State-Building and Political Economy in Early-modern Japan
Author(s): Mark Ravina
Reviewed work(s):
Source: The Journal of Asian Studies, Vol. 54, No. 4 (Nov., 1995), pp. 997-1022
Published by: Association for Asian Studies
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and Political
State-building
Economyin Early-modern
Japan
MARK RAVINA
[Languages}determinethe unique, oftenambiguoustenorof human consciousness
and make the relationsof thatconsciousnessto 'reality'creative.... To a greateror
lesserdegree,everylanguageoffersits own readingof life.
George Steiner,AfterBabel
Since the birthofhumankind,wheretherehave been things,therehave been names.
Names are,in origin,thingsaffixedby commonpeople,but thisis so onlyforthings
withsubstance.Thingswhichhaveno substance,in otherwords,thingswhichcannot
be seen by commonpeople,are clarifiedand namedby Sages.
OgyiuSorai,Benmei
Land and Lordship
In 1785, on the occasion of his retirement,Uesugi Harunori, the daimyo of
Yonezawa, composed a three-articleepistle on statecraftforhis heir, Uesugi Norihiro:
The state (kokka) is inherited fromone's ancestors and passed on to one's
descendants:it should not be administeredselfishly.
The people belong to the state:theyshould not be administeredselfishly.
The lord existsforthe sake of the stateand the people: the stateand the people
do not existforthe sake of the lord.
(Kasaya 1988, 252-53).
Harunori's concise missive is arguably the best-known political document of the
eighteenthcentury.Because Uesugi Harunori was used as a model of virtue in prewar
Japanese textbooks, the epistle was widely disseminated. To this day facsimiles of the
original manuscript, now embellished by a portrait of Harunori, are available as
Mark Ravina is AssistantProfessorof Historyat EmoryUniversity.This researchwas
supportedby the Japan Foundation,the StanfordJapan Fund, and the EmoryUniversity
in thePrincetonJapanSeminar,
ResearchCouncil.The authorwishesto thanktheparticipants
the SouthernJapanSeminarand the EmoryVann Seminarfortheirvaluable insights.
TheJournal
ofAsian Studies54, no. 4 (November1995):997-1022.
? 1995 by the AssociationforAsian Studies,Inc.
997
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998
MARK RAVINA
.,~~~~~~~~~~t"f
.74,~
Figure 1. A portraitof Uesugi Harunori(Yozan) witha facsimileof
his epistleto Norihiro.The plaque is sold as a souvenirat Uesugi Shrine
in Yonezawa City,Yamagataprefecture.
souvenirsat theUesugi shrinein Yonezawa.The documenthas also receivedsustained
scholarlyattention:it is cited in numerousstudiesofearlymodernpoliticalthought
(Tahara 1976, Ogi 1973, and Kasaya 1993). Historianshave commonlyfocusedon
the strongMencian aspectof Harunori'snotionof lordship.Althoughthe lord did
not ruleat the behestof thepeople,he existed,nonetheless,
to servethem.Harunori
thus made civil administrationthe centraltask of warlordrule. By basing his
of his subjects,Harunoripresentedthe most
legitimacyon the peace and prosperity
enlightenedfaceofJapaneseenlighteneddespotism(Tahara 1976, 303-4).
As compellingas what Harunoriincludedin his epistle is what he saw fitto
exclude.His instructions
make no mentionofcentralauthority,
eithertheshogunate
or the emperor.Harunoriwas scarcelyunawareof the extentof shogunalpower.As
he wrote,his retainersand commonerswere groaningunder the burdenof castle
repairsmandatedby the shogunate.For Harunori,however,the essenceof statecraft
was not servingthe shogunate,but honoringone's ancestorsand providingforone's
descendants by nurturingone's subjects. Presumably,a lord who fulfilledhis
obligationsto his familyand his subjectswould also fulfillhis dutiesto the shogunate, but serviceto the shogun was reducedto an implicitratherthan an explicit
duty.
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STATE-BUILDING
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POLITICAL
ECONOMY
999
Harunori's terminology reinforced this sense of daimyo autonomy. Harunori
referredto his domain as a kokka,which in modern Japanese is translatedas "state."'
Harunori, did not, of course, mean a state in the modern sense of an institution with
full and exclusive sovereign power. But he conspicuously avoided terms such as han
(domain) which would have implied fealty to a superior lord. Kokka, by contrast,
implied autonomy, if not exclusive sovereignty.Harunori's epistle is striking in its
clarity,but not in its content. The sense that a daimyo's obligations to his familyand
his subjects overshadowed his obligations to the shogunate was a critical component
of early modern political practice. This ideology of autonomy, however, is neglected
in our currenthistoriographicparadigms.
American studies of early modern politics have centered on questions of statebuilding. A perennial researchproblem has been the status of the Tokugawa shogunate
as a state. Historians have treated the centralization of authorityby Oda Nobunaga,
Toyotomi Hideyoshi, and the earlyTokugawa shoguns as nascent state-building. The
political practices of the early modern era have been examined largely for how they
justified or sustained the power of the shogunal state (Bolitho 1974, Hall 1966,
Totman 1967, and Sasaki 1981). The classic American studies of the Tokugawa
shogunate, for example, compared the shogunate to the Stuart and Bourbon
monarchies, implicitly drawing a comparison with state-building in Europe. By
focusing our attention on state-building, these works presented local autonomy as an
absence of centralization ratherthan as a fundamentalfeatureof a legitimate political
system. The political practices of daimyo domains were thus analyzed largely as
responses to the shogunate: the core, not the periphery, determined the research
agenda. In his study TreasuresAmongMen, forexample, Harold Bolitho chronicled the
decline of shogunal power, but fromthe shogunate's perspective. Since Bolitho treated
the daimyo as shogunal vassals, he took their opposition to shogunal directives as
evidence of shogunal weakness and incompetence. Significantly,both TreasuresAmong
Men and Conrad Totman's 1967 study, Politicsin theTokugawa Bakufu emerged from
studies of the collapse of the shogunate (Totman 1967, 1). The overleaf to Treasures
AmongMen thus poses the question, "by the middle of the seventeenth century the
Tokugawa Bakufu seemed well on the way to achieving centralized control overJapan.
Why did it subsequently weaken and fail?" (Bolitho 1974). This is an important
question. The danger, however, is that the fall of the shogunate in 1868 penumbrates
all previous political developments. Hence the decline in state-building after 1650
becomes a deformed rather than an alternative political process. This state-building
paradigm lends an air of pathology to the entire early modern political system.
Historians have recently begun to suggest alternatives to the state-building
paradigm. In his recent surveyof early modern history,forexample, Conrad Totman
compared Hideyoshi's order to the Aztec and Roman empires, with the daimyo as
rulers of subordinate "client states" (Totman 1993, 43-44). Mary Berry has
characterizedHideyoshi's rule as "federal . . . the union of semi-autonomous domains
under an overseer of the common interest." Such an approach, she argues, helps
'In this essay I followthe tradition,common in philosophy,of using word-for-word
translations
of keyterms.Thus, "kuni" is alwaysrenderedas "country"and "kokka" always
as "state." These translationsrely on a fortuitouscorrespondenceof multiple meanings.
"Kokka," in earlymodernJapanese,could referto a varietyof institutionsrangingfroman
ancientChinesekingdom,to theshogunate,to a largedomainlikeYonezawa.Similarly,"state"
in modernAmericanEnglishcan referto eithera fullysovereignstateor a memberofa federal
union,such as the stateof Delaware.
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MARK RAVINA
approachto
overcomethe sense of "arrestedpolitical developmentor schizophrenic
rule" thatis suggestedby termslike "centralizedfeudalism"(Berry1982, 147-67).
as
regionalauthority
whereinwe can interpret
These approachesprovideframeworks
Uesugi
a legitimatelocus of powerratherthan as an impedimentto centralization.
Harunori'sespistle,forexample,is outlandishfora pettynoble but appropriatefor
thus require that we
the head of a "client state." These alternativeframeworks
or extensionofcenter,but as component
conceptualizelocal politicsnotas a reflection
My projecthereis twofold.First,paceBerryand
partsofa broaderpoliticalstructure.
lordsand
Totman,I wishto showhow thedual identityofdaimyoas quasi-sovereign
aspectoftheearlymodern
ratherthana destructive,
as shogunalvassalswas a defining,
paradigmfortheearlymodernorder,that
order.Second,I wishto offeran alternative
ofa "compoundstate."
SearchingforStates
The political landscape of earlymodernJapan lacked anythingresemblinga
modernstate. In the eighteenthcenturythe shogunate,or bakufu,exerteddirect
controlover land assessedat over fourmillionkoku,roughly15 percentofJapan.2
Another 10 percent was entrustedto liege vassals (hatamoto),who staffedthe
The imperialfamilyand variousreligiousordersheld
shogunate'sadministration.
ofJapanwas ruled by
roughlyone-halfmillionkoku.The remainingthree-quarters
some 250 daimyo,whosedomainsrangedin size fromten thousandkokuto overone
million.A politicalmap ofearlymodernJapanthusrevealsan intricatepatchworkof
with broad areas of ambiguous and overlappingauthority.
distinctgovernments,
in the regionsaround Edo and
Governmentalcontrolwas at its most fragmented
Osaka: in the 1840s the fivesquareri area (roughly150 square miles) surrounding
authorities.This checkerboardpatternof
Osaka was governedby 165 different
oftenled to dividedcontrolovervillages.In the Kawasakiregion,for
administration
example,after1717, twelvevillagesweredesignatedas both liege vassal investiture
and ecclesiasticallands of the Tokugawa house temple,Zoj6ji. Two
(hatamotoryo)
villageswere treated,in addition,as directTokugawa holdings(Waters 1983, 40politicalunitstendedto be largerand more
43). FurtherfromtheEdo-Osakacorridor,
contiguous:midsizedomainssuch as Mito, Utsunomiya,Numata,and Fuchu traced
a broad arc aroundEdo. At the peripherylay the massive,consolidateddomainsof
greatwarlordhouseslike theShimazu,theMori,theYamauchi,and the Date. These
to theirnumber.In the
territories
encompassedresourcesin completedisproportion
1860s roughlyone in twelveJapaneselived in the threelargestdomains:Kanazawa,
Satsuma,and Chashu.
of authoritywas paralleledby a verticaldivisionof
This spatial fragmentation
the supremepoliticalauthorityin Japan,
politicalrights.The shogunwas effectively
to a militaryappointmentby theemperor.The daimyowere,in
but thetitlereferred
theory,investedvassalsofthe shogun,and theirfiefscould be revokedforinfractions
political
ofshogunaledicts.Withintheirdomains,however,daimyoheld formidable
power.The daimyomaintainedindependentstandingarmies,wrotetheirown legal
codes, set and collectedtheirown taxes,controlledand policed theirown borders.
The shogunatemaintaineda monopolyon foreignpolicy, but the domains were
2Kokuwas a measureofvolume,equal to 4.96 bushels.
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STATE-BUILDING
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1001
entrustedwith the managementof theirown domesticaffairs.The authorityof the
partoftheTokugawasystem.The sankinkjtai
shogunatewas,ofcourse,an important
system,forexample,whereindaimyowererequiredto spendalternateperiodsoftime
in Edo, the shogun'scapital, servedas a constantreminderof the primacyof the
Tokugawahouse.The shogunatealso issued laws regulatingthe personalconductof
daimyoand retainedthe rightto overseedaimyomarriagesand adoptions.But the
of the shogunatefocusedon daimyo:it claimed onlylimitedand indirect
authority
overthe commonerpopulationof daimyodomains.The shogunatenever
suzerainty
outsideitsdirectholdings.This resultedin a schism
asserteda rightto taxcommoners
the shogunateclaimed
betweenthe rightsof the shogunateand its responsibilities:
but had financialauthorityover less
sole authorityin issues such as foreignaffairs,
thanone-thirdofJapan.
Because of this imbalancein shogunalpowers,assessmentsof the strengthand
ofstatepower.Drawingon
legitimacyof the shogunatehingeon our understanding
a readingof Max Weber,JamesWhite has argued that the shogunatewas a state
because it maintaineda monopolyon the physicaluse of forcewithinJapan. The
shogunatewas not,White concedes,a modernstate,but it prohibiteddaimyofrom
whileretainingforitselfthe rightto use forceagainst
usingforceamongthemselves,
daimyo.The shogunate,moreover,steadilyexpandedits coerciveauthorityoverthe
people underdaimyorule.Followingthe Tenma Rebellionof 1764, whichinvolved
not onlyTokugawa holdings,but also liege vassal and daimyolands,the shogunate
sent investigatorsthroughthe entirearea. They arrestedat will and ultimately
The shogunatetooksimilar
forvariousoffenses.
sentencedseveralhundredcommoners
actionafterthe Kamo Rebellionof 1836 (White 1988).
Ronald Toby, focusing on foreignpolicy, came to a similar assessment of
Tokugawa strength.The shogunate'smonopolyon foreignaffairsestablishedits
legitimacyas the supremegovernmentof Japan. "The ability autonomouslyto
yearsofthe dynasty
manipulateforeignstatesand foreignmonarchsin the formative
servedto preservethephysicalsecurityof theJapanesehomelandand to preventthe
subversionof the new state,on the one hand,and to legitimatethe new Tokugawa
receptionofenvoysfromKoreaand
order,on theother."The shogunate'sostentatious
and domestically
the Ryukyusservedto enhanceits legitimacyboth internationally
(Toby 1984, 3-22, 242).
witha fiscalapproach.As Joseph
We mightcontrasttheseapproachesto statecraft
Schumpeterargued,the modernstatearosefromthe increasedneed of governments
forrevenue."Taxes not onlyhelped to createthe state.They helped to formit. The
tax systemwas the organof developmentof [sic] whichentailedthe otherorgans."
the modernstateemergedwhen"commonexigencies,"suchas war,
ForSchumpeter,
allowed princesto asserta right to tax superiorto traditional,feudal privileges.
Taxationthenbecamethe centrallink betweenstateand society:
An
ofa peopleis aboveall an essential
partofitsgeneralhistory.
The fiscalhistory
which
from
theeconomic
emanates
onthefateofnations
bleeding
influence
enormous
areput....
andfromtheuse to whichitsresults
theneedsofthestatenecessitates
thedeedsitspolicymay
level,itssocialstructure,
Thespiritofa people,itscultural
ofall phrases.
in itsfiscalhistory,
stripped
prepare-allthisandmoreis written
1954)
(Schumpeter
argumentthatcultureis a functionof fiscalpolicy is hyperbolic,
Schumpeter's
but his analysisrightlystressestaxationas a centrallink betweenstateand society.
This, in turn,leads us to questionWhite's emphasison coercion.State coercionlis
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1002
MARK RAVINA
impossiblewithoutassetsgatheredthroughtaxation.Armiesorpolicefundedthrough
ofstate
agentsofcoercion,but questionablemanifestations
privatemeansarecertainly
power.Resistanceto taxation,in turn,is a majorobjectofstatecoercion.Coercionis
to raisetaxes.Taxes are necessaryto fundcoercion.Taxationis thusbotha
necessary
meansand an end of statepower.
of state.This
definitions
The shogunatethussits uneasilyamongthesedifferent
of
becomesmoreapparentwhen we employmoreexpansiveand robustdefinitions
in findingwidely
"state." CharlesTilly, forexample,while noting the difficulty
acceptedcriteriafor"stateness,"denotedfiveareasas essentialto state-building:the
ofarmedforces,taxation,policing,controloverthefoodsupply,and the
organization
formation
of technicalpersonnel(Tilly 1975, 3-83, esp. 3-6, 70-71). Joel Migdal
form.The essentialaspectsofa state,
delineatedsimilarcriteriain a moretheoretical
extract
he argued,arethecapabilityto penetratesociety,regulatesocial relationships,
and appropriateor use resources(Migdal 1988, 3-5).
resources,
of stateness,the shogunate'spowerand
Withinthesemoreexpansivedefinitions
authorityseem dangerouslyunbalanced.In the Tenma and Kamo rebellions,for
ofotherlordsin the
example,theshogunateprosecutedpeasantrebelsin theterritory
over
Kanto. By White's criteriaof "monopolyof coercion"thissuggestssovereignty
the region.Yet the shogunatedid not claim the rightto tax the area it policed,nor
did it reduceor changetheholdingsofthelordswhosedomainswereinvolvedin the
uprisings. In Migdal's terms, the shogunate sought to increase its regulative
capability.The shogunate'sactionsthusincreased
but notits extractive
responsibility
its obligations,but not its power.My purposehereis not to argue thatfinancesare
moreimportantthandiplomacyor the exerciseof coercion.My point is thatunless
we narrowour definitionof state to a single power, the shogunateemergesas a
institution.
even self-destructive
contradictory,
strangely
that is oftentreatedas a
The shogunatealso lacked the absolute sovereignty
forexample,did notdesignate
definingattributeofthestate.The originaltitleshJgun,
a position of supremeauthority,but a militaryappointmentconfirmedby the
emperor.Althoughthe title implied broadercivil authorityin additionto military
command,it lostmuchofits lusterwiththecollapseoftheAshikagashogunate.The
formidable
powerof the Tokugawa house stemmedlargelyfromits abilityto claim
that it had createdpeace and orderafterdecades of chaos. In the earlyseventeenth
century,at the peak of the shogunate'spowers,political analystsimplied that the
imperialhousehad lost heaven'smandateand the rightto rule.The shogunatethus
ruled in lieu of the emperor,ratherthanat his behest.But such claims weremade
largelyin privatedocuments.In public,evenshogunalapologistswereloathto assert
shogunalsupremacyoverthe emperor.Shogunalideologuesarguedfora hegemonic
shogunateby ignoringthe emperorratherthandenyinghim. By the late eighteenth
however,theshogunatewas commonlyseenas subjectto imperialauthority.
century,
In 1788, MatsudairaSadanobu,thenservingas shogunalregent,explicitlydescribed
the shogunas an imperialservant(Ooms 1985, 162-93).
Some historianshave treatedthephrasekogior "public authority"as evidenceof
to
In theWarringStatesperiod,kogicommonlyreferred
supremeshogunalauthority.
to
the
to refer
shogunate.
centuryit came increasingly
daimyo,but in theseventeenth
Some daimyo describedthemselvesas servantsof the kogi,suggestingthat their
authoritywas based on shogunalassent(Sasaki 1981). But the termkogiwas not
reservedforthe shogunate.Even in the late eighteenthcentury,kogicould referto
eithertheshogunateor a domain.The shogunatewas sometimesdistinguishedby the
but themeaningofkogiis oftenclearonlyin context.
termthe "largekogi"(daikJgi),
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STATE-BUILDING
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ECONOMY
1003
GG).
(See, e.g., Yozezawa-shishi hensaniinkai 1981-86, 2:80, 4:130-31, hereafter
As Mary Berryhas argued,kogiwas a "chameleontermthat masks as oftenas it
mirrorsmeaning."Even the translationof kogias "public authority,"she argues,
suggestsa distinctionbetweenthepublic and privaterealmsthatwas foreignto early
modernthought(Berry1986).
The shogunate'sformidableauthoritystemmedless fromany single title than
froma concatenation of multiple systemsof legitimacy. The shogunate drew
legitimacyfromthe imperialhouse througha seriesof offices:ministerof the right
captain
betto),
Sh5gakuryoin
(Udaijin),rectoroftheJunnaand Shogakucolleges(Junna,
left
and inspectorof the
imperialstables
of the leftimperialguards(sa-konoe-taisho)
enhanced
its
legitimacyby
the
also
shogunate
As
Ooms
has
noted,
(sa-meryJ-nJ--gogen).
refusingimperialappointments,therebyincreasingthe independenceof those it
accepted.Each shogun was also head of the Tokugawa house, the most powerful
warlordhouse in the land. Through imperialassent and creativegenealogy,the
Tokugawa shogunswere furtherdubbed heads of the Minamoto lineage, the first
Tokugawashogun,
warlordhouseto claimthetitleshogun.TokugawaIeyasu,thefirst
was posthumously refiguredas Toshdgut,a Shinto deity. A memorial shrine,
and setting,was built in Nikko to burnishIeyasu's
spectacularboth in architecture
image (Hall 1966, 345-53). Ieyasu'sstatusas a Shintodeityalso gave him elevated
statusin certainschoolsofBuddhism,whereShintodeitieswereviewedas alternative
The shogunatewas thus legitimizednot by absolute
of bodhisattva.
manifestations
authoritywithin a single statistideology,but by commandingauthoritywithin
Shintoism,Buddhism,the emperorsystem,
multipleideologies:Neo-Confucianism,
and the traditionsof warriorrule were all broughtto bear in defenseof shogunal
power.This gave theshogunateconsiderablepower,but also bound it to thepolitical
withwhichit sharedpoliticallegitimacy.The shogunatethusexistedin
institutions
with both the imperialhouse and rivalwarlords(Ooms
ideologicalinterdependence
1985, 162-93).
While illogicalas a state,the shogunatewas exceptionallycapable as a warrior
centuriesthe Tokugawa ruled unquestionedas
house. For over two-and-one-half
withWesternimperialismled
Japan'ssupremewarlordhouse. Only a confrontation
imperialloyaliststo envisiona world not dominatedby the Tokugawa house. To
argue that the Tokugawa shogunatewas a failureas a state, but a success as a
shogunate,begs the question.But the longevityof the Tokugawa dynastysuggests
thedangerof treatingnonstatesas weak states.
Language and Land
In determining
whatthe earlymodernorderwas, ratherthanwhatit was not,it
As notedabove,Uesugi Harunorideemed
is essentialto attendto periodterminology.
commonlyreferto theterritories
historians
hisdomaina kokkaor "state."By contrast,
of daimyoas han. Althoughsometimestreatedas an historicalexpression,the term
or officialdocuments.Prior to the Meiji
was neverused in shogunal investitures
literaryterm,used largelyforits resonanceswith
han was an informal,
Restoration,
to militaryinvestitures
granted
classicaltextssuchas theBookofOdes,whereit referred
by the Chineseemperorduringthe Chou dynasty(Hall 1968, 79-80). When used,
In the eighteenthcentury,the scholar
thetermhancarrieddemeaningconnotations.
monarch,referred
Arai Hakuseki,who soughtto recastthe shogunas a Chinese-style
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MARK
RAVINA
to daimyo holdings as han in order to diminish their authorityrelativeto the
shogunate.In the nineteenthcentury,imperialloyalistsused the termto emphasize
thesubordination
ofdaimyoto theemperor.It was in thissenseofsubmissionto the
emperorthathan was firstused in an officialcontext:in 1868 the Meiji government
referred
to all daimyoholdingsas han,as partofitsreorganization
ofJapaneseterritory.
In the strictest
sense,han existedforonlythreeyears,betweenthe Meiji Restoration
and the implementation
of theprefectural
systemin 1871.3
The termhan thus reflectshow advocatesof a strongshogunateor imperial
authorityunderstooddaimyoauthority.Because all daimyowere equally shogunal
vassals,theirdomainswereall equallyhan.The termconcealsimportantdistinctions
in how daimyoand theirretainersviewedthemselves.The recordsof small domains
commonlyreferto the "holding" (ryt7bun
or ryo-chi)
of the ruling family.In large
domains,however,the mostcommontermwas kunior "country."Officialsspoke of
thetraditionsoftheir"country,"
theprosperity
oftheir"country"and thewell-being
of their "countrymen"(kokumin).From a modern perspective this language is
problematicsince termssuch as kuni could referto a varietyof political bodies:
provinces,domains,or countriesin the modernsense. In the house recordsof the
Motokifamily,wealthyTokushimalandowners,
forexample,themeaningoftheterm
"country"(kuni)variedaccordingto context.WritingofWesternshipsin the 1840s,
a Motoki referred
to "warshipsof foreigncountries."In such contexts,the family's
led by the shogun(shWgunsama
allegiancewas to the countryofJapan,or Nipponkoku
or kokuoY).
In most othercontexts,however,the term"country"meantdomain. In
thepanic afterOshio Heihachir6'sfailedrebellion,Motokiwrote,"thedead
reporting
are too manyto number,and as a resultof the disturbancethe daimyoeach tend to
and thedaimyoofneighboringcountriesraceback to their
theirown Edo residences,
castles."4 The Motokicommonlyassociatedthepersonofthedaimyowiththecountry
ofTokushima,referring
to thedaimyoas okunisama,
or lordofthecountry.Oftenthe
finalhonorific
samawas elided, and the countryservedas a synecdocheforthe lord.
When HachisukaNariaki,whowas withoutheir,adopteda childfromtheTokugawa
house,theMotokirecordedthat"thecountryhasadopteda younglordoftheshogun."
Finally,the Motoki used kunito indicatethe provincesof Japan as definedby the
to the
ancientritsu-ryosystem.This usage was commonlyemployedwhen referring
Kanto, whichwas controlledby hundredsof small domains.The Motoki tendedto
distinguishbetweenforeigncountriesand domestic"countries"throughadjectives.
while Russia
Hence, otherprovincesor domainswere "variouscountries"(shokoku),
and Europeancountrieswere"foreigncountries"(ikoku).Yet eventhisdistinctionwas
farfromconsistent.During the Tempo crisis,the Motoki wroteangrilyof daimyo
who would not allow ships of "foreigncountries"to dock. The price of rice was
therefore
rising,despitebountifulharvestsin "othercountries"ofJapan(Fukui 1968,
210, 356).
This polysemanticuse of kuniwas not limitedto private,colloquial workssuch
as householdrecords.In his 1727 essaySeidan,OgytuSoraiused the termkunias did
the Motoki, to referto threedifferent
political entities.Sorai spoke of Japan as a
3Someimportantsourcesare misleadingon this subject.The editorsofJapan before
Tokugawasuggestthatdomainswerecalled kokkain the sixteenthcenturybut han in the seventeenth.No such abrupttransformation
occurred,save in historicalwriting.See Hall 1981,
7-8. See also Kasaya 1993, 138-39.
4The Motoki diaryis from"Kadoya nikkihikae," reproducedin Fukui 1968, 157-364.
For the reference
to Oshio Heihachir6,see pp. 262-64.
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STATE-BUILDING
AND POLITICAL ECONOMY
1005
country,but also of the kuniof daimyoand of kunias provinces.As in the Motoki
diary,this led to passageswhichstrikethe modernreaderas quixotic. Warningof
thedangersofunregulatedinternalmigration,Soraiarguedthat"becausepeople can
go freelyto otherkuni,comefreelyfromotherkuniand live [wheretheysettlelfreely,
thekuniofJapanare in confusion"(Yoshikawa1973, 275). Sorai
people throughout
to provincesas shu-,but, despitehis concernwith linguisticprecision,
also referred
distinguishprovincesfromdomainsor countries.
did notuse thistermto consistently
Termssuchas kokkaweresimilarlyambiguous.In modernJapanese,kokkarefers
to a centralizedstate,but in the Tokugawaera it could signifyeitherthe shogunate
to the ruling
literally,the "houseof the country,"oftenreferred
or a domain.Kokka,
familyof the domain,or, by extension,the rulingfamilyand its retainers.The term
the modernnotion
thatcharacterizes
thuslackedthesenseofan absolutesovereignty
of a state.But kokkacould also designatean abstractpoliticalinstitution.In 1622,
forexample,the daimyoof Fukuoka,Kuroda Nagamasa, warnedhis heir to choose
his successorwisely.Do not entrustthe kokka,he cautioned,to someonewho is selfindulgent,willful,or failsto heed his advisors.Such conductwould resultin "divine
and loss of the domain.The keyto managingthe domainlay
punishment"(tenbatsu)
in recognizingthat it was not the daimyo'sproperty,but somethingentrustedto
and avoidedselfhim. A good rulerthusbrought"peace to thepeople and farmers"
indulgence(Kasaya 1988, 249-50). This notionthatthe daimyoservesthe kokkais
echoedin Uesugi Harunori'sstatementthat"the lord existsforthe sake of the state
and the people: the stateand the people do not existforthe sake of the lord." This
conceptionof the kokkathus embodiesboth a modernconceptionof the stateas an
notionof the stateas thepatrimonyof the
abstractpoliticalentityand a less rarefied
ruler.The notionthat a daimyoinheritsa "state" suggeststhat a kokkawas little
more than an investitureto be carefullymanaged forone's descendants.But the
ofFredericktheGreat'sclaim
argumentthatthelordexistsforthestateis reminiscent
thatthe monarchis the firstservantof the state.Because this conceptionof a kokka
Nagamasa and Harunoricould describe
did not involvesupremepoliticalauthority,
theirrealmsas "states"withoutdenyingthattheywereinvestedby the shogun.In
Tokugawawriting,Japanthusconsistedof "states"withina "state."
literally"people of the
Most intriguingis Tokugawausage of the termkokumin,
a
kokumin
was used as Japaneseequivalentfor
country."Afterthe Meiji Restoration,
could referequallyto the people of a
"nation."Priorto the 1860s, however,kokumin
could refermerelyto "the commoners,"
domainas to the people ofJapan.Kokumin
but it was oftenused to stresstheobligationofthe stateto its subjects.In describing
notedthat"the
thefailureof a formof fiatmoney,Kudo Koichi, a Hirosakiofficial,
kokumin
wereimpoverished"and "drivento riot."When the daimyolearnedof this
in orderto "bringpeace to thekokumin"
(Aomorihe dismissedtheresponsibleofficials
could include
kenbunkazaihogo kyokai1958, 233-34). In some instances,kokumin
of Yonezawa referred
samurai.In 1833, amidstthe Tempo famine,the government
rationing:
emergency
whenjustifying
to kokumin
hasbeenpained
his lordship
Giventherecentseriesofexceptionally
poorharvests,
there
thathislandwillnothaveenoughfoodfornextyear.Although
bytheprospect
samurai,artisansand
are bothnobleand base amongthe fourestates[peasants,
thinks
thislordship]
thekokumin
areoneand indivisible.
Accordingly,
merchants],
thateventhosewhohaveamplericeshould
landas onefamily
andorders
oftheentire
eatricegruel,sendingtheirsurplusto thosewhodo nothaveenough.
shihensaniinkai1981-86,6:75-76)
(Yonezawa-shi
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MARK
RAVINA
Although the kokuminof Yonezawa were not a "nation," they were obviously
understoodto sharea commoninterestand purpose,even acrossclass lines. Luke
Roberts'stranslationof kokumin
as "countrymen"capturesmuch of this sense of
solidarity(Roberts1991). When constructedas a kokumin,
the people of Yonezawa
wereloyalfirstand foremost
to theirfellowcountrymen,
irrespective
of class.5
Language and Translation
The polysemyofpoliticaldiscoursecomplicatesthetranslation
ofTokugawatexts.
"Languages differ,"as Roman Jakobsonobserved,"essentiallyin what they must
conveyand not in whattheymayconvey"(Jakobson1959, 236). Thereis no wordin
modernEnglishwhichcan capturethe multiplemeaningsof kuni:countrycaptures
the sense of culturalcommonality,domain the sense of political suzerainty,and
provincethe sense of geographiccontiguity.Yet a kunicould be all or any one of
theseunits.We confront
similarproblemswiththetranslation
ofkokkaand kokumin.
Because our modern political vocabulary seeks to clarifysovereignty,formal
translationtendsto specifywhatthe originalJapanesehas leftunspoken.
Althoughdirecttranslations
of Tokugawapoliticaldiscoursecan soundquixotic
and contradictory,
periodEnglish-languageaccountsofJapanemployeda language
as foreignas earlymodernJapanese.FrangoisCaron'swidelyread accountofJapan,
firstpublishedin 1645-46, describeda "country"subdividedinto "countries"and
"kingdoms."The supremerulerofJapanwas the "Emperor,"by whichCaronmeant
the shogunTokugawa Iemitsu.But the countrywas subdividedinto "Countreys,"'
ruledby thevarious"Kings,Princes,Dukes and LordsofJapan."The "Emperor"had
formidablepower over these nobles and could "banish or punish with death, at
pleasure,his offendingKings and Lords,and ... give away theirCommandsand
Treasures to those he fancies more deserving than they.''6 Yet for Caron, the
subservience
ofthedaimyoto theshogundid notmakethemanyless "kings."Caron's
political language was typicalof earlymodernEuropeanpolitical discourse(Caron
1935). Into the eighteenthcentury,Englishmenconflatedcountriesand counties,
speaking, forexample, of the "country" of Lancashire. In central Europe, the
supremacyof the nationstate,and the corresponding
vocabulary,emergedstill later.
As late as the 1790s, Prussiawas referred
to as both a "state"and an amalgamation
of "Prussianstates."Similarly,the Holy Roman Empirecould be defined,in 1786,
madeup ofmanysmall,particularstates."In 1833 Metternich
as a "state(Staatkorper)
observedthatPrussiawas emergingas a "statewithinthe statein thefullestsenseof
the term."The centralconceptin traditionalcentralEuropewas notthestatebut the
laws and customs.Like
Land. Ldnderwereterritorial
unitswithdistinctinstitutions,
kuni,Land implied political authority,but not sovereignty:"a Land assertedits
identitybut not its primacy."Ldnderwerethusporouspoliticalunits,and could be
penetratedby outside elements,such as the Catholic Churchor the Holy Roman
Empire.While neitherthe "country"ofseventeenth-century
EnglishnortheLand of
GermanarepreciseequivalentsofthekuniofTokugawaJapanese,
eighteenth-century
5Itis worthnotingthe limitsofwho was includedin this"family"ofYonezawa subjects.
The fourclassesdid not includeuntouchablessuch as eta or hinin.
6J have reliedhereon the 1663 English translation
of Caron'sRechte
Beschryvinge
Van het
MachtighKoninghrijck
van Iappan.See Caron 1935.
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STATE-BUILDING
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1007
ambiguityofearlymodernpolitics(Sheehan
all threetermsconveythepolysemantic
1989, 11-41; Wehler 1985, 20).
By contrast,it is difficultto translateTokugawa political texts into modern
Japanese:the languageofTokugawapoliticsdid not outlivethe Tokugawapolitical
order.In 1868/6 the dajJkan(council of state) designatedthreetypesof internal
divisionforJapan: ken,fu, and han. Ken and fu were ancientJapanesetermsfor
Tokugawahouse
provincialunitsoftheimperialstateand werecreatedbyaggregating
lands, liege vassal holdings, and small domains. Larger daimyo holdings were
political
designatedhan. Underthe pretextof restoringseventh-and eighth-century
eliminatedthe wordkmnias a termfordomain.
institutions,
the Meiji government
country/kuni,
theMeiji statethesole state/
Implicitly,
Japanbecametheonlyeffective
The introductionof
kokka,and the Japanesepeople the only true nationlkokumin.
of
distincttermsforprefecture,
domain,and statewas thuspartof the construction
the modernstateitself.
The polysemyof earlymodernJapanesehas two importantimplications.First,
the parallelsbetweenearlymodernJapaneseand earlymodernEuropeanpolitical
discoursesuggestthatthe"stateswithinstates"phenomenonwasa politicalformation
commonto Europe and Japan,not some dysfunction
of the state-buildingprocess
unique to Japan. Second, the polysemyof Tokugawa discoursemakes clarityin
translationa problematicvirtue.Howevervexingthe ambiguitiesof "country,"to
dependingon context,is to translate
translate
kunias a province,domain,ora country,
thought.Althoughthe resultis
Tokugawa thoughtinto modern,post-Restoration
increasedclarity,thisis a dubiousvirtue,sincethislack ofclaritywas a salientaspect
of Tokugawapoliticaltexts.In clarifying
Tokugawa politicallanguagewe therefore
run the riskof effacingthe complexitiesof the earlymodernpolitical order.More
of political
of such "clarity"antedatesthe transformation
seriously,the interjection
languagewhichaccompaniedthe Meiji Restorationand treatsthe nationstateas an
existingeven in a worldwhichhad no wordsto
ontologicallyprivilegedinstitution,
describeit. That largedomainscalled themselves"states"does not,of course,mean
thattheywerestatesin themodernsense.But to translate"kokka"as stateonlywhen
it refersto the shogunateis, in effect,
to imposea moderntheoryof sovereignty
on
Tokugawa thought.The dangerhereis thatwe will findevidenceof state-building
becausewe haveput it therethroughour processof translation.
Language and Sovereignty
A close examinationof early modernpolitical language suggests a need to
thebasesofdaimyoauthority.
reexamine
Daimyo based theirruleon threecoincident
and suzerainauthority.
sourcesoflegitimacy:feudalauthority,
patrimonialauthority
Feudal authoritywas once seen as the primarysource of legitimacyin the
of the early modern order as
Tokugawa polity, hence Sansom's characterization
"centralizedfeudalism"(Sansom 1963, 3:46; see also Reischauer1970; Reischauer
1956). I use feudalismherein a morelimitedsenseto referto the personalcompact
betweenlordand vassal.The feudalbondwas createdwhena vassalsworeloyalservice
In thisform,feudalauthoritytouched
to a superiorlord in returnforan investiture.
over
all samurai.All daimyowereinvestedvassalsof the shogun,and theirauthority
theirdomainswas thus derivedpartlyfromshogunalauthority.Daimyo, in turn,
investedtheirown samuraiand demandedoaths of loyalty.These ties of vassalage
also linkeddaimyoto the emperor,who, in theory,designatedthe shogun.
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1008
MARK RAVINA
Daimyo oathswerecommonlysimplevows of loyalty,based on the three-article
oath originallydemanded by Jeyasu.When Tsugaru Nobuaki of Hirosaki swore
to obeyall shogunallaws,
in 1787, he vowedstrictly
to thenewshogunJenari
fidelity
to keep his house fromwickedness,and to servehis lord diligently.Failureto fulfill
this oath warranted"all the resolutepunishments,both revealedand hidden, of
Bonten(Sk. Brahma),Taishaku(Sk. gakradevanamIndra),theFourHeavenlyKings,
ofIzu and Hakone,
and thegods of thesixtyprovincesofJapan,especiallythegongen
thedaimyojinofMishima,thebodhisattvaHachiman,and Tenmantenjin"(Kodama
1987b). Nobuaki signedhis oathin blood beforetheassembledshogunalelders(rijzi).
Daimyo demandedsimilaroathsfromtheirhigh retainers.The domainelders(karo)
ofTakazakidomain,forexample,sworein blood to obeyall laws and edictsof their
to servehim above all othersand in all things,and to carryout all his
lord (ko-gi),
withoutquestion or demurrer.The closing oath beforethe gods was
instructions
identicalto thatdemandedof daimyoby the shogun(Shinji 1984, 111-12).
The feudal bond between daimyo and shogun both created and conveyed
authority.The ritualof blood oathscan be seen as reproducingauthorityas well as
it: in drawingtheirown blood to proclaimtheirobedience,daimyo
representing
theyserved.Similarly,theinvocationofa widepanoply
helpedto createtheauthority
of deitiesgave the feudalbond a weightgreaterthan the defactomilitarymightof
daimyothenhad theirholdings
eitherparty.Having enhancedshogunalauthority,
bya vermilion
ofeachdaimyohousewereconfirmed
legitimizedbyit. The investitures
of investiturewhich specifiedthe location and extentof the
seal on a certificate
holding.
of feudalauthoritywas its personalnature.It bound a
The salientcharacteristic
to another(Berry1986). Accordingly,
singlevassalto a singlelord,notone institution
feudalauthoritydid not give the shogunatesuzeraintyovercommonersoutsideits
own holdings.The shogunatewas the daimyo'slord, not the lord of the daimyo's
commoners.The feudal characterof the shogun-daimyobond is revealedin the
original"Laws GoverningMilitaryHouses," a set of edictsissuedin 1615. The laws
ofthe shogunate
delineatedacceptabledaimyoconductand establishedtheauthority
in severalkeyareas.Daimyowerenotto arrangemarriageswithoutshogunalapproval,
to theircastles.Daimyo were
norenterintoprivatealliances,normake modification
on theruleoftheirdomains,but thesepassageswerelargelyhortatory.
also instructed
and finalarticle,forexample,instructeddaimyo to "selectofficials
The thirteenth
While clearin generalpurport,thisarticle
witha capacityforpublic administration."
did notproscribeanyparticularactionsave grossincompetence.
As guarantorof thedaimyoholding,theshogunreservedtheauthorityto reduce
or seize the investitureof a daimyowho violated these edicts. But because feudal
authorityfocusedon personalties, feudal sanctionswere directedpredominantly
towardspersonal conduct. During the firsthalf centuryof Tokugawa rule, the
of scoresof daimyo.Between1600
shogunatereducedor eliminatedthe investitures
million
kokuin over 130 incidentsof
and 1650 the shogunateseized over twelve
the
death of the daimyo: this
was
attainder.The most commoncause forseizure
accountedfor nearlyhalf of all attaindersbefore1650. Although the shogunate
deathdissolvedthefeudalbond,
ofinvestitures,
commonlyrecognizedtheheritability
heir
as unsuitable.Theseseizures
a
reject designated
and theshoguncould legitimately
established
daimyo.The otherfocusof
conditional,evenforlarge,
made heritability
the
towards
shogun. Roughly one third of
attainderswas the daimyo's conduct
in attendingthe shogun,or
tardiness
attaindersresultedfromrudeness,"madness,"
similarpersonalactionsby thedaimyo.Attainderwas rarelyused to punisha daimyo
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STATE-BUILDING
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forincompetent
ruleor forviolationsofadministrative
procedures.Philip Brownhas
calculated that administrative
issues accountedfor a maximumof 12 percentof
attaindersbetween 1601 and 1760. A stricterdefinitionof administrative
failure
would put the rateas low as 3 percent(Brown1993, 24; Fujino 1975, app.). Feudal
authoritythus requiredloyalty,proprietyand generalcompetenceratherthan any
strictadherenceto an administrative
code.
The feudal principle that death dissolved the lord-vassal bond was
counterbalanced
by thepatrimonialprinciplethatinvestitures
wereheritable.Within
theframework
ofpatrimonialauthority,
an investiture
waspartofa family'spatrimony
and was transmitted
frompatriarchto patriarchacrossgenerations.
Thus,whilefeudal
linkedtwo individualsuntil death,patrimonialauthoritymade the feudal
authority
link a bond betweenhousesacrossgenerations.Patrimonialauthoritywas rootedin
the ie, or Japanesefamilysystem.The ie systemwas characterizedby what social
havetermed"stem-linearity,"
scientists
or "stemsuccession."An le could be succeeded
onlyby a singleheir,eithernaturalor adopted.Even whena familyhad morethan
one heir,the headshipof the ie was not partible:the lesserinheritorestablisheda
separate"branch"le. Unlike specifichouseholds,an ie was understoodto exist as a
singular,corporateunit acrosstime:althoughproperty
was partible,familyheadship
was not. The taskof each generationwas successfully
to sustainthe le and thencede
it to thefollowinggeneration.Althoughmuchofthesolidarityofan ie stemmedfrom
kinshipties, the survivalof the ie was more importantthan kinship.Succession
throughadoptionrarelydiminishedthe legitimacyof an ie.7
An importantdiscussionof the politicalimplicationsof the ie systemhas been
of
developedby MizubayashiTakeshi.Mizubayashiarguedthatthe decentralization
the Tokugawaorderwas rootedin the strengthof the ie, not the weaknessof central
oftheie was thewarriorhousehold,
power.The mostimportant
politicalmanifestation
with its attendantrightsand privileges,was the
whereinthe warrior'sinvestiture,
The bodypoliticconsistedofa hierarchy
ofwarriorle: the shogun
familypatrimony.
vassals.Althoughthe autonomyof
investedthe daimyo,who in turnsubinfeudated
thesewarriorie was drastically
reducedduringtheseventeenth
theshogunate
century,
continuedto honorthe financialand legal autonomyof the daimyo.Indeed, it was
in redefining
theirvassalsas subordinate
thedaimyowhoweremosteffective
members
of theirown le ratherthanindependentie heads.Thus, despitethe supremacyof the
shogunalhouse,shogunalpowerwas constantlymediatedthroughthe authorityof
otherdaimyole. The notionof the ie is particularly
importantbecauseit can readily
be linkedwith othertermsof Tokugawa politicallanguage:a state(kokka)is the ie
ofa kuni(country).Mizubayashihas thusdubbed theTokugawaordera "composite"
or "compoundstate" (fukug5kokka),whereinthe large daimyodomainsexistedas
smallcountries(sho-koku).
The concept of le, Mizubayashiobserved,permeatedearly modernJapanese
society,governingthe managementof farmerand merchanthouseholds,as well as
religiousorders.In True Pure Land Buddhismforexample,whereinpriestsmarried,
theheadshipofa templewas commonlytreatedas thepatrimonyofan le. The eldest
son succeededhis fatheras head priest,while youngersons held lesserpositionsin
the templecomplex.Thereare thusdistinctparallelsbetweenthe ie and the idea of
in earlymodernEurope. Much as the conceptof Herrschaft,
or lordship,
Herrschaft
7Fora discussionof the ie see Nakane 1970, especiallypp. 101-5. Also valuable is Murakami1984. This is best readin tandemwiththe critiquesinJournalofJapanese
Studies11:1
(Summer1985).
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1010
MARK RAVINA
servedto bind different
Landertogetherin an imperialunion,ie,linkedthroughties
like ie,
of vassalage, constituted a compound state. More broadly, Herrschaft,
legitimizedauthorityacross class lines. Both conceptsservedto substantiatethe
ofthefatherin a peasanthouseholdas well as thelegal autonomyofa noble
authority
house(Mizubayashi1987, 272-307).
positionwiththedaimyo's
The vassalhouseholdheld a potentiallycontradictory
ie. The rightsand privilegesof each warriorhouse constitutedan ie and were thus
legitimized by patrimonialauthority.This principle allowed retainersto resist
reforms,such as the standardizationof tax collectionor limits on corvee,that
challengedtheirestablishedperquisites.The autonomyofvassalle,however,could be
challengedby subsumingvassal houses within the daimyo house. This process
reconstructed
thevassalie as a subordinateunitofthedaimyole and made thesurvival
ofthedaimyohousetheparamountconcernforbothlordand vassal.Becausethehead
ofan ie could directfamilymembersin the broaderinterestof the le, the daimyo,as
patriarchto his vassal, could bind them to rules of conduct and strip them of
traditionalautonomy.Patrimonialauthoritythus encompasseda tensionbetween
independentvassalie, boundto theirlordby a feudalpledge,and subsumedvassalie,
bound to theirlordas membersofhis house(Mizubayashi1977).
Kasaya Kazuhiko has taken this tensionas a definingquality of earlymodern
politics. Accordingto Kasaya, the earlymodernera was characterizednot by the
In the
diminutionof independent,patrimonialrights,but by theirtransformation.
WarringStatesera, samuraihad broad,independentauthorityover theirholdings.
or holding)gave them
Theirpatrimonialauthority
(whichKasayacalls theirmochibun
broad latitude in defendingtheir interests:in order to increaseor defendtheir
territory,
theycould declarewar,concludepeace, and arrangealliances.In the early
modernstructure
thesepowerswereeliminated.Daimyostrippedvassalsoftheirright
to independentmilitaryactionand made themsubordinateto daimyorulings.The
shogunateexercisedsimilarauthorityoverdaimyo.Kasaya insists,however,thatwe
also look at whatretainers
gainedwhentheseautonomouspowerswerelost.As agents
in a daimyo'sgovernment,
retainers
gainedthepowerto affectthedecisionsofa larger
political structure.Instead of raisingan armyto advance theirinterests,powerful
warriorfamiliescould use theirhereditary
positionsin the domain governmentto
Kasaya notes how in early modern
influencepolicy regularlyand systematically.
politics,dictatoriallordswerevastlyoutnumberedby consultativelords:daimyoand
shogunswho reliedon the counselof theirretainers.Daimyo wererarelyautocratic,
he argues,becauseearlymodernpoliticswas based on patrimonialauthority.
Daimyo
respectedthe patrimonialrightsof theirvassalsby consultingwith themon major
of consultativedecision-making
and the scarcityofdaimyo
issues.The pervasiveness
thecontinuedpowerofsubordinatewarriors
(Kasaya 1990, 35-61).
autocracy,reflect
The subsumptionof a samurai'spatrimonyinto the broaderdaimyo ie had a
transformative
effecton politicalpractice.Because a warrior'sie was onlyas vital the
ofpatrimonybecame
broaderstatestructure
of whichit was a part,the preservation
serviceas a domainofficialbecame
enmeshedwithloyalserviceto the state.Effective
a part of defendingand increasingone's patrimony.Kasaya has thus pointed to a
"bureaucratic"tendencyin the patrimonialsystem.If a lord acted againstthe best
traditionsof the domain,a
interestof his house, or challengedthe administrative
retainercould legitimatelydepose him. Loyaltyto the institutionof the daimyo
"house" tookprecedenceoverpersonalloyaltyto the daimyo.
Even when
werenotWeberianbureaucracies.
Japan'searlymodernbureaucracies
wereas concerned
tightlybound by government
regulations,samuraiadministrators
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STATE-BUILDING
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1011
with rank and status as with the exerciseof instrumentalrationality.Further,
administrative
positionswere heritable,thus making earlymodernadministrative
But Kasaya's notionof bureaucracy
than Gesellschaft.
structuresmore Gemeineschaft
vassalsowed service
pointsto anotheressentialtensionwithinpatrimonialauthority:
bothto theirown "house"and the"house"oftheirlord(Kasaya 1990, 35-61; Kasaya
1988, 273-79; Mizubayashi1977, 1-63).
The thirdsourceof daimyoauthoritywas what I call suzerainauthority:the
autonomyof countrydaimyoin civil affairs.Suzerainauthorityhad its rootsin the
era daimyo.Sengoku
daimyJ
based
independentpoliticalauthorityof Warring-states
theirrule on theirabilityto bring tranquilityand orderto theirholdings.They
broughtpeace to theirrealmsby stoppingfeudsamongtheirretainersand repelling
invaders.This, in turn,justifiedtheirexpandedauthorityovercommoners:sengoku
daimyJclaimed independent fiscal authority,conducted cadastral surveys,and
as kogibased on
regulatedcommerceand currency.
Such daimyodescribedthemselves
to
theirabilityto bringpeace to the lands theyruled (ando)and succorthe people
of theirstates(kokka)(Katsumata1981, 101-24).
(kokumin)
the ambit of daimyoautonomy,
The earlyTokugawa shogunsgreatlyrestricted
of
but the traditions daimyo suzeraintyremainedan importantpart of the early
modernpoliticalsystem.In the rhetoricofthegreatdomains,thedaimyowerelords
investedby heaven with "countries"and obligated to succor their"people." The
investiture
was itselfevidenceof the lord'svirtue,but it also demandedvirtuousand
sage conduct.Fromthe mid-seventeenth
century,suzerainauthoritydrewlargelyon
Neo-Confucianconceptionsofrulership.Daimyowerethusexpectedto manifest
jinsei
or "benevolentrule."The conceptofjinseicalledfora wiseand virtuousrulerdedicated
to the promotionof the people's welfare.Like much of Tokugawa thought,suzerain
authoritywas syncreticand also incorporatedBuddhist elements.Daimyo were
expectedto treattheirsubjects with "compassion"or "mercy,"thus manifesting
assumedan equivalenceofdaimyoand shogun.
Buddhistvirtues.8Suzerainauthority
to bringpeace
Both werelordsentrustedby a higherpowerwith the responsibility
and prosperityto theirpeople. "The realm(tenka)is the realmof heaven,not the
realmofanyone man," wroteSakai Tadayuki,daimyoofObama. "Hence evenwhat
is held by the shogun,muchless whatis held by the lords,is held in trust"(Tahara
1976, 301-3).
Daimyo varied in their perception of the importance of the shogunate in
the"heavenlymandate."Ikeda Mitsumasa,forexample,saw theshogunate
conveying
in conveyingthe heavenlymandateto the daimyo. "The shogun
as instrumental
receiveshis authorityfromheaven.The daimyoreceivesauthorityoverthe people as
shouldaid thedaimyo
a trustfromtheshogun.The daimyo'scouncillorsand retainers
in bringingpeace and harmonyto the people" (Hall 1966, 403; Sasaki 1981, 28486). AlthoughIkeda clearlysubordinatedhimselfto the shogun,his tacticshouldbe
consideredin context.Mitsumasaheld advisoryprivilegeswith the shogunIemitsu
and was relatedto theTokugawahouse:his motherhad been adoptedby the shogun
Hidetadaand his wifewas a nieceofJemitsu(Ooms 1985, 50). Daimyowithoutsuch
stronglinks with the shogunatewere less inclined to subordinatethemselvesto
Kuroda Nagamasa,forexample,had been a Tokugawa ally at
shogunalintercession.
thebattleofSekigaharaand praisedtheshogunin his will as a leaderpeerlessin both
war and peace. Nagamasa,did not, however,mentionthe shogunwhen instructing
8Fora discussion
ofjinsei
seeHarootunian
1970,62-65; Scheiner
1978;andFukaya1972.
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1012
MARK RAVINA
impliedthatthe daimyo
his heirson managingthe domain.Rather,his instructions
was responsiblelargelyto heaven."If yourdescendantsshould carryon our spirit,
and prudence,rulingthe people with
strictlyobeyingthe law, practicingfrugality
o tadashiku)and keeping the
humanityand virtue,perfectinggovernment(seid5customsof our house manly and upright,all the world (tenka)will hear of the
humanityand virtueof our house and will submit[to our rule] in greatnumbers."
A failureto rule in this fashionwould resultin "heaven'spunishment"and the loss
ofthe"state"and "country"(Ishii 1974, 10-32). In a similarfashion,T6do Takatora,
daimyoof Tsu, wrote,"as our preciouscountryis somethingentrustedto us, we
cannotbe negligentin anyway." Takatoraskillfullyleftunansweredthe questionof
who or whathad entrustedTsu to the Todo (Tahara 1976, 301-2).
In ignoringthe role of the shogunate,apologistsfor daimyo authoritywere
adoptinga strategyparallelto thatof shogunalapologists.In his essayson shogunal
legitimacy,forexample,Arai Hakuseki did not denigratethe emperor.Rather,he
notedthatTokugawa Ieyasuhad broughtpeace to Japanaftera periodof chaos and
receivedheaven'smandate.Hakuseki thus implied thatthe imperialhouse had lost
heaven's mandate throughincompetenceand thus could not be superiorto the
shogunate.Hakusekithuscasttheshogunateas Japan'ssupremerulerwithoutdirectly
challengingthe emperorsystem.In a similarvein, apologistsfordaimyoauthority
did not denythatheaven'smandatepassedthroughtheshogunate.Yet in neglecting
to explorethisprocess,theymade the shogunate'sroleincidentalratherthancritical
(Tsuji 1991, 203-14).
Defendersof daimyoautonomywerecarefulnot to attackthe shogunate.Yet a
close readingofdomainlaws suggeststhatdaimyoand theiradvisershad reservations
about the ambit of shogunalauthority.In the early1600s, forexample,Yonezawa
repeatedlyordered retainersaccompanyingthe daimyo to Edo strictlyto obey
shogunal laws. (See, for example, GG 1:46[1623/5/161;1:50 [1626/5/221,1:51
[1626/6/191and 1:103 [1662/4/281.)Clearly,Yonezawa legal authoritiesthought
outsideYonezawa.But thesituation
thatshogunallawsappliedto Yonezawaretainers
insideYonezawa was less clear.There is no edict in the collecteddomainlaws that
to obeyshogunallaws whenin Yonezawa. Rather,the
explicitlycommandsretainers
ordersto retainersin Yonezawaenjointhemfrompubliclycriticizingshogunaledicts
hereis telling.OutsideYonezawa,theshogunate
(GG:1:93 [1657/21).The difference
was bothpowerfuland legitimate.InsideYonezawa,however,thedomainrecognized
werenot directedto
the shogunate'spowermorethanits legitimacy:henceretainers
obey the shogunatebut werewarnednot to criticizeit. Althoughthe domainoften
relayedshogunalorders,it explicitlyinterposeditselfbetweenthe shogun and its
retainers(GG 1:160 [1695/10/231).By implication,shogunalordersdid not apply
unlessthe daimyoconveyedthemto his people.
This senseofautonomywas mostpronouncedin largedomainsestablishedin the
sixteenthcentury.In period parlance,these were knownas the lands of "country
only
daimyo.In the narrowestsense, 'countryholder"referred
holding"(kunimochi)
to daimyowhose holdingsencompassedan entireprovince.These lords were also
knownas the"eighteencountryholdinghouses,"a groupofpowerfuldaimyofamilies
includingthe Maeda of Kaga, the Shimazu of Satsuma,the Date of Sendai, the
holders"
HachisukaofTokushima,and theUesugi ofYonezawa.Beyondtrue"country
were two broadergroupsof powerfuldaimyo.The "greatcountryholders"(taishin
werelordswho had holdingsofat least 150,000 koku,but did not rulean
kunimochi)
had investitures
entireprovince.Daimyowith"countryholdingrank"(kunimochikaku)
of at least 100,000 koku. "Countryholding" daimyo enjoyed markedlygreater
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autonomyfromshogunal directivesthan other lords. In 1633, for example, the
shogunategave thesedaimyobroaddiscretionin civil affairs:"in the case of country
holders,complaintsfromretainers,townsmenor farmersshould be dealt with in
accordancewith the wishesof thatlord" (Kasaya 1993, 150-2; Kodama 1987a). In
practice,thesedaimyowereexemptfromtheshogunalsanctionofattainder:onlyonce
after1700 did the shogunatemove, seize, or reducea domain over 150,000 koku.
Ironically,the targetof this actionwas not a tozamawarlordhouse but the hapless
heirofa shogunalregent.Ii Naosuke's heir,Naonori,had his domainreducedin the
powerstrugglefollowingNaosuke's assassination.9
out of
daimyo"werefewin number:in 1869 onlyforty-three
"Country-holding
wereformally
assessed 100,000 kokuor above, and only
two hundredand sixty-five
at 150,000 kokuor above. But the size of these domains made them
twenty-five
disproportionately
important.In 1869 nearlyelevenmillionpeople,or 36 percentof
the Japanesepopulace lived in domains of 150,000 kokuor larger.Over thirteen
millionpeople, nearly44 percentof the population,lived in domains 100,000 koku
or larger.The formalinvestitures
of the "eighteencountryholders"alone comprised
theterritory
ofJapan.The senseofdomainsas "countries"was thuscommon
one-third
to muchofJapan.10
oftenservedas complementary
rather
Suzerain,patrimonial,and feudalauthority
thanoppositionaldoctrines.Feudal authorityemphasizedthe daimyo'sobligationto
loyallyserve the shogun. Patrimonialauthoritystressedthe lord's obligation to
thedomainas his family'spatrimony.
Suzerainauthority
emphasizeda lord's
safeguard
obligationto bringpeace and prosperityto his people througha masteryof civil
all theseobligations.A lordwhosedomain
affairs.
Sound and sage ruleoftenfulfilled
was peacefuland prosperouswas both a worthyrecipientof heaven'smandateand a
diligent custodianof his family'spatrimony.Unless he displayeda contemptfor
he was also a loyalretainer.
Whena lord'sobligationsto "heaven"
shogunalregulation,
to his
and the shogunwerecoincident,a daimyowho broughtpeace and prosperity
realmwas also servinghis lord,the shogun.
SyncreticLegitimacyand Political Practice
The coexistenceof feudal,patrimonial,and suzerainauthoritygave political
A strikingcharacteristic
ofdomainpolitics
domaindiscoursea remarkable
flexibility.
is how retainerscould treattheirlord as a servantof heavenor a servantof shogun
dependingon immediatepoliticalconcerns.The actionsof the houseelders(karoi)of
Tokushimaduringthe 1760s are a revealingexample.
In 1766 Tokushimaintroduceda set of radicalreforms
designedto stop Osaka
merchantsfromforcingdown the priceof indigo,Tokushima'smajorcash crop. To
underminethe abilityof the Osaka merchantsto fixprices,Tokushimaset up an
9Naonori'sholdingswerecut in 1862 afterhis father,Ii Naosuke, a loyal ifunsuccessful
was assassinatedand his policiesdiscredited.For data on attainderand
bakufuadministrator,
transfer
see Fujino 1975, appendices#1 and #2. In my calculationsI have ignoredthe shogunate'spurportedseizureofMori land in responseto the ForbiddenGate Incident,sincethe
enforcethe order.
shogunatecould not effectively
'0See Kasaya 1993, 150-51 and the discussionbelow. The calculationsrelyon data preThe total population of Japan, for these calculations,was
sented in Ravina forthcoming.
30,089,401.
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1014
MARK RAVINA
indigo marketin its castle-town.Merchantswere requiredto come to the market,
examinethe indigo offeredforsale, and submitbids forapprovalto a government
assessor.The systemofopen,competitivebids was designedto stopthecartel'spricefixing.Sincethedependenceofindigogrowerson advancesfromOsaka buyershelped
sustainthe price-fixing
system,the domainalso offeredspecial loans at termsmore
favorablethanthecartel's.In notifying
theshogunateofthe reforms,
thedaimyowas
carefulto balance his role as a vassal of the shogun with his status as lord of a
"country.""It is ourbelief,"he concluded,"thatsincethismatterdealswitha product
of our country(kokusan),
it does not involveyourlordship'slaws (osata),but since it
is a changein the existingbalancewe herebynotifyyourlordship"(Nishino 1940,
82).
The reformscut deeply into the profitmarginof the Osaka indigo carteland
sparkedan immediatelawsuit.In 1766/9,roughlytwomonthsafterthereforms
were
implemented,
twenty-four
indigowholesalersand jobbersdelivereda petitionto the
Osaka city magistratesopposing the Tokushimareforms.The magistratesfavored
Tokushima'scase, but the domain'sreforms
wereopposedby MatsudairaTakemoto,
the Edo seniorcounsellor(r5jg).Takemoto dismissedthe city magistrates'initial
findingsand orderedTokushimato disbandtheindigomarket.Takemoto'sorderwas
striking for its brevityand imperiousness: "the establishmentof a market in
Tokushimais somethingofrecentorigin.Therefore,
be informed
thatmattersshould
continueas heretofore."
The ro-j'offeredno justification
forhis decision,but the
rationalewas implicitin the languageof the edict. AlthoughTokushimahad called
itselfa "country,"the edict referredto the "investiture"(ryJbun)
of Tokushima
(Hasegawa 1975, 148; Amano 1986, 26; Nishino 1940, 90-91). As an investiture,
ratherthan a land, Tokushimahad no authorityto act independently,
even in the
interestof its people. MatsudairaTakemoto'sedict thus assertedsuzerainauthority
over Tokushima:the shogun could prohibitthe indigo marketmerelybecause it
violatedprecedent.The daimyo'spowerwas reducedto thefeudalauthority
conveyed
by the shogun.
The shogunate'sedict dismayedthe Tokushima administration.The domain
of thedecisionand reiterated
requesteda clarification
its originaljustification
forthe
market.Since the indigo marketaddressedthe problemsof Tokushimaindigo cube
tradersand farmers,
theyclaimed,it was a matterof"national,"meaninglocal,politics
But thedomainknewthroughbackchannelsthatMatsudairaTakemotowas
(kokusei).
unlikelyto reversehis ruling.Resignedto a formaldefeat,theadministration
planned
to challengethroughsubterfugewhat it could not overturnthroughlegal appeal
(Nishino 1940, 90-91; Nagao 1908, 2: ch. 6).
In a letterdated 1767/9/10Hasegawa Omi, a domainelder,detaileda strategy
forfeigningcompliancewiththeshogunaldecisionwhilemaintainingtheTokushima
market.The domain would initiallyship to Osaka all of its indigo cubes. The
followingyear,however,it would ship 70 percent,then50 percent,and then30. By
1773 the domainwould haveeffectively
returnedto its initialplan of forcingbuyers
to come to Tokushima.The strategyrelied on the shogunate'spoor knowledgeof
conditionsin Tokushima:"althoughthe shogunate(kogi)has issued a ruling,they
have not investigatedthe details of the situation.... It would be difficultforthe
shogunateto investigateall of our own state(okokka)."Since the domaincould feign
compliancein case ofan official
visit,it could effectively
ignoretheshogunaldecision.
"Because this is a matterforthe lord of our country,I believethat the shogunate's
decisioncan be takenlightly"(Nagao 1908, 2: chap. 6). Hasegawa believedthatthe
shogunatehad exceededits jurisdictionin banningthe Tokushimamarket,but he
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1015
did not advocate a directlegal challenge.Instead, he proposedthat the domain
challengetheshogunatebytestingitsabilityto enforceitsdecrees.Tokushimasought
ratherthan
to defendits tradepolicy,and its rightsas a "state,"throughsubterfuge
open dissent.
Hasegawa'spolicyprovedremarkably
successful.Only in 1788 did theshogunate
stop the
realizethatits edictwas beingignored,and notuntil 1790 did it effectively
Tokushima market.Even this ruling only stalled Tokushima's determinationto
theOsaka cartels:startingin 1802, thedomainbeganorganizingan indigo
undermine
supplier'scartel,designedto counterbalance
the influenceof the Osaka wholesalers.
In thisstrugglebetweenthe shogunateand the domain,the TokushimakarJclearly
consideredtheirdomaina "state"withbroadeconomicpowers.Althoughtheywisely
did notadvocatean open challengeto shogunalauthority,
theyweremorethanready
to ignorethe shogunatewhen"national"interestswereat stake.
It would be misleading,however,to call the karJdomain "nationalists."When
theirown patrimonialperquisiteswere challenged,theyprovedequally willing to
drawtheshogunateintodomainaffairs.
In 1769 theyengineeredthe remarkable
feat
of havingthe shogunatedepose theirdaimyo.
The struggle between the Tokushima karp and their daimyo, Hachisuka
Shigeyoshi,had its rootsin a seriesofreforms
Shigeyoshiintroducedin 1759/2.Like
manyadopteddaimyo,Shigeyoshiwas moreinterestedin talentthanlineage in his
seniorretainers.
rank
Accordingly,
he soughtto weakenthelinksbetweenhereditary
and office.Most boldly,he opened the high officesof executor(shiokiyaku)
and Edo
executor(Edo shiokiyaku)
to retainersoutside the fivekarJfamilies,the elite clique
who dominated Tokushima politics. Shigeyoshi's reformsencountered fierce
The karJ
oppositionfromthe karo,who viewed him as arrogantand disrespectful.
Yamada Oribe Masatsune,forexample,submitteda formalremonstrance
warning
Shigeyoshithatthe new systemwas a gravemistake.It showeda lack of respectfor
and a lack ofthe humilitybecomingan adoptedson. Further,argued
one's ancestors,
administration:
evenifShigeyoshi's
was thekeyto successful
policy
Yamada,harmony
had merit,it would failif it provokedresistanceamong the retainers(Kasaya 1988,
21-22).
On 1759/3/1he summonedfourofthehouse
Shigeyoshirespondedaggressively.
elders,KashimaKazusa, KashimaBizen,Yamada Oribe,and Ikeda Noboru,and read
his responseto Yamada's remonstrance.
Yamada, he argued,had failedas a house
elderby obstinately
defendingtheexistingadministrative
system:ratherthannoting
the failingsof previousdaimyo,he had aided and abetteda faultysystem.Further,
Yamada had failedto understandConfucianprinciples.He had argued,based on the
Analects,that"one does not changethe wayofone's fatherforthreeyears,"but had
failedto note that this did not apply in criticalmatters,nor had he demonstrated
thata birthson and an adopted son have the same obligations.FinallyShigeyoshi
accused Yamada of hypocrisy:Yamada had argued that harmonywas essentialto
successful
rule,but had thearroganceto accuseShigeyoshiofunfilialconduct(Kasaya
1988, 23-24). He thendismissedYamada Oribe fromhispostas executorand ordered
him intoisolation.
Shigeyoshi'sfierceresponsecowed many opponents,but did not break the
determination
ofthekaro.In late 1761 Yamada began to solicitsupportfora plan to
drawin thebakufu
and haveShigeyoshireplacedwithHachisukaShigetaka,a grandson
ofthefifth
daimyo,HachisukaTsunenori.Shigeyoshimanagedto dividethekarJand
further
consolidatehis controlover the domain. Shigeyoshidiscoveredthe scheme,
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1016
MARK RAVINA
orderedYamada to commit seppukuand orderedtwo other karJ,Hasegawa and
(Kasaya 1988, 25-28; Kamikawa 1915, 32-36).
Kashima,intoconfinement
His hold on the domainnow secure,Shigeyoshiresolvedto move decisivelyon
program.In starkcontrastto
retrenchment
reform:
in 1761 he declareda seven-year
ofhighrankingretainers
while
commonpractice,Shigeyoshireducedtheinvestitures
Shigeyoshialso challenged
maintaining
or increasingthestipendsofpoorerretainers.
orderinga cadastralsurveyofkarJInada Kurobei'sfief.
theimmunityoflanded fiefs,
Shigeyoshiinsisted that this was not a reprisalagainst Inada, but part of the
of stipendsunderthe yakuseiyakudakasystem.The daimyofurther
standardization
shockedthe domain establishmentby putting in prison retainersopposed to his
reforms.Shigeyoshijustifiedhis actions by arguing that such personshad been
strippedofrankforimproperconductand thensentencedto jail. Thus, samuraiwere
notbeingimprisoned.Overall,Shigeyoshishowedlittlerespectforrankand protocol.
(Kamikawa
ofmiddlingrankto highoffice
He ignoredthekarJand promotedofficials
1915, 33; Kasaya 1988, 33-38; Otsuki 1955, 140)
The domainelitewas beatenbut notdefeated.While Shigeyoshichallengedtheir
perquisitesat home, the domain elderswere conspiringwith shogunalofficialsto
arrangehis ouster.When Shigeyoshiarrivedin Edo on 1769/10/22he was presented
by the bakufuwith a fourcount indictmentof his conduct.The shogunatecharged
him with upsettingtraditionaldomain regulations,beleagueringhis subjectswith
ill-conceivedpolicies, failingto consultwith his elite retainers(kachgfudai), and
indulging in selfishdisportmentat the expense of his retainersand subjects.
but thekarJclique prevailed:on thelastdayof 1769/
Shigeyoshidefendedhis reforms
was
forimproperconduct.The retirement
10 Shigeyoshiwas orderedintoretirement
a clearvictoryfortheTokushimaold guard.Shigeyoshiwas succeededby his twelveyear-oldson, Haruaki. The yakuseiyakudakareformswere abandoned and power
returnedto the karJclique, led by Hasegawa (Kasaya 1988, 34-42; Amano 1986,
27; Otsuki 1955, 142-43).
a
of Shigeyoshisuggests,at first,a victoryforthe bakufu,
The forcedretirement
a
in
The
and
forward
defeatfordomain autonomy,
shogunate
state-building.
step
cited how Shigeyoshi'sfailureto rule his countryproperlyhad harriedthe people
kokuminnangi ni oyobi),suggestingthat the shogunatecould
(kokuseitorimidare,
intervenein the interestof the subjectsof Tokushima.Suzerainauthorityover the
people ofTokushimathuslaywiththeshogunate,not the Hachisukahouse.Yet this
logic was temperedby theshogunate'sinsistenceon maintainingthetraditionsofthe
Hachisukahouse,implyingthattheseprecedentsbound not onlythedaimyobut the
shogunateas well. Indeed, Shigeyoshiwas punished,in part, for reformswhich
violated Hachisuka tradition.Thus, even when it assertedsuzerainauthority,the
shogunatecontinuedto recognizethepatrimonialauthorityof the Hachisukahouse.
forthe futurerule of Tokushima
Accordingly,the shogunatemade no prescription
to
nor
did
the shogunateassignany agents
an
to
return
save exhortation
precedent,
The
to superviseor directTokushimapolitics.
impact of shogunalauthoritythus
the
exerted
remainedlargelyfeudal:
poweroverthe rulersof Tokushima,
shogunate
not
itself.
but
Tokushima
The case is still more problematic as an example of state-formation.The
of its strength.But the
shogunate'sabilityto deposeShigeyoshiwas a clearreflection
domain
elder who had
in
of
the
the
hands
Hasegawa Omi,
shogunateput power
directedTokushima'squiet violationof the shogunate'sdirectiveson indigo. The
victorsin this case seem to be the TokushimakarJ,who not onlyviolatedshogunal
orders,but thenused shogunalpowerto theirown advantage.
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1017
The victoryofthehouseelderslay in theirabilityto exploitthetensionbetween
feudal,patrimonial,
and suzerainauthority.
Unable to unseatShigeyoshion theirown,
theysuccessfully
used the bakufuto depose Shigeyoshiand installa pliable heir.In
doing so theyaccededto a notionof theirlordas a servantof the shogun,dependent
on shogunalsanctionforgoverningauthority.
But thekar5werehardlyshogunalallies.
The domainelite was no morewillingthanShigeyoshito cede controlovertradein
werenot
indigo.When the issue was trade,Hasegawa believedthatdomainalaffairs
the shogun'saffair,
but thoseof the "lord of the country."It is temptingto dismiss
this apparentcontradiction
as opportunism:the kar5deceivedthe shogunatein the
name of theirlord, and theirlord in the name of the shogunateas it suited their
immediateinterests.This opportunism,however,was groundedin the patrimonial
authorityof the kardhouses. Hasegawa and his allies acted to defendTokushima's
economicinterests
becausetheirpatrimony
as elite retainers
dependedon thevitality
oftheTokushimaeconomy.Theywereequallywilling,however,to deposetheirlord
whenhis reforms
threatened
theirpatrimonialclaim on the domain'spremieroffices.
in theshogunate'sindictment
ofShigeyoshi.
Thesepatrimonialconcernswerereflected
The shogunatefound him unfitfor rule because he broke with the traditionof
not as shogunalor
consultingwith his elite retainers.The karJacted consistently,
of theirpatrimony.
Tokushimavassals,but as defenders
Nations and Names
As theseexamplessuggest,greatdomainscould be definedboth as autonomous
"states" and as vassal holdingsof the shogunate.Completingthe political order,
however,was the underlyingconceptof patrimonialauthority,which legitimized
warriorpower as familypatrimony.How can we characterizesuch a multivalent
system? Concepts such as "empire" and "federation" offeruseful analytical
as "clientstates"in a
frameworks.
Domains like Tokushimaare aptlycharacterized
union.
My preference,
however,is
Japaneseempireor "states"in a Japanesefederal
forthe term"compoundstate." The term,as originallyproposedby Mizubayashi
Takeshi,highlightsthe statusof largedomainsas small stateswithina broaderstate
system."The compoundstate orderwas createdthroughthe combinationof small
statessuch as the Tokugawa domain,whichencompassedthefudai daimyoand the
and thedomainsofthecountryholdingtozamadaimyowhoweredescendants
hatamoto,
of WarringStates daimyo" (Mizubayashi1987, 279). The concatenationof these
politicalstructures
comprisedthe Tokugawastate.Althoughin isolationneitherthe
shogunatenor any of the domainswas a state,in combinationtheyexercisedmost
statepowers:the organizationof armed forces,taxation,policing,controlover the
foodsupply,and the formationof technicalpersonnel(Tilly 1975, 3-83, esp. 3-6,
70-71),
Two additionalconsiderations
supportthechoiceof "compoundstate."First,the
termaptlyreflectsthe compositelegitimacyof the earlymodernorder.Tokugawa
in two senses.It fusedmultipleideologies(Shinto,Buddhist,
ideologywas syncretic
and Neo-Confucian)in supportof multipleformsof authority(feudal,patrimonial,
and suzerain).The shogunateand the domainwerenot supportedby a singlestatist
ideology,but by severalideologicaltraditions.Thus, as seen above, the Tokushima
in domainaffairs.
kar6could simultaneously
opposeand inviteshogunalintervention
This concatenation
of ideologiesgave the earlymodernordergreatstrengthbut also
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1018
MARK RAVINA
greatinertia.When, forexample,the shogunatesoughtto replaceits liege vassals
as a recipientof
witha conscriptarmyin the late 1860s, it was actingappropriately
thusstrengthened
as a feudallord.These reforms
heaven'smandatebut irresponsibly
the shogunate'spositionas an absolutistregimebut cast doubt on its reliabilityas a
partyto a feudalcompactand as a guarantorofthepatrimonialrightsofthehatamoto.
undermined
Because of its compositelegitimacy,the shogunatewas simultaneously
effects.
and strengthened.
The term"compoundstate"capturesthesecontradictory
Second,the notionofa compoundstatedirectsour attentionto theprevalenceof
autonomousstructureswithin the early modern order. The persistenceof such
politics.Although
autonomouspowerswas morethana legacyof sixteenth-century
"country"domainswerelargelya legacyof the 1500s, theshogunateactivelycreated
An exampleis the house of Danzaemon,rulerof the
semi-autonomous
institutions.
untouchablecastes of eta and hinin.The Danzaemon house relied on Tokugawa
sponsorshipto achieve dominanceover othereta familiesin the late 1600s. The
shogunateinvestedDanzaemon with legal authorityover leatherwork and alms
seeking.Danzaemon,in turn,investedhousesbeneathhim: KurumaZenshichi,for
example,was made head ofthehininand investedwithexclusiverightsto seekalms.
Danzaemon held independentjudicial authorityoverhis people. In disputesamong
eta or hininhe was empoweredto investigatethe conflict,
pass judgment,and decree
punishmentsas severeas the death penalty.In disputesbetweencommonersand
was cededto theresponsibledaimyo,but Danzaemon
untouchables,
judicialauthority
assessed(Mizubayashi1987, 288remainedresponsible
forapplyinganypunishments
a retrogression:
Within
the
of
Danzaemon
framework
represents
state-building,
94).
than
created
another
feudalagent.
authority,
the
shogunate
rather
expandits direct
The conceptof a compoundstateallows us to understandDanzaemon as part of a
coherentpoliticalorderratherthana "schizophrenic
approachto rule."Ifwe treatthe
state order as a composite of subordinate institutions,all linked by shogunal
then the creationof independentauthoritieslike Danzaemon becomes
imprimatur,
partof a consistentpoliticalorderratherthana departurefromstate-building.
Finally, the term "compound state" avoids the implicationof a dichotomy
betweenthe shogunateand the domains. As the case of Tokushima reveals,the
shogunatewas not uniformlyin favorof a "strong"shogunate,nor the domains
in favorof"strong"domains.Rather,notionssuchas patrimonialauthority
uniformly
divide.The reluctanceof the Osaka citymagistrates
cut acrossthe shogunal/domain
to interveneagainstTokushimamakeslittlesenseif we see themsolelyas shogunal
werealso pettydaimyoand thussharedwithTokushima
agents.But the magistrates
an interestin maintainingthepatrimonialauthorityof warriorsagainstthe suzerain
authorityof the shogunate.The domaineldersof Tokushimahad a similarinterest
in a strongshogunate.If suzerainauthoritylay solelywiththeirdaimyo,theycould
notcheckhis attemptsto reducetheirpatrimonialprivileges.By treatingthedaimyo
as an agent of the shogun,the elders were able to depose Shigeyoshiwhile still
of theirdomain.
maintainingthe integrity
Writing the historyof a compoundstate involvesa distinctset of challenges.
Althoughsuch a historydoes not precludeeithersynthesisor closure,it does require
to thenationthatwe abjurepresenting
theTokugawaorderas an imperfect
precursor
state. Althoughone can findin earlymodernpolitics the antecedentsof modern
centralauthoritywas but one strandof political practice.Centralto an
statecraft,
of earlymodernpoliticsis the recognitionthatthegreatdomainsdid
understanding
not arriveat uniform,or even markedlysimilar,responsesto the challengesof a
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All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
STATE-BUILDING
AND POLITICAL
ECONOMY
1019
changingsocioeconomicstructure.
Rather,in a contentiousintellectualenvironment,
different
governments
and adaptations.
employeda broadrangeof countermeasures
The replacementof the domainswith prefectural
governmentsubject to direct
centralauthority
was amongthesignalaccomplishments
oftheRestoration.
The new
state,as H. D. Harootunianhas observed,reducedthe "polyphonicdiscoursesof the
late Tokugawa,withtheirmanyvoicesspeakingabout thesame things,to thesingle
voiceofan authoritative
discourse"(Harootunian1991, 258). In essence,thenational
policiesofthenew statewerean epitaphto domainautonomy:it was thedestruction
ofthedomainswhichmade possiblethecentralizedpowersoftheMeiji government.
The danger,however,is allowing this watershedto assume teleologicalstatus.We
mustavoid treatingstrongdomainsas an impedimentto a strongstatein orderto
with the nationas subject,an "etatist
emplotJapanesehistoryin a metanarrative
Bildungsroman"
(Geyer1989, 321-22). The taskofwritingTokugawapoliticalhistory
is thusto understanddomainpoliticsnot onlyas a precursorto the Meiji state,but
as partofa worldwhichthe new regimesystematically
destroyed.
Glossary
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ie
karo5
kokka
kokumin
I2I2
IXLR
kokuo
kokusan
XIE
kogi
AzI*
kokusei
kuni
kunimochi
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it
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