War Neurosis, Adjustment Problems in Veterans, and an Ill Nation: The Disciplinary Project
of American Psychiatry during and after World War II
Author(s): Hans Pols
Reviewed work(s):
Source: Osiris, Second Series, Vol. 22, The Self as Project: Politics and the Human Sciences
(2007), pp. 72-92
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War
Neurosis, Adjustment Problems
in Veterans,
11
and
an
Nation:
The DisciplinaryProjectof AmericanPsychiatry
duringand afterWorldWarII
By Hans Pols"
ABSTRACT
AfterWorldWarII, theconfidenceof Americanpsychiatristswas at an all-timehigh
as a resultof theirsuccessfulparticipationin the war.Whenthe incidenceof mental
breakdownin the Americanarmedforces rose to unprecedentedheights,new and
effective psychotherapeuticmethodswere developedto treatthe traumaticeffects
of the extraordinarystresses of warfare.At the same time, social scientists concludedthatbreakdownincidencewas inverselyrelatedto morale,which led to the
developmentof preventivemeasuresaimedat specificgroups.Bothinitiativesstimulateda numberof psychiatriststo planprojectsof social engineeringafterthe war.
They firstfocused on aidingthe reintegrationof returningveterans.Later,they addressedthe poormentalhealthof the Americanpopulationas a whole, which they
consideredto be the consequenceof faultychild-rearingmethods.
INTRODUCTION
In the air,passingtime duringthe longjourneyon a soon to be decommissionedB-17
bomberbetween an unidentifiedmajorairportand the little airportof Boone City,
Ohio, the three main charactersof the 1946 film The Best Yearsof Our Lives exchangedthoughtsabouttheiryearsin the armyand whatlife wouldbe like now that
the warwas over.Air ForcebombardierFredDeny admittedthathe was "justnervous out of the service,I guess."ArmysergeantAl Stephensonresponded:"Thething
thatscaresme most is thateverybodyis gonnatryto rehabilitateme."1Most contemporaryviewers of this movie would have recognizedthe significanceof these state* Unit for Historyand
Philosophyof Science, CarslawF07, Universityof Sydney,NSW 2006, Australia;[email protected].
The researchfor this articlehas been supportedby a Discovery ProjectGrantof the AustralianResearch Council, "War,Trauma, and Rehabilitation:The Army, Psychiatry, and World War II"
(DP0450751). The authoris gratefulto GregEghigian,AndreasKillen, andChristineLeuenbergerfor
organizingthe conferencefromwhich this volume resulted,the participantsat the conferencefor their
feedback,and StephanieOak for her detailedand insightfulcommentson earlierdrafts.
1The Best Years Our Lives
of
(videorecording),screenplayby RobertE. Sherwood,producedby
Samuel Goldwyn, directedby William Wyler,presentedby Samuel Goldwyn PicturesCorporation,
SantaMonica, Calif., MGM Home Entertainment,2000 [1946]. In the original scriptfor this Oscarwinningmovie aboutthe predicamentof returningex-servicemen,the characterof HomerParrish,the
thirdman on the plane, was thatof a veteransufferingfrom shell shock. In the final version, Parrish
° 2007
by The Historyof Science Society. All rightsreserved.0369-7827/07/2007-0004$ 10.00
OSIRIS2007,22 : 72-92
72
WARNEUROSIS
73
ments immediately. In 1944, there began appearing an unusual number of magazine
articles, newspaper features, lectures, radio broadcasts, and pamphlets, written by
psychiatrists, psychologists, sociologists, priests, ministers, politicians, and social
commentators, devoted to the veteran problem and detailing the psychological assistance necessary to transform former soldiers familiar with war, violence, and death
into peaceful and productive postwar citizens. According to American psychiatrists,
psychologists, educators, and opinion leaders, the main challenges in the transition
from war to peace were psychological in nature. This made the psychology of the exserviceman one of the most discussed topics after the armistice- much to the chagrin
of most returningveterans, who felt that the attention devoted to their mental lives was
mistaken and misplaced.
Defining the principles for aiding the readjustment and the rehabilitation of returning veterans after World War II constituted the first major postwar political project of
American psychiatry. These principles were based on the Utopianbeliefs of a number
of reformist psychiatrists, inspired by prewar public health and mental hygiene ideas,
that their discipline not only had the tools to treat mental illness and mental disorder
in individuals but also could contribute to the social and cultural transformationof society as a whole. These beliefs were strengthened by the enormous success psychiatrists had had in treating mentally unwell soldiers during the war. Short-term methods
of psychotherapy, administered near the battlefield, as soon as possible after a soldier
had broken down, had proven to be very effective. In addition to developing new psychotherapeutic approaches for the treatment of individuals, American psychiatrists
had also been involved in preventive activities directed at units, platoons, battalions,
and the armed forces as a whole. By boosting morale and disseminating information
among soldiers about the natureof the human mind and how to best manage emotions,
psychiatrists hoped to reduce the incidence of mental breakdown. The perceived results of both initiatives - developing effective treatment methods for individuals and
preventive programs for the army as a whole - increased the confidence of American
psychiatrists in developing postwar disciplinary projects, which involved making
psychiatric care available within the community on an out-patient basis as well as preventing a future world war and the maintenance of peace and democracy. As G. Brock
Chisholm, former director-general of medical services for the CanadianArmy and future founding director-general of the World Health Organization, stated: "We cannot
afford to squander our best brains on psychotherapy . . . [but] should do [our] utmost
to examine, compare, study, understand and treat the ills of our society."2According
to Chisholm, not only did the transformation of society have a much higher priority
than the treatmentof individuals, but it was also imperative to prevent the annihilation
of humankind in the near future.
The psychiatric discourse on the veteran problem held immediate appeal for Americans who wanted to organize the best possible welcome for returning soldiers, who
was a double amputee,a role played by real veteran(andamputee)HaroldRussell. For an analysisof
this film and other "reintegrationdramas,"see David A. Gerber,"Heroesand Misfits:The Troubled
Social Reintegrationof DisabledVeteransof WorldWarII in TheBest Yearsof OurLives'' in Disabled
Veteransin History,ed. David A. Gerber(Ann Arbor,Mich., 2000); and Sonya Michel, "Dangeron
the Home Front:Motherhood,Sexuality,and DisabledVeteransin AmericanPostwarFilms,"in GenWarTalk,ed. MiriamCooke andAngela Woollacott(Princeton,N.J., 1994).
dering
2 G. BrockChisholm,"TheReestablishment
of PeacetimeSociety"(WilliamAlansonWhiteMemorial Lectures),Psychiatry9 (1946): 3-20, on 19. For Chisholm, see Allan Irving, Brock Chisholm:
Doctor to the World(Markham,Ontario,1998).
74
HANS POLS
had prevailed,againstall odds, over well-equippedand persistentenemies.The discoursealso appealedto those individualswho were apprehensiveaboutthe returnof
morethan10 millionveteransto a society thatno longerbenefitedfromthe wareconomy. Manygroupsattemptedto contributeto the reintegrationof all returningveterans.However,manyveteranshatedall the fuss andwantedto havenothingto do with
it. Someof themprovidedcriticismof andironicalcommentarieson theeffortsof psychiatriststo turnevery veteraninto a neuropsychiatric
problemin dire need of treatmentandrehabilitation.The grand,and at times even Utopian,ambitionsof postwar
Americanpsychiatriststo contributeto the general political project of creatinga
peaceful,prosperous,andwell-integratedsocietyclashedwiththe needs,desires,and
intentionsof the individualswhose selves they aimedto shapeandtransform.The involvementof Americanpsychiatristsin the rehabilitationof veteranswould prove
shortlived.As psychiatrymovedawayfromthe clinicaltreatmentof individualswith
clearlyidentifiablediagnoses,veteranswere less inclinedto adoptits guidelinesand
perspectives.This did not deterpsychiatristsfromformulatingeven boldergoals for
theirpostwarpoliticalproject.Theymadethe managementof a peaceful,democratic,
and open society in which aggressionand hostility were handledwith therapeutic
prowesstheiraim for the cold warera.
In this article,I investigatethe developmentof the involvementof Americanpsychiatrywith the armedforces duringWorldWarII andthe broadersocial andpolitical concernsof the disciplinein the postwarworld.3Duringthe firststagesof the war,
psychiatristsdevelopedextensive screeningprogramsto weed out unfitindividuals
fromthe armedservices.Despite the high rejectionratesof inductees,the incidence
of mentalbreakdowncontinuedto climbduring1942,whenmilitaryoperationsin the
Mediterranean
andPacificTheatersof Operationsfaltered.As a response,new forms
of psychotherapeutic
interventionwere developed,which were widely appliedin the
armedforces. Sociologists and psychologists investigatingsoldiers suggested preventive measuresto improvemorale. Both activities inspiredthe Utopianideas of
AmericanpsychiatristsafterWorldWarII. I highlightthepsychiatricdiscoursearound
the rehabilitationof returningveteransas the firstattemptof psychiatriststo formulate a broaderpoliticalprojectin the immediateaftermathof the war.
PSYCHIATRYAND SELECTION
There were three approachesin Americanpsychiatrybefore 1940 that are relevant
for understandingthe developmentof AmericanmilitarypsychiatryduringWorld
WarII.4First, academicpsychiatristsand superintendentsof mental hospitalshad
3 Foroverviewsof the involvementof American
psychiatrywith the armedforces duringWorldWar
II, see Ellen Herman,TheRomanceof AmericanPsychology: Political Culturein theAge of Experts
(Berkeley,Calif., 1995), chap. 4, "Nervousin the Service";Ben Shephard,A Warof Nerves: Soldiers
and Psychiatrists,1914-1994 (London,2000); Hans Binnenveld,FromShellshockto CombatStress:
A ComparativeHistoryof MilitaryPsychiatry(Amsterdam,1997); and EdgarJones and Simon Wesseley, Shell Shockto PTSD:MilitaryPsychiatryfrom 1900 to the GulfWar,MaudsleyMonographs47
(New York,2005); PaulWanke,"AmericanMilitaryPsychiatryand Its Role among GroundForcesin
WorldWar11,"Journalof MilitaryHistory63 (1999): 127^6.
4 For an overview of
psychiatricideas in the 1930s, with an emphasison mentalhygiene, see Hans
Pols, "Divergencesin AmericanPsychiatryduringthe Depression:Somatic Psychiatry,Community
Mental Hygiene, and Social Reconstruction,"Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences 37
(2001): 369-88.
WARNEUROSIS
75
experimented with somatic treatment methods (Metrazol shock, electroconvulsive
therapy, and lobotomy) that had been introduced in the 1930s and hoped to identify
the biological causes of mental illness. This approach had been dominant within
American psychiatry during the first part of the twentieth century and had been reinvigorated with the introduction of new treatment methods.5 Second, through a variety
of out-patient agencies, psychiatrists associated with the National Committee for
Mental Hygiene had advocated increasing the number of individuals who could benefit from psychotherapy by arguing that those mental disorders that did not constitute
mental illness, among them the neuroses, were worthy of their attention.6These psychiatrists were inspired by American interpretations of psychoanalysis and were
eager to broaden the array of conditions they considered suitable for professional intervention. A third strand in psychiatric thinking was represented by mental hygiene
psychiatrists, who sought to realize the ideal of prevention, the guiding philosophy of
the public health movement, within psychiatry. They hoped to develop preventive
methods that could reduce the incidence of mental illness and mental disorder in the
population as a whole. Their methods included educating the public on health issues,
reducing economic instability, reforming education, and making mental health care
available to those who needed it through general practitioners, teachers, and others.7
Mental hygiene psychiatrists articulatedprojects of social and cultural transformation
aimed at preventing mental disorders and fostering mental health. In their perspective,
healthy, happy, and well-adjusted individuals constituted a peaceful and prosperous
society. As Ellen Herman has commented, psychiatrists and psychologists blurredthe
lines between the individual and the collective, which enabled them to use their expertise in treating the mental disorders in the former to develop politically motivated
intervention strategies aimed at the latter.8
Even before the official declaration of war, American psychiatrists had been contemplating how they could aid the war effort.9Initially, they focused their attention on
processes of selection and screening by emphasizing the need to bar individuals with
a predisposition to mental illness from the armed forces. As a consequence, they expected that the number of psychiatric casualties during war would be reduced significantly.10In December 1940, the psychoanalytic psychiatrist Harry Stack Sullivan
5 Forthe
historyof somaticpsychiatrybeforeWorldWarII, see Joel T. Braslow,MentalIlls and Bodily Cures:Psychiatric Treatmentin the First Half of the TwentiethCentury(Berkeley,Calif., 1997);
EdwardShorter,A Historyof Psychiatry:Fromthe Era of theAsylumto theAge of Prozac (New York,
1997); and Jack D. Pressman,Last Resort: Psychosurgeryand the Limits of Medicine (New York,
1998).
6 Foran overviewof these initiatives,see KathleenJones, Tamingthe TroublesomeChild:American
Families,ChildGuidance,and the Limitsof PsychiatricAuthority(Cambridge,Mass., 1999);Theresa
Richardson,TheCenturyof the Child:TheMentalHygieneMovementand Social Policy in the United
Statesand Canada(Albany,N.Y., 1989);andElizabethLunbeck,ThePsychiatricPersuasion:KnowlGender,and Power in ModernAmerica(Princeton,N.J., 1994).
edge,
7 See, e.g., Pols, "Divergencesin AmericanPsychiatry"(cit. n. 4).
8 Herman,Romance AmericanPsychology (cit. n. 3), 22.
of
9 For an overview,see
AlbertDeutsch, "MilitaryPsychiatry:WorldWarII,"in One HundredYears
of AmericanPsychiatry,ed. J. K. Hall (New York, 1944); HarryStack Sullivan, "Psychiatryand the
NationalDefense,"Psychiatry4 (1941): 201-17; and [Sullivan],"SelectiveService Psychiatry,"Psy4 (1941): 440-66.
chiatry
10See,
e.g., William C. Porter,"MilitaryPsychiatryand the Selective Service," WarMedicine 1
(1941): 364-71 ; andotherarticlesin the special issue on psychiatricaspectsof militarymedicinepublished in the second issue of WarMedicinein 1941.
76
HANSPOLS
was appointedby the Selective Service System to organizepsychiatricselection for
inductees.He developed a screeningprogramthat was much more extensive than
]
previousones hadbeen.1 In his opinion,psychiatristsneededto detectnot only mental illness butalso maladjustmentin general.Individualswho haddemonstratedthat
they lackedthe abilityto adjustto the changingchallengesof everydaylife could not
be expectedto adjustto the muchmore demandingand arduousconditionsof army
life. Withthese broadenedcriteria,it is not surprisingthata high percentage,at times
up to 25 percent,of inducteeswere consideredunfitto serve.
TheAmericanarmedforces eagerlyacceptedthe advice of psychiatristson organizing the screeningas part of the Selective Service System. Partlybecause of the
promisethatthoroughselection would obviatethe need for psychiatrictreatmenton
the battlefield,therewereveryfew psychiatristsin the field.Virtuallyall psychiatrists
workingfor the selective service and in the overseastheatersof operationwere recruitedfrommentalhospitals;and most held somatictheorieson the natureof mental illness.Armypolicy dictatedthatsoldiersdiagnosedwith mentalillness hadto be
dischargedand repatriatedas they were sufferingfrom preexistingconditionsfor
whichtherewereno effectivetreatments.Psychiatristsarguedthatthe stressesof warfaremightenabletheseconditionsto come to the surface,butthose stressescouldnot
be consideredto be the causes:in this way, "theArmycan well be called the proving
groundof man."12
Duringthe firstfew monthsof battle,the incidenceof mentalillness in the armywas roughlyequalto thatin the populationatlarge.ThusRoy D. Halbranchof the Officeof the SurgeonGenloran,the firstheadof the neuropsychiatric
eral of the U.S. Army and formermedical superintendentof the MetropolitanState
HospitalnearBoston, Massachusetts,concludedthatthe wardid not pose any unexpectedchallengesfor psychiatry.Yetdespitethis assessment,he did reporton a number of puzzling schizophrenic-likedisturbanceswith suddenonset thatdisappeared
ratherquicklywhen soldierswere hospitalized.13
Despite the fact thatSullivan'spsychoanalyticideas were very differentfromHalloran'ssomaticapproach,theirideas andapproachestowardscreeningfittedtogether
very well. The two psychiatristsagreedthatstringentselection would reducethe incidence of mentalillness in the army.Halloranviewed mentalillness as the resultof
a probablyinheritedpredisposition,which made it pointless to treatthe condition
nearthe battlefield.Accordingto Sullivan,a predispositionto mentalbreakdownwas
the outcomeof earlychildhoodexperiencesandthereforeessentiallystableandpredictable.Both men trustedthat,on the basis of a shortinterview,psychiatristscould
predictthe extentto whichindividualscould adjustto new,unexpected,anddemanding circumstances.Halloranadvocatedthe removalof those individualswhose mental illness could have been detectedif selection had been more thorough.Both psychiatristsintendedto develop techniquesto detect instabilityand predispositionin
1'
HarryStack Sullivan,"MentalHygiene and NationalDefense: A Yearof Selective-ServicePsyMentalHygiene 26 (1942): 7-14; Sullivan,"Psychiatryandthe NationalDefense"(cit. n. 9).
chiatry,"
12
Roy D. Halloranand Malcolm J. Farrell,"TheFunctionof Neuropsychiatryin the Army,"American Journalof Psychiatry 100 (1943): 14-20, on 17.
13
Roy D. Halloran and Paul I. Yakovlev, Military Neuropsychiatry, vol. 7 of Postgraduate Seminar
in Neurologyand Psychiatry(Waltham,Mass., 1942); Halloranand Farrell,"Functionof Neuropsychiatryin theArmy"(cit. n. 12);Roy D. Halloran(chairman),"Proceedingsof the MilitarySession of
the AmericanSociety for Researchin PsychosomaticMedicine on the Unfit: How to Exclude Them
and How to Use Them,"PsychosomaticMedicine5 (1943): 323-63.
WARNEUROSIS
77
humanbeings to removethe problemof mentalillness fromthe Americanarmyand
thusincreaseits efficiencyandfightingpower.
WARNEUROSISAND BATTLEFATIGUE
Late in 1942, the numberof soldierswho could not continuefightingbecause they
were sufferingfromneuropsychiatricsyndromesincreaseddramatically.The battles
in the PacificTheaterof Operations(specifically,those aroundGuadalcanal)and in
the AfricanTheaterof Operations(in particular,those in Tunisia)were unusually
fierce,leadingto greatnumbersof casualtieson bothsides.Manysoldiersbrokedown
andsufferedfromdebilitatinganxietyattacks,repetitivenightmares,tremors,stuttering, mutism,and amnesia.Duringthe 1943 Tunisiancampaign,when severalcatastrophicengagementswith the Germanfield marshalErwinRommelled to a number
of strategicsetbacks,20 to 34 percentof all casualtieswere neuropsychiatricin nature.To U.S. Armyphysicians,these patientswere as bafflingas they were irritating
becausetheirsymptomschangedrapidly,no physiologicalcause could be found,and
noneof the treatmentsofferedprovedeffective.Warneuroses,like shell shockduring
the GreatWar,successfully mimickedthe symptomsof organicdisease, confusing
andfrustratingphysicians.
Militaryofficials realizedthatthe policy of evacuatingsoldiers with a neuropsychiatricdiagnosiscouldnotbe maintainedas moremen wereleavingtheAfricanTheaterof Operationsthanwere enteringit.14As a consequence,they becamereceptive
to the argumentsof a small butoutspokengroupof psychoanalyticallyorientedpsychiatristswho proposedprovidingpsychotherapeutictreatmentto soldierssuffering
from war neurosesclose to the frontlines (a practiceknown as forwardpsychiatry
duringWorldWarI). The armedforces startedto enlist psychiatristsandcommenced
trainingarmyphysiciansin the principlesof militarypsychiatry.In January1943,
Colonel WilliamC. Porter,a leader in militarypsychiatry,startedteachinga fourweek coursein militarypsychiatryfor generalphysiciansatthe LawsonGeneralHosThe U.S. Air ForceengagedRoy G. GrinkerandJohnP.
pital in Atlanta,Georgia.15
Spiegel, two psychiatristsinterestedin psychosomaticmedicinebeforethe war,who
developedtechniquesfor short-termpsychotherapythatcould be administerednear
the front lines.16The authorsof a widely used manualfor medical officers on the
treatmentof warneuroses,GrinkerandSpiegelreliedon basicpsychoanalyticnotions
by arguingthat,undersevere battleconditions,even the strongestand most mature
soldiersregressedto the conditionof a helpless child. "Theego reactswith the anxiety andhelplessnessof a child andabandonsthe scene altogether(stupor),or refuses
to listen to it (deafness),or to talk about it (mutism),or to know anythingaboutit
14In this
respect,an analysis of the situationby militaryofficials andthe aspirationsof a numberof
psychoanalyticallyorientedpsychiatristsconverged.For the militaryperspectiveon the incidence of
warneuroses,see Elliot DuncanCooke,All ButMe and Thee:Psychiatryat the FoxholeLevel (WashD.C., 1946). The chaptersof this book had been previouslypublishedin the InfantryJournal.
ington,
15WilliamC. Porter,'The
Ame*/ Psychiatry100 (1943):25-7.
Schoolof MilitaryNeuropsychiatry,"
16
Roy Grinkerhad been in analysis with SigmundFreudundera stipendof the RockefellerFoundation.Forhis career,see Daniel OfferandDaniel X. Freedman,ModernPsychiatryand ClinicalResearch:Essays in Honorof RoyR. Grinker,Sr.(New York,1972). Foran excellent overviewof the role
of psychoanalystsduringandafterWorldWarII, see NathanG. Hale, Freudand theAmericans,19171985: TheRise and Crisis of Psychoanalysisin the UnitedStates (New York, 1995), chap. 11, "World
WarII: PsychoanalyticWarriorsandTheories."
78
HANS POLS
In this perspective,war neurosesrepresenteda flightinto the comforts
(amnesia)."17
anddependenceof childhoodandconstituteda retreatfromthe desiredmasculinebehaviorof soldiers,which could be definedas the abilityto standup understressand
not be overwhelmedby one's emotions.
GrinkerandSpiegel arguedthatindividualssufferingfromwarneuroseswere neithercowardsnorweaklings.Quitethe contrary:the reactionsof traumatizedsoldiers
wereentirelynormalgiventhehorrificconditionsatthe frontline.Accordingto them,
"[I]twould seem to be a morerationalquestionto ask why the soldierdoes not succumb to anxiety,ratherthan why he does."18Army psychiatristswere treatingnot
pathologicalconditions in abnormalindividualsbut normalreactionsof perfectly
healthyandpreviouslywell-adjustedindividualswho hadbeen exposedto extraordiconnarilystressfulsituations.Thustreatingsoldierssufferingfromneuropsychiatric
ditionsnearthe frontlines requireda reorientationin the perspectiveof militarypsychiatry.As two leadingpsychiatristscommented:"it was necessaryto shift attention
fromproblemsof the abnormalmindin normaltimesto problemsof the normalmind
in abnormaltimes."19
Ratherthanexplainingmentalbreakdownas the expressionof
preexistingconditions,militarypsychiatristscameto acknowledgethe importanceof
environmentalstressesandthateverymanhadhis breakingpoint;estimatesof when
thispointwas reachedvariedbetween 100daysanda full yearof battleexposure.The
enduranceof even the best-trainedandhardiestof men was limited.
The treatmentproposedby Grinkerand Spiegel involvedofferingsoldiersan opWith
portunityto workthroughtheirtraumaby reexperiencingit in psychotherapy.20
a sodiumpentothalinjection,the psychiatristwould inducea state of twilight sleep
thataidedin bringingrepressedtraumaticmemoriesto the surface.The effectsof this
treatment,GrinkerandSpiegelreported,weredramatic:"Thestuporousbecomealert,
the mutecan talk, the deaf can hear,the paralyzedcan move, and the terror-stricken
psychoticsbecome well-organizedindividuals."21
Militarypsychiatristsnow emphasized the importanceof treatingsoldiers near the front line because treatmentwas
oftenmoresuccessfulwhenprovidedas soon as possibleafterthe onsetof symptoms.
In addition,the bonds between soldiers, which were of essential importancefor
morale,werethusmaintained.In theserespects,the abilitiesof psychoanalyticallyinspiredpsychotherapymet the demandsof militarydiscipline:psychiatristswere able
to returnmen to the frontlines andsalvagethemfor furtherduty.The astutemanagementof soldiers'emotionsmadethemmoreefficientfightingmen. Severalprograms
emphasizingthe provisionof rest,good food, andtreatmentnearthe frontlines were
developed,includingthatof neurologistFrederickR. Hanson,who was workingin
17
Roy R. Grinker and John P. Spiegel, War Neuroses (Philadelphia, 1945), 93. This book had been
published as a confidential document in 1943 as Roy Grinker and John P. Spiegel, War Neuroses in
North Africa: The Tunisian Campaign (New York, 1943).
18
Ibid., 115.
19Malcolm J. Farrell and John W.
Appel, "Current Trends in Military Neuropsychiatry," Amer. J.
Psychiatry 101 (1944): 12-19, on 19. The stress concept became more important in Grinker and
Spiegel's reinterpretation of their war experiences in Roy R. Grinker and John P. Spiegel, Men under
Stress (Philadelphia, 1945). According to Russell Viner, this work was instrumental in making the
stress concept generally known in the medical profession. See Russell Viner, "Putting Stress in Life:
Hans Selye and the Making of Stress Theory:' Social Studies of Science 29 (1999): 391-410.
20See the chapter on treatment in Grinker and Spiegel, War Neuroses (cit. n. 17), 75-1 14.
21
Ibid., 82.
WARNEUROSIS
79
treatments(rest, good food,
Algeria.Hansonintroducedsimple and straightforward
hot showers,andsedation),whichhe claimedwere successfulin returningmen to the
fightingline in just a few days.22
In December 1943, WilliamC. Menninger,a tireless advocateof psychoanalysis
and the modernizationof psychiatry,was appointedchief of the Division of Neuropsychiatryin the SurgeonGeneral'sOfficeof the U.S. Army.He informedall miliPsychiatristsclaimed
tarymedicalofficersof the principlesof forwardpsychiatry.23
cases to dutywithin
thatthey wereable to returnup to 80 percentof neuropsychiatric
a week.24Afterthe war,these figureshad to be adjusteddownward,when it was acknowledgedthatthe percentageof personnelable to returnto the frontlines hadbeen
disappointinglylow (generally,they wereonly ableto functionin supportingroles).25
treatmentnearthe frontlines hadbeen
Yetalthoughthe success of psychotherapeutic
its
success
was
tremendous,boostingthe confidenceof
greatlyoverstated, perceived
In his presidentialaddressto the
disorder.
in
their
to
treat
mental
ability
psychiatrists
AmericanPsychiatricAssociationin 1944, EdwardA. Streckernoted that"[practically everymembernot barredby age, disabilityor ear-markedas essentialfor civilAboutone-thirdof all Americanpsychiatristswere
ian psychiatryis on activeduty."26
Not
in
the
armed
forces.
surprisingly,their experiencesgreatly influenced
serving
postwarpsychiatry.
Managingthe emotionswas a tasknot left exclusivelyto the experts;the participation of soldiersthemselveswas essential.A greatnumberof pamphletsandbooklets
informing soldiers about the latest findings of psychology and psychiatrywere
printedand distributedamongthe armedforces. One of the better-knownexamples
was Psychologyfor the FightingMan,compiledby a teamof fifty-nineexpertsunder
the chairmanshipof esteemedHarvardpsychologistEdwinG. Boringandwrittenby
the sciencejournalistMarjorievande Water(see illustrationI).27Morethan400,000
copies of the booklet,which was printedin a small formatthatcould easily be taken
anywhere,were sold duringthe war.Psychologyfor the FightingMandiscussedtopics rangingfrom interactingwith foreigners,seeing in the dark,and color and camouflageto food and sex as militaryproblems,the soldier'spersonaladjustment,and
the managementof fear.Withrespectto the lasttopic,soldierswereinformedthatfear
and panic were entirelynormaland that,with some effort,these emotionscould be
broughtunderrationalcontrol.The authorsadvisedtheirreadersto developa cool and
detachedattitudetowardtheirinnerselves andto discusstheirfeelings with theirfellow soldiersor officers.
22FrederickHanson,ed., Combat
Psychiatry:Experiencesin the NorthAfricanand Mediterranean
Theatersof Operation,AmericanGroundForces,WorldWarII (Honolulu,2005), originallypublished
in Bulletinof the U.S.ArmyMedical Department9, suppl. (Nov. 1949).
23Deutsch, "MilitaryPsychiatry"(cit. n. 9).
24Leo H. Bartemeieret al., "CombatExhaustion,"Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease 104
(1946): 358-89, 489-525.
25NormalQ. Brill, MildredC. Tate,andWilliamC. Menninger,"EnlistedMen Dischargedfromthe
Army Because of Psychoneurosis:A Follow-upStudy,"Journalof theAmericanMedicalAssociation
128, 30 June 1945, 633-7; NormalQ. Brill andGilbertW. Beebe, A Follow-upStudyof WarNeuroses
(Washington,D.C., 1955).
26EdwardA. Strecker,"PresidentialAddress,"Amer.J. Psychiatry 101(1) (1944): 1-8, on 1.
27Edwin G.
Boring and Marjorie Van de Water, Psychology for the Fighting Man: Prepared for the
FightingMan Himself(Washington,D.C., 1943).
80
HANSPOLS
Thecover o/Psychology for the FightingMan.
Morethan400,000 copies weresold to soldiers
duringWorldWarII.
THEAMERICANSOLDIER:A SOCIOLOGICALPERSPECTIVE
Herbert Spiegel was one of the first psychiatrists to observe the development of war
neurosis in Tunisia.28He was interested in the factors that contributed to the incidence
of mental breakdown and made a number of interesting observations on the topic. He
concluded that most soldiers were not motivated by a hatred of the enemy or an admiration for American values such as peace and democracy. Instead, soldiers kept on
fighting out of loyalty to their buddies, not wanting to let them down. They were motivated not only by regard for their comrades but also by respect for those in positions
of leadership, concern for the reputation of their units, and an urge to contribute to the
success of their units.29Men often broke down after they had lost one or more of their
comrades, when they received unwelcome news from the home front, or when they
perceived conditions in the army to be bad. The incidence of war neurosis was low
when morale was high. Spiegel argued that insight into the factors that contributed to
a high morale could greatly aid the military in maintaining its strength.
American soldiers during World War II were probably the most thoroughly investigated soldiers in history. In October 1941, the Research Branch of the U.S. Army's
Morale Division was established to conduct research into the attitudes and opinions
of American soldiers using the most modern research techniques developed by the social sciences. The research, later published in four impressive volumes titled The
American Soldier, was directed by Samuel Stouffer, a sociologist from the University
28HerbertX.
Spiegel, "SilverLiningsin the Cloudsof War:A Five-DecadeRetrospective,"in American Psychiatryafter WorldWarII, ed. Roy W. Menningerand John C. Nemiah (Washington,D.C.,
2000); Spiegel, interviewwith author,New YorkCity, 19 March 1997.
29HerbertX.
Spiegel, "PreventivePsychiatrywith CombatTroops,"Amer.J. Psychiatry101 (1944):
310-5.
WAR NEUROSIS
81
of Chicago.30StoufferconfirmedSpiegel's findingsand statedthat moralewas inverselycorrelatedto breakdownincidence.Accordingto him, moralewas intimately
boundup with the trustsoldiershad in theirofficers,theirtraining,theiroutfits,their
weapons,andtheirfellow soldiers.It was also relatedto the level of perceivedsupport
fromthe homefrontanda senseof fairnessin the army.Lastly,it was relatedto the natureof the emotionalbondsamongsoldiersandbetweensoldiersandtheircommanders. It was somewhatdisturbingto investigatorsto discoverthatmost soldiershad no
realidea, anddid not careto findout, whatthe warwas aboutor why they were fighting in the firstplace.Formanysoldiers,the warwas a dirtyjob thatneededto be finishedas quicklyas possibleso theycouldreturnhome.31Severalmorale-boostinginitiativeswereundertaken,suchas a seriesof instructionalmovies titled WhyWeFight.
Nevertheless,it becameincreasinglydifficultto maintainmorale,in particularwhen
the end of the warremainedelusiveanddissatisfactionwith armyconditionsrose.
Grinkerand Spiegel advocateda view inspiredby psychoanalysisthatcharacterized mentalbreakdownas a normalreactionof normalindividualsunderextraordinarilystressfulconditions.The treatmentmethodsthey developedwere perceivedas
very successful,which increasedthe confidenceof psychiatristsin theirtherapeutic
abilities.Becausementalbreakdownwas seen as a normalresponse,all enlistedmen
and the ways in which they dealt with stress and adversitybecame of interestto
psychiatrists.In the sociological perspectivedevelopedby social scientists,mental
breakdownwas consideredto be relatedto the qualityof intragrouprelationshipsand
moraleratherthan to individualcharacteristics.Constructiveand preventiveintervention,therefore,had to be directedat the level of groups,which inspiredpsychiatristswho, beforethe war,had been involvedwith the mentalhygiene movement.In
the Americanarmedforces, the mindsof soldierswere investigatedby social scientists, receivedministrationsfrom moraleboosters,were informedby psychological
writings,andif they ceased workingproperly,wouldbe treatedby psychiatrists.Mobilizationandengagingin a war againstseveralcountrieson a global scale trulyrequiredthe coordinatedeffortsof politicians,militaryofficers,andscientists.
Soldiers adoptedthe languageof psychiatryvery quickly and commonly spoke
At firstglance,this illustrates
abouteight-balls,psychos,NPs, andpsychoneurotics.32
of
how
the
IanHacking'sthesison
language psychiatryprovidesthe vocabularyto arand
identitiesand therebyconstructsthem. In other
ticulate complaints,illnesses,
30Samuel A. Stouffer et al., The American Soldier:
Adjustment during Army Life, vol. 1 of Studies
in Social Psychology in World War II (Princeton, N.J., 1949); Stouffer et al., The American Soldier:
Combat and Its Aftermath, vol. 2 of Studies in Social Psychology in World War II; Carl I. Hovland,
Arthur A. Lumsdaine, and Fred D. Sheffield. The American Soldier: Experiments on Mass Communication, vol. 3 of Studies in Social Psychology in World War II; Samuel A. Stouffer et al., The American Soldier: Measurement and Prediction, vol. 4 of Studies in Social Psychology in World War II.
31These
findings indicate a general disenchantment with the war among the majority of soldiers,
which was mostly forgotten after the war, when American society attempted to construct memories of
valor and sacrifice about the just and glorious war. Recently, historians have embarked on a reappraisal
of World War II, in which the attitudes expressed by American soldiers appear less surprising. See Paul
Fussell, Wartime:
Understanding and Behavior in the Second World War (New York, 1989); Fussel,
'
The Boys Crusade: American GIs in Europe - Chaos and Fear in World War Two (London, 2003); and
Richard Polenberg, "The Good War? A Reappraisal of How World War II Affected American Society,"
Virginia Magazine of History and Biography 100 (1992): 295-322.
32
Eight-balls (later, "odd-balls") refers to a Section 8 discharge ("unsuitable for Army service"); NP
to "discharged because of neuropsychiatric reasons."
82
HANS POLS
Bewords,the languageof psychiatryprovidesthe meansfor "makingup people."33
causeof soldiers'writings,theirnewspapers,andtheiraccessto themedia,theirvoices
can be heardvery clearly- and these voices providea differentperspectiveon the
the languageof psysupposedsuccess of psychiatry.Althoughsoldiersappropriated
of
its
and
turned
the
intentions
subverted
psychiatristsupside
chiatry,they
meaning
down. Psychiatrybecame the languagein which soldiersexpressedtheirown conto the narracerns. In this way, soldiersoffereda very interestingcounter-narrative
tive of the psychiatrists,not augmentingbut delineatingand limitingthe powersof
psychiatry.Soldiers relatedhow the army made them into psychoneuroticsby its
hopeless inefficiency,pointlessand tediousassignments,workassignmentsthatdid
not fit an individual'sability,administrativeerrorsthatled to havingto do the same
basictrainingcourserepeatedly,andfailureto listento suggestionsfor improvements
(improvementsthatcould not be accommodatedin any case).34
In the perspectiveof a numberof vocal and outspokensoldiers,the armedforces,
ratherthan battle conditionsor the separationfrom home, were the cause of their
trauma.The high, lofty, and patrioticideals celebratedat home had no meaningfor
the averagesoldier.As one soldierstated:"Theplain,unpublicizedfact of the matter
was thatnine out of ten servicemenwantednothingmoreto do with warsaftertheir
firstweek of training.. . . [The soldier's]special gripes,however,were reservedfor
the undemocratic,stupefying,favor-riddentotalitariannatureof militarylife itself."
Manysoldiersviewedthe armyas inefficientandoftencorrupt,while its policies were
seen as arbitraryat best and plain stupidand unjustat worst.The initialAmerican
policy of not providingalcohol to soldiers,for instance,was thoroughlyhated (althoughthe tobaccocompaniesprovidedcigarettesfree of charge).The strictseparationbetweenofficers,who receivedverygood treatment,andthe greatmajorityof enlisted men was particularlygalling to most soldiers:"[Thesoldier]had no use for a
systemin whichone class got the best of everything,andthe otherclass got less than
what was left."35On severaloccasions, soldiers returneda day after they had conquereda townat the cost of the lives of severalof theirfellow soldiersonly to findnotices everywherein the town stating,"ForOfficersOnly"and "No EnlistedMen."
AfricanAmericansoldiers,who were placed in separateunits, suffereddiscrimination, andwere generallyassignedto insignificantandtedioustasks,hadhigh ratesof
nervousbreakdown.36
THE VETERAN PROBLEM
Whenthewarcameto anend,mostAmericanswantedto providetheirsoldiersthebest
possiblewelcome.Afterall, thosesoldiershadtriumphedovertwo well-equippedand
highly motivatedenemies who had also excelled in crueltyand destruction.The returnof veteranswas widely celebrated.The GI Bill of Rights(officially,The Servicemen'sReadjustment
Act of 1944) aimedto provideaccess to homeandbusinessloans
33Ian
Hacking, "Making Up People," in Reconstructing Individualism: Autonomy, Individuality,
and the Self in WesternThought,ed. ThomasC. Heller (Stanford,Calif., 1986), 222-36.
34See,
e.g., "TheNeutralSoldiers,"CommonSense 14(10) (1945): 25-6, providingthe accountof
a soldier who receiveda neuroosvchiatricdischargebecause he could not standarmvculture.
35EdgarL. Jones, "OneWarIs Enough,"AtlanticMonthly,Feb. 1946, 48-53.
36Ellen
Dwyer, "Psychiatryand Race duringWorldWarII,"Journalof the Historyof Medicineand
Allied Sciences 61 (2006): 117-43.
WARNEUROSIS
83
and expand educational opportunities. Apart from solutions such as the GI Bill of
Rights, many Americans were eager to make the readjustment of veterans as easy as
possible. Yet there was also uneasiness and apprehension about the process of demobilization. During the war, a number of wounded and disabled veterans had returned
home, among them soldiers discharged for neuropsychiatric reasons.37 American
business had thrived because of the war economy; many were concerned about what
would happen when the war came to an end. When more than 12 million veterans
came home, where would they find work? Moreover, many soldiers had enlisted as
young men; the army had changed them into rough-talking, demanding, and potentially violent individuals. Army training had taught them how to kill efficiently; although these skills would not be helpful in civilian life, they might not disappear.
Starting in 1944, an impressive number of advice books, articles, and pamphlets on
the readjustment problems of veterans was published. It was believed that with tact
and understandingby the home front, in addition to some counseling and advice from
experts, the intemperate emotions of returning ex-servicemen could be readjusted to
postwar peace. One of the more ominous warnings about the coming veteran problem
was presented by the educational sociologist and World War I veteran Willard Waller.
Using several examples, he stated that "veterans have written many a bloody page
of history, and those pages have stood forever as a record of their days of anger."38
Calling veterans America's gravest social problem and citing the activities of southern veterans after the Civil War,the roots of the German Nazi party in the activities of
German ex-soldiers, and the 1932 Bonus March in Washington, D.C., by 20,000 disgruntled Great War veterans, Waller concluded: "The veteran is, and always has been,
a problematic element in society, an unfortunate, misused, and pitiable man, and, like
others whom society has mistreated, a threat to existing institutions." His conclusion
was clear: "Unless and until he can be denaturalized into his native land, the veteran
is a threat to society."39The pleasant, obedient, and equable boys who were enlisted
at the beginning of the war would return as hardened, bitter, and angry men. To
counter this problem that threatened to overwhelm society, a new art of rehabilitation
had to be invented and diligently applied.
Willard explored the reasons why so many veterans might face problems adjusting
to peace. He related how the army had annihilated the individual soldier's personality
and will to make him function like a cog in a machine. After the inductee had been
handed his outfit, he was forced to discard all individuality. The lives of soldiers were
completely regimented and regulated by superiors;obedience ratherthan initiative was
valued. There was no privacy in the army: soldiers spent their time in cramped living
quarters,continuously exposed to one another. Many soldiers had a hard time getting
used to the fact that they were, in principle, expendable. Finally, in the army, prohibitions of peacetime society were set aside. Army training was a training in violence and
killing. It was expected that a great number of soldiers would have been hardened
from their experiences on the front lines. Many others could have acquired behavior
patterns that would make them lastingly unsuitable for living under conditions of
37
Dorothy Paull, "PsychiatricRehabilitationof Rejectees and Men Dischargedfrom the Armed
Forces:The WisconsinService for Rejectees,"MentalHygiene 29 (1945): 248-54.
38WillardWaller,The VeteranComesBack (New York, 1944), 5. This was not the only book bringing the veteranproblemto the attentionof the Americanpublic. See also Dixon Wecter,WhenJohnny
ComesMarchingHome (Cambridge,Mass., 1944).
39Waller,VeteranComesBack (cit. n. 38), 13.
84
HANSPOLS
peace. Of particularworrywere those soldierswho had receiveda neuropsychiatric
discharge.Not only were they "probablypoor marriagerisks,"but in general,the
"oddswere againstthem."Forjobs in which interpersonalskills were importantor
thatmightbe stressful,"psychoneuroticsare suspect."40
Yetit could be expectedthat
almostall soldierswould sufferfrompsychologicalproblemsaftertheirreturn."The
problemof helpingthese psychologicallybatteredveteransto regaintheirbalanceis
verygreatandmosturgent,butnot insoluble.If we areto solve it, we mustbeginnow
to trainthousandsof techniciansto deal with suchcases."41
Therewere manypositiveelementsof armylife thatsoldierscould be expectedto
miss afterthey had returnedhome. First,many soldiershad made deep and lasting
friendshipsin the army;they would find civilian life cold and harshwithoutthose.
Second,manysoldiershadgrownup in smalltowns;afterjoining the army,they had
traveledfor the firsttime, seen differentcountriesandlargecities, andbecomefriends
with individualsthey wouldneverhavemet otherwise.They wereunlikelyto be content to returnto theirsmall and mundanehometowns.Third,manysoldierswho had
been out of workor in dead-endjobs duringthe Depressionyearshadbeen given positionsof powerandresponsibility.Veryfew soldierswouldbe happyto merelytake
up the jobs they had left behind.They expectedmore out of the postwarworld and
madetheirdesiresknown.Because most of them had spenttheirformativeyears in
the army,they hadbeen completelyalienatedfromcivilianlife; manyof themmight
preferarmyovercivilianlife.
Waller'sopinionswere repeatedin the popularpressmanytimes.42As a result,numerousarticles,pamphlets,lectures,speeches,radiotalks,andsermonsweredevoted
to the veteranproblem,giving advice to friendsand family of veteranson how they
could assist the returnees'readjustment.Althoughthe committeethathad published
Psychologyfor the FightingMan also producedPsychologyfor the ReturningServiceman*3most books and articleswere directednot at the soldiers,but at women
backhome- the mothers,wives, andsweetheartsof returningsoldiers.44
Afterall, as
Wallerwrote in the Ladies'Home Journal,"[t]hepersonalside of reconstructionis
woman'swork."Walleradvisedwomen to help returningveteransreadjustwith the
most modernadvice:"[A wife] shouldbegin by makinga thoroughstudyof the psychology of the veteran,his habits,attitudes,beliefs, desiresandcapacities,the ideals
and values by which he lives. . . . The wife must study her own veteranin orderto
learnhis needs andproblems,his strengthsand weaknesses."45
Severalpsychiatrists
40Ibid., 169.
41
Ibid., 55. See also Willard Waller, "Why Veterans Are Bitter ,"American Mercury 61 (Aug. 1945):
147-54; Waller, "The Veteran's Attitudes," Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social
Science 238 (March 1945): 174-9.
42
See, e.g., Agnes E. Meyer, "The Veterans Say- or Else!" Collier's 118, 12 Oct. 1946, 16, 17, 1 159; Cristopher La Farge, "Soldier into Civilian," Harper's Magazine 190 (March 1945): 339-46.
43Irvin L. Child and
Marjorie Van de Water, Psychology for the Returning Serviceman (Washington, D.C., 1945). Directed also at returning soldiers were Dorothy W. Baruch and Lee Edward Travis,
You're out of the Service Now: The Veteran 's Guide to Civilian Life (New York, 1946); Maxwell Droke,
Good-by to GI: How to Be a Successful Civilian (New York, 1945); Benjamin C. Bowker, Out of Uniform (New York, 1946); Leo M. Cherne, The Rest of YourLife (Garden City, N.Y., 1944).
44There is some
analysis of this genre. See, e.g., Sonya Michel, "American Women and the Discourse of the Democratic Family in World War II," in Behind the Lines: Gender and the Two World
Wars, ed. Margaret Randolph Hieonnet et al. (New Haven. Conn.. 1987). 154-67.
45Willard
Waller, "What You Can Do to Help the Returning Veteran," Ladies' Home Journal, Feb.
1945, 26, 27, 92-8, on 26 and 95.
WARNEUROSIS
85
also wroteadvice books and articlesfor the popularpress on the veteranproblem.46
One of the most popular,writtenby GeorgeK. Pratt,a psychiatristconnectedto the
NationalCommitteefor MentalHygiene,interpretedarmylife as a stateof regression
fromwhichveteranshadto be weanedthroughthe effortsof the homefront.47Several
exampleswere given of readjustmentgone wrong- not becauseof long-lastingwar
traumasor unbearablearmyconditions,butbecauseof the lack of warmth,tact, and
understandingof mothers,wives, and partnersin encouragingreturningveteransto
take up theirresponsibilities.48
Journalists,social commentators,critics, clerics, social workers,teachers,and othersproducedan even greaternumberof publications,
thusestablishinga new genreof rehabilitationliterature,focused on the psychological aspects of readjustment,which would aid ex-servicemento fit into a normal,
peacefulsociety.
Spokespersonsfor veteransand outspokenveteransthemselvesgenerallyreacted
negativelyto the concernsabouttheirrehabilitationandloathedthe endless streamof
literaturethatportrayedthemas psychoneurotics,disgruntledkillers,potentialcommunists,alcoholics, and louts boundto disturbthe social order.They wantedto be
treatedlike normalhumanbeings who hadhada numberof unusualexperiencesand
who were a few yearsolder.They distrustedthe motivesof psychiatrists,journalists,
andopinionmakerswho portrayedreturningsoldiersas threatsto the social orderto
be managedwith emotionalfinesse and psychologicaltactics.They knew thatcopious amountsof advicehadbeen eagerlyreadby the home frontin anticipationof the
veterans'return.Most veteranswere insultedby the advice and refusedto view the
difficultiesthey mightencounteron theirreturnas psychologicalin nature.They demandedthatsoldierswho were sufferingfrompsychiatricsymptomsreceivethe very
best of carebutrejectedany psychologicalapproachto the problemsand issues facing normalveteranson theirreturnhome. In this respect,the attemptof psychiatrists
and psychologiststo implementtheirsocial projectfor the realizationof a peaceful
andprosperouspostwarworldappearedto be a failure.
Many soldiersdid admitthatveteranswould be changedmen, first,becausethey
were a few years older and, second, becausethey had spent a significantamountof
time awayfromhome.Therewere otherreasonsas well. Manyof themdid not want
to returnto life as they hadknownit from beforethe war.They did not wantto take
up their old, meaninglessjobs or returnto their own small, provincialtowns. And
manyof themhadstrongconvictionsthatthereshouldneverbe a waragain andsupNations.
of
the
United
Manywere
portedpoliticalinitiativessuchas theestablishment
with
theirjobs,
were
not
restlessaftertheirreturn.They could not settledown,
happy
of
As
a
and were dissatisfiedwith the uneventfullife of civilians.
group sociologists
46See,
e.g., ThomasA. C. Rennie and LutherE. Woodward,WhenHe Comes Back; If He Comes
Back Nervous: Two Talks to Families of Returning Servicemen (New York, 1944); Alexander G. Dumas and Grace Keen, A Psychiatric Primer for the Veteran 's Family and Friends (Minneapolis, Minn.,
1945); Herbert I. Kupper, Back to Life: The Emotional Adjustment of Our Veterans (New York, 1945).
For articlesin the popularpress, see CarlR. Rogers, "WartimeIssues in FamilyCounseling,"Journal
of HomeEconomics36 (Sept. 1944): 390-3; andNormanQ. Brill, "Veteranswith Problems,"Journal
of Home Economics38 (June 1946): 325-8.
47George K. Pratt, Soldier to Civilian: Problems of Readjustment (New York, 1944).
48Fora case
historyfromPratt'sSoldierto Civilian,in which a veteransurviveda mortarattackwell,
only to succumbto the pressuresof his parents,see Hans Pols, "The Repressionof WarTraumain
AmericanPsychiatryafterWorldWarII,"in Medicineand ModernWarfare,ed. Roger Cooter,Mark
Harrison,and Steve Sturdy(Amsterdam,1999), 251-76, at 264-5.
86
HANS POLS
Cartoon from Stars and
Stripes cartoonist Bill
Mauldin, highlighting the
predicament of many returning ex-servicemen. From:
Bill Mauldin, Back Home
(New York,1947), 42. Copyright 1947 by Bill Mauldin.
Reprinted courtesy of the
William Mauldin Estate.
"How old is your problem child, Madam?"
observed about veterans in the months after their discharge: "This quality of restlessness, of impatience, of irritability, was evident in many of the average veteran's early
post-service behavior."49They liked to meet with other veterans, drink, and go over
old and cherished memories. In the memories of war of veterans, two diametrically
opposed images emerged. On the one hand, they saw the years in the army as the best
and the most exciting years in their lives. On the other, they saw the war as an endless
series of frustrations:the army must have been the most inefficient and undemocratic
institution on earth. The two repertoires are presented as mutually exclusive, but during their drinking bouts, soldiers easily switched between them.
Many people commented on the sheer amount of writing on the veteran problem.
As a teacher observed: "Pick up almost any currentperiodical and the chances are you
will find an article on how to deal with the returning veteran."50One veteran turned
journalist complained: "Apartfrom politicians and movie personalities, few individuals in America were so publicized as veterans." He felt that the public only became
interested in American soldiers after their returnhome because of the perceived threat
they posed to society: "It was only after victory that the invasion of America became
49RobertJ.
Havighurstet al., TheAmericanVeteranBack Home:A Studyof VeteranReadjustment
made by journalistsand casual observers.
(New York, 1951), 74. Similarobservationswere
50WalterR. Goetsch, "TheG.I. in Civvies " School and
Society,21 July 1945, 45-6, on 45.
WARNEUROSIS
87
a reality."51Often, veterans, or at least their spokesmen, showed resentment about the
unwanted and misdirected attention given to them. As Charles G. Bolte, organizer of
the American Veterans Committee, stated:
GI Joe, mythicaldarlingof the advertisingcopy writers,has had morenonsensewritten
abouthim thanhas everbeen set downconcerningany otherAmericanfolk hero . . . We
aredailyfloodedwithspeeches,articles,editorials,books,pamphletsandconfidentialreportstellingus whatthis legendarycharacterthinks,feels, wants,needs andplans.52
Many veterans were suspicious of these efforts, which they viewed as attempts to
sell particularviewpoints and products to them. To continue Bolte's statements:
Even moreoddly,the coursesof actionthey recommendto deal with whatthey call "the
veteranproblem"alwaysparalleltheirown professionalbents:the educatorsurgemore
schooling for Joe, the psychiatristswant mentalclinics, the businessmensay he needs
free enterprisein big doses, the laborleadersdemandstrongunionsto receivehim, and
so on. Everybodyis out to help Joe; one half the countryis telling the otherhalf how to
treathim;thousandsof "experts"areinterpretinghim.53
After 1944,politicians,businessmen,andthe clergyall attemptedto framethe veteranproblemin a way thatfurtheredtheirown interests.As one criticimplored:"No
one speaksfor the soldiersbutthe soldiers.... It may be a good idea to tryto get accustomedto theirvoices as earlyas possible."54
Americanpsychiatristswere unusuallysuccessful in convincing the public that
theirexpertisewas neededin managingthe readjustmentof returningveterans.One
veterandecriedhow psychiatrists"hadfoundtheiropportunityto catapultintopublic
consciousness"as membersof the SelectiveService System.55Now thatthe warwas
over,"themorevocal and zealous psychiatristsmadeit soundas thoughmost veterans wouldreturnas mentalproblems.. . . Like the otherspecial-pleaders,the psychiatristsused the veteranas a packagefor displayingthe same waresto whichthe public hadpreviouslybeenapathetic."56
Psychiatristshadbeenableto convincethepublic
or
neurotic
veteranin needof theirspecialattentionbut
was
the
wounded
thatnotonly
was
a
veteran
also that every
potentialpsychologicalproblem.Soldiers writingin
indicated
that
Stars and Stripes
many ex-servicemenfelt a strong disgust for the
"
is
fad'
which
sweepingthecountry,andwhichis basedon thebelief
'psychoneurotic
or "halfhero andhalf problem."57
is 'maladjusted',"
veteran
thateveryhomecoming
which
these
ideas,
they thought were disseminated"by amateur
They begrudged
in
the
Sundaysupplementsandthe ladies magazineswho saw a
psychiatristswriting
Bolte describedPratt'smanualas
neurotic
beneath
or
a
everyuniform."58
psychopath
51Bowker,Outof Uniform(cit. n. 43), 25.
52Charles G. Bolte, The New Veteran(New York, 1945), 2. The AmericanVeteransCommittee
aimed to be an alternativeveteransorganizationapartfrom the AmericanLegion and was motivated
by53
left-wing political ideals.
Ibid.
54"No One Speaksfor the GI,"CommonSense 14 (1945): 27-8, on 28.
55Bowker,Outof Uniform(cit. n. 43), 32.
56Ibid.. 34.
57Kupper,Back to Life (cit. n. 46), 19; Bolte, New Veteran(cit. n. 52), 6.
58Bolte, New Veteran(cit. n. 52), 108.
88
HANSPOLS
one that"wouldmakethe averageciviliana littlejumpyaboutgoing down a darkalley with a veteran,"while a literarycritic claimedto be unableto escape the disappointingconclusionthatthe manualwas "essentiallyan elementarytext in psychiatry- with a contemporarycover."59
Publicationson the veteranproblemalso appearedoverseasand were readby soldiers who wantednothingmore thanto returnhome. Soldiershad mixed reactions.
One psychologist reportedhow a "youngofficer sufferingfrom fatigue and battle
strain[had]come uponone of these direlydistressingpieces in a popularmagazine."
This poorpatientwas upsetfor a week andhadto be assuredtime andagain"thathe
was 'all right'andthatthe warhadn'ttransformedhim into a beastor a bogeyman."60
A veteranclaimedthatif soldiershad paidattentionto these articles,they had probablydeveloped"aterrificinferioritycomplex"becausetheywereportrayedas "tamed
dogs gone wild who mustpauseon the roadbackto normalcyin orderto be rehabilitated."He concludedthatit wouldbe "ashockto some of oursons andbrothersto find
Otherveterans
themselvesthe subjectsof highly academicpsychological study."61
weremerelybemusedor irritated.One of themreportedthathe felt compelledto "act
nervousso as not to disappointthe barrageof relativeswho hoveredaboutme like
Anothereven reportedhow his mother,on the basis on an advice
homingpigeons!"62
that
article,pretended he hadneverbeen away.Fortunately,he guessed whatshe had
beentryingto do; otherwisehe "mighthavethoughthis mothera good case for a psychiatrist."63
Some veteransexpressedtheirannoyancewith the widespreadconcernabouttheir
supposedproblemsby writingtheirown manualsabouta strangeandoutlandishgroup
of peoplewithratherpeculiarhabits:theCivilians.A formerjournalistwroteone of the
better-knownadvice books, which containedextensiveguidelineson, among other
matters,restrooms(latrinesfor Civilian personnel);eating habits ("Civilianshave
an oddcustomof servingfood in individualdishesor in neatandseparatepiles on the
same plate");manners("Don'tbe misled by the Civiliantendencyto be soft-spoken
and polite");or even Civilian speech ("Don't make fun of Civilian speech or accents").64Some booklets even contain a dictionarytranslatingGI to Civilian.The
same symbolicreversalis played out in explainingthe overly concernedreactionto
the returningveteran:
[Civilians] are apt to treat as a mental case any returnedsoldier who has just been
paroledto the communityat large. It's not entirelytheir fault. They've been . . . bombardedwith learnedarticleson how to treata returnedsoldier,how to handlehim and
humorhim and whatto say and whatnot to say. . . . You'll find,especially on your first
day,thatCivilianswill wearstrainedexpressionswhen they talkto you, andstartagreeing with you beforeyou open yourmouth.Some of themwill tryto get you to talkabout
yourexperiences.65
59Ibid., 140;
RalphPeterson,"Problemsin Reconversion[Reviewof Soldierto Civilian]''Saturday
Reviewof Literature28, 13 Jan. 1945, 12.
60Droke, Good-byto G.I. (cit. n. 43), 44.
61WilliamBest,
"TheyWon'tAll Be Psychoneurotics,"SaturdayEveningPost 216, 14 April 1945,
112.
62
Kupper,Back to Life (cit. n. 46), 20.
63Best,
"TheyWon'tAll Be Psychoneurotics"(cit. n. 61), 112.
64Morton
Thompson,How to Be a Civilian (GardenCity, N.Y., 1946), 37, 40, 41 , 75.
65Ibid., 31-2.
WARNEUROSIS
89
As fordealingwiththoseoverlyconcernedCivilians,the followingadvicesufficed:
"Youhave foughta moredemandingwarthanthe Civilian.Don't rubit in. Play fair
with him. He can be a pal in need."66
Mostveteranswereafraidthatall the adviceliteraturecouldturnmothersandwives
"intokitchenpsychologistsdeterminedto 'cure'the veteran- even at the cost of his
Onejournalistreportedhow veteranshad imploredhim to convey this adsanity."67
vice: "stoptryingto practiceamateurpsychiatryon them"so thatnew veteransdidnot
haveto "undergothe patronizing,over sympathetic,kid-glovetreatmentthey hadencounteredon theirreturn."Instead,theywanted"onlyto be treatedlike normalhuman
arbeingswithoutanyof the pamperingadvocatedin most 'When-He-Comes-Home'
The greatmajorityof veteranshadratherconventionalideas of whatwould
ticles."68
to peace.Theywould"behappyto sit in frontof ourfireplaces
ease theirreadjustment
fetch us Old Fashioneds."69
A naturalapproachby
let
our
wives
and
sweethearts
and
"A
would
be
the
best:
wife
can makeher husand
sweethearts
theirwives, mothers,
not
but
with
a
little
band'sadjustmenteasy, by 'psyching'him,
pre-Freudianlove and
understanding."70
Veteransgenerallyresistedthe attemptsof psychiatriststo transformtheminto individualswho needed special attentionand care. They concededthat veteranswith
psychiatricproblemswere entitledto the best professionalpsychiatriccare available
butvigorouslyresistedtheexpansionof the psychiatricdomainto includenormalsoldiers.The firstpostwarprojectof psychiatry,to extendits domainbeyondthe mentally ill andsoldierswho sufferedfromwar-relatedpsychiatricsyndromesto include
guidingthe readjustmentof averageveteransto postwarsociety, had failed. The attemptto providethe languageandtools for the shapingof thepostwarveteranself had
foundan unappreciativeaudience.
MOTHERS
Despite the veterans'reaction,the popularesteem of Americanpsychiatristsrose to
unprecedentedheights immediatelyafterWorldWarII. Their war efforts had been
widely publicizedandpraisedby the generalpublic.WilliamC. Menningerappeared
on the cover of Timemagazine(October1948), and psychiatricthemes appearedin
several movies (one only needs to think of Spellbound[1945], directedby Alfred
Hitchcock,andHomeof theBrave[ 1949]). Thetrustin theirabilitieshadbeengreatly
increasedby theirwartimesuccesses.Immediatelyafterthe war,psychiatristssought
to translatetheirwartimesuccesses into peacetimegains.A numberof leadingpsychiatristswereeagerto participatein the buildingof America'spostwarsociety,characterizedby the restorationof a traditionaldomesticorder.The managementof environmentalstresseshad provento be the key in the managementof war neurosisand
in boostingmoralein the army;psychiatristswere optimisticthatthese lessons could
be appliedin the postwarworldas well. Manyformermilitarypsychiatristsbanded
togetherand formedthe Groupfor the Advancementof Psychiatryin an attemptto
66Ibid., 76.
67David
Dempsey, "VeteransAre Not ProblemChildren,"AmericanMercury,Sept. 1945, 326-31,
on 326.
68Don Wharton,"TheVeteranIs No ProblemChild,"CommonSense 14 (1945): 17-18, on 17.
69
Back to Life (cit. n. 46), 19.
70Kupper, "Veterans
Are Not ProblemChildren"(cit. n. 67), 33 1.
Dempsey,
90
HANSPOLS
reformtheirdisciplineby adoptingpsychoanalyticideas andprewarmentalhygiene
ideals.71Consequently,afterthe war,the interestsof psychiatristsshiftedaway from
treatingsoldiersscarredby battleandaidingveteransto readjustto issues of socialengineering,culturalchange,fortifyingpeacetimesociety,andpreventinga thirdworld
war.Theirinterestsin veteranshadonly been a stationstop on the roadto expanding
theirviews to projectsfor postwarsociety thatwouldencompassall citizens.
By the end of the war,nearly1,000 psychiatrists,almostone-thirdof all American
psychiatrists,hadbeenenlistedin the armedforces.72Afterthe war,manyof themexpressedconcernaboutthe mentalhealthcrisis thatwas facing postwarAmericaand
cited the high neuropsychiatricrejectionand dischargeratesas an indicationof the
seriousnessof the problem.They sharedthese concernswith those psychiatristswho
had stayedat home duringthe war.Psychiatricattentionthen shiftedfromthose soldierswho hadbrokendownafterheroicserviceto the highnumbersof inducteeswho
hadbeen rejectedbecauseof mentalimbalanceandthe high numberof soldierswho
had brokendown withouthaving been exposed to battle.In 1946, the conservative
PhiladelphiapsychiatristEdwardA. StreckerpublishedTheirMothers'Sons, which
explicitly dealt with these soldiers.73Streckerexcluded those soldiers- true war
heroes- who had brokendown after prolongedexposure to battle, claiming they
wereentitledto the best possiblepsychiatriccareavailable.His treatisewas aboutthe
soldierswho hadbrokendown withouthavingfaced any unusualadversityor simply
in reactionto uncomfortablebarracks,tastelessarmyfood, andseparationfromtheir
families. Streckercontrastedthe behaviorof the heroes,who, upon theirfirstphone
call to theirparentsafterhavingbeen woundedin action,made"lightof the loss of an
armor a leg" with patientsin a wardof soldiersdischargedfromarmyservicewhose
complaintshadno physiologicalbasis whatsoever:"Itwas like tryingto pushbacka
wall of water.Therewas nothingsolid to grasp."74
Streckerindictedthe American"Mom"for raisingsons of weak andquestionable
characterwho broke down for the slightest reasons- the undeservingpsychiatric
casualtiesof war.Invariably,he claimed,behindeach broken-downsoldierstood an
overprotectiveMom who had not untiedthe emotionalapronstringswith which she
boundherchildrento her.Streckerdecried"theemotionalsatisfaction,almostrepletion, she derivesfromkeepingherchildrenpaddlingaboutin a kindof psychological
amnioticfluidratherthanlettingthem swim awaywith the bold anddecisive strokes
of maturityfromthe emotionalmaternalwomb."75
By heroverprotectiveattitudeand
71GeraldN. Grob, "The
Forgingof Mental HealthPolicy in America:WorldWarII to New Frontier" J. Hist. Med.Allied Sci. 42 (1987): 410-46; Rebecca Jo Plant,"WilliamMenningerandAmerican Psychoanalysis,1946-1948," Historyof Psychiatry 16(2005): 181-202.
72WilliamC.
Menninger,"PsychiatricExperiencein the War,1941-1946,"Anter.J. Psychiatry103
(1947): 577-86, 578.
'
73Edward A.
Strecker, Their Mothers Sons: The Psychiatrist Examines an American Problem
(Philadelphia,1946). The most importantchaptersof this book also appearedin the conservativeSaturdayEveningPost as Strecker,"What'sWrongwithAmericanMothers?"SaturdayEveningPost 219,
26 Oct. 1946, 14-5, 85-104. These thoughtswere initially expressedin Strecker,"PsychiatrySpeaks
Democracy,"MentalHygiene 29 ( 1945): 59 1-605, which was basedon a lecturegivenApril27, 1945.
Strecker'suse of the phrase"Mom"was, as he acknowledged,derivedfrom the stronglymisogynistic
Philip
Wylie,A Generationof Vipers(New York, 1942).
74Strecker,
TheirMothers'Sons (cit. n. 73), 15, 14.
75Ibid., 31. The
genderedmetaphorsare almost too obvious to point out. For the equationof femininity with fluidity,fluids, floods, and water, see Klaus Theweleit, Male Fantasies, vol. 1, Women,
Floods, Bodies, History (Minneapolis,Minn., 1987).
WARNEUROSIS
91
becauseof her own emotionalneeds, the AmericanMom hadproduceda generation
of psychiatriccasualties,rejecteesfrom army service, and draftdodgers "who resortedto any device, howevershameful,even to the wearingof female clothing."76
Everythinga Mom did was unconsciouslydesigned"exclusivelyto absorbher chilThe good mother,by contrast,
drenemotionallyand to bind them to her securely."77
in
balance
of
her
a
children,whichenabledthemto atgive-and-take
produced proper
tainsocial maturityandindependencelaterin life.
Accordingto a numberof AmericanpsychiatristsspeakingafterWorldWarII, the
warhaddone the nationa favorby exposinga mentalhealthproblemthathadexisted
for a long time. In Strecker'swords:"Waris a greatleveler.It stripsthe soft, protective swathingof civilianlife frommillionsof youngmen andexposes themto a threat
to survival.Itbringsouttheirstrengthsandrevealstheirweaknessesbothphysicaland
Warconditionsonly triggeredtraumasthathadbeen establishedin peacemental."78
and
time
would,naturally,continueto findexpressionin grownmen now thatthe war
hadbeen won. Life at the frontlines andlife underpeacetimeconditionswere essentially the same: both could be stressfulat times, but nothinga mentallyrobustand
well-adjustedmanwouldnot be able to handle.
Strecker'saccountis strikingfor manyreasons.In the firstplace, the importanceof
a stress-inducingenvironmenthadvirtuallydisappeared,to be replacedby a renewed
- albeita radicallydifferentconception
emphasison the importanceof predisposition
as comparedwith the one thathad been generallyacceptedamong prewarpsychiatrists.Second, Strecker,who had been an armypsychiatristduringWorldWarI and
an adviserto variousgovernmentbodies duringthe previousfouryears,hardlymentionedthe horrificnatureof battle,which was repeatedlyhighlightedby Grinkerand
Spiegel and otherpsychiatristsin the armedforces. The latterhadjustifiedtheirinterventionby emphasizingthe extraordinarily
traumatizingnatureof warfare,while
and
war
of
Streckerconsideredthe stresses peace
essentiallythe same. In Strecker's
in
America's
useful
tremendousmentalhealth
revealing
perspective,the warhadbeen
contribution
his
could
maketo maintaining
discipline
problem.In his view, the main
methods
or
ropingin American
peace andprosperitywas by reformingchild-rearing
Moms. The 1950s would become an unusuallydomestic decade in which prosperous families in wealthysuburbsfocused on raisingfamilies.79It was also the era of
Dr. Spock, duringwhich motherblamingbecameone of the main characteristicsof
These tendencieswere inspiredandreinforcedby the cold war.Psychipsychiatry.80
atristsandothersbecameconcernedaboutchild-rearingmethodscontributingto fospersonalitiesandhow familiescould best managethe expression
teringauthoritarian
76Strecker,TheirMothers'Sons (cit. n. 73), 18.
77Ibid., 36.
78Ibid., 17.
79Elaine
TylerMay,HomewardBound:AmericanFamilies in the Cold WarEra (New York, 1988);
Fred Matthews, "The Utopia of Human Relations: The Conflict-Free Family in American Social Thought, 1930-1960," Journalfor the History of the Social and BehavioralSciences 24 (1983):
343-62.
80The firstedition of
BenjaminSpock's famous child-rearingbook was publishedin 1946: Spock,
The CommonSense Book of Baby and Child Care (New York, 1946). For an analysis of the presence
of Dr. Spock's manualin Americanfamilies, see Nancy PottishmanWeiss, "Mother,the Inventionof
Necessity: Dr. BenjaminSpock's Carefor Infantand Child,"in Growingup in America: Childrenin
Historical Perspective,ed. N. Ray Hiner and Joseph M. Hawes (Urbana,111.,1985). See also Molly
Ladd-Taylorand LauriUmansky,eds., "Bad" Mothers:The Politics of Blame in Twentieth-Century
America(New York, 1998), 519-46.
92
HANS POLS
of frustrationto preventaggressionfrombuildingup.81A consumeristsociety might
aid the formationof mass man,whichhadlost its criticalcapacitiesandcould potentially follow a strongleaderwhen one was able to appealto the masses.82
CONCLUSION
DuringWorldWarII, Americanpsychiatristshadbeen eagerto expandtheirdomain
and implementUtopianideas of social engineeringthat they had developedbefore
WorldWarII. Duringthe firstyearsof the war,they were activelyinvolvedin the Selective Service System and were successful in implementinga broaddefinitionof
conditions,based on the conceptof adjustment,which wouldjustify rejectionfrom
armyservice.These effortswerebasedon the idea thatthe lack of a predispositionto
mentalillness was the mostreliableindicatorof the likelihoodthata personwouldbe
ableto standthe challengesof armylife. In 1943,thisconceptionwas replacedby one
emphasizingthe effects of environmentalstresseson essentiallynormalindividuals.
Successfulmethodsof short-termpsychotherapywereintroducednearthefrontlines.
At the sametime, social scientistsinvestigatedbreakdownincidenceandrelatedit to
the level of morale.Both approachesprovidednew stimulantsfor psychiatriststo develop a postwarpoliticalproject:theirmethodsof psychotherapyhadbeen unusually
effectiveandcould be appliedon a mass scale.
The firstpostwarprojectof Americanpsychiatristswas to guide the reintegration
andrehabilitationof returningex-servicemen.In this attempt,they were not successful. As psychiatrymoved away from the immediateclinical care of individualswith
clearlyidentifiablediagnoseswho appearedto benefitfrom well-circumscribedand
definedtreatmentinterventions,individualswere less inclinedto follow its mandate
or to adoptits vocabularyandtechniques.This, nevertheless,did not discouragepsychiatrists,who consideredthe reformof child-rearingmethodsas an essentialconditionof changingthe nationalcharacterof Americans.As faras the veteranswereconcerned, they had ratherconventionalideas of what would ease their returnhome.
Accordingto them, jobs, job security,financialsupportfor furthereducationand
housing,andfamily life were essentialingredientsfor a happypostwarlife.
On the flighthome in TheBest Yearsof OurLives,afterstatingthathe is scaredthat
everybodyis going to rehabilitatehim, Al Stephensonexpresses his own opinion
aboutwhatit will taketo get used to postwarlife: "AllI want'sa goodjob, a mild future,a little house big enoughfor me andmy wife. Give me thatmuchandI'm rehabilitated[snapshis fingers]like that."83
81TheodoreW.Adorno,TheAuthoritarian
Personality(New York,1950);JohnDollardet al., FrustrationandAggression (New Haven,Conn., 1939).
82David Riesman. The
Lonely Crowd:A Studyof the ChangingAmericanCharacter(New Haven,
Conn., 1950); ErichFromm,TheSane Society (New York, 1955). See also Hans Pols, "Anomiein the
Metropolis:The City in AmericanSociology and Psychiatry,"Science and the City,Osiris 18 (2003):
194-211.
83TheBest Years OurLives (cit. n. 1).
of