HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND PRETEXTS FOR WAR
*
ByRyanGoodman
The legalstatusof humanitarianinterventionposesa profoundchallengeto the futureof
globalorder.'The centralquestionis easyto formulatebut notoriouslydifficultto answer:
Shouldinternationallawpermitstatesto intervenemilitarilyto stopa genocideor comparable
That questionhasacquiredevengreatersigatrocitywithoutSecurityCouncilauthorization?
nificancein the wakeof militaryinterventionsin KosovoandIraq,andnoninterventionin the
Sudan.Concerteddeliberationon theseissues,however,hasreachedanimpasse.A keyobstacle
to legalizingunilateralhumanitarianintervention(UHI)2is the overridingconcernthatstates
would use the pretextof humanitarianinterventionto wagewarsfor ulteriormotives.In this
article,I arguethat it is just as likely,or even morelikely,that the impacton stateswould be
the opposite.Drawingon recentempiricalstudies,I contendthat legalizingUHI shouldin
warswith ulteriormotives,andI discusschangesto international
importantrespectsdiscourage
legalinstitutionsthatwould amplifythat potentialeffect.
The concernthat stateswould exploita humanitarianexceptionto justifymilitaryaggression haslong dominatedacademicandgovernmentaldebates.This concernpits the virtuesof
humanitarianrescueagainstthe horrorof havingexpandedopportunitiesfor aggressivewar.
Dating backto Grotius,proponentsof legalizinghumanitarianinterventionhavestruggled
with the objectionthattheirproposalswould be abusedasa pretextforwar.3The proponents
* Sinclair
J.
ArmstrongAssistantProfessorof Foreign,International,and ComparativeLaw, HarvardLaw
School.This articlebenefitedsignificantlyfrompresentationsat the BoaltHall Schoolof LawInternationalLaw
Workshop,the Universityof ChicagoInternationalLawWorkshop,the GeorgetownUniversityLawCenterInternationalLegalTheoryColloquium,and the Universityof GeorgiaInternationalLawColloquium.I owe special
thanksto WilliamAlford,DavidBarron,DonaldBraman,JamesCavallaro,AndrewGuzman,DerekJinks,Christine Jolls, Beth Van Schaack,Henry Steiner,William Stuntz,andJohn Yoo. I thankNaomi Loewith,Brandon
Miller,BryanSeeley,and StephanSonnenbergfor excellentresearchassistance.
1 SeeUN PressReleaseSG/SM/7136
(Sept.20, 1999) (KofiAnnanexplainingthathumanitarianintervention
presentsa "corechallengeto the SecurityCounciland the United Nationsas a whole in the next century");seealso
DavidJ. Bederman,Globalization,
International
Lawand UnitedStatesForeignPolicy,50 EMORY
L.J.717 (2001)
interventionshave... becomea centralissueof the foreignpoliciesof manynations,greatpowers
("humanitarian
and smallnationsalike").
2 A conventional
definitionof "humanitarian
intervention"is "thethreator useof forcebya state,groupofstates,
or internationalorganizationprimarilyfor the purposeof protectingthe nationalsof the targetstatefromwideINTERHUMANITARIAN
spreaddeprivationsof internationallyrecognizedhumanrights."SEAND. MURPHY,
VENTION:THE UNITED NATIONS IN AN EVOLVINGWORLD ORDER 11-12 (1996). The term "unilateral
humanitarian
intervention"commonlyrefersto the threator useof forcebyone or morestatesactingwithoutSecurityCouncil authorization.SeeMichaelByers& Simon Chesterman,ChangingtheRulesAboutRules?Unilateral
INTERVENTION:
and theFutureof nternationalLaw,in HUMANITARIAN
HumanitarianIntervention
ETHICAL,
LEGAL
AND POLITICAL
DIMENSIONS
177, 178 (J. L. Holzgrefe& RobertO. Keohaneeds., 2003).
3 The
Dutch
interventiontracesits rootsto thetreatiseby theseventeenth-century
legaldoctrineof humanitarian
juristHugo Grotius.Upon introducingthe idea, Grotiustackledthe prospectof its beingabusedas a pretextfor
war. 2 HUGO GROTIUS,DE JUREBELLIAC PACISLIBRITRES, ch. XXV, pt. VIII(4) (Carnegie ed., Francis W.
Kelseytrans.1925) (1625) ("Hence,SenecathinksthatI maymakewarupon one who is not one of my peoplebut
oppresseshis own,... a procedurewhich is often connectedwith the protectionof innocentpersons.We know,
it is true,fromboth ancientandmodernhistory,thatthe desireforwhatis another'sseekssuchpretextsas this for
its own ends;but a rightdoes not at once ceaseto existin caseit is to someextentabusedby evil men. Pirates,also,
SwissjuristEmerde Vatteltook
sailthe sea;armsarecarriedalsoby brigands.").Interestingly,eighteenth-century
107
108
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LAW
OFINTERNATIONAL
JOURNAL
[Vol. 100:107
weremost influentialin the latenineteenthcentury4-admittedlya periodin which internationallawpermittedstatesto useforceon manyandvariedgrounds(andimperialismreigned).
In the contemporaryera,however,the proponentshaveessentiallylost the debate.The terms
of discussionhaveshiftedat variouspoints,5andNATO's interventionin Kosovohas,in particular,spurredone of the mostnuanceddiscussionsabouttheproprietyofUHI andtheability
to regulateit in the post-Cold War period.6Nevertheless,the consensusof opinion among
intervengovernmentsandjuristsfavorsrequiringSecurityCouncilapprovalforhumanitarian
tion.7And the pretextobjectionhasbeena significantfactorin shapingthatperspective;over
the pastfew decades,it hasfiguredimportantlyin the analysesof leadingpublicinternational
LouisHenkin,ll
law scholars-including RichardBilder,8Ian Brownlie,9ThomasFranck,1?
Grotiusto taskspecificallyon the pretextissue.SeeEMERDE VATTEL,THE LAWOFNATIONS bk. II, ch. i, ?7
(JosephChittytrans.,1879) (1758) ("Whatled [Grotius]into thiserror,was,his attributingto everyindependent
man, and of courseto everysovereign,an odd kind of rightto punishfaultswhich involvean enormousviolation
of the lawsof nature,thoughtheydo not affecteitherhis rightsor his safety.... Couldit escapeGrotius,that,nothis opinionopensa doorto all the ravwithstandingall the precautionsaddedby him in the followingparagraphs,
Thoselinesof debateconagesof enthusiasmandfanaticism,andfurnishesambitionwith numberlesspretexts?").
tinuedinto the nineteenthcentury.See,e.g.,G. Rolin-Jaequemyns,
Note surla Theoriedu DroitdIntervention,8
REVUEDE DROIT INTERNATIONAL
ETDE LtGISLATIONCOMPAREE675,679 (1876) (revisiting issue of pretext
objectionin Vattel'sresponseto Grotius).
4 SeeIAN BROWNLIE,INTERNATIONAL
LAWANDTHEUSE OF FORCEBYSTATES338 (1963) (explainingthat
intervention
"[b]ytheendof thenineteenthcenturythemajorityof publicistsadmittedthata rightof humanitarian
(l'intervention
d'humanite)existed").
5
Revisited,
MURPHY,
supranote 2; seealsoJamesMayall,TheConceptofHumanitarianIntervention
Seegenerally
in KOSOVOAND THECHALLENGE
INTERVENTION:
SELECTIVE
OF HUMANITARIAN
INDIGNATION,COLLECTIVEACTION, AND INTERNATIONAL
CITIZENSHIP319 (Albrecht Schnabel & Ramesh Thakur eds., 2000).
6
NATO'sKosovoIntervention,
93 AJIL824 (1999) (includingessaysbyJonathan
See,e.g.,EditorialComments:
I. Charney,ChristineM. Chinkin,RichardA. Falk,ThomasM. Franck,LouisHenkin,W. MichaelReisman,and
10 EUR.J. INT'LL. 1 (1999);
RuthWedgwood);BrunoSimma,NATO,the UNand the UseofForce:LegalAspects,
AntonioCassese,Exiniuriaiusoritur:Are WeMovingTowards
ofForcibleHumanitarian
InternationalLegitimation
in the WorldCommunity?
id. at 23.
Countermeasures
7 In the
pastfiveyears,morethan 133 states(representingapproximately80 percentof the world'spopulation)
haveissuedindividualor joint statementsrejectingthe legalizationof UHI. Seeinfratext accompanyingnote 26.
":Promise
The weightof academicopinionis alsoagainstit. RichardB. Bilder,Kosovoandthe "NewInterventionism
orPeril?9 J. TRANSNAT'L
L. & POL'Y153, 161 (1999) ("mostscholarshaverejectedthe claimthathumanitarian
CLARK
ANTHONY
interventionis a legitimateexceptionto theprohibitionof the useof forcein the UN Charter");
AREND& ROBERTJ.BECK,INTERNATIONAL
LAWANDTHEUSE OFFORCE:BEYONDTHEUN CHARTERPAR-
to UseArmed
ADIGM131 (1993) (describingviewof the "majorityof scholars");
OscarSchachter,TheRightofStates
Force,82 MICH.L. REV.1620, 1629 (1984) ("governments
by andlarge(andmostjurists)wouldnot asserta right
to forcibleinterventionto protectthe nationalsof anothercountryfrom atrocitiescarriedout in that country").
8 Bilder,supranote 7, at 160-61 ("historically,
claimsofhumanitarianinterventionhavetypicallyservedsimply
as a pretextforwhat are,in fact,selfishassertionsof nationalinterest,power,and greed");seealsoid. at 166-67.
9 IanBrownlie,HumanitarianIntervention,
WORLD217-28 (John
in LAWANDCIVILWARINTHEMODERN
INTERVENTION
NortonMooreed., 1974);IanBrownlie,Thoughts
onKind-Hearted
Gunmen,in HUMANITARIAN
ANDTHEUNITEDNATIONS139, 147-48 (RichardB. Lilliched., 1973) ("Whateverspecialcasesone can point
to, a ruleallowinghumanitarianintervention,asopposedto a discretionin the United Nationsto act throughthe
appropriateorgans,is a generallicenseto vigilantesand opportuniststo resortto hegemonialintervention.").
10ThomasM. Franck&
TheLawofHumanitarianInterventionbyMilitary
Nigel S. Rodley,AfterBangladesh:
Force,67 AJIL275,304 (1973) ("[A]lawderivedfromthe Bangladeshprecedentis an unlimitedfiatforlargerstates
to oppresstheirsmallerneighbors.... Historyshowsthatwhen the humanitarianjustificationhasbeen invoked,
it has mostlybeen undercircumstancesin which thereis at leasta strongsuspicionthat the factsand usuallythe
motive,werenot as alleged.").AlthoughFrancksubsequentlymodifiedhis position,he maintainsthat the use of
forceregimeis not readyfor a humanitarianexceptiondue to the prospectof self-servinginterpretations
by interAND
THE
HEGEMONY
states.
UNITED
STATES
See
Thomas
on
and
in
Comments
7
Franck,
8,
vening
Chapters
FOUNDATIONS
OFINTERNATIONAL
LAW264, 265, 267 (MichaelByers& GeorgNolte eds., 2003); THOMAS
M. FRANCK,RECOURSETO FORCE:STATEACTIONAGAINSTTHREATSAND ARMEDATTACKS172, 185-86
in HUMANITARand Changein theLawofHumanitarianIntervention,
(2002);ThomasM. Franck,Interpretation
IANINTERVENTION:
AND POLITICAL
LEGAL
DIMENSIONS,
ETHICAL,
supranote 2, at 204, 229-31.
POLICY
144-45 (2d ed. 1979) ("Tome,
11LOUISHENKIN,HOWNATIONSBEHAVE:
LAWANDFOREIGN
thesepressureserodingthe prohibitionon the use of forcearedeplorable,and argumentsto legitimizethe use of
2006]
HUMANITARIANINTERVENTIONAND PRETEXTSFOR WAR
109
OscarSchachter,12
BrunoSimma,13andJaneStromseth'4-who havearguedagainstlegalizthe
same
For
UHI.15
reason,manygovernmentshaveopposedlegalizingUHI,16andeven
ing
in the caseof governmentsthathaveengagedin humanitarianinterventionwithout Security
Councilapproval,therehasbeena reluctanceto justifysuchactionsby referenceto a rightto
engagein UHI.17
The overridingconcernaboutpretextwarsturnson assumptionsaboutstateopportunism
and the powerof both law and perceivedlegitimacyin regulatingstatebehavior.To address
thisproblemthusrequiresunderstanding
empiricalpatternsof interstatehostilitiesandthe influan abundanceof
institutionsmightexerton stateconduct.Fortunately,
encethatinternational
socialscienceresearchaddressesmanyof thesesubjects.Of specialinterestfor this articleare
theoreticaland empiricalinsightsinto the relationshipbetweeninternationaland domestic
areunpersuasive
anddangerous.... '[H]umanitarianintervention'can too readilybe
forcein thosecircumstances
seealsoLouisHenkin,KosovoandtheLawofHumanitarianInterusedas the occasionor pretextforaggression.");
vention,93 AJIL824 (1999).
12
LAWIN THEORYAND PRACTICE126 (1991) ("[I]t is highly undeOSCARSCHACHTER,INTERNATIONAL
sirableto havea new ruleallowinghumanitarianintervention,for that could providea pretextfor abusiveintervention.").
13
Simma,supranote 6, at 5 (favorablyquotingearlierBritishgovernment'sviewthat"thescopeforabusingsuch
a rightarguesstronglyagainstitscreation"andquestioningwhether"recentorcurrentinstancesof'militaryhumansuchactionsin the past").
showthemselvesto be uninfectedby the lesslaudablemotivesthatcharacterized
itarianism'
14JaneStromseth,Rethinking
TheCaseforIncremental
HumanitarianIntervention:
Change,in HUMANITARIAN
INTERVENTION:
DIMENSIONS,supranote 2, at 232,257 (rejecting notion that
ETHICAL,LEGALANDPOLITICAL
"formal adoption of a legal doctrine of humanitarian intervention with specified criteriawould lessen the prospect
of unwarranted, pretextual interventions" and arguing that "[e]stablishing an additional legal basis for resort to
force, albeit with criteria attached, would provide another theory under which states determined to use force can
seek to justify their actions"). Stromseth supports the gradual normative acceptance of UHI. However, she rejects
proposals to codify or legally enshrine a right of UHI anytime soon.
15
CRIMINALJUSTICE
INTERNATIONAL
Seealso HANS KOCHLER,GLOBALJUSTICEOR GLOBALREVENGE?:
AT THE CROSSROADS313 (2003) ("in an environment in which no checks and balances exist to restrain the arbitrary use of power[,] '[h]umanitarian intervention' has become one of the key terms to legitimize what otherwise
would have to be called 'act of aggression' or 'interference in internal affairs'");YORAMDINSTEIN,WAR,AGGRESSIONAND SELF-DEFENCE
67 (2001) ("Commentators have drawn comparisons between 'humanitarian intervention' and medieval just war criteria. .... As a rule, interventionists believe that they are pursuing a higher goal: 'the
ideal of justice backed by power.' The trouble is that ... there is too much room to abuse the law in the name of
to UseForce,
the SecurityCouncil:AmbiguousAuthorizations
justice.");Jules Lobel & MichaelRatner,Bypassing
Cease-Firesand the Iraqi InspectionRegime,93 AJIL 124, 153 (1999) (arguing that "greatpowers can use humanitarian concerns to mask geopolitical interest");Michael Akehurst, Humanitarian Intervention, in INTERVENTION
IN WORLD POLITICS95, 111 (Hedley Bull ed., 1984).
16
See, e.g., United Kingdom Foreign Office, Pol'y Doc. No. 148, reprintedin 1986 BRIT.Y.B. INT'LL. 614,619
("the overwhelming majority of contemporary legal opinion comes down against the existence of a right of humanitarian intervention ... on prudential grounds, that the scope for abusing such a right argues strongly against its
creation"); UN SCOR, 54th Sess., 401 1th mtg. at 9, UN Doc. S/PV.4011 (June 10, 1999) (government of China
arguing that UHI "promote[s] hegemonism under the pretext of human rights");see also SCHACHTER,supra note
7, at 1629 ("The reluctance of governments to legitimize foreign invasion in the interest of humanitarianism is
understandable in the light of past abuses by powerful states.... Most governments are acutely sensitive to this danger and show no disposition to open article 2(4) up to a broad exception for humanitarian intervention ....").
17 Nicholas Wheeler, TheHumanitarian
of a New
J.
ExplainingtheDevelopment
of Sovereignty:
Responsibilities
INTERVENin International
HumanitarianPurposes
NormofMilitaryInterventionfor
Society,in HUMANITARIAN
RELATIONS29,42 (Jennifer M. Welsh ed., 2004) (discussing concerns of the United
TIONAND INTERNATIONAL
States regarding pretext wars); FRANCK,supra note 10, at 170 (discussing concerns of the Netherlands regarding
pretextwars);cf Simon Chesterman,HardCasesMakeBadLaw:Law,EthicsandPoliticsin HumanitarianIntervention, inJUST INTERVENTION46,50 (Anthony F. LangJr. ed., 2003) ("Interestingly, despite the efforts by some
legal scholars to argue for the existence of a right of humanitarian intervention, states themselves have continued
to prove very reluctant to embrace such a right- even in defense of their own actions.... This reluctance appears
to have stemmed in part from recognition that such a legal argument is dubious, but also that if any such right were
embraced, it might well be used by other states in other situations."); Antonio Cassese, A Follow-up: Forcible
Humanitarian CountermeasuresandOpinio Necessitatis, 10 EUR.J. INT'LL. 791,792-93 (1999) (discussing concerns of Germany and Belgium not to set "precedent" for UHI); Byers & Chesterman, supra note 2, at 198-200.
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[Vol. 100:107
politicalprocess.Indeed,an importantdevelopmentin politicalscienceresearchrecognizes
that internationalrelationsand domesticpoliticsareinterrelatedand thatthose connections
arecentralto explainingthe causesofwar.18Whethera permissiveinternationallegalenvironment for humanitarian
justificationswould spurundesirableusesof forceshouldaccordingly
be analyzedwith theseinstitutionaldynamicsin mind.
Thisarticleanalyzesthedeterminantsofwarlargelyusingavailablequantitativeresearchand
otherpoliticalsciencestudies.Fromthis methodologicalvantagepoint, the gruesomenature
of warmayseemto recedeinto the background.Its presenceis alwaysfelt,however.Sincethe
patternsof interstatehostilitiesallowforsuchsystematicanalysis,it is crucialto examineclosely
whetherlawsdesignedto regulatethe useof forceareaccordinglymoreorlesslikelyto promote
violencebetweenstates.
In partI, I describethe lawon the use of forceand outlinethe theoreticalmodel thatserves
asthe basisforthe pretextargument.In partII, I contendthatacademicdiscussionsaboutthe
pretextobjectiondo not adequatelyconsiderthe sociologicalconsequencesof being required
to justifystartinga war.In particular,I contendthat encouragingaggressivestatesto justify
using force as an exerciseof humanitarianinterventioncan facilitateconditionsfor peace
betweenthosestatesand theirprospectivetargets.This resultis, of course,paradoxical,but it
is groundedin empiricalstudiesof unintendedconstraintson stateaction.As the discussion
in partII demonstrates,leaderscanbecomecaughtin theirown publicjustificationsfora militarycampaign.Consequently,framingthe resortto forceasa pursuitof humanitarianobjectives,or addinghumanitarianissuesto an ongoingmilitaryeffort,can reshapedomesticpolitical arrangementsand the characterof interstaterelationsthat lead to war. In its most
provocativeform, my argumentis that-compared to the existingbaselineof interstatedisputesthatmightescalateinto warbetweensuchaggressoranddefendingstates-the net effect
on warwould be desirable.That said, I do not purportto offera comprehensivedefenseof
UHI, andI do not suggestthattheseeffectsprovideanaffirmative
justificationto legalizeUHI.
I suggestonly that they discreditthe pretextobjection.I alsofocuson just this one objection
and addressotherconcernsonly insofaras they relateto the pretextissue.The essentialpoint
is thattheveryconditionsthatcommentatorssuggestwouldunleashpretextwarsby aggressive
statesmay,in generalandon average,temperthe bellicosebehaviorof thosestates.In partIII,
I considerpotentialobjectionsand refinementsto the precedinganalysis.
The claimspresentedin thisarticleincludeboth a stronganda modestposition.The strong
warsby statesthat
positionholdsthatlegalizingUHI should,on balance,discourageaggressive
use the pretextof humanitarianism.If this position is correct,concernsabout pretextwars
shouldberetired.The modestposition,whichis moreeasilydefended,is alsohighlyimportant.
It holdsthatsomeaggressivewarsthatwould be foughtin the currentlegalregimewould not
be foughtin a regimethatpermitsUHI. On thisview, it is dubiousfor the pretextconcernto
remainan obstacleto legalizingUHI, especiallywithout knowingwhetherthe prevalenceof
warswouldlikelybe higherorlowerthanthe statusquo. Commonto bothpositions
aggressive
is the insightthatlegalizingUHI holdsthe prospectof restrainingsomeaggressivewars.Once
18
88 AM.POL.
Escalation
See,e.g.,JamesD. Fearon,DomesticPoliticalAudiencesandthe
ofnternationalDisputes,
SCI. REV.577 (1994); BRUCERUSSETT,GRASPINGTHEDEMOCRATICPEACE:PRINCIPLES
FORAPOST-COLD
WARWORLD(1993); T. CliftonMorgan& SallyHowardCampbell,DomesticStructure,
DecisionalConstraints,
and War:So WhyKantDemocracies
RESOL.187 (1991); Zeev Maoz & NasrinAbdolali,
Fight?35 J. CONFLICT
RESOL.
3 (1989); cf RyanGoodman,Review
RegimeTypesandInternational
Conflict,1816-1976, 33J. CONFLICT
Essay:InternationalInstitutionsand the Mechanismsof War, 99 AJIL507 (2005) (reviewingJOHNNORTON
MOORE, SOLVINGTHEWAR PUZZLE:BEYONDTHE DEMOCRATICPEACE(2004)) (analyzing competing theoretical explanations of the democratic peace for the purpose of institutional design).
2006]
HUMANITARIANINTERVENTIONAND PRETEXTSFOR WAR
1ll
the dynamicsthat produce those restraintsare understood,institutionalschemes can be
designedto strengthenand supportthem.
At bottom,a leadingprudentialobjectionto legalizingUHI restson questionableassumptions. Those assumptionsconcernthe effectsof legal changeon state behavior.Given the
potentialadvantagesof authorizingstatesto stop genocidesandsimilaratrocities,misconceptionsof countervailingeffectsof proposedlegalchangesmustbe corrected,andeffortsto mitigatesuch effectsshouldbe closelyconsidered.
I. THE MODELOFPRETEXT
WARS
In this part,I firstoutlinethe contemporaryinternationallawon UHI. This analysisis relSecond,I analyzethe pretextobjecativelysynoptic,asthe issueis amplycoveredelsewhere.19
tion to legalizingUHI. This discussionis necessarilymoredetailed,becausean expositionof
the componentsof the objectionhas not been presentedbefore.
TheLawAgainstUnilateralHumanitarianIntervention
SinceWorldWarII, internationallawhasprohibitedstatesfromthreateningor usingforce
exceptin self-defenseor pursuantto SecurityCouncilauthorization.Althoughsomescholars
havearguedotherwise,20
it is difficultto escapethe conclusionthat internationallaw forbids
As a matterof treaty
the unilateraluseof forceto rescuevictimsof a humanitariancatastrophe.
law, the UN Charterdoes not exemptUHI from the prohibitionon the use of force,21and
As a matterof
prominentGeneralAssemblyresolutionsclearlysupportthis interpretation.22
customaryinternationallaw, the InternationalCourtof Justicein Nicaraguav. UnitedStates
concludedthat customdoes not permitUHI.23And accordingto leadinginternationallaw
treatises,despitedivergentstatepracticesin the 1990s,thelegalprohibitionpersistsunderboth
treatyand custom.24
19See,
e.g., Adam Roberts, The So-Called "Right"ofHumanitarian Intervention, 2001 Y.B. INT'LHUMANITARASPECTS77-95
IANL. 3; DANISHINST. INT'LAFF., HUMANITARIAN
INTERVENTION:LEGALAND POLITICAL
(1999), at <www.dupi.dk/www.dupi.dk/htdocs/enl 1240.ssi>; Tom J. Farer,An Inquiryinto theLegitimacyof
ORDER185 (LoriFislerDamHumanitarianIntervention,
in LAWANDFORCEINTHENEWINTERNATIONAL
rosch & David J. Scheffer eds., 1991).
20 For one of the most
persuasive arguments that UHI is lawful, see Christopher Greenwood, Humanitarian
Intervention:TheCaseofKosovo,1999 FINNISHY.B. INT'LL. 141.
21
THE CHARTEROF THE UNITED NATIONS:A COMMENTARY(Bruno Simma ed., 2d ed. 2002).
See Definition of Aggression, GA Res. 3314 (XXIX) (Dec. 14, 1974); Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the
United Nations, GA Res. 2625 (XXV) (Oct. 24, 1970); see also Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention
and Interference in the Internal Affairs of States, GA Res. 36/103 (Dec. 9, 1981).
23
Military and ParamilitaryActivities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 ICJ REP. 14, para. 268
(June 27) ("[W]hile the United States might form its own appraisal of the situation as to respect for human rights
in Nicaragua, the use offorce could not be the appropriate method to monitor or ensure such respect.... The Court
concludes that the argument derived from the preservation of human rights in Nicaragua cannot afford a legal justification for the conduct of the United States ....").
24
LAW373-74 (2d ed. 2005) (summarizing the legal authorSee, e.g., ANTONIO CASSESE,INTERNATIONAL
LAW710-12 (6th ed. 2003) (summarizing the
OF PUBLICINTERNATIONAL
ity); IAN BROWNLIE,PRINCIPLES
LAW1046 (5th ed. 2003) (summarizing the legal authorlegal authority); MALCOLMN. SHAW,INTERNATIONAL
LAW221 (7th rev. ed.
ity); PETERMALANCZUK,AKEHURST'SMODERNINTRODUCTIONTO INTERNATIONAL
1997) (summarizing the legal authority); cf Anne Ryniker, The ICRC's Position on "Humanitarian Intervention,"
83 INT'LREV.RED CROSS527, 530-31 (2001) (statement by legal adviser and deputy head of the Legal Division
of the International Committee for the Red Cross); INDEP.INT'LCOMM'NON KOSOVO,THE KOSOVOREPORT
166-76 (2000).
22
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To be sure,recentdevelopmentsindicatethatthe legalregimemaybe subjectto changein
the coming years.Subsequentto ECOWASinterventionsin Liberiaand SierraLeone and
NATO's interventionin Kosovo,manycommentatorsagreethat some formof exceptionto
the prohibitionmaybe gainingacceptance.25
Nevertheless,in the pastfiveyears,at least 133
stateshaveissuedindividualorjoint statementsopposinglegalization.26
Additionally,despite
the prospectof wide-rangingUN reform,both the 2004 reportby the UN High-LevelPanel
on UN
on Threats,Challengesand Changes27and the 2005 reportof the secretary-general
reform28suggestmaintainingthe SecurityCouncil'slegalmonopolyoverthe use of forcefor
humanitarian
purposes.At bottom,the legalprohibitionon UHI remainslargelyin place,and
powerfulinternationalactorsarenot inclinedto supporta fundamentalrevisionof it.29
Forthe purposeof our discussion,it is importantto understand(or recall)the scopeof the
legalprohibition.The prohibitionappliesto all usesof force-the full spectrumof interstate
violence.The prohibitionregulatestwo practices:the threatto use forceand the actualuseof
force.The formalruleagainstUHI categoricallybansall thesemeasures.Yetas the analysisin
partII demonstrates,we mightconsiderinteractionsbetweenthesevariousmeasures,includpurposesmayreducetheprevalence
ing:whetherthe useof forceshortof warforhumanitarian
of wars,andwhetherthe threatto wagewarfor humanitarianpurposesmayreducethe prevalenceof statesengagingin war.
The remainderof this partexplicatesthe pretextobjectionto UHI. Forthe purposeof the
analysis,it is importantsimplyto recognizethatmoderninternationallawprecludesUHI. The
questionis: shouldit?
ThePretextObjectiontoLegalization
One mightwell supporta state'suseof forceto halta genocidein a specificinstance,yet be
humanitarconcernedaboutthe consequencesof openlyendorsinga principlepreauthorizing
ianinterventionasa matterof law.30A keyconcernis how to containthe practicalimplications
25
LAWAND THE USE OF FORCE99 (2d ed. 2004); MURPHY,
See,e.g.,CHRISTINEGRAY,INTERNATIONAL
ANDSTATE
supranote2, at 366; Stromseth,supranote 14, at233; cf INDEP.INT'LCOMM'NONINTERVENTION
SOVEREIGNTY,
supranote 19, at 15-16, 47-51 (discussingemergingpractice).
26 See,
e.g., Declarationof the South Summit, Havana, Cuba, Apr. 10-14, 2000, para. 54, at <http://
("Werejectthe so-called'right'of humanitarianintervenwww.g77.org/Docs/Declaration_G77Summit.htm>
tion, which has no legalbasisin the United Nations Charteror in the generalprinciplesof internationallaw.");
Movementof the Non-alignedCountries,XIII MinisterialConference,Cartagena,Colombia,Apr. 8-9, 2000,
FinalDocument, para.263, at <www.nam.gov.za/xiiiminconf/index.html>("Werejectthe so-called'right'of
ofinternational
humanitarian
whichhasno legalbasisin theUN Charterorin thegeneralprinciples
law.").
intervention,
27 SECRETARY-GENERAL'S
AND CHANGE,A MORE
PANELON THREATS,CHALLENGES
HIGH-LEVEL
SECURE
WORLD:
OURSHARED
RESPONSIBILITY65-66
(2004);cf MichaelJ.Glennon,IdealismattheU.N.: The
REV.3 (2005) (criticizingpanel'sconclusionsregardingSecurity
129 POL'Y
High-LevelPanel's
High-MindedErrors,
Council authorizationto stop genocideand similaratrocities).
28 Reportof the Secretary-General,
In LargerFreedom:TowardsDevelopment,SecurityandHumanRightsfor
All at 33, UN Doc. A/59/2005 (2005).
29
OFHUMANITARIAN
AND THECHALLENGE
Revisited,in KOSOVO
Cf AlanJames,TheConceptofSovereignty
INTERVENTION,
supranote 5, at 334, 342-43 (suggestingKosovoconflictwill not significantlyalterlegalnorms
againstintervention).
30 OscarSchachtermadethis distinction
plain:
force
to
State
or
of
States
[A]
group
using
put an end to atrocitieswhenthe necessityis evidentandthehumanitarianintentionis clearis likelyto haveits actionpardoned.But, I believeit is highlyundesirableto havea
new rule allowinghumanitarianintervention,for that could providea pretextfor abusiveintervention.It
wouldbe betterto acquiescein a violationthatis considerednecessaryanddesirablein the particularcircumstancesthan to adopta principlethatwould open a wide gap in the barrieragainstunilateraluse of force.
SCHACHTER,
supranote 12, at 126.
2006]
HUMANITARIANINTERVENTIONAND PRETEXTSFOR WAR
113
of legal authority. As noted earlier,the concern that stateswould initiate wars by using humanitarianism as a pretext constitutes perhaps "the most compelling"31 and certainly the "most
common"32 objection to legalization.33
In order to sharpen the argument, it is worth considering that similar prudential concerns
animated the framers of the UN Charter. States designed the use of force regime partly in
response to the perceived lessons of World War II. One of the haunting memories was Hitler's
use of humanitarianjustifications for military expansion. It is well known that Hitler invoked
the "rightof self-determination"of German nationals as a pretextfor his incursions into Austria
and Czechoslovakia.34Perhaps less well known is the striking resemblance between Hitler's
rhetoricand contemporaryhumanitarian initiatives. In a letter to Chamberlain, Hitler justified
his military objectives in the Sudetenland on the grounds that "Germans as well as the other
various nationalities in Czechoslovakia have been maltreated in the unworthiest manner, tortured, . . . [and denied] the right of nations to self-determination," that "[i]n a few weeks the
number of refugeeswho have been driven out has risen to over 120,000," that "the security of
more than 3,000,000 human beings" was in jeopardy, and that the German government was
"determinedby one means or another to terminate these attempts... to deny by dilatorymethods the legal claims of oppressed peoples."35Hitler's rhetorical efforts reveal-perhaps in the
starkest terms possible-what is at stake with regard to UHI. Such concerns, however, help
only to focus, not to answer, the central empirical inquiry. Whether international legal norms
that are consistent with such diplomatic representationswould (or did) increasethe likelihood
of military invasion is a fundamentally different question. Whether a permissive legal regime
would increaseor decreasethe aggregatenumber of aggressivewars is also part of that empirical
quandary.36
It is helpful and important to identify the structureand empirical assumptions of the pretext
argument-the case against legalizing UHI. The argument relies on particularconceptions of
the relationship between state conduct and international legal norms. It assumes that international law affects how states-particularly duplicitous, aggressivestates- orient themselves to
the international order. More specifically, the argument proceeds from the premise that legalizing UHI will affect, even if only on the margins, the use of force by such states. Otherwise,
the argument is a nonstarter. Though scholarshave advanced slightly different versions of the
31
Bartram S. Brown, Humanitarian Intervention ata Crossroads,41 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1683, 1727 (2000)
("Perhapsthe most compellingargumentagainstrecognizinga rightof humanitarianinterventionis thatit might
be usedas a pretextfor militaryinterventionactuallymotivatedby other,less noble, objectives.").
32
Dino Kritsiotis,ReappraisingPolicy
19 MICH.J. INT'LL. 1005, 1020
toHumanitarianIntervention,
Objections
interventionis thatitsincorporationinto
(1998) ("Themostcommoncriticismleveledat the rightof humanitarian
the systemof the lawof nationswouldenhancethe opportunitiesfor the abusiveuse of force,the long-termeffect
of which would be to bringthe internationalnormativesysteminto disrepute.").
33
Process:TheSpeSeeW. MichaelReisman,UnilateralAction
andthe Transformations
ofthe WorldConstitutive
cialProblemofHumanitarianIntervention,11 EUR.J. INT'LL. 3, 16 (2000) (describingpretextconcernsas "the
primaryjuridicalobjection"to legalizingUHI).
34
OFWARSINCE1914, at 58 (1986).
See,e.g.,AMOS YODER,WORLD POLITICSAND THECAUSES
35 LetterfromReichChancellorHitlerto PrimeMinisterChamberlain
(Sept.23, 1938), in TheCrisisin Czechoslovakia,April24-October13, 1938, 19 INT'LCONCILIATION
433, 433-35 (1938). Hitleralso rallieda baseof
domesticsupportforhis initialmilitaryexpansionsby assertingthatforeigngovernmentswereflagrantlyviolating
the right of self-determinationof Germannationals.Extractsfrom Speechby ChancellorAdolf Hitler at the
NationalSocialistPartyCongressat Nuremberg,Germany(September12, 1938), in id. at 411, 412.
36
Using the Third Reichas an examplealso raisesquestionsaboutwhetherthe empiricalpatternswill varyby
regimetype. For a descriptionof those aspectsof the relevantstudies,see infratext accompanyingnotes 115-18
(discussingexpectationsof constrainingeffectson nondemocracies,democracieswith significantpoliticalcartelization,and democracieswith weakpoliticalcartelization).
114
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pretextargument,theiranalysesgenerallycontainsimilarelements,which constitutewhat I
call the "modelof pretextwars":
1. Staticcondition:The leadershipof a revisioniststate(stateR)37is motivatedby selfregardingand aggressivepurposesto wagewaragainsta defendingstate (stateD)
2. Dynamic interactions:Expandingthe internationallegal exceptionincreasesthe
likelihoodthat stateR will wagewaragainststateD
Element A. State R undertakeseffortsto justifyescalatinghostilitiesin termsof
purposesthat conformto the new legalexception
Element B. The effortto justifyescalatinghostilitiesis undertakenin orderto convinceactorsor institutionsto relaxpressurethattheywouldotherwise
applywerestateR to attackstateD
Element C. The actualor expectedreductionof pressurereducesthe costsof state
R to wagewaragainststateD
Admittedly,thereis some evidencesupportingaspectsof the pretextmodel.At a general
level,empiricalstudiessuggestthatinternationallegalinstitutionscanaffectpatternsof interMorespecifically,nontrivialevidencesupportsparticularcomponentsof the
statehostilities.38
model.With respectto the firstelement,statesgenerallydo attemptto justifytheiruseof force
within the parametersset by internationallaw. ChristineGrayfindsthat
[i]n practice,statesmakingtheirclaimsto self-defencetryto put forwardargumentsthat
willavoiddoctrinalcontroversyandappealto thewidestpossiblerangeof states.Especially
sincethe Nicaraguacase,39stateshavetakencareto invokeArticle51 to justifytheiruse
offorce.Theydo so evenwhenthisseemsentirelyimplausibleandto involvethestretching
of Article51 beyondall measure.40
In Recourse
toForce,ThomasFranckdetailsboththe publicjustificationsadvancedby revisionist statesand the supportingor opposingargumentsmadeby othergovernments.41
37 The term"revisionist
state"is widelyusedin socialscientificstudiesofwar.Here,the termrefersto a statethat
is dissatisfiedwith statusquo conditionspriorto the onsetof a militarizedinterstatedisputeandthatseeksto overturnthoseconditionsthroughthe threator useof force.SeeDanielM. Jones,StuartA. Bremer,& J. DavidSinger,
MGMT.
andEmpiricalPatterns,15 CONFLICT
MilitarizedInterstate
Disputes,1816-1992: Rationale,CodingRules,
& PEACE
SCI.163, 178 (1996).
38 See,e.g.,Brett
AshleyLeeds,AllianceReliabilityin Timesof War:ExplainingStateDecisionsto ViolateTreaties,
andMul57 INT'LORG.801 (2003); KennethA. Schultz, TyingHandsand WashingHands:The U.S. Congress
OFDOMESTHEINTERACTION
THEPROPERAUTHORITIES:
in LOCATING
tilateralHumanitarian
Intervention,
TICANDINTERNATIONAL
INSTITUTIONS
(DanielW. Dreznered., 2003); BethA. Simmons,Capacity,CommitRESOL.829 (2002);
InternationalInstitutionsand TerritorialDisputes,46 J. CONFLICT
ment,and Compliance:
WilliamJ. Dixon, Third-PartyTechniquesfor
PreventingConflictEscalationandPromotingPeacefulSettlement,50
INT'LORG.653 (1996);HerbertK.Tillema.&JohnR.VanWingen,LawandPowerinMilitayIntervention:Major
StatesAfterWorldWarII, 226 INT'LSTUD.Q. 220 (1982).
39
[Author'sNote: Article51 of the UN Charterrequiresthatmeasurestakenby statesin exerciseof the rightof
self-defensemust be "immediatelyreported"to the SecurityCouncil.In Nicaragua,the Courtheld thatfailureto
"reportmay be one of the factorsindicatingwhetherthe Statein questionwas itselfconvincedthat it was acting
in andAgainstNicaragua(Nicar.v. U.S.), 1986 ICJREP.14,
in self-defence."MilitaryandParamilitaryActivities
para.200 (June 27).]
40
GRAY,supranote 25, at 99.
41
OFINTERVENTION:
THE PURPOSE
FINNEMORE,
FRANCK,
supranote 10, at 53-108; seealsoMARTHA
CHANGING
BELIEFS
ABOUTTHEUSEOFFORCE(2003) (analyzingprofessednormativejustificationsfor useof
forceovertime);id. at 15 ("Everyinterventionleavesa long trailofjustificationin itswake.... When statesjustify
theirinterventions,theydrawon andarticulatesharedvaluesandexpectationsthatotherdecisionmakersandother
publicsin otherstateshold.Justificationis literallyan attemptto connectone'sactionswith standardsofjusticeor,
perhapsmoregenerically,with standardsof appropriateand acceptablebehavior.").
2006]
HUMANITARIANINTERVENTIONAND PRETEXTSFOR WAR
115
Other studies support aspects of the first and second elements: states undertake efforts to
justify the resortto force in accordancewith international legal principles, and these efforts are
intended to satisfy particular audiences. In a leading analysis of the origins of war, Richard
Lebow identifies a class of international crises in which leadersuse pretextualjustifications for
initiatingwar.42He explainsthat, acrossnumerous historicalcases, leaders"employedstrikingly
in articulatingjustificationsfor war. One of the principal
similarmeans,"if not a "formula,"43
step[s] in [this] formula for justifying hostility consists of legitimizing one's demands in
terms of generallyaccepted international principles. By claiming to act in defense of a recognized interest or right, leaders may succeed in masking aggression or at least in maintaining the fiction of innocence. This may be very important to third parties or domestic
public opinion.44
Other scholars have made similar observations about the tendency of states to employ international legal justifications to persuade domestic and international audiences.45
In the balance of this article, I analyze the pretext model and some broader issues that it
raises. I do not contest all of the premises of the model. Instead, I offer an affirmativetheory
that shares some of the same empirical foundations. But my argument also diverges from the
pretext model in significant respects. First, exponents of the pretext model fail to articulate a
baseline of interstate hostilities for measuring the effect of legalizing UHI. It must be remembered in this context that the level of militarized conflicts is alreadyhigh; one vital question is
whether legalizing UHI might substantially discourage some of those conflicts from erupting
into war.
Second, the pretext model does not adequatelyconsider relationshipsbetween international
and domestic political process. Analyzing structuralrelationships between these two domains
should help in determining the consequences of legalizing UHI. Indeed, the model seemingly
accepts what some scholarshave called "the felt need for justification"46-the desire of leaders
to show that their actions conform to international legal norms. Such justificatory appeals,
however, have ramifications on the domestic political sphere that are not envisaged by the
model. In the discussion below, I consider such ramifications.47I also consider how affected
domestic political processes can, in turn, influence the escalation of hostilities between states.
42 RICHARDNED
CRISIS23 (1981).
LEBOW,BETWEENPEACEAND WAR:THE NATUREOF INTERNATIONAL
43Id. at 29.
44 Id. at 34 (emphasisadded).
45 SCHACHTER,supranote 12, at 110 ("[I]nvirtuallyeverycasethe use of forceis soughtto be justifiedby ref-
erence to the accepted Charter rules. ... [T]he felt need to issue a legal justification ... demonstrates that States
requirea basisof legitimacyto justifytheiractionsto theirown citizensand even more to otherStateswhose cosupranote 41, at 18, 21 (describingrelationshipbetweenjusoperationor acquiescenceis desired.");FINNEMORE,
tifyinginterventionthroughrational-legalauthorityand anticipationof acceptanceby otherstatesand domestic
publics),149 ("[A]consistentfindingof the casesis thatthe useof forcehasincreasinglybeenshapedbyWeberian
authoritystructures-internationalorganizationsandinternationallawin particular.States'decision
rational-legal
makingaboutwhen forceis desirableandeffectiveincreasinglytakesplacewithin the contextof multilateralinstitutionsand is justifiedby appealsto internationallaw, to mandatesfor multilateralinstitutions,or to both.").
46 In his famousinsider'saccountof the Cubanmissilecrisis,AbramChayesdescribes"thefelt need for justiTHECUBAN
CHAYES,
fication"thatled the U.S. governmentto appealto internationallegalinstitutions.ABRAM
CRISESAND THEROLEOFLAW(1974); cf SCHACHTER,supranote 12, at 110
MISSILECRISIS:INTERNATIONAL
(discussing"thefeltneedto issuea legaljustification"exhibitedby stateswhenresortingto force).Anothervaluable
insider'saccountalsoemphasizesthe felt need for legaljustification,as experiencedby SecurityCouncilmembers
Security,17 MICH.
duringthe heightof the Iraq-Kuwaitcrisis.MarttiKoskenniemi,ThePlaceofLawin Collective
for justification,
need
the
identified
not
in
INT'L
L.
477-78
455,
(1996).
experiential
J.
Chayes, particular, only
but alsoanalyzeddomesticramificationsthatcan resultfromappealingto internationallegalinstitutions.The pretext model failspartlybecauseit does not adequatelyconsiderramificationson domesticprocessesof action.
47 This relationship
mightbe modeledasa two-levelgame.RobertD. Putnam,DiplomacyandDomesticPolitics:
TheLogicof Two-LevelGames,42 INT'LORG.427 (1988).
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Third,andmost fundamentally,the pretextmodeldisregardsthe sociologicaleffectsof the
processof justifyingthe resortto force.The model assumesthat leaders'interestsand beliefs
remainstatic.The leadersof stateR beginand end with the designto wagean aggressivewar
againststateD. They lackonly the opportunityor permissivelegalenvironmentto do so. In
the followingpart,I discussdomesticsociopoliticalprocessesthat confoundthis supposedly
straight-line,staticset of preferences.Indeed,justificatorypracticesnot only build domestic
with respectto the conflict.
politicalsupport,butalsochangecollectivebeliefsandpreferences
Those changeddomesticconditionshave importantimplicationsfor constrainingleaders'
actionsand, morespecifically,determiningwhethera disputewill escalateinto war.
II. FRAMING HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION
Warsresultfrom interactionsat the internationallevel-for example,exchangesbetween
adversarial
states- coupledwith conducivedomesticpoliticalconditions.Identifyingimportantaspectsof theserelationshipscanhelpto predictthe effectsof makingspecificjustifications
for war more acceptable.In this part,I discusssignificantfeaturesof the institutionof war,
includingthe "stepsto war"48(thatis, thosepracticesadoptedby statesthatincreasethe likelihood of war);sourcesof conflict(whatstatesfightover);andthe politicsof justification(the
politicalmobilizationof supportfor escalatinghostilities).
mindedstatesto jusOn the basisof thesefeatures,I contendthatencouragingaggressively
forpeace.As disconditions
tifyforceasan exerciseof humanitarianinterventioncanfacilitate
cussedin detailbelow,justificationsthatleaderscontrivein orderto buildpoliticalsupportfor
warcan meaningfullyconstrainsubsequentgovernmentalaction.An appealto humanitarian
interestasthejustificationforwarcanproducetwo typesof pacifyingeffects.First,it canframe
(or reframe)an interstatedisputein a mannerthat is ultimatelyless escalatory.That is, nonhumanitarian
frameworks
are,in generalandon average,lesscontrollableandmoreincendiary
than humanitarianones. In this regard,the relevantmechanisminvolvesdomesticsociopoliticalprocesses,includingpublicor elite supportfor foreignmilitaryambitions.Second,the
additionof humanitarianissuesto an existingframeworkcan facilitatenegotiationsto avoid
war-in particular,by providingopportunitiesfor issuelinkageand face-savingsettlements.
The followingdiscussionanalyzestheseeffectsandthe associatedprospectsof avertingwarsof
aggression.
Stepsto War
Warsaregenerallythe productof an extended,dynamicprocess.WilliamDixon describes
Muchto the
interstateconflictasa "dynamicprocessthatunfoldsthrougha seriesof stages."49
sameeffect,JohnVasqueznotesthat "warsgrowout of a long-termpoliticalrelationshipthat
has becomeincreasinglyintractable,conflictive,and hostile."50Notably, even in the periods
in which internationallaw permittedstateswide latitudeto wage war as an instrumentof
towarwas
wasthatrecourse
nationalpolicy-indeed, asa sovereignright-the generalexpectation
effortsof justification
an actof lastresort.51
Historyis repletewithexamplesof statesundertaking
48
THEWARPUZZLE199 (1993).
JOHNA. VASQUEZ,
note
at 656.
38,
supra
50
note
at 42.
48,
VASQUEZ,
supra
51
See,e.g.,BROWNLIE, supranote 24, at 21-22.
49 Dixon,
2006]
HUMANITARIANINTERVENTIONAND PRETEXTSFOR WAR
117
Evenatthepoint
beforeinitiatinganarmedattack.52
andemployingpeacefulandcoercivemeasures
it isnecessary
warplans,theprocesscanstillbeprotracted.
thatstatesbegindeveloping
Accordingly,
to considerfeaturesof the generalprocessandassociatedpatternsof statebehavior.We needto
fromaninitialstageof adiplomaticdispute
theconditionsunderwhichstatesprogress
understand
to a militarized
interstatedispute(MID)53andthento the onsetof war.
In detailingthis process,Vasquezcoined an expression-the "stepsto war"-to denote
practicesthat statesadoptin responseto a disputethat can, regardlessof intentions,increase
the likelihoodof war.54ForVasquez,thesestepsinclude:elevatingindividualswho adhereto
a "powerpolitics"paradigm(realpolitik)to positions of greatergovernmentalauthority;
He contendsthat thesepractices
engagingin armsbuildups;and forgingmilitaryalliances.55
have the perverseeffect of generatingdangerouslevels of insecurity,distrust,and hostility
WhetherVasquezis correctabouttheseparticularpracticesis not relevant
betweenadversaries.
for the moment. Here, the key points arethat the roadto wargenerallyinvolvesa long-term
andinterstaterelationscanuninprocess,andthatchangesin domesticpoliticalconfigurations
increasethe likelihood
unfolds-and
accelerate
the
with
which
the
tentionally
speed
process
that it will, in the end, lead to war.
Understandingwarin thesetermshasthreeimplicationsfor legalizingUHI. First,consideringwar as the outcomeof a processfocusesattentionon politicalinteractionsduringthat
processand on the sequenceof events.56Depending on when it occurs,the invocationof
humanitarianjustificationscanshapeboth how actorsrespondto the conflictandsubsequent
may affectwhich
stepsto war. For example,actionstakenin the name of humanitarianism
beliefsabout
collective
and
which
are
circles
within
expertgroups empowered
governmental
the situationdevelopin the courseof the conflict.
Second,examiningthe onsetof warasa processhelpsto illuminatenot only the theoretical
significanceof relativelydiscretestagesin the process,but potentialtransitionsbetweenthose
stages.57Most importantin this respectareMIDs- conditionsof tensionbetweenstatesthat
involvea threatto use force, a show of force, or the limited use of force.58In considering
humanitarianintervention,it is importantto recognizethat in some casesan aggressivestate
intendsto actonly or initiallywithin the realmof an MID. Nevertheless,asVasquezsuggests,
stepstakenduringor in reactionto that MID can escalateinto war.As discussedbelow, the
issuesaroundwhichMIDs areframedcandeterminethe likelihoodof suchescalation.In other
cases,of course,leadersof aggressivestateswill,fromthe outset,intendto wagewar.Eventhen,
52
JackS. Levy,OntheEvolutionofMilitarizedlnterstate
Conflicts,in THE PROCESSOFWAR:ADVANCINGTHE
SCIENTIFICSTUDYOFWAR219, 221-22 (StuartA. Bremer& ThomasR. Cusackeds., 1995) (discussinggeneral
patternsof statepracticein the periodafter1816); LEBOW,supranote 42, at 26.
53The term"MID"is
of war.An MID involvesa conflictshortof war
usedin the
commonly
empiricalstudy
thatincludesa threat,overtdisplay,or useof force.Joneset al.,supranote 37, at 168 ("Theterm'militarizedinterstatedispute'refersto unitedhistoricalcasesin whichthe threat,displayor useof militaryforceshortof warby one
officialforces,property,or termemberstateis explicitlydirectedtowardsthe government,officialrepresentatives,
of
another
state.").
ritory
54
VASQUEZ,supranote 48, at 155.
55Id. at 153-97.
56 StuartA. Bremer,
OFWAR,supranote 52, at 1, 12
AdvancingtheScientificStudyof War,in THEPROCESS
("[T]hegenesisandevolutionof militarizedinterstateconflictcanbe betterrepresentedby a processmodelbecause
the transitionfrompeaceto war... is a multistageprocedurein which the sequenceof eventsand choicesplaysa
criticalrole.").
57 Dixon,
supranote 38, at 656 ("Thinkingof conflictasa dynamicprocessthatunfoldsthrougha seriesof stages
directsattentionto transitionsbetweenstagesand,in particular,to thequestionofwhy onlysomeinterstatedisputes
escalateto the point of militaryresolution.").
58 See
supra note 53.
118
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however,it takesa complicatedprocessto get there.The discussionbelowalsoelaboratesthe
stagesof that processand the prospectof movingthroughthem.
Third,the "steps,""roads,"or "paths"to war- howeverone putsit-imply a qualification:
wardoes not resultfroma singleor inexorablecourseof action.Rather,"therearequitea few
If the ideaof humanroadsto interstatewar,andallof themhavefairlyfrequentexitramps."59
itarianinterventionis considerednormativelyappealing,the taskfor institutionaldesignis to
encouragewarrantedhumanitarianactionsto remainon the roadto war(solvingthe Rwanda
problem),and to discourageothermilitaryactions.
TheFoundationforUsingForce
Avastempiricalliteratureexaminesthe likelihoodthatanMID will end in war.Thesestudies areespeciallyhelpfulin analyzinghumanitarianinterventionand the pretextmodel.The
studiesisolatesituationsin which statesareinvolvedin a disputethat exceedsdiplomaticdisagreement;atleastone statehasshownan interestin usingforceagainstthe other.SomeMIDs
morelikelyto be
aresystematically
morelikelyto resultin war,whileothersaresystematically
resolvedpeacefullyoratlowerlevelsofviolence.Asdiscussedbelow,the mostwar-proneMIDs
are framedaroundissuessuch as territory.In contrast,MIDs framedaroundhumanitarian
issuesareamongthe leastescalatory.In the firstof two subsectionsbelow, I arguethatwere
interestsand,
revisioniststatesencouragedto downplayterritorialor similarlyself-regarding
instead,to justifythe initiationor escalationof hostilitieson the basisof humanitarianviolations, such disputeswould be less likelyto end in war.These expectedpatternslikelyreflect
variationsin domesticpoliticalandsocialresponsesto differentissuesin dispute.In the second
subsectionbelow, I discussthe formationof those domesticconditionsand analyzesociopoliticalprocessesthroughwhichofficialjustifications,evenif disingenuous,canshapecollective
beliefsand politicalcommitmentsrelatingto the dispute.
Issuesmatter.A growingbodyof socialsciencescholarshipdemonstratesthatthetypeof issue
in disputecan constitutean importantvariablein shapingthe courseof interstatehostilities.
The firstgenerationof empiricalscholarshipon the originsof wardid not considerthisdimension.60Politicalscientistsinsteadconcentratedon featuresof the internationalsystem (for
of states(forexamexample,the distributionof poweramongstates)andon the characteristics
Researchagenvariables.
ple, formsof domesticgovernancestructures)asthe keyexplanatory
dashavebroadenedconsiderably,however,in the pastfifteenyears.In that period,"[s]everal
studies have identifiedsubstantialdifferencesin conflict behaviorover differenttypes of
The availableevidenceshowsthatstatesaresignificantlymoreinclinedto fightover
issues.""61
particulartypesof issues,evenin thefaceof likelyoverallmaterialandstrategiclosses.62Studies
have also illuminatedpossiblecausalexplanationsfor these empiricalpatterns.Specifically,
59J. DavidSinger,TheEtiologyofInterstateWar:A NaturalHistoryApproach,
in WHATDO WEKNOWABOUT
WAR?3, 19-20 (John A. Vasquezed., 2000).
60 Paul F. Diehl, WhatAre
29 J.
TheyFightingfor?TheImportance
of Issuesin InternationalConflictResearch,
PEACERES.333,337 (1992); RICHARDW. MANSBACH&JOHNA. VASQUEZ,IN SEARCHOFTHEORY:A NEW
PARADIGM
FORGLOBAL
POLITICS
(1981) (proposingan issue-basedparadigmto studyinterstateconflict).
61 PaulR.
on Geography
andConflict,in WHATDO WEKNOWABOUTWAR?supra
Hensel, TheoryandEvidence
note 59, at 57, 69.
62 See,
EthnicConflict:TowardaCriandInterstate
InternalConstraints
e.g.,id.;DavidCarment& PatrickJames,
sis-BasedAssessment
RESOL.82 (1995). While our discussionconcernsthe origins
oflrredentism,39 J. CONFLICT
of war,it is noteworthythat,once atwar,statestendto incurhigherbattledeathswhenparticularissuesareatstake.
SeePaulD. Senese,Geographical
ProximityandIssueSalience:TheirEffectson theEscalationofMilitarizedInterstate
CONFLICT
147 (PaulF.
OFINTERNATIONAL
DIMENSIONS
Conflict,in A ROADMAPTOWAR:TERRITORIAL
Diehi ed., 1999); Hensel,supranote 61, at 73-74.
2006]
HUMANITARIANINTERVENTIONAND PRETEXTSFOR WAR
119
domestic(popularand elite) constituenciesmore readilysupportbellicosebehaviorby their
governmentwhen certainsalientculturalor ideologicalissuesarein contention.63Particular
issueareasmayalsodeterminethe expertcommunitiesthatgaininfluencein governmentalcircles-a developmentthatcan shapethe hard-lineor soft-linestrategiesadoptedin the course
of the dispute.64In short,domesticpoliticalorganizationandprocessesexertsignificantinfluence on whetherthe contestbetweenstateswill escalateto violenceand all-outwar.
Turningspecificallyto humanitarianintervention,the relevantstudiesgenerallyusea populardatabaseprovidedby the Correlatesof Warproject.65Fourfactorsmakethe databaseand
associatedstudiesespeciallyrelevant.First,someof themostinnovativeandusefulstudiesconsiderstate"dyads"(pairsof states)as the primaryunit of analysis.This vantagepoint allows
to identifyrelationalfactorsthat can influencethe likelihoodof warbetweentwo
researchers
time
statesover
(forexample,stateRand stateD).66In evaluatingthe pretextobjection,dyadic
studiesallowus to understandbetterthe factorsthatmakewarbetweenan aggressorandtarget
statemoreor lessprobable.
Second,the datasettakesinto accountthe particularissuesin contention.The datasetclassifiesthreetypesof issues:(1) territorialclaims("territory");
(2) claimsthatinvolvea conflict
with the otherstate'sforeignpolicybehavior("foreignpolicy");and (3) claimswith respectto
The last encompassesdischangingthe otherstate'sgovernment("regime/government").67
While
putes "pertainingto the type of governmentof anotherstateor its currentregime."68
that categoryhassome limitations,it is the one into which humanitarianinterventionsmost
closelyfit.69Conflictsin this categoryinvolvethe intrusioninto the internalaffairsof another
63
Seeinfratext accompanyingnotes 94-95.
64
Addressto theInternationalStudiesAssoJohn A. Vasquez,TheProbabilityof War, 1816-1992, Presidential
ciation,48 INT'LSTUD. Q. 1,2-3 (2004);VASQUEZ,
EpistemicComsupranote48; cf PeterM. Haas,Introduction:
munitiesand International
46 INT'LORG.1 (1992) (discussingstudiesdemonstratingeffect
PolicyCoordination,
of internationalregimesin empoweringgroupswith specializedknowledge,and the influencethat thosegroups
exerton institutionalprocessesandpolicy).Foran importantinsider'saccountby a formerU.S. assistantsecretary
of statefor democracy,humanrights,and labor,see JOHNSHATTUCK,
FREEDOM
ON FIRE:HUMANRIGHTS
WARSANDAMERICA'S
RESPONSE
164 (2003) ("HolbrookeunderstoodthatBosniawasa humanrightswar,and
he supportedmy participationin the new American-leddrivefor peacewhen otherssoughtto excludeme.").
65 The Correlates
of War(COW)datasetis usedextensively
in politicalscience.See,e.g.,<www.correlatesofwar.org/
international
("Inresearch
COW_bibliographic_essay.htm>
reportedin fifteen... journalsthatfocuson quantitative
politics,COW wasthe mostfrequentlyciteddataprojectin the period1974to 1986;COW accountedforthirty-one
inasurveyconductedin 1984amongonehundred
percentofthecitationsoftheeightleadingdataprojects.Furthermore,
andsixty-onespecialists
in international
andcomparative
thirty-ninepercentfoundCOW at the top
politicalresearch,
ofthelistofcurrently
formaintenance,
archiveddatasetsthat'shouldbedesignatednationaldataresources
improvement,
andExtraandexpansion.'");
MeredithReidSarkees,FrankWhelonWayman,&J. DavidSinger,Inter-state,
Intra-state,
stateWars:AComprehensive
Lookat TheirDistribution
overTime,1816-1997,47 INT'LSTUD.Q. 49, 49 (2003) ("For
world
morethanthreedecadesthe [COW]Project'sdatabasehasservedthe research
needsof mostof the quantitative
politicscommunity,especiallyin identifyingandtryingto accountforseveralcassesof war... throughoutthe internationalsystemsince1816.").
66
John Vasquez& ChristopherS. Leskiw,The Originsand WarProneness
ofInterstateRivalries,4 ANN. REV.
POL.SCI.295,298 (2001) (describing"consolidatedshift"towardusingdyadicanalysiswithinorigin-of-warstudies); DANIELS. GELLER& J. DAVID SINGER,NATIONSAT WAR:A SCIENTIFICSTUDY OF INTERNATIONAL
CONFLICT22-24,68 (1998) (describing theoretical importance of dyadic analysis);seealso StuartA. Bremer, Dan-
RESOL.
309 (1992).
War,1816-1965, 36J. CONFLICT
gerousDyads:
ConditionsAffectingtheLikelihoodoflnterstate
Notably, two-party conflicts represent the vast majorityof all militarized interstate disputes in the past two centuries.
See GELLER& SINGER,supra at 22.
67
Jones et al., supra note 37, at 178.
Vasquez,supranote 64, at 10.
CfJohn A. Tures,ExpandingtheIssueCorrelates
Claims,Disputes,and
of War(ICOW)Project:Regime-Based
MeansofSettlement,1816-1996(1998) (paperpresentedat the annualmeetingof the InternationalStudiesAssociation,Minneapolis,MN), at <http://garnet.acns.fsu.edu/-phensel/Research/tures98a.pdf>)
(discussingmore
comprehensivelythe coding methodsand measurementsfor humanitarianinterventionsand otherregime-based
conflictsfor the ICOW database).
68
69
120
LAW
THEAMERICAN
OFINTERNATIONAL
JOURNAL
[Vol. 100:107
of humanitarianinterventions.Also, the categoryincludesmilstate-a salientcharacteristic
to
effectuate
efforts
itary
"regimechange"-an acuteformof interventionthat has becomea
primaryconcernfor contemporaryopponentsof legalizinghumanitarianintervention.In
termsof codingproceduresusedforthe dataset,theseMIDs include:theU.S.-ledintervention
in Haitiin the early1990s;the British,French,andU.S. no-flyzonesin northernandsouthern
interventionin SierraLeone.70
Iraq;and the Nigerian/ECOMOG
has
to
the
dataset
Third,
begun includevariablesthat identifythe primaryand secondary
issuesin dispute.Thesevariables,whichreflectthe recognitionthatdisputesofteninvolvemulto examinemorecarefullywhetherandhow theprobabilityofwar
tipleissues,allowresearchers
correlateswith primaryand secondaryissuesin contention.
Fourth, the datasetdeterminesthe content of the issues based on the claims explicitly
assertedby the revisioniststatebeforethe MID.71This deviceis well suitedfor evaluatingthe
pretextmodel.The codingproceduresdo not identifyissuesby tryingto drawinferencesconcerningthe actors'actualmotivationsor underlyinginterests.The codingprocedurestrackthe
claimsthat the revisioniststateopenlyasserts.72
thepretext
studiesserveuswellin analyzing
Overall,thesevariables,
codingrules,andassociated
state.Somestudiesexaminetheprobmodelandtheissuesplacedon theagendabytheintervening
thatan MID
abilitythata disputewill escalateinto an MID, andothersexaminethe probability
at differentpointsin the article.73
will escalateintowar.I discussbothareasof research
The availableevidencesuggeststhat if a revisioniststateis encouragedto portrayhumanwarmaybe diverted;
itarianconcernsasthebasisforescalatinghostilities,the roadto aggressive
militarizedconflictsin whichthe revisioniststateclaimsto seekchangesin theopposingregime
aregenerallyamongtheleastincendiary,orleastwar-prone.In sharpcontrast,territorialMIDs
arethemostlikelyto leadto war.Indeed,althoughterritorialdisputesrepresentonlya minority
of MIDs, thoseMIDs producethe majorityofwars.74Acrossseveralstudiesof statedyads,the
70 The next closestcognatefor humanitarianinterventionis the foreignpolicy category.Indeed, researchers
issuesincludedin laterphases
codedtheKosovoconflictprimarilyasa foreignpolicyMID with regime/government
of the hostilities.Those codingdecisionsmayreflectthatin buildingsupportfor,andthreateningthe useof, force,
NATO membersarticulateda rationalebased on regionalstabilityand alliancecredibility.Notably, in many
respects,the distinctionbetweenforeignpolicyMIDs and regimeMIDs may not resultin a significantempirical
difference.As discussedbelow,the two classesof casesgenerallyexhibitsimilarempiricalpatternsof escalationwith
respectto the issuesexploredin thisarticle.Indeed,somestudiesmergeregimeandforeignpolicyMIDs into a comparisoncategoryfor territorialMIDs. Seesupranote 61; infranote 78. This articlerelieson the availableevidence
to makeempiricallygroundedtheoreticalclaims.A researchprojectthatspecificallymeasuredhumanitarian-based
MIDs wouldallowthesetheoreticalclaimsto be tested.The ICOW databasepromisesto soon offerthe meansfor
conductingsuchanalyses.SeeTures,supranote69, at 17;seealsoICOW projectdescription,at <http://garnet.acns.
fsu.edu/'-phensel/icow.html>.
71
andtheProbability
JohnVasquez& MarieT. Henehan,TerritorialDisputes
of War,1816-1992,38 J. PEACE
RES.123, 125 (2001) ("Eachdisputeis coded in termsof the revisiona disputantis tryingto bringabout.").
72
Accordingto the COW coding procedures,a revisioniststatemust "openlyattempt[]to challengethe predisputecondition"by expresslyraisingone of the threeclaimsbeforethe initiationof an MID. SeeJoneset al.,supra
note 37, at 178; cf Paul D. Senese& John A. Vasquez,A UnifiedExplanationof TerritorialConflict:Testingthe
ImpactofSamplingBias,1919-1992, 47 INT'LSTUD.Q. 275,287 (2003) ("Codingof the substantivecontentof
the revisionistclaimsarebasedon objectivesstatedbeforethe initiationof the MID ... In termsof territorialdisputes, ... explicitclaimsto territory[musthave]precededthe MID. The sameis truefor regimechanges....").
Notably,asdiscussedbelow,pretextualclaimscanalsobecomeinternalizedastruemotivations.Seeinfrasubsection
on the politicsof justification.
73 In this
article,I usethe bestavailablesystematicanalysesto analyzethe pretextobjection.Thesestudiesarenot
specificallytailored,however,to the pretextmodel.Accordingly,inferencesdrawnfromtheirfindingsremainspeculative.Anothertaskforthe academyis to testempiricallythe pretextmodelandits specificpropositions.One goal
of this articleis to identifylines of inquiryworthpursuingfurther.
74 JohnA.
theStepsto War:New Evidenceand Theoretical
Insights,in 2 HANDBOOKOF
Vasquez,Reexamining
WARSTUDIES
371, 385-87 (ManusI. Midlarskyed., 2000); Hensel,supranote 61, at 65-66.
2006]
FORWAR
AND PRETEXTS
HUMANITARIAN
INTERVENTION
121
resultsarehighly consistent: territorialMIDs have the greatestlikelihood of escalatinginto war;
regime MIDs and foreign policy MIDs are substantially less escalatory; and the likelihood
attached to regime and foreign policy MIDs tends to be roughly equivalent.
Consider some of the studies that show these correlations.A recent study by two of the leading political scientists in the field demonstrates that 30 percent of territorial, 6 percent of
regime, and 5.5 percent of foreign policy MIDs escalate into war within five years of initiation.75Notably, the authors employ a five-year"window of opportunity" due to the theoretical
expectationthatwar is a processresultingnot simply from the MID itself,but from politicalinteractions preceding and proceeding the MID.76 Another important study compares the probability of MIDs escalating into war against the overall base probability of war.77That study
finds "only territorialdyadic disputes ... increase the probability of war ... [and] both policy
and regime [disputes] have a statistically significantly lower probability of going to war than
expected by chance."78These patterns also generally adhere across dyads with different balances of power: disputes between major-majorstates,79major-minor states,80and minor-minor states.81Finally, according to another influential study, territorialMIDs are nearly twice
more likely than nonterritorial MIDs to be followed by a renewed conflict between the same
adversariesin the future.82The subsequent conflict also tends to occur sooner after the occurrence of a territorialMID, "with territorial issues producing almost two years less 'stability'
before the outbreak of the next dispute than other types of issues."83
75 Senese&
Vasquez,supranote 72, at 292-93. The regimeand foreignpolicy MIDs areclusteredso closely
togetherthatthe rangeof the former(measuredby a 90 percentconfidenceinterval)completelyoverlapsthe latter.
Seeid. at 293.
76 Id.at
285;seealsoid. ("Thisindicatesthata researchdesignthatlooksonlyatwhetherthecurrentMID escalates
thata properlyspecifiedtestrequiresawindowofopporintowaris a misspecifiedtest.It cannotbeoveremphasized
the
cf PaulD. Senese& JohnA. Vasquez,Assessing
tunity;otherwiseimportantpatternsmight be suppressed.");
Stepsto War,35 BRIT.J. POL.SCI.607, 616 (2005) (explainingthat"useof five-yearwindow(orsometimeslonger)
hasa longhistoryin thefield").The authorsalsoconductananalysisto determinewhetherindividualMIDs escalate
into warwith no five-yearwindow.While the resultsareconsistentwith the authors'theoreticalconclusionthat
territorialMIDs aresignificantlymorewarpronethan regimeor foreignpolicy MIDs, the resultsdemonstratea
widergap betweenregimeand foreignpolicyMIDs. Specifically,with no five-yearwindow, 19.6 percentof territorial,.025 percentof regime,and .004 percentof foreignpolicyMIDs escalateinto war.The differencebetween
regimeandforeignpolicyMIDs, however,is arguablylessimportantwhenone considersthatthe lowerconfidence
bound of regimeMIDs (.009) is the sameas the higherconfidencebound of foreignpolicyMIDs (.009).
77Vasquez& Henehan,supranote 71, at 123.
78 Id. at 1
andInterstate
31; cf PaulR. Hensel,ChartingaCourseto Conflict:TerritorialIssues
Conflict,1816-1992,
in A ROADMAPTO WAR,supranote 62, at 115, availableat <http://garnet.acns.fsu.edu/lphensel/Research/
chart98.pdf>(usingaggregateddisputeratherthandyadicmodel,but findingthat"theoddsof escalationinto war
overthreetimeshigherfor disputesinvolvingterritorialissuesthan for disputesoverothertypesof disputes")(in
Contiguity,
subsequentcitationsto article,pagenumbersreferto onlineversion);seealsoPaulD. Senese,Territory,
andInternational
49 AM.J. POL.SCI.769 (2005) (tbls.1b, 2, & 3) (findConflict:Assessinga
NewJointExplanation,
ing thatterritorialMIDs, betweenboth contiguousstatesand noncontiguousstates,weresignificantlymorelikely
to escalateinto warthan nonterritorialMIDs).
79 In
disputesbetweentwo majorstates,territorialdisputesshowa muchhigherprobabilityof escalatingintowar
(.42), which is well abovethe baseprobabilityof war(.246). Foreignpolicydisputes(.177) arenontriviallyhigher
than regimedisputes(.056). Vasquez& Henehan,supranote 71, at 135. All variablesarestatisticallysignificant.
80
In disputesbetweenmajorandminorstates,territorialdisputesagainshowa muchhigherprobabilityof escalatingintowar(.478), whichis stillwell abovethe baseprobabilityofwar (.206). Regimedisputes(.122) arehigher
than foreignpolicydisputes(.091)-but only marginallyso. Id. at 135. All variablesarestatisticallysignificant.
81
In disputesbetweentwo minorstates,territorialdisputesretainthe highestprobabilityof escalatinginto war
(.235)-again, wellabovethe baseprobability(.147). Here,regimedisputes(.133) arenontriviallyhigherthanforeign policy disputes(.05). Id. However,the regimevariablelacksstatisticalsignificance.
82
SeeHensel,supranote 78, at 25. Hensel findsthat theseresultspersistwhen differenttypesof resolutionsto
the initialMID-stalemate, decisivevictory,or compromise-are takeninto account.Id. at 26-27. Compromise
outcomes,however,arenot statisticallysignificant.Id. at 27.
83 Id. at 26.
122
THE AMERICANJOURNALOF INTERNATIONALLAW
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One might speculate that the issues that dominate disputes between two states-for example, if states have a long-standing dispute over territory-will swamp the effects of recasting a
particularMID in humanitarian terms. Another recent study finds, however, that even when
controlling for the issue that generally dominates disputes between two particularstates, if a
single incident involving the threat or use of force (an MID) is cast as reflecting a regime claim
instead of a territorialor foreign policy claim, the likelihood that the dispute will escalate into
war is significantly reduced.84In particular,the probability that the MID will result in war is
remarkablylower for regime issues (1.179) than for territorial(1.493) or foreign policy (1.544)
issues.85
Scholars who have studied the incendiary nature of territorialdisputes generally attribute
these findings to the cultural and ideological salience of territory within domestic politics,
whether popular or elite. Some commentators, however, do not accept such cultural explanations. They assume that the salience of territorycorrespondsprimarilyto the state'ssecurityand
materialinterests.86On this view, such interstatedisputes accord well with realistexpectations
that territoryconstitutes a possession over which states fight to maximize absolute or relative
power. Nevertheless, systematic analysesof these conflicts provide contraryevidence. Disputes
frequently arise over territoryof negligible strategic or materialvalue.87States take inordinate
security risks in claiming materially unimportant territory.88Among the most escalatorycategories of territorialdisputes are irredentist claims involving geographic areasof historical or
cultural significance.89Weak states frequently initiate territorialdisputes with powerful states
despite the risk of escalation.90Some findings are so dramatic that scholars postulate that the
explosive characterof territorialMIDs may reflectthe influence of innate human tendencies.91
That observation would suggest not that territorialdisputes are inevitable or intractable, but
only that, when raised, they tend to be associatedwith especiallyvolatile or destructive behavior. Other scholars attribute the disproportional importance of territory to the symbolic and
emotive power of nationalism, cultural heritage, and, on occasion, ethnic affiliation.92As Paul
84 This
MIDis followedbyan
a particular
partof thestudyexamines
pattern-thatis,whenanissue-specific
that
thiswayassures
thepattern
that"[p]osing
andthenanother
of type.Vasquez
alliance
MID,regardless
explains
inMIDs."SeeVasquez,
withinvolvement
alliance
supranote
making[oneofthecommonstepstowar]isconnected
64, at 21.
85 Id.Allthree
betweenthe
Thesamepatternof disparities
variables
arestatistically
in thisanalysis.
significant
rivalries
areadded.WhentheseaddiMIDsholdswhenindependent
variables
forarmsracesandenduring
different
intowar(.686)thanforeignpolicy(1.127)
areincluded,
tionalvariables
regimeMIDsarestilllesslikelyto escalate
thevaririvalries
MIDs(1.533).Id.Withthevariables
forarmsracesandenduring
orterritorial
however,
included,
ableforregimeMIDsis no longerstatistically
significant.
86
See, e.g., GARYGOERTZ & PAUL F. DIEHL, TERRITORIALCHANGESAND INTERNATIONALPOLITICS
andtheRoad
& Russell
schoolsofthought);
S.Gochman
Charles
(1992)(discussing
J.Leng,Realpolitik
competing
to War:AnAnalysis
andBehavior,27 INT'LSTUD.Q. 97, 100 (1983) (makingrealistassumptionwith
ofAttributes
of a state).
to, nationalborders
within,andcontiguous
respectto territory
87 See, e.g., PAULK. HUTH, STANDINGYOUR GROUND: TERRITORIAL
DISPUTESAND INTERNATIONAL
territorial
countries,
CONFLICT
(1996). Moreover,
mayimposecostsondeveloping
possessions
retaining
expansive
areas.Cf.K.J.
controlovervastgeographic
andadministrative
manyofwhichfindit difficultto maintain
security
ORDER, 1648-1989,
HOLSTI, PEACEAND WAR: ARMED CONFLICTSAND INTERNATIONAL
at 309 (1991);
GOERTZ& DIEHL,supranote 86, at 20.
88
See,e.g., HUTH,supranote 87, at 94, 188.
89
theSimilarity
EthnicConflict,
orContiguity:
Culture
See,e.g.,id.at 82-84, 110-11; cf ErrolA. Henderson,
RESOL.649 (1997).
ofStates,and the Onsetof War,1820-1989, 41 J. CONFLICT
90See,e.g.,HUTH,supranote87, at 182-83.
91 Senese& Vasquez,supranote 72, at 277; VASQUEZ,supranote 48, at 151-52.
92
Hensel,supranote78, at 4; PaulK. Huth, WhyAreTerritorial
DisputesBetweenStatesa CentralCauseof nterin WHATDO WEKNOWABOUTWAR?supranote 59, at 85, 100;DavidNewman,RealSpaces,
nationalConflict?
MAPTOWAR,supranote
inA ROAD
in theArab-Israeli
Interrelated
Notionsof Territory
Conflict,
Spaces:
Symbolic
62, at 3, 16.
2006]
HUMANITARIANINTERVENTIONAND PRETEXTSFOR WAR
123
Henselexplains,"Inshort,territoryis arguedto have'a psychologicalimportancefor nations
thatis quiteout of proportionto its intrinsicvalue,strategicor economic,'and territorialdisputesseemto arousesentimentsof prideandhonormorerapidlyandmoreintenselythanany
othertype of issue."93Regardlessof whetherhumantraits,nationalism,or othersocialinstitutionsexplainthe importanceof territory,it is notablethattheseexplanationsgenerallyturn
on popularor elitesupportfor escalatoryaction.94Thesetheoreticalinsightsarealsoremarkablyconsistentwith studiesthatdemonstratethe significanceof domesticpoliticsfor leaders'
abilityto deescalateor settleterritorialdisputeswith otherstates.95
To summarizethe precedingdiscussionof issuesleadinggovernmentsto wagewar,interstateconflictsframedaroundparticularstrategicandsymbolicallychargedissuesareespecially
prone to escalation.The MID studiesincludehighly useful, though admittedlyimperfect,
proxiesfor understandingthe consistencyand magnitudeof those empiricalpatterns.A
remainingquestionis whetherpersuasiveeffortsundertakenby politicalleadersto justifythe
resortto forcecan shapepopularand elite conceptionsaboutthe natureof the dispute.
In the followingdiscussion,I arguethatthoseresultscan,andshould,be expected.I discuss
how the officialpromulgationof pretextualrationalesfor escalatinghostilitiescan frame-or
reframe-sharedbeliefsandattitudesabouta conflict,includingthe issuesat stake.I alsoanalyzehow such effortscan, albeitunintentionally,constrainsubsequentgovernmentalaction.
Finally,I brieflydiscusshow the promotionof such rationalesmight, as a secondaryeffect,
expandbargainingspacefor leaderswho areinterestedin avertingwar.
Thepoliticsofjustification.In the studyof interstatewarand crisismanagement,socialsciboomerentistshaveidentifieda phenomenonalternatively
called"blowback,"96
"propaganda
in
which
the
or
to
situations
culture."98
These
terms
refer
imageryandjusang,"97 "strategic
tificationsthatleadersuseto buildsupportfortheirpoliciesat one stageof hostilitiesconstrain
theiractionsat laterstages.To be clear,a verydifferentset of studiesaddresscognitiveframeworksthat distorthow actorsperceiveoptions,outcomes,and probabilitiesin interstatedisputes.99Those constraintson rationalbehaviorgenerallyinherein individualpsychology.By
In some cases,
contrast,"blowbackeffects"inherein politicaland sociologicalprocesses.100
93
94
Hensel, supranote 78, at 4 (citationomitted).
See,e.g.,HUTH, supranote 87, at 183 ("Domesticpoliticswouldoften leadforeignpolicyleadersto maintain
adversarialrelations and to consider the option of diplomatic and military escalation, while calculations of relative
military strength and assessments of strategic opportunities as well as constraints would either reinforce or moderate
thoseincentivesto actforcefully.");
Vasquez,supranote 74, at 389 (describingstudiesthatshow "themainreason
disputesrecuris thatdomestichard-liners,usuallyforethnicnationalistreasons,will not let decisionmakerscom-
promise or defuse issues ... even when one side faces strong international constraints against doing so") (citing
A. BikashRoy, Intervention
RES.303 (1997)); Huth, supranote 92, at 100.
AcrossBisectingBorders,34 J. PEACE
95 Simmons,
supra note 38.
96JACKSNYDER,MYTHS OF EMPIRE:DOMESTICPOLITICSAND INTERNATIONAL
AMBITION41 (1991);
Stephen Van Evera, Causes of War, at 400 (1984) (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of California, Berkeley) (on file
Winter
with author);cf. StephenVan Evera,PrimedforPeace:EuropeAfterthe ColdWar, 15 INT'LSECURITY,
1990-1991, at 7, 22.
97
orHumanitarianIntervention:
InternationalRulesand theDomesticPoliticsof
GregJ. Rasmussen,Aggression
ThreatPerception(1998) (paperpresentedat the annualmeetingof the InternationalStudiesAssociation,Minneapolis, MN), at <www.ciaonet.org/conf/rag01>.
98CHARLESA.
OF EMPIRE87 (1994).
KUPCHAN,THE VULNERABILITY
99 M.
and InternationalRelationsTheory,4 ANN. REV.POL.SCI.67
J.
Goldgeier& P. E. Tetlock,Psychology
(2001);JackS. Levy,LossAversion,Framing,and Bargaining:TheImplicationsofProspectTheoryforInternational
IN INTERConflict, 17 INT'L POL. SCI. REV. 179 (1996); ROBERTJERVIS,PERCEPTIONAND MISPERCEPTION
NATIONALPOLITICS(1976); cf GELLER& SINGER,supra note 66, at 33-40.
100Cf SNYDER,
supranote 96, at 31 (distinguishingcognition-basedexplanationsfrombeliefs"boundup with
the social order, the political balance of power within it, its legitimation, and the justification of policies favored by
particular social groups").
124
THE AMERICANJOURNALOF INTERNATIONALLAW
[Vol. 100:107
these effects can result from deliberate efforts by political opponents to use leaders'own policy
justifications and factual representations against them. In other cases, these effects can result
from processes of socialization in which individuals internalize images and form collective
beliefs about the situation based on the way the dispute is framed.
Analysis of blowback effects can illuminate important interactions between international
and national levels of political organization. The invocation of international legal norms by
leaders-as well as factual representationsthat legal categoriesencourage leadersto make- can
shape the content of political discourse.101For example, in order to pursue a bellicose military
agenda, legal norms limiting the use of force to self-defense may encourage leadersto represent
the rivalstate as incorrigiblyhostile and to representunfolding events as an impending security
threat. Popular or elite views that form on the basis of these images and associatedjustifications
can restrictleaders'freedom of action in later phases of the conflict (for example, the ability to
make conciliatory gestures toward a rival).
Empiricalstudies have identified these effects acrossdifferent domestic political systems. For
instance, Andrew Cortell and James Davis posit that "domestic actors-state or societal- can
appropriate international norms and rules to further their interests in the domestic political
arena," and that through such appeals those norms and rules may "under some conditions
influenc[e] the type of policy a country pursues."102As one of their case studies, Cortell and
Davis examine the U.S. domestic political processes following Iraq'sinvasion of Kuwait. Specifically, the authors analyze President George H. W. Bush's assertion of the international
norm of collective security to justify a U.S. military response to Iraq.103"Through these
repeated invocations, the president enhanced the salience of the collective security norm
domestically, and in doing so, framed the terms of the subsequent domestic debate."104At two
important junctures, Congress later employed the collective security norm to compel the president to abandon a unilateralstrategyand to seek, instead, a UN mandate:first,to enforce trade
sanctions through a militaryblockade, and second, to drive Iraqiforces from Kuwait.105Cortell
and Davis conclude: "Principally, President Bush's appropriation of the collective security
norm to justify a U.S. response to the Iraqi response ultimately enabled the Congress to constrain his range of responses to the Iraqi invasion."106
In Mythsof Empire:DomesticPoliticsand InternationalAmbition,JackSnyderidentifies
deeper forms of socialization that may result from leaders' efforts to justify the escalation of
hostilities with another state. He hypothesizes and ultimately concludes that logrolling among
domestic political coalitions explains incidents of self-defeating expansionism by powerful
states. The empirical evidence compels Snyder to conclude that blowback effects have significant explanatorypower.107 In severalcasesthat Snyder studies, government officials and opinion leaders promulgated "strategicmyths" to justify expansionist policies, and these images
101
Cf LEBOW,
supranote 42, at 29, 34-35 (discussingstates'employingjustificationsthat conformto internationallyacceptedstandards);supratext accompanyingnotes 39-45.
102AndrewP. Cortell&JamesW. Davis,HowDo International
Matter?TheDomesticImpactoflnterInstitutions
nationalRulesand Norms,40 INT'LSTUD.Q. 451, 471 (1996).
103
Id. at 464-71.
104 Id. at 466.
105 Id. at
465.
106 Id. at 469.
107
SeeSNYDER, supranote96, at314 ("Insomecasesideologywasso integralto thepoliticalprocessthatit played
a centralrole in determiningwhat the individual'interestgroups'wanted.... Sometimesideologicaldynamics
merelyexaggeratedthe outcomeof interestgrouplogrollingand madeit harderto reverse.But in otherinstances
thatgaveriseto thestrategicideologies.In thiscase,withideologicalblowbackoutlivedthe politicalcircumstances
out referenceto ideologythereis no explanationat all.");seealsoid. at 63.
20061
HUMANITARIANINTERVENTIONAND PRETEXTSFOR WAR
125
were internalized by members of the public, elites, and, at times, proponents of the rationalizations themselves.108For example, in the Crimean War, members of the British ruling party
promoted conceptions of Russianhostility and other security-basedrationalesto justify foreign
military ventures.109The same leaders later found themselves unable to rescind bellicose policies due to hardened public and elite opinions formed around the original myths.110In a comparable effort to justify military ambitions, leaders of Wilhelmine Germany supported strategic myths about the aggressiveintentions of potential adversaries(Britain and Russia), the
definition of a favorablebalance ofpower, the German nation's relativestrengths, and the prospects of success."1 The German leadership was subsequently unable to change course once
powerful domestic actors internalized those conceptions. The domestic groups came to expect
and demand aggressivebehavior abroad and became increasingly unable to recognize flaws in
contemporary policies."2 Notably, other scholars' examinations of the historical cases largely
support Snyder's conclusions.113 In addition, Charles Kupchan extends these theoretical
explanations to strategicmyths used to justify self-defeating cooperativeforeign policy agendas
(not only self-defeating competitive agendas)."14
As these historical cases suggest, blowback effects may occur (with some variation) across
different regime types-that is, across a range of domestic political systems. This point may
appear surprising. One might suppose that illiberal states would be relatively unresponsive to
public opinion and thus not susceptible to blowback effects. On this view, such regimes lack
internal mechanisms of accountability to exert pressure on governmental leaders. Recent
researchon state behavior and military conflict, however, provides a more nuanced account.
That research suggests the importance of disaggregating illiberal states and understanding
internal constraints on political coalitions in nondemocracies.115Specifically, Snyder finds
that two types of regimes are highly prone to experiencing blowback: nondemocratic regimes
Id. at 310; seealsoid. at 41-42 (discussing
associated
with a moralmission).
blowbackeffectsfromjustifications
109Id. at 154, 165-74.
110See,
e.g., id. at 179-80 ("Butif Palmerstonhimselfcoulddistinguishbetweenrhetoricand reality,manyof
his supporterscould not, and sometimeshe felt constrainedto act on his rhetoric.Palmerston'slettersto Britain's
peacenegotiatorscontinuallyremindthemthat'theeyesandthoughtsof all Englandarefixedon this negotiation'
and constantlytryingto stiffenthem againstconcessions.").
11Id. at 75-80, 84-91.
112 See,
e.g.,id. at 102 ("[M]anyparticipantsin the logrollinghadfullyinternalizedthe mythsof empireandconsequentlywereunableto recognizethatthe bigstickpolicieswerefailing.Thiswasespeciallytrueof the Protestant,
who votedforthe fleetforideologicalreasons... andwereappalledbywhat
urban,upwardlymobileprofessionals,
they sawas the criminallyweakstanceof the Germangovernmentduringthe Moroccancrisis.")(citingROGER
108
CHICKERING,WE MEN WHO FEELMOST GERMAN:A CULTURALSTUDY OF THE PAN-GERMANLEAGUE,
AND
1886-1914, at 261-66 (1984); GEOFFELEY,RESHAPINGTHEGERMANRIGHT:RADICALNATIONALISM
POLITICAL
AFTERBISMARCK
CHANGE
(1990)), 104 ("Thoughthe elites helpedshapemasspreferences,they
foundtheycouldnot limitthemasspassionstheyhadunleashed,especiallywhennewlyemergingelitegroupsfound
they could use nationalistargumentsto flog the more cautiousold elites.").
113
See,e.g.,KUPCHAN,
supranote 98, at 9, 23 ("Torallydomesticsupportfor extraordinary
policies,decision
makerspropagatespecificstrategicconceptions.But by sellingpowerfulstrategicimagesto the polity-molding
publicopinion and reshapingthe rolesand missionsof the broaderdecision-makingcommunity--elites unwittinglyentrapthemselvesin a strategicculturethatlaterpreventsthemfromreorientinggrandstrategyandavoiding
Failedin 1914, 38 WORLDPOL.80,
self-defeatingbehavior."),87-102; StephenVan Evera,WhyCooperation
83-99 (1985); Van Evera,supranote 96, at 18-20.
114
KUPCHAN,
supranote 98, at 130-84, 213-67 (discussingBritishand Frenchcooperativestrategiesin the
EuropeantheaterprecedingWorldWarII).
115DAN REITER& ALLANC. STAM, DEMOCRACIES
AT WAR 23-25 (2002); H. E. GOEMANS,WAR AND
PUNISHMENT:THE CAUSESOF WAR TERMINATIONAND THE FIRSTWORLD WAR (2000); H. E. Goemans,
RESOL.555 (2000). Notably,
FightingforSurvival:TheFateof eadersand theDurationofWar,44 J. CONFLICT
the researchers
borrowfrom Snyder'sframework.REITER
& STAM,supra,at 24; Goemans,supra,at 559.
126
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governed by cartelsand democratic regimes with significant cartelization.116He identifies two
featuresthat accentuate blowback effects in such cases. First, logrolling among cartels encourages the maintenance of strategic myths."17Second, a free press and open political space-institutions that illiberal states lack-provide important checks on strategic mythmaking.118
Members of the cartelizedgroups internalize (or fail to distinguish strategicfrom genuine) discourse justifying military expansion; they can also become entrapped by justificatorydiscourse
used to mobilize mass support for the military effort."19
To help explain internalization, Snyder'sfindings can be usefully supplemented with studies
of"bureaucratic politics." Lebow contends that once governmental leaders have propounded
a guiding rationale and beliefs with respect to a crisis situation, subordinate organs and individuals within the governmental bureaucracyare often loath to contest, and eager to substan21
tiate, those commitments. 20 Lebow calls this dynamic "cognitive closure." Another scholar
has appropriatelyredescribedthe dynamic as sociological in nature, however, and has thus conceptualized the effect as "socialclosure."'22In a similar vein, Kupchan identifies institutional
effects that produce bureaucraticconformity: "Evenif strategicimages arecraftedprimarilyfor
public consumption, they graduallyspreadthrough the top-level elite community, the bureaucracy, and the military services.They become, as it were, organizing principles for the broader
decision-making community."'23As a result, members of the bureaucracybecome less directed
by "inference-based strategic pragmatism" or by "strategic conceptions informed by logic
alone."124The originating rationales, along with associated beliefs about the conflict, shape
their subsequent actions.
The politics of justification contain three lessons for regulating humanitarian intervention.
First, the institution of war is often founded upon a process of justification, with audiences
potentially including the public, elites, or members of the governing coalition.125Second, the
rationalesthat leaderscontrive to justify hostilities can meaningfully shape the content of social
and political discourse. Accordingly, there are strong reasons to believe that justifying hostilities on the basisof humanitarianpurposes can shift the terms of the conflict by disrupting competing rationales or, more affirmatively,by establishing humanitarian issues as the dominant
framework for the dispute. The articulation of a humanitarian justification can produce
116
theoreticalexpecSNYDER, supranote 96, at 308-11; cf Cortell& Davis,supranote 102, at 455 (organizing
tationsaccordingto regimetypes).Snyderconcludesthatdemocracieswith weakercartelizationalsosuccumbto
blowbackeffects.Snyder,supranote 96, at 309 -10. AlthoughSnydersuggeststhatmediafreedomandopenpublic
debateshouldhelp to diminishthoseeffects,id. at 310, a recentcasestudyof the presentIraqconflictcastsdoubt
on the strengthof suchdemocraticchecks,seeChaimKaufmann,ThreatInflationand theFailureoftheMarketplace
5 (2004). Snyderpostulatesthat individualdictatorships
ofIdeas:TheSellingoftheIraqWar,29 INT'LSECURITY
will succumbto blowbackeffectswhen the top leadershipinternalizesstrategicmyths.SNYDER,supranote 96, at
18, 309.
& STAM,supranote 115, at 24-25 ("Thereasonthat mixed
cf. REITER
vulnerable
are
most
is
that
their
regimes
oligarchicsystemof governancemakesthem especiallysusceptibleto logrollingcoalitions.... Suchsystemsarealsomorelikelyto fallpreyto imperialmythmakingthatmakesexpansion
seem falselyappealing.").
118
SNYDER,
supranote 96, at 17, 31, 312-14.
119Id. at 17, 41-42.
117 SNYDER,
supranote 96, at 35-37;
120
LEBOW,supra note 42, at 153-54, 293.
Id. at 154.
122
Rasmussen, supra note 97; SNYDER,supra note 96.
123
KUPCHAN,supra note 98, at 92.
124
Id. at 492-93.
121
125 This
processis especiallyrelevantin consideringtheeffectsof a permissiveruleforhumanitarianintervention.
Indeed,the pretextobjection- concernthatstateswill use a humanitarianexceptionto justifyaggressivewarsimplicitlyrelieson this understandingof the politicsof persuasion.
HUMANITARIANINTERVENTIONAND PRETEXTSFOR WAR
2006]
127
(through various causal pathways such as strategic manipulation by political actors, internalization by relevant members of society, and bureaucraticconformity) a new normative equilibrium and shared beliefs about the conflict, its aims, the interests at stake, and the attributes
and inclinations of the opposing state. Third, an important consequence of new beliefs and
normative commitments taking root is the constraint placed on subsequent action. Though
slightly dramatic, one scholar describesblowback effects as "the Procrusteanbed that decisionmakerscreate for themselves when, afterpersuading the public of a theory which justifies [military] expansion, they can no longer diverge from it.""26In short, these effects suggest the
potential strength and durability of humanitarian justifications for escalating hostilities.
These insights can help addressviews that skeptical readersmight hold about the process of
war: that the fundamental cause of a war-the underlying conflict of interest between two
states-is real and cannot be suppressed simply by promulgating different justifications. To
sharpen this point, a skeptic might argue that the proper implication to draw from studies
showing that territorialMIDs escalate into war is that those states have an outstanding territorial problem driving them toward war-a situation that is left unaltered by a new, or newly
characterized,dispute. Of course, there is some truth to this perspective, and many wars will
not be affected.127That said, this view relies on a narrow conceptual understanding of the origins ofwar. As one example, much scholarlyattention has been given to "diversionarytheories
of war"as a path to interstate conflict. Various studies suggest that leaderswho pursue aggressive foreign policies to deal with domestic political turmoil will create or accentuate international disputes.128Foreign ambitions may also derive from less calculative, more prosaic efforts
of political actors to gain or maintain popularity. The question is whether international institutions can direct those political ambitions toward more peaceful outcomes by opening avenues for other types of interstate claims to be raised.
Additionally, the skeptic's view erroneously relies on a sense that wars result from a unitary
cause or motivation. Instead, the initiation of a war frequently serves multiple foreign policy
objectives and interests (for example, preserving a regional balance of power, global prestige,
open sea lanes, alliance relations).'29Which objectives are emphasized by officials and which
interestseventually define the principalframeworkofthe dispute can be relativelyflexible. Similarly, leading blowback studies show how foreign policy behaviors can result from the harmonization of diverse domestic interests (for example, logrolled coalitions among parochial
groups), though not openly expressed as such; instead, public rationales are offered to legitimize policy, and numerous options exist for how these public representations might be strategically framed.'30Once again, a goal for international institutions is to encourage representations that avoid explosive, uncontrollable consequences.
Finally, it is incorrect to interpret the empirical studies of MIDs as inconsistent with the
insights presented here concerning the politics of justification. Indeed, some of the principal
researchersspeculate that highly plausible explanations of their findings include political
Problem"in International
and Conflict:The "Goldilocks
RichardRosecrance,Overextension,
Vulnerability,
INT'L
SECURITY
19
149
145,
(1995)
(review
essay).
Strategy,
126
127
As I discuss below, this line of argument-that some paths to war will not be averted-would also discredit
the pretext objection as a reason to reject legalizing UHI. See infra text accompanying note 134.
128 JackS.
Levy, The CausesofWarandthe ConditionsofPeace, 1 ANN. REV.POL. SCI. 139, 151-57 (1998) (discussing the literature on "societal-level"explanations, especially including diversionary (such as scapegoating) the-
oriesof war).
129
130
See, e.g., HOLSTI,supra note 87, at 271-84.
See, e.g., SNYDER,supranote 96, at 76, 306 ("The very structure of these ideas suggests they were ex post facto
justificationsfor policyand elementsof a strategicideologyratherthanmerebeliefsor perceptions.In manycases
the conceptsunderlyingthe policy of securitythroughexpansioncameclose to self-contradiction.").
LAW
OFINTERNATIONAL
THEAMERICAN
JOURNAL
128
[Vol. 100:107
opportunismin the initialframingof a disputeand subsequentblowbackeffects.PaulHuth
statesthat"[c]omparedto ... conflictsof politicalideologyandregimechange,I wouldargue
thatleaderscanmoreeffectivelydrawon popularandelitesentimentsof patriotismandnationHuth also suggestsblowbackeffectsof this
alismto justifysupportfor territorialclaims."131
strategy:
While nationalismcan be used to mobilizedomesticsupportand undercutpolitical
opponents,it alsoconstrainsthe diplomaticoptionsof stateleaders.... Havinginvoked
nationalistprincipalsto legitimizeterritorialclaims,leadersopenthemselvesup to charges
of hypocrisyand deceitif they subsequentlymakesubstantialconcessionsto settlea territorialdispute.Thus nationalistargumentsonce reliedon to build supportcan also be
usedto discredita governmentand its leadership.Put differently,the domesticpolitical
costsof accommodationin territorialdisputesshouldbe highercomparedto most other
foreignpolicyissuesgiventhatrulingelitesaremorelikelyto drawon nationalismto justify
theirpolicyposition.'32
SeneseandVasquezmakea similarargumentbutdo not emphasizenationalismin theirtheoreticalexplanation.In theirview,the mostincendiaryissues-territorialclaims-are vulnerableto exploitationdue to an assortmentof culturaland politicalfactorsthatimbueterritory
with specialsalience.Similarto Huth, SeneseandVasquezidentifyblowbackeffectsfromleaders'effortsto justifyforeignambitionson groundsthat fosterbellicosedomesticattitudes:
[L]eadersmayuseterritorialissuesto rideto power,but theseissuesarehighlysusceptible
to creatingtheirown domestichard-lineconstituencies,so leadersfindthemselvespushed
to takeincreasinglyhard-lineactionsuntilthe issuewasresolvedin favorof the state.Such
a logicis consistentwith existingevidencethatterritorialMIDs aremoreproneto fatalities
and to warthan othertypesof MIDs. Given thesefindings,it is plausibleto expectthat
leaderswho do engagein a territorialMID aregoingto be lesshesitantandlessableto resist
MID andwho will be
escalationto war,comparedto leaderswho initiatea nonterritorial
morewillingand ableto "bailout" if pursuingthe disputeseemstoo costly.133
At this point, it is importantto note how the plausibilityof a humanitarianjustification
justificationto gainpolitmightdetermineits effectiveness.We shouldexpecta humanitarian
icaltractiononly if it is sufficientlycredible.If a governmentpromulgatesa highlyimplausible
reasonforusingforce,the profferedrationalewouldnot increasepoliticalsupportforthe militaryinitiative,norwouldthe rationaleproducea blowbackeffect(sincethejustificationwould
not havetakenhold). What factorsaffectthe plausibilityof a humanitarianjustificationand
what implicationsfollow?
First,the plausibilityof a humanitarianrationalewill dependon the factualconditionsin
state D. A humanitarianjustificationwill be perceivedas plausible-and accordinglygain
politicaltraction-if gravehumanrightsviolationsarebeing committedin stateD. Importantly,thisconstraintnarrowsthecasesin whichthejustificationhaspracticalsignificance.The
the reason
relevantcasesarethosein whichthefactualconditionsin stateD fit (orapproximate)
citedforusingforce.Blowbackeffectsareunlikelyto resultfromthepromulgationof a humanbut the pretextobjectionis negated
itarianrationalein casesthatfalloutsidethoseparameters,
in those cases,too. Indeed,the sameconstraintsexistwith any legalexceptionto the prohibition on usingforce.That is, stateR would not receivea politicalbenefitfromprofferinga
permissiblebasisfor interventionthatclearlyfailsto accordwith actualeventson the ground.
131
132
133
Huth, supra note 92, at 100.
Id. at 101 (citations omitted).
Senese& Vasquez,supranote 72, at 277-78 (citationsomitted).
2006]
HUMANITARIANINTERVENTIONAND PRETEXTSFOR WAR
129
StateR, for instance,would not obtaina politicalbenefitin claimingthe rightto self-defense
when stateD exhibitszerothreatof a militaryattack.In short,the politicsof justificationmay
be effectivein garneringpoliticalsupportfor the use of force-and in producingblowback
effects- but onlyin casesin whichthe factualpredicateis atleastplausible.Thesefactorslimit
the rangeof casesin which the humanitarianpretextis usable,and they can explainwhy the
in certaincaseswill not producemeaningfulpoliticaleffects.
invocationof humanitarianism
Second,the plausibilityof a humanitarian
justificationmaydependon how it is expressed
in conjunctionwith otherrationalesforusingforce.Accordingto a standardversionof thepretext model, stateR will employa humanitarianexceptionto concealits ulteriormotives.On
thisview,the availabilityof an authorizedhumanitarian
justificationwouldsuppressthe articulationof otherreasonsforescalatinghostilities.Similarly,stateRwouldhavedifficultyin proclaiminghumanitarianismas the reasonfor using force if the proclamationis superficially
whilemilitary
attachedto existingobjectives.A meager,formalreferenceto humanitarianism
effortsareobviouslypursuedforotherreasonsshouldnot obtainthepoliticalbenefitsof a publicly legitimateduse of force.The importantpoint is that stateR will need to investconsiderablyin a humanitarianrationale-possibly to the relativeexclusionof other (generallyless
justifiable)reasons.This factormaypartiallyexplainwhy pastusesof a humanitarianrationale
failedto gainmeaningfulpoliticaltraction,even thoughthe factualpredicatewas potentially
meritorious
(anissuethatI explorelaterwithrespectto the UnitedStates'2003 invasionof Iraq).
rationalecan
Someof the pointsjustdiscussedmightcastdoubton whethera humanitarian
alterthe courseof eventsif leadershavealreadyembarkedon differentjustifications;that is,
preexistingpublicrationalesmayprecludeleadersfromreframinga disputealonghumanitarianlines.Thisobservationraisesa legitimateconcernbutdoesnot underminethe presentanalysisof UHI. First,to the extentthatpreexistingrationalesforeclosethe promulgationof alternativerationales,the pretextobjectionto legalizingUHI losesits force;thatis, concernsabout
states'abuseof a humanitarianexceptionaremisplacedor exaggeratedif leadersareunableto
succeedwith a justificationafterhavingespousedan earlierone.134Second,such considerationsregardingthe impactof preexistingrationaleshould, if anything,add supportto the
projectof fashioninginstitutionsto takeaccountof empiricalpatternsof statepractice.The
prospectof earlylock-inssimplyhelpsto establishthe tasksfor institutionaldesign.Accordingly, in partIII, I proposesome institutionalreformsto encouragethe earlyand emphatic
articulationof humanitarianpurposesin interstatedisputes.Third, recallthat the studieson
MIDs recognizethatmultipleissuesmightbe atstakein a dispute.The questionis:whichissue
claimneednot combecomestheprincipalclaimraisedbytherevisioniststate.A humanitarian
pletelyreplaceor retirean earlierclaim;in such cases,it is morea matterof emphasis.135
Finally,if the assertionof humanitarianclaimsonly supplements-ratherthandisplacesotherissues,a roadto warmayyet be averted.One meansfor defusinga crisisinvolvesissue
linkage.Accordingly,the introductionof humanitarianissuescanfacilitateconflictresolution
by expandingbargainingopportunitiesfor trade-offswith otherissuesin a dispute.'36Moreover,studiesof internationalcrisessuggestthatissuelinkageis morelikelyto succeedwhenthe
134 Indeed,the samemay be said for the skeptic'sargumentabove.See supratext accompanyingnote 127.
Also recallthat evenif an interstaterivalryis dominatedby otherissues,whethera lone incidentconcernsa
territorial,foreignpolicy,or regimeissuemaysignificantlyaffectthe maintenanceof peacebetweenthe rivals.See
supratext accompanyingnotes 84-85.
136
Diehl, supranote 60, at 338; MichaelD. McGinnis,IssueLinkageand theEvolutionofInternationalCoopRESOL.141 (1986); cf. MANSBACH
& VASQUEZ,
eration,30 J. CONFLICT
supranote 60, at 200-01.
135
130
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salienceascribedto an issue is differentfor the disputingparties'37-a situationwe should
expectto occurwhen the issue involveshumanrightsconditionsin one of the countries.
Anothermeansfor defusinga crisisis to facilitateface-savingcompromises.As Seneseand
Vasquezposit, otherdisputedissuescan propelleadersunwittinglyto a point at which they
havetrouble"bail[ing]out."In thiscontext,the additionof humanitarianissuesmightreduce
accordAn "importantfindingrelatedto crisisbargaining,"
thepoliticalcostsof sucha reversal.
ing to a leadingreviewof the literatureby PaulHuth, is thatthe inclusionof secondaryissues
can allowleadersto takepoliticallysensitive,pacifyingstepsthat avertwar:
[D]iplomaticpoliciesthat includeflexibilityand a willingnessto compromiseand negotiateon secondaryissues,combinedwith a refusalto concedeon vital securityissues...
canhelpleadersof attackerstatesto retreatfromtheirthreatsby reducingthe domesticor
internationalpoliticalcosts of backingawayfrom a militaryconfrontation.Leaderscan
claimthat defenderconcessionson certainissueswerea majorgain, or that a defender's
willingnessto negotiatewas a promisingdiplomaticdevelopment.In eithercase,foreign
policyleaderscan use evenlimitedaccommodativediplomaticactionsof the defenderto
who claim that the governmentof the
fend off domesticor foreignpoliticaladversaries
would-beattackerstatehas retreatedunderpressure.38
In Huth'sown workon territorialdisputes,he notes that humanitarianissuescan provide
thesetypesof opportunitiesfor deescalation:
[T]o inducethe challengerto makeconcessions,the termsof a settlementneed to be
formulatedso thatleaderscancounterchargesof appeasementand capitulation.Thus, if
claimsto territoryhaveto bewithdrawn,someformof concessionsbythe targeton policies
withinthe disputedterritory(e.g.,treatmentof ethnicminorities)maybe criticalto pack39
aginga politicallyviableagreement.
Forsucha tacticto work,however,the secondaryissuewouldpresumablyneedto be perceived
as a genuinepartof the dispute.
Two conflicts-the Kosovointerventionand the recentIraqwar-will help to illustrate
theseclaims.The abovediscussionanalyzesconsequencesthat mayensuewhen a revisionist
stateproffersforeignhumanrightsviolationsasa casusbelli.The KosovoandIraqconflictseach
involvedsuchframingeffortsby revisioniststates.Both casesthereforepotentiallyilluminate
some of the consequencesthat could ensue were states (legally)encouragedto set forth a
humanitarianjustificationfor usingforcein otherdisputes.
Considerfirstthe Kosovointervention.Althoughnot a perfectfit, the conflictillustratesthe
opportunitiesfor face-savingsettlementsin a multi-issuedispute.More specifically,the case
indicateshow a humanitarianrationalecan preventall-outwaror deescalatean existingconflict. As I discussshortly,havingproffereda humanitarianjustificationfor initiatingforce,
NATO leaderswereableto makepoliticallydifficultconcessionsand deescalatethe conflict
beforeit turnedinto full-scale,groundwarfare.The Kosovoconflictthus showcasessome of
the mechanismswherebyhumanitarian
justificationscouldservethe interestsof peaceat these
and otherstagesin a dispute.
137
T. Clifton Morgan, IssueLinkagesin International CrisisBargaining, 34 AM. J. POL. SCI. 311, 322-33, 329
(1990).
138
Paul K. Huth, DeterrenceandInternational Conflict:EmpiricalFindings and TheoreticalDebates,2 ANN. REV.
POL.SCI.25, 38 (1999).
139 HUTH,
supra note 87, at 190-91.
2006]
HUMANITARIANINTERVENTIONAND PRETEXTSFOR WAR
131
The use of force by NATO led "only to a limited military intervention,"140 and the conflict
deescalatedonce NATO (and Milosevic) found political space to make significant concessions.
The intervention served multiple interests: securing regional stability, maintaining the credibility of NATO, and protecting human rights.141Notably, some commentators doubt
whether the last of these rationales genuinely motivated NATO's actions.142We need not
resolve that particularquestion here. It is worth noting, however, that if the official humanitarianjustificationswere disingenuous, the Kosovo intervention would serveour analytic purposes even better. Regardlessof which motivations actually inspired them to act, when government leaders made the commitment to use force, they expected that Milosevic would
quickly capitulate.143Once the conflict was under way, however, member states became
increasinglyconcerned that NATO would have to escalateto ground warfarein order to obtain
the concessions initially demanded ofMilosevic.144 Indeed, President Clinton and other leaders- especially in Germany and Italy-were reportedly searching for an opportunity to claim
success and bring the conflict to an end. 145 NATO ultimately obtained guaranteesfrom Milosevic for the protection of Kosovo Albanians but compromised on other significant demands.
Political leaderssecured an imperfect peace and claimed victory. Notably, some close observers
of the conflict argued that NATO had abandoned some of the main objectives of the
intervention.146 Champions of the intervention pointed to the achievements gained and the
relatively low number of battle-related deaths.147In short, the availability of a humanitarian
rationaleallowed NATO leaders,in Huth's terms, "to packag[e]a politically viable agreement"
and "counter chargesof appeasement and capitulation"while retreatingfrom a major military
140Jean-MarcCoicaud,
Kosovoand theDilemmasof nternationalDemocraticCulSolidarityVersusGeostrategy:
ture, in KOSOVOAND THE CHALLENGEOF HUMANITARIANINTERVENTION,supra note 5, at 463, 469.
141NICHOLAS
J. WHEELER,SAVINGSTRANGERS:HUMANITARIANINTERVENTIONIN INTERNATIONAL
SOCIETY265 (2000).
142
1 CHINESEJ. INT'LL. 1,
Lawand theUseofForcebyStates"Revisited,
See,e.g.,Ian Brownlie,"International
11 (2002); Abdullahi A. An-Na'im, NATO on KosovoIs Badfor Human Rights, 17 NETH. Q. HUM. RTS. 229,
229-30 (1999); NOAM CHOMSKY,THE NEW MILITARYHUMANISM:LESSONSFROMKOSOVO (1999); cf
Coicaud, supra note 140, at 470-74.
143
See,e.g.,Adam Roberts, NATO's"Humanitarian War" over Kosovo,41 SURVIVAL102, 111 (1999).
144
IVO H. DAALDER& MICHAELE. O'HANLON, WINNING UGLY:NATO'S WAR TO SAVEKOSOVO13839, 155-61 (2000); Steven Mufson, NA TO BattlesFrayingAlliance, Refugees'Needs,WASH. POST., May 21, 1999,
at A28; cf WESLEYK. CLARK,WAGINGMODERN WAR: BOSNIA,KOSOVO,AND THE FUTUREOF COMBAT
346-47 (2001).
145
CLARK,supranote 144, at 356-57; Jane Perlez, Clinton'sQuandary:NoApproach to EndWarIsFastorCertain
ofSuccess,N.Y. TIMES,Apr. 29, 1999, at A16; Mufson, supra note 144, at A28; cf David P. Auerswald, Explaining
Warsof Choice:An IntegratedDecision Model ofNATO Policy in Kosovo,48 INT'L STUD. Q. 631, 651-53 (2004).
146 Michael Mandelbaum
poignantly identified significant concessions on the part of NATO members:
[T]he terms on which the bombing ended... included important departures from Rambouillet that amount
to concessions to the Serbs. The United Nations received ultimate authority for Kosovo, giving Russia, a country friendly to the Serbs, the power ofveto. The Rambouillet document had called for a referendum after three
years to decide Kosovo's ultimate status, which would certainly have produced a large majority for independence; the terms on which the war ended made no mention of a referendum. And whereas Rambouillet gave
NATO forces unimpeded access to all ofYugoslavia, including Serbia, theJune settlement allowed the alliance
free rein only in Kosovo.
. . [W]hen the war ended, the political question at its heart remained unsettled. That question concerned
the proper principle for determining sovereignty.
Michael Mandelbaum, A PerfectFailure: NA TO's War against Yugoslavia,FOREIGNAFF., Sept/.Oct. 1999, at 2,
4-5; cf WILLIAMG. O'NEILL, KOSOVO:AN UNFINISHEDPEACE28-31 (2002).
147
See, e.g., DAALDER& O'HANLON, supra note 144, at 192-94.
132
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commitmentandterminatingtheconflict.148In otherwords,NATO leaderscould"claimthat
[Milosevic's]concessionson certainissueswerea majorgain,"thereby"fend[ing]off domestic
or foreignpoliticaladversaries
who claim[ed]that the governmentof the would-beattacker
state[s] ... retreated under pressure."'49As a more general lesson, these events indicate how
a humanitarian justification in a multi-issue dispute can facilitate opportunities for leaders to
bail out of militarized disputes that they do not want to escalate.
Leaderswill not always seek opportunities to avert escalation, as the UK and U.S. actions
in the recent Iraqwar demonstrate. The question is, then, whether the Iraq conflict is a counterexample to the preceding analysis.In that case the U.S. government included humanitarian
intervention as one of the potential grounds for invading Iraq, and the conflict nonetheless
ended in war. A single contradictory (or consistent) case would not, of course, either repudiate
or confirm an analysis of aggregatetendencies of state behavior.'50Nevertheless, it is helpful
to examine the Iraq conflict as a salient case of a humanitarian justification used to promote
war. As the following discussion demonstrates, the Iraq conflict does not serve as a counterexample; the case is, instead, consistent with points made above. The Iraq conflict illustrates,
in particular,the importance of the politics ofjustification and the ineffectiveness of an implausible humanitarian rationale.
The political process leading up to the Iraq war shows the importance of justificatory strategies. Borrowing from Snyder's analysis of strategic myths, Chaim Kaufmann's case study of
the war examines the theoretical significance of various rationalesthat the Bush administration
promulgated for invading Iraq.15 Most importantly, the administration framed the conflict
away from the previously dominant justification (Saddam Hussein's threat to the region) to a
new justification (Saddam Hussein's direct threat to the U.S. homeland and citizenry). The
latterrequireda concertedstrategyof depictinga threatthatlinkedHusseinto transnational
terrorismandweaponsof massdestruction(WMDs).152While the earlierframeworkcreated
a politicalconsensusfavoringmilitarycontainment,thesubsequentframeworkmobilizedsupA usefulsupplementto Kaufmann'sanalysismightbe thatthe post-9/11
portforan attack.153
contextuniquelyamplifiedthe politicaleffectof the morerecentframework.154
Independent
of 9/11, however,it was this generaljustificatorycampaign- concentratingon Hussein's
directthreatto U.S. security-that ultimatelyled to the war.
The Iraqwarmayillustratethe significanceof security-oriented
MIDs thatdatedbackto the
1990s. Had the United Statesspent the previousyearsframingthose hostilitiesprincipally
aroundhumanitarianconditionsinsideIraqratherthan aroundIraq'smilitarythreatto the
region,it mayhaveprovenmoredifficultforthe U.S. governmentto go to warin 2003. At the
veryleast,the lateinvocationof humanitarianconcernsasa justificationforthe 2003 Iraqwar
mayhavebeenlessof a causeforthe escalationof hostilitiesthanwerethe MIDs in yearsprior.
Moresignificantly,the likelihoodof warmighthavebeenlowerhad the legalregimeencouragedtheUnitedStatesto promulgatehumanitarian
objectivesasthedrivingforceforinterstate
hostilitiesduringthat earlierperiod.
148
HUTH supra note 87, at 190-91.
Huth, supra note 138, at 38.
150
While I proceed with a discussion of the 2003 Iraq war, it deserves emphasis that one data point-one anecdote-would not independently suffice to discredit a. systematic analysis of general tendencies and aggregate
patterns.
151
Kaufmann, supra note 116, at 5; cf Jack Snyder, Imperial Temptations,71 NAT'L INT. 29 (2003).
152
Kaufmann, supra note 116, at 9-29.
153 See,
e.g., id. at 9-13, 30-32.
154
Cf. Ronald R. Krebs, Correspondence:Selling the Market Short?TheMarketplaceofldeas and the Iraq War, 29
INT'L. SECURITY196, 200-01 (2005).
149
2006]
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AND PRETEXTS
HUMANITARIAN
INTERVENTION
133
The Iraq conflict also demonstrateshow a humanitarianpretext will fail- either to
empowerorto constrainleaders-if it is consideredimplausible.Thatis, a humanitarianrationale can produce constraining(blowback)effects only if it createsthe initial impression
assumedby the pretextmodel:the justificationmust be both believedand acceptedif it is to
The
thispointis straightforward.
produceanymeaningfulsocialeffects.Asexplainedabove,155
will
a
in
humanitarian
that
state
R
can
achieve
pretext dependon
employing
politicalsupport
the plausibilityof the justification.Plausibilityturns,in significantpart,on whetherthe facts
of the casematchthe justificatoryrationale.Half-heartedlyusinga humanitarian
justification
asa supplementto otherreasonsforwaralsoundercutsthe plausibilityof the assertedhumanwe shouldnot expectits promotionto
itarianrationale.And if the rationaleis unpersuasive,
exertsignificantinfluencein buildingpublicsupportor, as a result,in constrainingbehavior
througha blowbackmechanism.The roadto warwill be determinedon othergrounds.
The humanitarianrationalefor invadingIraqwas generallynot believedor accepted.The
humanrightsconditionsin Iraqwereconspicuouslyunlikepreviouscasesin which humanitarian interventionwas consideredappropriate.156
Indeed, former Deputy Secretaryof
DefensePaulWolfowitzadmittedthatthe administration"settledon the one issuethateveryone could agreeon whichwasweaponsof massdestructionas the corereason"-ratherthan
"thecriminaltreatmentof the Iraqipeople,"which he believedwas by itself"nota reasonto
put Americankids'lives at risk."'57As SeanMurphyexplains,the agreed"justification...
reflecteda publicrejectionof the argumentfor a U.S. invasionbasedsolelyon humanitarian
'58 Analyzingthe rhetoricaleffortsprecedingthewar,RodgerPayneexplainsthatthe
grounds."
didnot sellthewaron thebasisofa humanitarian
administration
justificationbutinsteadrelied
humanitarianrationalefor the conflict
The administration's
on nationalsecuritythreats.159
cameto the foreonly afterthe militarydefeatof the Husseinregimeand the realizationthat
Iraqhad no WMDs.
One mightassumethatevenif onlya smallfractionof the publicbackedthewarforhumanitarianreasons,that supportmight havehelpedbuild a politicalbasefor militaryescalation.
Thereis no evidenceto conclude,however,thatthe humanitarian
justificationwasimportant
if anything,the administrationeschewedpromoting
for any politicallysignificantgroup;160
such a rationalepreciselybecausethe public did not acceptit. The public overwhelmingly
155 See
supra pp. 128-29.
156
andOrderintheWakeoflraq,97AJIL621,626 (2003) ("[I]n
TomJ. Farer,TheProspectforInternationalLaw
Kosovo... one couldplausiblyarguethatNATO's attackwas responsiveto a genuinehumanitarianemergency.
In Iraqhumanrightsviolationswerechronicandatthetimeof theinvasionlessseverethanatvariousothermoments
in recentIraqihistory.In no instancein recenthistoryhasan interventionbeenwidelyperceivedas humanitarian
wherethe supposedlytriggeringviolationswerechronic.").
157 U.S.
Dep'tof DefenseNewsTranscript,DeputySecretaryWolfowitzInterviewwith SamTannenhaus,Vanity Fair(May9, 2003), at <http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/2003/tr20030509-depsecdef0223.html>.
158
theLegalityofInvadingIraq,92 GEO.L.J. 173, 240 (2004).
SeanD. Murphy,Assessing
159
NuclearThreat
A.
Rodger Payne, DeliberatingPreventativeWar:The StrangeCaseof Iraq'sDisappearing
(2005) (paperpresentedat RidgwayCenter,WorkingGroupon PreventiveandPreemptiveMilitaryIntervention,
("The primary
Universityof Pittsburgh),at <http://www.ridgway.pitt.edu/docs/working_papers/Payne.pdf>
rationaleforthe U.S. attackon IraqwasSaddamHussein'sallegednuclear,chemicalandbiologicalweaponsstockpiles and programs.Iraq'ssuspectedconnectionsto internationalterrorismalso playedan importantrole in justifyingU.S. action.The attackwasnot sold as a humanitarianor democratizingmission,however;the warwasnot
sold becauseHusseinwas a horribletyrant.").
160Analyzingpublicopinion data,Kaufmannnotes that a smallfractionof the publicfavoredinvadingIraqto
protector liberatethe Iraqipeople.Kaufmandoes not indicatewhethertheseindividualsalso supportedthe war
on independentgrounds(forexample,to preemptIraq'suseof WMDs). If theydid,theirnumberswouldhavebeen
even less consequential.Kaufmann,supranote 116, at 31 ("Thefew polls that askedrespondentswhetherthey
would favorinvadingIraqfor objectivessuch as savingthe Iraqipeoplefrom Hussein,promotingdemocracy,or
safeguardingoil showedonly smallminoritiesin favor.").
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favoredgoing to war-and overwhelmingly for national security reasons.In late 2002, "70 -90
percent of the American public believed that Hussein would sooner or later attack the United
States with weapons of mass destruction."'16Matching the evolution of the administration's
public positions concerning WMDs and terrorism,public support for the war "rosegradually
and more or less steadily to 66 percent in March 2003,"162 and exceeded 70 percent around
the time of the invasion.163Without the overriding belief in the evidence of Hussein's threat
and U.S. security interests, Kaufmann concludes, "the administration probably could not have
made a persuasivecase for war."'64He notes that the war "wasmade possible partly by support
from 'liberalhawks' who would not have supported a foreign military adventure proposed by
a Republican president unless it appearedessential to national security."'65The humanitarian
pretext, in short, did not make a meaningful difference in the escalation of hostilities and
should accordingly not be expected to have prevented the war.
Nevertheless, public or elite support for the war along humanitarian lines may have exerted
some associated blowback effects. The modicum of acceptance of the humanitarian rationale
may have stimulated limited institutional effects (such as bureaucraticclosure or the empowerment of particularexpert groups). In the Iraq context, those effects, however, overwhelmingly lost to war-promoting frameworks employed to prove that Iraq violated the relevant
Security Council armscontrol resolutions. A lesson from Iraqmay thereforebe that had greater
incentives been provided to revisionist states to frame their military pursuit with emphasis on
a humanitarian rationale, the blowback effects might have been amplified.
Important allies also could not be convinced of a humanitarian basis for invasion. The British public, for example, was not moved by humanitarian justifications for invading Iraq.166
And in a secret memorandum to Prime Minister Tony Blair, the British attorney general concluded that the application of a humanitarian rationale to the case of Iraq was unconvincing:
"Iknow of no reasonwhy [the doctrine of humanitarianintervention] would be an appropriate
basis for action in present circumstances."167Here, too, it appearsthat the humanitarian justification did not alter the outcome, because it did not gain sufficient traction as a ground for
escalating hostilities.
More generally, the Iraq conflict suggests broader lessons for the structure of the international legal regime. The availablegrounds for lawful use of force encouraged the UK and U.S.
governments to emphasize both the gravity of Iraq'spurported breaches of the cease-fire resolution and the imminence of Iraq'sthreat to their homelands. The analysisof MIDs suggests
that these justificatory strategies can escalate interstate violence. A broader question, not
explored here, is whether the international legal regime has the effect of propelling states to take
161
162
Id. at 30.
Id. at 31.
163
See, for example,the surveyconductedon behalfof the Pew ResearchCenterfor the People & the Press
(March20-22, 2003), at <http://www.pollingreport.com/iraq2.htm>.
164
Kaufmann,supranote 116, at 31.
165 ChaimKaufmann,
of deasand theIraq War,29
Correspondence:
SellingtheMarketShort?TheMarketplace
INT'L. SECURITY202, 206 (2005).
166
DavidChandler,RhetoricWithoutResponsibility:
TheAttraction
Policy,5 BRIT.J. POL. &
of "Ethical"Foreign
INT'LREL.295,300 (2003) (describingdifficultyforgovernmentsin creating"an'ethical'interventionistagenda"
in the caseof Iraq,since"[t]heBritishandUS publicshaveneverbeenas enthusiasticas theirgovernmentsin pursuingconflictwith SaddamHussein.... Forexample,inJuly2002 whenGeorgeW. BushandTony Blairprepared
the publicfora possiblemilitaryconquestof Iraq,pollsshowedthatonly a small,anddeclining,majorityofAmerican peoplewerein favour.").
167
MemorandumfromLordGoldsmithto PrimeMinisterTony Blair,Iraq:Resolution1441, para.4 (Mar.7,
2003), at <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/shared/bsp/hi/pdfs/28_04_05_attorney_general.pdf>.
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HUMANITARIANINTERVENTIONAND PRETEXTSFOR WAR
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suchpathsastheyconsidertheuseofforce;it is anopenquestionwhethersecurity-based
exceptions to the use-of-forceprohibitionmay actuallypromotewar.At the veryleast,wereUHI
legal,justificationsmadein its nameshouldnot havesuch incendiaryramifications.
SummaryandAssessment
The model of pretextwars recognizesthe importanceof institutionalpressureon state
behaviorandthepotentialof internationallawto influencethatpressure.The modelattributes
specialsignificanceto lawin encouragingstatesto espouseparticularjustificationsforescalating hostilities.The modelfailsto takeinto account,however,eitherthe potentialsociological
effectsof justificatorypracticesor how, in turn,thoseeffectsinfluencethe processesthatlead
to war.
Blowbackeffectsexplainthe processby which a humanitarianjustificationcan shapepopularand elite beliefs-and, ultimately,the decisionto wagewar.Threemechanismsaremost
significant:strategicpoliticalmanipulation,socialinternalization,and bureaucraticpolitics.
Notably, a standardversion of the pretextmodel assumesthat leaderswill conceal other
motives.In that event,the formalpromulgationof a humanitarianjustificationshouldexert
an even strongerinfluenceacrossthe threemechanisms.
It is not essential,however,for other motives or contestedissuesto be completelysubmerged.The argumentthat I have presentedrecognizesthat states often act from mixed
motivesandthatmultipleissuesmightremainin contention.Indeed,pacifyingeffectsshould
occurunderavarietyof conditions-for example,whenhumanitarian
concernsreceivetheprimaryemphasisin a justificationfor war,when they disruptthe salienceof alternativeframeworks,andwhen they constitutea secondaryissuein crisisbargaining.
The resultsofframing-- or reframing-the escalationof hostilitiesasanexerciseof humanitarianinterventionshouldconfoundthe standardobjectionto legalizingUHI. MIDs thatare
framedarounda humanitarianobjectivearesystematically
lesslikelyto resultin war,whereas
otherMIDs aresystematically
morelikelyto spiralinto sucha militaryconfrontation.Studies
suggestthatthesedivergenttendenciesresultfromdifferentpopularoreliteattitudesaboutthe
issuesatstake.Particular
issuesmayevokedifferentdegreesof psychicandemotiveinvestment.
Additionally,elevatingparticularissuesto serveofficiallyasa casusbellishouldinfluencebeliefs
abouttheconflict,suchastheperceived
characteristics
andthreatsposedbytheprospective
enemy.
Accordingly,significantsupportexistsfor both the strongand modestpositionsdiscussed
earlier.The pretextobjectionholds that aggressivestateswill use the bannerof humanitarianismto undertakemilitaryinterventionspursuedfor ulteriormotives.The strongposition
holdsthat legalizingUHI should,on balance,discourageaggressivewarsbetweenthose revisioniststatesandtheirprospectivetargets.Existingstudieshelpprovidethefoundationforthat
claim.That is, the researchsuggeststhatrationalizingthe useof forceasa humanitarianinterventionshouldreduce-relative to the existingbaseline-the projectedlevelof warsbetween
those states.
The modestpositionis easierto substantiatebut hassimilarimplications.The modestposition holds thatsomewarsof aggressionthatwould be foughtunderthe existinglegalsystem
would not be foughtin a systemthatpermitsUHI. It remainspossible,however,thaton balance,morewarsof aggressionwould be inspiredthanthe numberthwarted.Takentogether,
thesedualpossibilitiesundercutthe pretextmodel,which assumesthat the riskof aggressive
waris unidirectional;
thatis, the modelassumesthatlegalizingUHI risksonly moreaggressive
wars.The evidencesuggests,moreover,thatthe oppositewill be truein manycircumstances.
Indeed,the numberof aggressivewarsmightbe greaterin the statusquo thanin a legalregime
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permitting UHI. Accordingly, even on the modest view, the pretext model cannot, by itself,
provide a sufficient reason to oppose legalizing UHI.
III. ADDITIONAL CONSIDERATIONSAND COMPLICATIONS
Part I presented the conceptual model of pretext wars. Part II evaluated the plausibility of
the model by analyzing the institutional processesthat lead states to war. In this part, I consider
potential criticisms and refinements of the preceding analysis.
Before addressing these additional considerations, I should clarify a couple of issues. First,
it deservesemphasis that this articleis intended to serveneither as a comprehensive analysisnor
as an affirmativeargument for legalizing UHI. Instead, the article considers and refutes a leading objection to legalization. As a consequence, I take no position on broader debates about
how the transformation of existing international rules might be effectuated. That is, I do not
advocate a particularmeans for legalizing UHI. Of course, some forms of legalization-such
as unilateralviolations of customary international law as a process for generating new rulesmay have destabilizing effects on the broader use-of-force regime.168Additionally, even if
generally accepted by states, a gradual evolution of customary international law might also
conceivably undermine that same regime. That is, state practice and opiniojuris that substantially diverge from the UN Charter could perhaps breed disrespect for the overall system. To
avoid those kinds ofproblems, regime architectsmight choose, instead, an approachthat works
within or closer to Charter norms. For example, the Security Council could, under Chapter
VII, adopt a resolution that essentially preauthorizes UHI (and perhaps also delineates
normative criteria and reporting requirements), or governments could consent to regional
arrangementsthat permit intervention by other states in the event of a humanitarian catastrophe.l69 It is important to recognize that such alternativeforms of legal reform exist,170though
a comparative evaluation of them is beyond the scope of this project.17
InducingHumanitarianJustifications
One issueraisedaboveis that humanitarianjustificationsmight not appearearlyor emphatically
enough in a dispute to change the course of hostilities. As discussed previously, this concern
168
ThomasM. Franck,WhatHappensNow?The UnitedNationsAfterIraq,97 AJIL607, 614-17 (2003).
ProtocolRelatingto the MechanismforConflictPrevention,Management,Resolution,Peace-Keepingand
Security,Dec. 10, 1999,Art.25; ConstitutiveAct of theAfricanUnion, July11,2000, Art.4(h), OAU Doc. CAB/
LEG/23.15,availableat<www.au2002.gov.za/docs/key_oau/au_act.pdf>;
cf Franck,supranote 168, at614-15
(suggestingthatdevelopmentssuchas the ConstitutiveAct of theAfricanUnion andinterpretivepracticesof principalUN Charterorganscan potentiallyrevisecustomaryuse-of-forceruleswhile maintainingintegrityof overall
system);Farer,supranote 156, at 621, 625-26 (suggestingthat deviancythat is morecloselytetheredto existing
multilateralinstitutionsis less disruptive).
170See,
e.g., DANISHINST.INT'LAFF.,supranote 19, at 111-20 (discussingvarious"legal-political
strategies
on humanitarianintervention").
171 A full evaluationwould also have to comparesuch second-order
effectsof legalchangeagainstthe existing
baseline:theimpactof ongoingpracticeson use-of-forceprohibitions.The IndependentInternationalCommission
on Kosovoreport,supranote24, at 186, suggestedthatUHI is, at leastin somecircles,currentlyconsidered"illegal,
yet legitimate."One wouldhaveto weighthe extentto which thatcontinuingdiscrepancyerodesthe use-of-force
regime.Seeid. ("Allowingthis gap betweenlegalityand legitimacyto persist... seriouslyerodesthe prohibition
on the use of forcethat the World Court and otherauthoritieshavedeemedvalid. Closelyrelatedto this effect,
recourseto forcewithoutproperUN authorizationtendsto weakenthe authorityof, and respectfor, the United
Nations, especiallythe [SecurityCouncil], in the domainof internationalpeaceand security.").Additionally,if
statesarediscouragedfromrescuingvictimsof massatrocitiesdue to the existinglegalrules,the use-of-forceregime
may suffergreaterdisrespectthan a systempermittingUHI. Cf. id. ("Itneedsto be observed... that a failureto
acton behalfof the Kosovars,or a repetitionof the Bosnianor Rwandanexperienceof an insufficientUN mandate
and capabilities,would havealsoweakenedthe United Nations, probablyto a greaterdegree.").
169
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HUMANITARIANINTERVENTIONAND PRETEXTSFOR WAR
137
is, if anything,a reasonto rejectthe pretextobjectionto legalizingUHI.172Nevertheless,the
empiricalevidencerevealspotentialpacifyingeffectsfrominducingaggressivestatesto assert
a humanitarianjustificationin the courseof a dispute.That evidencemight encourageus to
contemplateadditionalwaysto mobilize-early and often-the sociologicalforcesthatproduce such results.
The most pertinentmechanismsidentifiedin partII involveinstitutionaldynamicswithin
the domesticpoliticalprocess.Beyondthe importantstepof legalizingUHI, the international
legalsystemcouldattemptto enhancethoseeffectsevenfurther.In termsof proceduralrules,
a robustnotificationsystem(similarto Article51 of theUN Charter)couldamplifythesalience
of officiallypromulgatedjustificationsby requiringstatesto reportmeasurestakenin exercise
of the rightto humanitarianintervention.Within a reportingprocess,it would be usefulto
dedicateresourcesto focusespeciallyon lower-levelusesof forceandthreatsto useforce(that
is, at the MID stage).As is apparentfromthe analysispresentedin partII, thisstagein the road
to waris muchmoresignificantthantypicallyassumed,andhow statesframethe issuesin dispute at the earlierstagesmay stronglyconstrainsubsequentdevelopments.
The forum for reportingshould emphasizefeaturessuch as publicity,accessibility,and
A reportingprocesscould yield additionalbenefitsby specificallyencouraging
transparency.
in the
orreinforcingtheparticipationof membersof therevisioniststate'snationalbureaucracy
processofjustification.Reportingprocedurescouldalsoattemptto promotelinkswithspecific
nationalactorsor agenciesin orderto encouragethe participationof membersof particular
epistemiccommunities(such as human rightsand humanitarianexperts).The important
point is to strengthenblowbackeffects-to build and entrench humanitarianjustificaandfosteringbureaucratic
tions- by increasingthe salienceof publicrepresentations
politics.
RationalLearningbyGovernmental
Leaders
A criticmightcontendthat the constrainingdynamics,describedin partII, would be selfdefeatingovertime. In particular,the criticmight assertthat if the invocationof a humanitarianpretexttendsto constrainleaders'subsequentactions,rationalleaderswill learnnot to
maketheinitialinvocation.Thisobjectionis unavailing.Asaninitialmatter,thelineof analysis
lacksforcewith respectto the currentprojectof evaluatingthe pretextobjection;if the critic's
assertionsare correct,they would simply provideanotherground for rejectingthe pretext
objectionto legalizingUHI. One couldacceptboththattheanalysisin partIIshowsthatinitial
justificationssubsequentlyconstrainleaders'actionsand thatleaderswill learnovertime not
to promulgatethosejustifications.On this view, however,the blowbackeffects-rather than
constrainingleaders'subsequentaction-will constrainleaders'exantewillingnessandability
to use the humanitarianjustificationas a pretext.
Nevertheless,severalreasonssuggest rationallearningwill not operatein the manner
describedby thecritic,andthisobjectionthusprovidesno reasonto reject(orreplace)theanalysis in partII. First,this notion of rationallearningrestson questionableempiricalgrounds.
The variousstudiesof strategicmythsandblowbackeffectsdemonstratethatleaders,timeand
again,trapthemselvesin justificationsthatrenderit difficultto abandonself-defeatingmilitary
behavior.Notably, manyof thesecasesinvolvesituationsin which otherstateshavealready
undergonea remarkablysimilarset of experiences.Hence, cross-nationalhistoricallearning
does not appearto be takingplaceunderthesecircumstances.
172
See supra text accompanying note 134.
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Second, rationallearningmight function properlyif the leadersare repeatplayers.It is
doubtful,however,that the leaderswill havea sufficientset of"negative"experiences(unintentionalconstraintson theiractions)fromwhich to learn.Also, eachoccasionthat they do
experiencesuchconstraintshelpsminimizemilitaryaggression.Morefundamentally,the evidencesuggeststhatsharedbeliefsandpreferences
amonggoverningelitesmaychangeasa result
of blowbackeffects.In thatevent,leaderswould not be "thesame"afterthe interveningsocial
change.The strengthand scope of theirinterestin evadingthe constraintsmay not endure.
Third,leadersmayhavedifficultyin avoidingtheprocessof constraintevenif theyareaware
of it exante.As mentionedin partI, the justificationfor resortto forcemayoperateas a twolevelgamebetweeninternationalanddomesticpoliticalprocess.173
Accordingly,leadersmay
seekto satisfyinternationalaudiencesthroughthe use of the pretextdespitethe risksentailed
in subsequentconstraintsplacedon them in the domesticpoliticalsphere.Moreover,the
mechanismthat operateson the internationallevelmay not translateinto a cost-benefitcalculationthat can be weighedagainstdomesticconstraints.Indeed,if the mechanismat the
internationallevel is sociologicalin nature-such as the felt need for legaljustificationin an
effortto conform'74-such "trade-offs"
might be incommensurablein practice.
ArbitratingBetweentheStrongandModestPositions
Althoughboth the strongandmodestpositionsprovidereasonsto rejectthe pretextobjection, it is worthanalyzingadditionalfactorsthatcould determinewhichpositionshouldprevail.At theveryleast,thisexerciseshouldilluminatefutureareasof researchandinquiry.It may
also suggestwhetherpotentialempiricalargumentsremainfor salvaginga modifiedpretext
objection.For expositionalpurposes,considerthreecategoriesof MIDs:
1. Projected
MIDs:MIDs initiatedby an aggressivestatethatwill occurregardlessof
legalizingUHI
2. Novel MIDs: MIDs initiatedby an aggressivestate that will occur as a resultof
legalizingUHI
MIDs initiatedby an aggressivestatethat fail to occuras a result
3. SuppressedMIDs:
of legalizingUHI
Fornow, considermorecloselythe firsttwo categories,which havebeenthe mainconcern
for this article'sanalysis.In the caseof projectedMIDs, aggressivestatesmayasserta humanitarianrationaleto capturebenefitsthatdo not directlybearon the decisionwhetherto initiate
an MID. Indeed,even a statethat has fully committeditself to warmay still engagein such
justificatorypractices,for example,to reapa legitimacywindfall.As discussedin partII, these
efforts-the formationor transformationof projectedMIDs aroundhumanitarianissuesshouldreducethe prevalenceof wars.
In the caseof novelMIDs, the assumptionis thata humanitarian
exceptionwouldlowerthe
costof usingforceandthataggressivestateswould,on thatbasis,initiateanMID on pretextual
grounds.Simplyput, legalizingUHI wouldrenderthe useor threatof forceeasier.Evenif that
legalchangewas not decisivein the actionsof most aggressivestates,it could affectbehavior
that is on the margin.While novelMIDs would be amongthe leastescalatorytypes-due to
theirarisingundera humanitarianframework--eachone would, nevertheless,introducean
173
See supra text accompanying note 47.
See,e.g.,FINNEMORE,supranote 41; supranote 45 (discussing"feltneed forjustification"despitenational
security threats).
174
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HUMANITARIANINTERVENTIONAND PRETEXTSFOR WAR
139
addedriskof war.To minimizeaggressivewars,it is obviouslybetterto haveno MID thanto
haveone framedas humanitarian.
Giventhe above,andwithoutknowingthe distributionamongthe categoriesof cases,it is
impossibleto evaluatewhethertheoverallnumberof warswouldbe lowerin a legalsystemthat
permitsUHI. Admittedly,legalizingUHI couldhaveits mostvaluableeffectin reducingthe
numberof projectedMIDs that end in war-especially in view of the baselineprevalenceof
MIDs:approximately
1,500 suchdisputesin theperiodfrom1946 to 2001, with a higherthan
averagerateoccurringafterthe end of the Cold War.175Nevertheless,the numberof novel
MIDs could,in theory,swampthosepositiveeffects.Thatis, the impactof defusingprojected
MIDs could be offsetby a largeincreasein novel ones.
Therearethreepossibleresolutionsto this empiricalquandary.If distributionaleffectsare
indeterminate,only the modest position remainscompelling.If distributionaleffects are
skewedin favorof defusingprojectedMIDs andthusloweringthe overallbaserateof war,the
strongpositionwouldprevail.If the distributionaleffectsareskewedtowardincreasingnovel
MIDs andthusraisingthe overallriskofwar,neitherthe strongnorthe modestpositionwould
remainviable.In that event,the pretextobjection(or a modifiedversionof it) would be sustained.
Severalfactorssuggestthat the distributionaleffectswill be skewedtowarddefusingprojected MIDs (thus lowering the overall rate of war). First, international legal rules will likely
have a more direct effect on leaders' decisions to proffer a particularjustification (for using
force) than on leaders' decisions to employ force. This difference should be even more pronounced when dealing with aggressivestates pursuing foreign military ambitions. Those states
are probably among the least likely to curb their use of force in order to comply with international legal dictates. Such states, however, regularlyassertlegal justifications for using force.
Indeed, states generally engage in such justificatory practices.176In sum, international law
should exert its greatestand most direct influence on how aggressivestates justify the resort to
force, not whetherthey resort to force. The former applies to expected effects on projected
MIDs; the latter applies to expected effects on novel MIDs.
Additionally, the dynamics identified in part II should also suppress the incidence of MIDs
(the third category of cases). Two processes are important in this regard. The first involves
events preceding the stage of militarized hostilities. The second involves positive-feedback
effects from projected MIDs.
Consider the interactions preceding militarized hostilities-those at the "dispute-onset
stage,"when intense, but nonmilitarized, claims are first raised. Here, suppression effects follow on the logic of novel MIDs. In the case of a novel MID, state R will presumablybe encouraged to frameantecedent claims againststate D in terms of humanitarianconcerns. Such efforts
would allow state R to obtain the benefit of legal justification in pursuit of its ulterior motives.
Due to the same dynamics identified in part II, however, such initiatives should also generate
considerable pacifying effects at an earlier point in the path to war.
175 SeeHensel,
supranote 61, at 64-65 (providingdatasetasof 1992);FatenGhosn& ScottBennett,Codebook
3.0, at 1 (Oct. 10, 2003), at <http://cow2.1a.psu.edu>
for theDyadicMilitarizedInterstateDisputeData, Version
(providingdatasetas of 2001 and noting thatapproximatelythreehundredMIDs occurredfrom 1993 to 2001).
176 As Martha Finnemore
explains,"[e]veryinterventionleaves a long trail of justificationin its wake."
FINNEMORE,
supranote 41, at 15. And as OscarSchachternoted, "invirtuallyeverycasethe useof forceis sought
to bejustifiedby referenceto the acceptedCharterrules."SCHACHTER,
supra
supranote 12, at 110. SeealsoGRAY,
note 25, at 27 ("withonly a tiny numberof exceptions[states]takecareto offera legalargumentfor theiruse of
force");supratext accompanyingnotes 39-45.
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Empiricalstudiessuggestthat the particularclaimsraisedin an interstatepoliticaldispute
mayinfluencewhetherthe disputewill escalateinto an MID.177That is, blowbackeffectsand
escalationeffectsthatapplyin the transitionfromMID to waralsoapplyin the transitionfrom
disputeonset to MID. Specifically,manyof the casestudiesidentifyblowbackeffectsin the
general construction of interstate hostilities and expansionism. Additionally, studies suggest
that escalatorypatterns associated with particularissues occur in the transition from dispute
onset to MID. Senese and Vasquez, for example, demonstrate that the differential escalation
patterns of territorial,foreign policy, and regime issues at the MID stage exhibit similar empirical patterns at the earlier (pre-MID) dispute-onset stage.178Also, studies based on an independent dataset-which measureswhether an intensely contested interstateclaim will escalate
into armed violence-"produce[] convergent findings" with studies based on the MID dataset.179In sum, creating structural opportunities for states to frame pre-MID claims around
humanitarian issues should also suppress the overall number of MIDs.
Changes in projected MIDs may also suppressthe prevalence of MIDs through a feedback
effect. As discussed in part II, territorialMIDs are nearly twice more likely than nonterritorial
MIDs to be followed by a renewed conflict between the same adversariesin the future.'80The
subsequent conflict also tends to occur in a shorter time period after a territorialMID, "with
territorialissues producing almost two years less 'stability' before the outbreak of the next dispute than other types of issues."'81In short, each MID that is successfully framed around
regime issues should reduce the occurrence of subsequent MIDs.
Finally, it is important to consider objections to using evidence of escalation patterns from
past MIDs to predict escalation patterns under a prospective legal system. In particular,a critic
might question whether changes in the background rule-shifting from a legal prohibition on
UHI to a legal endorsement of UHI-might affect the escalatorynature of regime MIDs. For
instance, the low escalation of past regime MIDs may be explained, in part, because the default
rule-Article 2(4) of the UN Charter-prohibits the use of force for regime change absent the
right of self-defense. If the critic is correct, one implication is that, under an international system permitting UHI, novel MIDs could be more escalatorythan otherwise predicted. Another
implication is that projected MIDs framed by a humanitarian claim may also be more escalatory than otherwise suggested by data generated under a default rule proscribing UHI.
The leading studies should resolve these concerns. First, the data cover periods both preceding and following the establishment of the UN Charter. This feature of the research is
important because a strong case could be made that UHI was lawful, or that a permissive legal
environment governed UHI, during the pre-Charterperiod. Hence, the data include regime
MIDs under alternative default rules.'82 Second, a few studies include separate analyses of
177
PaulR. Hensel,Contentious
IssuesandWorldPolitics,
45 INT'LSTUD.Q. 81 (2001);Senese& Vasquez,supra
note 72, at 289-90; Vasquez,supranote 74, at 389-90.
178
Senese& Vasquez,supranote72, at 289 -90 (discussingfindingsacrossthreeissueareasanddisprovingselection bias);seealsoSenese,supranote 78, tbls. la, 2, & 3 (findingthatterritorialdisputes,betweenboth contiguous
statesandnoncontiguousstates,weresignificantlymorelikelythannonterritorial
disputesto culminatein MIDs).
179 See
A
& JONATHAN
BRECHER
WILKENFELD,
Vasquez,supranote 74, at 389-90 (discussingMICHAEL
STUDYOFCRISIS(1997)).
180 See Hensel,
supra note 78, at 25.
181Id. at 26.
182
See,e.g.,Senese,supranote78, at9 (studying1919-1995); Senese& Vasquez,supranote72, at289 (studying
1919-1992); Vasquez& Henehan,supranote 71, at 128 (studying1816-1992); Hensel, supranote 78, at 13
(studying1816-1992); Senese& Vasquez,supranote 76, at 615 (studying1816-1992); Vasquez,supranote 64,
at 14-22 (studying1816-1992); seealsoHensel,supranote 61, at 64-66 (studying1816-1992).
2006]
HUMANITARIANINTERVENTIONAND PRETEXTSFOR WAR
141
One studyfindsthat the patternsof warescalationbeforethe
pre-and post-1945 periods.183
Charterweresimilarto, or evenmorepronouncedthan, some of the findingspreviouslydiscussed.184
Indeed,"regimecasesexhibit[ed]the lowestpropensityfor warpriorto 1946."185
The resultsof anotherstudycomplementthesefindings.186Accordingly,the pre-Charterevidencedoes not suggestthatwe need to revisitor qualifythe conclusionsreachedabove.
CONCLUSION
The overarching
of theprepurposesof thisarticlehavebeen,first,to identifycoreassumptions
textobjectionto legalizingUHI, andsecond,to subjectthoseassumptions
to criticalevaluation.
One of theprincipalobstaclesto aninternationally
intervention
recognizedrightof humanitarian
is the concernthataggressive
to launchwarsfor
stateswouldusethe pretextof humanitarianism
ulteriormotives.Inthepastfewdecades,suchprudential
havestymiedthedoctrinal
considerations
of humanitarian
lawscholarsandthegreat
intervention.
development
Leadingpublicinternational
of
intervention-refuseto
states
have
in
humanitarian
that
majority states-including
engaged
endorsethelegalityofUHI forfearof itsabuseasapretext.Iftheywererelievedofthisapprehension,
a morerobustdiscussionof the legalrulesandrelatedinstitutionscouldbeginto unfold.
otherobjectionsexistto legalizing
to offer
notpurported
UHI, andI haveaccordingly
Certainly,
a comprehensive
defenseofUHI. The ultimateconclusionof thisarticeis notthatUHI shouldbe
legalized,butonlythatthepretextobjectionshouldnot remainanobstacleto sucha development.
Thatsaid,ifwe setasidethepretextobjection,wemightbein a betterpositionto addressotherconcernsaboutlegalizingUHI. Forexample,one suchconcernrelatesto the ambiguityof standards
fordetermining
sufficientconditionsfortherightto intervene.
Anotheris thatevenhumanitarianmindedleaderswillmisapplytherequirement
thatforcebe usedonlyasa lastresort.Whilevarious
havearticulated
commentators
to regulateintervenand
principles otherdefinitionalboundaries
tionsandtherebyaddresstheseconcerns,intergovernmental
institutionsandpoliticallyimportant
stateshaverefrained
fromdoingso.187Thisreluctance
basedon theview
appearsto besubstantially
thatsuchformalexercises
methodof conductwouldbetantamountto discussingtheappropriate
an
act.
If
a
about
concern
ing illegal
leading
legali7ation-thepretextobjection-wereeliminated,
thoseactorsmightbe morewillingto discuss,sharpen,orendorsea setof standards.
Sucha develcould
in
constitutea considerable
opment
improvementon a system which statesoccasionally
offorengagein defactoUHI- butinwhichthereis no substantial
politicaldebateorarticulation
malstandards
to regulatethe practice.
In sum, systematicallyexaminingthe pretextmodel demonstratesthat it does not sufficientlycomprehendimportantpropertiesof internationalsocietyandthepoliticalfoundations
of war.Accordingly,this articlesubstantiallyvindicatesthe proposedrightof humanitarian
interventionagainstwhat is widelyconsideredits most significantdetraction.At bottom, the
concernthataggressive
stateswouldexploita humanitarian
exceptionto justifymilitaryaggression shouldnot forestallthe legalizationof UHI. On the contrary,legalizingUHI could significantlyinhibit recourseto warby such states.
183 See,e.g.,Senese& Vasquez,supranote 76, at 622-31 (comparing1816-1945 and 1946-1992); Vasquez&
Henehan,supranote 71, at 134 (comparing1816-1945 and 1946-1992); seealsoHensel,supranote61, at64-66
(comparing1816-1945 and 1946-1992).
184 In
particular,"theoddsof warescalationare3.25 timeshigherforterritorialdisputesthanforpolicydisputes
and 7.7 times higherthan ... for regimedisputes."Senese& Vasquez,supranote 76, at 622.
185
186
Id. at 628.
Vasquez& Henehan,supranote 71, at 134 (findingthatpriorto 1946, territorialMIDs exhibita statistically
significant,higherprobabilityof going to war (.475) than foreignpolicy (.168) and regime(.149) MIDs).
187 SeeStromseth,supranote 14, at 262-67; DANISH
INST.INT'LAFFAIRS,supranote 19, at 105-06.