THE QUIET GERMAN:
THE VIETNAM WAR
AND THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY
BY
HUBERT
ZIMMERMANN
In his famous novel The Quiet American, Graham Greene portrays
the character of an American undercover-agent in Vietnam in the mid1950s. His activities evoke increasing anger and frustration in the narrator, a British journalist, who at one point sighs: 'I never knew a man
who had better motives for all the trouble he caused!' This statement
reflects quite well the feeling most West Germans had regarding the
American engagement in Vietnam. While the D.S. objectives were generally supported, the way in which these objectives were pursued was
seen with increasing alarm since it caused a series of dilemmas for
Bonn's foreign policy. In order to avoid becoming pulverised between a
very critical public and an assertive ally, successive German governments reverted to a strategy which, paraphrasing Graham Grecne,
might be circumscribed as 'the Quiet German'.
This interpretation is somewhat different from the usual image of the
German government's position vis-a-vis the Vietnam War. Most of the
rather small body of scholarly literature on the impact of Vietnam on
West Germany's foreign policy asserts that Bonn supported the war
whole-heartedly until the late 1960s (1). However, the dilemmas cited
(I) The best and most nuanced treatment is a recent conference paper by Nuti LEOI'OI.DO,
'T"ansatlant,ic Relations in the Era of Vietnam: Western Europe and the escalation of the
War, 1965-68', paper presented at the international conference NATO. Ihe Warsaw Pacl and
the Rise aJ Detenle, 1965-72, Dobbiaco, September 2002. Wilfried MAUSIJArH is working on
the impact of Vietnam on German self-perception: 'EuI'opean Perspectives on the war in
Vietnam' in Bulletin oJ /he Gemwn Historical Institute, volume 30, (Spring 2002), Washington. pp, 71-86. Most other publications on German-American rch,tions includc only passing
references to the war with a general acknowledgement of negative effects. Joaehim
AIIENTH'S beak Johnson, Vietnam und del' Westen. 'I'rans(Ltlantisc1lP Belastunyen, 1963-1969,
Olzog Vel'iag, Miinchen, 1994 is useful as a compilation of paraphrased documents (most
already available) and press reports. Tt suffers, however, from a disconnected structure with
little consistence in the interpretation. More useful is his article on the Washington-Bonn
special relationship: 'Die Bewiihrungs'(lrobe del' S'(lecial Relationship: Washington und
Bonn (1061-69)' in Lanes KLALlS and Oppelland TOI~~1'~:N, eds., Deut8clllaoo und die USA int
50
LA GUERRE AMERICAINE
LA GUERRE AMERICAINE
above were present from the beginning and this interpretation is therefore exaggerated. The growing unease the war caused for German elites
finally even led to a perceptible re-orientation of the basic outlook of
German foreign policy.
Germany confined itself to non-committal statements and general
expressions of support, hoping that the war would be terminated
quickly and the American attention would turn back to the real issues
of the Cold War.
THE DEBATE ABOUT A PHYSICAL COMMITMENT
When, in November 1963, the diplomats at the German foreign office
(Auswdrtiges Amt, hereafter cited as AA) discussed the question of
whether to recognise the new government in Vietnam after the overthrow of the Diem regime, they agreed that such an act would be a
friendly gesture towards the U.S. which would not cost anything (apar
from the continuation of modest development aid). Therefore, it should
be quietly realised (2). This non-committal attitude, connected with
economic diplomacy, set the tone of Germany's policy regarding the
Vietnam problem for a long time.
In its early stage, the conflict was interpreted in the FRG within a
general Cold War framework and the legitimacy of the US intervention
was barely questioned. Even the rather Left-wing Spiegel, in its first
cover story on Vietnam in 1963, called the insurgency against the Diem
regime an infiltration carried out by 'communist partisans' supported
by Soviet airpower (3). The use of heavily loaded analogies from the
German past ('partisans' had a negative World War II connotation)
was to shape German perceptions of and reactions to the conflict to
quite a large extent. In the same aJ,ticlc, Diem's forces were termed 'S8like special troops'. Thus, the article also made clear that the regime in
South Vietnam was anything but legitimate, and that this was a major
factor in the uprising (4). The exclusive interpretation of the Vietnam
War as a major battle against communism was viewed from the beginning with a lot of scepticism in Germany. Very soon, the logic of the
American involvement came to be seen as rather doubtful. Therefore,
iO. Jallrhunderl. Wissenschaft1icho Buchgesellschal't, Darmstadt, 1997, pp. 151-177, which
focuses very much on Vietfll~m. A recent concise treatment on the impact of Vietnam on 1r8·
FRG "elations is T. Michacl Ruddy's article which is hitherto only availahle in Germlln
'Grenzen dol' Solidaritiit : Die Bundesrepublik. die USA und del' Krieg in Vietnam', in Det,lel
JUNKElt, cd., Die USA Ilnd Deatsellland im Zeilalterdes Kalten Krieges. 1968-1990, volume
2, Deutsche Vel'lags-Anstalt, MOnchen, 2001, 200-210.
(2) Akten zur Auswiirligen Polilik der B"",de,'''p"blik Deutschland 1963, ed. Institut Wr
Zeitgeschichtc. Oldcnbourg, Miinchen 1994 [hereafter cited as AAPDj, 1963, Doc. 409, On
4 December 1963, the FRG extended a credit of DM 15 million to Vietnam (AAPD 1963,
Doc.4H).
(3) Der Spiegel. volume 17, number 37, (11 September 1963), p.71.
(4) Ibid.
51
Contrary to what is often asserted (5), Germany was never unconditionally 'supportive' of American policy in Vietnam, although German
politicians across the board pledged solidarity (much more outspokenly
in conversations with US officials than in public). The FRG itself had no
particular interests a.t stake in Vietnam and, in principle, shared the
French assessment of the situation (6). The German position was therefore shaped almost entirely by two indirect factors on which Vietnam
had a major impact: AmeJ'ica's policy towards Europe and the hostile
reaction of the German public towards any involvement in the war.
Involvement meant not only diJ'ect participation on the spot. Even outspoken 'moral' support of American policy had created difficulties. It
led to heavy criticism by the Left and the Gaullist Right alike, as German politicians soon discovered. Successive German governments saw
only onc way to avoid that the two objectives (satisfying the Americans
and the domestic critics) openly clashed: to keep a very low public profile regarding the war, resist strong American pressure for a direct commitment, and to try and satisfy the increasingly frustrated Americans
with 'quiet' economic help.
Official German silence in the early years of the war was also suggested by the precarious state of Franco-German relations after Adenauer left the scene. France's neutrality proposals of 1963-1964 were
seen as a challenge to the US (though even the German ambassador in
Saigon thought that neutralisation of Vietnam might be the ultimate
result) (7). However, given the rather precarious American-Franco-German triangle at that time, it was not wise to disavow publicly De Gaulle
and add to mutual irritation (8). At the same time, it did not cost anything to pledge support for the American cause at lower levels and in
private meetings.
However, in 1963-1964, Vietnam was generally considered a distant
theatre and a nuisance, and it took the German government and its
public quite some time until they realised the seriousness of the Ameri(5) 'For example by MarcF,ui:Y in his recent Geschicllte des Vietnantkriegs, C. H. Beck,
Mum'hen, 1999. p. 184.
(6) 'Mcmomndum by State Secretary Carstens'. 27 July 1964, p. 893, AAPD 1964. ll,
Doc.210.
(7) 'Wend land to AA'. 16 December 1963, AAPD 1963, Ill. Doc. 474.
(8) 'Schroder to Erhard'. 17 May 1964, AAPD 1964, 1, Doe. 130: lI1Au8BACH, 'European
Perspectives', p. 80.
52
LA G UERRI!; AMERICAIN.8
can predicament in Southeast Asia. It has been often stated that Ger­
man support for the US in Vietnam originated in the perception that t
some degree Berlin WitS defended in Vietnam, as part of the general
struggle against communism. This rests particular on Chancellor
Erhard's repeated use of this analogy in conversations with Ameri­
cans (9). The careless equalling of Berlin and Saigon set the pretext for a
series of most unwelcome demands by the Americans as soon as they felt
placed nationally and internationally in an increasingly defensive posi­
tion. The rost of the German government was therefore careful to avoid
the analogy. Hardly anybody bl'lieved that Berlin was really defended
in Saigon (otherwise the Germans would have sent more than just a hOR
pi tal ship to the help of their allies). A few years later, they had to try
and dissuade the Americans from using this analogy, since it became a
major argument in the transatlantic dispnte about German particip"­
tion in the war effort (10).
Very early on, this dispute led to irritations. The American demands
for a sizeable amount of support from the FRG have to be seen in the
context of a long-term strategy by the US to get the allies to more bur­
den-sharing. (l1) Vietnam wa.s an obvious additional al'gllment. Ini­
tially, the US confined itself to asking for explicit and public political
support against the proposals by De Gaulle and domestic critics such aR
Senator Mansfteld for a neutralisation of South Vietnam. (12) In mid
1964, the Americam stepped up the pressure, drawing on some alto·
gether familiar arguments which had been used since President Eisen­
hower had seen the American economy endangered by the Cold Wa.r
cost. When Secretary of Defence McNamara, in May 1964, travelled to
Bonn, he made very clear what was expected of Germany regarding its
share in the overall cost of Western defence. On Vietnam, he asked for 'a
strong statement in support of the South Vietnamese effort t,o defea.t
the Vietcong' and 'a direct contribution to Viet Nam' (13). He sug­
gested, for example. a medical unit. Erhard's response was rather non­
committal: '[ ... j we shall support within our given possibilities thE'
United States in their efforts t,o maintain South Vietnam as a bulwark
(9) FOI' example.
8('('
'~!l',,,(),,,,n(J,lIn of l'onve"sation with LB•.!". 12 .June IY65. }I'HI'S
It}64·G8, "ol",n(' XV, Due nO.
t 10) I"or cxumple: "~\('morandnm by Ambassador Schnippcnkottcl", 2 Novcmbel' lil07,
pp. :378379, AAPJ) I06?, Ill.
(11) Sl'C. H ubcrt ZIMMh:IHI INN, ,l!"llcl/lltld SUllrity. Troops, Monetary Policy. and 11'".
(JprmflllY·. RP/a/;nn. /I'illl t1lr Tl8 find Brit";ll, 195071, Camhridge. Cambridge LTni"e",it,v
T' I'OSS, 2002.
(12)FRUH 19646H,XV.Doe. 15.
(J310t'o"I!f'lown Librory,l\lcUh~cpnpc·)'s.1!)88Ildu .. Bonn ],510. Vielnam. IIAby 1\10-1·
LA OUERRE AMERICA IN"'~
53
of I, he Free World in South East Asia' (14). It turned out that these pos­
sibilities were rather limited. A military contribution by Germany was
rejected for legal and political reasons (15).
The US continued, however, to work for a commitment of some 'civil'
unitl:l, such as a medical battalion (HI). The tonc became much stemer in
the run-up to the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, although the American
ambassador in Germany, McGhee, cautioned against too much pres­
sure. (17) In J'une 1964, when Erhard visited Washington, the president
himself stepped up the pressure on the German Chancellor (18). Bonn
tried to defuse the issue by promising more aid to Vietnam and - against
the apprehension of experts by new commitments in the offset issue.
But since Erhard, on every occasion, pronounced his complete support
for the American policy a position which was shared by almost no on
rise in Germany he became a natural target for increased pressurv.
Shortly afterwards, the ambassadors in the capitals of America's closest
allies,innluding Bonn and Paris, were told in no uncertain terms what
the US government expected ofthem in terms of support : 'Our interost
is that this contribution should be as large and significant as possible in
terms of men on the scene, in each case. With sixty thousand Americans
in Vietnam, there is every reason to hope that our Allies, especially the
111I'ger ones, will think in terms of many hundreds of men each. not
handfuls'. These men should not be necessarily combat soldiers, but
they should be closely involved in the task at hand. The circular tele·
gram, signed by Rusk, expressed the hope that the ambassadors came
hack with tangible results in the very near future (19). However, the
result was again negative.
(1-1) FRUS 64·8, XV. Doe. :36. undated (May 19(4). 'fhus. Erhal'Cl's support wns not
unc·onditional. Strnuss' assertion ill his memoil'll (' I was completely shocked; Franz·Josef
STIlAl'HH, J)if Er;llnerullYffl, Si~dler. lI-hilll·hclI. 1l189. 428429) that Erhard in 1063 had
promi6NI LB.J a mllnpower commitment is possible, gi \'011 Erhard" ineptitude ill forei!!!1 1'01­
i,)' ,Ind his urgo to please the US president; however, it certainly was not government pO!il'y.
(15) The following reasons were cited in a eabinel paper by the AA : the Bl/lldfW"I"
should not be implicated in a conniel which had nothing to do \\~th :NA'fO and whirh was
controversially diseussed within :NATO; there was no other country mililarily present in
Vietnam: and a political engagement in Southeast Asia might have had negative overall eon­
Hf'4 I ,enoc. for Germany's foreign policy. See: 'Cabinet Papu,' of27 May 1004'. 1940. AAPD
1965. TTT, DocA69, fn 13.
(16) 'Department of Rtate to the Embassy in Oerman.v', 21 May 1964, F'RUS 648. XV,
Doe. -12; 'Conversation l\leNamam El'hard', 12 June 196-1, FRU8 (;4 R, Doe. 53.
(17) '1 would cito ou,' recent "pproaeh on South Vietnum lUI a e,"C in I,oinl. Prom whlll \I c
hl\\'~ heMd, our handling of I.lie matter "t Bonn lInd The Ha!(uc Icft the Ger'mans witli the
impression th.ll I,hey wCf'(' being pushed too openly. This ocel\llioncd some rcsentmenl in gov­
ernment circles, and" "001. often e"ilieal, press reaction' f1c-e. ''fclel!ram from Embassy
Ronn to Department of State' , I .Iune 1964, FH.llS 1964 68, XV. Do(·. ~,).
(Ill) 'Memcon I~r'hard - L.BJ' 12 .Tune 1964. FRUS XV. Doe. 50.
(HI) 'Circub\( Telegram', 2 .July 196-1. box I, 1988 lldd .. MeCJhee Pupers.
54
LA OUF.HRE AMERICA1NE
LA GUERRE AM ERlCA1NE
In 1965, the Amerioans made another pitch to get 'some Germans
into the field'. In bis ,June L965 meeting with LBJ, Erhard used the Ber­
lin-Saigon analogy once more, although in the meantime he should have
realised that this would serve only as pretext for new American
demands (20). Thus, a few months later, Secretary of State Rusk asked
his German count,erpart that Germany should as a matter of utmost
importance 'send considerable numbers of people to South Viet­
nam' (21). Foreign Minister Schrodor informod him that no volunteers
for even peaceful tasks, such as mcdical care, had turned up in Ger­
many. The deployment of military personnel was legally impossible. In
the samc month. Erhard, du ring onc of his many visits to Washington,
remained also non-committal, although he was subjected to the John­
son treatmcnt (22). LBJ made a very passionate appeal for a medical
unit of 200 men and a constmction unit of 1,000 men (23). This new
request, which was accompanied by similar demands from U.S. sena­
tors, caused a. hectic search in the German government for un-contro­
versial forms of support which might defuse the American pressure and
at the same time avoid a domestic uproar. Most officials argued that
Germany should continue to stay away from the conflict. and attempt a
position of neutra.! distancE' (24). Any involvement of military person­
nel, including medical units, was therefore once more categorica.lly
excluded (25). In cal'ly January, the Cabinet. decided to send a hospital
ship to Viet.nam. This provided the opportunij,y to remain at a physical
distance from the war and a,t the same time reap some humanitarian
points. The Americans judged this result as disappointing (26). Subse­
quently, however, the American pressure calmed down. 'rhc continuin
resistance of the Germans and the fact that rumours in the German
press about American requesta had stirred up considerable unrest, led
the US fina./ly to the realisation that a physical commitment was indeed
out of the question.
(20) 'Meeting of.j. June J965', 1988 add., McGhec Papers; also in AAPD 1065, n, Doe.
233,9112. J do not share W. Mausbtwhs' ,"ssertion that t.hiR wu' a def'isive fRetar in bhuping
Germany's response to the Vietnam W"r. !'lee MA LlSRArtt, 'Eu rope..n Per$peetives', p. 79.
(21) FRUS 1964-8. X V, Doc. 135.
(22) Cc-orge M('OIH~~;, AI till erN/lion DJ (l New Germany: An Amba8satlor',. Acro1lllt. Yale
Unh'crsit.y Press, New Haven, 11)89, pp. 184·5; FRUS XV, Does. J38. 139,141, 143.
(23) 'Oc.prach zwischcn Erhard IJnd Johnson', 20 December IOn5, 1039, AAPD 1965,
J I I. Doe. -l69.
(24) 'Mel11of'U.nr!um by Millist.ol·ialdirc,ktor Thicrfcldcr'. 19 Fcbrt",l'y 1966, 187.188,
AAPD 1960. J, Doe. :30.
(25) 'Minist.eriuldirektol' Krapfta AmbUR$lIdoJ' Knllpp$t.ein,
l!)(j6. 8, AAPD 1966. T, Doc. 2, fn. 6.
WU~hington·. IfJ ,January
(26) ':'tfcNnmarl\ Johneon telephone conversntion', 17 ,Janul\l'Y 1966, ~'RUS 1964 68, II',
Do~
26 ('LBJ . The (:crmuns coming throUKh with anything 1 McNal11ura; Not
thing except till' hospital ship')
11
d""nn
55
What were the reasons for the steadfast German refusal? The first
reason was West Germany's international position and the way it was
complicated by the country's past,. This had become vcry visible during
the disaster of its Near East policy in 1964-1965. Urged by the Ameri­
cans and motivated by its specific responsibility towards thc country,
the FRG had in the late 1950s started to ship weapons to Israel. During
his Washington visit in June 1964, Erhard agreed to augment these
deliveries All this was done in absolute sccrecy to avoid damage to Ger­
many's traditionally close relations with the Arab countries. However,
soon the deal became known, and almost all Arab countries broke up
their official relations with Bonn (27). The affair pffectively erased Ger­
many's willingness to engage itself in yet another conflict area. Ther'
was also thc danger of collateral damage to Germany's Eastern policy,
German personnel working side-by-side with the Americans would have
led immediately to a very vivid debate, not only in communist coun­
tries. Every attempt. to pursue even the most t,imid detente would have
been impossible. Domestically, the government would have come under
st.rong attacks. Towards the Americans, the cautious position was
explained wit.h the following arguments: the danger of a stepping-up of
communist agitation against West Germany; the lacking capacity of
the B7lndeswehr for out-of-area missions; and the danger of new moves
against Berlin (28). Additionally, there were important legal problems.
A memorandum by the legal division of the AA noted that the German
:onstitution allowed only defensive actions by the Bundeswehr : 'The
military activities of the Vietcong rebels or the North Vietnamese units
do not constitute an attack on the FRG or one of her allies in Europe or
North America. The argument that the free world, including Germany,
is being defended in Vietnam is of a purely political nature and in this
context of no relevance'. Since the NATO treaty obliga.tions were lim­
ited to the geographical area of NATO, they were not applicable
either (29). These arguments foreshadowed the fundamental debates in
Germany during the late 1990s about German participation in the con­
flicts in former Yugoslavia. A deep aversion against the settlement of
conflicts by milita.ry means had developed as a lasting legacy of two lost
World Wars. As long a-s the American involvement seemed to be one of
helping a weak a.lly against a communist insurgency, it was more or less
(27) fi'or an account see: Schollgen GIU:UOR, Dip A"jJ'"]Jolilik dCT Ji1w.drdTfpubW· Vrllt­
.rlll'm.d, C. H. Beck. Bonn 1999. pp. 81-83.
(28) 'Ministeriahlir(·ktor Kmpfto Ambassador Knappslein, Washington', 28 Janullry
1966, III 3, AAPD 1960, J. Doe. 24.
(29) 'Ministerialdil'Cklor \Yen to Embassy WMhingLon·. 18 April 1966, G06 l1./bicl..
Doe. 11ii.
56
LA
.r:HRE AMERICAINE
LA
acceptable. As soon as the US itself was officially engaged in the war, its
character changed altogether.
Although most West Germans wished that the Americans would win
the war, nobody really believed that a continued demonstration of
American resolve had. any positive impact on the situation in Berlin. In
the end, mORt argued exactly the contrary, pointing to the rising pres­
sure on German financial and moral resources, and the weakening oftb
American resolve in Europe. The thinning out of Amcriean military
manpower in Germany during the Vietnam War was clear evidence of
that. Since the mid-1950s, with only a few breaks, there had been a cho­
rus of voices in the US that the European commitment should be
reduced. Vietnam was a filrther factor lending credence to this debate
which was sparked by traditions of non-entanglement, strategic consid­
erations and, increasingly, financial concerns (30). The public opposition
to a continuation of the troop commitment, focused in the resolutions by
1he Democratic Senator MansfieJd, took the lack of help and the failure
frset the troop foreign exchange cost in Europe as a pretext to demand a
step-by-step military disengagement (which was in accordance with the
wishes ofthe civilian leadership of the Pentagon). One of Chancellor
Erhard's major concerns was to avoid a reduction of American troops in
Europe, lest this was construed as a weakening of deterrence and an
indieation that the Americans placed the value of the German-Ameri­
an relationship far lower than Erhard himself (who was under consid­
erable domestic attack on this precise issue). The Americans strongly
denied that Vietnam bad a negative impact on troop deployments in
8:urope. However, the statements of the administration were clearly
untrue. This is evidenced by the significant fall in number and quality of
American troops (31). In January 1968, the US army in Europe was
only 86% of its authorised strength, and Over 90% ofthese remaining
troops were unable 'to conduct sustained combat operations for 90
days' (32).
All those factors caused the German government to see the war as an
increasing challenge to their own international and domestic position.
It would have been political suicide to support the war physically. How­
ever. the paramount importance of the transatlantic alliance made it
imperious that something had to be done to soothe the American hus­
(:10) Src my paper 'The I ,nprobable Prrmanence or a Com mitment . The Rattle about the
H Military Presenre ill Europe in the Period of Detonte, 1965-75'. presented at ""onferon"e
in Dobbiaeo in October 2002.
(31) RUDOY. (/rulZl'7I. 20620 •.
(32)
'Gin~bu"gh to
Rostow'. 19 Mar"', 1968, Name File: Oinsburgh
~lerno;. NSF, LJl,j L.
Elum AMEHlCAINE
57
tration. Thus, the 'quiet' instrument of economic diplomacy, the pre­
ferred mcdium of West German foreign policy, was employed.
ECONOMIC
SUllPORT
The role of economic diplomacy in Bonn's foreign policy is often
underestimated and a systematic evaluation is as yet not available.
However, as in so many other instances of German post-war foreign pol­
icy, a comprehensive look at the German participation in the Vietnam
War has to scrutinise this field above all. German activities covered var­
ious fields: trade, a.id, and monetary diplomacy. I will allude briefly to
all three fields, providing some exa.mples.
In 1963, Chinese officials approached Germany with the wish to
establish regular economic contacts between the two countries. This
held some obvious attractions for Germany, and not just auspicious
business opportunities. The Chinese proposal also offered the possibility
to expose the rift between Cbina and the Soviet Union (particularly if
China was willing to accept Berlin as part of the FRG in the agreement)
and to lure Beijing away from East Germany (:33). During his conversa­
tions with Johnson in June 1964, however, El'hard retreated as soon as
he heard that the Americans would disapprove of such an agree­
ment (34). During a press conference, he said that the FRG would nei­
ther establish a trade mission nor extend long-term credits to
China (35). In a following conversation with Robert Kennedy, he con­
firmed this statement: ·the FRG would make no efforts to institutional·
ize its trade with China or to encourage any great expansion in tmde on
the part of German business interests' (36). The talks broke down sinee
China felt cheated and terminated the contact (37). However, German
firms were not particularly pleased with this decision and. of course, the
(33) ':Memortlndum by Ministeriuldirektor Krapf, 19 Mr,y 1964,6-43-544. AAPD, J(J()J,
Doe. 131.
(34) 'With N'garcJ t.o Red China, the ChancelloT' did not envisage diploffllitic recognition
on the pa,'t ofGermuny. Matters of this 80rt would bl' carefully coordinated with the United
Htatcs. 'f'mdo rch.tions with Red ChinH were very limited No expansion would be under­
taken without lld,'ance con~lIltation with the Unitt1d State". both a8 to timc l\fId substance.
MOl·cover. Germany did !lot anticipate the establishment of any tT'['clc uommi~sions.' FR,US
190-i·tJ8, XV, Doe. 49. flee also 'Conversation betwecn Rusk and Sehroedor', 12 Junc J964,
!/dd.. Do(' 51, which "",kes thc connection to Vietnon, very oIeal·.
(:l5) AAPD J!i6~, Doc. 206,812. n. 7.
(:ltl) Oeorgelown Library, McGhce pupers, 1988 add .. Bonn 4309, 26 June J9M.
(37) This is (·onfirmed by (l JTlomorandum of 21 Mar"h I971 on " possible T'l'-d(·finition of
.,ermany's relations wit h China. 1'he State Sceretary noted th8l the Chinese allegution that
it was the Oel'man rault that the contacl was "ancelll'd was 'unfortunately true' Aufzdch·
nun~ des Ministerialdirigenleo Oncken. 489. n. 5, AAPD 1970,1, Doe,. 123.
58
LA GUERRE AMERJCAINE
FRG had a fundamental interest, 'to sustain and enlarge its share of the
China trade in order to avoid being Jocked out in the future from a market
of 700 million people' (38). In 1966, the topic was again on the GermanAmerican agenda. This time the issue was a credit line ofDM 350m which
the government had given China in connection with the construction of a
gigantic steel plant. Despite heavy criticism in the Senate, the US government's response was this time less outspoken, and the deal went
a.head. However, the FRG refrained from an institutionalisation of these
contacts out of concern for American sensibilities (39).
erman economic cooperation was not only confined to such diplomatic concessions. From the start of the war, West Germany was the
biggest aid donor to South Vietnam aftcr the United States. However,
very care was taken that the various aid measureS would not be of a
political and military nature. Thus, the German help consisted of a
whole series of humanitarian small scale measures (such as a hospital
ship) and credits to the South Vietnamese government. Exact figures
are difficult to find. The amount of foreign aid wa.g about DM 200m
until 1973; credits and humanitarian help to the tune of about DM 25m
were also extended (40). Given the lack of a comprehensive study of
these issues, the impact of thcse sums is hard to assess. However, they
certainly played an important role in the stabiJisation of various South
Vietnamese regimes.
Much more valuable than these aid efforts was German support for the
dollar. In the literature on the monetary crises of the 1960s and 1970s, it
has become a IStock phrase to attribute to Vietnam a core role in the
breakdown of the Bretton Woods system. This is certainly not wrong,
although the connections are not as straightforward as it appears (41). It
is often said that by inflating the dollar the Americans actually madc
their allies pay for the war. (42) Even Paul Volcker, Nixon's Undersecretary for Monetary Affairs stated, that Vietnam 'was the period when
inflation really gained momentum in the United States and threatened
(38) 'Memorandum ofVorLragender Legationsrat Luedde Neun-I,h', 14 December 196,~.
AA PD 1965, TTT, Doo. 468.
(39) 'Conversatiou Brondt wiLh UK Foreign Rec'~tary Brown', 12 April 1967,571, AA PD
1967, IJ, Doe. 124.
(40) These figurcs oome from. Bcrrosheim VOI.KER. 35 '}aJlr~ Indochinl,politik der BRD.
Hamburg, Imtil III fur Asionkunde, 1086, pp. 40, 55.
(41)1 dealt wiLl> Lhis issue ILt length in 'Who P"id for America·" War! Vietnam and tilt'
InternaLional MOIlPt>try System, 1960-76' in Lloyd () GAllmO';'\, Androas D,'UM and Wil.
fried MAll~'l;\G", cds , America'~ It'ar and Ihe World: Vietnam in I1lt,nwlional and Compar.
Mivp. Perspcctillcd, Cambridge, Cambridge University P,x,ss, 2003. The following pumgraph,
draw hea vily 011 this carlier work.
(42) Scc, for eXllmple, ('lIrole F1NK, Philipp (1AHSEJ<'r. Dellof ,J UIO(F.H. 'JnLroducLion', in
Ibid.. 1968. Thf World Trl1l1sfomU'-c1, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1908. p.8.
LA GUERRE AMERICAINE
59
to spread to Europe too, and if we weren't willing to finance the war
properly, then maybe Wf> shouldn't have fought it at all' (43).
In fact, the Vietnam War had a serious impact on the American balance of payments. In 1968, the part of the deficit related to military
activities amounted to 54.5 billion and outlays in Asia had risen from
825 million in 1960 to 52.491 million in 1968 (44). This hefty foreign
exchange loss was a welcome target for those who were critical of the
military campa.ign in Southeast Asia. Instead of djrectly targeting
Johnson's Vietnam policy, however, Congressional critics turned their
attention to the commitment in Europe and initiated a lasting debate
,bout force reductions in Europe. What was even more dangerous than
the cLi rect monetary impact, of the war was the decline of international
confidence in the dollar's role as reserve currency associated with the
erisis in Vietnam (45). The American administration was determined to
avoid a devaluation of the dollar lest it could be construed as a major
defeat and an indication that the US economy could not sustain a prolonged war effort. It was also well aware of the fa.ct that an overvaluod
dollar was helpful to finance military commitments worldwide and to
shield the domestic economy from the inflationary impact of these
expenditurcs. However, stabilising the dollar was not possible without
the help of the allies. In this field, the Americans were looking mainly to
Bonn. Secretary of Treasury Fowler had outlined the basic idea already
in 1966:
I pro post' that W(~ give spriou8 consideration to asking the kcy dollar-holding nat,ions [... ] to pledge not to convert dollars/hey presently hold and 11.0110 conl'prl any additional dollars [emphasis in original] that lUay accrue to them as
long as the Vietnam struggle continues. To accomplish this, wo will have to
state in thc strongest possible teI'IDS that, L We most emphatically do int·ond
to bring our balanco of payments into oquilibrium. 2. The Vietnam War, with
its attendant direet and indirect balance of payments costs. has made it difficult for us to do this as soon as we hoped. But we will do it. 3. We are betuing
virtually the entire burden of the Vietnam conflict. We view this as commit·
mcnt on behalf of all free natioos. We do not ask othcr. to see it this way, but
wc do ask that they not act in 6. ma.nner that will prevent us from meeting our
(43) Paul VOJ.('Kf;n and Toyoo CY(IOllTf:N, ('hanging forlllflf$. Times Book8. New York,
100~. p. 62. As SUBun Strunge write~: '[ ...] the United Stl\WS had used its oxorbitant privilege
!IS the cent er-count ry of a gold-cxohllngc system to flIn a perpetual balance of payments deficit
and Lo fiuanee a dishnL and cxpensive W;I'· in Yietnam by inOaLionary credit crcation rather
than by a trnnsfer of resources from the civilians to the military by menns oftaXllLion' Susan
~'I''''\NC:E, 'lllturprctnt ions of" Docadc· in L\lc811 TsoukaliB, ed., Tlit Politico I gamomlj of Inurnntional.l101lnj, London, Sllge Publications Ltd. 1085, p. 11
(44) FigureB come from ConI, R SHf;I'LRR and Leonllrd G. CAMI'BEI.L, 'United State"
])cf('nsc Rxpenditurc Abroad' in Su",ey of ('UTrrnt B1/8infR~, (Dco~mber WOO), p. 44.
(45) 'RobNI. M. Cfll.LJNS, ·'\'\'a Economic Crisis of 1968 and t he Waning of the 'Am~rican
(\'ntury', AmcriwlI Historical. Revifw, volume 101 (April 1996), pp. ~13-416.
60
LA GU~HRE A.MERICAINE
commitments and/or destroy the international finan~ifl,l institutions that
such a vital part of the world wc /It·o attempting to defend (46).
LA
IIrC'
This policy was pursued in the following years. In the framework of
the offset agreements, Germany accepteu l~ commitment not to
exchange any surplus dollars to gold and thus undermine the system (47) Already before this agreement, the FRG had indirectly subsid.ised the war by buying huge amounts of American weapons in order to
offset the dollar cost of American tT·oops in Europe.
Nevertheless, the run out ofthe dollar continued. American liabilities
abroad rose between 1968 and 1972 from $21 billion to $80 billion (48).
West Germany alone, between January 1970 and March 1973, had an
unprecedented foreign exchange inflow ofDM 71 billion, most of it from
American sources, which threatened to infla,te the economy (49). The
Germans who felt morally bound to Blessing's letter and who were still
dependent on U.S. security coverage for their 08tpolitik" were helpless
against the currency flood. Then, in August 1971, Nixon, in a spectacular unilateral move, officially closed the gold window, a,nd, in d.isrespect
to all post-war principles of U.S. foreign economic policy, imposed a
10% surtax on all imports to the United States. In the ensuing turmoil
on the cU1'l'ency markets, the dollar lost approximately 40% of its value
until 1973, and the reserves of America' s partners shrank, insofar as
they consisted of dollars. by the st\,me percentage. This devaluation of
the world's dollar rese/'ves was, because partly it can be attributed to
the Vietnam War, an indirect Vietnam tax on America's allies.
All in all, monetary support was probably the most important part of
Germany's support of the US war effort. It is well known that the gold
crisis of 1968 in connection with the Tet-oHensive had been a major factor in the turn-about of America's Vietnam policy (50). Had Germany
not supportod the dollar, the monetary impact of Vietnam would hav
been felt much earlier on the markets. The constraints and cost which
came with this support led to inCl'easing frustration with the US managed international monetary system. It is no accident, that in the end of
1969, the FRG accepted for the first time the idea of a European cur(46) Memomndum by Fowlnr-to,lolil1son, lOMa)' HJ66, "'RUB 1904-68, VIII. pp. 274
27G.
(47)'I'hc whole story ofthc so-called Blessing lolt"r is reoount~d in deluil in 7.imlncrmann, },fon,y and Security, ohllpter 9.
(48) Erie H(H·J'M~;YI'.H, 1'11, .I101ltl(lry 8y81,m, Amsler<.ltulI. ~olth-Hollnnd, 19l12, p. 89.
(49) Emmingcr OT\lAI •. 'Dclllllche Geld- llnd Wahmngspolitik ill1 Spnnnlln~fcld zwischcn
innercrn untlliullor'rm OIcichgewicht, 1948-71)' in DC1l~cllr Bundr8/xl/lk, ed., Walt/"ll"!! und Wirl.•ciwft'n DrulJlrltland 1876197,5. Frankfurt, Fritz Knapp, 1976 p. 1;32.
(50) Sec' COI.LI.'IS, ''T'hc p'('onomic Crisis of 1968'. pp. 396 ol22.
ERRE AMERICA/NE
61
rency and that the EEC made its first attempt towards this goal, in the
form of the Werner plan
GERMAN POSTWAR FORElON POLICY
AND AltMED CONFLICT
It has been remarked that the Vietnam War had a major fall-out on
the political climate and intellectual framework in which German forign policy was made. The impact of the war cannot, not be understood
if we lea.vc aside the fact that the Vietnam war touched a very sensitive
nerve of a German society which, after World War 11, had devoloped a
very deep-seated aversion to military means of solving conflicts (as is
evidenced by the recent debates about German participation in the war
in Iraq). Vietnam became a core issue in the German protest movement
of the 1960s (51). But the general public, too, saw the war with incroasing scepticism; although most llupported the US in general, a majority
was against a continuation ofthe Vietnam War. In January 1966,25%
of the population advocated a continuation of the war, whereas 44%
were against, it (with the rest being undecided). In February 1968, the
answer to the same question was 19% 'yes' and 56% 'no' (52).
The debates within German parties rcfleeted very well the general
dilemma of the Federal Republic's foreign policy regarding the Vietnam
issue. At least those parties which had a chance to take over some
responl:libilities in the government were careful to embarrass neither the
U.s. with outspoken opposition to the war nor their electorate with too
openly voiced t.lemonstrationll of solidarity. While all parties made clear
that they were dead-set against any military involvement (53), they
grappled with the question as to how exactly to formulate their position
on Vietnam in public. In the CDUfCSU, Erhard's unanimously positive
position was quite isolated. Many sha.red Adenauer's allegations that
the Americans neglected Europe becauso of Vietnam and that they
would try to find some kind of arrangement with the Soviet Union in
Europe which was t.l.isadvantageous for the FRG (54). American hopes
that the Soviet Union could restrain its North Vietna.mese ally had, in
(a I) On this is;,ut'. >PP thc arlidl' b) ,lost DUlffcl' inthiH volume.
(5:1) Figures from 81aJisliJJelle Jl'lh,biirhrr dr, Runll'MI'I}lIblik.
(5:1) SCl' for example the 1'coolution of the FDP PIl1'ty leadcrRhip from J:! Feb"uHr)' 1966 in
Ih, Libl'rllln, unLtr drlll Vorsi/. t'On R.Mrnde. Sil,u'oysprolokolle 19(;()-7 (Quelle1l ,ur 0,.-
d,.
chirhte
Por/omm/ori"mlls und de, polilisclun Par/riet!. 711 JJ). Droate. Dtlsscldorf, 1993,
pp. 661-662
(;')~) Gr8bbo HANS-,JnIUl~~N, Unio1lJl]Jq,rlrien. 8ozioldrmokrot-ie 1t1l.d Vrr"jnigtr 81(1"/'/1 T'on
.1 ",nil'a. 194;) 1966, Drostc, nUs-'1eldorf. 1983, p. 45~.
62
LA GUERRE A~tER1CAlNE
LA GUERRE AMERICAJNE
faot, led t,o an interest in detente in Europe. An active reunifioation policy could no longer count on general American support. The same is true
for German measures which might be perceived as oriented against the
status quo in Europe, such as a German finger on the nu<:lear trigger (55). The way the Non Proliferation Treaty was handled by the
Amer'icans lent credence to this argument and was particularly resented
by Conservatives. Public crit,icism of the Americans remained the
xception, but lasting distrust was the result.
By drawing this comparison, the protestors not only distanced themselves from the silence of their parents about Nazi crimes, which moved
during the 1960s increasingly into the realm of public debate, for example during the Eichmann trial, the Auschwitz Process and the discussion about the Nazi past of Chancellor Kiesinger. They also expressed a
need to achieve the moral high ground against the US which was portraying itself as the gual'aotor of peace. The protest against, war linked
with the protest against German elites which seemed to support the war
and US post-war policy unconditionally. A resurgence of anti-Americanism was the result (59). It linked up with the frustration of political
elites about American policies in Europe and their incessant demands
for German participation in the war. At that point. the strategy of
remaining the 'Quiet German' had arrived at its cnd. The German government was forced to take a public position and while they still
refrained from too harsh oritieism of the US, the call for a peaceful soluhOll became part of every official remark on this issue.
The do-legitimisation of the transatlantic pillar during the Vietnam
conflict led to a renewed emphasis on the second pillar of German postwur foreign policy: Europe. This framework had been regarded by
many Germans with much ambiguity since it seemed to be a vehicle for
French f'conomic and political goals and more a construction in the
service of Franco-German reconciliation rather than a means to furt.her
German objectives in other fields. The exclusion of Britain. which many
saw as an integral part of Europe, had underlined that feeling. In 1969,
this situation changed. De Gaulle left thc scene and talks with the
nited Kingdom about membership were under way. A multitude 0
other initiatives, for example in the technological and monetary field,
were brought on their way. Europe suddenly became a real alternative;
furthermore. the new Ostpolitik tended to lessen West Germany's
dependence on NATO's security guarantee.
The Social Demo<:rats adopted a very similar position for different
reasons. Since 1959, its leadership had tried to acquire pro-American
credentials in order to become a serious contender for the government.
Initially, some SPD politicians had even echoed Erhard's Saigon-Berlin
analogy. However, soon Vietnam caused growing unrest within the
party ranks. The best strategy for the leadership in this dilemma
seemed to stick to a low profile and quietly hope that the US sooner or
later' would inaugura.tc a peaceful solution to the conflict. Early voices
within the parliamentary group to thl' effect that the SPD should join
the moral critique of the American campaign, were admonished by
Brandt and Schmidt that friendship with America was the cornerstone
of Germany's foreign policy and that it was best to express cautious solidarity (56). However, the Berlin-Saigon comparison was dismissed by
Brandt as simplifying (57). Only in 1968 was the first critical resolution
towards the war passed at the annual SPD convention (and prompt.ly
received very badly by Washington). At that time, a critical stance
towards America permeated the party ranks. The new anti-militaristi<:
opposition to the war by younger pa,rty members Jinked up with the traditional anti-capitalist mindset of the older generation. The position of
Brandt and others in the early 1960s which saw the transatlantic alliance as the central point of reference for Germany's foreign policy had
become a minority position, and sooo Europe became the new nor
tive core of Social Democratic foreign policy.
Wilfried Mausbach has argued that the Vietnam War changed the
German framework for creating a post-national identity by undermin
ing the notion of being part of the Free World camp (58). This was also
due to the wide-spread identification of US foreign policy with Vietnam,
and the latter with events in the German past. Auschwitz and Vietnam
were often used as synonyms in heated domestic protests in Germany.
(G5) On Ihiti poinl, tieo: NUT!. ·'rrllntio.t1ILnlic Relations in tha Erll orVialnam'. p. 28.
(56) Di" S/'D /i'mklion im 811nrlf~la(J. SilZll1l{JSpr%lwllf 1961-66 (QlIfUen %1Ir GfSC!liC!lt,
de., f'or'"mml(mR1llU~ /11/11 tlrr POTlri"n, 81T11 j, DI'OSlc, Diisseldorr, I!193. 782-784.
(5i) GIUllllt-:, Ullion~paTltien. So:ialdtmokmlir. p. ,563.
(5!!) lIIAURIlM'II, 'European PCr1lpeclil'cs'
63
CONCLUSIONS
This article takes a broad view of the consequences of the Vietnam
Wll,r for the international policy of the FRG. It recounts the American
attempts to extract a sizeable contribution of German manpower to the
war cffOI't and discusses the reasons for the American failure in this
respect. The U.S. was more successful regarding other forms of support,
notably finan<:ial help. Economic diplomacy had the advantage that it
(SO) Ml:I,LP.R, Emil-Peter. Anliamerilwnis11ltls in [)elll~r.il/ond : Zll';"chrn C'1l'" Pakrlll1l1l
('mist Missile. my. Koln 1986. pp. 103-104.
64
LA CUERRE AMERlCAINE
was a 'quiet' means of satiRfying the American demands. This squared
well with the general strategy of silence which was pursued by the FRG.
Thus it tried to bridge the contradiction between the attempt to maintain an impression of neutrality in the conflict and the need to bolster
the transatlantic alliance.
However, even this 'quiet' form of support led to increasing strains in
German-American relations. This combined with disillusiomnent about
S willingness to support German objectives in Europe and increasing
misgivings about the morality of US foreign policy in general (particularl.y, when the war effort in Vietnam became an important element in
the unresolved debate about the German past). The core thesis of this
article is t,hereforo that the Vietnam War was of particular importance
in a process in which the ideological outlook of Bono's foreign policy
slowly changed from a basically transatlantic framework towards an
emphasis on European integra.tion as first priority.
THE ANGLO-US LINKAGE
BETWEEN VIETNAM AND THE POUND:
1964 AND 1968
BY
SAKI
DOCKRILL
When the Harold Wilson Labour Government replaced its Conservative predecessor in the autumn of 1964, t,he United States began to consider stepping up its military pressure against North Vietnam. The
President of 1, hp United States. Lyndon Johnson, told the Guardian editor on 2 Decem ber 1964 that 'the United States did not want to be alone
in a 'colonialist position'. '" We want your flag' (1). Between 1964 and
January 1968, Britain's deliberatiollE over its global defence role and its
determination to avoid the devaluation of t,he pound were intertwined
with the United States' interest in keeping Britain's military presence
East of Suez as well as in Europe. Washington also wanted Britain to
continue to avoid the devaluation of the pound. Contemporaries suspected that Wilson ma,y have struck a deal with the Americans,
whereby Britain was compelled to remain East of Suez and to support
the Vietnam War, in return for America's financial support for keeping
the pound solvent, a view which has been supported (to varyin
degrees) by a number of scholars (2). This chapter seeks to clarify
whether there existed such a deal, and if so, in what form.
Perhaps Harold Wilson and Lyndon Johnson were the most misunderstood leaders of the time. Wilson was often described as devious,
insecure. and manipulative, while we are told that Johnson was impul(I) 'John~on in Wasbington. DC'. 2 December 10M, 7/2, Ala8lair Hetherington Paper~
[h"renfter cited RI! AH PI. the British Library ofPolitioal and Social Soience, London.
(2) Barbam CAS'I'J.B, The Castle Diaries 1964- 70. London, Weidenfcld & Nicolson, 1984.
p. 148; Richard CHO"'MAN, The1Jiaril'1l oJ Cl GaMnel Mini.ttr 1'01.1 (1964 19(6) ,London, Book
('Iub ASBociate~, 1976. p. 417, Clive PONl'INO, Brearh oj Promi<!e . LahO/lr i" Pallier /964-1970,
LlJndon, Hamish Hamilton, 1989. jJp. 103-107; Oeoffrey PI('KEllINll, Britain.·s Wil/ldmwal
Jro/ll ealll oJ Suez, London, Macmillan. 1998. p. 149; John Dl'MBI\EI.I,. 'The Johnson Adminis\ ration and the British Labour CO\'crnmenL Vietnam, t he Pound and East of Suez', Joumal
of Ilmericatl Studiu. volume 30, number 2, (August W96), pp. :!12-224; Diano KUNZ. "Some
what Mixed Up together' : Anglo-American Dofenoe and Rinnneial Policy during t he 1960,', in
Robert D. K I.NG &. Robin K1L~ON, cd;;, ThR. Slalecraf! oj British lmptriali~m : Essay. in FlolI.Q1LJ'
r;j Wm. Ro(W l.ouis. London. FrunkC88ll, 1999, pp. 216 218