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Electronic Theses, Treatises and Dissertations
The Graduate School
2006
Selling War as Obligation: Appeals to
Obligation at Work in George W. Bush's
Iraq Speeches
Mark Baseman
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THE FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY
COLLEGE OF COMMUNICATION
SELLING WAR AS OBLIGATION:
APPEALS TO OBLIGATION AT WORK IN GEORGE W. BUSH’S
IRAQ SPEECHES
By
MARK BASEMAN
A Thesis submitted to the
Department of Communication
in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of
Master of Science
Degree Awarded:
Spring Semester, 2006
The members of the Committee approve the Thesis of Mark Baseman defended
on March 30, 2006.
_____________________
Danielle R. Wiese
Professor Directing Thesis
_____________________
Davis W. Houck
Committee Member
_____________________
Donna Marie Nudd
Committee Member
Approved:
__________________________________________________
Stephen D. McDowell, Chair, Department of Communication
__________________________________________________
John K. Mayo, Dean, College of Communication
The Office of Graduate Studies has verified and approved the above named
committee members.
ii
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
Oh, where do I begin!?
Let me first thank Natasha Hinson-Turner for answering all of my questions and
for dealing with me and the other grad students. Sorry I lost your stapler.
Also, I need to thank Kristin Carlton who, despite spelling her name wrong,
always knew what forms needed to be turned in by what date. She was an excellent
person to follow around. And she brought me horseradish when I couldn’t figure out how
to buy it.
Next, I have to thank the amazing members of my committee, and Dr. Houck.
First, Dr. Donna Marie Nudd. Thanks for always being approachable and willing
to give advice. You taught me how to teach. You forced me to become friends with a
group of weirdoes—and my every enjoyable moment as a graduate student can be traced
back to you.
And thank you, Dr. Davis Houck. You were the one who got me into this mess so
many years ago. You opened my eyes to the rhetorical world around me, and now I can’t
enjoy anything ever again. You taught me to be a critic, and to work hard, and that it’s ok
to be creative in Academia. And, it goes without saying, but I will forever be in debt to
you and your frightening proofreading skills.
Finally, Dr. Danielle Wiese, who is the reason this thesis exists. There really is no
way I can express how grateful I am for all the help you gave me. I would thank you for
all of the sleep you must have lost over this project, but I’m not certain that you actually
do sleep. Seriously, you are an amazing person. One of these days I might even learn to
call you “Danielle.”
Lastly, I have to thank my family. Mom and Dad, thanks for all your support,
financial and otherwise. You made me who I am today and, while others may hold that
against you, I just want to let you know that I appreciate everything you’ve done for me.
And Matt, what can I say, you’re a poet.
iii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Abstract
......................................................................................................
vi
1. INTRODUCTION ..........................................................................................
1
The March to War with Iraq .......................................................................
Bush’s Crisis ...............................................................................................
Summary ................................................................................................
1
9
10
2. LITERATURE REVIEW ...............................................................................
11
The Emergence of Presidential Rhetoric ....................................................
Criticizing Presidential Rhetoric.................................................................
Presidential Crisis Rhetoric ........................................................................
Presidential War Rhetoric ...........................................................................
Summary and Research Questions..............................................................
11
12
14
16
23
3. METHODOLOGY .........................................................................................
25
Defining “Obligation Rhetoric”..................................................................
Choosing the Relevant Texts ......................................................................
Addressing Research Questions Two and Three ........................................
Summary ................................................................................................
25
26
27
36
4. ANALYSIS
..............................................................................................
38
President Bush’s Obligation Rhetoric.........................................................
Appeals to Obligation and Bush’s Credibility............................................
Appeals to Obligation and Crisis Management ..........................................
Appeals to Obligation and the “Obligated Hero” .......................................
38
48
53
54
5. CONCLUSION ..............................................................................................
57
Guidelines for Effectively Using Obligation ..............................................
Further Considerations................................................................................
Final Thoughts on Bush’s Rhetoric of Obligation......................................
57
60
62
iv
APPENDICES
A.
B.
C.
D.
E.
...............................................................................................
63
Bush’s Radio Address, October 5, 2002...............................................
Bush’s Speech at the Cincinnati Museum Center, October 7, 2002.....
Bush’s State of the Union Address, January 28, 2003..........................
Bush’s Speech, March 17, 2003 ...........................................................
Bush’s Address to the Nation, March 19, 2003....................................
63
66
74
86
91
REFERENCES
................................................................................................
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH ..............................................................................
v
94
103
ABSTRACT
This thesis examines the rhetoric employed by President George W. Bush in the
period leading up the American-led invasion of Iraq. Specifically, this thesis posits that
the appeals to obligation so prevalently featured in Bush’s oratory were well suited to his
particular rhetorical situation. In supporting this claim, a theoretical understanding of
how obligation rhetoric functions is created. By approaching appeals to obligation from
both a Neo-Aristotelian and Narrative criticism perspective, the conclusion emerges that
obligation rhetoric: 1) builds a speaker’s credibility, 2) limits a speaker’s liability with
regard to proposed action, and 3) allows a speaker to receive praise for future success.
The rhetorical work done by appealing to obligation is then applied to Bush’s particular
rhetorical situation to show how obligation rhetoric worked in his unique context.
vi
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION
On February 28, 1991, President George H. W. Bush called for a cease fire—
officially signaling the end of Operation Desert Sabre and, in effect, bringing a close to
the short-lived yet highly successful Persian Gulf War (“Persian Gulf War,” 2006). With
combat that lasted less than two months, the American led coalition effectively forced
Iraqi President Saddam Hussein to cease his occupation of neighboring Kuwait; thus
halting his expansionist goals and bringing some stability to the otherwise volatile region.
A decade later, Bush’s son, George W. Bush, was elected the 43rd President of the
United States. Soon after, in almost perfect Hollywood sequel fashion, this second
President Bush turned his attention toward finishing what his father had started. This
thesis examines the rhetoric Bush used prior to launching his invasion of Iraq.
In this chapter, I first detail the events that preceded the U.S. invasion of Iraq. I
then describe Bush’s rhetorical position with regard to the discourse surrounding the
proposed invasion. Finally, I explain the ideas which guide the remainder of this thesis.
The March to War with Iraq
The United States and other nations did nothing to deserve or invite this threat.
But we will do everything to defeat it. Instead of drifting along toward tragedy,
we will set a course toward safety. Before the day of horror can come, before it is
too late to act, this danger will be removed.
- President George W. Bush, March 17, 2003
Hindsight suggests that war with Iraq was inevitable from the moment George W.
Bush stepped into the presidency. As early as January 22, 2001, a mere two days after
1
President Bush took office, a spokesperson for the State Department was quoted as
saying “military force [towards Iraq] always remains an option for the United States”
(“Iraq-U.N. Talks Begin,” 2001). Shortly after that, an anonymous White House official
confirmed that the U.S. was funding the Iraqi National Congress—an Iraqi opposition
group. The group was financed in the hopes that they would find evidence that Saddam
Hussein was violating human rights and/or United Nations’ resolutions (“U.S.
Reportedly,” 2001). Despite administration arguments that this move represented only a
minor change in U.S. policy, as well as one that was advocated and supported by the
previous administration, in retrospect it appears to be evidence of more complex designs
anticipating the use of military force in Iraq.
On February 16, 2001—two weeks after Bush’s inauguration—a series of air
strikes were carried out on targets near Baghdad, Iraq’s capital city (Smyth and O’Clery,
2001). The operation was led by U.S. and British aircraft, and was said to be in response
to increased Iraqi threats on the U.S. and British planes which regularly patrolled the nofly zone. Bush later categorized the events as “essentially a self-defense measure,” adding
that it was a “routine mission” and part of America’s ongoing strategy toward Iraq
(“Allies,” 2001).
Yet, Congressional leaders were skeptical. Immediately following the air strikes,
several members of Congress publicly announced their disappointment with the White
House, specifically citing the Bush administration’s failure to inform the legislature
before the strikes occurred. Senator Jesse Helms, a Republican from North Carolina,
complained directly to the White House about his frustration. Other Republican Congress
members anonymously brought their displeasure to the media, telling reporters of their
desire to be “kept informed.” Many argued that the White House “should know better,”
referring to the fact that Republicans were often annoyed by the Clinton White House’s
tendency to keep them in the dark on similar matters. The Bush administration
downplayed the controversy and responded by noting that the attacks were “routine.”
Officials added that Congressional notification was unnecessary because the attacks were
part of an already pre-approved policy toward Iraq (Garrett, 2001).
Whether the Bush administration would have eventually used these attacks as
the jumping off point for a full scale war against Saddam Hussein quickly became a moot
2
point. Osama bin Laden’s orchestrated attacks on the Pentagon and the World Trade
Center on September 11, 2001, amounted to such a drastic change in America’s political
climate that the air strikes prior to this time became almost irrelevant. To be clear,
because the environment changed so immensely after 9/11, Bush’s push for war in Iraq
was given a new starting point—one characterized, among other things, by Bush’s nearly
ninety percent approval rating (Torpy, 2001) and a frightened public seemingly willing to
write him a blank check regarding future military action. The new situation also meant
Bush would publicly set new priorities—including a war in Afghanistan against Osama
Bin Laden and the ruling Taliban—thus moving the issue of Iraq to the proverbial backburner.
The administration’s near silence on Iraq changed on January 28, 2002, with
Bush’s State of the Union Address. In it, Bush announced that the war on terrorism had
just begun and added that Iraq, along with Iran and North Korea, was part of an “axis of
evil.” Characterizing Iraq by its attempts to build “weapons of mass destruction,” Bush
made clear that his administration would eventually turn its focus toward Hussein
(Borger, 2002). Still benefiting from a public approval rating of 82 percent (Harwood,
2002), Bush likely saw his speech as an opportunity to get public backing for the future
war in Iraq.
Despite his momentum, Bush’s move toward war began with baby steps. Wary of
world opinion, Bush sought U.N. involvement in the conflict. A minor victory occurred
in May, 2002, when the U.N. Security Council agreed to replace the existing Iraqi
sanctions with updated “smart” sanctions. The original sanctions were placed on Iraq
eleven years prior at the end of the Gulf War. In contrast, the smart sanctions focused
specifically on preventing Iraq from gaining military and dual-use equipment. While Iraq
dismissed the modifications as “cosmetic,” U.S. and British officials applauded the move
as a significant change (MacAskill, 2002).
Shortly thereafter, in July 2002, talks between the United Nations and Iraq in
Vienna broke down without compromise. The two-day meeting involved U.N. Secretary
General Kofi Annan and Iraqi Foreign Minister Naji Sabri with Annan arguing for Iraq to
allow the resumption of weapons inspections. The session ended unsuccessfully though
3
not virulently as Annan later told the press that he expected to resume deliberations with
Iraqi officials in the coming months (Leopold, 2002).
Meanwhile, the Bush administration continued its push for “regime change” amid
reports that the Pentagon had drafted plans to invade Iraq. Eric Schmitt, writing for The
New York Times, broke the story, focusing his attention on a document which he
described as envisioning:
…tens of thousands of marines and soldiers probably invading from Kuwait.
Hundreds of warplanes based in as many as eight countries, possibly including
Turkey and Qatar, would unleash a huge air assault against thousands of targets,
including airfields, roadways and fiber-optics communications sites. Special
operations forces or covert C.I.A. operatives would strike at depots or laboratories
storing or manufacturing Iraq's suspected weapons of mass destruction and the
missiles to launch them (2002, p. A5).
Perhaps startled by this news, Iraq agreed in early August, 2002, to readmit U.N.
weapons inspectors. A letter to Kofi Annan from Iraq’s Foreign Minister, Naji Sabri,
surprised the international community by inviting the U.N.’s chief inspector, Hans Blix,
to come to Baghdad to discuss ways to move forward in the weapons inspection process
(Campbell, 2002).
Despite the Iraqi concession, Bush appeared before the United Nations General
Assembly in September calling for the U.N. to take direct action against Saddam Hussein
(Coorey, 2002). Citing what he called a “grave and gathering danger,” Bush noted that
the United States would be willing to engage Iraq unilaterally if the United Nations
refused to act (Deans, 2002a). Among his specific grievances was the fact that, as he saw
it, Iraq was within one year of creating a nuclear weapon capable of striking countries as
far away as Israel or, possibly worse, ending up in the hands of terrorists. Bush further
revealed that he would be asking Congress to support his plan to use “whatever is
necessary” to confront the threat posed by Hussein.
Making good on his word, Bush presented Congress with a draft resolution on
September 19, 2002, which, when approved, would authorize the use of force in Iraq—
were the use of such force deemed necessary by the president (“Bush Puts,” 2002). On
October 11, the resolution passed with a vote of 296-133 in the House of Representatives
4
and a vote of 77-23 in the Democratically controlled Senate. The measure, which called
on Bush to exhaust all diplomatic means before resorting to war and to update Congress
every sixty days on new developments, prompted Bush to declare that Congress had
“spoken clearly to the world and to the United Nations Security Council: The gathering
threat of Iraq must be confronted fully and finally” (Miga, 2002). Even Senate Majority
Leader Tom Daschle, a Democrat and one of Bush’s most outspoken critics, backed the
resolution exclaiming, “my belief [is] that a united Congress will help the president unite
the world” (McGregor, 2002).
Reacting to the fervor, Saddam Hussein held a nationwide referendum on October
16, 2002, during which Iraqis could vote for or against Hussein to remain president for
seven more years. Perhaps unsurprisingly, he wound up receiving one-hundred percent
approval from eligible Iraqi voters (Blair, 2002). Iraqi officials claimed the vote was as
much about expressing anti-U.S. sentiment as it was about showing love for Saddam
(Peterson & Barr, 2002). Responding to the vote, White House Spokesman Ari Fleischer
remarked: "obviously it's not a very serious day, not a very serious vote, and nobody
places any credibility on it" (“US dismisses,” 2002).
Tuesday, November 5, found Bush facing a similar if unofficial referendum. The
mid-term election for House and Senate seats was scheduled that day—races throughout
the county were considered too close to call before the polls opened. At the end of the
day, however, Bush became the first president in fifty years to win both House and
Senate seats for his party (Walker, 2002a). Bringing Republican majorities to both houses
of Congress, the elections were largely seen as a mandate for Bush to continue his pursuit
of military action in Iraq (O’Clery, 2002).
Meanwhile, on November 8, 2002, the United Nations put forth Security Council
Resolution 1441 (Hottelet, 2002). The resolution consisted of guidelines regarding
weapons inspections and set a strict time-table for Hussein to disarm or face potential
military action (Settle, 2002). Reacting two days before the expressed deadline, Hussein
agreed on November 13 to accept the resolution and allow entrance to U.N. weapons
inspectors. Despite Hussein’s declaration that Iraq had nothing to hide, President Bush
reiterated his promise that the United States would disarm Iraq by force if it became
necessary (Deans, 2002b).
5
Less than a week later, United Nations weapon inspectors arrived in Iraq. Led by
Chief Inspector Hans Blix, the group resumed their search for weapons of mass
destruction. At the same time, President Bush warned that any failure on Saddam’s part
to cooperate with the inspectors would lead to an American invasion. Bush called for
“zero tolerance” regarding potential Iraqi stall tactics as Hussein was given a three week
deadline to reveal his weapons of mass destruction or to provide adequate evidence of
their destruction (Mroue, 2002).
In compliance with this deadline, on December 7, Iraq presented the U.N.
inspectors with a 12,000 page report outlining its chemical, biological, nuclear, and
missile programs (Deans, 2002c). Upon reading the report, U.S. Secretary of State Colin
Powell declared Iraq in “material breach” of U.N. Resolution 1441. Powell stopped short
of urging war as a solution despite calling the report "a catalog of recycled information
and flagrant omissions" and dismissing Saddam Hussein’s claims of disarmament as “a
new lie” (Crittenden, 2002).
Following the discovery of eleven rocket warheads which the U.S. claimed were
unaccounted for in Iraq’s 12,000 page report (Crittenden, 2003), Bush administration
officials—including Secretary of State Colin Powell, National Security Advisor
Condoleezza Rice, and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld—announced, on January
19, that Hussein could avoid war and escape a potential war crimes prosecution were he
to go into exile (Kessler, 2003). This came on the heels of growing worldwide
disapproval regarding potential military action in Iraq. In fact, only one day earlier
protestors around the world took to the streets to demonstrate against what they perceived
as an ensuing war. Demonstrations included tens of thousands of Americans gathering in
Washington and San Francisco, thousands of Britons marching in Bradford and
Liverpool, upwards of six-thousand protestors in Paris, and five-thousand people
marching in Tokyo (Wazir & Bright, 2003).
The Bush administration’s next move further reflected their desire to gain backing
for war from an unconvinced world. On February 5, 2003, in a long-awaited and much
hyped appearance before the U.N. Security Council, Colin Powell presented what many
characterized as a “sales pitch for war” (Collins, 2003). The purpose of Powell’s
appearance was to convince the Council that inspections alone, no matter how long they
6
lasted, would not cause Saddam Hussein to disarm. This was a response, at least in part,
to the fact that France, Germany, and other U.S. critics had long claimed the mere
presence of weapons inspectors was enough to prevent Iraq from rearmament.
Threatening that the U.N. was in danger of making itself “irrelevant,” Powell called on
the Security Council to take a tough stand against Iraq (Grier, 2003).
Despite Powell’s message, France and Germany responded by proposing the
United Nations triple its number of weapons inspectors on the ground while backing
them with surveillance flights. The Bush Administration, led by Colin Powell, reacted
angrily to this suggestion. With frustration, Powell reiterated his belief that more
inspectors would make little difference. He expressed his irritation by sarcastically
inviting the French and Germans to “read [resolution] 1441 again” (Black, NortonTaylor, et al, 2003). The Bush Administration was further angered, on February 10, when
France, Germany, and Belgium blocked the U.S. plan to have NATO protect Turkey if
attacked. The representatives of the three countries opposed the bid because they felt it
would undermine diplomatic efforts to avoid an invasion of Iraq—likely seeing the
proposal as the first step down an irreversible path to war (Wilson & Ames, 2003).
Days later, on February 15, the world saw another round of large scale protests.
Millions took to the streets, voicing their opposition to the gathering threat of war in Iraq.
According to estimates, one million people demonstrated in Rome, at least 75,000 in
London, and half a million in Berlin. In New York City, protestors stretched for 20 city
blocks while police in riot gear patrolled the scene. Cries for “peace” and pleas to “give
the inspectors time” were heard amidst those marching (Ray, 2003).
March 1, 2003, found the U.S. reeling from yet another blow. The Turkish
Parliament announced that it would not allow the Bush Administration to use Turkey as a
base for opening a northern front for war with Iraq. The proposal was narrowly defeated
by Turkish representatives and stunned American officials who had expected the plan to
pass (Filkins, 2003). Despite the setback, reports surfaced the following day that the ongoing attacks on Iraq by American and British war planes were increasing in frequency
and that they were now being directed at Iraq’s surface-to-surface missiles and rockets
(Gordon, 2003). These facts were seen by many as proof that the U.S. was in the final
stages of preparing to invade Iraq.
7
In a last ditch effort to gain the support of the United Nations Security Council, on
March 7, the United States and Britain proposed a March 17 deadline which would order
Iraq to give all weapons and other prohibited items to the inspectors or face military force
(Emling, 2003). Immediately, France, China, and Russia threatened to veto the measure,
opposing the idea of giving Saddam Hussein an ultimatum (Lauria, 2003). France went
on to indicate they would not support any resolution that could lead to war (Neuffer,
2003).
Finally on March 16, fed up with the slow pace of U.N. diplomacy, President
Bush issued a one-day deadline for the United Nations to support military action in Iraq.
Speaking at a summit in Portugal, Bush reiterated his message that the U.S. and its allies
would invade Iraq without the support of the United Nations if the Security Council did
not back his proposal (Bazinet, 2003). France, Germany, and Russia immediately
countered by suggesting the U.N. set a reasonable timetable for inspections to continue.
In line with past decisions, the U.S. rejected that plan categorically.
The next day, Bush turned his back to the United Nations, issuing a proclamation
that Saddam Hussein and his sons had forty-eight hours to leave Iraq or face military
invasion by the United States. Bush directed portions of his speech directly to the citizens
of Iraq, telling them that the U.S. would be coming to liberate them from a tyrant and
assuring them that the U.S. would help Iraqis rebuild their nation following the removal
of Hussein (Shepard & Lindell, 2003). Bush’s rhetoric accused the United Nations of
shirking its responsibilities and claimed that it would be suicide and not self-defense for
America to wait on war until she was directly attacked. The speech was critical of the
Europeans as well—permeated with thinly veiled references to their failing to stop Hitler
in World War II (Sweet, 2003).
To the surprise of few, Saddam Hussein did not take advantage of Bush’s offer.
As promised, the United States and its allies began striking Iraqi targets in the early
morning hours of March 20, 2003. In a televised speech the same day, Bush told his
audience that the attacks were part of a campaign to topple Saddam, secure Iraq, and rid
the country of weapons of mass destruction. Meanwhile, twenty five protesters were
arrested outside the White House. They were part of a larger group of demonstrators
8
which, among other things, carried signs that read “Stop the War on Iraq” (Donnelly &
Bombardieri, 2003).
Bush’s Crisis
Punctuating the preceding timeline, President Bush regularly spoke to the
American people on the subject of Iraq. These speeches cast Iraq in a context that
included the global war on terrorism, national security, and the attacks of 9/11. in
particular, Bush’s oratory positioned his response to the Iraq crisis, specifically the
impending war, as something America needed to do. In other words, removing Saddam
Hussein from power was America’s responsibility.
This thesis critically examines Bush’s “rhetoric of obligation” with particular
emphasis on explaining how and why it was successful. Combining what is known of
Bush’s rhetorical situation with a theoretical understanding of how obligation rhetoric
works allows the following explanations to arise: 1) obligation rhetoric succeeded in
building and maintaining Bush’s credibility, 2) obligation rhetoric allowed Bush to
occupy a position of limited liability once the war began, and 3) obligation rhetoric
positioned Bush to achieve hero status in the event of military success.
The relevance of this thesis rests on the assumption that, as president, Bush was in
a unique position to control, in part, the discourse surrounding the crisis with Iraq. The
inherent credibility of the office allows any president to frame international crisis in a
way that is often accepted as cultural lore by a public. Rhetorical criticism makes it
possible to interrogate the ways in which presidents shape public discourse, and how
presidential rhetoric “works” to control prevailing interpretations of public events.
In many ways, this thesis is a response to the existing body of scholarly work on
presidential crisis rhetoric which fails to directly examine and explain the use of appeals
to obligation in crisis situations. While the scope of this thesis is admittedly narrow, it is
nonetheless written in the hope that it will provoke newfound academic interest in the
rhetoric of obligation—a type of rhetoric that can be observed not only in the political
arena, but in nearly all types of discourse.
9
Summary
In short, President George W. Bush found himself in a precarious rhetorical
situation in the period leading up to the invasion of Iraq. Seeking to pursue a war that was
unsupported by the United Nations, much of the world, and many of his constituents,
Bush effectively used his position as president to frame the US invasion of Iraq, and
control the possible interpretation of events. This thesis examines a key component of the
rhetoric Bush used, namely his appeals to obligation. By conducting a rhetorical
criticism, I uncover and explain the rhetorical work Bush’s rhetoric of obligation
performs.
In the following chapter I set the stage for my criticism by reviewing the relevant
academic literature. I start with the genesis of presidential rhetoric and the criticism of it.
From there I move to the criticism of presidential crisis rhetoric where the existing
research facilitates the formation of three research questions that guide the bulk of this
project. After that, chapter three explains the methodology by which I conducted my
analysis. This is followed by a chapter describing the analysis itself and, finally, the
thesis ends with a chapter discussing my conclusions.
10
CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW
The Emergence of Presidential Rhetoric
The criticism of presidential rhetoric is a relatively new pursuit among
academics—only truly becoming a realm of study in the latter half of the twentieth
century. Prior to that time, public speeches by American presidents were limited. In fact,
the office did not become synonymous with public oratory until at least a century into the
nation’s history. The framers of the Constitution were against the notion of a rhetorical
president and sough to discourage interaction between the president and the public
(Ceaser, 1981). They believed, in Platonic fashion, that “whether crudely demagogic or
highly inspirational… mass oratory… would undermine the rational and enlightened selfinterest of the citizenry which their system was designed to foster and on which it was
thought to depend for its stability” (p. 7). Fear that skilled orators could use language to
“circumvent reason” (Jamieson, 1988, p. 47) and persuade their listeners with passion
alone, likely guided the Founding Fathers’ decision to constitutionally imply that the
president engage in very little public interaction.
From a twenty-first century perspective, it is clear that the separation of the
Presidency and public address no longer exists. The reason for the change is attributable
to three factors: 1) The emergence of the presidency as a “leadership” position, 2) the
creation and expansion of the modern mass media, and 3) the evolution of the modern
presidential campaign (Ceaser, 1981, p. 7). These factors brought about radical changes
in the nature of the office and consequently changed the current understanding of what it
means to be President of the United States. Most notable from an academic perspective,
though, is that the changes surrounding the office necessarily led to an expansion of the
possibilities regarding the study of the Presidency.
11
In a 1960 book entitled Presidential Power and the Modern Presidents, Richard
Neustadt, famously remarked that “presidential power is the power to persuade
(1960/1990, p. 11).” His work serves to highlight a considerable shift in how
contemporary scholars perceive the presidency. Social critics have stopped looking at the
office solely in terms of the legal powers constitutionally imparted on the Presidency,
turning their attention instead to the persuasive nature of the position (Windt, 1973).
Despite its late start, the study of presidential rhetoric now represents fertile ground for
academic inquiry.
Criticizing Presidential Rhetoric
Rhetorical critics dissect presidential oratory from a number of angles. A useful
template for categorizing the different types of criticism is provided by Theodore Windt
in Essays in Presidential Rhetoric (1992, p. xxv). 1 Windt’s first category involves
criticisms of individual presidential speeches. Richard Nixon’s November 3, 1969
“Vietnamization” speech, for example, is the subject of much critical discussion and
serves as an excellent example of how a speech can be dissected in different ways by
different scholars. For example, a piece by Stelzner (1971) critiques the speech from a
narrative perspective. The narrative approach assumes that humans make sense of the
world by organizing it mentally into familiar story lines (Sillars & Gronbeck, 2001). A
speaker wishing to persuade can do so by framing his or her interpretation of reality in a
way that fits one of these accepted story types, thus making their vision more acceptable
to an audience. Based on this assumption, Stelzner asserts that Nixon’s speech was
unsuccessful because it was written as a quest story but lacks crucial elements that would
allow it to conform to the audience’s narrative expectation. Specifically, Nixon’s speech
posited Nixon as a hero on a quest for peace; the sacred object. However, Stelzner argues
that Nixon failed to include a climactic confrontation between himself and the
“guardians” of the sacred object, thereby failing to present his audience with a satisfying
1
Windt also has a catch-all category for articles on “various ancillary topics” (p. xxv). I have not included
this category in my literature review because do not feel it adds to the content.
12
narrative. Thus Nixon’s Vietnamization speech was ultimately doomed to fail. Stelzner’s
(1971) analysis contrasts sharply with Hill’s (1972) critical interrogation of the same
speech. In his work, Hill employs the tools of neo-classical criticism to conclude that
Nixon’s speech was successful insofar as Nixon was able to effectively utilize the best
available means of persuasion to gain the support of his specific target audience. 2 Other
presidential speeches that receive considerable scholarly attention include Clinton’s
apologies to the nation regarding his White House affair with intern Monica Lewinski 3
and President Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s first inaugural address. 4
In contrast to analyses of single presidential speeches, a more “big picture”
approach to the criticism of presidential address involves the examination of multiple
speeches from a single administration. The critical aim here is to create an understanding
of the “rhetorical movements” (Windt, 1992, p. xxv) which span the body of discourse
and, by doing so, attempt to explain how presidents strategically use several rhetorical
opportunities to disperse their message and persuade their audiences. For example,
Goodnight (1986) argues that President Reagan’s speeches worked together to redefine
the American public’s perception of nuclear weapons and military power near the end of
the cold war. Jamieson employs a similar approach in her book, Packaging the
Presidency (1996), where she asserts that President Carter used numerous rhetorical
techniques to create the public impression that Reagan was “unsafe” (p. 401).
Windt’s (p. xxv) third category of criticism of presidential rhetoric is “generic
criticism.” Here critics seek to categorize speeches into genres. Generic criticism looks
beyond single speeches, as well as beyond single speakers, and attempts to group similar
artifacts with the hope of identifying patterns or rules that govern a particular genre
(Burgchardt, 2000a, p. 407). Defining these generic qualities makes it possible for the
2
For other examples of writings on Nixon’s “Vietnamization” speech, see Newman’s “Under the Veneer:
Nixon’s Vietnam Speech of November 3, 1969” (1970); & Campbell’s “An Exercise in the Rhetoric of
Mythical America” (1972).
3
For examples see Kramer and Olson’s “The Strategic Potential of Sequencing Apologia Stases: President
Clinton's Self-Defense in the Monica Lewinsky Scandal” (2002); Glinert’s “Apologizing to the Nation”
(1999); Gronbeck’s “Underestimating Generic Expectations: Clinton's Apologies of August 17, 1998”
(1999); & Simons’ “A Dilemma-Center Analysis of Clinton's August 17th Apologia: Implications for
Rhetorical Theory and Method” (2000).
4
For examples see Houck’s FDR. and Fear Itself: The First Inaugural Address (2002); & Ryan’s
“Roosevelt’s First Inaugural: A Study of Technique” (1979).
13
critic to not only draw overall conclusions about large groups of speeches, but also opens
up the opportunity for future critics to dissect a text based on how well it meets an
audience’s expectations for its specific genre. Notable among the writings on presidential
address is Campbell and Jamieson’s (1986) piece entitled Inaugurating the Presidency in
which they posit that the presidential inaugural address is generically constrained and
therefore must contain certain features in order to meet the requirements inherent in the
rhetorical situation. These features include reconstituting the people, rehearsing the
values of the past, setting forth the guiding political principle of the coming
administration, and showing that the incoming president is capable of enacting the
persona associated with the office.
Another example of genre criticism is Ware & Linkugel’s article “They Spoke in
Defense of Themselves: On the Generic Criticism of Apologia” (1973). Here the authors
look to show apologetic discourse constitutes “a distinct form of public address, a family
of speeches with sufficient elements in common so as to warrant legitimately generic
status” (p. 426). They find four strategies common in apology speeches; two reformative
strategies—denial and bolstering—and two transformative strategies—differentiation and
transcendence. They go on to write that there are four sub-genres of apologia defined by
the “rhetorical posture” (p. 433) of the speaker. These sub-genres employ pairs of the
aforementioned strategies—one reformative and one transformative—which become the
parameters by which each sub-genre may be recognized. The four rhetorical postures, as
they define them, are “absolution, vindication, explanation, [and] justification” (p. 433).
Presidential Crisis Rhetoric
One genre of presidential rhetoric that is the focus of much scholarly interest is
“crisis rhetoric.” Windt (1973) lays the framework of the genre by explaining the “three
lines of argument” that presidents employ in a crisis situation: 5
5
In his article, Windt is particularly concerned with ‘international crisis’, an argument could potentially
exist as to whether he intends his framework to apply to the genre of Presidential crisis rhetoric in general
(as I have assumed).
14
First, the president tells the people that a dangerous new situation exists that
requires that he acts decisively. Second, he states that this new situation is only
one more in an ongoing greater battle between incompatible ideologies. Finally,
he calls for the public to realize that the enactment of his policy and support for it
are moral acts (p. 98).
Windt goes on to say that presidential crisis rhetoric generically features the president
declaring policy as opposed to discussing it—asking for support as opposed to debate.
President Bush did this when he spoke to his audience about America’s obligation to deal
with Saddam Hussein. In Bush’s speeches, he presents the prospect of war as
unavoidable; thus the purpose of his discourse is to garner support for a policy that will
go forward regardless.
Disagreement over whether presidential crisis rhetoric can reasonably be
considered a genre is prevalent among rhetorical scholars. Even before Windt argued for
universal parameters governing presidential crisis speech, it was written that crisis
speeches are not as easily reducible, in terms of genre, as one might suspect. James W.
Pratt (1970) looked at three crisis speeches delivered by Kennedy, Eisenhower, and
Johnson and came to the conclusion that even the differences in the rhetorical situation
they were addressing were not great enough to explain away the differences in “strategy
and approach” used by each president (p. 202). He goes on to write that “the variety of
strategies used by the three speakers suggests that no particular strategies [italics added]
are demanded by the crisis situation” (p. 202). Furthermore, he argues that “the speaking
characteristics of the president involved and the specific nature of the crisis setting
combine to determine the type of speech which will result and this…is more important
that the simple presence or absence of crisis" (p. 202). In other words, there is not enough
constraint inherent in any particular crisis situation to warrant classifying all presidential
crisis rhetoric into its own category. As Dow (1989) succinctly puts it, “the acceptance of
crisis rhetoric as a genre on the basis of existing scholarship would be an error” (p. 307).
These concerns challenge critics to move beyond formal generic criticism of
presidential crisis rhetoric. Instead, special care must be taken to analyze presidential
crisis rhetoric with regard to the context of the rhetorical situation. Therefore, even
though presidential crisis rhetoric may not necessarily be a discernable genre, the critic
15
should not be blinded by this question and thus risk ignoring the existence of crisis
rhetoric and its importance as a target of study.
The fact that a number of critics argue that the concept of “crisis” itself is a purely
rhetorical creation further complicates the study of presidential crisis rhetoric. Windt
makes this exact argument in his 1973 essay on presidential crisis speeches. Bostdorff,
too, argues this in The Presidency and the Rhetoric of Foreign Crisis (1994). As she
writes:
Foreign crises are not objective, independent entities, but are instead linguistic
constructions. Political events occur, but the meaning given to those events lies
with the language that people use to interpret them. The shipment of weapons
from one country to another, for instance, may be ignored as insignificant,
depicted as a valid defensive measure, or portrayed as a threatening escalation in
arms that constitutes a crisis (p. 205).
Countering this view, Bonnie Dow warns that “critics who define all crises as rhetorical
creations adopt an assumption that may prejudge their reactions to crisis discourse”
(1989, p. 294). Specifically, Dow argues that dismissing all crises as products of
discourse is unproductive as it constrains the critic and forces an analysis that fails to
treat specific crises with the seriousness they deserve. Regardless of whether “crisis”
objectively exists, the rhetoric surrounding and regarding it certainly does. Furthermore,
presidential crisis rhetoric often deals with life or death decisions, and is therefore worthy
of critical attention.
Presidential War Rhetoric
Presidential rhetoric during wartime arguably represents the most consequential
types of presidential crisis rhetoric. As Ivie notes, “rhetorical studies can and should
function as an instrument of life, especially through the critical analysis of war rhetoric” 6
6
For the purposes of this study, it should be noted that “war rhetoric” is a subset of “crisis rhetoric” and
therefore all assumptions about the latter apply to the former.
16
(1974, p. 337). With that in mind, a number of communication scholars have applied their
energies to this specific type of oratory.
Critics of presidential war rhetoric typically approach the discourse from one of
two perspectives. The critic will either examine rhetorical artifacts to understand how the
president used language to construct or frame the crisis, or they will focus their attention
on how a president justifies certain actions relating to the crisis. There tends to be a high
degree of blurring between these categories, and each of these perspectives bears on my
current study.
First, many scholars examine presidential war rhetoric for insight into how it is
used to create public perception of the issue. This approach is justified because the
American president occupies a unique position during wartime. They very often are the
first to explain any crisis to the American people because they have nearly immediate and
unfettered access to the channels of mass media (Bostdorff, 1994). The American
president is also able to draw on the “institutional credibility of the Presidency” to help
legitimize their claims (p. 205). This, alongside the fact that neither Congress nor the
public has the ability to quickly locate verifiable information that would counter a
president’s portrayal of the situation, gives them an enormous amount of control over
defining an event (Windt, 1973).
The scholarship in this area has produced a wide variety of conclusions regarding
the workings of presidential crisis speech. For example, a piece by King and Anderson
(1971) argues that Nixon used his Vietnam-era speeches to accomplish his goal of further
polarizing an already split nation. He did this by promoting the idea of “radical liberals”
as a common enemy while painting the “silent majority” as good people for whom he
was fighting. This followed Nixon’s belief that unifying the nation on ideological
grounds would be impossible and that it would be easier to strengthen his support base by
creating a common enemy from which they could stand apart. The goal of his crisis
rhetoric, then, was to frame the current issues in a way which divided the nation along
distinct lines to serve his political needs.
In another piece, Kathryn Olson (1991) argues that Presidents Reagan and Bush
used subtle rhetorical techniques to create a description of crisis which acted to close the
possibilities for public deliberation during U.S. military involvement in Grenada and the
17
Persian Gulf crises, respectively. By way of framing, Reagan and Bush were able to
skillfully constrain the ability for detraction by:
collapsing the distinction between ‘pro-war’ and ‘pro-troop’…minimizing the
costs to the citizens by promising few casualties, clear war objectives, and
immediate use of overwhelming force…[and] packaging media presentations to
replace… deliberation… simultaneously making relevant information difficult to
obtain, thus precipitating predictable results from news media (p. 65).
Turning to more recent events, the rhetoric of George W. Bush following the
attacks of September 11, 2001, 7 was analyzed by Denise Bostdorff in a 2003 article
published in the Quarterly Journal of Speech. In her analysis, she detects a rhetoric of
“covenant renewal” which she likens to that used by the Puritans in the late 1600s in their
attempt “to bring second and third generation Puritans [back] into the church” (p. 293).
She explains that Puritans used to rely on jeremiadic rhetoric—rhetoric of blame and
guilt—to keep parishioners in line. However, the younger generations felt put off by this
type of speech and lost interest in the church. In order to prevent the disintegration of the
church, leaders adopted a kinder, less judgmental form of oratory. They preached that
parishioners were good people and that outside forces were evil and blameworthy. They
even began to praise the younger generations. This type of rhetoric, Bostdorff argues, is
similar to that found in Bush’s post September 11 speeches. She describes his style as
portraying Americans as a good, special people who are watched over by God (p. 301).
Juxtaposed against this is Bush’s description of the enemy as evil and external. Finally,
just as the Puritan’s rhetoric of covenant renewal sought to bring younger generations
back to the church and to reaffirm their commitment to God’s demands, Bush asked that
the public recommit themselves to America’s ideals—namely the ideals of the WWII
generation. By framing the war in this way, Bush was able to encourage support for his
military policies, as well as set the stage for future military action in the name of “good.”
One key consideration to make when analyzing how presidents create public
perception in times of crisis is the role of narrative. As Griffin (1994) explains, “a
7
I include all of Bush’s post September 11, 2001 speeches under the broad heading of “crisis rhetoric” as
long as they deal in some way with national security or the war on terror.
18
number of scholars have identified narrativity as a basic attribute of the rhetorical
Presidency.” He writes that:
Narrative form plays an especially important role in presidential crisis rhetoric not
only because presidents often tell stories when they speak during crisis situations,
but, more important, because one of the ways that presidents bring order and
meaning to crisis situations is by arranging the people, places, and events
involved in story form (p. 138).
Griffin goes on to explain that the role a president creates for themselves is critical
because the president is a singular representation of the American people. Therefore, the
critic should be careful to examine the rhetoric used by a president to define his or her
character amidst the storyline of a given crisis. For this thesis, that means navigating
Bush’s rhetoric of obligation to decipher the character that he is portraying.
The second category of presidential war rhetoric criticism, that which looks at
presidential justifications for specific action, can help further illuminate how Bush might
be successful promoting his military strategy. As rhetorical critics examine crisis rhetoric
more closely, they begin to create a picture of how American presidents justify specific
action through the manipulation of language. Before an understanding of policy
justification rhetoric can be achieved, though, it is crucial for the critic to be aware of the
broad natured goals of modern presidential rhetoric.
Due to the evolution of the office, it is increasingly difficult for an incumbent
president to switch from performing their presidential duties to getting back on the
campaign trail for reelection (Tenpas & Dickinson, 1997). Blumenthal (1982) describes
this phenomenon as the permanent campaign, terminology that reminds us that politicians
are, effectively, always running for office. That being the case, it is reasonable to assume
that any speech given by a first term president seeks to garner public support. In a most
basic sense, the speech always hopes to persuade an audience of a president’s
competence and likeability.
In addition to the idea of the permanent campaign, the structure of the Federal
Government largely affects the goals of presidential rhetoric as well. Though a strong
connection between public opinion and what happens in the legislature is highly
dependent on several contextual factors, Rivers and Rose (1985) suggest that, in general,
19
a one percent rise in public presidential approval can lead to approximately a one percent
rise in the president’s legislative approval (p. 193). Congressional representatives share
the same pool of voters as the president (more or less) and these representatives very
often seek reelection. Therefore, a president with high public approval is likely to find
support in Congress because members of Congress act with their constituent’s desires in
mind. In a basic sense, this means that a president would benefit directly by appealing to
the public, even when the policy they are proposing is one that requires congressional
approval.
This is especially true during wartime. As Andrews writes, “why and how men
are persuaded to take up arms is a critical area for serious study by the rhetorical scholar”
(qtd. in Ivie, 1974, p. 337). One can posit that Andrews does not only recommend
studying how the armed forces, specifically, are persuaded to go to war, but more
appropriately how the public is persuaded to support the military’s involvement in such a
pursuit. In other words, most recent war rhetoric does not directly seek the recruitment of
fighters. Instead, presidential crisis speeches are geared towards generating public
support for a given policy. As Tulis explains in The Rhetorical Presidency, “presidents
regularly ‘go over the heads’ of Congress to the people at large in support of legislation
and other initiatives” (1987, p. 4). This support is crucial for two of the reasons that have
already been mentioned. First, public support often translates to congressional support
and congress controls much of the machinery of the United States military. And second,
public support benefits the president in the context of the “permanent campaign.”
The most in-depth analysis of presidential war justification is Robert Ivie’s (1974)
“Presidential motives for war.” Answering a call by Mills to “locate vocabularies of
motives in historical epochs and specified situations” (qtd. in Ivie), Ivie focuses his
attention on various historical American war speeches and discovers their commonalities.
Among reoccurring themes is the emphasis on “our rights” (p. 341) being front and
center in terms of justification for entering a conflict. This suggests that a basic
characteristic of crisis or war rhetoric is that a president justifies our involvement by
claiming (either explicitly or implicitly) that an enemy is infringing on our rights. In
Ivie’s words, “American presidents…insist that war is imposed on America by violation
20
of her rights—and always unjustifiably” (p. 343). The protection of our rights, then, is
one of the most prominent rhetorical justifications for war in a president’s arsenal.
Expanding on this point, Ivie says that “American presidents consistently perceive
a war situation as a moral [italics added] crisis (p. 343).” Instead of arguing for combat in
terms of practical necessity—resources, strategy, security—American presidents tend to
paint wars in melodramatic tones. Verbally depicting war as a conflict between good and
evil shifts the parameters of the war and posits it as a noble struggle of almost Biblical
proportions. This use of us/them good/evil mentality was not only described by Ivie, but
harshly criticized by him as well:
The reductionistic tendency toward a moralistic and idealistic definition of war
situations directs attention away from more objective determination of causes,
crisis and solutions and severely delimits America’s potential for identification
with other nations…. [this] must result to some extent in “unrealistic” images.
The possibility of peace, it would seem, could only be enhanced by a more
sophisticated “grammar of motives” in our vocabulary of motives for war. (Ivie,
1974, p. 345)
Ivie finds the traditional description of war as a moral conflict between good and evil to
be not only inaccurate, but also binding and problematic for future efforts to make peace.
Defining an external enemy as “evil” may motivate, but that perception can only serve to
make resolving future differences akin to compromising with the devil.
Still, the portrayal of war as a matter of morality is central to the arguments
employed by presidents justifying their proposed military actions. Even when war
justifications seem to employ objective reasoning (war as self-defense, for example) they
are still informed by a use of moralistic ideology. For example, President Johnson is said
to have justified American activity in Vietnam by relying on a rhetorical theme of
“aggression” (Smith, 1972). Americans had to enter the conflict with Vietnam because
the communists were being too antagonistic. This ignored the fact that Americans likely
were just as aggressive as the North Vietnamese—a fact bemoaned by Johnson’s
detractors who described the president’s explanations of the happenings in Vietnam as
almost “Orwellian” (p. 218). Smith ends his article by concluding that Johnson likely did
not intentionally lie to the American people but that Johnson’s ingrained understanding of
21
evil communism vs. benevolent Americanism actually altered his interpretation of events.
This subconscious filter, then, colored his description of the events in Vietnam.
Ivie (1999), writing on Truman, suggests that Truman justified military action by
relying heavily on an exaggerated description of America’s vulnerability. More
specifically, Truman consistently painted America as exceptionally vulnerable to
impending disaster. Metaphors of disease juxtaposed with images of fire and flood served
this end. By conveying this image of danger at home, Truman was able to use public fear
to ensure his defense policies would receive the support of the American people.
Other presidential justifications for war have also been examined in recent years.
Work on the first President Bush’s rhetoric on the Persian Gulf crisis has yielded the
conclusion that Bush used value-laden descriptions of events to justify taking action in
the region. A piece by Bates (2004) uses metaphoric cluster analysis to posit that Bush
employed alternating metaphor clusters to define the two sides of the impending conflict.
Bates explains that the use of a “savage” metaphorical system to characterize the actions
of the Iraqis invasion of Kuwait served to justify the American led response—which was
characterized by a “civilization” metaphor cluster. Clearly, even this style of war
justification has at its core the battle of morality that Ivie references.
A similar critical example is Butler’s (2002) piece regarding President Clinton’s
rhetoric on Somalia. Butler argues that Clinton’s language reflects a reemergence of an
earlier rhetorical technique for characterizing an enemy—that of the “imperial savage.”
He explains that this depiction paints an entire people as uncivilized and that this style of
rhetoric was common in the expansionistic discourse of early imperialist America. This is
contrasted with the recently prominent rhetorical description of the “modern savage”
which posits an enemy state’s leader as primitive and dangerous. Clinton’s regression to
the rhetoric of the imperial savage is noteworthy because it represents a reinstituting of a
previously discarded rhetorical justification. In a sense, this is a case of rhetorical history
repeating itself.
Observing how the rhetoric of the past relates to that of the present brings me
back to Bostdorff’s (2003) aforementioned piece which highlighted similarities between
President George W. Bush’s post September 11 rhetoric and that of the Puritans
preaching covenant renewal. As I explained, Bush’s rhetoric tended to constitute the
22
American public as benevolent and watched over by God while portraying our enemy as
external, blameworthy, and pure evil. In terms of war justification, however, this rhetoric
had an extra element. The polarizing rhetoric, along with describing Al Qaeda’s intent as
an attack on freedom in general, allowed Bush to frame military involvement in
grandiose tones. Bush also positioned Al Qaeda with past enemies of the United States—
specifically those of the Second World War—thus drawing comparisons between the
United States’ mission to defeat the evils of Nazism and a new mission to defeat the
broader evil of the present. Specifically, the issue was framed in order to argue that the
war on terrorism was part of an ongoing war on evil that became part of the national
consciousness during World War II. This connection allowed Bush to utilize a new
rhetoric that implied present day Americans were indebted to the heroes of WWII. They
were therefore obliged to honor their ancestors’ tradition by recommitting themselves to
fight for the causes of the previous generation. In other words, Bush’s audience,
according to the language he used, was obligated to do whatever they could to defeat the
evil that was behind the September 11 attacks. This concept of “obligation rhetoric” is
essential to this thesis.
Summary and Research Questions
The existing academic literature on presidential crisis rhetoric alerts my attention
to several considerations for this study. In general, the literature clearly shows the power
a president holds during war time with regard to his or her ability to guide public
perception. With respect to that, my study looks at how Bush used his Iraq speeches to
shape the public’s view of his character. Similarly, I describe how Bush used his rhetoric
to frame the situation in Iraq in ways that benefited his particular needs. Bearing heavily
on my study are Ivie’s writings on morality and Griffin’s work on the importance of
narrative in presidential crisis rhetoric. On top of that, Bostdorff’s brief allusion to
obligation rhetoric in her 2003 piece might adequately be termed the “jumping-off point”
for this thesis.
23
Specifically, the research on presidential crisis rhetoric exposes a gap in the
literature as it relates to obligation rhetoric. While my instinct is to suggest that the
language of obligation is prevalent in political policy speeches, it seems that
communication scholars have, by and large, paid very little attention to use of such
rhetoric. For example, Ivie (1974) states that presidential rhetoric often portrays America
as obligated to combat evil—but he does not delve into the complexities of obligation as
a rhetorical tool. Similarly, Bostdorff under-theorizes the connection between obligation
and audience. In hopes of filling this notable void, this thesis draws conclusions about
how obligation rhetoric benefited George W. Bush’s pursuit of war in Iraq. The paper
will be guided by the following research questions:
RQ1: What, if any, appeals to obligation are present in President George W.
Bush’s speeches prior to Operation Iraqi Freedom?
RQ2: What rhetorical strategies are accomplished by appeals to obligation in
President Bush’s speeches prior to the invasion of Iraq?
RQ3: How do appeals to obligation meet President George W. Bush’s rhetorical
goals?
In the pages that follow, I will answer these questions. The methodology I employ
in this pursuit is described in the following chapter. In the chapter after that, chapter four,
I analyze Bush’s Iraq speeches with regard to these research questions. Finally, in chapter
fire I discuss my various conclusions on the subject.
24
CHAPTER THREE: METHODOLOGY
To answer my research questions I conducted a rhetorical criticism of a series of
speeches delivered by President George W. Bush. Rhetorical criticism is most
appropriate for these questions given the rhetorical critic’s goal of “describing,
interpreting, and evaluating human communication events” (Sillars and Gronbeck, 2001,
p. 7). While this definition is necessarily broad, it nonetheless represents the overarching
aim of the current study.
Defining “Obligation Rhetoric”
This thesis focuses on the “obligation rhetoric” deployed by President Bush prior
to the 2003 American-led invasion of Iraq. For clarity sake, I should like to define the
term “obligation rhetoric” now.
Obligation rhetoric is characterized by the framing of proposed action as required
by forces beyond the control of the speaker. The forces may remain unspecified; likewise
the reason for the obligation may go unexplained. For example, a president suggesting
that American’s have a duty to destroy communism would be using obligation rhetoric
despite the fact that no explicit mention of where this duty comes from is given.
Obligation rhetoric is further defined by the use of “appeals to obligation” which
may be explicit or implicit. An explicit appeal to obligation generally involves the use of
obligation-like terminology. These are terms that are synonymous with obligation and
include words like duty, responsibility, and requirement. The previous example includes
an explicit appeal to obligation.
Implicit appeals to obligation are similar to their explicit counterparts but differ in
that they suggest an obligation while avoiding the use of the terminology described
25
above. A president saying a dictator has nuclear weapons and intends to use them might
imply an obligation on the part of America to use her available power to stop this from
happening. In similar fashion, a section of text can have what I deem the “tone” of
obligation if its arguments situate events in such a way as to imply a duty to act in some
manner.
Choosing the Relevant Texts
Having described what this thesis means by “obligation rhetoric,” I can move to
discussing the reasons behind choosing the texts that were analyzed in this study. My first
research question asks “what, if any, appeals to obligation are present in President
George W. Bush’s speeches prior to Operation Iraqi Freedom?” To address this question
I focused on a series of speeches delivered by the president from the time period
following the attacks of September 11, 2001, until the actual invasion of Iraq on March
20, 2003. Speeches delivered prior to September 11, 2001, were not included in the
current study as they fall outside the scope of this thesis. With regard to context, Bush’s
rhetorical situation was so drastically different before the attacks of 9/11 that to have
included speeches from that time period would have been needlessly complex and
unproductive insofar as answering the posed research questions. Speeches delivered
following the invasion of Iraq were disregarded for similar reasons.
Texts chosen for this study were based on several other criteria as well. First, they
had to explicitly make mention of the Iraqi crisis. Speeches dealing with the threat of
terrorism in general, without making specific reference to Iraq or Saddam Hussein, were
not included. Furthermore, the texts studied were those that were undoubtedly prepared in
advance. Informal remarks on Iraq, including those made to reporters or other unscripted
situations, were not included in the current analysis. To focus on Bush’s unprepared
statements on Iraq might yield insight into how he personally views the impending
conflict, but that would be outside the scope of this thesis.
Finally, I am looking only at speeches delivered by President Bush and not at the
rhetoric of the administration as a whole or, for that matter, the general pro-war dialogue
26
of the public sphere. This distinction is critical to this study. Research has shown that the
American president occupies a unique position during a crisis situation. This is especially
true when the policy proposed in response to a crisis situation is by and large seen as the
president’s policy—as was the case with the invasion of Iraq. This fact complicates the
rhetorical situation because it enhances the president’s vulnerability with respect to the
outcome of his or her policy. To see how this is, consider the different situation Bush
would face had the invasion of Iraq been proposed and pursued by the United Nations
with Bush backing it as a supporter. Should the invasion turn out to be a disastrous move,
Bush’s personal credibility would be far less susceptible to attack than that of the United
Nations. In reality, though, the invasion of Iraq was perceived almost exclusively as a
Bush policy. This fact with its subsequent effect on Bush’s rhetorical situation suggests
that the richest analysis of pre-Iraq rhetoric will come from an examination only of
speeches delivered by Bush himself.
Noting these criteria, the speeches I selected for inclusion in this thesis are as
follows: Bush’s radio address on October 5, 2002, Bush’s remarks at the Cincinnati
Museum Center on October 7, 2002, Bush’s State of the Union Address from January 28,
2003, Bush’s March 17, 2003, speech where he declared that Hussein had 48 hours to
leave Iraq, and finally Bush’s address to the nation on the night the bombing started—
delivered March 19, 2003. 8 By interrogating these texts, I am able to most effectively
produce an understanding of what rhetorical appeals Bush used prior to the war in Iraq.
Addressing Research Questions Two and Three
Research question two asks “what rhetorical strategies are accomplished by
appeals to obligation in President Bush’s speeches prior to the invasion of Iraq?” and
research question three asks “how do appeals to obligation meet President George W.
Bush’s rhetorical goals?” To adequately answer these questions, an understanding of the
rhetorical work done by appealing to obligation is necessary. However, to my knowledge
8
These speeches were taken directly from the official presidential website (www.Whitehose.gov) and are
included in the appendix section of this thesis (Appendices A-E, respectively).
27
no such project has yet to be undertaken. To make my analysis of Bush’s rhetoric
possible, then, I must first explain how obligation functions in the general realm of
presidential rhetoric. To do this, I will examine the rhetoric of obligation from a NeoAristotelian perspective, as well as from a Narrative perspective.
Neo-Aristotelian Criticism and Obligation Rhetoric
Approaching presidential appeals to obligation from a Neo-Aristotelian standpoint
means examining obligation with a primary concern for how it affects a given audience.
Traditionally, Neo-Aristotelian criticism judges a text on how well it utilizes the
Aristotelian proofs of Ethos, Pathos, and Logos. For the purpose of evaluating
presidential rhetoric, it is most useful to understand how Ethos is used and developed
throughout a particular text. This is because presidential credibility is critical to the nature
of the office. The character of the president is most likely the biggest predictor of whether
their proposed policies are well received by the public.
Even Aristotle wrote that credibility should be seen as the “controlling factor in
persuasion” (trans. 1991, p. 38). To quote:
It is necessary not only to look to the argument, that it may be demonstrative and
persuasive, but also [for the speaker] to construct a view of himself as a certain
kind of person…for it makes much difference in regard to persuasion that the
speaker seem to be a certain kind of person (p. 120).
Thus a valuable way to critique presidential rhetoric from the Neo-Aristotelian viewpoint
is to do so with an eye toward understanding how that rhetoric works to build and
maintain the president’s credibility. Approaching obligation through this lens provides
insight into the first rhetorical benefit associated with it.
Obligation rhetoric implies a series of speaker qualities that enhance the
audience’s perception of speaker credibility. For example, speaking in terms of obligation
separates the speaker from their proposed action in such a way as to quell fears of selfish
motives. For a president to say that the country is obliged to take specific action is for
him (or her) to say that outside forces require this action to occur. In other words, the
president appealing to obligation momentarily takes their motivation out of the argument
28
and replaces it with the implication of stimulus from a higher authority. This quiets an
audience’s suspicion about a speaker’s potentially selfish motives while similarly
emphasizing their selflessness and therefore aiding in the perception of their character
and credibility.
Appealing to obligation also carries with it the impression that the speaker has
weighed the available alternatives in a given situation. This is especially important in the
modern political arena where speakers are limited by time and dwindling audience
attention spans. This is contrasted with presidential speech in the past. As Jamieson
explains:
Speakers in the golden ages of…oratory routinely laid out the range of policy
alternatives for examination, scrutinizing each in turn. Only after showing the
flaws in the alternative options, weighing the objections to their proposals, and
arguing the comparative advantages of the course they favored did they conclude
(1988, p. 11).
This level of detail is unimaginable today. Presidential speeches are almost always aired
on television—a medium that prizes brevity. A president attempting to speak in the
historical style will quickly find they lose their audience. Appealing to obligation,
however, can serve as a substitute, in many ways, for the long-winded though highly
credible arguments of the past. It does this by implying that a speaker has considered the
alternative courses of action only to reject them in favor of the course he or she is
proposing—the only one that meets our obligation. In other words, the feeling conveyed
is that the president referencing obligation has decided on their proposed policy because
all other available options fail to meet the requirements of the situation. Obligation has
the power to stand-in for the style of oratory Jamieson references and, in doing so, it
suggest a speaker is more intelligent, thoughtful, and credible.
As we have seen, obligation’s power to build credibility stems primarily from the
character traits it implies. Most critically, its effectiveness is attributable to its subtleness.
As Hauser (2002) explains, a speaker seeking to build character by display of their
virtues will be most successful when they avoid directly listing their positive qualities.
For a president to stand up and tell his audience that he is a thoughtful or that he is
29
selfless clearly would not be a rhetorically prudent move. On the other hand, letting the
language of obligation imply these traits has the potential to be far more effective.
In Aristotle’s On Rhetoric, he explicitly lists the characteristics which constitute
“virtue.” 9 A speaker possessing these qualities is generally seen as trustworthy and
credible. Included in Aristotle’s list of virtuous traits are two that are demonstrated
through the use of obligation rhetoric. They are the qualities of self-control and
magnificence (trans. 1991, p.80).
The quality of self-control or temperance is demonstrated when a speaker shows
that they practice self-restraint, believe in moderation, and do not act in a way that is selfindulgent (Hauser, 2002). I have previously shown how appealing to obligation stifles
ideas of self-indulgence, but it also suggests temperance in that it demonstrates self
restraint and moderation. Obligation rhetoric contains elements of a proposal being one
of “last resort.” For example, for a president to suggest we have a national obligation to
make sure our citizens never go hungry, the argument put forth is that at the very least we
need to make sure our citizens do not go hungry. Or, to use a more relevant example, if a
president says we are obligated to use force to defend our nation, they are, in effect,
saying that at the very least we must take this action. The image then becomes one of the
speaker—of the president—as a temperate person and that perception is beneficial to
their credibility.
Speaking in terms of obligation also builds character in that it demonstrates the
quality of magnificence. A speaker showing that they have a sense of the grand and
exalted, or that they are committed to the elevating the human spirit to the highest quality
of life, will elevate his or her credibility in the eyes of the audience (Hauser, 2002). This
characteristic is on display whenever a president describes an obligation to improve the
world in some way. Had Nixon suggested America had an obligation to destroy
communism or Bush claimed the world had an obligation to stop terrorism for the sake of
humanity then they would evoke this sense of magnificence. Obligation implies moving
people toward a higher calling. The speaker is simply motivating the audience to heed
9
These include justice, courage, self-control, magnificence, magnanimity, liberality, gentleness, prudence,
and wisdom
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that call by acquiescing to the truth of the speaker’s claim. This move helps paint the
speaker in this virtuous and credible light.
The final way in which talk of obligation benefits speaker credibility rests on an
understanding of the philosophical notion of obligation and how that relates to the
speaker’s audience. First of all, philosophers make a distinction between being
“obligated” and being “ought to” do something. In other words, there is a difference
when you say “person A ‘ought to’ do B” and “person A is ‘obligated’ to do B.” Most
philosophers seem to agree that obligation is often used to mean ‘ought to’ but that the
two are fundamentally different (Dagger, 1977). Early philosophers seemed sure that
obligation could only be defined as a sense of duty to a recognized natural authority
(Schurman, 1894). In that vane, a person can never be told that they have an obligation to
fulfill (Neblett, 1976). The sense of obligation is internal and recognition of an obligation
is a purely personal event. The implication is that obligation is a command from the will
of God (Quillian, 1949). If not God, then some other natural force that is beyond the
control of even the most eloquent of speakers. Indeed, doubt continues as to whether or
not God must exist for obligation to exist. Many philosophers maintain that a deity is not
critical for humans to feel obligated. Society, for instance, can instill in people feelings of
obligation. However, it should be noted that most people find it nearly impossible to
understand feelings of obligation without positing them as the creation of some higher
power (Schurman, 1894).
It is my belief, then, that first: the appeals to obligation in political speech tend to
use obligation in place of the less powerful ‘ought to.’ Second: despite this, the layperson
does not distinguish between ‘ought to’ and obligation and therefore regards them as one
in the same. Third: because it is nearly impossible for most to understand obligation
without its divine implications, the use of appeals to obligation in political policy
speeches plays on audience members’ ideas of religion. Specifically, then, a president
appealing to obligation emerges as associated with spirituality.
This association with a higher power builds speaker credibility, in part, because of
America’s strong Judeo-Christian roots. Since most people see obligation as proof of
spirituality, references to obligation create an impression of similarity between speaker
and listener in the listener’s mind. Because Americans and American society are
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grounded in religion, an appeal to obligation brings about thoughts not only of God, but a
belief that the speaker shares the listener’s understanding of God. This element of
similarity is very helpful in terms of building perceptions of character. A speaker who is
seen by an audience member as being like him or her is more likely to have their message
accepted (Perloff, 2003). Not only that, but an appeal to obligation carries with it the
added benefit of not being an overt reference to religion. Explicit references to religion
can theoretically cause a backlash in that they violate core American values relating to
religion and government. By being so subtle, then, an appeal to obligation has the benefit
of evoking our religious ideals without going so far as to bring to the surface concerns
over the separation of church and state.
Narrative Criticism and Obligation Rhetoric
The previous section examined obligation rhetoric from a Neo-Aristotelian
perspective. This perspective exposed how obligation works to build speaker credibility.
An even broader understanding of obligation rhetoric can be attained by adding a
Narrative analysis to what has already been found. The employment of Narrative
criticism in a primarily Neo-Aristotelian work is by no means controversial. Both focus
particularly on how a speech works on an audience. However, Neo-Aristotelian criticism
does little to explain the way in which rhetoric works to shape an audience’s perception
of reality. Presidential rhetoric takes much of its power from the fact that it has the ability
to assist listeners in framing certain issues. Here, “framing” refers to the context by which
an audience is asked to interpret and understand an event (Goffman, 1974). It describes
how a speaker chooses to depict reality in the hopes, generally, of controlling the choices
a listener can make. A Narrative analysis allows me to examine appeals to obligation
with this outcome in mind.
Kenneth Burke’s notion of “dramatism” is one approach for engaging public
narratives. Dramatism contains within it the idea that we can understand a speaker’s
motives by closely examining the rhetoric by which they speak. Thus word choice is
extremely dominant in this view. The way a speaker decides to tell a story—to frame the
events, characters, and setting—is of the utmost importance to the dramatistic critic.
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Burke believed that language was powerful. He felt that language was reality, and that a
critic could examine how a speaker talked and, from that, draw conclusions about how
that speaker viewed the external world (Burgchardt, 2000b).
To begin to understand how a person views the world, you first need tools for
criticizing their language. Burke responds to this need with the Dramatistic Pentad. The
pentad is a list of five elements, five categories by which one can separate out the main
elements of a story to begin uncovering a speaker’s worldview. The five elements are
Agent, Act, Scene, Purpose, and Agency—the who, what, where, why, and how of
journalism (Burke, 1946). These elements represent all of the critical elements of a story
and, as Burke posits, life itself. The power to understand motives and worldview via
dramatism comes from the ability to look closely at any given work (a speech for
instance) and not only locate these five terms, but also see how the terms merge together
and begin to blur.
After careful consideration, the critic should be able to see one term emerge as the
organizing element by which the others are given meaning. For example, a woman could
be late for work and explain her reasons to her boss. Told in story form, maybe she (the
agent) was driving (the act) in her car (the agency) to work (the purpose) but it was
raining so hard (the scene) that she was forced to pull over. After viewing this story
critically, one would start to see that the scene is the organizing term. Every element of
the story is out of her control. She is simply a byproduct of her environment (the scene).
Everything else in the story is organized by that scene; she is simply in motion, reacting
to what is happening to her. Burke would claim that this story indicates that she sees the
world as a “materialist.” He would identify the outside world as her “primary motivating
factor” (p. 277).
Taking Burke’s ideas a step further, David Ling (2000) suggests that not only
does language shape and reflect a person’s reality, but that a skilled rhetor can use
language in such a way as to manipulate a listener’s interpretation of events. Ling
demonstrates this belief by critiquing a speech delivered by Senator Edward Kennedy
regarding the events that took place at Chappaquiddick. Days before the speech, Kennedy
had driven his car off a bridge and into lake. A young woman passenger died in the
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accident, and Kennedy failed to report what had happened until the next morning. On
July 25, 1969, he addressed the people of Massachusetts.
Criticizing Kennedy’s oration, Ling notes that when the elements of Burke’s
pentad are applied, one begins to notice that the scene becomes the term by which the
others are organized. In other words, Kennedy tells his story in a way that emphasizes the
environment around him as the controlling factor. In this way, Kennedy attempts to
organize events for the audience in order to persuade them that he was simply a product
of his environment. To go back to Burke’s terminology, even the actor (Kennedy
himself) is positioned as being dependent on events out of Kennedy’s control. By doing
this, Ling believes that Kennedy was trying to garner sympathy and, by doing so,
persuade his audience to absolve him of any responsibility for what happened. Despite
his verbally taking sole responsibility for events, his underlying message is one of lack of
control. Much like in the example of the woman arriving late to work, the emphasis of
scene dominance in a narrative is very similar to making an excuse. The purpose of the
scene dominant excuse is to subtly say that things were not really your fault, that you had
no choice but to act the way you did and that you therefore should not be subjected to any
blame or punishment. One can see, then, how expertly crafting an apology/excuse speech
around the notion of scene dominance can shift the audience’s perception and cause their
judgments to become less harsh.
The idea of promoting a policy that is an obligation frames the issue in this scene
dominant light. In a way, this can be viewed as the speaker giving a preemptive excuse
for future failure. To say we are obligated to act is to say we can act in no other way; and
logic tells us that we should not blame someone for acting without the ability to act
otherwise.
Interestingly, further exploration of appeals to obligation through the narrative
lens yields one other function of obligation rhetoric, one that seemingly flies in the face
of the previous notion. The narrative critic believes that humans understand and make
sense of the world through their use of stories (Sillars & Gronbeck, 2001). Common story
types and themes are so engrained in people’s minds by their repetition in society that we
literally frame reality based on these archetypes. It is almost cyclical in that society
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creates stories which become basic elements of our culture whereby these stories wind up
shaping society and so on and so forth.
The power of the narrative, in terms of persuasion, is found in the speaker’s
ability to capitalize on his or her knowledge of common story types as held by their
intended audience. Describing events in such a way as to make them conform to the
listener’s already accepted views of reality—i.e. their already existing narratives—can
have a positive impact on whether the audience is receptive to a speaker’s message. On
the other hand, failure to meet audience expectations by using inappropriate poorly
executed narratives can be very harmful to a speaker’s goals. For example, in an essay on
Reagan, William F. Lewis (2000) uses narrative criticism to help explain why Reagan’s
personal popularity was able to far outweigh the popularity of his policies. He concludes
that Reagan’s ability to tell a satisfying story that met the desires and expectations of his
audience was the key to his attractiveness (Lewis 2000). Compare that with the criticism
of Nixon’s November 3, 1969 “Vietnamization” speech in which Stelzner (1971)
concludes that the policy speech was a major failure in that it fell short of conforming to
the common narrative type it resembled. Nixon did not provided a satisfactory “quest
story” and, because of that, his version of the ‘facts’ did not fit into the reality of his
audience—thus his speech was unsuccessful. Narrative criticism says, then, that
arguments are most easily accepted when they fit into those preexisting narratives and
that they are more likely to be rejected if they do not.
Looking at narratives that involve obligation yields the existence of an “obligated
hero” storyline in American culture. To see this, it helps to look at very specific cultural
artifacts that support this assertion. First, some of the country’s most popular movies
contain themes of the obligated hero. Movies like The Matrix, Harry Potter, and even
Star Wars exemplify this. These movies, whether by prophesy or some other force,
predict what lies ahead for their hero (to some degree). All that is actually left is that the
hero does what the world around them has already decided they must do. Their lives are a
matter of destiny. Yet in the end, when all is said and done, they are still seen as being
heroic and praiseworthy.
As a second example, consider the Bible, specifically the New Testament. As I
have already discussed, our culture is very much based in some way on Biblical
35
teachings. Whether through direct exposure to scripture or simply via everyday contact
with allusions to the Bible, one is almost undoubtedly familiar with Biblical storytelling.
To the list of common narratives which allow for an obligated hero, I would go as far as
to add the story of Jesus. Consider that Jesus is sent to Earth to eventually suffer and die
for humanity. Everything is already planned out. Essentially, then, Jesus is simply a
product of his environment. He has a fate, he has a destiny, and in the end he does what
he has no choice but to do. He is, however, considered to be heroic for what he did. The
story of Jesus, then, can be taken as one of American culture’s fundamental narratives
whereby an obligated actor becomes a hero.
For a president, this means obligation rhetoric can put him in a position of limited
future liability, while still leaving room for future praise if actions are successful. These
seemingly contradictory findings can be rectified, at least to a degree, by considering
obligation once more with the tools of dramatism.
The reason an obligated actor can be praised in success but not completely
blamed in failure lies in the emphasis the former can have agency. Scene dominance
continues to constrict the entire situation, thereby controlling for liability. However, in
the latter case, the actor can be seen as heroic because they are the one who recognized
the existing obligation. In other words, they lack liability because they did not create the
obligation, but they can be praised because they chose to follow it. For a president
speaking in terms of obligation, this creates almost a rhetorical win/win situation, if they
use it to its fullest advantage.
Summary
In this chapter, I have defined what is meant by “obligation rhetoric” and
explained my reasons for choosing specific speeches for inclusion in my critical analysis.
I then provided a list of speeches that directly impacted the results of this study.
Furthermore, this chapter created a broad understanding of how obligation rhetoric works
by examining appeals to obligation from a Neo-Aristotelian perspective as well as from a
Narrative analysis perspective.
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The next chapter is an analysis of President George W. Bush’s pre-Iraq war
rhetoric. The goal is to first identify what types of appeals to obligation Bush uses.
Following that I will apply the findings of this section to Bush’s rhetorical situation so
that I might make judgments regarding the appropriateness and the effectiveness of his
rhetoric.
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CHAPTER FOUR: ANALYSIS
In this chapter, I analyze the selected speeches of President Bush. Specifically,
this chapter answers the three research questions posed earlier in the thesis. To
accomplish this, I begin by describing and characterizing the appeals to obligation found
in Bush’s speeches. Next, I discuss how the rhetoric of obligation serves Bush’s
credibility. Finally, I explain the ways in which obligation helps Bush frame the Iraq
crisis as to make it most beneficial to his rhetorical needs.
President Bush’s Obligation Rhetoric
Examining President Bush’s Iraq war speeches with an eye for obligation rhetoric
uncovers the existence of three general styles of appeals: 1) explicit references to
obligation, 2) implicit references to obligation, and 3) underlying tones of obligation. In
this section I will analyze five of Bush’s speeches so that I might highlight the use of
these appeals. In order to appreciate the speeches contextually, I will discuss each in
chronological order.
Bush’s Radio Address: October 5, 2002
On October 5, 2002, President Bush delivered one of his weekly radio addresses.
Two weeks prior, on September 19, Bush had presented Congress with a draft of the
resolution that would authorize him to use force against Hussein if it became necessary.
The purpose of this radio address, then, was for Bush to explain the Iraqi threat to the
American people so that he might motivate them to contact their Congressional
representative and voice their support for the resolution. Even here, in one of Bush’s
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earliest, post-September 11, Iraq speeches, we see him laying the foundation of American
obligation.
In terms of explicit appeals to obligation, there is a certain appreciable subtlety to
their use. For example, half-way through the short speech, Bush declares that Saddam
Hussein “must be stopped” and that the United Nations’ resolutions “must be enforced.”
He also frames future military action as obligation when he states that, “should force be
required to bring Saddam to account, the United States will work with other nations to
help the Iraqi people rebuild and form a just government.” He goes on to add that the
Iraqis “will be the first to benefit when the world’s demands are met.”
Each of these examples constitutes an explicit appeal to obligation. Obligation
emerges in the use of language that demarcates necessity, requirement, and demand. The
fact that Hussein “must” be stopped and that the resolutions “must” be enforced, for
example, paints American obligation as the duty to meet these necessities. Likewise, the
use of force being “required” and America’s submission to the “demands of the world”
also constitute explicit appeals to obligation. The explicit use of appeals in this instance
also reveals a central element in the rhetoric of obligation; that obligation extends beyond
the speaker to the audience. Public consent stands in as one way to fulfill the obligation.
Similarly, analyzing the speech with an eye for implicit references to obligation
reveals the existence of numerous examples. When Bush says that “Saddam Hussein has
used these weapons of death against innocent Iraqi people, and we have every reason to
believe he will use them again,” he leaves it to his audience to infer America’s duty to
prevent that from occurring. Similarly, when Bush exclaims that “we cannot leave the
future of peace and the security of America in the hands of this cruel and dangerous
man,” he implies that America has the capacity to prevent this from happening, and
assuming the duty to do so is, again, left to the listener. Obligation to act in a timely
manner is also implied when Bush tells his audience that “the danger to America from the
Iraqi regime is grave and growing.”
An obligation to fight is further suggested in Bush’s characterization of the
impending war as unwelcome yet unavoidable. Saying that “the United States does not
desire military conflict” or that “the use of force may become unavoidable” suggests an
obligation to fight as a last resort. In this way, implicit references to obligation emerge as
39
the President deploys hypothetical narratives which invoke long-held American values.
In this case, the conscientious decision-making called for by rational liberal thought
reigns as the motivation for making military action a necessity.
The final style of obligation appeal is the general tone of obligation found
throughout Bush’s speeches. The best way to understand this type of appeal is to think of
it as a highly enthymatic argument for the need to take action. In general, this can be
found whenever Bush vividly portrays the danger posed by Saddam Hussein while
intermittently stressing America’s ability to intervene and stop the worst from happening.
While explicit and implicit references to obligation undoubtedly contribute to the overall
tone of obligation, this category is set aside for those passages that do not include either
of these succinct and identifiable appeals to obligation.
Because Bush’s speech contains the implication that America has the ability to
intervene, as identified earlier, one section of the text can be said to contain this tone of
obligation. In it, Bush tells his audience that Hussein’s regime is “guilty of beginning two
wars. It has a horrible history of striking without warning…. [It] has stockpiled biological
and chemical weapons, and is rebuilding the facilities used to make more of those
weapons.” Again, the tone of obligation is facilitated by the premise that America is able
to prevent disaster from occurring. The premises of Bush’s enthymeme—that Saddam
Hussein is dangerous and must be stopped and that America is capable of stopping him—
leads invariably to the conclusion that America’s duty is to stop Hussein. This tone of
obligation is made even clearer in some of Bush’s later speeches.
Bush’s Speech at the Cincinnati Museum Center: October 7, 2002
A mere two days after President Bush’s radio address on Iraq, he again discussed
the dangers posed by Hussein. This much longer address was delivered in front of fivehundred invited guests at the Cincinnati Museum Center and was televised. Prior to the
speech, White House aides promoted the event by explaining that its purpose would be to
address the concerns of war critics and of the American people—especially concerns
regarding issues of timing (McQuillan & Kiely, 2002). At the time of the speech,
40
Congress was still preparing for the vote that would decide whether to authorize the
president’s use of force against Hussein.
The obligation rhetoric in this speech is consistent with that of the president’s
radio address, although the appeals are becoming bolder. Here, we begin to see Bush
employing more explicit references to obligation including the use of more overt
terminology. For example, Bush says that “understanding the threats of our time,
knowing the designs and deceptions of the Iraqi regime, we have every reason to assume
the worst, and we have an urgent duty to prevent the worst from occurring.” He also calls
on Congress to authorize his discretionary use of force by imploring them to “consider
the facts, and their duties.” Interestingly, Bush also alludes to obligation on the part of
Saddam Hussein’s regime, saying that they have invited conflict by “violating all of
[their] obligations.” This reminds Bush’s audience that an obligation, while representing
a constraining force in terms of available actions, can nonetheless be ignored completely.
The fact that Hussein “must disarm” coupled with the idea that America will be forced to
attack his county if he fails to oblige brings to the forefront the thought that failure to
conform to obligation can yield dire consequences. Furthermore, this element of
“agency”—the freedom to choose to follow obligation—serves Bush’s rhetorical needs in
a very specific way. I address this issue in more detail later in the chapter. For now,
Bush’s address at the Cincinnati Museum extends the markers of explicit appeals to
obligation to include the use of direct terms such as “obligation” and “duty” in addition to
specific calls for action “demanded” or “required” by the political context.
Yet these same terms also appear in the text. Referring to “terror cells and outlaw
regimes,” Bush exclaims “our security requires that we confront both.” Later in the
speech, Bush mentions the need for regime change in Iraq and explains that he “hope[s]
this will not require military action, but it may.” In other words, while he himself would
prefer to avoid war, America may find herself obliged to engage in battle. Finally, near
the end of his speech, after discussing how the Iraq threat is far clearer than that posed by
al Qaeda before 9/11, Bush concludes that “Saddam Hussein’s actions have put us on
notice, and there is no refuge from our responsibilities.” Interestingly, in this example, as
well as others, Saddam Hussein is free to act in any way he desires. What he chooses to
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do, however, confines Bush’s available reactions and positions Bush’s desires as
secondary to the obligations inherent in the newly constructed narrative.
Scouring Bush’s speech for implicit appeals to obligation again reveals their
numbers to be more substantial than their explicit counterparts. Recalling the attacks of
September 11, Bush says “we resolved then, and we are resolved today, to confront every
threat, from any source, that could bring sudden terror and suffering to America.” In this
way, America is obligated by her own resolve to remove Hussein from power. Bush also
highlights his personal obligation when he reminds his audience that “when I spoke to
Congress more than a year ago, I said that those who harbor terrorists are as guilty as the
terrorists themselves.” The implication here is that Bush is obligated to act because of the
virtues of his character—in other words, to keep a promise. In similar fashion, Bush
explains that failure to confront Hussein would be tantamount to the United States
resigning “itself to a future of fear” and that “that is not the America I know, that is not
the America I serve.” Of course servitude does not necessarily invoke obligation.
Involuntary servitude, for example, is forced, not obliged. The rhetoric of obligation
invokes servitude as choice, and that choice is needed in order to complete Bush’s
narrative.
Finally, this speech, more so than the last, contains several passages which I
identify as possessing the tone of obligation. The key to this tone lies in the fact that Bush
regularly suggests the United States has the capacity to prevent Hussein from acting. For
example, Bush refers to Iraq’s ability to build a nuclear weapon in less than a year,
adding that “if we allow that to happen, a terrible line to be crossed.” The fact that
America has the power to “allow” and, by extension, prevent Hussein from building a
nuclear weapon allows the tone of obligation to materialize. In another example, Bush
announces that the “United States military is capable of confronting both [terror cells and
outlaw regimes].” Finally, Bush again supplies the key premise when he states that “this
nation has never permitted the brutal and lawless to set history’s course.”
These premises allow many passages of Bush’s speech to be seen as revealing
national obligation. One typical passage is observed here:
We know that Iraq and the al Qaeda terrorist network share a common enemy—
the United States of America. We know that Iraq and al Qaeda have had high-
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level contacts that go back a decade. Some al Qaeda leaders who fled Afghanistan
went to Iraq. These include one very senior al Qaeda leader who received medical
treatment in Baghdad this year, and who has been associated with planning for
chemical and biological attacks. We've learned that Iraq has trained al Qaeda
members in bomb-making and poisons and deadly gases. And we know that after
September the 11th, Saddam Hussein's regime gleefully celebrated the terrorist
attacks on America. Iraq could decide on any given day to provide a biological or
chemical weapon to a terrorist group or individual terrorists. Alliance with
terrorists could allow the Iraqi regime to attack America without leaving any
fingerprints.
Specifically, the section works because Bush provides evidence that action must be taken.
He also tells his audience that America is capable of taking said action and, therefore,
America is obliged act.
This tone of obligation is seen in several other sections of the speech, each
functioning in a similar fashion. For example, Bush states that:
Iraq possesses ballistic missiles with a likely range of hundreds of miles—far
enough to strike Saudi Arabia, Israel, Turkey, and other nations—in a region
where more than 135,000 American civilians and service members live and work.
We've also discovered through intelligence that Iraq has a growing fleet of
manned and unmanned aerial vehicles that could be used to disperse chemical or
biological weapons across broad areas. We're concerned that Iraq is exploring
ways of using these UAVS for missions targeting the United States. And, of
course, sophisticated delivery systems aren't required for a chemical or biological
attack; all that might be required are a small container and one terrorist or Iraqi
intelligence operative to deliver it.
Again, Bush describes the threat and its imminence—the implication is that it is
America’s duty to do whatever she can to stop the inevitable from occurring. This tone of
obligation is even more pervasive in Bush’s next speech, his 2003 State of the Union
Address.
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Bush’s State of the Unions Address: January 28, 2003
Clearly the State of the Union Address is broad in terms of the issues it covers.
For this thesis, I am only analyzing the portion of Bush’s address that deals directly with
Iraq and Saddam Hussein. As indication of the importance levied on the Iraq issue, it
should be mentioned that nearly half of Bush’s speech (specifically the latter half) deals
directly with the need for action in Iraq.
Regarding Bush’s use of explicit appeals to obligation, this speech contains more
than in the previous two speeches. Bush begins by announcing that “this threat is new;
America’s duty is familiar.” This is as clear a reference to national obligation as can be.
Following this, Bush explains how America has been “called to defend the safety of our
people” and that “we accept this responsibility.”
Two paragraphs later, Bush frames his future policy by saying “whatever action is
required, whatever action is necessary, I will defend the freedom and security of the
American people.” In the next sentence, he goes on to say that “different threats require
different strategies.” Finally, near the end of the address, Bush says “we go forward with
confidence, because this call of history has come to the right country,” and “Americans
are a resolute people who have risen to every test of our time.” The “call of history” in
this case, is what ties both Bush and his audience to the necessary act of military efforts
against Hussein. The obligation extends across generations in the “tests of time”
Americans must face.
Consistent with Bush’s previous speeches, we also find ample use of implicit
appeals to obligation. When Bush says, “this nation fights reluctantly because we know
the cost,” he is implying that America will only go to war if we have no choice, if we are
obliged to do so. He reinforces this idea by using the phrase “if war is forced on us” twice
in the following paragraph. Bush ends this speech by telling his audience that:
We Americans have faith in ourselves, but not in ourselves alone. We do not
know—we do not claim to know all the ways of Providence, yet we can trust in
them, placing our confidence in the loving God behind all of life, and all of
history. May he Guide us now.
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If this does not constitute an implicit appeal to obligation in and of itself, it certainly
works within the context of obligation to suggest that Bush’s duty is bestowed upon him
from a higher power. Evoking the God of “history” as the source of obligation only
furthers Bush’s argument that U.S. involvement in Iraq is unavoidable. Likewise, this
move calls forth the reference to spirituality and religion that invest obligation with
rhetorical power.
As mentioned previously, this speech contains a very prominent tone of obligation
throughout its “Iraq section.” As with Bush’s previous speeches, this tone is made
possible because Bush is careful to supply the necessary premise—i.e. that America is
capable of intervening for the benefit of the world. Here, the premise is found when Bush
says “we will not permit the triumph of violence in the affairs of men” and when he says
“our nation and the world must learn the lessons of the Korean Peninsula and not allow
an even greater threat to rise up in Iraq.” Finally, Bush uncompromisingly states that “this
nation and all our friends are all that stand between a world at peace, and a world of
chaos and constant alarm.” Cleary, Bush makes certain to explain that America has the
capacity to protect the world from the dangers posed by Hussein.
And, as in his other speeches, Bush also supplies the equally necessary premise
whereby he demonstrates that Saddam Hussein must be stopped. For example, he claims
that:
Today, the gravest danger in the war on terror, the gravest danger facing America
and the world, is outlaw regimes that seek and possess nuclear, chemical, and
biological weapons. These regimes could use such weapons for blackmail, terror,
and mass murder. They could also give or sell those weapons to terrorist allies,
who would use them without the least hesitation.
Saddam Hussein’s regime, of course, is representative of these “outlaw regimes.”
Similarly, Bush dedicates a considerable amount of time detailing the weapons in
Saddam’s arsenal. These include as much as “25,000 liters of anthrax....38,000 liters of
botulinum toxin….500 tons of sarin, mustard, and VX nerve agent….and 30,000
munitions capable of delivering chemical agents.” All of these figures are presented to
suggest that Hussein is a threat to the world and, therefore, America has a duty to use her
available means to eliminate that threat.
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Bush’s Speech: March 17, 2003
In this speech, given days before the start of battle, Bush famously declares that
Hussein has 48 hours to leave Iraq and avert war. Despite this showing of bravado,
Bush’s speech is still filled with references to duty and obligation. Again, beginning with
his explicit appeals, we see that Bush says “the United States of America has the
sovereign authority to use force in assuring its own national security. That duty falls to
me, as Commander-in-Chief, by the oath I have sworn, by the oath I will keep.” Here
obligation is invoked as a function of democratic office. He also states that “the cause of
peace requires all free nations to recognize new and undeniable realities” and “the
security of the world requires disarming Saddam Hussein now.” Furthermore, Bush ends
this important speech by saying “free nations have a duty to defend our people by uniting
against the violent. And tonight, as we have done before, America and our allies accept
that responsibility.” Not only is that a clear reference to obligation, but it is also another
acknowledgement of the ability to accept or reject obligation. This is an important
clarification, and one that will later allow Bush to receive praise for his proposed actions
in Iraq.
Moving now to the implicit appeals to obligation, this appears to be the first time
where implicit appeals do not vastly outnumber the explicit appeals. The speech is,
admittedly, short, but the seeming emphasis on explicit appeals over implicit appeals here
suggests that Bush wants to make clear that an obligation exists in these days before the
war will begin. In other words, this tactic strikes me as a last ditch effort to frame the war
in this beneficial way.
Still, implicit appeals do show up in the speech. Bush assures his audience that
“should Saddam Hussein choose confrontation, the American people can know that every
measure has been taken to avoid war.” Again, we see war posited as a last resort to meet
an implied duty, but we also get a reminder of the fact that Hussein had the power to
choose the war while America is constrained to respond in accordance with an obligation.
A similar implicit appeal to obligation is evident when Bush says “we are acting
because the risks of inaction would be far greater.” He backs that statement by adding
46
“we choose to meet that threat now”—another indication of the power to choose to act in
accordance with obligation. Finally, Bush implies obligation when he claims that military
action is necessary to “enforce the just demands of the world.” Again, the duty to act
comes from outside forces, but the choice to obey duty is attributable to Bush.
Finally, there are very few passages in this speech which clearly possess only the
tone of obligation. One example, though, appears early in the speech when Bush makes
this statement:
The danger is clear: using chemical, biological or, one day, nuclear weapons,
obtained with the help of Iraq, the terrorists could fulfill their stated ambitions and
kill thousands or hundreds of thousands of innocent people in our county, or any
other.
Bush does not provide what I previously called the key premise in this speech.
Specifically, he never describes America’s ability to stop this from happening. But in the
context of this speech, this premise might not be needed. The heart of this address is that
America will invade Iraq if Saddam does not comply with Bush’s demands immediately.
Perhaps this is implication enough of America’s ability to intervene.
Bush’s Address to the Nation: March 19, 2003
Bush’s final public address before the American-led invasion of Iraq only lasted
four minutes. In it, he announces the start of strategic air strikes and dedicates a
substantial portion of his time to praising the troops which are about to head into battle.
Despite this, Bush is careful to begin and end the speech by emphasizing the obligation
which his commands seek to fulfill.
Early in the speech, Bush makes an explicit appeal to that obligation, stating that
“every nation in this coalition has chosen to bear the duty and share the honor of serving
in common defense.” We see the themes of Bush’s previous obligation rhetoric
synthesized and abridged here, but the key components are still apparent. First, there is
the direct reference to obligation—presented here, as in other speeches, under the veil of
duty. On top of that, Bush includes a mention of the choice to obey that obligation. He
supplements this by describing the honor associated with simply accepting obligation.
47
Regardless of the outcome, he is suggesting, there is heroism in submitting to that higher
calling.
Bush ends the speech with implicit references to obligation. These are nothing
new, especially as compared with his previous speeches. He mentions that “our nation
enters this conflict reluctantly” and he explains that “we meet [this] threat now, with our
[armed forces]…so that we do not have to meet it later with armies of fire fighters,
police, and doctors on the streets of our cities.” Again, Bush is emphasizing the “last
resort” property of fulfilling obligation and reminding his audience that we are obliged to
act now so that we can prevent the worst from occurring. He ends by cementing this idea
of action required by a higher power by saying “now that conflict has come, the only way
to limit its duration is to apply decisive force.” Specifically, he is being careful to frame
the war as outside of his control and, by doing so, he frames his decision as necessary to
fulfill his duty to America, and America’s duty to the world.
The shortness of the speech and the fact that a handful of explicit and implicit
appeals to obligation are used means that no passage strikes me as purely possessing the
tone of obligation. This suggests once more that Bush is trying to be clear and direct as he
frames the war in Iraq as a duty one last time before the battle begins.
Appeals to Obligation and Bush’s Credibility
Understanding what is meant by Bush’s “appeals to obligation,” we can now
address the questions of what rhetorical strategies these appeals accomplished for
President Bush and how these appeals to obligation helped Bush meet his rhetorical
goals.
An article written by Victor Marshall and republished in the Pittsburg PostGazette on January 6, 2003, effectively expresses the importance of Bush’s credibility in
regard to the situation with Iraq:
The Bush administration's confrontation with Iraq is as much a contest of
credibility as it is of military force. Washington claims that Baghdad harbors
ambitions of aggression, continues to develop and stockpile weapons of mass
48
destruction and maintains ties to Al Qaeda. Lacking solid evidence, the public
must weigh Saddam Hussein's penchant for lies against the administration's own
record.
To this, Marshall adds the sardonic “[It’s] not an easy choice.”
Clearly Bush’s credibility was critical to his finding support for the invasion of
Iraq. Marshall’s observation that the choice was not an easy one, while perhaps intended
mockingly, exemplifies one of Bush’s biggest problems in the time leading up to Iraq.
For several distinct reasons, Bush lacked the solid credibility needed to win over the
minds of his constituents. The two most prominent reasons were concern over his
motives for war and his seeming push for war with no regard for possible alternatives.
The purpose behind Bush’s prewar speeches, then, was not simply to lay out a
foundation of objective facts in the hopes that his audience would reach a similar
conclusion about the need to invade Iraq. Instead, it was more important that Bush use
these speeches to boost his perceived credibility and, in that way, increase his chances of
receiving backing for the war. In executing this strategy, Bush deployed the rhetoric of
obligation. By doing so, he effectively negotiated the complex rhetorical situation which
threatened both his leadership and his global agenda.
First, Bush’s credibility was lacking because doubt existed as to his real motives
for pushing the invasion of Iraq. A letter to the editor published in the St. Louis PostDispatch on December 28, 2002, exemplified the mounting public concern. In it, the
writer challenged the administration’s reliance on foreign oil and the potential threat to
U.S. credibility in the world (“Letters to the Editor,” 2002). Anti-war protestors, with
their common cry of “no blood for oil,” clearly subscribed to this point of view
(“Germany Braces,” 2002). Even when the Bush administration attempted to explain the
necessity of war, their attempts were met with hostile criticism:
America’s credibility is taking a beating [as] Washington keeps shifting the
reasons for “regime change” in Baghdad: Saddam’s supposed buildup of
biological, chemical and, especially, nuclear weapons. His unproven links to
terrorists. His proven dodging of United Nations weapons inspectors. The failure
of inspectors to reach conclusions more acceptable to Washington. The danger
Saddam poses to his own people and to [other] nations…. The American case for
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war has been so imprecise, so propagandistic that it has convinced no allies in the
Middle East…or Europe (Siddiqui, 2002).
Perhaps more worrisome were the perceptions that Bush was going to war
primarily for personal reasons. This view was only furthered when reports surfaced
stating that Bush had poked his head in on a meeting between Republican and
Democratic Senators and Condoleezza Rice. According to the reports, he was
uninterested in debating what actions to take regarding Saddam. He instead became
“notably animated” and referred to Hussein using “a vulgar epithet” before announcing in
a matter-of-fact way that, “we’re taking him out” (Eisenberg, 2002). On top of that,
doubts about Bush’s personal motives were again made salient when Bush referred to
Hussein as “the guy who tried to kill my dad” (King, 2002).
Worries that Bush and the Bush administration were unwilling to consider
alternatives to war further weakened Bush’s credibility. Russian President Vladimir
Putin, while speaking to British Prime Minister Tony Blair, went on record as saying he
had “deep doubts that there are grounds for the use of force in connection with Iraq” (“No
Grounds,” 2002). Canadian Foreign Affairs Minister Bill Graham echoed this sentiment
(Swift, 2002).
This international belief that the U.S. was an “expansionist bully” (Keller, 2002)
on “unilateralist overdrive” (“Analysis: Why,” 2002; Dougherty 2002) exemplifies the
overall sentiment. Many even saw Bush’s appeals to the United Nations as “laughably
insincere” (Keller, 2002).
Further fanning the fear that the United States would consider no alternative to
war was Dick Cheney’s statement in September, 2002. In it, he explained that the United
States’ goal in Iraq was to “topple” Saddam Hussein. As Walker writes:
The bottom-line message was the first admission from a senior Republican
administration official that the United States is going to war with Iraq regardless
of any outcome this week at the United Nations, and regardless of international
opinion (2002b).
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Clearly this announcement would do nothing to quell the fears of those like independent
journalist Khalid Amayrec who had declared Bush and his administration “conspicuously
ignorant of the situation in the Middle East” (Beaumont, 2002).
These reasons for Bush’s lack of credibility leading up to the war in Iraq were
well known and widely shared. His use of obligation rhetoric, I maintain, was designed to
combat these concerns in the minds of his audience. This is attributable to the arguments
implied by appeals to obligation.
First, obligation addresses the shortcomings of Bush’s credibility with regard to
his motives for war. Most importantly, appealing to obligation distances Bush from the
action he is proposing. When Bush says, in his 2003 State of the Union Address, that “we
are called to defend the safety of our people, and the hopes of all mankind, and we accept
this responsibility” he is appealing to a national duty to act. In doing so, he effectively
argues that military action is called for by forces beyond his control. Questions and
concerns over his personal motivation are sidestepped by Bush’s argument from
obligation.
Similarly, when Bush says in his March 17, 2003, speech that “we are acting now
because the risks of inaction would be far greater” he is arguing that military intervention
is required for the sake of future peace. In other words, we have an obligation to make
things right while we still can. Again, the argument is that we have no choice but to act.
In other words, even if Bush is acting for personal reasons, even if his motivation is not
sound, we still have to act because we have no choice.
The rhetoric of obligation also addresses the credibility Bush loses because he is
perceived as unwilling to consider possible alternatives to war. Framing a policy as
obligation implies that other policies have been considered and rejected as they do not
fulfill that obligation. In Bush’s March 19, 2003, address, he says that “our nation enters
this conflict reluctantly.” These words echo an earlier pronouncement from his 2003
State of the Union Address where he says “this nation fights reluctantly, because we
know the cost and we dread the days of mourning that always come.” In these cases, the
appeal to obligation lies in the fact that we are going to war because we have to, not
because we choose to. This implies Bush has dismissed alternatives, but it also implies
going to war as a last resort—thus portraying Bush as possessing the virtue of
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temperance. By doing so, the rhetoric of obligation worked to restore and sustain Bush’s
credibility in the Iraq crisis.
An article entitled “But Which War” by E. J. Dionne (2003) lends support to this
argument. The article, largely anti-war, nonetheless contains this paragraph:
On Tuesday, [President Bush] put aside the John Wayne act—one hopes for good.
“This nation fights reluctantly,” the president declared in the most effective
portion of the address, “because we know the cost and we dread the days of
mourning that always come.”
Without making too much of this report, it nevertheless shows that Bush’s appeals
resonated with those who struggled to define the appropriate conditions for war.
Bush’s use of appeals to obligation builds his credibility in one more general way
as well. References to obligation are often perceived as evidence of a speaker’s spiritual
beliefs because they seemingly imply a thoughtful higher power. Because Bush’s
audience is religious, to some degree, they will likely perceive him as sharing similarity
with them. The perception of similarity between audience and speaker greatly enhances
the audience’s view of speaker credibility.
Bush takes advantage of this tendency by often placing his appeals to obligation
in an explicitly religious context. For example, in his 2003 State of the Union Address,
while discussing America’s obligation to free the Iraqi people, Bush adds the line “the
liberty we prize is not America’s gift to the world; it is God’s gift to humanity.” He goes
on to say that “we Americans have faith in ourselves, but not in ourselves alone…. We do
not claim to know all the ways of Providence, yet we trust in them, placing our
confidence in the loving God behind all of life and all of history.” Juxtaposing our
obligation to act with our trust in God implies very strongly a connection between the
two. And this recognition of and submission to a higher power is the final way obligation
rhetoric enhances Bush’s perceived credibility in the eyes of his audience.
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Appeals to Obligation and Crisis Management
A lack of credibility was not the only complication facing President Bush as he
pursued the war in Iraq. Another problem Bush needed to address dealt with the
repercussions of war in general. The fact that the invasion of Iraq was seen as eminent
long before it actually occurred gave detractors time to explain the potential problems a
war with Iraq might incur. This affected Bush’s rhetorical situation by making it more
likely that he would be blamed for any casualties of the war. As we will see, Bush’s
obligation rhetoric addresses this difficulty by re-contextualizing the invasion so as to
limit the president’s future liability.
Thousands of civilian deaths by starvation, waterborne diseases and bombing;
increased likelihood of the use of weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear
weapons, by our country, Israel, Iraq or other countries drawn into a regional
conflict; increased Islamic fundamentalism, anti-Americanism and terrorist
repercussions worldwide; civil war in Iraq, exacerbating Christian-Muslim and
inter-tribal tensions and causing the deaths of up to 20,000 civilians. The death of
innocent civilians, by U.S. bombs and in our name, will destroy our soul as a
nation and continue the cycle of violence. These are people like ourselves. Our
leaders must find ways to settle differences other than by obsolete violence (“Iraq;
We Must Recognize,” 2002).
These words were written by Sister Marion Verhaalen of Milwaukee. They explain part
of the laundry list of concerns facing President Bush as he pushed toward war.
Reservations that Iraq could become this generation’s Vietnam (Bash, 2002) and doubts
that America could sustain any successful policy in the Middle East (Elliot, 2002 &
Friedman, 2002) were also prevalent. Capping this sentiment was the feeling that Bush
himself would be the focus of blame were any of these fears realized. The Democratic
Representative from Indiana, Rep. Lee Hamilton, expressed this point of view, saying “if
he does not prevail, his prestige suffers” (Johnson, Kuhnhenn, & Edna, 2002).
Knowing that Bush was susceptible to the failings of any Iraq policy allows the
critic to see a secondary objective that his obligation rhetoric met. Bush’s appeals to
53
obligation framed the issue of Iraq in a way that positioned him away from the arena of
blame. If something were to go wrong in Iraq—and the chances of something failing
seemed eminent—Bush would bear limited liability. .
Obligation rhetoric in Bush’s pre-Iraq speeches was effective because it framed
the crisis in Iraq, and Bush’s proposed response, as existing outside of Bush’s control.
This happens because appealing to obligation implies a situation constricted by scene
dominance. Stemming from what David Ling (2000) said about scene dominance in
excuse making, it becomes clear how obligation may help to avoid future blame if Bush’s
policy fails.
Obligation is the ultimate scene dominance. Use of obligation reduces the agent to
the level of messenger. By structuring the way listeners interpret reality, talk of
obligation helps to ensure that a speaker suffers the least possible repercussions for any
harm their actions might cause. For example, in Bush’s radio address on October 5, 2002,
he says that “the values of our country lead us to confront this gathering threat.” In other
words, America is obliged to act in accordance with the collective values shared by her
citizens. Notice the general positioning this creates. Bush is not asking us to back his
ideas. He is simply pointing out an existing obligation that we must fulfill. The same is
evident in the quotation I cited earlier where Bush says that “that duty falls to me, as
Commander-in-Chief, by the oath I have sworn….” Again, Bush locates himself in a
position of scene dominance whereby he cannot act in any other way. The implication
down the road, of course, is that no one can be blamed for acting if they had no choice
but to act.
Appeals to Obligation and the “Obligated Hero”
Turning back to the quotation by Rep. Lee Hamilton of Indiana, he claimed that if
Bush did not prevail in Iraq, his “prestige” would suffer (Johnson, 2002). This comment,
while likely true, fails to address the flip side of Bush’s situation. The upcoming war
certainly has the potential to harm Bush in the ways discussed above. Importantly,
though, it also has the power to benefit him substantially. President George H. W. Bush,
54
for example, saw his popularity rise to nearly ninety-percent following his success in the
first Gulf War (Toner, 1991). In much the same way, George W. Bush might expect
similar gains if his military policy were to achieve its goals in Iraq.
The extent to which this advantage is realized depends again on the framing of the
situation. A problem seems to exist, however, when the results of the previous section are
considered. If Bush is framing the war in Iraq as beyond his control, as dominated by
scene, as an obligation, then how can he receive credit for success? Insight into this
apparent contradiction lies in the narrative Bush creates.
On March 17, 2003, days before the start of the war, Bush’s speech includes a
quotation that clearly exemplifies his chosen narrative. He tells his audience that “the
United Nations Security Council has not lived up to its responsibilities, so we will rise to
ours.” Bush makes similar references in other speeches, but this is his most transparent.
What he is saying is that an obligation to deal with the Iraqi crisis exists beyond the
control of anyone. Most importantly, he goes on to chastise the United Nations for
ignoring this obligation, thereby praising America (vicariously himself) for recognizing
its duty.
This example yields insight into the rhetorical power of obligation. Bush is still
framing the impending conflict as beyond his control, as a requirement bestowed upon
him by a higher authority. By doing this he maintains the scene dominance which frames
Iraq as unavoidable and frames his involvement as unimpeachable. On top of this,
though, he further frames himself as an “obligated hero.” Strategically speaking, he
places himself in position to take credit for any positive outcomes the war might bring.
This potential for heroism comes from the small presence of agency involved in
meeting an obligation. Bush’s quotation serves to highlight that element of agency in his
narrative. By showing that the United Nations has refused to accept its obligation, he
points out that, while obligation itself is beyond human control, the ability to act in
accordance with obligation is a choice. And, as he makes clear throughout his speeches,
this particular obligation was a difficult choice fraught with peril, but he stepped up and
accepted the challenge for the benefit of the greater good.
This is the story of the obligated hero, a narrative that exists within American
culture. It is likely religious in nature, though it has clearly spread to secular culture as
55
well. The Bible, for instance, is full of instances where God calls on a specific man to
obey his commands and face difficulty and hardship for the greater good. Abraham being
asked to sacrifice his son, Moses being asked to free the Israelites from Egyptian
oppression, and Jesus being asked to accept torture and death for the sins of mankind all
represent instances of a hero being put upon by forces beyond their control and asked to
take action despite the consequences they will face. The heroism of these characters is
beyond question, despite the fact that they are arguably only doing what God has
commanded that they do. Because they accept this commandment unconditionally, they
represent the “obligated hero.”
Seeking to capitalize on the power of this narrative, Bush too uses the rhetoric of
obligation. While the scene dominant properties of obligation serve to limit his future
liability regarding the invasion of Iraq, the fact that he, the agent, accepts the obligation
allows him the status of hero should Iraq breed success. Bush’s appeals to obligation
frame his situation in this way because of the implications that stem from its use. These
implications—that attaching Iraq is a duty but that accepting that duty is a matter of
personal heroism—allows Bush to cast the impending war in a way that ensures he will
reap the possible benefits will averting the potential liabilities.
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CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSION
President Bush’s use of obligation rhetoric to frame his proposed war in Iraq
made his complex rhetorical situation considerably more navigable. The rhetorical work
done by his appeals to obligation suited his particular needs on three specific fronts: first,
appeals to obligation functioned to subtly argue that Bush was a credible and trustworthy
speaker. Second, appeals to obligation softened the existing danger that Bush might be
blamed harshly for future failure in Iraq by framing the need for military action as
existing beyond the arena of Bush’s control. And third, appeals to obligation allowed
Bush to frame the invasion of Iraq in a way that suggested he would deserve praise and
recognition for any success his policy might bring.
As previously stated, this paper is the first of its kind to directly examine the use
of obligation rhetoric in politics. Similarly, my research suggests that this project is the
first to theorize the workings of obligation rhetoric in general. That being so, a host of
implications and questions stem from the findings of this thesis. In this section, I will
discuss some of these broad ideas.
Guidelines for Effectively Using Obligation
Much work remains to be done insofar as understanding the potential of
obligation rhetoric. Bush’s rhetorical situation seemed ideal for effectively appealing to
obligation, but what of other situations? It would seem unwise, for instance, had
President Clinton appealed to obligation in his apology to the nation following Monica
Lewinsky affair. Indeed, to claim a duty or a calling from a higher power constrained his
actions and somehow decreed that he commit adultery would not appear to be an
appropriate rhetorical strategy. Does this mean obligation in presidential apologia is to be
57
avoided? Certainly not. For example, If Bush’s NSA wiretapping program is declared
illegal, and Bush apologizes and defends himself on the grounds of his obligation to
protect Americans, that could be effective. Where, then, is the line drawn?
One consideration that needs to be addressed is the idea that all obligation rhetoric
appears within the context of apologia; the same goes for presidential appeals to
obligation. To be clear, a speaker only calls on the rhetoric of obligation when that
speaker is explaining and apologizing for their actions or, as I have shown in my analysis
of Bush’s rhetoric, when they are preemptively creating an excuse for events that could
be problematic in the future. This generalization may seem careless at first, but reflecting
briefly confirms that appeals to obligation always appear in the above circumstances.
Considering potential scenarios, then, obligation rhetoric appears to be most
effective when employed in a situation where a greater good can be reasonably implied.
So, had Clinton appealed to obligation to explain his affair with Monica Lewinsky, he
would have, in fact, had to make the case that he engaged in the affair for some higher
purpose. Clearly that would be a hard argument to sell. Whereas if Bush appeals to
obligation in defense of the NSA wiretaps, he could do so effectively as he can
reasonably suggest he was acting toward a greater good.
This “utilitarianism” 10 criterion for successfully appealing to obligation appears to
be broadly applicable. It is not confined to the realm of presidential or political rhetoric,
although what qualifies as “the greater good” may vary with respect to the speech
environment. In the political sense, though, the idea of greater good includes the ability to
speculate in grand, futuristic terms. For example, Bush’s appeals to obligation worked so
well not only because he could argue that his policy would make America safer and free
the oppressed Iraqis, but also because he could theorize that his proposal would benefit
future generations.
To appeal to obligation in a situation where utilitarianism cannot be plausibly
argued, then, would nullify the benefits of the rhetoric while likely doing serious harm to
the speaker’s credibility. A similar consideration should be made regarding the level to
which obligation is employed. For example, Bush’s appeals were relatively subtle. Had
10
Utilitarianism is the ethical theory which states that what makes one action more right than its
alternatives is that said action brings about greatest good for the greatest number of people (Schick &
Vaughn, 2003).
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Bush been overt with his claim—in other words, had he hit his audience over the head
with the idea that he was pursuing military action out of obligation—would his rhetoric
still have resonated as it did? There is reason to suggest that, no, it would not have. An
essay by William Neblett from 1976 lays out this concern. He cautions that an “overdeveloped…sense of obligation…is often injurious (1976, p. 343).” He explains that it is
possible for someone to feel “uncomfortable when a person performs an action in our
behalf ‘merely because he feels obligated to do so’ (p. 343).”
Too heavy a reliance on obligation rhetoric may be even more detrimental if the
speaker is in a leadership position—such as President of the United States. Claiming too
often to work in accordance with duty may hurt perceptions of leadership characteristics.
Further harm may also be done by excessive mention of obligation insofar as a speaker’s
audience may begin to question where this obligation comes from. If Bush’s appeals to
duty were too explicit, detractors may have picked up on them and turned them to their
advantage. “Obligation to whom?” they might ask. Worries that Bush feels a
responsibility to the oil companies, or to his father, or to his legacy in general might
damage his credibility and hurt his effort to find support.
Another drawback to obligation rhetoric is that an audience aware of its use could
be far less susceptible to its effects. Prior to the war, if opponents of Bush’s policy were
able to pick up on his attempts to frame and turn them against him, they may have been
able to negate some or all of the benefits Bush was receiving. Drawing attention to the
fact that Bush was doing rhetorical work on his audience would make people more aware
of this strategic use of appeals to obligation and, therefore, less likely to let these appeals
affect them. This phenomenon would be similar to the one observed in persuasion
research called “tactic revealed,” whereby those exposed to a persuasive tactic are alerted
to that fact and the effects of that tactic are, to a degree, neutralized (Williams & Dolnik,
2001).
Addressing the potential downsides of obligation rhetoric, perhaps it would be
wise for future presidents to limit their appeals to duty while encouraging supporters and
other administration officials to employ obligation rhetoric. In other words, if Bush had
lessened the appeals to obligation, but had sent Secretary of State Colin Powell around to
talk shows to describe America’s duty to invade Iraq, would this have been a more
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effective strategy? On the one hand, Powell could highlight Bush’s heroism in a way that
Bush himself could never do. By explaining that Bush is the only world leader who is
strong enough and brave enough to accept his duty, Powell might be able to frame to
successfully Bush as praiseworthy despite the scene dominance of the situation. On the
other hand, Powell might not be able to successfully frame the situation in a way that
affects Bush’s audience’s perception in any large-scale way. The president has an
exceptional ability to frame issues due to their access to media and the credibility
inherent in the office they occupy. Powell, while highly credible among Americans, still
might not be in the right position to effectively frame an entire war.
Changing cultural and societal norms should also affect the use of appeals to
obligation. For instance, if claims about America’s increasing secularization prove to be
correct, the change in audience may impact the use of obligation rhetoric in the future.
Specifically, the way in which a speaker contextualizes his or her appeal to obligation
would have to be reconsidered. President Bush’s appeals to obligation were often
embedded in or placed alongside images of spirituality. Amidst a wholly godless group, a
speaker would need to imply an obligation toward society, or toward human decency, or
toward some other culturally shared ideal.
Further Considerations
Absent from this study is an examination of the role of media in the context of
presidential rhetoric. According to Kuypers:
The press facilitates public perception of the context in which a particular
situation resides. In the past, the Cold War meta-narrative has helped to establish
this context in foreign affairs; it was common, public knowledge. Now the way
the press frames international events takes on an even greater importance and may
even contend against the president’s frame (1997, p. 50).
If Kuypers’ hypothesis is true, the role of the press may need to be examined more
closely. Bush likely benefited from 9/11 by the pacification of the press with regard to
criticism of his “war on terror” policies. By extension, his attempts to frame Iraq as
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America’s obligation might not have been scrutinized as much as they typically would
be. In this way, the press likely facilitated Bush’s rhetorical goals.
In a different context, though, the effect might be the opposite. Presently it may
be more important for presidents to work toward making the press convey their intended
frame as opposed to bringing it directly to the people; the benefit being a reduced
likelihood the president would suffer direct repercussions from their use of obligation
rhetoric such as those discussed above. On the other hand, a future president seeking to
frame action as duty might be hard-pressed to find a receptive audience if the press does
not accept and disseminate their narrative. As Jamieson notes in Eloquence in the
Electronic Age, Americans are becoming less and less likely and willing to sit through an
entire presidential speech (1988). If current trends continue, American’s short attention
spans will only get shorter, thereby increasing the power or the press while diluting the
power of presidential speech. The future will find the media acting—even more so than
today—as the middleman, the filter, the gatekeeper of president’s messages. Rhetoric
which perceives newspersons as the target audience as opposed to the general American
populace may become a tool of the future politician.
The current study also does not go as far as to conceptualize Bush’s obligation
rhetoric within the administration’s overall discourse of the “war on terror.” As Ivie
claims, America is a nation that is “forever insecure” and, following 9/11, has become a
“republic of fear” (2005, p. 10). The benefit of obligation in times like this might be the
implication of order that it brings. As we have seen, appealing to obligation invokes
thoughts of outside forces constricting events toward their will. Of course, the obvious
conceptualization of these forces is God. This study uses that association to explain
Bush’s use of obligation rhetoric for credibility purposes. An auxiliary effect of this
rhetoric, though, may be a certain level of comfort that comes from believing it.
Accepting the frame of obligation should bring feelings of security to a person.
Believing that outside forces have created a duty, by logical extension, suggests an
underlying order and meaning to the seemingly random events of the world. This
perception might address the perpetual “insecurity” that characterizes America. This
might be another way to increase speaker credibility insofar as a speaker bringing
comfort to an audience will be more likeable and therefore more credible in their eyes.
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Then again, the comforting properties of obligation rhetoric could simply make a
message more palatable to an audience with little regard to their understanding of the
messenger.
Final Thoughts on Bush’s Rhetoric of Obligation
Considering Bush’s rhetorical situation alongside the benefits wrought by
effective use of obligation rhetoric suggests that Bush’s decision to use such appeals was
a good one. Indeed, as I write this in the spring of 2006, it appears the Bush
administration has not abandoned the rhetoric of obligation with regard to the war effort.
The mounting criticism regarding missing weapons of mass destruction, faulty
intelligence, and rising casualties is often countered with reference to America’s duty to
take out Saddam Hussein (Hughes, 2004). Nowhere is this more prominent than among
supporters of the decision to invade Iraq, thereby suggesting Bush’s rhetoric resonated
with and shaped the perceptions of at least some in his audience.
Whether Bush’s appeals to obligation were responsible for his garnering support
for the war is unknowable. Whether war would have been realized in lieu of public
backing is, likewise, a matter of mere speculation. But where rhetoric is defined, as it is
by Aristotle, as “an ability…to see the available means of persuasion” (Trans. 1991, p.
36) and, by extension, successful rhetoric is the ability to choose the best strategy among
those available, it is the overall conclusion of this thesis that Bush’s rhetoric was, indeed,
successful. With regard to Bush’s particular situation, including its strengths and its
weaknesses, Bush relied on a rhetorical strategy that almost perfected suited his rhetorical
needs.
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APPENDIX A
Bush’s Radio Address, October 5, 2002
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Good morning. This week leaders of the Congress agreed on a strong bipartisan
resolution authorizing the use of force if necessary to disarm Saddam Hussein and to
defend the peace. Now both the House and the Senate will have an important debate and
an historic vote. Speaker Hastert and Leader Gephardt and Leader Lott did tremendous
work in building bipartisan support on this vital issue.
The danger to America from the Iraqi regime is grave and growing. The regime is guilty
of beginning two wars. It has a horrible history of striking without warning. In defiance
of pledges to the United Nations, Iraq has stockpiled biological and chemical weapons,
and is rebuilding the facilities used to make more of those weapons. Saddam Hussein has
used these weapons of death against innocent Iraqi people, and we have every reason to
believe he will use them again.
Iraq has longstanding ties to terrorist groups, which are capable of and willing to deliver
weapons of mass death. And Iraq is ruled by perhaps the world's most brutal dictator who
has already committed genocide with chemical weapons, ordered the torture of children,
and instituted the systematic rape of the wives and daughters of his political opponents.
We cannot leave the future of peace and the security of America in the hands of this cruel
and dangerous man. This dictator must be disarmed. And all the United Nations
resolutions against his brutality and support for terrorism must be enforced.
The United States does not desire military conflict, because we know the awful nature of
war. Our country values life, and we will never seek war unless it is essential to security
and justice. We hope that Iraq complies with the world's demands. If, however, the Iraqi
regime persists in its defiance, the use of force may become unavoidable. Delay,
indecision, and inaction are not options for America, because they could lead to massive
and sudden horror.
Should force be required to bring Saddam to account, the United States will work with
other nations to help the Iraqi people rebuild and form a just government. We have no
quarrel with the Iraqi people. They are the daily victims of Saddam Hussein's oppression,
and they will be the first to benefit when the world's demands are met.
American security, the safety of our friends, and the values of our country lead us to
confront this gathering threat. By supporting the resolution now before them, members of
Congress will send a clear message to Saddam: His only choice is to fully comply with
the demands of the world. And the time for that choice is limited. Supporting this
resolution will also show the resolve of the United States, and will help spur the United
Nations to act.
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I urge Americans to call their members of Congress to make sure your voice is heard.
The decision before Congress cannot be more consequential. I'm confident that members
of both political parties will choose wisely.
Thank you for listening.
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APPENDIX B
Bush’s Speech at the Cincinnati Museum Center, October 7, 2002
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Thank you all. Thank you for that very gracious and warm Cincinnati welcome. I'm
honored to be here tonight; I appreciate you all coming.
Tonight I want to take a few minutes to discuss a grave threat to peace, and America's
determination to lead the world in confronting that threat.
The threat comes from Iraq. It arises directly from the Iraqi regime's own actions -- its
history of aggression, and its drive toward an arsenal of terror. Eleven years ago, as a
condition for ending the Persian Gulf War, the Iraqi regime was required to destroy its
weapons of mass destruction, to cease all development of such weapons, and to stop all
support for terrorist groups. The Iraqi regime has violated all of those obligations. It
possesses and produces chemical and biological weapons. It is seeking nuclear weapons.
It has given shelter and support to terrorism, and practices terror against its own people.
The entire world has witnessed Iraq's eleven-year history of defiance, deception and bad
faith.
We also must never forget the most vivid events of recent history. On September the
11th, 2001, America felt its vulnerability -- even to threats that gather on the other side of
the earth. We resolved then, and we are resolved today, to confront every threat, from any
source, that could bring sudden terror and suffering to America.
Members of the Congress of both political parties, and members of the United Nations
Security Council, agree that Saddam Hussein is a threat to peace and must disarm. We
agree that the Iraqi dictator must not be permitted to threaten America and the world with
horrible poisons and diseases and gases and atomic weapons. Since we all agree on this
goal, the issues is : how can we best achieve it?
Many Americans have raised legitimate questions: about the nature of the threat; about
the urgency of action -- why be concerned now; about the link between Iraq developing
weapons of terror, and the wider war on terror. These are all issues we've discussed
broadly and fully within my administration. And tonight, I want to share those
discussions with you.
First, some ask why Iraq is different from other countries or regimes that also have
terrible weapons. While there are many dangers in the world, the threat from Iraq stands
alone -- because it gathers the most serious dangers of our age in one place. Iraq's
weapons of mass destruction are controlled by a murderous tyrant who has already used
chemical weapons to kill thousands of people. This same tyrant has tried to dominate the
Middle East, has invaded and brutally occupied a small neighbor, has struck other nations
without warning, and holds an unrelenting hostility toward the United States.
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By its past and present actions, by its technological capabilities, by the merciless nature
of its regime, Iraq is unique. As a former chief weapons inspector of the U.N. has said,
"The fundamental problem with Iraq remains the nature of the regime, itself. Saddam
Hussein is a homicidal dictator who is addicted to weapons of mass destruction."
Some ask how urgent this danger is to America and the world. The danger is already
significant, and it only grows worse with time. If we know Saddam Hussein has
dangerous weapons today -- and we do -- does it make any sense for the world to wait to
confront him as he grows even stronger and develops even more dangerous weapons?
In 1995, after several years of deceit by the Iraqi regime, the head of Iraq's military
industries defected. It was then that the regime was forced to admit that it had produced
more than 30,000 liters of anthrax and other deadly biological agents. The inspectors,
however, concluded that Iraq had likely produced two to four times that amount. This is a
massive stockpile of biological weapons that has never been accounted for, and capable
of killing millions.
We know that the regime has produced thousands of tons of chemical agents, including
mustard gas, sarin nerve gas, VX nerve gas. Saddam Hussein also has experience in using
chemical weapons. He has ordered chemical attacks on Iran, and on more than forty
villages in his own country. These actions killed or injured at least 20,000 people, more
than six times the number of people who died in the attacks of September the 11th.
And surveillance photos reveal that the regime is rebuilding facilities that it had used to
produce chemical and biological weapons. Every chemical and biological weapon that
Iraq has or makes is a direct violation of the truce that ended the Persian Gulf War in
1991. Yet, Saddam Hussein has chosen to build and keep these weapons despite
international sanctions, U.N. demands, and isolation from the civilized world.
Iraq possesses ballistic missiles with a likely range of hundreds of miles -- far enough to
strike Saudi Arabia, Israel, Turkey, and other nations -- in a region where more than
135,000 American civilians and service members live and work. We've also discovered
through intelligence that Iraq has a growing fleet of manned and unmanned aerial
vehicles that could be used to disperse chemical or biological weapons across broad
areas. We're concerned that Iraq is exploring ways of using these UAVS for missions
targeting the United States. And, of course, sophisticated delivery systems aren't required
for a chemical or biological attack; all that might be required are a small container and
one terrorist or Iraqi intelligence operative to deliver it.
And that is the source of our urgent concern about Saddam Hussein's links to
international terrorist groups. Over the years, Iraq has provided safe haven to terrorists
such as Abu Nidal, whose terror organization carried out more than 90 terrorist attacks in
20 countries that killed or injured nearly 900 people, including 12 Americans. Iraq has
also provided safe haven to Abu Abbas, who was responsible for seizing the Achille
Lauro and killing an American passenger. And we know that Iraq is continuing to finance
terror and gives assistance to groups that use terrorism to undermine Middle East peace.
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We know that Iraq and the al Qaeda terrorist network share a common enemy -- the
United States of America. We know that Iraq and al Qaeda have had high-level contacts
that go back a decade. Some al Qaeda leaders who fled Afghanistan went to Iraq. These
include one very senior al Qaeda leader who received medical treatment in Baghdad this
year, and who has been associated with planning for chemical and biological attacks.
We've learned that Iraq has trained al Qaeda members in bomb-making and poisons and
deadly gases. And we know that after September the 11th, Saddam Hussein's regime
gleefully celebrated the terrorist attacks on America.
Iraq could decide on any given day to provide a biological or chemical weapon to a
terrorist group or individual terrorists. Alliance with terrorists could allow the Iraqi
regime to attack America without leaving any fingerprints.
Some have argued that confronting the threat from Iraq could detract from the war
against terror. To the contrary; confronting the threat posed by Iraq is crucial to winning
the war on terror. When I spoke to Congress more than a year ago, I said that those who
harbor terrorists are as guilty as the terrorists themselves. Saddam Hussein is harboring
terrorists and the instruments of terror, the instruments of mass death and destruction.
And he cannot be trusted. The risk is simply too great that he will use them, or provide
them to a terror network.
Terror cells and outlaw regimes building weapons of mass destruction are different faces
of the same evil. Our security requires that we confront both. And the United States
military is capable of confronting both.
Many people have asked how close Saddam Hussein is to developing a nuclear weapon.
Well, we don't know exactly, and that's the problem. Before the Gulf War, the best
intelligence indicated that Iraq was eight to ten years away from developing a nuclear
weapon. After the war, international inspectors learned that the regime has been much
closer -- the regime in Iraq would likely have possessed a nuclear weapon no later than
1993. The inspectors discovered that Iraq had an advanced nuclear weapons development
program, had a design for a workable nuclear weapon, and was pursuing several different
methods of enriching uranium for a bomb.
Before being barred from Iraq in 1998, the International Atomic Energy Agency
dismantled extensive nuclear weapons-related facilities, including three uranium
enrichment sites. That same year, information from a high-ranking Iraqi nuclear engineer
who had defected revealed that despite his public promises, Saddam Hussein had ordered
his nuclear program to continue.
The evidence indicates that Iraq is reconstituting its nuclear weapons program. Saddam
Hussein has held numerous meetings with Iraqi nuclear scientists, a group he calls his
"nuclear mujahideen" -- his nuclear holy warriors. Satellite photographs reveal that Iraq is
rebuilding facilities at sites that have been part of its nuclear program in the past. Iraq has
attempted to purchase high-strength aluminum tubes and other equipment needed for gas
centrifuges, which are used to enrich uranium for nuclear weapons.
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If the Iraqi regime is able to produce, buy, or steal an amount of highly enriched uranium
a little larger than a single softball, it could have a nuclear weapon in less than a year.
And if we allow that to happen, a terrible line would be crossed. Saddam Hussein would
be in a position to blackmail anyone who opposes his aggression. He would be in a
position to dominate the Middle East. He would be in a position to threaten America.
And Saddam Hussein would be in a position to pass nuclear technology to terrorists.
Some citizens wonder, after 11 years of living with this problem, why do we need to
confront it now? And there's a reason. We've experienced the horror of September the
11th. We have seen that those who hate America are willing to crash airplanes into
buildings full of innocent people. Our enemies would be no less willing, in fact, they
would be eager, to use biological or chemical, or a nuclear weapon.
Knowing these realities, America must not ignore the threat gathering against us. Facing
clear evidence of peril, we cannot wait for the final proof -- the smoking gun -- that could
come in the form of a mushroom cloud. As President Kennedy said in October of 1962,
"Neither the United States of America, nor the world community of nations can tolerate
deliberate deception and offensive threats on the part of any nation, large or small. We no
longer live in a world," he said, "where only the actual firing of weapons represents a
sufficient challenge to a nations security to constitute maximum peril."
Understanding the threats of our time, knowing the designs and deceptions of the Iraqi
regime, we have every reason to assume the worst, and we have an urgent duty to prevent
the worst from occurring.
Some believe we can address this danger by simply resuming the old approach to
inspections, and applying diplomatic and economic pressure. Yet this is precisely what
the world has tried to do since 1991. The U.N. inspections program was met with
systematic deception. The Iraqi regime bugged hotel rooms and offices of inspectors to
find where they were going next; they forged documents, destroyed evidence, and
developed mobile weapons facilities to keep a step ahead of inspectors. Eight so-called
presidential palaces were declared off-limits to unfettered inspections. These sites
actually encompass twelve square miles, with hundreds of structures, both above and
below the ground, where sensitive materials could be hidden.
The world has also tried economic sanctions -- and watched Iraq use billions of dollars in
illegal oil revenues to fund more weapons purchases, rather than providing for the needs
of the Iraqi people.
The world has tried limited military strikes to destroy Iraq's weapons of mass destruction
capabilities -- only to see them openly rebuilt, while the regime again denies they even
exist.
The world has tried no-fly zones to keep Saddam from terrorizing his own people -- and
in the last year alone, the Iraqi military has fired upon American and British pilots more
than 750 times.
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After eleven years during which we have tried containment, sanctions, inspections, even
selected military action, the end result is that Saddam Hussein still has chemical and
biological weapons and is increasing his capabilities to make more. And he is moving
ever closer to developing a nuclear weapon.
Clearly, to actually work, any new inspections, sanctions or enforcement mechanisms
will have to be very different. America wants the U.N. to be an effective organization that
helps keep the peace. And that is why we are urging the Security Council to adopt a new
resolution setting out tough, immediate requirements. Among those requirements: the
Iraqi regime must reveal and destroy, under U.N. supervision, all existing weapons of
mass destruction. To ensure that we learn the truth, the regime must allow witnesses to its
illegal activities to be interviewed outside the country -- and these witnesses must be free
to bring their families with them so they all beyond the reach of Saddam Hussein's terror
and murder. And inspectors must have access to any site, at any time, without preclearance, without delay, without exceptions.
The time for denying, deceiving, and delaying has come to an end. Saddam Hussein must
disarm himself -- or, for the sake of peace, we will lead a coalition to disarm him.
Many nations are joining us in insisting that Saddam Hussein's regime be held
accountable. They are committed to defending the international security that protects the
lives of both our citizens and theirs. And that's why America is challenging all nations to
take the resolutions of the U.N. Security Council seriously.
And these resolutions are clear. In addition to declaring and destroying all of its weapons
of mass destruction, Iraq must end its support for terrorism. It must cease the persecution
of its civilian population. It must stop all illicit trade outside the Oil For Food program. It
must release or account for all Gulf War personnel, including an American pilot, whose
fate is still unknown.
By taking these steps, and by only taking these steps, the Iraqi regime has an opportunity
to avoid conflict. Taking these steps would also change the nature of the Iraqi regime
itself. America hopes the regime will make that choice. Unfortunately, at least so far, we
have little reason to expect it. And that's why two administrations -- mine and President
Clinton's -- have stated that regime change in Iraq is the only certain means of removing
a great danger to our nation.
I hope this will not require military action, but it may. And military conflict could be
difficult. An Iraqi regime faced with its own demise may attempt cruel and desperate
measures. If Saddam Hussein orders such measures, his generals would be well advised
to refuse those orders. If they do not refuse, they must understand that all war criminals
will be pursued and punished. If we have to act, we will take every precaution that is
possible. We will plan carefully; we will act with the full power of the United States
military; we will act with allies at our side, and we will prevail.
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There is no easy or risk-free course of action. Some have argued we should wait -- and
that's an option. In my view, it's the riskiest of all options, because the longer we wait, the
stronger and bolder Saddam Hussein will become. We could wait and hope that Saddam
does not give weapons to terrorists, or develop a nuclear weapon to blackmail the world.
But I'm convinced that is a hope against all evidence. As Americans, we want peace -- we
work and sacrifice for peace. But there can be no peace if our security depends on the
will and whims of a ruthless and aggressive dictator. I'm not willing to stake one
American life on trusting Saddam Hussein.
Failure to act would embolden other tyrants, allow terrorists access to new weapons and
new resources, and make blackmail a permanent feature of world events. The United
Nations would betray the purpose of its founding, and prove irrelevant to the problems of
our time. And through its inaction, the United States would resign itself to a future of
fear.
That is not the America I know. That is not the America I serve. We refuse to live in fear.
This nation, in world war and in Cold War, has never permitted the brutal and lawless to
set history's course. Now, as before, we will secure our nation, protect our freedom, and
help others to find freedom of their own.
Some worry that a change of leadership in Iraq could create instability and make the
situation worse. The situation could hardly get worse, for world security and for the
people of Iraq. The lives of Iraqi citizens would improve dramatically if Saddam Hussein
were no longer in power, just as the lives of Afghanistan's citizens improved after the
Taliban. The dictator of Iraq is a student of Stalin, using murder as a tool of terror and
control, within his own cabinet, within his own army, and even within his own family.
On Saddam Hussein's orders, opponents have been decapitated, wives and mothers of
political opponents have been systematically raped as a method of intimidation, and
political prisoners have been forced to watch their own children being tortured.
America believes that all people are entitled to hope and human rights, to the nonnegotiable demands of human dignity. People everywhere prefer freedom to slavery;
prosperity to squalor; self-government to the rule of terror and torture. America is a
friend to the people of Iraq. Our demands are directed only at the regime that enslaves
them and threatens us. When these demands are met, the first and greatest benefit will
come to Iraqi men, women and children. The oppression of Kurds, Assyrians,
Turkomans, Shi'a, Sunnis and others will be lifted. The long captivity of Iraq will end,
and an era of new hope will begin.
Iraq is a land rich in culture, resources, and talent. Freed from the weight of oppression,
Iraq's people will be able to share in the progress and prosperity of our time. If military
action is necessary, the United States and our allies will help the Iraqi people rebuild their
economy, and create the institutions of liberty in a unified Iraq at peace with its
neighbors.
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Later this week, the United States Congress will vote on this matter. I have asked
Congress to authorize the use of America's military, if it proves necessary, to enforce
U.N. Security Council demands. Approving this resolution does not mean that military
action is imminent or unavoidable. The resolution will tell the United Nations, and all
nations, that America speaks with one voice and is determined to make the demands of
the civilized world mean something. Congress will also be sending a message to the
dictator in Iraq: that his only chance -- his only choice is full compliance, and the time
remaining for that choice is limited.
Members of Congress are nearing an historic vote. I'm confident they will fully consider
the facts, and their duties.
The attacks of September the 11th showed our country that vast oceans no longer protect
us from danger. Before that tragic date, we had only hints of al Qaeda's plans and
designs. Today in Iraq, we see a threat whose outlines are far more clearly defined, and
whose consequences could be far more deadly. Saddam Hussein's actions have put us on
notice, and there is no refuge from our responsibilities.
We did not ask for this present challenge, but we accept it. Like other generations of
Americans, we will meet the responsibility of defending human liberty against violence
and aggression. By our resolve, we will give strength to others. By our courage, we will
give hope to others. And by our actions, we will secure the peace, and lead the world to a
better day.
May God bless America.
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APPENDIX C
Bush’s State of the Union Address, January 28, 2003
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Mr. Speaker, Vice President Cheney, members of Congress, distinguished citizens and
fellow citizens: Every year, by law and by custom, we meet here to consider the state of
the union. This year, we gather in this chamber deeply aware of decisive days that lie
ahead.
You and I serve our country in a time of great consequence. During this session of
Congress, we have the duty to reform domestic programs vital to our country; we have
the opportunity to save millions of lives abroad from a terrible disease. We will work for
a prosperity that is broadly shared, and we will answer every danger and every enemy
that threatens the American people.
In all these days of promise and days of reckoning, we can be confident. In a whirlwind
of change and hope and peril, our faith is sure, our resolve is firm, and our union is
strong.
This country has many challenges. We will not deny, we will not ignore, we will not pass
along our problems to other Congresses, to other presidents, and other generations. We
will confront them with focus and clarity and courage.
During the last two years, we have seen what can be accomplished when we work
together. To lift the standards of our public schools, we achieved historic education
reform -- which must now be carried out in every school and in every classroom, so that
every child in America can read and learn and succeed in life. To protect our country, we
reorganized our government and created the Department of Homeland Security, which is
mobilizing against the threats of a new era. To bring our economy out of recession, we
delivered the largest tax relief in a generation. To insist on integrity in American business
we passed tough reforms, and we are holding corporate criminals to account.
Some might call this a good record; I call it a good start. Tonight I ask the House and
Senate to join me in the next bold steps to serve our fellow citizens.
Our first goal is clear: We must have an economy that grows fast enough to employ every
man and woman who seeks a job. After recession, terrorist attacks, corporate scandals
and stock market declines, our economy is recovering -- yet it's not growing fast enough,
or strongly enough. With unemployment rising, our nation needs more small businesses
to open, more companies to invest and expand, more employers to put up the sign that
says, "Help Wanted."
Jobs are created when the economy grows; the economy grows when Americans have
more money to spend and invest; and the best and fairest way to make sure Americans
have that money is not to tax it away in the first place.
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I am proposing that all the income tax reductions set for 2004 and 2006 be made
permanent and effective this year. And under my plan, as soon as I sign the bill, this extra
money will start showing up in workers' paychecks. Instead of gradually reducing the
marriage penalty, we should do it now. Instead of slowly raising the child credit to
$1,000, we should send the checks to American families now.
The tax relief is for everyone who pays income taxes -- and it will help our economy
immediately: 92 million Americans will keep, this year, an average of almost $1,000
more of their own money. A family of four with an income of $40,000 would see their
federal income taxes fall from $1,178 to $45 per year. Our plan will improve the bottom
line for more than 23 million small businesses.
You, the Congress, have already passed all these reductions, and promised them for
future years. If this tax relief is good for Americans three, or five, or seven years from
now, it is even better for Americans today.
We should also strengthen the economy by treating investors equally in our tax laws. It's
fair to tax a company's profits. It is not fair to again tax the shareholder on the same
profits. To boost investor confidence, and to help the nearly 10 million senior who
receive dividend income, I ask you to end the unfair double taxation of dividends.
Lower taxes and greater investment will help this economy expand. More jobs mean
more taxpayers, and higher revenues to our government. The best way to address the
deficit and move toward a balanced budget is to encourage economic growth, and to
show some spending discipline in Washington, D.C.
We must work together to fund only our most important priorities. I will send you a
budget that increases discretionary spending by 4 percent next year -- about as much as
the average family's income is expected to grow. And that is a good benchmark for us.
Federal spending should not rise any faster than the paychecks of American families.
A growing economy and a focus on essential priorities will also be crucial to the future of
Social Security. As we continue to work together to keep Social Security sound and
reliable, we must offer younger workers a chance to invest in retirement accounts that
they will control and they will own.
Our second goal is high quality, affordable health care for all Americans. The American
system of medicine is a model of skill and innovation, with a pace of discovery that is
adding good years to our lives. Yet for many people, medical care costs too much -- and
many have no coverage at all. These problems will not be solved with a nationalized
health care system that dictates coverage and rations care.
Instead, we must work toward a system in which all Americans have a good insurance
policy, choose their own doctors, and seniors and low-income Americans receive the help
they need. Instead of bureaucrats and trial lawyers and HMOs, we must put doctors and
nurses and patients back in charge of American medicine.
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Health care reform must begin with Medicare; Medicare is the binding commitment of a
caring society. We must renew that commitment by giving seniors access to preventive
medicine and new drugs that are transforming health care in America.
Seniors happy with the current Medicare system should be able to keep their coverage
just the way it is. And just like you -- the members of Congress, and your staffs, and
other federal employees -- all seniors should have the choice of a health care plan that
provides prescription drugs.
My budget will commit an additional $400 billion over the next decade to reform and
strengthen Medicare. Leaders of both political parties have talked for years about
strengthening Medicare. I urge the members of this new Congress to act this year.
To improve our health care system, we must address one of the prime causes of higher
cost, the constant threat that physicians and hospitals will be unfairly sued. Because of
excessive litigation, everybody pays more for health care, and many parts of America are
losing fine doctors. No one has ever been healed by a frivolous lawsuit. I urge the
Congress to pass medical liability reform.
Our third goal is to promote energy independence for our country, while dramatically
improving the environment. I have sent you a comprehensive energy plan to promote
energy efficiency and conservation, to develop cleaner technology, and to produce more
energy at home. I have sent you Clear Skies legislation that mandates a 70-percent cut in
air pollution from power plants over the next 15 years. I have sent you a Healthy Forests
Initiative, to help prevent the catastrophic fires that devastate communities, kill wildlife,
and burn away millions of acres of treasured forest.
I urge you to pass these measures, for the good of both our environment and our
economy. Even more, I ask you to take a crucial step and protect our environment in
ways that generations before us could not have imagined.
In this century, the greatest environmental progress will come about not through endless
lawsuits or command-and-control regulations, but through technology and innovation.
Tonight I'm proposing $1.2 billion in research funding so that America can lead the world
in developing clean, hydrogen-powered automobiles.
A single chemical reaction between hydrogen and oxygen generates energy, which can be
used to power a car -- producing only water, not exhaust fumes. With a new national
commitment, our scientists and engineers will overcome obstacles to taking these cars
from laboratory to showroom, so that the first car driven by a child born today could be
powered by hydrogen, and pollution-free.
Join me in this important innovation to make our air significantly cleaner, and our
country much less dependent on foreign sources of energy.
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Our fourth goal is to apply the compassion of America to the deepest problems of
America. For so many in our country -- the homeless and the fatherless, the addicted -the need is great. Yet there's power, wonder-working power, in the goodness and
idealism and faith of the American people.
Americans are doing the work of compassion every day -- visiting prisoners, providing
shelter for battered women, bringing companionship to lonely seniors. These good works
deserve our praise; they deserve our personal support; and when appropriate, they
deserve the assistance of the federal government.
I urge you to pass both my faith-based initiative and the Citizen Service Act, to
encourage acts of compassion that can transform America, one heart and one soul at a
time.
Last year, I called on my fellow citizens to participate in the USA Freedom Corps, which
is enlisting tens of thousands of new volunteers across America. Tonight I ask Congress
and the American people to focus the spirit of service and the resources of government on
the needs of some of our most vulnerable citizens -- boys and girls trying to grow up
without guidance and attention, and children who have to go through a prison gate to be
hugged by their mom or dad.
I propose a $450-million initiative to bring mentors to more than a million disadvantaged
junior high students and children of prisoners. Government will support the training and
recruiting of mentors; yet it is the men and women of America who will fill the need. One
mentor, one person can change a life forever. And I urge you to be that one person.
Another cause of hopelessness is addiction to drugs. Addiction crowds out friendship,
ambition, moral conviction, and reduces all the richness of life to a single destructive
desire. As a government, we are fighting illegal drugs by cutting off supplies and
reducing demand through anti-drug education programs. Yet for those already addicted,
the fight against drugs is a fight for their own lives. Too many Americans in search of
treatment cannot get it. So tonight I propose a new $600-million program to help an
additional 300,000 Americans receive treatment over the next three years.
Our nation is blessed with recovery programs that do amazing work. One of them is
found at the Healing Place Church in Baton Rouge, Louisiana. A man in the program
said, "God does miracles in people's lives, and you never think it could be you." Tonight,
let us bring to all Americans who struggle with drug addiction this message of hope: The
miracle of recovery is possible, and it could be you.
By caring for children who need mentors, and for addicted men and women who need
treatment, we are building a more welcoming society -- a culture that values every life.
And in this work we must not overlook the weakest among us. I ask you to protect infants
at the very hour of their birth and end the practice of partial-birth abortion. And because
no human life should be started or ended as the object of an experiment, I ask you to set a
high standard for humanity, and pass a law against all human cloning.
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The qualities of courage and compassion that we strive for in America also determine our
conduct abroad. The American flag stands for more than our power and our interests. Our
founders dedicated this country to the cause of human dignity, the rights of every person,
and the possibilities of every life. This conviction leads us into the world to help the
afflicted, and defend the peace, and confound the designs of evil men.
In Afghanistan, we helped liberate an oppressed people. And we will continue helping
them secure their country, rebuild their society, and educate all their children -- boys and
girls. In the Middle East, we will continue to seek peace between a secure Israel and a
democratic Palestine. Across the Earth, America is feeding the hungry -- more than 60
percent of international food aid comes as a gift from the people of the United States. As
our nation moves troops and builds alliances to make our world safer, we must also
remember our calling as a blessed country is to make this world better.
Today, on the continent of Africa, nearly 30 million people have the AIDS virus -including 3 million children under the age 15. There are whole countries in Africa where
more than one-third of the adult population carries the infection. More than 4 million
require immediate drug treatment. Yet across that continent, only 50,000 AIDS victims -only 50,000 -- are receiving the medicine they need.
Because the AIDS diagnosis is considered a death sentence, many do not seek treatment.
Almost all who do are turned away. A doctor in rural South Africa describes his
frustration. He says, "We have no medicines. Many hospitals tell people, you've got
AIDS, we can't help you. Go home and die." In an age of miraculous medicines, no
person should have to hear those words.
AIDS can be prevented. Anti-retroviral drugs can extend life for many years. And the
cost of those drugs has dropped from $12,000 a year to under $300 a year -- which places
a tremendous possibility within our grasp. Ladies and gentlemen, seldom has history
offered a greater opportunity to do so much for so many.
We have confronted, and will continue to confront, HIV/AIDS in our own country. And
to meet a severe and urgent crisis abroad, tonight I propose the Emergency Plan for AIDS
Relief -- a work of mercy beyond all current international efforts to help the people of
Africa. This comprehensive plan will prevent 7 million new AIDS infections, treat at
least 2 million people with life-extending drugs, and provide humane care for millions of
people suffering from AIDS, and for children orphaned by AIDS.
I ask the Congress to commit $15 billion over the next five years, including nearly $10
billion in new money, to turn the tide against AIDS in the most afflicted nations of Africa
and the Caribbean.
This nation can lead the world in sparing innocent people from a plague of nature. And
this nation is leading the world in confronting and defeating the man-made evil of
international terrorism.
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There are days when our fellow citizens do not hear news about the war on terror. There's
never a day when I do not learn of another threat, or receive reports of operations in
progress, or give an order in this global war against a scattered network of killers. The
war goes on, and we are winning.
To date, we've arrested or otherwise dealt with many key commanders of al Qaeda. They
include a man who directed logistics and funding for the September the 11th attacks; the
chief of al Qaeda operations in the Persian Gulf, who planned the bombings of our
embassies in East Africa and the USS Cole; an al Qaeda operations chief from Southeast
Asia; a former director of al Qaeda's training camps in Afghanistan; a key al Qaeda
operative in Europe; a major al Qaeda leader in Yemen. All told, more than 3,000
suspected terrorists have been arrested in many countries. Many others have met a
different fate. Let's put it this way -- they are no longer a problem to the United States
and our friends and allies.
We are working closely with other nations to prevent further attacks. America and
coalition countries have uncovered and stopped terrorist conspiracies targeting the
American embassy in Yemen, the American embassy in Singapore, a Saudi military base,
ships in the Straits of Hormuz and the Straits the Gibraltar. We've broken al Qaeda cells
in Hamburg, Milan, Madrid, London, Paris, as well as, Buffalo, New York.
We have the terrorists on the run. We're keeping them on the run. One by one, the
terrorists are learning the meaning of American justice.
As we fight this war, we will remember where it began -- here, in our own country. This
government is taking unprecedented measures to protect our people and defend our
homeland. We've intensified security at the borders and ports of entry, posted more than
50,000 newly-trained federal screeners in airports, begun inoculating troops and first
responders against smallpox, and are deploying the nation's first early warning network
of sensors to detect biological attack. And this year, for the first time, we are beginning to
field a defense to protect this nation against ballistic missiles.
I thank the Congress for supporting these measures. I ask you tonight to add to our future
security with a major research and production effort to guard our people against
bioterrorism, called Project Bioshield. The budget I send you will propose almost $6
billion to quickly make available effective vaccines and treatments against agents like
anthrax, botulinum toxin, Ebola, and plague. We must assume that our enemies would
use these diseases as weapons, and we must act before the dangers are upon us.
Since September the 11th, our intelligence and law enforcement agencies have worked
more closely than ever to track and disrupt the terrorists. The FBI is improving its ability
to analyze intelligence, and is transforming itself to meet new threats. Tonight, I am
instructing the leaders of the FBI, the CIA, the Homeland Security, and the Department
of Defense to develop a Terrorist Threat Integration Center, to merge and analyze all
threat information in a single location. Our government must have the very best
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information possible, and we will use it to make sure the right people are in the right
places to protect all our citizens.
Our war against terror is a contest of will in which perseverance is power. In the ruins of
two towers, at the western wall of the Pentagon, on a field in Pennsylvania, this nation
made a pledge, and we renew that pledge tonight: Whatever the duration of this struggle,
and whatever the difficulties, we will not permit the triumph of violence in the affairs of
men -- free people will set the course of history.
Today, the gravest danger in the war on terror, the gravest danger facing America and the
world, is outlaw regimes that seek and possess nuclear, chemical, and biological
weapons. These regimes could use such weapons for blackmail, terror, and mass murder.
They could also give or sell those weapons to terrorist allies, who would use them
without the least hesitation.
This threat is new; America's duty is familiar. Throughout the 20th century, small groups
of men seized control of great nations, built armies and arsenals, and set out to dominate
the weak and intimidate the world. In each case, their ambitions of cruelty and murder
had no limit. In each case, the ambitions of Hitlerism, militarism, and communism were
defeated by the will of free peoples, by the strength of great alliances, and by the might of
the United States of America.
Now, in this century, the ideology of power and domination has appeared again, and
seeks to gain the ultimate weapons of terror. Once again, this nation and all our friends
are all that stand between a world at peace, and a world of chaos and constant alarm.
Once again, we are called to defend the safety of our people, and the hopes of all
mankind. And we accept this responsibility.
America is making a broad and determined effort to confront these dangers. We have
called on the United Nations to fulfill its charter and stand by its demand that Iraq disarm.
We're strongly supporting the International Atomic Energy Agency in its mission to track
and control nuclear materials around the world. We're working with other governments to
secure nuclear materials in the former Soviet Union, and to strengthen global treaties
banning the production and shipment of missile technologies and weapons of mass
destruction.
In all these efforts, however, America's purpose is more than to follow a process -- it is to
achieve a result: the end of terrible threats to the civilized world. All free nations have a
stake in preventing sudden and catastrophic attacks. And we're asking them to join us,
and many are doing so. Yet the course of this nation does not depend on the decisions of
others. Whatever action is required, whenever action is necessary, I will defend the
freedom and security of the American people.
Different threats require different strategies. In Iran, we continue to see a government that
represses its people, pursues weapons of mass destruction, and supports terror. We also
see Iranian citizens risking intimidation and death as they speak out for liberty and human
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rights and democracy. Iranians, like all people, have a right to choose their own
government and determine their own destiny -- and the United States supports their
aspirations to live in freedom.
On the Korean Peninsula, an oppressive regime rules a people living in fear and
starvation. Throughout the 1990s, the United States relied on a negotiated framework to
keep North Korea from gaining nuclear weapons. We now know that that regime was
deceiving the world, and developing those weapons all along. And today the North
Korean regime is using its nuclear program to incite fear and seek concessions. America
and the world will not be blackmailed.
America is working with the countries of the region -- South Korea, Japan, China, and
Russia -- to find a peaceful solution, and to show the North Korean government that
nuclear weapons will bring only isolation, economic stagnation, and continued hardship.
The North Korean regime will find respect in the world and revival for its people only
when it turns away from its nuclear ambitions.
Our nation and the world must learn the lessons of the Korean Peninsula and not allow an
even greater threat to rise up in Iraq. A brutal dictator, with a history of reckless
aggression, with ties to terrorism, with great potential wealth, will not be permitted to
dominate a vital region and threaten the United States.
Twelve years ago, Saddam Hussein faced the prospect of being the last casualty in a war
he had started and lost. To spare himself, he agreed to disarm of all weapons of mass
destruction. For the next 12 years, he systematically violated that agreement. He pursued
chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons, even while inspectors were in his country.
Nothing to date has restrained him from his pursuit of these weapons -- not economic
sanctions, not isolation from the civilized world, not even cruise missile strikes on his
military facilities.
Almost three months ago, the United Nations Security Council gave Saddam Hussein his
final chance to disarm. He has shown instead utter contempt for the United Nations, and
for the opinion of the world. The 108 U.N. inspectors were sent to conduct -- were not
sent to conduct a scavenger hunt for hidden materials across a country the size of
California. The job of the inspectors is to verify that Iraq's regime is disarming. It is up to
Iraq to show exactly where it is hiding its banned weapons, lay those weapons out for the
world to see, and destroy them as directed. Nothing like this has happened.
The United Nations concluded in 1999 that Saddam Hussein had biological weapons
sufficient to produce over 25,000 liters of anthrax -- enough doses to kill several million
people. He hasn't accounted for that material. He's given no evidence that he has
destroyed it.
The United Nations concluded that Saddam Hussein had materials sufficient to produce
more than 38,000 liters of botulinum toxin -- enough to subject millions of people to
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death by respiratory failure. He hadn't accounted for that material. He's given no evidence
that he has destroyed it.
Our intelligence officials estimate that Saddam Hussein had the materials to produce as
much as 500 tons of sarin, mustard and VX nerve agent. In such quantities, these
chemical agents could also kill untold thousands. He's not accounted for these materials.
He has given no evidence that he has destroyed them.
U.S. intelligence indicates that Saddam Hussein had upwards of 30,000 munitions
capable of delivering chemical agents. Inspectors recently turned up 16 of them -- despite
Iraq's recent declaration denying their existence. Saddam Hussein has not accounted for
the remaining 29,984 of these prohibited munitions. He's given no evidence that he has
destroyed them.
From three Iraqi defectors we know that Iraq, in the late 1990s, had several mobile
biological weapons labs. These are designed to produce germ warfare agents, and can be
moved from place to a place to evade inspectors. Saddam Hussein has not disclosed these
facilities. He's given no evidence that he has destroyed them.
The International Atomic Energy Agency confirmed in the 1990s that Saddam Hussein
had an advanced nuclear weapons development program, had a design for a nuclear
weapon and was working on five different methods of enriching uranium for a bomb. The
British government has learned that Saddam Hussein recently sought significant
quantities of uranium from Africa. Our intelligence sources tell us that he has attempted
to purchase high-strength aluminum tubes suitable for nuclear weapons production.
Saddam Hussein has not credibly explained these activities. He clearly has much to hide.
The dictator of Iraq is not disarming. To the contrary; he is deceiving. From intelligence
sources we know, for instance, that thousands of Iraqi security personnel are at work
hiding documents and materials from the U.N. inspectors, sanitizing inspection sites and
monitoring the inspectors themselves. Iraqi officials accompany the inspectors in order to
intimidate witnesses.
Iraq is blocking U-2 surveillance flights requested by the United Nations. Iraqi
intelligence officers are posing as the scientists inspectors are supposed to interview. Real
scientists have been coached by Iraqi officials on what to say. Intelligence sources
indicate that Saddam Hussein has ordered that scientists who cooperate with U.N.
inspectors in disarming Iraq will be killed, along with their families.
Year after year, Saddam Hussein has gone to elaborate lengths, spent enormous sums,
taken great risks to build and keep weapons of mass destruction. But why? The only
possible explanation, the only possible use he could have for those weapons, is to
dominate, intimidate, or attack.
With nuclear arms or a full arsenal of chemical and biological weapons, Saddam Hussein
could resume his ambitions of conquest in the Middle East and create deadly havoc in
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that region. And this Congress and the America people must recognize another threat.
Evidence from intelligence sources, secret communications, and statements by people
now in custody reveal that Saddam Hussein aids and protects terrorists, including
members of al Qaeda. Secretly, and without fingerprints, he could provide one of his
hidden weapons to terrorists, or help them develop their own.
Before September the 11th, many in the world believed that Saddam Hussein could be
contained. But chemical agents, lethal viruses and shadowy terrorist networks are not
easily contained. Imagine those 19 hijackers with other weapons and other plans -- this
time armed by Saddam Hussein. It would take one vial, one canister, one crate slipped
into this country to bring a day of horror like none we have ever known. We will do
everything in our power to make sure that that day never comes.
Some have said we must not act until the threat is imminent. Since when have terrorists
and tyrants announced their intentions, politely putting us on notice before they strike? If
this threat is permitted to fully and suddenly emerge, all actions, all words, and all
recriminations would come too late. Trusting in the sanity and restraint of Saddam
Hussein is not a strategy, and it is not an option.
The dictator who is assembling the world's most dangerous weapons has already used
them on whole villages -- leaving thousands of his own citizens dead, blind, or
disfigured. Iraqi refugees tell us how forced confessions are obtained -- by torturing
children while their parents are made to watch. International human rights groups have
catalogued other methods used in the torture chambers of Iraq: electric shock, burning
with hot irons, dripping acid on the skin, mutilation with electric drills, cutting out
tongues, and rape. If this is not evil, then evil has no meaning.
And tonight I have a message for the brave and oppressed people of Iraq: Your enemy is
not surrounding your country -- your enemy is ruling your country. And the day he and
his regime are removed from power will be the day of your liberation.
The world has waited 12 years for Iraq to disarm. America will not accept a serious and
mounting threat to our country, and our friends and our allies. The United States will ask
the U.N. Security Council to convene on February the 5th to consider the facts of Iraq's
ongoing defiance of the world. Secretary of State Powell will present information and
intelligence about Iraqi's legal -- Iraq's illegal weapons programs, its attempt to hide those
weapons from inspectors, and its links to terrorist groups.
We will consult. But let there be no misunderstanding: If Saddam Hussein does not fully
disarm, for the safety of our people and for the peace of the world, we will lead a
coalition to disarm him.
Tonight I have a message for the men and women who will keep the peace, members of
the American Armed Forces: Many of you are assembling in or near the Middle East, and
some crucial hours may lay ahead. In those hours, the success of our cause will depend
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on you. Your training has prepared you. Your honor will guide you. You believe in
America, and America believes in you.
Sending Americans into battle is the most profound decision a President can make. The
technologies of war have changed; the risks and suffering of war have not. For the brave
Americans who bear the risk, no victory is free from sorrow. This nation fights
reluctantly, because we know the cost and we dread the days of mourning that always
come.
We seek peace. We strive for peace. And sometimes peace must be defended. A future
lived at the mercy of terrible threats is no peace at all. If war is forced upon us, we will
fight in a just cause and by just means -- sparing, in every way we can, the innocent. And
if war is forced upon us, we will fight with the full force and might of the United States
military -- and we will prevail.
And as we and our coalition partners are doing in Afghanistan, we will bring to the Iraqi
people food and medicines and supplies -- and freedom.
Many challenges, abroad and at home, have arrived in a single season. In two years,
America has gone from a sense of invulnerability to an awareness of peril; from bitter
division in small matters to calm unity in great causes. And we go forward with
confidence, because this call of history has come to the right country.
Americans are a resolute people who have risen to every test of our time. Adversity has
revealed the character of our country, to the world and to ourselves. America is a strong
nation, and honorable in the use of our strength. We exercise power without conquest,
and we sacrifice for the liberty of strangers.
Americans are a free people, who know that freedom is the right of every person and the
future of every nation. The liberty we prize is not America's gift to the world, it is God's
gift to humanity.
We Americans have faith in ourselves, but not in ourselves alone. We do not know -- we
do not claim to know all the ways of Providence, yet we can trust in them, placing our
confidence in the loving God behind all of life, and all of history.
May He guide us now. And may God continue to bless the United States of America.
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APPENDIX D
Bush’s Speech, March 17, 2003
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My fellow citizens, events in Iraq have now reached the final days of decision. For more
than a decade, the United States and other nations have pursued patient and honorable
efforts to disarm the Iraqi regime without war. That regime pledged to reveal and destroy
all its weapons of mass destruction as a condition for ending the Persian Gulf War in
1991.
Since then, the world has engaged in 12 years of diplomacy. We have passed more than a
dozen resolutions in the United Nations Security Council. We have sent hundreds of
weapons inspectors to oversee the disarmament of Iraq. Our good faith has not been
returned.
The Iraqi regime has used diplomacy as a ploy to gain time and advantage. It has
uniformly defied Security Council resolutions demanding full disarmament. Over the
years, U.N. weapon inspectors have been threatened by Iraqi officials, electronically
bugged, and systematically deceived. Peaceful efforts to disarm the Iraqi regime have
failed again and again -- because we are not dealing with peaceful men.
Intelligence gathered by this and other governments leaves no doubt that the Iraq regime
continues to possess and conceal some of the most lethal weapons ever devised. This
regime has already used weapons of mass destruction against Iraq's neighbors and against
Iraq's people.
The regime has a history of reckless aggression in the Middle East. It has a deep hatred of
America and our friends. And it has aided, trained and harbored terrorists, including
operatives of al Qaeda.
The danger is clear: using chemical, biological or, one day, nuclear weapons, obtained
with the help of Iraq, the terrorists could fulfill their stated ambitions and kill thousands
or hundreds of thousands of innocent people in our country, or any other.
The United States and other nations did nothing to deserve or invite this threat. But we
will do everything to defeat it. Instead of drifting along toward tragedy, we will set a
course toward safety. Before the day of horror can come, before it is too late to act, this
danger will be removed.
The United States of America has the sovereign authority to use force in assuring its own
national security. That duty falls to me, as Commander-in-Chief, by the oath I have
sworn, by the oath I will keep.
Recognizing the threat to our country, the United States Congress voted overwhelmingly
last year to support the use of force against Iraq. America tried to work with the United
Nations to address this threat because we wanted to resolve the issue peacefully. We
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believe in the mission of the United Nations. One reason the U.N. was founded after the
second world war was to confront aggressive dictators, actively and early, before they
can attack the innocent and destroy the peace.
In the case of Iraq, the Security Council did act, in the early 1990s. Under Resolutions
678 and 687 -- both still in effect -- the United States and our allies are authorized to use
force in ridding Iraq of weapons of mass destruction. This is not a question of authority, it
is a question of will.
Last September, I went to the U.N. General Assembly and urged the nations of the world
to unite and bring an end to this danger. On November 8th, the Security Council
unanimously passed Resolution 1441, finding Iraq in material breach of its obligations,
and vowing serious consequences if Iraq did not fully and immediately disarm.
Today, no nation can possibly claim that Iraq has disarmed. And it will not disarm so
long as Saddam Hussein holds power. For the last four-and-a-half months, the United
States and our allies have worked within the Security Council to enforce that Council's
long-standing demands. Yet, some permanent members of the Security Council have
publicly announced they will veto any resolution that compels the disarmament of Iraq.
These governments share our assessment of the danger, but not our resolve to meet it.
Many nations, however, do have the resolve and fortitude to act against this threat to
peace, and a broad coalition is now gathering to enforce the just demands of the world.
The United Nations Security Council has not lived up to its responsibilities, so we will
rise to ours.
In recent days, some governments in the Middle East have been doing their part. They
have delivered public and private messages urging the dictator to leave Iraq, so that
disarmament can proceed peacefully. He has thus far refused. All the decades of deceit
and cruelty have now reached an end. Saddam Hussein and his sons must leave Iraq
within 48 hours. Their refusal to do so will result in military conflict, commenced at a
time of our choosing. For their own safety, all foreign nationals -- including journalists
and inspectors -- should leave Iraq immediately.
Many Iraqis can hear me tonight in a translated radio broadcast, and I have a message for
them. If we must begin a military campaign, it will be directed against the lawless men
who rule your country and not against you. As our coalition takes away their power, we
will deliver the food and medicine you need. We will tear down the apparatus of terror
and we will help you to build a new Iraq that is prosperous and free. In a free Iraq, there
will be no more wars of aggression against your neighbors, no more poison factories, no
more executions of dissidents, no more torture chambers and rape rooms. The tyrant will
soon be gone. The day of your liberation is near.
It is too late for Saddam Hussein to remain in power. It is not too late for the Iraqi
military to act with honor and protect your country by permitting the peaceful entry of
coalition forces to eliminate weapons of mass destruction. Our forces will give Iraqi
military units clear instructions on actions they can take to avoid being attacked and
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destroyed. I urge every member of the Iraqi military and intelligence services, if war
comes, do not fight for a dying regime that is not worth your own life.
And all Iraqi military and civilian personnel should listen carefully to this warning. In
any conflict, your fate will depend on your action. Do not destroy oil wells, a source of
wealth that belongs to the Iraqi people. Do not obey any command to use weapons of
mass destruction against anyone, including the Iraqi people. War crimes will be
prosecuted. War criminals will be punished. And it will be no defense to say, "I was just
following orders."
Should Saddam Hussein choose confrontation, the American people can know that every
measure has been taken to avoid war, and every measure will be taken to win it.
Americans understand the costs of conflict because we have paid them in the past. War
has no certainty, except the certainty of sacrifice.
Yet, the only way to reduce the harm and duration of war is to apply the full force and
might of our military, and we are prepared to do so. If Saddam Hussein attempts to cling
to power, he will remain a deadly foe until the end. In desperation, he and terrorists
groups might try to conduct terrorist operations against the American people and our
friends. These attacks are not inevitable. They are, however, possible. And this very fact
underscores the reason we cannot live under the threat of blackmail. The terrorist threat
to America and the world will be diminished the moment that Saddam Hussein is
disarmed.
Our government is on heightened watch against these dangers. Just as we are preparing to
ensure victory in Iraq, we are taking further actions to protect our homeland. In recent
days, American authorities have expelled from the country certain individuals with ties to
Iraqi intelligence services. Among other measures, I have directed additional security of
our airports, and increased Coast Guard patrols of major seaports. The Department of
Homeland Security is working closely with the nation's governors to increase armed
security at critical facilities across America.
Should enemies strike our country, they would be attempting to shift our attention with
panic and weaken our morale with fear. In this, they would fail. No act of theirs can alter
the course or shake the resolve of this country. We are a peaceful people -- yet we're not a
fragile people, and we will not be intimidated by thugs and killers. If our enemies dare to
strike us, they and all who have aided them, will face fearful consequences.
We are now acting because the risks of inaction would be far greater. In one year, or five
years, the power of Iraq to inflict harm on all free nations would be multiplied many
times over. With these capabilities, Saddam Hussein and his terrorist allies could choose
the moment of deadly conflict when they are strongest. We choose to meet that threat
now, where it arises, before it can appear suddenly in our skies and cities.
The cause of peace requires all free nations to recognize new and undeniable realities. In
the 20th century, some chose to appease murderous dictators, whose threats were allowed
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to grow into genocide and global war. In this century, when evil men plot chemical,
biological and nuclear terror, a policy of appeasement could bring destruction of a kind
never before seen on this earth.
Terrorists and terror states do not reveal these threats with fair notice, in formal
declarations -- and responding to such enemies only after they have struck first is not
self-defense, it is suicide. The security of the world requires disarming Saddam Hussein
now.
As we enforce the just demands of the world, we will also honor the deepest
commitments of our country. Unlike Saddam Hussein, we believe the Iraqi people are
deserving and capable of human liberty. And when the dictator has departed, they can set
an example to all the Middle East of a vital and peaceful and self-governing nation.
The United States, with other countries, will work to advance liberty and peace in that
region. Our goal will not be achieved overnight, but it can come over time. The power
and appeal of human liberty is felt in every life and every land. And the greatest power of
freedom is to overcome hatred and violence, and turn the creative gifts of men and
women to the pursuits of peace.
That is the future we choose. Free nations have a duty to defend our people by uniting
against the violent. And tonight, as we have done before, America and our allies accept
that responsibility.
Good night, and may God continue to bless America.
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APPENDIX E
Bush’s Address to the Nation, March 19, 2003
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My fellow citizens, at this hour, American and coalition forces are in the early stages of
military operations to disarm Iraq, to free its people and to defend the world from grave
danger.
On my orders, coalition forces have begun striking selected targets of military importance
to undermine Saddam Hussein's ability to wage war. These are opening stages of what
will be a broad and concerted campaign. More than 35 countries are giving crucial
support -- from the use of naval and air bases, to help with intelligence and logistics, to
the deployment of combat units. Every nation in this coalition has chosen to bear the duty
and share the honor of serving in our common defense.
To all the men and women of the United States Armed Forces now in the Middle East,
the peace of a troubled world and the hopes of an oppressed people now depend on you.
That trust is well placed.
The enemies you confront will come to know your skill and bravery. The people you
liberate will witness the honorable and decent spirit of the American military. In this
conflict, America faces an enemy who has no regard for conventions of war or rules of
morality. Saddam Hussein has placed Iraqi troops and equipment in civilian areas,
attempting to use innocent men, women and children as shields for his own military -- a
final atrocity against his people.
I want Americans and all the world to know that coalition forces will make every effort to
spare innocent civilians from harm. A campaign on the harsh terrain of a nation as large
as California could be longer and more difficult than some predict. And helping Iraqis
achieve a united, stable and free country will require our sustained commitment.
We come to Iraq with respect for its citizens, for their great civilization and for the
religious faiths they practice. We have no ambition in Iraq, except to remove a threat and
restore control of that country to its own people.
I know that the families of our military are praying that all those who serve will return
safely and soon. Millions of Americans are praying with you for the safety of your loved
ones and for the protection of the innocent. For your sacrifice, you have the gratitude and
respect of the American people. And you can know that our forces will be coming home
as soon as their work is done.
Our nation enters this conflict reluctantly -- yet, our purpose is sure. The people of the
United States and our friends and allies will not live at the mercy of an outlaw regime
that threatens the peace with weapons of mass murder. We will meet that threat now,
with our Army, Air Force, Navy, Coast Guard and Marines, so that we do not have to
meet it later with armies of fire fighters and police and doctors on the streets of our cities.
92
Now that conflict has come, the only way to limit its duration is to apply decisive force.
And I assure you, this will not be a campaign of half measures, and we will accept no
outcome but victory.
My fellow citizens, the dangers to our country and the world will be overcome. We will
pass through this time of peril and carry on the work of peace. We will defend our
freedom. We will bring freedom to others and we will prevail.
May God bless our country and all who defend her.
93
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BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH
Mark Baseman received his Bachelor of Science Degree in Communication from
Florida State University in the spring of 2004. This thesis is the final requirement for a
Master of Science Degree in Rhetorical and Political Communication Theory from the
same University. While at Florida State, Mr. Baseman taught thirteen sections of Public
Speaking and, consequently, heard an ungodly number of speeches. Following
graduation, Mr. Baseman plans to begin a career in a yet-to-be-determined field.
Currently, though, he resides in an apartment with his ex-girlfriend and six mice of
varying temperament. He is running dangerously low on shirts and has an incredibly hard
time buying new ones.
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