CMI working paper no. 13, 2016
Dimensions of broadband policies and developments
Morten Falch & Anders Henten
Center for Communication, Media and Information technologies (CMI), Electronic
Systems, AAU Copenhagen, Denmark
CMI Working Paper no. 13:
Morten Falch & Anders Henten (2016) Dimensions of broadband policies and developments. AAU,
Copenhagen
ISBN: 978-87-7152-095-8
This paper has been presented at the 2016 ITS Biennial Conference, Taipei, Taiwan
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Dimensionsofbroadbandpoliciesanddevelopments
MortenFalchandAndersHenten
CenterforCommunication,MediaandInformationtechnologies(CMI)
ElectronicSystems,AAUCopenhagen
ITS21stBiennialConference
Taipei,Taiwan
26-29June2016
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Dimensionsofbroadbandpoliciesanddevelopments
MortenFalchandAndersHenten
1. Introduction
Thereisacontinuousdiscussiononthedevelopmentandcomparisonofbroadband
infrastructuresandbroadbandstrategiesinthedifferentcountriesandregionsaroundtheworld
(e.g.LemstraandMelody,2014;Yoo,2014).IstheUSaheadofEurope,orisittheotherway
round,andhowaboutEastAsiancountries?And,arethereanypolicyreasonsforit?Notonlycan
differentstatisticsbeusedandbepresentedindifferentmanners.Thereisalsoanon-going
debateontheprimaryfactorsaffectingbroadbanddevelopment.Inthispaper,threeofthemost
importantpolicydimensionsaffectingbroadbanddevelopmentsarepresentedandcountry
examplesarediscussed.
Anoftendebatedissueregardingbroadbanddevelopmentisinfrastructure(orfacility-based)vs.
servicecompetition(Bourreau&Doğan,2004;Briglauer,2013).Isitbesttopromote
infrastructurecompetitioninordertoexpandandupgradetelecommunicationinfrastructuresor
canservicecompetitionalsobeanavenuetoinfrastructurecompetition?Europeancountrieshave
seenservicecompetitionasawayalsotopromotesubscriptiontake-upbutalsoinfrastructure
competitioninthelongrun,whiletheUSrelativelyearlygaveprioritytoinfrastructure
competition.
Asecondimportantfactoristheemphasisonrespectivelyregulatoryvs.developmentalmeasures
(Lemstra&Melody,2014;Falch&Henten,2015).Somecountrieshaveprioritizedbuildinga
regulatoryframeworkforthedevelopmentofthetelecommunicationareawithoutmuchdirect
publiceconomicsupportforbuildinginfrastructures,whileothercountrieshavefolloweda
developmentaltrackwithahigherdegreeofdirecteconomicsupportforinfrastructureexpansion.
ThoughtheUSactuallyhaspublicprogramsforsupportinginfrastructureimprovementand
expansion,theUSisoftenseenasanexampleofacountryfollowingaregulatorymodel,while
countriesinEastAsia,forinstanceSouthKorea,haveprovidedpubliceconomicsupportto
infrastructurebuild-outandhavefollowedadevelopmentaltrack.
Athirddimensionisconcernedwiththeprioritygiventonetworkdevelopmentvs.theuseand
applicationofthenetworkresources(Igari,2013).Insomecountries,theimplicitassumptionhas
beenthatifnetworksarebuilt,content,servicesandapplicationswillfollow.Inothercountries,
publiccontent,servicesandapplicationsandthesupportforprivatecontent,servicesand
applicationshavebeengivenmoreemphasis.Japanisanexampleofacountrythathasfocusedon
expandingnetworksandincreasingcapacity.SomeEuropeanstateshavetoalargerextentgiven
emphasistodevelopingpublicservices.
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Inthepaper,wewilldenotethesethreedimensions:
•
•
•
Infrastructurevs.servicecompetition
Regulatoryvs.developmentalpolicies
Networksvs.contentprioritization
Allthreedimensionsareimportantforthedevelopmentofbroadbandinfrastructuresandcanbe
foundinnumerousvaryingcombinationsindifferentcountries.Theprioritizationofinfrastructure
competitionoverservicecompetitionisnotnecessarilyfollowedbyafocusonadevelopmental
strategywithpubliceconomicsupporttoinfrastructureexpansion.TheUSisanexampleofa
countrycombininginfrastructurecompetitionwitharegulatoryemphasis,andJapanisan
exampleofacountryfollowingastrategywithafocusoninfrastructurecompetitionanda
developmentalpolicy.Thereisnotasimplerelationshipbetweenthethreedifferentdimensions.
Thepaperexaminesthesestrategicprioritiesanddiscussescountryexamplesandtheir
combinationsofthedimensionsofbroadbandstrategies.Theaimofthepaperistobuilda
conceptualframeworkforanalysingbroadbandpoliciesindifferentcountries.Emphasisison
policiesandregulation.Itisacknowledgedthatmanyotherfactorsinfluencebroadband
developments,firstandforemosttheeconomicwealthofthecountriesinquestionandthe
factorswhichbroadbandpolicieshavenoneorverylittleinfluenceonsuchasgeographyor
educationallevelanddistribution.Thispaperfocusesondimensions,whichareinfluencedby
policiesandregulationandwhich,therefore,aresubjecttosomedegreeofchange-takingpolicy
inertiaintoconsideration.
First,thereisanoverviewsectionofthetrendsintheliteratureonbroadbanddevelopmentswith
apolicyfocus.Thereafter,thethreedimensionsappliedinthispaperarepresentedanddiscussed
–withinfrastructurevs.servicecompetitionfirst,regulatoryvs.developmentalpoliciessecond,
andnetworksvs.contentprioritizationlast.Furthermore,thereisasection,wherecombinations
ofpoliciesrelatingtothethreedimensionsareanalysedusingcountryexamples.Last,thereisa
conclusionsummarizingcountryexamples.
2. Trendsintheliteratureonbroadbanddevelopments
Howcannationaldifferencesintheadoptionofbroadbandservicesbeexplained?Thisquestion
hasdirectlyorindirectlybeenthesubjectofnumerousstudiesonbroadbandpoliciesand
strategies.Inordertoanswerthisquestion,atleastthreedifferentapproachescanbeidentified:
theoreticalmodellingofincentivestructuresrelatingtodifferentregulatorypolicies,econometric
studiesestimatingtheimpactofvarioussocio-economicandpolicyfactors,andcomparisonof
countrycases.Eachofsuchstudieshasapplieditsowncategorizationofpolicyandregulatory
measuresandishighlyinfluencedbythekindsofrelevantpolicymeasuresconsideredfor
implementationinpracticeatthepointintime.However,theyarealsoinspiredbytheoretical
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conceptsdevelopedinacademicpapersoninnovationeconomics,newinstitutionaleconomics,
informationeconomics,orpoliticaleconomy.
SinceSchumpeterputemphasisontheroleoftechnologyineconomicdevelopment(e.g.
Schumpeter,1946),thefactorsstimulatinginnovationslowlystartedattractingattentionandso
havethekindsofpoliciesstimulatingthesefactors.Schumpeterfocusedontechnologyasan
engineforeconomicgrowth.Eventhoughhedidnottreatinnovationasanentirelyexogenous
process,hecanbeseenastheoriginatorofthetechnologypushhypothesis(Coombsetal.,1987).
Schmookler(1966),ontheotherhand,sawinnovationasaninteractiveprocessinvolvingmarketpullaswellastechnology-push(Coombsetal.,1987).
Inthe1960sand1970s,theextenttowhichtherateanddirectionofinnovationwasdependent
onsupplyanddemandwasdebated(Nemet,2009),andthisdistinctionisappliedinlaterstudies
ontechnicalchangeandeconomictheoryforinstanceintheconceptofthetechno-economic
paradigms(Freeman&Perez,1988).
Lookingatinnovationsfromthepolicyside,Hall(1986)makesadistinctionbetweendirectand
indirectpolicytools,wheredirectpolicytoolsincludedirectgovernmentparticipationin
innovativeactivities,whileindirectpolicytoolsincludeimprovedinformationflows,public
purchasingpolicy,co-ordinationofactivitiesofprivatefirms,patentpolicies,andsubsidiesand
fiscalincentives.AsimilardistinctionismadeinastudyonbroadbandpoliciesbyFalch(2007).This
studydistinguishesbetweendirectintervention,regulationandfacilitation.Likethenew
institutionaleconomists,Hall(1986)seesinnovationpolicyinthecontextofmarketfailuressuch
asuncertaintyandincompleteinformationthatmayleadtounderinvestmentininnovation
activities.Thescopeofinnovationpoliciesisthustocorrectpossiblemarketfailures.
IntheiranalysisofinstitutionalfactorsinITinnovation(Kingetal.,1994)combinethetwo
dimensionssupply-pushvs.demand-pullandinfluencevs.regulation,ina2x2tablewherethey
categorizedifferentinnovationpolicies.
TABLE1:INSTITUTIONALFACTORSINITINNOVATION
Supplypush
Influence
Knowledgebuilding
Knowledgedeployment
Subsidy
Innovationdirective
Regulation
Knowledgedeployment
Subsidy
Standards
Innovationdirective
Source:Kingetal.(1994)
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Demandpull
Knowledgedeployment
Subsidy
Mobilization
Subsidy
Standards
Innovationdirective
Subsidiesareincludedasacategoryinallfields,assubsidiescanbeprovidedtoR&D(supplypush)
aswellastotheuseofaninnovation(demandpull).Subsidiesmayeitherbeprovidedthrough
specificfundinginitiativesorasapartoftheregulationofthemarket.Itshouldbenotedthatthe
termregulationusedbyKingetal.differsfromthekindsofregulationusuallyincludedina
telecomregulatoryframework.RegulationintheKingetal.contextisdirectedatthefacilitationof
innovativeactivities,suchasrequirementsforinvestmentsinR&D,subsidiesforR&D,and
knowledgedeployment.Regulatorytoolsaddressingcompetitionissuesarenotmentionedatall
inthisframework.Theonlyregulatorytool,whichmayfallundertheauspicesofanormaltelecom
regulatormentionedintheframework,isstandardization.TheKingetalframeworkhasbeen
appliedinanumberofotherICTinnovationstudies(Damsgaard&Lyytinen,2001;Silva&
Figueroa,2002;Leeetal.,2002;Thaietal.,2016).Frieden(2005)appliesasimilarframework,
wherehedistinguishesbetweenregulation,supplystimulationanddemandstimulation.
Alargenumberofboththeoreticalandeconometricstudiesfocusonregulationasthekeypolicy
toolforthepromotionofbroadbandinvestments-seeCambini&Jiang(2009)foraliterature
review.Thedistinctionhereisbetweenregulationofretailpricesandregulationofaccess
includingregulationofwholesaleprices.Theissueishowtoprovidetherightincentivesto
incumbentsaswellasnewentrantoperatorsinordertostimulateinvestments.Especiallyin
Europe,manypaperstesttheladderofinvestmenthypothesisformulatedbyCave(2006).
Baueretal.(2005)representsanearlyattempttomeasuretheimpactofnationalbroadband
policieswithaslightlydifferentcategorizationofregulatorytools.Adistinctionismadebetween
unbundling,separationofcableandtelecomnetworks,andgovernmentfundingtosupport
broadbanddeployment.
Anon-goingdiscussioninbroadbandpolicyiswhetherinvestmentsintheinfrastructureshouldbe
promotedthroughthecreationofacompetitivemarketorbyprovidingpublicsubsidies.This
leadstoadistinctionbetweenregulationanddirectintervention.Inotherstudiesthedistinctionis
betweenpromotionofcompetitionbytheuseofvariousregulatorymeasuresandinfrastructure
support,forinstancebyengagementinPPParrangements(Picot&Wernick,2007;Falch&
Henten,2007).Montolio&Trillas(2013)makeasimilardistinctionastheytalkaboutpolicies
‘relatedtomarketpower(regulationandcompetitionpolicy)andthoserelatedtopositive
externalities(networkexternalitiesandimpactonoveralleconomicgrowth)’.Itshouldbenoted
thatwhilethefirsttypeiscarriedoutatthenationalorinternationallevels,thesecondtypeis
oftencarriedoutatmoredecentralizedlevels(regionalormunicipal).
Thegeneraltrendsintheliteratureonbroadbanddevelopmentsaremostlycentredonsupplyand
demandfactors,supply-pushanddemand-pull,directandindirectpolicyinterventions,and
regulatorymeasures.Inthispaper,wewillconcentrateonthreeissues:infrastructurevs.service
competition,regulatoryvs.developmentalpolicies,andnetworksvs.contentprioritization.
Infrastructurevs.servicecompetitionisatopicoftendealtwithinconnectionwithregulatory
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discussions;regulatoryvs.developmentalpoliciesclearlyrelatetosupply-pushanddemand-pull
andtodirectandindirectpolicymeasures;andnetworksvs.contentisalsoanissueconcerning
supplyanddemandfactors.
3. Infrastructurevs.servicecompetition
Arecurringissueinthepolicydebatesonbroadbanddevelopmentshasbeenconcernedwith
infrastructure(facility-based)andservicecompetition.Infrastructurecompetitionmeansthe
competitionbetweenalternativebroadbandinfrastructureswhetherthesametechnologiesare
usedorcompetitionreliesontheuseofdifferenttechnologies.Servicecompetitionmeansthat
networkoperatorsusethesameinfrastructuresbutcompeteonnetworkservices.The
technologiesmostlyusedareDSL(basedonPSTN-infrastructures),cablemodem(basedoncable
networks),fibre,andmobileorotherwirelesstechnologies.Itshouldbenotedthatthedefinition
ofinfrastructurevaries,asfullunbundlinginmanypublicationsisdefinedasfacility-based
competition.Theargumentisthatoperatorsmustinvestintheirownactivecomponentssuchas
switchesandroutersandthatonlythepassivecablesareshared.Inthiscontext,facility-based
competitionisdefinedascompetitionbetweenindependentnetworkinfrastructures,whereonly
sharingofductsormastsisallowed.
Whenbroadbandstartedbeingspreadtothegeneralresidentialandbusinessmarketinthe
1990s,thereweren’tanymobilebroadbandsolutionsavailableandtheissuewashowtocreate
competitioninthefixedbroadbandarea.Asinfrastructureswere,toaverylargeextent,ownedby
theincumbenttelecommunicationoperators,theimmediateandprimaryquestionwashowthese
infrastructurescouldbemadeaccessibletoalternativeoperators.Thebroadbandcompetition
issuewasthussimilartothenarrowbandtelephonyissue,wherecompetitionwasalsoprimarily
settobebasedonservicecompetition.Inmobiletelephony,theissuewasdifferentasnetworks
hadtobeestablishedfromscratchandprioritywasoncreatingcompetinginfrastructures.
Thoughfocuswasonservicecompetitioninbroadbandprovision,therewasnodisagreementas
towhetherservicecompetitionwasas‘good’asinfrastructurecompetition.Infrastructure
competitionwasgenerallyconsideredtobethemostsustainablesolutioninthelongrun.
However,forthetimebeing,servicecompetitionneededtobepromotedasitwouldotherwise
takelongtocreatecompetitiononbroadbandmarkets.Thequestionthusbecamehow
infrastructurecompetitioncouldbeestablishedinthelongerrunwhilebuildingservice
competitioninashorterperspective,bringingbroadbandpricesdownandincreasingsubscription
tobroadbandservices.
Thetheoryoftheladderofinvestment(LoI),stylizedbyMartinCave(Cave,2006),cametobethe
answertothisquestion–atleastinEurope.TheideaintheLoItheoryisthatnewoperatorswill
enterthemarketsusingtheinfrastructuresofexistingoperators,andthentheywillclimbupthe
rungsoftheladderastheygetabettergriponthemarkets,eventuallydeployingtheirown
infrastructures.Thistheoryhasbeenextensivelyscrutinizedsinceitwaslaunched(Briglaueretal.,
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2003;Bourreauetal.,2010).Ithasbeenusedinpracticebyregulators,andithasbeendebated
andtestedbyacademics.Fromtheacademicside,therehasbeenmuchcriticism.Thecritiquehas
beenthatthepossibilityforalternativeoperatorstogetaccesstothenetworksoftheincumbents
willtendtolimitinvestmentsinnewinfrastructuresbynewcomers.Furthermore,ithasbeen
indicatedthatnewoperatorsdonotembarkonajourneygoingfromthelowestservice-based
rungstothehighestinfrastructure-basedlevels.Theywilleitherstaywithservicecompetitionor
godirectlytoinfrastructureinvestments.
Inaresponsetosuchcritique,Cavehasshownthatthereareactuallyoperatorswhichstartfrom
leasingcapacityorusingbitstreamaccessandeventuallygrowintousingunbundling(Cave,
2014).However,thisisalsowhereitends.Thereisnotapaththatleadsfromunbundlingto
investmentsinowncableinfrastructures.TheLoIonlyappliestothedifferentcategoriesof
competitionnotincludingnewcabledeployment.
Withrespecttotheissueregardingimplicationsforinvestmentsofservice-basedcompetition,Yoo
(2014)hasarguedthatitmaybetruethatservice-basedcompetitionleadstolowerpricesand,
consequently,highersubscriptionrates,butservice-basedcompetitiondoesnotleadtohigher
coveragebyhigh-speedconnections–NextGenerationAccessnetworks(NGA).Yoohasshown
thatthereisacorrelationbetweenhighpercentagesofDSLlinesprovidedbynewentrantsand
lowpercentagesofNGAcoverage.
Thegeneralconclusionseemstobethatservice-basedcompetitionpromotesimmediate
competition,leadingtolowerpricesandhighersubscriptionrates,butthatitmaylimit
investmentsinnewinfrastructuresandcoveragebyhigh-speedtechnologies.Service-based
competitionsupportsstaticcompetition,whileinfrastructure-basedcompetitionsupports
dynamiccompetition.
WhenbroadbandusingDSLtechnologybrokethrough,service-basedcompetitionbecamethe
preferredmodeofregulatoryintervention.Provisionsformandatoryaccessrulesand
interconnectionpriceswereestablished.ThisappliestoEuropeaswellastheUSandmostother
countries.However,thepoliciesoftheUSandtheEuropeancountriesrelativelyquicklydiverged.
WhiletheEUmaintainedastrongemphasisonservice-basedcompetition,theUSdecidedto
abandonthefocusonservice-competitionandtogiveprioritytoinfrastructurecompetition.
Service-basedcompetitionhasprimarilybeenappliedonDSLtechnologybutcanalsoapplyto
cableandfibre.TheprimaryreasonforDSLbeingatthecentreofdiscussionisthatthePSTN
infrastructureswerethemostwidespreadnetworks,andthattheincumbenttelephoneoperators
didnothavethesamedominantpositioninothertechnologyareassuchascableandfibre.Infact,
operatorsinEuropewereforcedtodivesttheircablenetworksinordertopromotecompetition.
Mobilehastakenquiteadifferentregulatorytrajectory.Whendigitalmobilecommunicationswas
launchedintheearly1990s,morethanoneoperatorwasgenerallylicensedandprovidedwith
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frequenciestooperate.Inordertopromotethedeploymentofmobilenetworks,nationalroaming
wasmostlynotallowed.Therewastobefullinfrastructurecompetition.Thishas,however,
changedwiththedevelopmentsinmobile.Competitiononmobilemarketshasbeenfiercedriving
downpricestoalevelwherethenumberofoperatorswithownnetworks(MNOs)hasstarted
shrinking.Withthecontinuousnewgenerationsofmobiletechnologies,itbecomesless
economicallysustainablewithfullanddirectinfrastructurecompetition.Thisisthereasonwhy,
facilitysharinghasincreasinglybeenpromotedpolitically.
Seenfromaverygeneralpointofview,theregulatorytrajectoriesoffixedandmobile
technologies,respectively,havethusdevelopedinoppositedirections.Whilefixedlinebroadband
regulationhasbecomelessorientedtowardsservice-basedcompetition,mobilehasdeveloped
towardsputtingmoreemphasisonservicecompetition.Thishas,however,beencombinedwitha
greaterdegreeofpublicfundingoffixedinfrastructureupgrades,wherethemostprominent
combinationwillbeservicecompetitiononthebasisoftheinfrastructurewithpublicfunding.
Othercombinationsare,however,possible.Publicfundingcangotooperatorsin,forinstance,an
openbid,wherethewinningoperatorswillcompetewithotherinfrastructureproviders.
Combinationswillbediscussedinalatersectionofthepaper.
4. Regulatoryvs.developmentalpolicies
TheseconddimensiondistinguishesbetweentwodifferentapproachestoICTpolicy–aregulatory
andadevelopmentalapproach.ThisdistinctionisinspiredbyChalmersJohnson(1982)andby
GiandomenicoMajone(1997),andisappliedinafewstudiesonbroadbandpolicy(Lemstra&
Melody,2014;Falch&Henten,2015).InhisbookontheJapanesepost-warmiracle,Johnson
introducedtheconceptofthedevelopmentalstateasopposedtotheregulatorystate.According
theJohnson,theroleofthestatebureaucracyinadevelopmentalstateincludes‘first,toidentify
andchoosetheindustriestobedeveloped(industrialstructurepolicy);secondtoidentifythebest
meansofrapidlydevelopingthechosenindustries’(Johnson,1982).
Thedevelopmentalstateiscontrastedwiththeregulatorystate,wherethestateismainly
concernedwithfacilitatingeconomiccompetition,butnotwithdirectinterventioninsubstantive
matters.JapanwasanexampleofadevelopmentalstatewhiletheUSismentionedasan
exampleofaregulatorystate.Johnson(1982)claimsthatstateinterventionandespeciallytherole
oftheMinistryofTradeandIndustry(MITI)playedaninstrumentalroleinthesuccessful
economicdevelopmentinJapan.Inalatercontribution,hesuggeststhatotherEastAsian
countries(HongKong,Taiwan,SouthKorea,andChina)eachhavedevelopedtheirownversionsof
thedevelopmentalstate(Johnson,1999).
AccordingtoMajone(1997),Europeancountrieswereforcedtochangetheirmodeofgovernance
indirectionofaregulatorymodelinresponsetothechallengescreatedbyincreasinginternational
competitionanddeepeningeconomicintegrationwithintheEUinthelate1970s.Thisincluded
privatizationofpublicenterprisesincludingpublicutilities,liberalizationofmarkets,and
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regulatoryreforms.Historically,publicownershiphasbeenthemainmodeofregulationinEurope
(Majone,1997).Withprivatization,newmodesofgovernancehadtobedeveloped.Especially
withintheareaofpublicutilities,privatizationhadtobeaccompaniedbyregulatoryreform.
Inthecontextofthepresentpaper,regulationembracesprimarilyactivitiescarriedoutby
nationaltelecomauthorities.Thisincludessectorspecificregulation,whileregulatoryissues
addressingtheeconomymoregenerallyareomittedfromthisframework.
Theobjectiveofaregulatoryapproachistocreateastablepolicyframeworkforaliberalized
telecommarketwithrealcompetition.Theinstrumentsinthisapproacharerulemakingand
correctionofmarketfailures.However,directmarketinterventionsaretobeavoided.This
approachistheoreticallysupportedbyinstitutionaleconomics.Theargumentisherethatastable
regulatoryenvironmentreducestransactioncostsandstimulatesinvestments(Spiller&Tommasi,
2008).
ThedevelopmentalapproachistostimulateinvestmentsandtheuseofICTthroughvariouspublic
sectorinitiatedactivities.Theinstrumentsincludepolicies,whicharemoreintrusivethanthose
appliedintheregulatoryapproach.Thesecouldbepublicinvestmentsanddirectmarket
intervention,e.g.intheformofpublicprivatepartnershipsprovidingpublicsupportto
infrastructuredevelopmentorsubsidiestouseorsupplyICTservices.Thisapproachissupported
by,forinstance,Stiglitz(1998)andisinlinewithconceptofthedevelopmentalstate(Johnson,
1982).However,itincludesalsolessintrusivemeasuressuchasdemandstimulationviapublic
consumptionorupgradeofICTskillsofthecitizens.
WithintheareaofICT,EUpolicieshaveincludedregulatoryaswellasdevelopmentalinitiatives.
TheEUinitiativeshavefollowedatleastthreedifferenttracks.ThefirsttrackinitiatedbytheEU
Commissionfocusedonthetelecommanufacturingindustryandincludedfundingof
precompetitiveresearchandstandardization.Eventhoughtheseactivitiescarefullyweredefined
inawaysothatmarketdistortionsweretobeavoided,thefirsttrackisclearlyinlinewiththe
developmentalmodeofgovernance.Thesecondtrackfocusesontheliberalizationofthetelecom
serviceindustryandwasintroducedwiththeGreenPaperin1987(CEC,1987).Theaimwasto
stimulategrowthandcompetitiononacommonEuropeanwidetelecommarket,andthe
instrumentswereprivatization,liberalization,andregulation.Thethirdtrackhasabroader
perspective,asitincludestheentireICTecosystem.Thisstreamincludesaseriesofconsecutive
developmentplanssuchase-Europe,i2010andEurope2020.Theseplanscontainanumberof
developmentalinitiativesstimulatingtheuseofICTapplicationssuchase-governmentandehealth.
Majone(1997),atthetime,observedaEuropeantrendtowardstheregulatorymodeof
governance.Howevercurrently,itseemsthatwithregardtoICT,thedevelopmentalgovernance
modehasgainedimportance.Onereasonisthattheregulatoryinstrumentsused-oratleastthe
mannerinwhichtheyhavebeenused-accordingtosomescholars(e.g.Melody,2013),have
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proventobeinsufficienttofacilitatethedevelopmentofbroadbandinfrastructuresatan
adequatespeed,andmanycountriesaresearchingforalternativepolicyinstruments(Falch,
2008).Accordingto(Galperin,Mariscal&Viecens,2013)asimilartrendcanbeobservedinLatin
America.
Lemstra&Melody(2014)applytheconceptofthedevelopmentalstateinasummarychapter
comparingnationalstrategies.Inthisstudy,theUSisseenasanexampleofaregulatorystate,
whileSouthKoreaappliesthedevelopmentalmodel.Betweenthesetwoextremeswefindmost
oftheEUcountries.UKisleaningtowardstheregulatorymodel,whileFranceismoreoriented
towardsthedevelopmentalmodel.However,evenintheUS,anumberofdevelopmental
initiativeshavebeentaken(Falch&Henten,2010).
Accordingto(Greenwald&Stiglitz,2012)industrialpoliciesarebackinfashion.WithintheICT
areathisisrelatedtothegrowingimportanceofaccesstoICTservices.Thisrevivaldoesnotimply
areturntoKeynesianinspiredpoliciespracticedinthepost-warperiod.Todaydevelopmental
initiativesmustbedesignedinaway,sothattheyconformtotheEUinternalmarketregulation
andaliberalmarketenvironment.Resourceallocationandchoiceoftechnologiesare,wheneverit
ispossible,lefttoprivateenterprises,e.g.withtheestablishmentofpublicprivatepartnerships.
5. Networkvs.contentprioritization
Thethirddimensionisconcernedwithnetworksandcontent.Arebroadbandpoliciesmainly
concernedwiththedeploymentofnetworksoraretheyalsoconcernedwiththecreationand
diffusionofcontent?It’sobviousthatcontentandnetworksarecomplementary.Wide
distributionofcontentisnolongerviablewithoutappropriatenetworkfacilitiesandnetworks
withoutcontentwillbemeaningless.However,emphasisinpolicyprioritizationcandifferfroma
primaryfocusoncontentcreationornetworkdeployment.Thequestionis:whichistheprimary
driverforthecomplementarycontentandnetworkdevelopment?
Inthepresentpaper,focusisonpolicyimplications.Thecomplementarydevelopmentofcontent
andnetworksdoesnotnecessarilyneedanypublicintervention,butifdeemedimportant,public
policycansupportnetworkprovisionaswellasdemand,andcontentprovisionaswellasdemand.
Networkprovision(supply)aswellasdemandcanbebasedondevelopmentalaswellas
regulatorypolicies,andthesameappliestocontentprovision(supply)anddemand.Furthermore,
networkprovisionaswellasdemandcanbecombinedwiththeprioritizationofinfrastructurebasedorservice-basedcompetition.And,thesameappliestocontentprovisionaswellas
demand.Therearemultiplecombinationpossibilities.
InEuropeanICTpolicies,thewholeDigitalAgendapaysmuchattentiontothecontentside.The
DigitalAgendais,toalargeextent,concernedwiththeapplicationsofICTs,i.e.whatICTsand
specificallybroadbandcanbeusedforconcerningresidentialaswellasbusinessapplications.
ThereareinEuropeanICTpoliciestwomaintrajectoriessincethebeginningofthetelecomreform
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process.Onetrendfocusesonthenetworksideandhasprimarilybeenconcernedwiththe
liberalizationandregulationofthetelecomindustry.Theothertrendhasalsoreferredtonetwork
developmentsbuthas,firstandforemost,beendealingwiththedevelopmentofcontent,
applicationsandservices.TheDigitalAgendaisthelatestversionofthistrend,whichpreviously
hasbeenpromotedundertheheadingsofe-Europe,i2010andEurope2010.
SomecountriesinEuropehavebeenespeciallyconcentratedoncontent,applicationsand
services.Thisapplies,forinstance,totheNordiccountries,wheremuchfocushasbeenonegovernmentapplications.Requirementsoncitizensandbusinessestoseekinformation,toreport
topublicauthoritiesandapplyforpublicserviceshavecontributedtopromotingtheuptakeof
broadband.Theprimeconcernmaynothavebeenontheimplicationsforbroadbandextension,
butithasbeenseenasaconcertedactionforsupportingadigitalsocietycomprisingcontent,
applicationsandservicesaswellasnetworkinfrastructures.
Whiletelecompolicy,addressinginfrastructureissues,hasbeensubjecttointensiveacademic
researchformorethanacentury,researchonpoliciesregardingcontent,applicationsandservices
isofamorerecentorigin.Apartfromthefactthattelecominfrastructuresformerlyweresubject
topublicownershipinmostplacesandthatnetworkpolicies,therefore,wereendemic,thereason
couldbethatindustrialpoliciestraditionallyhavefocusedoninfrastructuresandthe
manufacturingsectorratherthanonservices.AnotherreasonisthattheITsectorhistoricallyhas
developedinaliberalenvironmentwithlimitedregulation.
Inthewakeoftheprivatizationofthetelecomnetworks,competitionregulationhasaimedat
ensuringthattheformermonopolymarketsweretransformedintocompetitiveenvironments.
Lessattentionhasbeenpaidtoregulatemonopoliesintheservicemarkets.Thisisnottosaythat
ICTcontentandapplicationsareentirelyunregulated.Thereis,indeed,nosectorspecific
competitionregulation,butthereisregulationinotherareas.ICTservicesareregulatedasany
otherkindsofservices.Inadditiontothis,thedevelopmentofelectronicinformationserviceshas
creatednewregulatoryissueswithregardtoprivacy,marketing,security,etc.However,thescope
differsfromtelecomregulation.
Whenitcomestofacilitationpolicies,thesituationistheopposite.Thefocusoncompetitionhas
impliedthatpublicinvolvementinnetworkdevelopmenthasbeenconsideredasanogoarea,as
itwilldistortcompetition.EU,forinstance,onlyallowsfundingofinfrastructureinruraland
peripheralregions.Ontheotherhand,publicinvolvementinthedevelopmentofcontent,
applicationsandservicesislesscontroversial.Thepublicsectorisamajorsupplierofservices,and
theprovisionofelectronicpublicservicesispromotedindifferentmannersinanycountry.The
primaryaimmaybetoenableeitherpublicsavingsorimprovedqualityofservicedelivery(24
hoursaccess,shorterresponsetime,etc.).However,publicdemandandsupplyofelectronic
servicesmayalsostimulateprivateuseanddemandfornetworkservices.
11
6. Nationalstrategies
Whenlookingatcountryexperiencesregardingthevariousstrategies,itisimportanttonotethat
anycountrycanapplymanydifferentstrategiesatthesametime.Itis,forinstance,possibleto
implementbothdevelopmentalandregulatorypoliciesatthesametime.Fewcountrieswillclaim
thattheydon’tregulatetelecommarketsinordertostimulatecompetition.Stillthereisa
differenceamongcountrieswithregardtothedegreethatmarketforcesareassumedtobeable
tosecureadequatebroadbandinvestments.Thiscanmostclearlybeseenintheextenttowhich
programmesprovidingfinancialsupporttoinfrastructuresareimplemented.Also,network
expansionandthedevelopmentofcontentsupplementeachotherwell.Moreover,infrastructure
andservicecompetitioncanalsobothbeusedatthesametime.Thequestionisthedegreeto
whichthedifferentpolicydimensionsareimplemented.
WithintheEU,telecommarketswereliberalizedinthelate1990s.ButaccordingtoMajone(1997)
themovetoamoreregulatoryapproachstartedmuchearlierandwasrelatedtotheambitionof
creatinganinternalEuropeanmarket.EventhoughtheEUcountriesareusingacommon
framework,therearebigvariationsinhowitisappliedinpractice.
Inthe1996USTelecommunicationsAct,theobjectivewas‘topromotefacilitybasedcompetition
inallmarkets’.Theadoptionofthe1996actincludedanobligationtoprovideinterconnectionat
costbasedrates(inordertopromoteservicebasedcompetition).However,thisledtothe
cancellationofmostoftheinvestmentplansannouncedbypotentialalternativeoperatorsfor
introducingfacilitybasedcompetition,andin1998,FCCmovedtowardsamorefacilitybased
approach,wherecertainnetworkelements,suchDSLAMs(providingADSLservices)were
exemptedforthisregulation.
Tosomeextent,thedevelopmentinEuropehasbeentheopposite.Broadbandunbundlingwas
notapartoftheliberalizedEUtelecommarketwhenbroadbandwasintroducedin1998,and
mostEuropeancountriesdidnotaddresstheissuebeforeyear2000.In1997,theUKthe
regulatoryagencyOftelarguedthatunbundling‘couldjeopardisethedevelopmentofcompetition
alreadyunderway’(Lemstra,2014).From2000,unbundlingofthelocalloophasbeenapartofthe
EUregulatoryframework,andoperatorswithadominantmarketpositionarerequiredtoprovide
fullunbundlingatcostbasedratestotheircompetitors.Thefinalgoalisstilltoachievefacilitybasedcompetition,andseveralEUreportshaveproudlyannouncedagrowthinfacilitybased
competitionforxDSLservices.However,facility-basedcompetitionis,inthiscontext,definedas
fullunbundling(asopposedtobitstreamaccess).
Theimpactonplatformcompetitionislessclear.IntheUK,theinitialregulatedinterconnection
ratesweresetatarelativelyhighlevelinordernottospoilthepotentialforfacility-based
competition.However,theratesarenowinlinewiththerestofEU.Moreover,theUKhas
supplementedtheULL(unbundlingofthelocalloop)regulationwithademandforafunctional
separationofBTinordertoensurefaircompetitionatthewholesalemarketforDSLconnections.
12
FullfunctionalseparationisaregulatoryremedyrecognizedbytheEUregulatoryframework,but
appliedonlyintheUK(Cadman,2014).
Inspiteoftheon-goingdebateontheladderofinvestments,theregulatoryframeworkhasin
principleremainedunchangedsince2000.However,thereisatrendtowardsmorefocusonusing
otherremediesthanthepromotionofcompetitiontostimulatenetworkinvestments.This
includesdifferentkindsofdevelopmentalpoliciessuchaspublicinvestmentsorpublicsubsidies.
UKistheEuropeancountrywithmostfocusonaregulatoryapproach.Withtheentryofasecond
operatoralreadyin1984,theUKestablisheditselfasafrontrunnerwithregardtoliberalizingits
telecommarket.UKhasalsointroducedamarketbasedapproachtospectrumallocationbefore
anyothercountrywithintheEU.Withregardtobroadbandpolicy,themajordifferencefrom
othercountriesisthefunctionalseparationmentionedabove.
Denmarkhasformanyyearsfollowedasimilarkindofpolicy.Sincethesecondpartofthe1990s,
Denmarkhashadtheambitiontohostoneofthemostliberaltelecommarkets.Thisphilosophy
waslabelled‘Bestandcheapestthroughrealcompetitionandwasthebasisforapolitical
agreementmadein1999,whichstilldefinestheframeworkforcurrentpolicyinitiatives.
Acornerstoneinthispolicywasthatnopublicfundingofinfrastructureinvestmentsshouldbe
made.TheDanishTelecomAgencyhadastrongcommitmenttowardsensuringcompetitionby
wayofnewentrants.Denmarkhadforalongperioda‘bestpractice’clausethatensuredthat
DanishinterconnectionratesalwayswereamongthecheapestinEurope.Denmarkwasalso
amongthefirstcountriestodemandULL.Withinthepastdecade,thecompetitionpolicyhasbeen
relaxedandtheprovisionofpublicfundinginalimitedscaleforinfrastructuredevelopmentin
ruralareasisbeingimplemented.
Sweden,ontheotherhand,hasalongtraditionforastrongregionalpolicyfocusanddirectpublic
involvementindevelopmentofICTinfrastructures.In1999/2000theSwedishgovernment
adoptedabroadbandpolicy,whichincludedsubstantialpublicsupporttoinfrastructure
development.Thefinancialsupportincluded€280milliontoanationaloperator-neutral
backbone,€358milliontomunicipalitiestodevelopaccessand€290milliontoregionalnetworks
andtocreatelocalinfrastructureplans(Forzati&Mattsson,2014).Thepublicinvolvementgoes
beyondthemerefinancialsupportand,today,175outof290municipalitieshavedeployedtheir
ownfibrenetworks(Forzati&Mattsson,2014).
AlthoughtheFrenchtelecommarkethasbeenliberalizedaccordingtotheEUguidelines,France
representsamoredevelopmentalapproachandhasinitiatedalargenumberofdevelopmental
initiativesfacilitatingbroadbanddevelopment.ThisisinlinewiththeFrenchtradition,asFrance
alsoinotherareashashostedmajordevelopmentalinitiativesinhigh-techindustries,suchasthe
introductionofhighspeedtrains.
13
TheprivatizationofFranceTélécomstartedin1997andthegovernmentisstillamajor
shareholderinthecompany.Thehistoricalbackgroundforthedevelopmentalinitiativesisthat
theFrenchtelecominfrastructureupthe1980swasmuchlessdevelopedthanintheUSand
NorthernEurope.Developmentplanswere,therefore,initiatedtocatchupwiththeseregions.
Theideawasnotonlytoupgradetheinfrastructure,butalsotocreateamarketforFrench
industry.
In1983,FranceTélécomintroducedavideotexsystemcalledTélétel,whichwasakindofweb
servicebeforetheInternet.Similarsystemswereintroducedinothercountries(PrestelinUK,
BildschirmTextinGermany,andProdigyinUS),butvideotexbecamewidespreadonlyinFrance
(Andreasenetal.,1989).ThereasonwasthattheFrenchsystemwasheavilysubsidizedand
terminalswereofferedforfree.ThesystemwassosuccessfulthatFranceTélécomdidnot
introducetheirownInternetservicebefore1996(Loridan-Baudrier,2014).
InFrance,developmentalpolicyinitiativesgobeyondthepublicinvolvementintheincumbent
operator.Since2004,localauthoritieshavebeenallowedtoengageinnetworkoperations,and
theycanalsofacilitateprivateinvestmentsinvariousways.In2010,thegovernmentannounceda
‘high-speed’planinordertoclosethedigitalgapandstimulateinvestmentsinruralandremote
areas.Theplaninvolvedfundsforresearchanddevelopmentaswellasfornetworkinvestments.
TheUSisoftenseenastheprimaryexampleofaregulatorystate.Withregardtotelecom,the
incumbentoperatorshavealwaysbeenprivate,andregulationhasfromthebeginningbeena
crucialelementingovernance.However,theUShasatraditionfortakingdevelopmental
initiativesaswell.Theuniversalserviceobligation(USO)hassomedevelopmentalaspects
althoughitformallyisaregulatorytool.Incontrasttootherremediesitdoesnotaimatfacilitating
competition.Infact,thearrangementmaydistortcompetitionifnotproperlydesigned.Universal
serviceregulationhasmanythingsincommonwithdevelopmentalprogrammesofferingfinancial
supporttoinfrastructuredevelopment.
UniversalserviceregulationplayedanimportantroleintheUS,atthetimewheresmalllocal
operatorsdominatedpartsoftheruralareas.InEurope,therewasnoneedforauniversalservice
regulationaslongasnetworkswereoperatedbystateownedmonopolies.Universalservice
regulationisincludedintheEUregulatoryframework,buttherealityisthatithasneverplayed
thesameroleasintheUS.IntheEUframework,universalserviceisaboutcoverageinhighcost
areas.IntheUS,itisalsoaboutaffordabilityandconnectionofschools,andseveralprogrammes
addressingtheseissueshavebeencoveredbyuniversalservicefunds.
Inadditiontothis,theUSgovernmenthaslaunchedanumberotherprogrammesproviding
substantialsubsidiesforbothtelecomandbroadbandnetworks.Twoexamplesofsuch
programmesaretheBroadbandTechnologyOpportunitiesProgramme(BTOP)including233
projects(totallingUS$3.936billion)andBroadbandInitiativesProgrammeincluding320BIP
14
projects(totallingUS$3.529billion)(2010figures)(Egan,2014).Furthermore,theindividualstates
implementtheirowndevelopmentalinitiativessupportinglocaloperators.
Itisdifficulttomakeacomparisonofhowvariouscountriesprioritizecontentdevelopmentversus
developmentofnetworks,asthesepoliciescomplementseachother,andallcountriesclaimthat
bothareimportant.Itis,however,possibletocomparecountrieswithregardtohowsuccessful
theirpolicieshavebeeninthesetwoareas.
IgariprovidesacomparativeanalysisofDenmarkandJapan,whereitisstatedthat,whileJapan
hasbeenverysuccessfulintheirpromotionofnetworkfacilities,theyhavebeenmuchless
successfulindevelopingpubliccontentandICTusage(Igari,2014).Denmarkismentionedasa
countrywithemphasisoncontentdevelopment.Alreadyinthemid-1990s,Denmarkannouncedin
theirinformationsocietyplan,Info2000,thatfocusshouldbeontheservicesideandthatthe
publicsectorshouldtaketheleadinthisdevelopment.Othercountrieshaveintheirstrategies
focusedmoreonthehardwaresite.TheFrenchMinitelprojectwasaninterestingexampleofthis,
buteventhoughthesupportwenttotheproductionofterminals,themostimportantimplication
wasitsstimulationofcontentandserviceproduction.
SouthKoreaisoftenmentionedasthechampionwithregardtostimulationofnetwork
investments.However,animportantpartofthestoryisthatthegovernmenthascombineda
strongpushfornetworkbuildingwithdemandstimulatingmeasuressuchasimprovementofIT
literacy(Choudrie&Lee,2004).
Inmanyaspects,theUShasbeentheleadingcountrywithregardtothedevelopmentofnew
servicesandcontent.TheUShasfosteredplatformslikeFacebook,Netflix,YouTube,andGoogle.
However,theUShasinitspolicybeenmorefocusedonnetworkdevelopmentthanthecreation
ofcontent.Whetherthisisanexampleofasuccessfulsupply-pushstrategy,wheretheavailability
ofnetworkfacilitieshaspromotedICTusageandcontentproductionisdebatable.TheUShas
fromtheoutsethadastrongpositionbothinITandincontentproduction.Furthermore,theUS
hasnotbeenleadingtheroll-outofbroadband.Onlyinthepastfewyears,theyhaveexperienced
aremarkablegrowthinthedemandforbroadband–duetotheavailabilityofattractivecontent.
7. Conclusion
Thethreedifferentdimensionscanbefoundinthebroadbandpoliciesofallcountriesthoughthey
mayhaveamoreorlessprominentpositionintheindividualcountries.Theyallindifferent
mannersrelatetothebasicissueofsupplyanddemand,whichisafundamentalquestionforall
strategiesforbroadbanddevelopment.Service-basedcompetitiongivesprioritytothesupplyofa
varietyofserviceoffersandtheimmediatedevelopmentofsubscriptions,whileinfrastructurebasedcompetitionprioritizesthesupplyofavarietyofnetworkoffersandthecoverageof
networkresources.Developmentalpoliciesfocusonthesupplyofnetworkresources,and
regulatorypoliciesestablishtheframeworkformarket-basedsupplyofanddemandfornetwork
15
provision.Emphasisonnetworkdevelopmentvs.contentdevelopmentisconcernedwiththe
supplyanddemandregardingeithernetworksorcontent.
Allcombinationsofthedimensionsarepossible,butsomecombinationsaremorelogicaland
coherentthanothers.Itisunlikelythatacountrywillhaveanemphasisoninfrastructure-based
competitionandatthesametimegiveprioritytoadevelopmentalstrategyandfocusoncontent
provision.Butitispossiblethatsuchpolicyprioritizations,tosomedegree,mayformpartofthe
overallpolicydirectionofsomecountries.Whatwearelookingforinthispaperarethetypical
combinations,whichformacoherentsetofpolicies.Anexampleofacoherentsetofpolicies
couldbeacombinationofservice-basedcompetitionwithadevelopmentalstrategyandafocus
onnetworkprovision.Inthetable2,anoverviewofcountriesdiscussedinthispaperandtheir
policycombinationsisshown.
TABLE2:CATEGORISATIONOFNATIONALSTRATEGIES
US
Infrastructure-basedcompetition;regulatory
approach;networkemphasis
UK
Service-basedcompetition;regulatory
approach;networkemphasis
France
Service-basedcompetition;developmental
approach;networkemphasis
Denmark
Service-basedcompetition;regulatory
approach;contentemphasis
Sweden
Service-basedcompetition;developmental
approach;,network(andcontent)emphasis
Japan
Infrastructure-basedcompetition;
developmentalapproach;networkemphasis
SouthKorea
Infrastructure-basedcompetition;
developmentalapproach;network(and
content)emphasis
Asitgoeswithmostcategorisationsandmodels,theyonlypresentthemaindirections,andmany
contradictionsanddetailsaremissing.However,theydorepresentstrategiesthatentailsome
degreeoflogicandcoherence.France,forinstance,hasanoverallemphasisonservice-based
competition,whichiscombinedwithadevelopmentalstrategyandapriorityonnetwork
development.TheUS,ontheotherhand,hasapreferenceforinfrastructurecompetitionin
combinationwitharegulatorystrategyandanemphasisonnetworkdevelopment,whileDenmark
givesprioritytoservice-basedcompetition,aregulatorystrategyandemphasisoncontent
creationanddistribution.
Infutureworkontheissue,alagervarietyofcountrieswillbeincludedinordertobetterdescribe
typicalcombinationsofpolicies.Furthermore,specificpolicychoiceswillbeexamined.Theaimof
thisisalsotodeterminetypicalpolicyoptions.
16
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