Keeping the Peace after Secession: Territorial Conflicts between Rump and Secessionist States
Author(s): Jaroslav Tir
Reviewed work(s):
Source: The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 49, No. 5 (Oct., 2005), pp. 713-741
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Keepingthe Peace after Secession
TERRITORIAL CONFLICTS BETWEEN
RUMP AND SECESSIONIST STATES
JAROSLAVTIR
Departmentof InternationalAffairs
Universityof Georgia
Secession is an attemptto resolve a domesticallybased territorialdisputeby dividinga country'shomelandterritoryinto new,secessionist (e.g., Eritrea)andrump(e.g., Ethiopia)states.Yet,the secession maynot
have resolvedthe originaldisputeto the states'satisfaction.In the aftermathof a secession, the leaderof the
rumpstateis motivatedto use forceby the benefitsof retaking(some of) the landlost to the secessioniststate,
while the secessionist state's leaderis motivatedby the benefits of acquiringeven more land. The peaceful
versus violent secession process furtheraffects whetherthese desires escalate into the use of force. The
results-based on the examinationof the consequencesof all twentieth-centurysecessions--reveal thatethnicallybasedterritorialdisputesplay a muchgreaterrole in conflict onset thando theireconomicallyor strategically based counterpartsand thatpeaceful secessions lead to peaceful relations.
Keywords: secession; partition; territorialdispute; territorialchange; internationalconflict
One of the characteristicsmarkingthe end of the cold war has been an apparent
explosion in the numberof demandsfor full-fledgedethnicself-determination,thatis,
independence.Several states have been brokeninto smaller,ethnically based countries, with consequences ranging from the peaceful interstate relations following the
breakup of Czechoslovakia, to the interventions of Serbia-Montenegro and Croatia in
Bosnia, to the apparent ability of the division to end hostilities between SerbiaMontenegro and Slovenia. The vast range of experiences has helped fuel the debate
over the desirability of acquiescing to the secessionist movements' desire to form their
own countries out of the lands of existing states. The debate has separated the scholarly
community into two diametrically opposed camps: those who view the policy as a
disastrous, unacceptable course of action that only leads to future violence (e.g.,
Horowitz 1985; Etzioni 1992; Kumar 1997) and those who see it as the only policy that
AUTHOR'SNOTE:I thankPaul Diehl, Bear Braumoeller,Dina Zinnes,JohnVasquez,Doug Stinnett,
and Doug Giblerfor theirhelp in the developmentof this article,as well as Paul Huthand ToddAllee for
sharing their territorialdispute data. The data and Stata do-files used for the analyses can be found at
www.yale.edu/unsy/jcr/jcrdata.htm.
JOURNAL
OFCONFLICT
RESOLUTION,
Vol.49 No. 5, October2005713-741
DOI:10.1177/0022002705279426
© 2005SagePublications
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JOURNALOF CONFLICTRESOLUTION
is able to preventfuturearmedconflict (e.g., Kaufmann1996; Tullbergand Tullberg
1997). Because muchof the debatehas been markedby each camppromotingits own
viewpoint, there is currentlylittle consensus on why interstaterelationsin the aftermath of state breakupare sometimes peaceful (e.g., Estonia-Russia)and in other
instances violent (e.g., Ethiopia-Eritrea).
In this work, we referto these and similarcases of statebreakupas secessions (or
partitions).More specifically,we define secession as an internallymotivateddivision
of a country'shomeland(i.e., noncolonial) territorythat results in the creationof at
least one new independent(i.e., secessionist) state(e.g., Eritrea)-with full sovereign
rights and legal recognitionby the internationalcommunity-and leaves behind the
now territoriallysmallerrumpstate(e.g., Ethiopia).'We see this type of separationas
distinctfroma de facto controlof territoryby a rebelgroup(e.g., the TurkishRepublic
of NorthernCyprus)or internalgovernmentrestructuring,even if it results in broad
autonomy-because no new state has been created-and from decolonization(e.g.,
Angolan independence)-because the new countriesare not formedout of the imperial state'shomelandterritory.Althoughmost attentionhas been paidto the post-cold
war ethnic secessions, secessions are neitherrecent nor exclusively ethnic phenomena. For instance,Sweden andNorway ended theirunion in 1905, andcountrieshave
been divided for ideological (e.g., China-Taiwan)as well as economic (e.g., Singapore-Malaysia)reasons. We thus strive for a parsimoniousapproachthat applies to
ethnicandnonethniccases alikeas well as to a timeperiodsignificantlylongerthanthe
post-cold war era.
We tacklethe issue of secession's aftermathfromthe territorialdisputeperspective
because, in their drive for self-determination,secessionists disagree with the central
governmentover who should have sovereigncontrolover not only which people but
also over what land. Hence, the disagreementis territorialin nature,and what commences as a territorialdisputewith domesticoriginsleads-if the countryis dividedto the creationof new internationalboundaries.The new boundariesseparatetwo or
more internationallyrecognized countriesthat formerlybelonged to the same state.
Forthe sakeof brevity,we referto these rumpandsecessionist statesas statesinvolved
in secessions (SISs). The aim of this workis to investigateone of the consequencesof
the bordercreation,thatis, the circumstancesunderwhich the secession attenuatesthe
underlying territorialdispute to the extent that subsequent armed confrontations
between SISs over the new boundariesare avoided.2
More formally,the focus of this projectis on the causes of international-levelmilitarizedconflict over territory(conflict for short),takingplace between the rumpand
secessionist states-or between secessionist states in the case of multilateralsecessions-that formerlyconstituteda single country.The studyaims to answerwhy some
secessions are followed by boundaryconflicts between SISs while othersarenot. By
1. This use of the termsecession is consistentwith Wood's (1981) view thatit representsa substate
unit's demandfor formalwithdrawalfrom the state on the basis of claims to independent,sovereignstatus.
Secession is thus a subsetof separatism,which involves all aspectsof political alienationthatwould reduce
the centralgovernment'scontrolover the region.
2. Domestic-level consequencesof state breakupare examinedby Tir (2005).
Tir/ KEEPINGTHEPEACEAFTERSECESSION
715
providingan explanationthatcould accountfor bothpeacefulandviolent postdivision
outcomes, we seek to inform the pro- versus antisecession debate. Furthermore,by
adoptingthe territorialdisputeperspective,we aim to extendthe territorialconflict literature'scoverageto this largelyignoredsubjectarea.In partdrivenby Holsti's (1991)
observationthat most interstateconfrontationsover the past few centurieshave had
territorialorigins, the territorialdispute approachhas become one of the dominant
ways of studying the causes of armedconflict in the field of internationalrelations.
Among many others,the approachis favoredby researcherssuch as Vasquez(1993),
Huth (1996), Huth and Allee (2002), and Senese and Vasquez (2003). Yet, this
researchvein generally focuses on attemptsto alter internationalboundarieswhile
largelyignoringthe consequencesalterationsproduce(Diehl 1999). Of the systematic
efforts focusing on the consequences of territorialchanges (Goertz and Diehl 1992;
Tir 2003), only Tir (2002) examines specifically secessions. Tir is able to show systematicallythat secessions are followed not only by conflictualbut also by peaceful
outcomes. Yet, the aim of that study is not to explain the variationsin the outcomes
eithertheoreticallyor throughmultivariateanalysis.Moreover,due to datalimitations,
the author'sabilityto takeinto accountthe consequencesof secessions occurringatthe
end of the cold warwas quitelimited.This articlethereforenot only buildson previous
studies-by developing and testing a theoreticalexplanationthat accounts for the
variance in secessions' aftermath-but also helps bridge the traditional divide
between internationaland ethnic/domesticconflict research.
In terms of policy making, we seek to identify the circumstancesunder which
dividing a countrymay-or may not-be beneficial. The extantscholarlyadvice has
been to either allow secession in every situation (e.g., Mearsheimer 1993, 1998;
Mearsheimerand Van Evera 1995, 1996, 1999) or never (e.g., Etzioni 1992; Kaldor
1996; Kumar1997). Perhapsreflective of such contradictoryadvice, policy makers
havebeen inconsistentin the mannerthey have dealtwith ethnic secessionist conflicts
(e.g., allowing Bosnia, Croatia,and Slovenia to secede but not allowing secessions of
Kosovo, Montenegro,or RepublikaSrpska).Knowing when to divide countriesand
when not to do so is importantbecausethereexist manypotentialdecision pointsin the
future when the division or preservationof a (multiethnic) state will have to be
addressed (e.g., Indonesia, Russia, Rwanda, Israel, Sudan, Iraq, Afghanistan, Sri
Lanka,Nigeria,Congo, Cyprus,Spain,Canada).The internationalcommunityis inevitably involved in such decisions because it ultimatelydetermines-by extending or
denying recognition-whether a secessionist region becomes a new country. The
internationalcommunityalso decides withinwhatbordersto recognize the new countries.The commonly acceptedrule in recentrecognitionshas been to makethe former
internal,administrativebordersthe new internationalborders.Are the policy makers
makinga mistakeby not tacklingpotentialpostsecessionterritorialdisputes?Is therea
particularaspectof the dispute(e.g., ethnicallybasedterritorialdispute)thatshouldbe
resolved at the expense-if necessary-of otheraspectsof the dispute(e.g., economically based territorialdispute)?Should the more powerful countrybe favoredin the
ensuingdistributionof the land?Wouldit be betterif the internationalcommunityrecognized new states before the secessionists take up arms againstthe centralgovernment (or before the lattertriesto suppressthe movementviolently), or is the secession
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JOURNALOF CONFLICTRESOLUTION
processirrelevant?These areall importantpolicy-makingquestionsthatarein need of
systematicallyderivedanswers.
The remainderof the studyis organizedas follows. In the next section,we presenta
model linkingsecessions with futurepeace andconflict oversecession-createdboundaries. In lieu of a literaturereview, extantworks are consultedin the developmentof
the model and associatedhypotheses.The researchdesign and empiricalresults sections follow. We close with policy-makingand researchimplications.
SECESSIONS AND SUBSEQUENT MILITARIZED
CONFRONTATIONSOVER LAND: A MODEL
We startby observing that SISs (i.e., rumpand/orsecessionist countries)may be
dissatisfied with how the secession distributedthe land between them. Throughthe
secession, the rumpstatehas lost some of the territoryit previouslycontrolledto the
secessionist stateandmay wanta portionor all of it back. Conversely,the secessionist
state may not be satisfied with how much land it has received and may desire even
more of the rump state's land.3Finally, the secessionist state may set its sights on
another secessionist state's territory, as the Armenia-Azerbaijan dispute over
illustrates.In all these scenarios,the secession was the resultof an
Nagorno-Karabakh
attemptto deal with a domestic-level territorialdispute;however, one of its consequencesmay havebeen the onset of international-levelterritorialdisputesin which the
SISs seek to redistributethe land in ways more favorableto them. Priorresearchindicates thatin territorialdisputesituations,the use of force is quitelikely: both Vasquez
(1993) andHolsti (1991) findthatcountriesaremorelikely to use force to acquireland
than to deal with any otherissues (e.g., trade,ideology).4We aim to ascertainunder
what circumstancesthe territorialoutcome of the secession will be challengedby the
use of force.
Webuilda theoreticalmodel in which we presupposethatin chargeof SISs aretheir
respectiveleaders,who areoffice holdersinterestedin improvingtheirpositionsinternationally(e.g., greaterinfluence, prestige) and domestically (e.g., extendedtenure,
promotionof theiragenda,a positiveplace in the country'shistory).Domestic support
is assumed to be importantto both democratsand autocrats.All leadersrequirethe
backing of certain domestic groups to remain in office; Bueno de Mesquita and
Siverson(1995) referto these key constituenciesas the selectorate.The model ties the
leader'sdesiresfor influence andretentionof office to the factorsrelatedto the secession to explainthe leader'swillingness to use force in the secession's aftermath.These
3. For example,in the recentEthiopia-Eritreawar,the two countriesdisagreedabouttheircommon
boundary.Some observerseven arguedthatEthiopiadid not simply want more borderlandbut wantedthe
whole Eritreaback.
4. In contrast,Brooks(1999) arguesthatterritorialcontrolis becomingless importantto statesin the
age of tradeandtechnologicaladvancement.Yet Liberman(1996) notes thatterritorialconquestis useful if
the conqueroris willing to exploit the land beyond what tradingcould accomplish.We add thatterritorial
controlis the only policy alternativethatgoes beyondprovidingat best partialcontrolover the valuableland
resources.Finally,territorycan be valuedin termsof meaning(Newman 1999;GoertzandDiehl 1992), so
the value of controllingit remainsunaffectedby modernadvancements.See below.
Tir/ KEEPINGTHEPEACEAFTERSECESSION
717
factors are postsecession territorialdisputes, the secession process, and the level of
potentialantagonismbetween certainSISs. The decision to fight to regaina lost piece
of land (from the rump state's perspective)or to extend the newly acquiredterritory
even further(fromthe secessionist state'sperspective)is influencedin partby whether
andhow muchvalue the landin questionpossesses. (Re)acquiringthe landthatcan be
used to boost the country'srelativepoweror economic clout bringsthe leadera greater
internationalinfluence. Domestically, the leader can increase his or her popularity
among those portions of the selectoratethat are concerned with the country's economic and defensive abilities and its internationalstatus. The leader can also reach
beyondthese narrowerconstituenciesby attemptingto (re)takethe landthe citizens in
generalconsiderintegralto theirnationalidentity.5Furthermore,the peaceful versus
violent process by which the secession took place presentsthe leader with potential
constraintsagainstandopportunitiesfor using force to challengethe secession's territorialoutcome.Finally,we arguethatthe relationshipbetween rumpand secessionist
statesmaybe moreconflictpronethanthe interactionbetweentwo secessionist states.
TERRITORIAL DISPUTES
From the rump state's perspective,the secession has given the secessionist state
land that the rump state may value and want back. If the lost land is valuableto the
rumpstate,by retakingthe land,the leaderof the rumpstatehopes to obtainthe previously describedbenefits. The rumpstatemay value the lost land along one or both of
the following dimensions;in turn,each manifestationof each dimensionrepresentsan
alternatepathbetween the secession and subsequentconflict. First,the land in question may have tangible (Newman 1999) or intrinsic(Goertz and Diehl 1992) value,
manifestedin strategicor economic terms.Land'sstrategicvalue arisesfromits characteristicsand/orlocation. Losing a high groundor an impenetrableswampor desert
may makethe countryeasierto invadeandthusundermineits defensiveability.Losing
a piece of landcontainingresourcessuch as ore deposits,ports,and so on undermines
the rump state's economic-and, by extension, military-capability. The desire of
countriesto pursuepower is one of the cornerstonesof the realist school of thought,
andat least some realistsview the role of territorialcontrolas crucialto a state'spower
(e.g., Spykman1944;Mackinder1919;Morgenthau1948; GochmanandLeng 1983).
Controlof importantstrategicand economic lands can thus be regardedas contributing to a country'spower base, so the rumpstatehas an incentiveto contest the loss of
the landvaluedalong the tangibledimension.This agendais expectedto resonateparticularlywell among the portion of the selectoratethat is concernedwith or would
directlybenefit from the acquisitionof such lands (e.g., business enterprises,defense
contractors,border-regionpopulation).
Second, the leader may want to use force to reclaim the lost land because it possesses meaning to the country's citizens. Such land is thought to have intangible
5. Note thatleadershope to derivethe relevantbenefits:they do not have sole controlover the outcomes (e.g., remainingin office), as they also dependon otherfactors(e.g., electorallaws, political opponents).Thus, the benefitsderivedfrom territorialconquestdo not guaranteethe achievementof the desired
goals.
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JOURNALOF CONFLICTRESOLUTION
(Newman 1999) or relational(GoertzandDiehl 1992) value. Valueas meaningmanifests itself in forms representingadditional paths to territorialconflict: ancestral
homeland (e.g., Kosovo to Serbs), a religiously significant site (e.g., Jerusalem),or
landinhabitedby ethnicbrethren(e.g., Hungariansin westernRomania).Importantly,
scholars(Touval1972; Vasquez1983; GoertzandDiehl 1992; Diehl 1999) arguethat
intangibilityintensifiesthe willingness to fight for the land.In termsof the model, the
acquisition of such lands is likely to appeal to a potentially larger portion of the
selectorate,broadeningthe leader'spopularityandlegitimacyandgiving him or heran
additionalincentive to use force. Yet, because of currentdata limitations,we cannot
test for the impactof the nonethnicaspects of intangiblevalue; we thus focus on the
ethnic componentof intangiblevalue, althoughsimilar argumentshold for its other
manifestations.From the citizens' perspective,the foe-controlledland inhabitedby
theircoethnics is perceivedas integralto the nationalidentityand is thereforeseen as
(1) personal,(2) indivisible, and (3) unsubstitutable(Gottman1973; Sack 1986). (1)
The people feel as if theyhavea personalstakein the landpopulatedby theircoethnics.
Acquisitionof these landsbringsto the largerportionof the citizenrya greatersense of
rewardthandoes, say, a coal mine because the rewardfrom tangiblyvaluableland is,
somewhatironically,seen as more abstract.Hence, the people will be more likely to
rewardthe leader who acquiresthe coethnics' territory.(2) Having anotherpartyin
control of even a portionof this land can lead to feelings that the state is not whole
because it does not encompass the entire nation. In contrast,the coal mine could be
dividedor shared.(3) Anotherpiece of territorycannotsubstitutefor the originalone
because the emotional attachmentsto the coethnics' land cannot be replicatedelsewhere (e.g., evacuatingthe remainingSerbs from Kosovo and resettlingthem in Serbia properis seen as unacceptable).In contrast,a differentsource of coal could be
found. Furthermore,the attachmentstend to persistfor generations,meaningthatold
disputescan be revisitedeven afterprolongedperiodsof peace. Due to reasons(2) and
(3), the controlof landspopulatedby ethnicbrethren-and of intangiblyvaluedlands
in general-tends to be an all-or-nothingventure,so peaceful compromise,division,
andland sharingaredifficultif not impossible.The benefits-drivenleaderwill have an
easier time convincingthe generalpopulationthatmilitarizedactionis the only alternativeofferingaccess to the desiredland.In contrast,it is both comparativelyeasierto
compromiseovertangiblyvaluedlandsandharderto convincethe broaderselectorate
thatfighting is necessary;hence, a violent approachis expected to be less beneficial
for the leader.
From the perspectiveof the leader of the secessionist state who is contemplating
whetherto use force to redrawthe secession-createdmap,the key differenceis thathis
or her countryhas not lost land due to the secession. Instead,to receive the benefits of
territorialconquest,the leaderfocuses on obtainingeven more land;the targetof the
leader's desire can be eitherthe rumpstate or anothersecessionist country.An argument could be made thatthe leader'sopportunityto profitfrom additionalterritorial
gains may be limited.Throughthe secession thatestablishedit as a new, independent
country,the secessionist state has alreadyreceived large swaths of territory;this has
decreasedsubstantiallythe totalvalue of the landthe secessionists wantedpriorto the
secession. In turn, this would make the leader's willingness to become involved in
Tir/ KEEPINGTHEPEACEAFTERSECESSION
719
futureconflict over territorylow. Yet this may not be the case in two situations.First,
through the secession, the secessionist state obtained only a portion of the land it
hopedto acquire,as indicatedby territorialclaims the secessionist statemakesagainst
otherSISs afterthe secession. Second, the secessionist stategainedonly a segmentof
the landoccupiedby the ethnicbrethren.Because this territoryis likely to be perceived
as indivisible (Newman 1999; Diehl 1999), partialgains arenot likely to decreasethe
value of the remainingterritoryto a greatextent.In eithercase, the leadercan profitif
the secession failed to resolve the territorialdisputethatmotivatedthe secession to the
country'ssatisfaction.Thus, similarto the rumpstate'sleader,the secessionist state's
leaderis motivatedto use force by the benefitsof conqueringterritorythe constituents
find valuable.The above discussion leads to the following hypotheses:
disputeswithone anotherwill be morelikelyto
Hypothesis1: SISsinvolvedin territorial
experiencemilitarized
disputes.
conflictthanSISswithno territorial
Hypothesis2: SISswithterritorial
disputesinvolvinglandsoccupiedby ethnickinwill be
thanSISswithterritorial
morelikelyto experiencemilitarized
conflictoverterritory
disputesinvolvingtangiblyvaluedland.
Extantliteratureoffers preliminarysupportfor these expectations.Findings from
the territorialconflict literatureconfirmthatthe presenceof territorialdisputespositively affects the probabilityof conflict (e.g., Senese and Vasquez2003; Huth 1996;
Hensel 2000). Moreover,the roles of intangible-including ethnic-factors' intensifying influence are supportedby Goertz and Diehl (1992), Vasquez(1983), Bremer
(1992), and Huth (1996). However,apartfrom Goertzand Diehl (see also Tir 2003),
none of these works examines these issues in the context of territorialdisputes that
resultfrom alterationsof internationalboundaries.While Goertz and Diehl consider
this context,they do not investigatethe consequencesof secessions, andtheiranalysis
is limitedto whetherthe statethathas lost landis consideringto recoverit by the use of
force; that is, the additionalterritorialambitionsof the state that has alreadygained
land(i.e., the analogueof the secessionist state)arebeyondthe scope of theirwork.6
The (ethnic) secession literaturedoes not, unfortunately,offer much systematic
evidence aboutthe impactof territorialdisputeson futureconflict; yet, a host of case
studies opposing secession develops an argumentabout futureconflict based on the
territory'sethnic value. Mindful of problems following secessions in areas such as
India,Ireland,Palestine,and the formerYugoslavia,a groupof antisecessionauthors
(e.g., Hachey 1972; Fraser 1984; Horowitz 1985; de Silva and May 1991; Etzioni
1992; Brown 1993; Posen 1993; McGarryand O'Leary 1993; Kaldor 1996; Kumar
1997) arguesthatSISs arelikely to push for violent postsecession territorialrevisions
becauseit is impossiblefor the secession to createethnicallyhomogeneousstates.The
domestic problems associated with the poor treatmentof minoritieswill create tensions between the states, as each state seeks to protectits ethnic brethrenwho have
been "left"in the otherstate.The nationalistleaderswill pushfor the redrawingof bor6. This is similarto Huth's(1996) theoreticalapproach,which accommodatesonly one challengerto
the territorialstatusquo. Here,both the rumpand secessionist statescan challenge the postsecession status
quo.
720
JOURNALOF CONFLICTRESOLUTION
dersby force, thatis, for addressingthe secession-created,ethnicallybased territorial
disputes. Even the secession's supportersacknowledge these dangers. To ensure
postsecessionpeace, Kaufmann(1996, 1998) andTullbergandTullberg(1997) advocate (forced) population transfersthat would eliminate territorialdisputes. (Note,
however,thatthis may simply shift the value of the territorytowardanotherintangible
value-that is, ancestral-dimension.) Even if this logic appearscompelling,it entails
at least two shortcomings.The ethnic territorialdisputeissue is assumedto both exist
in every case andbe the sufficientcause of conflict. In contrast,we allow for the possibility thatethnicallybased territorialdisputesare not ever-presentand thatotherfactors may tempertheirpronenessto escalate into the use of force.7
SECESSION PROCESS
We furtherarguethathow the secession was conductedmay constrainthe leadersof
SISs against using force to revisit the secession-createdboundaries.The two basic
processes consideredare peaceful and violent secessions. Vasquez(1993) maintains
thatterritorialwarscan be avoidedif disputantsagreeon how to allocatethe contested
land (see also Kocs 1995;Huth 1996). Applyinghis logic to the secession context,this
means that an agreed-on secession either preemptsor rendersfutureterritorialdisputes so minor thatthey are not worthfighting over. Vasquez'slogic of agreement's
benefits can be expanded:the partiesreceive benefits such as land, securityguarantees, or evenjust a decreasein uncertaintyover theirfutureinteractions.The threatof
the loss of benefits and the reputationalcosts of breakingthe agreementdecreasethe
utility of futureconflict. If, in contrast,the secession results from violent confrontations, the boundaryis imposedand,at best, preemptsthe futureterritorialdisputeonly
in the eyes of one of the states.8
Vasquez(1993) arguesfurtherthatmutuallyacceptableborderscan be negotiated
bothbefore andafterviolent confrontations(i.e., a postwarsettlement).We agreewith
the initialpartof the logic suggestingthatpeaceful secessions would bringpeace. We,
however,rejectthe implicationthatpostsecessionistconflict settlementsbringpeace9
andinsteadmaintainthatsecessions precededby violence createincentivesfor future
confrontations,regardlessof whetheran agreementhas been signed.
Peaceful secessions constrainthe SISs' leadersagainstfutureuses of force. At the
time of the secession, the leadersusuallysign an agreementindicatingthattheyaresatisfied with the distributionof landbetween theircountries.The leaderwho uses force
7. Althoughthe focus of the secession literatureis predominantlyon the ethnicvalueof the territory,
Schaeffer(1990) notesthe significanceof strategiclandsin makingthe argumentthatsecessions createrivalries overlandcontrolthatmay escalatethe competitionto the nuclearlevel, as in the MiddleEastandIndian
subcontinent.In addition,in their studies of the Israelipursuitof expandedborders,both Newman (1999)
and Vanzo(1999) arguethatIsraelhas had an interestin obtainingstrategicallyandeconomicallyvaluable
territory.
8. If the conflict's winnerwas not able to conquerall the lands it sought, it too has an incentiveto
revisitthe secession-createdboundary.SequentialIsraelienlargementis an exampleof such unilateral"settlement,"showing that the initial, secession-relatedterritorialgain was insufficient.
9. Likewise, Werner(1999) reportsthatwar-endingtreatieshave no effect on the durationof subsequentpeace.
Tir/ KEEPINGTHEPEACEAFTERSECESSION
721
to revisitthe outcome of a peaceful secession risks bringingan arrayof possible costs
(e.g., damagedinternationalreputation,difficulty in securingtradearrangements)to
the country.The leaderwho attemptsto rally the country'speople againstthe foe will
thusbe hard-pressedto find much supportand may even be perceivedas jeopardizing
the country'ssafety and reputationfor personalgain.
Yet a peaceful, agreed-onsecession is not a guaranteeagainstfutureterritorialconflict. Preferencesover land distributioncan change-due to a change in the country's
leadershipor generalpolitical climate-and the leadercan actuallyreceive domestic
supportfor renegingon an agreementthathas become unpopular.In some cases, the
secession-relatedboundariesmay have been unpopularfrom the startbecause the
leaderssigning the associatedagreementdid not reflect the population'spreferences
or becausenonviolentcoercionwas appliedagainstthe leaderat the negotiatingtable.
Both states can fall victim to this problem:the futurerump state could be pressured
into relinquishinglandit did not wish to give up, while the would-be secessionist state
could be pressuredinto scaling down its territorialambitions.In fact, the leaders of
SISs areoftenpressuredby the internationalcommunityto acceptthe previouslyinternal, administrativeborders as the new internationalboundaries.In sum, peaceful,
agreed-onsecessions presentconstraintsbut not guaranteesagainstthe use of force.
In contrast,the leadersareconstrained,to a lesser extent,againsttakingmilitarized
action to revisit the outcome of a violent secession. In the rumpstate, the leadercan
rally the people against the secessionist state by claiming that the loss of land was
unjustandthatthe countrymustwardoff the possibility of futuresecessions by showing thatno such actionwill stand.In some cases, no agreementfollowing the confrontationhas been signed,meaningthattherearefew reputationalandloss of side benefits
costs. In postconflict agreementcases, the leaderof the rumpstate can claim thatthe
agreementwas made under duress and is hence null and void. Given the preceding
armedconfrontation,he or she is more likely to be believed by the constituentsand
internationalobserversthan a leader of a rump state who lost land peacefully. The
imposed agreementthus fails to constrainthe leader.For the secessionist state, it is
possible thatits violent secession victorywas incomplete.Its leadersdesireeven more
of the rumpstate'sland,andthey recognizethe opportunityto derivebenefitsby pushing further.If therewas a postconflictagreement,the secessionist statecan claim that
the conflict-basedagreementis illegitimatebecause it was signed underbattlefieldor
third-partypressure.10
In additionto the lack of restraints,the violent breakupmay actuallyencouragethe
use of force in the futurefor at least threeinterrelatedreasons.First,violent secession
involves the mobilizationof armedforces on both sides. Demobilizationmay not be
rapid due to lingering, fighting-relatedtensions. The presence of mobilized armed
forces makes it easier for the leadersto use this instrumentin dealing with the other
state. Second, violent secession elevates military leaders to the position of power,
10. Even in the cases of internallymotivatedsecessions thatwere ultimatelyenabledby the internationalwardefeat(e.g., thebreakupof Austria-Hungaryfollowing WorldWarI), statesinvolvedin secessions
(SISs) are facing a similarincentivestructure.In both scenarios,the secession is violently imposed against
the rumpstate's wishes, while the leadersof the secessionist state may be dissatisfiedwith how much land
was given to them because thirdpartiesdeterminedthe new borders.
JOURNALOF CONFLICTRESOLUTION
722
especially in the secessionist state.Such leadersare,arguably,morepronenot only to
rely on uses of force but also to engenderfeelings of mistrustand insecurityin the
rumpstate.This may serve to increasethe statureof militaryleadersin the rumpstate,
creatinga similarpronenessto use force. Finally,the secessionist fighting helps constructemerging,international-levelbilateralrelationson the basis of enmity.This creates suspicionon both sides, makingfutureuses of force appearmore appropriateand
justifiable to the selectorate(see Lustick 1993).
We arguefurtherthata similarexpectationholds for the relationshipbetween two
secessionist states following a multilateralsecession. The above logic implies that a
peaceful departureof secessionist regions indicates that the would-be secessionist
states accept the proposed territorialdivision-both vis-a-vis one anotherand the
rumpstate.In contrast,violence betweenthe would-besecessionistregionspriorto or
during the secession and over domestic-level sovereignty issues is an indication of
seriousproblems.The would-berumpstate-with its preponderantpoliticalandmilitarypower-is expected to have preventedthe secession-mindedregions from fighting one anotherwhile they all still formedthe same country.If the supposedlydominant force was unable to prevent the violence, it is likely that once this factor is
removed,the postsecessionrelationswill be problematic.A case in point is the Armenia-Azerbaijanconflict, which startedpriorto the dissolutionof the Soviet Union and
grewto a full-scale territorialwarafterthe two republicsbecameindependent.Linking
this observationto the model, the presecessionviolence betweentwo would-besecessionist stateslowers the thresholdat which the leaders'use of force is deemed acceptable by theirrespectiveconstituents.The leaderscan arguethatthe boundaryvis-a-vis
the other secessionist statehas been imposed on the countriesagainsttheirwill. This
argumentis more believable if the two secessionist groups have fought each other
immediatelypriorto or duringthe statebreakupprocess." In sum, we expect thatin
both the rump versus secessionist and the secessionist versus secessionist states
contexts, the following hypothesis will hold:
Hypothesis3: SISs aremorelikelyto experiencefutureconflictoverterritorywithone
anotherif theywereengagedin a violent-as opposedto a peaceful-secession.
The territorialconflict literatureoffers somewhatmixed supportfor the hypothesis.
GoertzandDiehl (1992) find thatpeaceful alterationsof bordersareno betterin terms
of futureconflict preventionthantheir violent counterparts.In contrast,Tir's (2003)
results-based on examining boundarymovements between two existing statesshow that the peaceful approachis beneficial. Furthermore,both Huth (1996) and
Kocs (1995) find thatlegally defined (which, by definition,meanspeacefully agreedon or, in their language, "settled")bordersare rarelyfought over. Yet none of these
works offers a directtest of the hypothesis because they do not examine specifically
the process of boundarycreationvia secessions.
11. Note, however,thatpeaceful presecessionrelationsarenot a guaranteeof futurepeace. The prior
peace may have been a peace imposed by the preponderantpower(e.g., Russia).
Tir/ KEEPINGTHEPEACEAFTERSECESSION
723
The broaderinternationalconflict literatureimplicitly supportsthe hypothesis.
Applying the reciprocityargument(e.g., Goldsteinand Freeman1990; Rajmairaand
Ward1990) to secession suggeststhatif violence was used to promptthe secession, the
futureuse of nonviolenttechniquesto retakethe landwill be viewed as a sign of weakness on the rump state's part and is thus avoided. Unlike reciprocity,in which two
states direct similartypes of behaviortowardone another,reinforcement(e.g., Most
andStarr1980; KirbyandWard1987) involvesrelyingon a previouslysuccessfulpolicy. In the secession context,this would meanthatif the secessionist stategainedland
throughviolence, thenviolence appearsas a fruitfulpolicy for dealingwith additional
territorialambitionsagainstboth the rumpand other secessionist states.
Finally,in the contextof ethnicsecessions, Kaufmann(1996, 1998) proposesa diametricallyopposedexpectation:violent secessions arelikely to be followed by peaceful relations.He arguesthatdividing countriesis the only real solution to interethnic
civil wars. The conflict producesethnic "unmixing,"a situationin which people flee
and seek protectionamong their own kin. By creatingseparatecountries, secession
finalizesandformalizesthe homogenizationprocessas well as dividesthe belligerents
andallows themto live on theirown andin chargeof theirown affairs.This will allegedly create few interethnicproblems within the SISs. Internationally,the SISs will
havelittlereasonto intervenein each other'sminorityaffairs,so the leaderswill not be
able to benefit from the uses of force. Althoughthe authordoes not explore the converseformof the argument,it would suggestthatpeaceful secessions do not entailethnic unmixingand thereforeopen up the possibility for the mistreatmentof minorities
andsubsequentmilitaryinterventions.Sambanis(2000) puts Kaufmann'sassertionto
empiricaltest but finds thatsecessions areno betteror worse in endingcivil warsthan
other solutions. Although important,this finding does not speak directly to our
hypothesisbecause examiningthe consequencesof peaceful secessions is beyond the
scope of Sambanis'swork.
Also contradictingthe hypothesis are the secession's opponents, such as Hachey
(1972), Fraser(1984), Horowitz (1985), de Silva and May (1991), Etzioni (1992),
Brown (1993), McGarryand O'Leary (1993), Posen (1993), and Kumar(1997). By
arguingthat all secessions will inevitablyfail to preventfutureconflict because new
internationalborderscannotbe drawnin mannersthatcreateethnicallyhomogeneous
states,they implicitly statethatthe secession process is irrelevant.The cases of Palestine, Ireland, and India are often cited in support, even though each involved
presecessionviolence.
Only a small segmentof the secession literaturesupportsthe hypothesis.Tullberg
andTullberg(1997; see also Gurr1993; Tir2002) criticizeKaufmann(1996) by arguing that people who flee conflict zones will want to returnto reclaim their land. (In
termsof ourmodel, this meansthatviolent secessions provideincentivesfor leadersto
seize upon the landreturnissue and use force againstthe othercountryto bettertheir
politicalstatus.)Instead,they maintainthatpeaceful secessions-preceded by a referendumon whetherto keep the countrytogether-are the only way to avertfuturevio-
724
JOURNALOF CONFLICTRESOLUTION
lence. Furthermore,Maoz (1989) confirmsour expectation,even thoughhe relies on
an analysis of decolonization and on a different conflict-producingreasoning. He
arguesthatnew, decolonizing statesthatgained statehoodthroughviolence areunder
pressureto establishthemselvesby showing a willingness to use force. If they areperceived as weak or reluctant,their reintegrationmay be attempted.In contrast,states
that gained independence peacefully are under no such pressure because their
statehoodis viewed as more legitimate.
RUMP-SECESSIONIST STATE INTERACTION
Whetherforce is used to challengethe territorialoutcomeof the secession may also
dependon the type of countriesinvolved.The secession is likely to createmoretension
between the rumpand secessionist states thanbetween two secessionist states. Each
new secessionist statemustdismantleits union with the rumpstate,while the dissolution vis-a-vis other secessionist states is more or less automatic;in fact, some secessionist statesmay even cooperatewith one anotherto facilitatetheirdeparturefromthe
union (e.g., the Baltic republics,Slovenia-Croatia).The rump-secessionistrelations
are,in contrast,not off to as good of a start.The rumpstatemayharborresentmentover
havinglost landto the secessionist state,while the secessioniststatemaybe suspicious
of the intentionsof the rumpstate-which may include rolling back the secessionand of the rump state's patronizingbehavior(e.g., Russia's "we know best" attitude
towardthe former Soviet republics). In the rump state, the resentmentwill make it
politically less controversialfor the leaderto use force to deal with issues-including
the distributionof territory-that arisewith the secessionist state.Similarly,the secessionist state's leader can arguethat the use of force is appropriatebecause the state
needs to send a signal of determinationand strengthin dealing with the rump state.
These dynamicslowerthe thresholdfor using force to deal with the territorialoutcome
of the secession. In short:
Hypothesis
4: Interactions
betweenrumpandsecessioniststateswillbe moreconflictprone
thaninteractions
betweentwo secessioniststates.
The territorialconflict and secession literaturesdo not explore this possibility. A
potentiallyrelevantargumentis madeby the prospecttheory(Levy 2000). According
to this view, the leaders will adopt a more risk-acceptantbehavior-which includes
loweringthe thresholdfor the use of force-when theyoperatein the domainof losses.
The rumpstate'sleadershiparguablyoperatesin the domainof losses because this is
the statethathas lost landthroughthe secession. The secessioniststate'sleader,in contrast,may be operatingin the domainof gains and adopta morerisk-averseapproach
in ordernot to gamble away the state's independence.Despite the similaritybetween
this and our argument,note thatthe predictionsdiffer somewhat:we predictthatboth
the rumpand secessionist states will be likely to use force in their dealings with one
another.Aftera considerationof the theoreticallinkagesbetweenthe key variablesand
postsecession territorialconflict, we turnto the researchdesign issues.
Tir/ KEEPINGTHEPEACEAFTERSECESSION
725
RESEARCH DESIGN
OPERATIONAL DEFINITIONS
Secession and relevantSIS dyads. We definedsecession as an internallymotivated
divisionof a country'shomeland(i.e., noncolonial)territorythatresultsin the creation
of at least one new independentstate-with full sovereignrightsandlegal recognition
by the internationalcommunity-and leaves behindthe now territoriallysmallerrump
state.Small andSinger's(1982) definitionof the stateis used to determinewhetherthe
secessionistregionqualifiesas a full-fledged state,while the Tiret al. (1998) list of territorialchanges helps us determinewhetherthe new states have been createdout of
homelandterritories.According to these coding rules, the Germanand Koreandivisions at the end of WorldWarII areexcludedbecausethey do not representcases of an
Yettwo grayerareacases associatedwith decolointernallymotivatedstatebreakup.12
nization-the divisions of IndiaandPalestine-are included.Consistentwith the definition employed, the Muslim populationin Indiaand the Jewish populationin Palestine werepursuingstatesseparatefromtheirneighborsas the colonialrulewas nearing
its end, thus indicatingan internalmotivationfor the division. Arguably,these arenot
so muchcases of decolonizationbutcases of stateformationout of the homelandterritory of the state that the neighboringgroups wanted to form after British departure.
This is clearerin the Indiancase, while the Palestiniancase is more debatable.A portion of Palestinebecame Israel, while the remainderwas incorporatedinto Jordan,a
state emerging from the neighboring and likewise British mandate territory of
Transjordan.These cases are analyzed in just about every prior study of secession's
aftermath,so their omissions would renderthis work less capableof speakingto this
literature.In any case, the inclusion of these cases has little effect on the results.
A relevantdyad is composed of a pair of states thatbelonged to the same unified
statepriorto the secession (e.g., Ethiopia-Eritrea).This rule is sensible for secessions
thatproduceonly one secessionist state,but in cases with multiplesecessionist states
(e.g., the breakupof the Soviet Union), matching all possible pairs produces some
apparentlyirrelevantdyads (e.g., Estonia-Kazakhstan).An alternativepossibility is to
consideronly those dyadsthataredirectlycontiguous(i.e., includeEstonia-Latviaand
Estonia-Russiabut not Estonia-Kazakhstan).This solution, however,ignores potential ties thatthe once-dominantrumpstatemay haveto the territoryof a noncontiguous
secessionist state.For instance,Russia may lay claim to partsof Kyrgyzstanbased on
the presence of a sizable Russian minority.As a sensible compromise,we adoptthe
politically relevant dyad (PRD) concept (Maoz and Russett 1993) commonly
employed in the internationalrelationsresearchas our main approach:in this study,
politicallyrelevantdyads are all contiguousdyads emergingfrom the same stateplus
all rump-noncontiguous-secessioniststatepairs.The PRDs resultingfrom all twentieth-centurysecessions are listed in the appendix.To ensure that the results are not a
12. AlthoughAustria-Hungary'sbreakupwas promptedby its defeat in WorldWarI, we includethis
case because the division of the countryhad a strong internalimpetus:the breakupof the state has been
sought by its many ethnic groupsfor some time.
726
JOURNALOF CONFLICTRESOLUTION
functionof the dyadselectionrule,we rerunthe analyseson all andon only contiguous
dyads.
Dependent variable. The dependentvariableis the onset of fatal militarizedconflict over territorythattakes place between two SISs. To operationalizethis concept,
we consultGhosn,Palmer,andBremer(2004), who providea listing of all militarized
interstatedisputes(MIDs)'3through2001 andnotebothwhetherthey involvedcasualties and were fought over territory.14
To evaluatehypothesis 1, we use all fatal MIDs
listed, butfor the otherhypotheses,we use only those instancesin which the fatalMID
concernedterritorialcontrolfor at least one of the disputants.The dataarearrangedon
a yearly basis, so the interactionwithin each dyad is trackedfor every year afterthe
secession; dyad-yearis thereforethe unit of analysis. To verify the robustnessof the
findings, both nondirected(testing for conflict involvement)and directed(testing for
conflict initiation) designs are employed. The relatedfatal territorialMID rates are
about 3 percentand 1.5 percent,respectively.
Territorialdispute.We rely on HuthandAllee's (2002)15data,which note the presence of territorialdisputesandreportwhetherthe disputedlandis valuedalong a set of
mutuallynonexclusiveindicatorsrepresentingthe land'sethnic,economic, andstrategic values.The territory'seconomic andstrategicvaluesrepresentdifferentmanifestations of the tangibledimensionof the land'svalue.Indicatorsof intangiblevalue other
thanethnicmanifestationareunfortunatelynot availablefromthis or otherdatasets at
this time. We thus employ the ethnic value as the sole indicatorof intangiblevalue.16
Initially,we attemptedto include all three dimensions of value for each partyin our
statistical equations, but this created multicollinearityproblems because territorial
claims are often reciprocated.We thus had to modify our original design by simply
notingthe existenceof a particulartype of territorialdisputewithinthe dyad,insteadof
assigningchallengerandtargetcategories.We feel comfortablewith this compromise
because the initial results suggested that the dyad members'behavior mirrorseach
other (see Tir 2001) and because the directed dyad results-in which we trackthe
behavior that the challenger directs toward the target-closely resemble the
nondirectedfindings.
13. A militarizedinterstatedispute(MID) is definedas "aset of interactionsbetweenor amongstates
involvingthreatsto use militaryforce, displaysof militaryforce, or actualuses of militaryforce... these acts
must be explicit, overt, nonaccidental,and governmentsanctioned"(Gochmanand Maoz 1984, 587).
14. Analyzing only fatal MIDs eliminates less serious confrontations(e.g., fishing disputes) and,
becausenonfataldisputesin theThirdWorldoftengo unreported,reducesthe Westernbias in the dataset.
15. To Huth's(1996) list, coveringthe periodfrom 1918 to 1995, we addterritorialdisputesoccurring
in the earlyandlate partsof the twentiethcenturyusing similarcoding criteria.The sourcesfor the extension
and additionalcoverage of the data set include Allcock (1992), the New YorkTimes,Facts on File, World
Almanacand theBookof Facts,Keesing'sArchives,CIA's WorldHandbook,Encarta,EncyclopediaBritannica, and so forth.
16. Huth(1996, 256-7) defines a disputedpiece of land as economically valuedif it containsnatural
resourcessuch as oil, iron ore, uranium,and so on; strategicallyvalued if it is in close proximityto major
shippinglanes, chokepoints,militarybases, attackroutes,andso forth;andethnicallyvaluedif it contains"a
minority[that]speaksthe same languageandsharesthe same ethnicbackgroundas the largestethnicgroup
within the challenger"state;see the source for full definitions.
Tir/ KEEPINGTHEPEACEAFTERSECESSION
727
Secessionprocess. The Tiret al. (1998) list of territorialchanges codes a change as
violent if there was organized,violent conflict in the year precedingthe change. The
coding rule shows that twenty-eight (out of sixty-six, about42 percent) SISs parted
underviolent circumstances.
Rump-secessioniststate interaction.Using Tir et al.'s (1998) list, we distinguish
dyads composed of rump and secessionist states from dyads made up of two secessionist states.
Controlvariables.In additionto the factorsthatmay contributeto the leader'swillingness to use force consideredin the model, severalotherinfluences may temperor
exacerbatethe chances that the leader actually does so. First, whether a leader uses
force to reconfigurethe new boundarymay be determinedin partby the country'srelative abilityto (re)takethe land;in fact, losing a warcan cost the leaderhis or her office
(Bueno de MesquitaandSiverson 1995). The importanceof power distributionis well
documentedin the internationalrelationsresearch,even though there is a disagreement about which distributiontype--balance (e.g., Morgenthau1948; Waltz 1979;
Mearsheimer1993, 1998; Mearsheimerand VanEvera 1995, 1996, 1999) or preponderance(e.g., Organskiand Kugler 1980; Bremer 1992)-is best for keeping peace.
We rely on the Correlatesof Warmaterialcapabilities for states' yearly composite
measuresof power.Following the commonpractice(e.g., RussettandOneal2001), in
the nondirectedanalyses, we note the dyad's relativepower configurationby taking
the naturallogarithmof the strongerto weakerstate'spowerratio.The powerratiocalculationis adjustedslightlyin the directedanalysesby measuringthe ratiobetweenthe
initiator'sandtarget'spowerlevels. Using the originaloperationalizationproducedno
appreciablechange in the findings.
Second, extant literaturehas shown that democracies tend to interactpeacefully
with one another(e.g., Russett and Oneal 2001). If a leader of a democraticcountry
wantsto challenge anotherdemocracyover the outcome of a secession, he or she will
face normativeand/orstructuralimpedimentsopposing successful militarymobilization againstthe targetcountry.Therefore,the leader's agenda of territorialconquest
againstanotherdemocracyis unlikely to generatemuch support.To distinguishpairs
of democracies from mixed or nondemocraticpairs, Polity data (Jaggers and Gurr
1995) are used.
Third,the anarchicalnatureof the internationalenvironmentdictatesthatbeing on
good termswith countriessharingcommonsecurity interestsis especially important.
Acting againstsuch a countrybringsto the leaderinternationalanddomesticcosts and
consequently rendersit more detrimentalto pursue the path of violence to acquire
land. To assess the presence of common security interests, we use Singer's (1995)
alliance data.
Fourth, the role of geographic proximity between the members of the dyad is
importantbothbecausethe country'sabilityto projectits force dropsoverdistanceand
because issues closer to the homelandare perceivedas more salient (Vasquez 1995).
Yet the readershould note thatthis well-documentedfactor(e.g., Bremer 1992) may
be less influentialin the postsecession context.Most secessions producenot only con-
728
JOURNALOF CONFLICTRESOLUTION
tiguous states but also states with a sharedhistory.Dispute salience may hence not
decrease as sharply over distance. Furthermore,because the rump state exercised
influence over the entire presecession territory,it has an in-depthknowledge of the
secessionist state'sterrain.This, in turn,makes it easier for the rumpstateto act militarilyover distance.We use the contiguityby land measure(Stinnettet al. 2002). The
datafor all of the abovecontrolvariablesareobtainedfromBennettandStam(2000).
Fifth, we also controlfor the potentialimpactof leadershipchange. A new leader
may be more willing to challengeviolently the secession-createdboundarybecause it
was eitheragreedto by or imposedon someone else. Forthe generalargumentlinking
leadershipchange to conflict, see Chiozza and Goemans (2003). Finally, a dummy
variableidentifiesdyadsresultingfrom the disintegrationof the Soviet Union. It controls for potentialinfluences relatingto this uniquehistoricalevent thatcontributeda
sizable portionof cases to our sample.
METHOD OF ANALYSIS
To evaluate the hypotheses, we rely on the Cox regression (Cox 1975; BoxSteffensmeierand Jones 2000) with robuststandarderrorsand repeatfailures.17This
method of analysis is appropriatefor longitudinaldatawith a binarydependentvariable whose valueis almostalwayszero (Beck 1998). In addition,it relaxesthe assumptions (1) of durationindependence,(2) of independencebetweenconflicts, and(3) that
the dataare not censored,which are made by othercommonly used methods such as
logit (Long 1997). Relaxing the formerand latterassumptionsis particularlyimportantbecause our dataset is composed of both older andrecentsecessions, which have
had an unequal opportunityto experience conflict. In terms of interpretingthe Cox
coefficients,we observethe impactof independentvariableson the hazardrate(probability of failure [i.e., conflict] at a given point in time, given survivalup to thatpoint)
ratherthanthe usual,directimpacton the probabilityof conflict. Aside fromthe technical difference,the substantiveinterpretationof the coefficients is actuallysimilarto
logit.18
EMPIRICAL RESULTS
We begin by reporting,in Table 1, the resultsof nondirectedanalysesthatfocus on
SIS dyad members'pronenessto become involvedin fatal MIDs with each other.In
additionto the observationthat all statisticalmodels are highly significant,we note
thatmost of the resultsreportedare consistentwith the hypotheses--even when controllingfor othercorrelatesof conflict. Startingwith hypothesis 1, the territorialdis17. Robuststandarderrorsaccountfor the fact thatobservationsfrom the same dyad areinterrelated.
The repeat-failuresetup is used because one confrontationdoes not exhaust the possibility of future
confrontations.
18. Cox regressionwas chosen overothereventhistorytechniquesbecauseit is nonparametric,meaning that it relies on fewer and weaker assumptionsaboutthe shape of the durationdistributionthan other
techniques(e.g., Weibull,exponential;see Box-Steffensmeierand Jones 2000).
TABLE 1
Cox Regression Estimates of Fatal Postsecession Militarized Conflict In
Variable
Territorialdispute
Strategicterritorialdispute
Economic territorialdispute
Ethnic territorialdispute
Violent secession
Secessionist-only dyad
Relative power
Allies
Dyadic democracy
Contiguity
New leader
Soviet Union dummy
2(df)
n
Model 1:
MIDs, PRDs Only
3.040***
3.629***
-1.226***
-0.269**
0.480*
-0.829
0.558
-0.322
1.353*
48.80***(9)
1,433
Model 2:
TerritorialMIDs,
PRDs Only
Model 3:
TerritorialMIDs,
All Dyads
T
Con
(0.929)
(1.219)
(0.459)
(0.126)
(0.331)
(0.783)
(0.886)
(0.375)
(0.934)
-0.654
0.474
3.136**
3.160***
-1.075*
-0.291*
0.681**
-0.769
-0.468
-0.130
1.056
97.25***(11)
1,433
(0.645)
(0.926)
(1.303)
(1.106)
(0.726)
(0.189)
(0.331)
(0.830)
(1.076)
(0.333)
(0.951)
-0.645
0.411
3.243***
3.728***
-1.179**
-0.282*
0.703**
-0.795
-0.390
-0.143
1.086
118.82***(11)
2,174
(0.643)
(0.945)
(1.267)
(1.112)
(0.711)
(0.193)
(0.330)
(0.843)
(1.159)
(0.333)
(0.950)
-0.3
0.8
3.7
3.2
-0.9
-0.2
0.8
-0.9
0.0
1.3
105.2
1,223
NOTE:Cell entriesreportcoefficients androbuststandarderrors(in parentheses).Unit of analysis is a nondirecteddyad-year.
secessions (SISs). MID = militarized interstatedispute;PRD = politically relevantdyad.
*p < .10, one-tailed. **p < .05, one-tailed. ***p < .01, one-tailed.
729
730
JOURNALOF CONFLICTRESOLUTION
pute coefficient is significantand positive in model 1, meaningthatthe relationships
between SISs arestronglyinfluencedby the presenceof unresolvedborderissues. The
finding that the existence of territorialdisputes significantlyincreases the hazardof
fatalMIDs helps extendthe territorialdisputeresearchinto the postsecession context.
To put this finding into perspective,a look at the datareveals thatterritorialdisputes
arepresentin about88 percentof the SIS dyads. Given thatwe arguedthatsecessions
result from territorialdisputes with domestic origins means that secessions' success
rateis about 12 percent.This figurecan be comparedto anotherprocessthatresultsin
the creation of new borders,namely, decolonization. Applying the Huth and Allee
(2002) datato boundariescreatedby decolonizationin the twentiethcenturyreveals
that they are disputedat a rate of 34 percent.The secession's proclivity to generate
territorialdisputesis thereforequite high.
Yet, SIS leaders could be making territorialdemandswithout a resolve to follow
them up with uses of force. Hence, it is importantto assess the risk to peace posed by
the frequentpresenceof territorialdisputes.Territorialdisputesescalateto fatalMIDs
in about24 percentof the SIS dyads.This escalationrateis notablybetterthanfor the
decolonization-relatedterritorialdisputes (43 percent).In sum, despite the relatively
high percentageof SIS dyads with postsecession territorialdisputes,the escalationto
territorialMIDs is farfrom inevitableand low in comparisonto the cases of decolonization. This finding contradictsthe statementsof secessions' opponents,who claim
that all secessions are likely to lead to conflict over the new borders.
To determinewhich aspectsof territorialdisputesareparticularlyproblematicand
to evaluatethe empiricalaccuracyof hypothesis2, we directour attentionto model 2.
In this model, the dependentvariableis a fatalMID fought over territorialissues, and
the territorialdisputesaredifferentiatedaccordingto theirunderlyingcharacteristics.
The hypothesisreceives strongsupport:the ethnicvaluecoefficientis not only positive
and significant,butin its importance,it also easily surpassesthe insignificantstrategic
and economic (i.e., tangible)value coefficients. The leadersof rumpand secessionist
states find more rewardin fighting for territoriesthat would unite lands occupied by
ethnic kin than in fighting for lands thatwould increasetheircountries'economic or
militarymight. As arguedabove, fighting for ethnically valued lands is expected to
have a broaderpopularappeal.Furtherincreasingthe importanceof fightingfor ethnically valuedlandis the fact thatthe secession itself has helpedelevatethe statusof this
issue on the country'sagenda.Given that most twentieth-centurysecessions involve
separationof ethnic groups means that SISs tend to define themselves along ethnic
lines. As a consequence,the objectiveof bringingall the kinsmenunderone roof, so to
speak, providesthe leaderswith a significantpotentialpayoff.
A closer look at the data reveals that ethnically based territorialdisputes among
SISs arethe most commontype:they occurin about80 percentof the dyads,while the
economically and strategicallybased territorialdisputesarepresentin 52 percentand
36 percentof cases, respectively.A comparisonto decolonizationrevealssome differences in the natureof territorialdisputes:landis most often contestedon the economic
basis (23 percent),somewhatless frequentlyon the basis of ethnicity(20 percent),and
quite rarelyon the strategicbasis (5 percent).Yet the greaterfrequencyof ethnically
basedterritorialdisputesin the postsecessioncontextdoes not translateinto an unusu-
Tir/ KEEPINGTHEPEACEAFTERSECESSION
731
ally gravethreatto peace:only about26 percentof such disputesescalate,which is less
thanone-halfof the ratefor similardisputesin the decolonizationcontext(56 percent).
The strongsupportfor hypothesis2 indicatesthatthe findingsfrompriorterritorial
conflict research(e.g., Goertz and Diehl 1992; Huth 1996) hold in the postsecession
contextwhile discreditingcommonrealistargumentsthatpower-related(i.e., strategic
and economic) territorialdisputesare the focus of states'interactions.In termsof the
secession literature,the resultsshow thatthe debateappropriatelyfocuses on the most
important culprit of postsecession conflict: ethnically based territorialdisputes.
Hence, both opponents(e.g., Horowitz 1985; de Silva and May 1991; Etzioni 1992;
Posen 1993; McGarry and O'Leary 1993; Kumar 1997) and proponents
(Mearsheimer1993, 1998; MearsheimerandVanEvera 1995, 1996, 1999; Kaufmann
1996, 1998) accuratelyidentifythis issue as important.Yet, again,the opponentstend
to overstatethe gravityof the problemposed by the presence of such disputes.
The behavioranalogousto the findingsfor the firsttwo hypothesescan be foundin
the cases of the Serbo-Montenegrinand Croatianinterventionsin Croatiaand Bosnia
in the early 1990s. The rumpstate(Serbia-Montenegro)fought the secessionist states
(CroatiaandBosnia) with the goal of bringingthe Serb-inhabitedlands in both countriesunderits control.Croatiahad a similaragendaof expandingits bordersover Croatian-inhabitedpartsof Bosnia. In fact, the interventionsconcentratedon the poorer
and less-developedregions of Croatiaand Bosnia, suggesting only a peripheralinterest in acquiringeconomically or strategicallyvaluablelands. The Serbs concentrated
much of their initial war effort on the eastern portion of Bosnia, while Croatians
focused on Herzegovina;both areasare poor in resourcesand industry-two characteristicsfor which centralBosnia is actuallywell known. Likewise, most of the Serb
war effort in Croatiawas focused on the lands inhabitedby ethnic Serbs and not on
economically or strategicallyimportantareas.
Examplesof secessionist statesattackingtheirrumpcounterpartsalso can be easily
found. In both the 1908 Bulgariansecession from the OttomanEmpireand the 1919
Finnishsecession from the Soviet Union, the secessionist countriesfought lateron to
acquireadditionalterritoriesinhabitedby theirethnicbrethren;the same landsheld little economic or strategicimportance.Finlandjoined WorldWarII-and did so on the
Axis side, despitethe fact thatit was the only democracyto do so-exclusively to fight
the Soviet Union and push its boundaryeastward.Similarly,Bulgariaparticipatedin
the First (successfully) and Second (unsuccessfully) Balkan Wars to acquire even
more of the Ottoman-controlledlands inhabitedby Bulgarians.
Next, we turnto hypothesis3. Both models 1 and 2 show thatthe violent secession
coefficientis significantandpositive. The findingthatviolent secessions significantly
increasethe hazardof futureconflict is consistentwith the hypothesisandrelatedtheorizing:peacefulsecessions makeit morecostly anddifficultfor the leadersto use force
thando violent secessions. An SIS dyadwhose memberspartedpeacefullyhas experienced futurefatalconfrontationsoverlandin only about5 percentof the cases; for violent secessions, this figure skyrocketsto 43 percent.In the decolonizationcontext,we
also find thatpeacefully establishedbordersareless likely to be fought over (15 vs. 31
percent);this finding is consistentwith Maoz's (1989) argumentthat statesemerging
from peaceful decolonizationare more peace loving than those that had to fight for
732
JOURNALOF CONFLICTRESOLUTION
their independence.Yet, importantly,the secession process variableproduces more
extremeoutcomesthandoes its decolonizationcounterpart.The differencein the hazardthata violently-as opposed to peacefully-created borderwill be fought over in
the secession contextis muchgreater(8.6 times) thanis the case for the decolonization
context (2.1 times). This means that the stakes relatingto how the secession is performedarequitelarge.In fact, the resultspresentedin Table 1 indicatethatin termsof
substantiveimpact,the process variablerivalsthe ethnicterritorialdisputevariableas
the most influential.Sweden-NorwayandIndia-Pakistancases, for example,illustrate
thatthe secession process has substantialinfluence on the qualityof futurerelations.
The former,peaceful secession has producedpeaceful relationsover the past century,
while the latter,violent secession has resultedin numerousconfrontations,including
full-fledged wars.
Although the finding that peaceful secessions lead to peaceful relationsmay not
soundall thatsurprising,this findingis quiteimportantin the contextof territorialconflict research.Despite the expectationthatpeaceful alterationsof bordersare beneficial, GoertzandDiehl (1992) fail to show this empirically.In fact, this is only the second systematic empirical study (the exception is Tir 2003) to show that peaceful
alterationsof bordersare beneficial and the first study to show this specifically for
secessions. The findingsextendthe territorialconflict literature'sargumentscontending thatpeacefully agreed-onbordersare rarelyfought over (Kocs 1995; Huth 1996)
to the contextof secessions. The findingsalso havebearingon the secession literature.
We find evidence contradictingthe expectationsthatall secessions lead to futureconfrontations,regardlessof the secession process (e.g., Horowitz 1985; de Silva and
May 1991; Etzioni 1992; Posen 1993; McGarryand O'Leary 1993; Kumar1997), or
that violent secessions lead to peaceful relations (Mearsheimer 1993, 1998;
Mearsheimerand Van Evera 1995, 1996, 1999; Kaufmann1996, 1998). Instead,we
offer first systematic empiricalevidence supportingTullbergand Tullberg's(1997)
and Gurr's(1993) arguments.
The final hypothesis,hypothesis4, arguesthatrump-secessionistrelationswill be
more adversarialthan relationsbetween two secessionist states. This will affect the
thresholdat which the leadersfind it profitableto use force. The hypothesisfinds some
supportin four out of the five models presentedin Table 1. The results suggestthough by no means strongly-that the main axis of territorialconflict lies between
rumpandsecessionist states.We investigatebelow whetherthe prospecttheory-based
explanationthattherumpstatesarethe likely initiatorsis responsiblefor the finding.
Before turningto the control variables,we assess the robustnessof our findings.
Recallingthe discussionon the topic of which sets of SIS dyadsto includein the analyses, we rerunmodel 2 using all dyads (model 3) andonly contiguousdyads (model 4).
In model 5, we dropthe controversialIsrael-Jordancase; similarresults(not reported)
obtain if the India-Pakistancase is dropped. The new findings resemble the ones
reportedfor model 2 closely.
As an additionalcheck of the findings'robustness,we use the directeddyaddesign.
This design allows one to go beyond analyzingconflict involvementand observeconflict initiation.Assuming no preemptivestrikes,much of our logic suggests that the
statedissatisfiedwith the secession-createdborderswill be the one to rely on the use of
Tir/ KEEPINGTHEPEACEAFTERSECESSION
733
force. Table 2 presentsmodels 6 through 10, which follow the setup of the first five
models and evaluatethis portionof the argument.The first three hypotheses remain
applicablein the (territorial)conflict initiation context, although some changes are
notable.First,the economic territorialdisputecoefficient is now significant,suggesting thatthese disputesmay providethe leaderswith sufficientpayoff to use force. Nevertheless, the earlierfinding that the ethnically based territorialdisputes provide the
greatestpayoff to the leaderstands.In model 7, the lattervariablehas abouta 1.5 times
(or 50 percent)greaterimpacton the hazardof fatalconflict initiationthanthe former.
Second, we noted earlierthatthe process variablehad a slightly largerinfluence than
the ethnic territorialdispute variable.In the initiationcontext, the differenceis more
discernible.The hazardof a fatal territorialMID being initiatedis 2.1 times (or 110
percent)greaterif the secession was violent thanif the potentialinitiatordisputesthe
target'sterritorialholdings on an ethnic basis.
In termsof the final hypothesis,we investigatewhetherthe prospecttheory-based
explanationfor the greaterincidence of conflict between rumpand secessionist states
is accurate.The related argumentmaintainsthat-all other things being equal-the
leaders of rump states will be more likely to risk using force to alter boundaries
becausethey areoperatingin the domainof losses. Accordingly,we changethe related
variableto reflect whetherthe countryinitiatinga fatal (territorial)MID is the rump
state. The incorrectcoefficient signs in every model indicatethatthe prospecttheory
interpretationfinds no support.The reason for the lack of supportmay be that the
secessionist statealso operatesin the domainof losses. It is possible thatthe secessionist state'sconstituentsandleadersee the disputed,rumpstate-controlledlandas rightfully theirs.The inabilityto controlthe landis thusinterpretedas a loss thattook place
duringthe establishmentof the secessionist state.Both statesthereforehave a similar
psychological perspectivetowarddesiredlandscontrolledby the foe. In sum, we find
more convincing evidence to supportthe original explanation,arguingthat the main
axis of conflict lies between rumpand secessionist statesratherthanthe prospecttheory-based alternative.
We finally turnto the resultsfor the controlvariables.Tables 1 and 2 revealthatthe
control variables do not perform as well as the key explanatoryvariables in the
postsecession context. The relative power and dyadic democracy coefficients
come the closest to meetingourexpectations,even thoughthey aresignificantonly by
the weakest of standardsand not in every model. Ratherthan challenging the wellestablisheddemocraticpeace findings, the lacklusterperformanceof the democracy
variablemay be a reflectionof too little varianceon this variable,as few SIS pairsare
democratic.The alliance variableresults, to some extent, resemble the contradictory
argumentsfoundin the literatureover whetherallies aremoreor less likely to fight one
another(e.g., Maoz 2000). Furthermore,we alreadypointedout thatthe effect of proximity may be mutedin the postsecession context, andthis is what we find. The results
aresimilarfor the leadershipandSoviet Union controls.Changeof leadershipdoes not
appearto provide an additional impetus to challenge the border and-despite the
momentousnatureof the Soviet Union's collapse-the relatedSISs do not show much
evidence of acting differentlythan SISs emerging from the breakupsof other states.
TABLE 2
734
Cox Regression Estimates of Fatal Postsecession Militarized Conflict
Variable
Territorialdispute
Strategicterritorialdispute
Economic territorialdispute
Ethnic territorialdispute
Violent secession
Rump state
Power advantage
Allies
Dyadic democracy
Contiguity
New leader
Soviet Union dummy
2(df)
n
Model 6:
MIDs, PRDs Only
2.667***
Model 7:
TerritorialMIDs,
PRDs Only
Model 8:
TerritorialMIDs,
All Dyads
(0.737)
-0.789
(0.584)
1.342**
2.018***
(0.723)
4.254**
(1.806)
-0.660
(0.537)
0.101*
(0.072)
0.347
(0.341)
(0.780)
-1.062*
-0.308
(0.782)
(0.437)
-0.169
(1.254)
0.966
78.52***(11)
2,899
-0.775
(0.746)
1.332**
(0.588)
2.061***
(0.714)
4.544***
(1.850)
-0.643
(0.530)
(0.074)
0.103*
0.358
(0.342)
(0.778)
-1.062*
-0.210
(0.881)
-0.185
(0.431)
0.964
(1.231)
95.78***(11)
4,389
T
Cont
(0.622)
3.846**
(1.603)
(0.632)
-0.604
0.071
(0.068)
(0.298)
0.089
-0.968
(0.773)
(0.725)
0.277
-0.293
(0.580)
0.363
(1.141)
101.48***(9)
2,899
-0.4
1.4
2.1
3.8
-0.7
0.1
0.3
-1.1
-0.0
1.2
78.6
NOTE:Cell entriesreportcoefficients androbuststandarderrors(in parentheses).Unit of analysis is a directeddyad-year.Eac
cessions (SISs). MID = militarized interstatedispute; PRD = politically relevantdyad.
*p < .10, one-tailed. **p < .05, one-tailed. ***p < .01, one-tailed.
Tir/ KEEPINGTHEPEACEAFTERSECESSION
735
TABLE3
Summaryof Key Findings
ViolentBreakup
Peaceful Breakup
Boundaryis contested on the High hazardof fatal militarized Medium hazardof fatal militarized
interstateconflict over the
basis of ethnicity
interstateconflict over the
boundary
boundary
Boundaryis not contested on Medium hazardof fatal
Low hazardof fatal militarizedinterthe basis of ethnicity
militarizedinterstateconflict
state conflict over the
over the boundary
boundary
POLICY MAKING AND RESEARCH IMPLICATIONS
Secession is of coursebutone way policy makerscan deal with domestic-leveldisagreementsover the degree of self-rulethatsubstategroups should have; alternatives
includepolicies such as culturalor territorial(butshortof full sovereignty)autonomy,
consociationalor other power-sharingarrangements,and so on. Yet the aim of this
projecthas not been to comparethe benefitsof variousoptions-that importanttaskis
left to futureresearch-but to determinewhat makes one particularoption, namely
secession, likely to succeed or fail. Perhaps the most important insight is that
postsecessionistrelationsbetween SISs are dominatedby the factorsassociatedwith
secessions and that the standardconflict reductionapproaches(e.g., Mearsheimer's
[1993, 1998] insistence on creatingthe balancedpower distributionbetween SISs)
may not be all thathelpful.This meansthatpolicy makersneed to focus on how to distinguishbetweencountrieswhose division is likely to lead to a lastingpeace versusthe
ones in which secession would lead to a disasterin futureinterstaterelations.To simplify the presentationof the above results,we focus on the two variablesthatemerged
as most important:ethnicallybased territorialdisputesand secession process.19Table
3 presentsa gridestimatingthe relativedangersof postsecession conflict based on the
two factors.Policy makerscould use this schematicto determinewhethersecessions
may be an appropriatepolicy choice for a countrydealing with internalsovereignty
problems.
If thereis a consensus on how to divide up the country'slandthatwould not lead to
the creationof ethnicallybasedterritorialdisputesbetweenSISs andif the division can
be conductedpeacefully, there is little reason to stand in the secession's way. More
problematicare the cases in which there is a disagreementover the location of the
postsecession boundaryand/orin which the centralgovernmentor secessionists use
force to impose theirwill. Yet,in at least some of these situations,a proactiveapproach
can be helpful.First,the currentconventionalwisdom has been to acceptthe old internal bordersas the new internationalboundaries.This strategyhardly optimizes the
19. Note, however,that the currentproject does not addressthe potentialcausal links between the
severityof pre- and postsecession violence. A futurestudy could explore whethersecessions promptedby
full-fledged civil wars set the stage for futurefull-scale territorialwarsbetween SISs.
736
JOURNALOF CONFLICTRESOLUTION
chances for future peace, especially if ethnically based territorialdisputes are left
behind. Changing the location of the boundary to resolve these disputes-at the
expense, if necessary,of creating strategicallyand, to a lesser extent, economically
based disputes-can help. Second, if it is not possible to resolve impendingethnically
based territorialdisputes, policy makers should keep in mind that peacefully conductedsecessions can negatethe problematicinfluenceof these disputes.Forinstance,
Czech Republic and Slovakia separatedpeacefully and laterpeacefully alteredtheir
border-showing that such disputes can be resolved constructively given the
precedentof peaceful interactions.
Disputants therefore stand to gain much from peaceful secessions. Resolving
potentialborderissues will be more productiveif the protagonistscan negotiatethe
new boundaries. Unilaterally imposed, violent "solutions"are unlikely to induce
peace except in those rarescenariosin which a violent secession does not leave behind
an ethnicallybasedterritorialdispute(e.g., Slovenia-Yugoslavia).Morecommonly,the
combatmay createthe boundarythatgives the winneradditional-but unimportantlands, while the loser may have lost key lands and remainin possession of territories
thatit cares little about.A peaceful secession could avertsuch scenariosandthe need
to reexaminethe bordersin the future.Also, peaceful,agreed-onsecessions createdisincentivesagainstthe futureuse of force, throughreputationalandloss of side benefits
costs. Forbothreasons-and also to avoid the loss of humanlife in combat-peaceful
secessions are preferredto their violent counterparts.
Giventhatfew stateswillingly give up land,the criticalquestionthenbecomes how
a secession can occurwithouthavingthe disagreementsover landcontrolbetweenthe
centralgovernmentandsecessionistsescalateto the pointof organizedviolence. From
the policy-makingstandpoint,internationaleffortscould be used to ensurea peaceful
breakup.This canbe done by offeringmediationefforts,puttingpressureon the adversariesto work theirproblemsout peacefully,and not waitinguntil violence occurs. It
often takes a while before secessionist desires evolve into full-fledged violence, but
the internationalcommunityhas been so incapableof facingthe prospectandrealityof
statebreakupthatit has often failed to react in time. For instance,the initial phase of
the disintegrationof Yugoslavia-between the election of independence-mindedleaders in SloveniaandCroatiaandthe declarationsof independencethatled to the onset of
war-took well over a year (March1990 to June 1991). In general,the lack of timely
reactiongives the centralgovernmenta green light to eitherignore the secessionists'
frustrationsor to repressthe groupfurther.Faced with such prospects,the secessionists may feel thatthey have little otherchoice but to press for a violent secession. This
chain of events has ultimatelyled to secessionist violence and, in some cases, to the
violent breakupof the state. As our results show, the violent secession scenariois an
invitationfor futuredisaster.The advice to policy makersis to take a more proactive
approachto addressthe grievancesof secessionists who aredemandingthe establishment of theirown state.The internationalcommunityholds the power of recognition,
and it can use it as leverage againstboth the centralgovernmentthat is unwilling to
compromise(i.e., threatenrecognition)and the secessionists who are makingunreasonabledemands(i.e., withholdrecognition).If pressureis put on the centralgovem-
Tir/ KEEPINGTHEPEACEAFTERSECESSION
737
ment to resolve the grievancespeacefully, the secession demandmay be dropped.If
the demandis not dropped,conductingthe secession peacefully is preferable.
Fromthe scholarlyperspective,the questionof how to achievepeaceful secessions
shouldbe pursuedin futureresearch.Groundworkfor relatedstudieshas alreadybeen
laid. Young's(1997) examinationof the pathto peaceful secessions revealsthatat least
ten mutuallyinterlockingconditionsneed to be present;amongthem, the centralgovernment'sconsentto let the secessionist region withdrawis the absoluteminimalnecessary conditionthatneeds to be met. Yet Young'sresearchdesign (i.e., investigating
only the cases of peaceful secession) preventshim from determiningwhat conditions
may be sufficientfor a peaceful secession. That is, the full arrayand complete influence of potentiallyrelevantvariablesneeds to be investigatedby including cases of
both peaceful and violent secessions. Additionalinsights are offered by Heraclides's
(1997) study of seventy separatistwars. She finds that fighting for secession is not a
very effective strategy,as only five of these wars resultedin independence.Although
this studydoes not tell us directlyhow secessions can takeplace peacefully,combining
its insightswith those fromYoungsuggests thatdecentralizedstatepowercan be helpful in two ways. First,by avoidingdominanceof stateinstitutionsby anothergroup,it
reducesthe chancesthatthe prospectivesecessionistgroupwill feel thatit has no other
way of improvingits situationthanto push for a violent secession. Second, decentralized power reduces the centralgovernment'scapabilitiesto fight; the governmentis
thus more likely to seek resolutionthroughcompromisethanthroughviolence and a
no-secession-at-any-costattitude.Furthertheoreticaldevelopmentthatwould include
additionalkey variables(e.g., internationalsupportfor the secessionist cause, presence of secessionistcoethnicsin a neighboringstate,majorpowersupportfor the preservationof the state, geographicaldistributionof the pro- and antisecession groups,
economic inequalities,historyof strife)andsystematicevaluationsof relatedhypotheses are necessary steps that the researchon secessions needs to pursue. That is, the
importanceof buildingon Heraclides'sandYoung'sstudiesis only highlightedby the
currentproject: the process of breakupnot only has immediate consequences on
whether breakup-relatedviolence will erupt but also sets the stage for long-term
interactionsbetween SISs.
738
JOURNALOF CONFLICTRESOLUTION
APPENDIX
List of Politically Relevant Dyads Produced by Twentieth-Century Secessions
Year
1903
1905
1908
1913
1919
1919
1919
1919
1919
1919
1919
1919
1919
1919
1919
1919
1919
1921
1921
1922
1947
1948
1949
1960
1961
1965
1971
1990
1991
1991
1991
1991
1991
1991
1991
1991
1991
1991
1991
1991
1991
1991
1991
1991
1991
1991
1991
1991
Dyad Members
Colombia
Sweden
Turkey
Turkey
Austria
Austria
Estonia
Germany
Hungary
Latvia
Poland
Poland
Soviet Union
Soviet Union
Soviet Union
Soviet Union
Soviet Union
China
Turkey
GreatBritain
India
Jordan
China
Mali
Egypt
Malaysia
Pakistan
South Africa
Armenia
Armenia
Croatia
Estonia
Georgia
Kyrgyzstan
Kyrgyzstan
Latvia
Latvia
Lithuania
Moldova
Russia
Russia
Russia
Russia
Russia
Russia
Russia
Russia
Russia
Panama
Norway
Bulgaria
Albania
Czechoslovakia
Hungary
Latvia
Poland
Czechoslovakia
Lithuania
Latvia
Lithuania
Estonia
Finland
Latvia
Lithuania
Poland
Mongolia
Yemen
Ireland
Pakistan
Israel
Taiwan
Senegal
Syria
Singapore
Bangladesh
Namibia
Azerbaijan
Georgia
Slovenia
Latvia
Azerbaijan
Kazakhstan
Uzbekistan
Belarus
Lithuania
Belarus
Ukraine
Armenia
Azerbaijan
Belarus
Estonia
Georgia
Kazakhstan
Kyrgyzstan
Latvia
Lithuania
(continued)
Tir/ KEEPINGTHEPEACEAFTERSECESSION
739
APPENDIX (continued)
Year
1991
1991
1991
1991
1991
1991
1991
1991
1991
1991
1991
1991
1991
1992
1992
1993
1993
1993
Dyad Members
Russia
Russia
Russia
Russia
Russia
Tajikistan
Tajikistan
Turkmenistan
Turkmenistan
Ukraine
Uzbekistan
Yugoslavia
Yugoslavia
Croatia
Yugoslavia
Czech Republic
Ethiopia
Yugoslavia
Moldova
Tajikistan
Turkmenistan
Ukraine
Uzbekistan
Kyrgyzstan
Uzbekistan
Kazakhstan
Uzbekistan
Belarus
Kazakhstan
Croatia
Slovenia
Bosnia
Bosnia
Slovakia
Eritrea
Macedonia
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