AARMS
SECURITY
Vol. 8, No. 2 (2009) 289–297
The North Korean nuclear crisis in the context of
regional security interests
TIBOR MEZEI
Ministry of Defence, Budapest, Hungary
The North Korean nuclear program is again on the foreign and security policy agenda.
My article attempts to outline the prospects for resolving the current crisis. First, an
analysis of the Beijing Accord is offered, highlighting the crucial role that the Chinese
government played in achieving that compromise. Then China’s national interests are
investigated in order to identify the reasons for China taking a more active role in the
Six-Party Talks, a multilateral framework set up to resolve the nuclear crisis on the
Korean Peninsula. The changing character of relations between Beijing and Pyongyang
is analyzed in the context of regional security policy dilemmas including the Taiwan
issue. Finally, the political conditions of the current crisis are defined with an emphasis
on China’s potential to influence the outcome.
Introduction
The “hermit kingdom” of North Korea unexpectedly switched from cooperation to
confrontation in the spring of 2009 with breaking all the promises it made at the SixParty Talks two years ago. North Korea not only conducted a nuclear test for the second
time on May 25, 2009, – the first test was executed in October, 2006 – but has kept
provoking the international community by test-firing short-range missiles. In the
following, the context of the North Korean nuclear crisis will be analyzed, while
keeping in mind that the crisis has several dimensions. It has a global dimension since it
involves the problem of nuclear proliferation; it is also a regional issue because it has
serious impact on East Asian regional security. Lastly, it is a national issue that has to
do with the question of the possible re-unification of the two Koreas.
The Beijing accord
The current developments on the Korean Peninsula may suggest that the Beijing accord
reached in February 2007 has no relevance anymore. Nevertheless, to evaluate the
present situation, it is worthwhile to investigate what made the Beijing accord possible
in the first place. One important factor was that the bilateral negotiations between the
Received: July 3, 2009
Address for correspondence:
TIBOR MEZEI
E-mail: [email protected]
T. MEZEI: The North Korean nuclear crisis
United States and North Korea which were conducted in the 1990’s have been
expanded to Six-Party Talks. The fact that North Korea had agreed to take part in the
new framework of the Six-party Talks indicated that the political objective of the
regime is not simply to “to extract concessions from the American government”, as
several analysts have claimed. If the objective of the North Korean regime had been to
gain recognition from the US government, they would not have needed to enter a
multilateral framework, since they already accomplished that with the Agreed
Framework signed in 1995. The establishment of the Six-Party Talks highlighted the
regional dimension of the North Korean nuclear crisis.
The other important factor was that the American attitude vis-à-vis North Korea
significantly changed. Many view this change in policy as the U.S. adopting a more
“realistic” approach, and by “realistic” they usually mean more flexible, more open to
accommodate North Korean interests. I would agree with labelling the Korea-policy of the
Bush administration as realistic, but for different reasons. From a global standpoint of
non-proliferation efforts, the Beijing accord was a clear fiasco for Washington. The Bush
administration failed to deliver a credible threat against North Korea, and it appears as if
they finally succumbed to Kim Jong-il’s blackmail. It was an agreement that definitely did
not deter countries aspiring for nuclear weapons from pursuing their end. However, the
U.S. readiness for compromise made a lot more sense when viewed from the perspective
of regional security politics. The Beijing accord made East Asia more stable, which was in
the interest of all major powers involved in the Six-Party Talks.
The most important lesson of the Beijing accord should also be noted. As opposed
to earlier rounds of negotiations, China, in the final round, was willing to put more
pressure on North Korea. There can be no doubt that China’s input was crucial in
achieving the agreement. Therefore, it is also the positive side of the Beijing accord that
China has been included as a “responsible stakeholder” in the arrangement, and
consequently it can be counted on in the future as ready to play a major role in
stabilizing the region. The calls on Washington to directly engage in bilateral talks with
Pyongyang are a thing of the past and the pressure on the U.S. to solve the Korean
nuclear crisis on its own is gone forever.
Actually, in addition to weighing the advantages and disadvantages of a
compromise, the primary reason for the US accepting the compromise had to do with
the change in the South Korean attitude towards the North. And that change had a
significant impact on the U.S.-South Korea relations as well.
Seoul was a much more important player in the Six-Party Talks than it is usually
acknowledged. Essentially, the Bush administration had to realize that South Korea
would not support taking a hard line against the North because the “Sunshine Policy”
290
AARMS 8(2) (2009)
T. MEZEI: The North Korean nuclear crisis
initiated by President Kim Dae Jung in the late nineties became a cornerstone of South
Korean foreign policy. A cornerstone which then President Roh Moo-hyun was not
willing to reconsider even when North Korea carried out its first nuclear test in 2006.
Moreover, Washington also had to realize that any hard-line policy is doomed to fail
without South Korea backing it. This was the “realism” that made Washington take a
different approach vis-à-vis North Korea. So the U.S. was willing to compromise not
because engagement proves to be more successful than confrontation in all cases, but
because it did not want to seriously risk its alliance with South Korea.
South Korea played an important role not only in dissuading the U.S. from a hardline policy, but also in inviting China to contribute more to the Six-Party Talks.
President Roh Moo-hyun combined the “Sunshine Policy” – that started out as an interKorean affair in the late nineties – with the multilateral framework of the Six-Party
Talks.1 Moreover, continually improving relations between South Korea and China was
a precondition for China taking a “responsible stakeholder” role in managing the
nuclear crisis of the Korean Peninsula. The reasoning, from the standpoint of the South
Korean President, went as follows. If the Beijing accord is successfully implemented, it
will not only promote East Asian regional security, but will enhance the “Sunshine
Policy” as conducted by President Roh Moo-hyun. Moreover, the cooperative stance
adopted by North Korea could improve Roh Moo-hyun’s chances to win the
presidential election in December 2007.2
So, to sum up, the Beijing accord did promote regional stability as well as advance
cooperation between the two Koreas, thus possibly bringing closer the peaceful reunification of the Korean Peninsula. On the other hand, the compromise with North
Korea may prove to be disadvantageous for the global cause of non-proliferation for it
suggests that a nuclear weapons program can be carried out without having to face any
negative consequences.
The Beijing accord in 2007 demonstrated not only that the Chinese government had
the necessary means to exert pressure on North Korea, but also that Beijing was finally
willing to use its influence in forcing Pyongyang to change its attitude. Several analysts,
also within Chinese academic circles, made the argument that the Chinese government
would not go as far as forcing North Korea into giving up its nuclear program. Professor
Shen Dingli at the University of Shanghai, in his study, North Korea’s Strategic
Significance to China, made the claim that it was not in the interest of China to exert
1
For how President Roh Moo-hyun developed the Sunshine Policy, see MO, JONGRYN: What Does South
Korea Want? Policy Review, Apr/May 2007.
2
More details on this can be read in CSOMA, MÓZES: Korea – Egy nemzet, két ország. pp 151–152. Napvilág
Kiadó, Budapest, 2008.
AARMS 8(2) (2009)
291
T. MEZEI: The North Korean nuclear crisis
pressure on North Korea.3 In the following, I will identify China’s major national
interests and demonstrate that Shen Dingli’s assumptions are unsupportable and it is in
the interest of Beijing to tame North Korea. Consequently, it can be expected that now
as the tension is increasing the Chinese government will, at some point, make the
decision to put more pressure on North Korea so that it is again forced to accept a
compromise with the implication of abandoning its nuclear program.
The Chinese perspective
Over the past fifteen years China has gone through a dramatic transformation. The
socioeconomic changes have had impact on all aspects of Chinese society and, at the
same time, the rise of China altered its relations with the outside world, and particularly
the relations with its neighbours. Many claim that China’s development has to do
primarily with the radical transformation of its economic system, while its political
system has remained essentially intact. However, such arguments overlook the fact that
the conditions – economic, political, cultural, international – that determine China’s
position have all changed, and the country is confronted with a challenge no less than
having to redefine itself, its vision for the future, including its role in the international
community. Therefore, the first inference to be drawn is that there is “no turning back”,
as Professor Zhang Wenmu put it, and the current period marks “a full transition for
China, changing from a closed country to…one that is irrevocably integrated with the
rest of the world.”4 This is then the fundamental challenge that China is facing today.
As for China’s security situation, I will argue that the national security of China is
determined by three major types of threat. One requires a political solution, the second
has to do with ensuring economic development, and the third is connected to China’s
position in the world of international relations. The first and foremost is that China
definitely perceives a threat to its sovereignty in the possibility of Taiwan embarking on
a road to full and legal independence. Ultimately there are two ways for China to handle
this threat. One is to develop its military might to the point that it in itself deters Taiwan
from opting for legal independence, and should Taiwan still chose to go independent,
then that military might would deter foreign powers from trying to assist Taiwan even
in case China resorted to force. The other way is to elevate China’s status to the point
that Taiwan as well as its potential foreign supporters would lose more economically
3
SHEN DINGLI: North Korea’s Strategic Significance to China. In: World Security Environment, pp. 95–104.
College of Defense Studies, National Defense University, China 2007.
4
ZHANG WENMU: Sea Power and China’s Strategic Choices, In: China’s Policies and Positions on Major
Security Issues, pp.107–115, College of Defense Studies, National Defense University, China 2007.
292
AARMS 8(2) (2009)
T. MEZEI: The North Korean nuclear crisis
and politically through entering into a conflict with China than they could possibly win.
The military approach is quite obvious; the other implies a complex strategy with
economic, political, and international dimensions.
Secondly, China’s vital economic interests can be threatened through endangering
the safety of the sea lanes along which China obtains the required energy resources.
“China’s dependence on international energy imports is rapidly changing from a
relationship of relative dependence to one of absolute dependence.”5 Again, the same
two approaches are applicable as for the Taiwan issue. However, this question is quite
different from the Taiwan issue because enhancing China’s political-economic
influence can easily go hand in hand with increasing its military capacity to protect the
sea lanes, for the simple reason that it is an internationally acceptable and recognized
strategy for any major power to develop its capabilities required for defending its vital
economic connections on sea.
The position China occupies in the context of international relations has great impact
on its security. As for the current state of global affairs, I tend to disagree with theories
about a unipolar world for two main reasons. First, because it is too one-dimensional:
power or the distribution of power is only one, though very significant, aspect of
international relations. International relations involve a complexity of various factors
influencing and modifying each other. The other reason is that the entire concept of power
is much less tangible than it may seem at first sight. Or how can we define the distribution
of power? It is certainly not a hard fact like the distribution of population according to
regions. My point is that while both economic power and military strength significantly
determine how much political influence a nation is able to exercise, the status of a country
in the international community is ultimately defined by a host of inter-related factors. Let
me highlight two important factors. One is to what extent a country participates in joint
international efforts, which can range from financing humanitarian projects to crisis
management and diplomatic activity in resolving conflicts. The other is whether a state
takes a cooperative or confrontational stance vis-à-vis the international community or to
some country within the international community. I believe these two aspects of
international presence are important because they are very visible, and therefore, they
influence the image of a country already in the short term. Taking all this into
consideration, I would argue that the downgrading of its international status constitutes a
threat for China. Many would argue that China used to be a country that was relatively
passive in international affairs, and was regarded with either lukewarm interest or with
politically motivated suspicion. Today it is China’s definite national interest to ascend to
5
ZHANG WENMU: Sea Power and China’s Strategic Choices, p. 108.
AARMS 8(2) (2009)
293
T. MEZEI: The North Korean nuclear crisis
the position of a regional power with high international standing, actively taking part in
global and regional affairs and regarded as a reliable partner with positive intentions. Most
importantly, China will only become a major power with high prestige when it is
recognized as such in the international community.
Let me conclude then by identifying the national interests for China.
• Restoring its sovereignty through achieving peaceful unification with Taiwan is
of foremost significance.
• The safety of the sea lanes for energy supply must be ensured for that is
indispensable for China’s economic development.
• China must elevate its international status in order to be able to play the major
role that is in line with its overall rise as a regional power.
These objectives are obviously related to one another; it is a lot more unlikely for
example that the vital economic interests of country with high international reputation
are challenged than that of a country which is internationally isolated or is viewed with
suspicion. Similarly, continuous economic growth going hand in hand with expanding
economic relations will definitely enhance the international position of a country.
Relations between China and North Korea
It is an often stated claim in security policy analyses that China needs North Korea as “a
buffer zone” on the Korean Peninsula. The claim is usually made to explain why China
is interested in maintaining the status quo on the Korean Peninsula and is therefore
reluctant to invest heavily into the six-party talks. Professor Shen Dingli develops his
position on Chinese-North Korean relations with taking this assumption as granted. His
argument is that the security relationship between China and North Korea is not onesided. “China provides security to North Korea, but North Korea also affords China
with a measure of security, and it is unlikely that China will risk it by pressuring North
Korea too much.”6
This argument derives from Shen Dingli’s central proposition that North Korea is a
strategic partner for China and, as such, enhances China’s national security. This
proposition is supported by two statements; one of them is – as has already been
mentioned – that North Korea serves as a buffer zone for China by “keeping at bay the
tens of thousands of US troops stationed in South Korea”.7 While this may make sense
from a strictly military point of view, in my analysis above I tried to demonstrate that it is
nothing else, but South Korea’s insistence on its Sunshine Policy that has put constraints
6
7
SHEN DINGLI: North Korea’s Strategic Significance to China, p. 99.
Ibid. p. 96.
294
AARMS 8(2) (2009)
T. MEZEI: The North Korean nuclear crisis
on the U.S. with respect to the Washington taking a hard-line against North Korea. If my
assessment is correct, then Shen Dingli significantly overestimates North Korea’s
contribution in containing possible American military expansion. Then, from North Korea
being a strategic buffer state, Shen Dingli concludes that this allows “China to reduce its
military deployment in Northeast China and focus more directly on the issue of Taiwanese
independence”.8 There are two problems with this conclusion: one is that it is based on the
presupposition that North Korea provides a strategic buffer zone for China, and the other
is that it interprets the Taiwan issue in military terms alone, disregarding all the political
and economic factors that influence the issue as well. Nevertheless, Shen Dingli continues
along this line. “The United States has to maintain military pressure in the Korean
Peninsula to prevent North Korea from taking pre-emptive action. However, the deterrent
that North Korea’s development of nuclear weapons obtains could further restrict the US
military’s room to take action in the Korean Peninsula. The net effect of this also helps to
contain the freedom of US policy choices regarding Taiwan.”9 He repeats this in an even
more unambiguous manner, stating that “a nuclear North Korea’s ability to pin down US
forces in a Taiwan Strait contingency deters America’s consideration of possible military
intervention.”10 So this is how he arrives at his claim that North Korea plays a strategic
role in the Taiwan issue.
All in all, Shen Dingli seems to overestimate North Korea’s military strength, and,
at the same time, he underestimates the military capacity of the United States. If the
U.S. was driven into a situation when it had to address the North Korean nuclear crisis
and the Taiwan problem simultaneously, it would definitely be able to deploy sufficient
forces to handle both.
The latest developments in the six-party talks do not support Shen Dingli’s position
that the crisis is essentially a U.S.-North Korea affair and that no progress can be
expected as long as bilateral relations between these two countries do not improve.
Contrary to his prediction, China did play a major role in the six-party talks, which in
turn proved to be instrumental in bringing about the Beijing accord. These
developments do not merely prove his predictions wrong, but impugn his entire
conception about China needing a North Korean buffer state to contain U.S. threat in
general and U.S. interference with respect to Taiwan in particular.
While it is quite doubtful if North Korea has any strategic significance with respect
to Taiwan, I would argue that the question of the peaceful re-unification of the Korean
Peninsula does have relation to the Taiwan issue. So in this respect, as one of the parties
8
Ibid. p. 96.
Ibid. p. 96.
10
Ibid. p. 97.
9
AARMS 8(2) (2009)
295
T. MEZEI: The North Korean nuclear crisis
in the process of Korean re-unification, North Korea can play a role. Moreover, if we
accept that Korean re-unification is hardly conceivable without Chinese and American
involvement in the process and that unification achieved in this manner would advance
the peaceful solution of the Taiwan issue, then further question marks are raised about
the strategic significance of North Korea for China. How could North Korea as we
know it today contribute to the peaceful re-unification of Taiwan and mainland China?
Especially, how could a North Korea that would keep up its nuclear program? If I may
refer back to my argument about what China’s national interests are, I would again
stress that China has to elevate its international status in order to be able to play the
major role that is in line with its overall rise as a regional power. Let’s face it: North
Korea is a country with very low reputation and having too close ties with North Korea
does not help China establish the kind of image in the world that would enhance its
aspirations as a respected major power.
Moreover, China does prefer a denuclearized Korean Peninsula, which would
enhance regional stability as well as inter-Korean relations. It should also be clear that
the old equation of China and North Korea on one side and the US and South Korea on
the other seems to hold less and less. In the near future South Korea may become even
more important for China, and eventually more important than North Korea. A united
Korea may be more advantageous for China in the long run than a “buffer state” North
Korea that constantly makes attempts to upset regional stability. A stable environment
would be more conducive to bringing Taiwan and mainland China closer to each other
as well as to developing a more favourable context for Sino-Japanese relations. While
the United States is not interested in China becoming the dominant power in East Asia,
it does have an interest in maintaining regional stability and a balance among regional
powers. So the US will not oppose the re-unification of the Korean Peninsula as long as
it does not upset that balance in the region. It is difficult to envisage how the reunification would take place in practice, but since the North Korean model has proved
to be a complete failure, the new, united Korea would have to be an upgraded version of
South Korea. And another factor to be taken into consideration is that China would
oppose US forces remaining in the Korean Peninsula following the re-unification. At
any rate the two Koreas can only be united under a multilateral framework in which all
concerned parties can make their contribution to the process.
Prospects for resolving the crisis
It is always difficult to interpret the acts and decisions of the North Korean “hermit
kingdom”, but it seems almost hopeless to find explanation for the latest provocative
296
AARMS 8(2) (2009)
T. MEZEI: The North Korean nuclear crisis
change of attitude in its nuclear policy that took place in the spring of 2009. Perhaps
North Korea’s succession crisis is the primary impetus for this change, and by “showing
strength” Kim Jong-il wants to strengthen his own position so that he can secure a
smooth transition of power for his choice of successor. Whatever be the motivations,
the international political situation is less favourable for North Korea now than it was in
2007. Most importantly, the new conservative administration in South Korea
completely abandoned the “Sunshine Policy” of the previous decade and took a tougher
approach towards Pyongyang. South Korean President Lee Myung-bak urged that the
pattern of rewarding North Korea’s provocations with dialogue and aid should not be
repeated. The South Korean government acted with resolution and, following a six-year
delay, joined the US-led Proliferation Security Initiative.
The North Korean regime is more provocative than ever: it is ready to discard all the
political and economic achievements of the Sunshine Policy period. Under these
conditions it is only Beijing that still has non-military means to exert pressure on
Pyongyang. As I demonstrated above, resolving the North Korean nuclear crisis in a
peaceful manner does promote China’s national interests. It would enhance regional
stability, and would thus create a security environment that is more conducive to the
peaceful re-unification of Taiwan and mainland China. It would also enhance China’s
international image as “a responsible stakeholder”, as a country that is ready to make its
contribution to resolving an international conflict.
It is certain that Beijing is aware of the special role it can play in resolving the crisis,
but time is of essence again. As time passes, the North Koreans are likely to execute
more and more provocations vis-à-vis the international community, therefore it will be
more and more difficult to force them into a compromise for their fear of “losing face”
before their domestic audience.
References
CSOMA, MÓZES: Korea – Egy nemzet, két ország, Napvilág Kiadó, Budapest, 2008.
DINGLI, SHEN: North Korea’s strategic significance to China. In: World Security Environment, College of
Defense Studies, National Defense University, China 2007.
MO, JONGRYN: What does South Korea want? Policy Review, Apr/May 2007.
WENMU, ZHANG: Sea power and China’s strategic choices, In: China’s Policies and Positions on Major
Security Issues, College of Defense Studies, National Defense University, China 2007.
AARMS 8(2) (2009)
297