences, as well as on coming changes in colour, 18
months in advance to the selling season. It was, in fact, the fabric manufacturers in
Lyon who coined the idea of ‘trend orchestration’. They started Première Vision in
Paris in 1973, which was a show that ‘orchestrated’ a synthesis of seasonal colour and
fabric trends before the Salon du Prêt-à-Porter. It also provided a venue for
Promostyl’s presentations.47 In Florence, the knitting yarn exhibition, Pitti Filati came
onto the scene in 1977, and quickly became the reference point for knitwear
manufacturers and designers for its large selection of yarns and its trend forecasting
function. Although London never established its own fabric event in the seasonal
fashion calendar, British synthetic companies, such as ICI and Courtaulds, were active
in providing information to manufacturers and retailers. They were, in fact, the only
16
British firms engaged in colour predictions and attended Interstoff. 48 In 1966, for
example, Courtaulds showed the ‘London Line Look’ designed by the students from
the Royal College of Art, while ICI also held their stand, collaborating with the
French designer Pierre Cardin. 49 In London, replacing old couture houses in the prime
location was the ICI head quarter.
50
Its in-house magazine celebrated ICI’s
involvement in design innovation. After such hype, the oil crisis of the mid-1970s was
a huge blow to the fibre conglomerates. British retailers and their suppliers slowly
started to work on their own predictions with help from bought-in consultancy
services.51
Garment Exhibitions. A centralized market place became established as the
European ready-made apparel sector expanded after the Second World War. The
German clothing industry had been in the lead. They used the selling-by-exhibition
method based on the open market fairs of their long tradition.52 In 1949, a handful of
German manufacturers of women’s outerwear founded an association called
Interessengemeinschaft Damenoberbekleidung (IGEDO) in Düsseldorf, and it quickly
became an international fair with foreign exhibitors from Europe and even the
USA..53 German buyers were prepared to condense their seasonal ordering into the
fashion fair periods. They could see all that was new in the current production without
wasting time by visiting individual showrooms. This practice was approved by the
exhibitors, too, because this enabled them to plan production scientifically on the
most economic lines and to save much of the high costs involved by lavish
showrooms and sales representatives.54 Denmark and Hong Kong entered the readyto-wear market in the 1960s, following the German method of international fashion
exhibition, and launched the Scandinavian Fashion Week and the Hong Kong Readyto-Wear Festival.55
17
In Italy, the Fascist trade organisation in Turin in 1954 was replaced by the
ready-to-wear fair, Salone Mercato Internazionale Dell’Abbigliamento (SAMIA),
which became the first in the round of European ready-to-wear fairs each season. 56
This commercially successful clothing fair moved to the emerging commercial capital
of Milan in 1978. The other important Italian garment show sprung up in Florence
and became known as Pitti Donna, which was ran alongside the above mentioned
couture shows in the palace ballroom. The buyers and manufacturers were required to
buy coupons with which they purchased merchandise at the exhibitors’ stands.57 The
Alta Moda shows, however, moved to Rome to the individual ateliers, while the
Boutique and Knitwear collections remained in Florence.58 The Florentine exhibitions
then diversified into different product segments, such as Pitti Uomo featuring
menswear in 1972, and Pitti Bimbo, for children's wear in 1975. By anticipating a
boom in the mass fashion industry the Florentine organisation made commercial
success.59
In France, the fashion calendar was also altered in the early 1970s. By the time
the Fédération Française de la Couture, du Prêt-à-Porter des Couturiers et des
Créateurs de Mode took charge as the umbrella organisation, the ready-to-wear trade
was the predominant force in the fashion industry. Salon International du Prêt-àPorter Feminine held in April and October at the Porte de Versailles became the most
important event for the buyers. Both couture and boutique designers showed their
ready-to-wear collections, holding individual fashion parades on their stands several
times a day, frequently masking their stands to keep away the trade pirates.60
In Britain, due to the dominance of the retailers, such as Marks & Spencer, and
their direct relationship with manufacturers, trade exhibitions had a low profile. They
were not really part of domestic retail buyers’ lives up until the early 1970s. The
18
Clothing Export Council tried to make London a fashion exhibition centre to rival
Paris, Düsseldorf and Copenhagen, with a belief that Britain had a reputation for
youthful fashion. The British garment manufacturers, however, were not interested in
co-ordinating for export or for the domestic independent sector.61 The problem was
that the British industry was dominated by the large chain store retailers, who were
reluctant to accommodate demand for small-scale high quality fashion. . The London
Fashion Fair organised by the Clothing Export Council was a small-scale export event,
and was not open to domestic independent buyers.62
TABLE 3. KEY EVENTS BEFORE THE START OF SEASON, 1950s - 1970s
1950s
1970s
- 22 months
- 11 months
Intercolor
Couture showing
- 8 months
Interstoff
- 4 months
IGEDO
- 3 months
Prêt-a-Porter
0
+ 3 weeks
<Start of Selling Season> <Start of Selling Season>
Couture showing
Table 3 shows how the sequence of trend-spotting events up to the start of the selling
season changed around the 1960s. While the garment industry of the 1950s was
anxious about the new trends arising from the couture showing a few weeks into the
season, the designers of the 1970s and the early 1980s could be more in tune with
what the mass market wanted. They went through the exercise of trend prediction and
orchestration together with the spinners, the textile producers and the wholesale
manufacturers who made their buying choices at each stage of the development. As
19
mentioned above, the process of ‘collective selection’, starting from colour, thread,
fabric and garment was established to synchronise the fashion trend across the
different levels of the trade and across different countries. 63
‘Collective screening’ in the open market, such as Interstoff, IGEDO and Prêtà-Porter, worked as an effective and efficient means of informational processing in a
society where the boundaries between elites and ordinaries, originals and imitations
were not clearly defined. In such an open market, competing firms orchestrated their
final product offer to be ‘in’ and together could hold a design monopoly.
IMAGE MONOPOLY AND DIVERSIFICATION
As the ‘trend orchestration’ process became firmly established, the concept of fashion
obsolescence itself eventually became obsolete in the minds of snob consumers.
Fashion conscious teenagers of the 1960s were getting older, while the number of the
next generation of teenagers was in decline. The initial response of the fashion
industry to the aging post-war generation was to try ‘young style with mature fit’.64
However, it was not only their figures but also their lifestyles that changed. The older
women were more likely to work outside home. Many of them had career aspirations.
The industry recognises the promising future market of value added clothing –
branded ‘power suits’. In the United States, the growth of the female workforce
preceded the phenomena in Britain. Molly’s The Women’s Dress for Success Book
published in 1978 marked a milestone, prescribing dark, monotonic tailored suits for
the working women with aspirations for managerial positions. 65 Fashion related to
feminine frivolity and youthfulness could no longer serve as an effective sign. The
sewn-on trademark, which added intangible attributes to the commodity, was used as
a sign of distinction, expressing authenticity, conservativeness and luxury.
20
By anticipating and building on the global market expansion, the emerging
Italian and American designer firms, such as Armani and Calvin Klein, made
significant ventures into the international design market without getting engaged in
Haute Couture altogether. The core of their strength was mass manufacturing capacity
which was based on mechanisation, standardisation and outsourcing. Italian and
American firms were the mass manufacturers who endorsed the benefit of branding
and advertising. They systematically turned what had been a subsidiary business for
the French couturieres, namely ready-to-wear and perfume production, into the core
of their business.66
The Italian designer-manufacturers emerged as a set of flexible and stable
networks, tightly embedded in the local industrial communities. The designer firms
concentrated on design and brand management, i.e. marketing, advertising and
promotion, while having a manufacturing unit under control.67 The established Italian
manufacturers realised the desirability of trademarks in the sales of middle-market
products, and thus acquired the renowned ones to adorn the mass-produced products
with their logos.68 In Milan, which underwent a massive consumer boom in the late
1970s, family-owned luxury goods businesses renovated their brand names and took
advantage of mass production of monogrammed goods.69
Mass production and mass marketing were the core strength of American
firms, due to the size and buying power of its domestic market. The French
couturieres, British young designers and Italian ready-to-wear designers all had
attempted to penetrate this market. American fashion firms originally started from
mass production at the lower end of the industry, and established themselves through
the production of tailored suits. For American firms, the source of competitive
advantage was brand management with their huge investment in advertising. With this,
21
the large firms could successfully marginalise smaller firms who played on creative
designs and innovation. 70
Several French couture houses were also tempted by licensing agreements
which were an obvious and easy way to secure the advantages of scale economies.71
Prêt-à-porter designers grew rapidly in influence after the decline of the haute
couture businesses, yet they had difficulty expanding further without financial
backing. Those aspiring firms who played upon design innovation were pushed back
to the margin, while money was put into the established couture houses for their brand
management and expensive advertising by the large holding companies. Brand names
were exploited in order to sell their standardized and mass-produced perfumes and
other accessory goods. 72
The purpose of the fashion show fundamentally changed in the 1980s and
consequently changed the character of many couture and designer collections. Until
the 1970s, the fashion show was a simple showcase, motivated by the practicality of
selling clothes or design patterns. In the 1980s, fashion shows became a media
spectacular dedicated to the imagery of a particular brand name. High-impact
designers started their careers in the field of fine art, employing ‘shock and spectacle’
techniques from the modern art field. 73 Estimates by the Chambre Syndicale
suggested that 150,000 pages of coverage in the international press and 150 television
slots were dedicated to designer fashion circus every year.74
The cost of presentation at couture and designer shows soared. This was part
of the advertising cost that was needed in order to manage brand image and to bring
greater profits through sales of perfume and other licensed products in the global
market.75 Smaller firms were obliged to stage their fashion shows with limited means,
22
paying for assistance with clothes and choosing public locations such as parking lots
and subway stations. 76
Apart from perfume, another commodity that epitomised the logo monopoly
was the simple, durable and androgenic garment, jeans. 77 After the denim jean
revolution of the early 1970s, jeans settled as the classic leisurewear with world-wide
appeal for the young and the old, for the rich and the poor, of all shapes and sizes.
Textile conglomerates started to invest in huge denim production lines, and
international trade exhibitions of sportswear and casual clothes were set up by the end
of 1970s.78 The mass market for monogrammed goods was opened up by sportswear
and denim specialists, e.g. Levis and Nike, in the 1980s. Branded garment were
limited to this sector until recently, particularly in the UK.79 Jeans were preferred by
the American and Italian designer-manufacturers, e.g. Calvin Klein and Armani, as a
subsidiary line, alongside perfume. These standardised commodities were massproduced, and were marketed with a logo, packaging and brand imagery, offering
prohibitive margins to manufacturers.80 Standardised jeans became the core product of
designer diffusion lines, with their logos only being consistent with the designer
collection but not the design content. Designers’ brand names diffused widely
throughout the world, but not their innovative designs - if there were any in the first
place.
The open market logic of design selection, on the other hand, persisted as
ready-to-wear designers with smaller capital continued to show at the large-scale trade
exhibitions, such as Prêt-à-Porter Paris and Collections Premieren Düsseldorf (CPD).
The exhibition organisers rapidly redirected their focus towards ‘designer’ clothes, too.
Since the Italian trade exhibitions moved from Turin to Milan in 1978, Camera de la
Moda Italiana started to hold Milan collections for the designers. Luxury goods
23
conglomerates sponsored the shows in order to promote brand names and to mark
Milan as the most important event in the calender.81 The London Fashion Exhibition
started to hold a separate ‘designer section’ in 1978, while IGEDO opened the
Düsseldorf Fashion House for designer apparel in attempt to appeal to Americans who
no longer wanted mass-market merchandise which they could buy from the Far East.82
The difference between designer catwalk shows and the trade exhibitions narrowed,
as many of the fairs also held their own catwalk shows of their exhibitors. A number
of ready-to-wear designers were hired by Paris couture houses after they made
success in the trade exhibitions in Paris and Düsseldorf.
83
However, the main
difference remained in the sense that shows at the trade fairs were not just about
image but more about the commercial viability of the actual products. In between the
shows, trend presentations were given by the fair organiser or by the trend forecasting
agencies. Trade fairs continued to be an important part of the design innovation cycle.
What we described for the period after the late 1970s appeared to be a swing
back to the elitist closed model at a first glance with the resurgence of couture houses.
But the strength of the new regime was not in ‘design monopoly’ but in ‘logo
monopoly’. Commercial exhibitions, on the other hand, grew steadily as a system of
orchestrating trend, while internalising the media-grubbing fashion spectacles of
designer shows as part of the ‘layered collective selection process’. The number of
international and domestic trade fairs reported in Drapers Record increased since the
early 1970s and then continued to grow during the 1980s and the 1990s. Table 4
shows the rise in the numbers of trade exhibitions for the spring/summer seasons over
the last half century by city and by sector. While Paris, Düsseldorf and Florence have
initially provided important market places, Milan and New York joined in since the
24
1980s with diversification into the designer wear sector and the jeans and sportswear
sector.
TABLE 4. NUMBER OF REPORTS ON TRADE FAIRS AND FASHION SHOWS ON
DRAPERS RECORD, SPRING/SUMMER SEASON
1952
1962
1972
1982
1992
2002
3
8
23
34
41
47
Paris
1
1
3
7
7
12
Düsseldorf
0
1
2
2
2
1
Florence
0
1
1
3
3
5
London
2
3
6
5
7
8
Milan
0
0
0
3
5
3
New York
0
0
0
1
1
1
Others**
0
2
11
13
17
17
Yarn
0
0
0
1
1
1†
Textile
0
1
3
4
4
9
Ready-to-wear
2
6
18
21
27
23
Designer
0
0
0
3
4
4
Couture
1
1
1
1
1
1
Jeans, sports, street wear
0
0
0
2
2
6
Accessory, lingerie
0
0
1
2
2
3
Seasonal Total *
by city
by sector
* Including couture shows, ready-to-wear designer shows, yarn shows, textile shows, garment shows for women,
men and children as well as accessories shows
Source: Drapers’ Record
25
** Others include Barcelona, Birmingham, Bologna, Cernobbio, Cologne, Copenhagen, Dublin, Frankfurt,
Harrogate, Hong Kong, Las Vegas, Lille, Lisbon, Ljubljana, Lyon, Moscow, Munich, Rome, Shanghai, Sydney,
Tel Aviv, Turin, Valencia, and Zurich.
†
The recorded yarn show is Pitti Filatti, a Florence yarn exhibition for the knitwear industry. Other fibre shows,
such as Expofil and Filo, which not only attract the textile mills but also large garment manufacturers and retailers,
have not so far been in the focus of Drapers Record readers.
While the appeal of the one-for-all mega exhibitions declined, the numbers of smaller
niche trade shows increased over time in response to the need for different segmented
markets. With the rise of ready-to-wear designer shows, which were held separately
from both the couture and the mass-market, Milan, New York and Paris became the
tripartite capital of fashion in the following decades, hosting biannual media
extravaganzas on fashion catwalks. London lacked the corporate sponsors and the
strong coordinating institution to perform such a role, but towards the end of 1990s, it
hosted number of small commercial exhibitions for ‘street-wise’ directional designers,
opening up a new exhibition niche. Although at a first glance the elitist model fits the
designers of the 1980s and the 1990s, as socio-economist Pesendorfer suggested, 84
the trajectory of ‘democratisation’ was not reversed liked a pendulum but was
becoming more multilayered and complex.
FASHION FRENZY AND GLOBALIZATION
The global market for powersuits and standardised denim goods became saturated
towards the end of 1990s. This led the younger generation of spin-off designers to
explore this popular fabric in their eclectic collections. Branded jeans were in decline,
and jeans ‘couture’ emerged, with a new emphasis on innovative cut and high-tech
fabric.85 Jeans, sports and casual wear exhibitions were replaced by street wear and
26
alternative club wear exhibitions, which provided the showground and commercial
opportunities for younger ‘street couture’ designers.86 Street-wear designers also gave
catwalk presentations on or off the exhibition venue with spectacular art effects. With
their fresh and shocking shows, these young talents opened up a new niche, which
multiple retailers tried to discover.
The ‘logo monopoly’ which made profits from monogrammed commodities
was difficult to sustain without rejuvenating and bringing in fashion obsolescence –
and this was part of the reason why brand conglomerates, which owned Haute
Couture houses and international designer firms, tried to hire younger designers in the
late 1990s.87 They found the younger design talents from London art colleges who
were struggling to make a name for themselves. London which used to lack gravity as
a fashion capital came to offer a unique forum for invention and originality in noncommercial art form.88 By 2005, London Fashion Week itself became a commercial
platform for the High Street chain Top Shop which employed young graduates
straight from colleges to design for their eclectic mass fashion lines. Their catwalk
presentations provided another illusion of the ‘democratization’ of fashion eliticism..89
The Spanish chain Zara mass-produced off-the-catwalk designs, and Swedish H&M
excelled in tie-ups with designers, such as Viktor & Rolf. The brand conglomerate
owned by Bernard Arnaud expanded its empire across the airports all over the world.
What was happening in the late 1990s was not, however, a simple reversion
back to the ‘designer monopolist’ model. It was an acceleration of frenzied
competition that took place in the ‘layered collective selection process’ beneath the
surface of brand proliferation. The keys to this process were globalization, IT
revolution and fragmentation of the markets. The acceleration did not, however,
happen in a way that shortened and quickened the fashion cycle, because the path
27
dependency on the institution of biannual season has been strong. It did happen in a
way that the layers of the selection process became densely multiplied without
changing the length of the prevailing fashion cycle. What we mean by this density is
the increased number of fashion shows and trade exhibitions for different layers and
niches of fashion (Table 4), and, more importantly, the concentration of timing of
these events
at the beginning of the season.
Figure 1 shows this increasing
concentration. The figure presents simple count data of trade fairs and fashion shows
reported each week between January and June for every decade since 1952.
total no. of fashion shows and exhibitions as
reported in Drapers Record per week
8
2002
7
6
1992
5
1982
1972
4
3
2
1962
1952
1
0
1
2
3
January
4
5
6
7
February
8
9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24
week (1=January Week 1)
March
April
May
June
FIG. 1. Weekly total of trade fairs and fashion shows, January – June, 1952 – 2002.
Source: Drapers’ Record
Until 1972 the fairs were held throughout the season from January to June. The
highest concentration came in at the end of April around the time of Paris Prêt-à-
28
Porter. London Fashion Week was also held in April to attract American buyers on
their trip to Paris. In 1982, attempts to hold the mid-season fairs in February resulted
in more fairs being held earlier in the season. By 1992, more and more exhibitions
were held in a concentrated period. Finally by 2002 the fairs were concentrated within
a month, peaking at the end of January.
The dates for major international trade fairs and fashion shows have moved
forward by weeks and months. Traditionally, Paris couture showings have taken place
at the end of January for the immediate spring/summer season and these dates have
not changed over the five decades. All the other major events in fibre, fabric and
finished garment moved earlier in the season by two months. Textile shows such as
Interstoff in Frankfurt moved from June to March; garment shows, such as
IGEDO/CPD in Düsseldorf moved from March to February while Prêt-à-Porter in
Paris moved more drastically from April to January to coincide with couture showing.
London Fashion Week moved from April to February, so did designers catwalks in
New York and Paris. Apart from Paris couture showing, all the other exhibitions have
shifted forwards to densely cluster around the start of the season. The key to
understanding why fairs moved earlier in each season is the increasing relevance of
the ‘layered collective selection process’ that involved the whole production chain
from yarn to textile to garment construction.
Garment shows and textile and yarn exhibitions were sometimes held by the
same event organiser, who claimed to offer ‘vertically integrated’ exhibitions that
covered everything from colour to finished apparel under one roof.90 The earlier dates
for the major events were set up by the pressure from the buyers who were eager to
discover the trend as early as possible within the season. The sellers were also eager
to secure the early orders which allow enough lead time for production. The
29
competition among the exhibition organisers to show before their international rivals
also quickened the pace.91 The number of the exhibitions increased also because of
the expansion of the fashion market to Asia and Middle East, and more recently to the
southern hemisphere, to South America and Australia, which had added to the
pressure on the accelerated competition on a global scale.92
TABLE 5. KEY EVENTS BEFORE THE SEASON, 1970s - 2000s
1970s
2000s
- 22 months
Colour
Intercolor (Paris)
- 20 months
Colour
- 18 months
Yarn
Premiere Vision (Paris)
- 17 months
Yarn
Filo (Cernobbio)
-14 months
Yarn
Expofil (Paris)
- 13 months
Yarn
Pitti Filati (Florence)
- 11 months
Textile
Tissue Premier (Lille)
- 11 months
Textile
Moda In (Milan)
- 11 months
Textile
Premiere Vision (Paris)
- 11 months
Textile
Texworld-Interstoff (Paris)
- 10 months
Textile
Interstoff Asia (Hong Kong)
- 8 months
Textile
- 7 months
Garment
Prêt-à-Porter (Paris)
- 6 months
Garment
IGEDO/CPD (Düsseldorf)
- 6 months
Garment
Moda Barcelona
- 6 months
Garment
London Fashion Week
- 6 months
Garment
Designer Shows (New York)
- 5 months
Garment
Designer Shows (Milan)
- 5 months
Garment
Designer Shows (Paris)
- 4 months
Garment
IGEDO (Düsseldorf)
- 3 months
Garment
Prêt-à-Porter (Paris)
Intercolor (Paris)
Interstoff (Frankfurt)
30
0 months
Garment
Couture Shows (Paris)
Couture Shows (Paris)
Source: Drapers’ Record; various websites
Table 5 shows the timetable of the ‘layered collective selection process’ in the early
2000s, in comparison to the time table in the 1970s. Fabric shows are held a year
ahead and fibre shows are held eighteen months ahead of the actual selling season.
Ready-to-wear shows are held a season ahead of the selling season. If we literally
assume that shows and exhibitions are ‘the market place’ of fast fashion, the forward
movement of show timing may appear to be somehow counter-intuitive, because it
actually prolonged the garment production lead time and order lead time by a few
months. However, if we take into consideration the importance of the ‘layered
collective selection process’, the dense clustering of show timings at the beginning of
the season does make clear sense. The actual market transaction, particularly between
large manufacturers and retailers, often happen outside the common market place,
leaving the shows as a venue for showcasing fashion prowess to be ‘in’ but also subtly
different. New trends were then sometimes adopted rapidly by the mass retailers
straight after the shows and were sold in the High Street in no time, regardless of the
season that was initially intended.
Gathering and foreseeing the upcoming trends became particularly important
at the Italian fairs which are often held earlier than the Paris fairs. The size and breath
of offers, however, are much larger and diverse in Paris, where the trends become
settled by the time of its fairs.93 With increasing competition among designers, mass
market producers and exhibition organisers, the business of fashion has grown larger
than ever before and has become multi-layered, agile and global, keeping hold of the
institutional frame work of biannual season that have survived over the twentieth
century.
31
CONCLUSION
The seasonal cycle has been and still is important because it legitimises the
authenticity of the glitz and glamour of the fashion world. The 1960s saw the
rationalization of the fashion selection system which demystified the authority of the
Haute Couture. Equally important was the development since the 1980s and the
acceleration since the late 1990s that made it diversify into different niches and layers
of fashion, internalising the elite element and stepping up the regenerative cycle of
fashion innovation and diffusion. The use of fashion shows for publicity by the ‘logo
monopolists’ has ironically undermined design innovation, while trends were
increasingly predicted by the mass-fashion industry through the series of trade fairs.
The rat race of design innovation became increasingly intensified and frenzied over
the years, causing ever increasing uncertainty in the fashion industry.
The model of the ‘design monopolist’ provided a useful framework for
conceptualising design innovation, but , in a form suggested by Pesendorfer, provided
little guidance to understanding the historical trajectories of the fashion systems. The
fashion industry is a highly competitive industry by its nature. Fashion firms
cooperated horizontally to achieve a monopoly-like effect, but this stability was prone
to new challenges. What remained unchanged was the institution of cyclical fashion
as the rhythm of clothing production. The ‘design monopolist’ model helped to
describe how designers conceptualised the workings of the fashion system and used it
in brand management, but the frenzy of the ‘layered selection process’ describe the
dilemma and impatience of the industry better. The proliferation of market-based
design selection seems to provide evidence for the linear trajectory of
‘democratization of fashion’. Whether this was illusory or not, however, would
32
somehow depend on the interpretation of social condition in Britain over the last half
of the twentieth century.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
I would like thank Professor Katrina Honeyman and Professor Jane Humphries for their valuable
advice on the earlier drafts. I am also indebted to Professor Lou Taylor for inviting me to deliver a
lecture on this piece of work at the University of Brighton in 2004. A different version of this
paper is accepted for publication in the 2008 autumn issue of Textile History. The usual disclaimer
applies.
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L. Taylor, ‘Hilfiger Factor and the Flexible Commercial World of Couture’ in N. White and I.
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H. Blumer, ‘Fashion: From Class Differentiation to Collective Selection’, The Sociological Quarterly
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5
L. Taylor and E. Wilson, Through the Looking Glass: A History of Dress from 1860 to the Present
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6
Blumer, ‘Fashion’ p. 278, p. 282. Blumer described the collective selection process which occurred at
a seasonal opening of a major Parisian fashion house in the mid-1960s where over a hundred designs
were presented before an audience of over a hundred buyers, who commonly chose only six to eight
designs out of them.
33
7
Lipovetsky, The Empire of Fashion, p. 88.
8
Pesendorfer, ‘Design Innovation’, p. 773, p. 781. Firstly, in the elitist case, there is a time lag between
the adoption of fashion designs by the social elites and the rest, providing effective distinction for the
former. Then in the egalitarian case, fashion designs diffuse through the whole population before a new
innovation occurred with consumers purchasing fashion quickly because the penalty of not owning it
was large.
9
W. Pesendorfer, ‘Design Innovation and Fashion Cycles’, American Economic Review, vol. 85, no. 4
(1995), pp. 349-373. Pesendorfer’s model is related to the literature on durable goods monopolies, such
as Coarse (1972) and is similar to the cyclical price discrimination model for a durable goods
monopolist, which is formulated by Conlisk et al. (1984). J. Conlisk, E. Gerstner and J. Sobel, ‘Cyclic
Pricing by a Durable Goods Monopolist’, Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 99, no. 3 (1984), pp.
489-505.
10
Pesendorser also examines the case of duopoly with interdependent pricing behaviour, separately as
‘the case of free entry’.
11
Ibid., p. 773.
12
Ibid., p. 781.
13
H. Blumer, ‘Fashion: From Class Differentiation to Collective Selection’, The Sociological Quarterly
(1969), vol. 10, no. 1; G. Lipovetsky, The Empire of Fashion: Dressing Modern Democracy (1987),
translated by C. Porter (Princeton, 1994).
14
This is also how investors in asset markets often behave, according to Keynes. J. M. Keynes, The
General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money (London, 1936/1997).
15
Banerjee argues that herd behaviour is inefficient in itself. A. Banerjee, ‘A Simple Model of Herd
Behaviour’, Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 107, no. 3 (1992). However, in the case of
egalitarian fashion, where there is no predetermined correct solution, the equilibrium reached by the
herd behaviour is the ultimate solution. The vendors anticipate this efficiently through their own herd
behaviour.
16
Pesendorfer regards expenses for marketing and advertising as an essential part of the designer’s
innovation cost. Pesendorfer (1995), op. cit., p. 778.
17
Ibid., p. 773.
34
18
The title of the journal has changed over time: The Drapers’ Record (1887-1988), DR (1988-1992),
Drapers’ Record (1992-2002) and Drapers (2002- ).
19
F. Boucher, A History of Costume in the West (New York, 1967), p. 192.
20
Lipovetsky, The Empire of Fashion, pp. 57-8; F. Boucher, A History of Costume in the West (New
York, 1967), p. 386; Brewer, Fashion, p. 256.
21
Lipovetky, The Empire of Fashion., pp. 108-9.
22
V. Steel, Paris Fashion: A Cultural History (New York, 1998) p. 221.
23
Fairchild News Service Paris, February 2 1924, cited in P. T. Cherington, ‘Some Commercial
Aspects of Styles and Fashions in the Clothing and Textile Industries’, Harvard Business Review I, no.
4 (1924).
24
Lipovetky, The Empire of Fashion, pp. 57-58.
25
The rules were: (1) To employ a minimum of 20 persons in the production of clothes in the
company’s studios; (2) To present in Paris each season to the press in Spring and Autumn a collection
of at least 75 designs; (3) To present this collection on a minimum of three live models; (4) To present
the same collection in the house itself in special areas for this purpose. D. Crane, ‘Globalisation,
Organisational Size, and Innovation in the French Luxury Fashion Industry: Production of Culture
Theory Revisited,’ Poetics, XXIV (1997). However, the rules were relaxed in January 2002: The
number of couture outfits was reduced to 25; the number of shows were increased to four times a year;
and the use of a design studio was included in the new guidelines. Drapers Record, February 9, 2002.
26
N. J. Troy, Modernism and the Decorative Arts in France: Art Nouveau to Le Corbusier (New
Haven, 1991) p. 54.
27
D. de Marly, The History of Haute Couture, 1850-1950 (London, 1980), p. 116.
28
N. White, Reconstructing Italian Fashion: America and the Development of the Italian Fashion
Industry (Oxford, 2000), p. 30.
29
G. Waddell, ‘The Incorporated Society of London Fashion Designers: Its Impact on Post-War British
Fashion’, Costume, no. 23 (1999) p. 92.
30
Ibid., p. 95.
31
Steel, Paris Fashion., p. 268.
32
A. Adburgham, ‘1953 to 1973 – A Journalist’s View’, Costume, VIII (1974).
33
De Marley, The History of Haute Couture.
35
34
Waddell, ‘The Incorporated Society’, p. 97.
35
Ibid., p. 105.
36
Ibid., p. 104; Adburgham, ‘1953 to 1973’.
37
Brewer, Fashion., p. 86; Crane, ‘Globalisation’, p. 400.
38
C. Brewer, ‘Fashion’s Front and Back: “Rag trade” Cultures and Cultures of Consumption in Post-
war London c. 1945-1970’, London Journal, vol. 31, no. 1 (2006), pp. 15-40.
39
Drapers Record, 30 December 1972, p. 22.
40
The International Congress of Man-made Fibre was held in 1962. Drapers Record, May 8, 1962.
41
Fashion Color Association, <http://www.jafca.org/>, accessed in April 2004.
42
There were other attempts, such as the Colour Council for the Common Market held in 1962 and the
International Colour Authority launched in London in 1968. Drapers Record, May 24, 1962; Colour
charts, International Colour Authority.
43
Pantone, <http://www.pantone.com/>, accessed in April 2004.
44
Management Review (1968) vol. 57, no. 10, p. 31.
45
Messe Frankfurt, <http://www.messefrankfurt.com/>, accessed in April 2004.
46
Promostyl, <http://www.promostyl.com/>, accessed in April 2004.
47
Premiere Vision, <http://www.premierevision.com/> accessed in April 2004.
48
A bulletine booklet, ICI Predicts, produced by Deryck Healey International, was subscribed to by
manufacturers and retailers.
49
Akzo Nobel (Courtaulds) Archive, Box File ADV23.
50
Breward (2006), p. 21.
51
S. Handley, Nylon: The Story of a Fashion Revolution (Baltimore, 1999), p. 123.
52
Market events have been part of German history and the life of Free Cities, such as Frankfurt which
held autumn and spring fairs since the Middle Age.
53
IGEDO,< http://www.igedo.com/>, accessed in April 2004.
54
Drapery and Fashion Weekly, 10 March 1972, p. 13. IGEDO launched the Masche International for
knitwear in 1966, which was a pioneering step towards opening fashion fairs to different product
segments. IGEDO, op. cit.
36
55
Drapery and Fashion Weekly, 4 February 1972, p. 6; Copenhagen International Fashion Fair,
<http://www.ciff.dk/>, accessed in April 2004; Drapery and Fashion Weekly, 7 January 1972, p. 24;
Drapery and Fashion Weekly, 10 March 1972, p. 20.
56
Drapery and Fashion Weekly, 14 January 1972, p. 4.
57
Drapery and Fashion Weekly, 7 April 1972, p. 30; Pitti Immagine, <http://www.pittimmagine.com/>,
accessed in April 2004.
58
Camera Nazionale della Moda Italiana, http://www.cameramoda.it/
59
Palazzo Pitti debuted Armani before Milan became the focus for the industry in the 1980s. The fair
organiser, Pitti Immagine, is now owned by the Centro di Firenze per la Moda Italiana (CFMI) which
is a half-privately and half-publicly owned, non-profit making organization. Pitti Immagine,
http://www.pittimmagine.com/ .
60
British manufacturers used to sneak their way in on spying missions with their buyer friends, and
reproduced the biggest hits in Paris by the end of the same week for sale in the UK. Drapery and
Fashion Weekly, 2 June 1972, p. 4.
61
Drapery and Fashion Weekly, 14 January 1972, p. 4; Drapers Record, 30 December 1972.
62
The Council charged entrance fees to the newly-admitted home buyers so that they can ‘contribute to
the industry-wide effort’ while it welcomed overseas buyers without any charge. Drapers Record, 4
October 1975. The London Fashion Exhibition became organised by a private event company,
Philbeach, also with the Council’s support. Drapers Record, 26 October 1978.
63
A similar observation of the formation of collective taste was made by a Finnish study of fashion
designers. J. Gronow, The Sociology of Taste (London, 1997) p. 110.
64
The Women’s Wear Working Group of the Clothing Institute. Drapers Record, 9 December 1972.
65
J. T. Molly, The Women’s Dress for Success Book (New York, 1978).
66
M-L. Djelic and A. Ainamo, ‘The Coevolution of New Organisational Forms in the Fashion
Industry: A Historical and Comparative Study of France, Italy and the United States’, Organization
Science, X, no. 5 (1999), p. 630.
67
Ibid., p. 631.
68
Italian designers who emerged in the late 1970s, such as Versace, Armani, Valentino and Ungaro,
along with Calvin Klein in the United States, benefited from alliances with industry sponsors, such as
Gruppo Finanziario Tessile (GFT), a long established Italian menswear manufacturer. M. A. Traverso
37
and G. Turco, ‘Leveraging Plotting Technology as a Competitive Advantage: A Profile of GFT’s New
Technology Adoption’, <http://www.techexchange.com/thelibrary/GFTProfile.html>, accessed in
April 2004; E. Merlo and F. Polese, ‘Turning Fashion into Business: The Emergence of Milan as an
International Fashion Hub’, Business History Review, LXXX, no. 3 (2006).
69
Firms such as Gucci and Prada managed to secure significant financial backing for a revamp, while
the boom allowed the new entrants such as Etro.
70
The large firms outsourced everything from manufacturing to even part of the core brand
management to freelance designers, advertising agencies or consultants. Djelic and Ainamo (1999),
‘Coevolution of New Organisational Forms’, p. 633. The entry and rapid expansion of Tommy
Hilfiger, the Hong Kong-based entrepreneur, is another example of the American model of branded
mass production. L. Taylor, ‘Hilfiger Factor’, pp. 121-142.
71
The earliest example of diversification was the production of own perfume by Paul Poiret before the
First World War, followed by Coco Chanel.
72
Holding company, LVMH (Louis Vuitton Moet Hennessy) emerged to bring together a number of
formerly independent houses and to exploit their brand reputation. Drapers Record, February 9, 2002.
73
Handley, Nylon, p. 157.
74
Drapers Record, February 9, 2002.
75
Crane, ‘Globalization’, p. 403.
76
Only a few non-couture ready-to-wear firms have been able to obtain licenses and to develop
perfumes, among which, Kenzo and Lagerfeld, are owned by LVMH. Ibid., p. 406.
77
Brewer, Fashion, pp. 110-1.
78
Italian textile giant, Legler, which was a leader in leisure-wear fabrics, was one of the first European
large-scale producer to invest in huge denim production in 1973 near Milan. Drapers Record, 27 July
1974, p. 14. In 1978, CFMI (Pitti Immagine) in Florence started to hold a fashion fair dedicated to
casual wear, jeans and sportswear in late January and July. The International Jeans Fair in Cologne
became the ‘hit-barometer’ in the early 1980s.
79
Taking the combined market share of Adidas, Puma, Le Coq Sportif, Umbro, Nike was 50 per cent
of the tracksuits market in 1985. Retail Business, no. 299 (Jan. 1983); no. 349 (Mar. 1987); no. 265
(Mar. 1980); no. 351 (May 1987).
38
80
Earliest examples are US designer jeans, Jordache and Vidal Sassoon, which opened up a new niche
with advertising and flagship stores in London. Drapers Record, 6 December 1980. Emporio Armani
was launched in 1989.
81
Milanovendemoda became organised by EXPOcts (Commerce, Tourism Services Exhibitions) of
Milan. Milan Collections are sponsored by Alfa Romeo and Moet et Chandon.
82
In 1992, many brands such as Escada, Max Mara, Mulberry and Karl Lagerfeld were showing their
ready-to-wear collections at Collections Premieren Düsseldorf. Drapers Record, May 22, 1992.
83
Lagerfeld was subsequently hired by the couture house of Chanel. Another innovative ready-to-wear
designer Michel Klein was showing his collections in Paris Prêt-à-Porter, and he, too, was subsequently
appointed as a head designer at Guy Laroche.
84
The examples of Pesendorfer’s design monopolist include Armani, which sells clothes under
different brand names, such as Emporio Armani and Armani Jeans, to target different market segments.
85
Levi Strauss, which held a monopoly of the classic 501 label for many years, had to change their
tactics to appeal to the younger generation with a series of new labels, but failed to hit the market.
Levi’s announced 300 job cuts in Europe in 2003. Drapers Record, September 6, 2003.
86
London, with its reputation as the capital of youth culture, hosted several exhibitions, which took
place in unusual locations such as disused breweries and underground clubs. A street and casual wear
exhibition that emerged as an ‘off-show’ to the large-scale exhibition, Interjeans in Cologne, quickly
gained momentum and moved to a larger site in Berlin, sponsored by Becks, the brewer, and other
brand manufacturers in the youth market.
87
LVMH’s profit was down 99 percent for 2001, while Gucci’s dropped 18 percent, and Prada
struggled with deep debt. S. Menkes, ‘Armani – I did it my way’, Milan Fashion, April 9, 2002.
Bernard Arnault, president of LVMH, started to invest in the future by sponsoring young designers.
Drapers Record, February 9 2002.
88
Since 1983, the British Fashion Council took responsibility for London Fashion Week, but little
public money and little support from the clothing and textile industry had been put in. De la Hay, The
Cutting Edge, p. 34. London Fashion Week now has a reputation of being stretched to the artistic
extreme. Drapers Record, February 16 2002.
89
Fashion sociologists Entwistle and Rocamora suggest that the main function of London Fashion
Week is to ‘produce, reproduce and legitimate the field of fashion and the positions of those players
39
withinit.’ J. Entwistle and A. Rocamora, ‘The Field of Fashion Materialised: A Study of London
Fashion Week’, Sociology, XL, 4, 735-751.
90
Pitti Immagine, <http://www.pittimmagine.com/>, accessed in April 2004.
91
Drapers Record, March 16 2002.
92
China is now not only the most important manufacturer of fashion apparel but also the emerging
market of most luxurious fashions for the aspiring new rich. Interstoff has diversified to the Asian
market, holding Interstoff Asia in Shanghai, and also bought into the Paris textile show Texworld to
continue catering for the European market. IGEDO organises Pure London, the largest garment show in
the UK with a British media conglomerate, Emap.
93
The key beneficiaries of the changed timetable are the vertically integrated manufacturer-distributors
and the own label retailers, such as Marks and Spencer and Arcadia. In-house designers of the large
firms go and see fabric ranges to work with the actual fabric from the textile shows, getting prepared to
adjust for the emerging trend straight after the catwalk shows. Drapers Record, April 6 2002.
40