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The resignation of American UN Ambassador Andrew Young following an unauthorized
meeting with a PLO representative has raised new questions about American
policy toward the Palestinians. The official position is that contact with
the PLO is prohibited by a secret pledge of then^Secretary of State Henry
Kissinger to the Israelis in 1975 that the United States would "not recognize
or negotiate with the Palestine Liberation Organization so long as (it) does
not recognize Israel's right to exist and does not accept Security Council
Resolutions 242 and 338". The Carter Administration cites the Kissinger commitment in refusing to talk to the PLO even though the State Department's Legal
Councel told a Congressional subcommittee last April that "there is no agreement, no contractual inhibition on contact (with the PLO) other than recognition or negotiation".
The United States first boycotted the PLO at Israeli insistence and continues
to do so under pressure so strong as to topple an American Ambassador to the
United Nations. If there is to be a change in American policy toward the
Palestinians and the PLO, there must be solid answers to the following questions:
1) Why is current policy inadequate?
2) Why should the United States deal directly with the PLO?
3) In what ways would a different policy be supportive of the
the American national interest in the Middle East?
4) What should be the components of a different American Middle
East policy?
1)
CURRENT POLICY
American Middle East policy is to implement the Camp David Accords of September
1978, consisting of one section on Egyptian-Israeli matters and one section on
the West Bank/Gaza Strip situation. The Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty of March
26, 1979 addressed the first issue, and attempts are now underway to launch the
discussions about Palestinian "autonomy" called for in the second portion of the
Accords.
The inadequacy of the Camp David formula "framework" has become apparent in the
intervening year:
a) Arab Alienation
A key ingredient in American hopes for Camp David was acquiescence by key
Arab friends of the United States such as Jordan and Saudi Arabia, on the
assumption that th^ir fears of political forces at work in the region would
leave them no choice but to associate with the American initiative. To the
Counterpoint is a series of analytical papers dealing with American policy and the Middle East conflict.
Published by the National Association of Arab Americans, 1825 Connecticut Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20009, (202) 797-7757.
(2)
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consternation of the Administration, both Jordan and Saudi Arabia have stayed
on the sidelines, preferring rapprochement with their Arab brothers to Involvement in a political arrangement in which they place no confidence.
Growing American dependence on imported Arab oil heightens the folly of driving
the Saudis into an alienated position.
b) Israeli Settlements Intensified
Israeli actions and policy statements since Camp David appear intended to give
maximum embarrassment to the Carter Administration. They demonstrate that no
matter what the Americans thought Camp David meant, the reality is development
of new Jewish settlements in occupied Arab territory, and a definition of
"autonomy" so narrow even as to deny Palestinian control over land and water
rights.
From the outset the Palestinian people and the PLO have rejected the Camp
David formula as a trap intended to produce their acquiescence in permanent
Israeli control over the occupied territories and denial of Palestinian
political aspirations. Perhaps most important for American hopes, no responsibile Palestinian under occupation is prepared to participate in the "autonomy"
talks as long as the P10 remains unconvinced of their utility for Palestinian
goals. At this time all West Bank/Gaza Strip mayors have indicated their intention to boycott the autonomy talks.
d) Attacks on Lebanon
Israel's "pre-emptive strikes" against alleged Palestinian guerrilla bases in
southern Lebanon have brought terror and violence to civilians in Lebanon, with
200 dead and 400 wounded since the Egypt-Israel peace treaty last March.
Neither international condemnation of the raids nor Administration concern over
violation of laws governing use of American-supplied weapons has deterred Israel
from making a wasteland of the southern portion of Lebanon.
2) THE PLO
The most compelling argument for American involvement with the PLO is that the
Palestinians are the key to Middle East peace, and the PLO speaks on behalf of
the Palestinians inside and outside of the occupied territories.
Few Americans realize the breadth of the PLO, described in a recent study as
"the general organizational framework within which all Palestinian organizations commando groups, trade unions, professional associations, as well as
prominent national figures meet to work for the achievement of Palestinian
national goals". The PLO is a diverse entity, incorporating the above-named
activities in the Palestine National Council (PNC), the Palestinian "parliament" made up of 290 Palestinians with participation allotted on the basis
of a formula that takes into account geographic distribution of Palestinians
as well as sectors of institutional activity. The PLO reflects all shades of
Palestinian opinion. Recognition of the PLO by 115 member states of the
United Nations demonstrates global confidence in its representative character.
It is regrettable that American policy-makers, locked into a formula inherited
(3)
from the past, are unable to respond to the evolution of PLO attitudes
toward the Middle East situation, as demonstrated by PLO icceptance of a
West Bank/Gaza Strip sta-te 1n contacts with Western political officials
Ironically, Ittfrf^ P^% ti^*^~*&<¥K&\& ^
for Palestinflfts c^*t^^*^*l*rf if t pm«ftewt
conspiracy" aimed at satK>t«f1ng Palestinian hopes for the future.
3) MERlCAte IHTERESTS
s
The Arab Middle East has become one of the most Important regions of the
world to the United States 1n recent years* yet Arab frustration at American
inability to check the Israelis constitutes a "wild card" In the AmericanArab relationship that could do grave damage to American Interests 1n the
region. Consider the following:
a) America's advanced Industrial society runs on oil, of which
more than 15% already comes from the Arab World. American dependence demands normal and healthy relations with the Arabs in order to maintain assured
supplies at reasonable prices.
b) Oil imports cost more than $40 billion last year, and 1t is
imperative that American suppliers have access to Arab markets 1n order to
"recycle" dollars that we pay out for Imported oil.
c) Lacking Arab trust or respect, the Soviet Union can hope to make
advances in the Middle East only in times of turmoil or anti-American feeling,
tooth of which are heightened by current American policy.
d) Orderly political and economic development are vital to a better
future for the Middle East, yet we see national treasure squandered in an
arms race resulting from the Palestine conflict.
4)
ELEMENTS OF A BETTER POLICY
A nation founded on the principles of self-determination and majority rule,
the United States must fashion a Middle East policy that reflects Its own
time-tested political ideals. Most of the rest of the world has already
endorsed the following general formulation:
a) Security for Israel within its pre-Oune 1967 boundaries subject to mutually agreed modification.
b) Self-determination for the Palestinians, centered on the West
Bank and Gaza Strip.
c) Justice for displaced Palestinians, including the right of return and compensation for properties lost 1n Palestine.
d) A shift in regional spending from arms purchases to economic
and social development.
e)
An active American role in all of the above.
(4)
A new American policy toward the PLO would above all reflect reality
and be consonant with several recent historical situations in which
American diplomats negotiated with representatives of foreign governments or movements trying to defeat forces being supported by the
United States. Surely the United States is confident enough of its
own status that it can afford to reach out a hand to encourage a people
who, in the words of Chairman Arafat, "need peace more than anyone".
No American policy could be more of a failure over a longer period of
time than the record of our policy toward the Palestinians. With so
much riding on Middle East peace, change for the better is worth a try.
August 31, 1979