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Federalism in Democracies and Autocracies: Compatibilities, Incompatibilities and
Dynamics
Arthur Benz, Technische Universität Darmstadt
Sabine Kropp, Freie Universiät Berlin
Paper to be presented at the 23rd IPSA World Congress 2014 ‘Challenges of Contemporary
Governance’
Montreal July 19-24
Panel RC28.197 Federalism, Democracy, and Authoritarianism – Tensions and Dynamics
(Democracy Part 1)
**Very first draft, please do not cite or circulate**
Abstract:
Federalism is considered to be conducive to democracy and incompatible with autocracy. In
democracies, federalism is established to limit state power and to augment citizens’
opportunities to participate. Authoritarian regimes allow neither. Our paper assumes that the
relationship between these three structural components is more complex than commonly
supposed. In both autocracies and democracies, federalism generates tension between
institutions and actors which impacts the functioning and the dynamics of the political
systems. By taking into account structural dilemmas and dynamics in ‘multidimensional’
governments, the interrelation between federalism on the one hand and democratic or
authoritarian regimes on the other hand can be assessed more accurately. Both types of
governments create incompatibilities between different institutional dimensions which have to
be resolved by formal or informal processes responding to tensions.
In democratic
federalism, they can lead to authoritarian tendencies, whereas in autocratic federalism they
can contribute to undermine the power of the center thus enhancing the potential for
democratization in non-democratic countries. The paper presents a framework for
comparative research on federalism.
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1. Democratic versus autocratic federations
In comparative research, federalism is usually associated with democracy and considered to
be incompatible with autocratic regimes. Either it is thought to be conducive to democratic
governance, or democracy is seen as the precondition for stable federalism (Benz 2014: 4-8).
In any case, federalism seems to survive only in functioning democracies. This empirical
observation gave rise to a discussion on whether federalism can exist in autocracies at all. As
regards young democracies, it has been argued that federalism can destabilize transitional
regimes. Federal regimes allowing political competition in the process of transition to
democracy risk that a competition which is organized around regional and local interests puts
a federal system’s territorial integrity into jeopardy. This is one reason for why young federal
democracies tend to limit political competition and thus lower the quality of democracy
(Filippov and Shvetsova 2013). These findings point to the fact that both relations between
federalism on the one hand and democracy or autocracy on the other are more complex than
often expected.
Unlike what normative theories of federalism suggest, federalism does not necessarily
increase a political system’s democratic quality (Benz 2014). The combination of the two
structural principles can even result in malfunctions in democracies, depending on the
institutional design of governments, the particular structure of the federation and patterns of
multilevel coordination and the embedding of the institutional framework into a given social
structure. In stable democracies, federalism often leads to interlocks between levels of
governance, for the benefit of the executive and administration and at the expense of the
legislative. Moreover, there is no general evidence that decentralization and subsidiarity
automatically foster civic participation (Treisman 2007). Democratic federations, too, can
become unstable over time and may develop centripetal or centrifugal dynamics (Riker 1964).
Considering these experiences, the governance of federations has recently become subject to
an intense academic debate. To put it briefly, it cannot be ruled out that federalism weakens
democracy or even fosters authoritarianism.
In a comparative perspective, federal autocracy should not be ignored since this combination
exists as a matter of fact. One may regard federalism in autocracies simply as a pretense used
to concealing centralism. However, it is still an unanswered question whether or not federal
institutions in autocratic systems solidify the non-democratic character of the incumbent
regime or whether they rather release dynamics within the federal system that promote
democratization or at least thwart the power of an autocratic regime (Lane and Ersson 2005).
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Therefore, we have good reasons to assume that federalism and democracy or autocracy
represent organizational principles in “multi-dimensional” political systems that remain in a
state of tension with each other. Accordingly, the question arises under which conditions these
tensions can be dissolved or reduced and how they can be dealt with if the former is not
possible.
In real political systems, it can be expected that tensions always cause dynamics, which
diminish one of the structural principles either for an individual decision, limited to specific
situations or with effects in the long run. In extreme cases, dynamics as well as tensions can
threaten the well-functioning of the political system in question. On the other hand, changes
can also lead to a relatively stable balance of power between these two dimensions. In which
direction exactly these dynamics progress – whether they stabilize the autocratic or
democratic character of regimes or have the opposite effect, and whether they sustain or
disturb the balance between central and decentralized levels or between the executive and the
parliament, - these questions have remained left unanswered in research on comparative
federalism.
In tackling this question, the close relation between democracy and federalism that is
emphasized in normative theories of federalism must in a first step be analytically decoupled.
For the benefit of comparative research, democracy, autocracy and federalism need to be
distinguished as particular structural principles in order to then clarify the ways in which they
interact and how different relations between them operate. In this context, it might be argued
that the concept of federalism tend to be stretched too far, if it only takes the federal
constitution into account, an argument which indeed cannot be dismissed. Autocracies more
or less invalidate the principle of vertical separation of powers. This is why federal
institutions have a hard time working effectively. However, the formal constitution of a
division of competencies can be regarded as a potential source of power, which political
actors can exploit under favorable conditions. Therefore, the correlation between regime type
and federal government is less obvious than often assumed, an aspect which speaks in favor
of comparative research beyond the boundaries of differing regime types (Obydenkova und
Swenden 2013).
In order to elucidate this research strategy, we will outline existing tensions between
federalism and democracy or autocracy on the basis of conceptual considerations. Based on
this framework we are able to analyze the specific risks of these tensions as well as the
ensuing structural dynamics for established democracies and autocracies in comparative case
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studies. Apart from western, established democracies, comparative research on federalism
should include defect and instable democracies as well as certain authoritarian autocracies. In
these states, federalism allows for varying degrees of interaction in civil society and therefore
creates dynamics that result from the analyzed tensions. Both defect democracies as well as
autocratic regimes allow a limited civil –and in a federal state also local and regional –
pluralism albeit it is affected by more or less consistent attempts of the central government to
regulate (see, e.g. Levitsky und Way 2010; Ottaway 2003). Pluralism which originates from
territorial conflicts, however, challenges the power of federal authorities in authoritarian
regimes. Authorities can respond to this uncertainty by resorting to an authoritarian closure or
by further opening collaborations towards the society. With other words: federalism tends to
boost uncertainty in authoritarian regimes. In autocratic like in democratic federations,
opening and closing trends do have an influence on the ways in which territorial interests are
represented in the federation, they impact on the federal distribution of powers or they
originate in federal conflicts.
2. Tensions between Federalism, Democracy, and Autocracy
Federalism refers to the territorial dimension of a political system in which power (including
legislative power) is distributed among several (usually two) levels of government.
Competencies are exercised either separately (self rule) or jointly (shared rule), and the
interests of the member states are represented on the federal level. Therefore, it is necessary to
have constitutional rules determining the distribution of competencies, which balance the
necessary unity with as much diversity of public policies and services as possible. Moreover,
constitutions have to establish procedures in which decision-making between central and
regional governments are coordinated in order to manage interdependence between levels. By
democracy we mean an institutional form of government that 1) guarantees individual liberty
through the public authorities’ obligation to comply with law and jurisdiction, 2) offers equal
opportunities for citizens to participate, 3) integrates diverging interests into a public interest,
4) ensures the accountability and public control over those in power and thus, 5) guarantees
that those holding offices in government respond to citizens’ expectations and are bound to
citizens’ approval. A political system is shifted towards autocracy to the extent to which the
rule of law, opportunities for political participation, attainment of the public good,
mechanisms of control and rights allowing to express opposition against incumbents’ policies
are restricted by institutional structures or given power relations.
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In the relationship between these two dimensions of a political system, the territorial
organization of the state and the form of government, conflicts emerge that are characteristic
for both democracies as well as autocracies. The following are the most relevant of these
tensions. They result from institutional dilemmas, which authorities have to cope with during
processes of change. Often, they harm either federalism or democracy or even impair both
principles. They also cause uncertainties with regard to decision-making, necessitate
adaptations of the government system, and potentially lead to far-reaching dynamics.
a) Rule of law dilemma
The first institutional tension, labelled “rule of law dilemma”, results from the close
connection between authorities’ legal obligations and their commitments made in political
processes in governments. As has been said, federalism implies constitutionalism and thus
gives precedence to law constraining democracy and (to a minor degree) autocratic rule. The
tensions find different expression in democratic federations compared to autocratic
governments.
More often than not, the rule of law and democratic principles emerge separately from each
other. This was the case in most western states, where governments had been bound to the law
long before the idea of democratic legitimacy took root. Still, both principles are connected in
the way that rule of law fosters democratization processes. Also, democracy can only be
maintained if it is combined with the rule of law as well as the separation of powers (Zakaria
1997). Federations are particularly dependent on the rule of law because the distribution of
powers between different levels must be protected by a constitution. They need an
independent court that decides on competence conflicts, takes care that the federation as well
the member states not only exercise their power based on their “autonomy” but also take into
account interests of the “community” and obliges them to not interfere with jurisdiction of the
other territorial units. However, the alleged consistency of federalism with the rule of law
proves precarious in practice. Social problems or the expectations of interest groups or civil
society change over time, particularly in liberal democracies. Accordingly, the allocation of
powers, patterns of intergovernmental relations and of the distribution of financial resources
have to be adjusted more often than not. Moreover, in multinational federal states, individual
and collective rights may come into conflict. Hence, constitutional rules must be flexible and
open to constitutional amendments and reinterpretations, or they may be circumvented in
political practice. The first option leads to a politicization of constitutional law, which
jeopardizes the legal basis of federalism. The second induces processes of juridification,
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which undermine democratic procedures. The third threatens the legitimacy of the
constitution at the expense of federalism, a development that is no less problematic as a rigid
implementation of static constitutional rules, which tend to limit democracy.
While the dilemma of the rule of law results in democracies from the dynamics of federalism,
it emerges in autocracies due to the weakness of the constitutionalism and law. Political elites
have usually not internalized the principles of the rule of law. This is why formal democratic
rules, which determine the transfer of power to the authorities as well as the control exercised
by citizens (Hart 1994), are violated or changed along the interests of those holding power.
Hence, the legal protection of federalism as a practiced constitutional principle is hardly
effective under these conditions. Federalism, which can solidify in democracies, remains
unstable in autocracies that lack the stabilizing force of the rule of law.
b. Plurality dilemma
A second type of tension is the “plurality dilemma”. Democracy is based on equal
participation of citizens in politics. It is realized by free and fair elections ensuring that
competing parties can present alternative candidates and programs. In federations, party
competition may interfere with intergovernmental relations regardless of whether they are
characterized by competition or cooperation among jurisdictions. In functioning, centripetal
and stable federations party systems are vertically integrated (Filippov, Ordeshook, and
Shvetsova 2004) and thus reduce the plurality of competing options. However, in vertically
integrated party systems opposing parties are likely to attain veto power through
representation of regional governments at the federal level with the consequence of an
ineffective “divided government”. On the other hand, centrifugal tendencies which can put
federalism into jeopardy are fostered when pluralistic party systems on the federal and
regional level are too divergent and when regionalist parties emerge.
In autocratic federal states, the plurality dilemma takes a different shape. Here, political
leaders are tempted to restrict party competition in order to prevent the federation from
breaking apart. They may also try to prevent decentralized governments from gaining
autonomy vis-à-vis central elites. Hegemonic political practices serve to control party
competition and to integrate subnational authorities into the ‘center’ of power. With other
words, the lack or the weakness of pluralism supports the centralization of power and
endangers genuine federalism. However, under the surface of hegemonic, nationally
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organized parties, regional enclaves of the opposition contesting centralization can emerge.
At best, they are conducive to processes of decentralization.
c. Coordination dilemma
Third, tensions arise from the vertical dimension of a federal system designed to balance
power of federal and regional jurisdictions. We call this the “coordination dilemma”. It
results from external effects or undesired inequalities among the constituent units of a
federation. Both problems call for central or intergovernmental coordination in order to
achieve the common good. In democracies the dilemma results from the need to coordinate
policies across levels and jurisdictions. It is caused by a politicization of the relations between
federation and regions, be it through a confrontation of the respective bodies of government in
case of redistributive issues to be dealt with or through strong regional parties or an
ideological divide. Thus, coordination can be disturbed and multilevel governance can be runs
the risk of ending in deadlocks, if agreements are blocked by governments insisting on their
autonomy. On the other hand, effective coordination can limit regional autonomy and hence
constrain discretion of the decentralized demos or parliaments.
In autocracies, the dilemma results from overregulation if the central government attempts to
claim authority in the regions and undermines their autonomy. Federal structures in which
regional or local governments have decision-making powers contradict the all-encompassing
claim to authority of autocratic regimes. They give regional elites the opportunity to move
partly beyond the control of the central government. Political leaders are thus anxious to bring
rival groups and diverging regional interests under their control and even latently mistrust
non-oppositional loyal groups. However, centralized regulation contradicts the diversity and
decentralization that is required by the principle of federalism. It makes it more difficult to
balance of interests among constituent units. In authoritarian federations, this results in a
latent instability of intergovernmental relations.
d. Dilemma of heterogeneity and homogeneity
The fourth point we want to make is that federally organized system are confronted with a
dilemma of heterogeneity and homogeneity. Again, we can observe different expressions and
consequences of this dilemma in democracies and autocracies. It arises due to the necessity to
regulate regional plurality on the one hand and to achieve a balance of interests in the
“horizontal dimension”, i.e. between member states, on the other. Heterogeneity and
homogeneity here refer to economic as well as socio-cultural aspects of society. An
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interregional fiscal balance and a minimum of homogeneity in law and public services are
(besides the power limiting function of the separation of powers) essential objectives of
federalism and, in general, an essential element of the federal principle. Yet, because the
balance of interests cannot be replaced by institutional harmonization or centralization, it must
constantly be renegotiated with agreements always setting incentives for opportunistic
behavior (e.g. Bednar 2008).
In democracies, the plurality of a society can be made explicit in democratic procedures as
well as by a regional variation of group rights or by the protection of minorities. However,
such a differentiation of politics and policy-making considering various regionally
concentrated nationalities could threaten the effectiveness of a federal democracy, because it
is not consistent with the principle of equality of citizens. Moreover, it undermines the
horizontal loyalty of constituent units in a federation. Besides, policies determined to reduce
economic disparities among regions require fiscal transfers to decentralized authorities, which
are frequently criticized as an interference with the autonomy of democratic institutions.
Grants or fiscal equalization systems contradict the principle of fiscal equivalence requiring
that a government decides both on revenues and expenditures. As a consequence, false
incentives are set in democratic procedures and costs and benefits of public services are not
properly calculated.
In autocratic systems, heterogeneity creates fewer problems with respect to the balance of
regional interests but causes uncertainty for the central government. Authoritarian rule
produces information asymmetries to the disadvantage of the center, because regional
governments and rivaling groups conceal their true intentions and opinions. Moreover, the
regime does not receive authentic responses providing reliable information on whether or not
its actions are accepted. Thus, in order to generate and maintain the trust and loyalty of
citizens and political groups to the regime, political leaders rely on incentives and provide
grants and privileges to regional units (Geddes 1994). These, however, always come along
with constant overpayments due to information asymmetries (Wintrobe 1998). Therefore,
authoritarian federations tend to consolidate clientelism. If autocratic systems are federally
structured, heterogeneous local interests and identities further increase the regime’s
uncertainty. Uncertainty is particularly high, if the federal territory is divided along religious,
ethnic and linguistic lines. Local resistance then continuously threatens the authoritarian
regime (Erk und Anderson 2009). Hence, authoritarian systems institutionalizing the tension
between homogeneity and heterogeneity through the federal structure increase the uncertainty
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on how to achieve the “optimal” balance between coercion and incentives given to regional
elites—as different ways to make them act according to the federal will.
e. Loyalty dilemma
A fifth source of tension emanates from the relationship between the effective provision of
public services (“output” -legitimacy) which correspond to the citizen’s interests on the one
hand and the ways in which the regime secures support in democratic procedures (“input”legitimacy) on the other. Both types of legitimacy are necessary in order to ensure loyalty to
the government and the political system on the whole. In multi-level governance systems,
input- and output-legitimacy tend to be even more tensely related to each other than in unitary
democracies and autocracies.
Hence, we talk about a specific “dilemma of loyalty” in
federations. It arises because public services are only partly provided by autonomous
governments. They have to be coordinated due to negative or positive external effects, while
the approval of or opposition against policies can only be articulated inside a jurisdiction
against the responsible authorities at the sub-national or national level. The limits of
responsibility and, as a consequence, accountability deficits typical for federal political
systems are particularly felt in sub-national governments and especially affect regional elites.
On the one hand they have to cooperate with the federal government and (partly) support its
policies in order to not jeopardize the federation’s performance. On the other hand, they rely
on a certain degree of responsiveness and loyalty to their citizens who expect them to
effectively solve social and economic problems inside their jurisdiction.
In democracies, elected local governments are agents of at least two principals
(Sharafutdinova 2009; Reuter 2010). They are supposed to implement their voter’s will. At
the same time, however, they must consider the federation’s interests. Regarding decisions
with local redistributive effects, they encounter conflict between the federation’s and local
interests. In authoritarian systems, regional authorities are not elected “from below” in free
elections, but typically come to power in a restricted pluralistic competition. Alternatively,
they may even be appointed “from above”, in a process which ultimately contradicts the
principles of federalism. In this case, regional governments act primarily as agents of the
center of power whose assertiveness may vary in the different member states. If the interests
of local and central units contradict each other, sub-national elites can either use coercion in
order to bring about the population’s compliance. This, however, increases the authoritarian
power “from below”, but as well produces new uncertainties. Or they may attempt to address
and integrate the population’s interests which could in turn lead to an opening of the regime.
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In that scenario, it is likely that regional governments provoke a power struggle with the
central government. As a consequence, the system’s instability increases.
Table 1 summarizes the different tensions arising in democratic and autocratic federations.
Not all of them must necessarily arise in particular federations, and their intensity can vary.
Therefore, this table only outlines an analytical framework for comparative research.
Table: Tensions in federalism
conditions of
legitimacy
effects of federalism
Tensions between institutional dimensions
in democracies
in autocracies
rule of law dilemma
guarantee of
freedom,
commitment to rule
of law
constitutional
definition of division
of powers
rigidity vs. flexibility
power vs.
constitutional law
plurality dilemma
Equal opportunities
to participate
central and
regional/local points of
access, mediated by
parties
integrated party
system vs. risk of
deadlock
constrained
pluralism vs.
centrifugal
movements
coordination dilemma
vertical balance of
power
autonomy and
coordination
coordination vs.
executive federalism
central control vs.
regional autonomy
dilemma of homogeneity and
heterogeneity
vertical balancing of
interests
regional diversity and
sociocultural
integration
integration vs.
regional diversity
inefficient
governance vs.
instability
loyalty dilemma
recognition
multiple loyalty
„federal comity“ vs.
loyalty to voters
support from central
government vs.
pursuit of regional
interests
As regards theory of federalism, these considerations show the ambivalence of federalism. It
can strengthen or weaken both autocracy and democracy, depending on the particular
conditions and dynamics set in motion by the mentioned tensions. Yet, we do not conclude
that federal systems are generally unstable. Tensions cause dynamics which can create
stability as well as instability. Whether one or the other developments occur depends on the
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given context and particular conditions. However, resolving the inevitable tensions can only
succeed in processes in which power relations are constantly re-negotiated, be it through
institutional reforms or through informal adaption reacting to pressures for change. We
assume that this is why politics in democratic federations constantly deal with constitutional
issues while authoritarian federations, given their typically weak rule of law, often attempt to
maintain their balance through informal processes.
3. Research Perspectives
Federalism and democracy are in a relationship of mutual tension covering the dimensions of
rule of law, party pluralism, balance of power, reconciliation of interests between the federal
government and the states, and loyalty of the citizenship. Decentralization and federalism,
however designed, therefore do not necessarily foster democracy. But tensions do not always
have negative impacts. They do not inevitably lead to a blockade of democratic rule and
legitimacy or to a dissolution of federalism by centralization or secession.
In liberal democracies, such tensions seem to foster dynamics, which on the one side make the
political system adaptable and on the other side make federal democracy reflexive by
becoming a matter of democratic constitutional policy. The example of Canada is especially
instructive because tensions are more pronounced in its multi-national constellation.
Moreover, the specific loose coupling of parliamentary majoritarian democracy and
intergovernmental federalism is extremely flexible (Broschek 2009). It can explain why,
despite massive social and political conflicts, the Canadian federation is now in a dynamic
equilibrium. Other democratic federations probably achieve this state of dynamic “multistability” in different ways and driven by other constellations of tensions whereby either
federalism or democracy can be strengthened or weakened. The question, which of these
scenarios applies, can only be answered in terms of the direction of a dynamic development,
which is by no means irreversible.
The relationship between federalism and autocracy can be analyzed in the same way. Both
dimensions of governmental structure are not incompatible, but form a multi-dimensional
regime whose evolution is driven by tensions. In contrast to established democracies, defect
democracies and authoritarian systems are shaped by significant uncertainties of action. In
case of a federal organization, these uncertainties are even higher. Political elites react to
these challenges by institutional and informal strategies of adaptation, which trigger changes
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of structures and contribute to their evolution. The development of Russian government
exemplifies these mechanisms and their effects. Here, no consolidated institutions of
federalism exist even 20 years after the fall of the centralist communist regime, and that the
authoritarian character of the political system has been intensified over the last decade
(Obydenkova and Swenden 2013). Yet, in view of the period of decentralization and
democratization under President Yelzin, we cannot rule out that the formal federation implies
significant potentials for re-democratization that under favorable circumstances can be
mobilized ‘from below’.
Both constellations of democratic and autocratic governments imply to consider federalism in
terms of its dynamics within a multi-dimensional regime (Benz and Broschek 2013). In the
course of processes of stabilisation and change, some of the dilemmas outlined above may be
weakened while others probably are intensified. Federalism and democracy or autocracy
never come into equilibrium, but at best are balanced around a theoretically possible
equilibrium by oscillating movements. Whether these movements become stronger or tend in
a certain direction is dependent on conditions still to be explored by empirical and
comparative research.
Our analytic considerations therefore point out that systematic comparison between
democratic and autocratic federations discloses significant potentials for new insights. A
future research program could take the following steps: First, it should include a higher
number of authoritarian federations and deficient democracies in the case selection. Second, it
seems reasonable to differentiate between combinations of different types of democracy or
autocracy and federalism. Third, dynamics can only be understood if scholars regard a longterm evolution, which requires studies focusing on sequential processes. Therefore, our
framework refers to a research perspective calling for a typological theory and empirical
process tracing (amongst others George and Bennet 2005: 233-262).
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