EU - PaPErs
The European Union’s Central Asia Strategy and Uzbekistan: Performing soft power
Farkhod Tolipov
THE EUROPEAN UNION’S CENTRAL
ASIA STRATEGY AND UZBEKISTAN:
PERFORMING SOFT POWER
• Relations between the European Union and Central Asia have a centuries-old
history. Having been revitalised after the dissolution of the former Soviet Union,
Eurocentrism began to manifest itself in Central Asian lifestyle, political outlooks,
education and culture. The EU’s Central Asian strategy was laid down on the fertile
ground of this newly evolving Eurocentrism.
• The 2007–2013 strategy, albeit very important and relatively successful, was
in many ways more tactical than strategic. This previous period allowed Europe
to accrue unique experience in Central Asia. However, the EU has faced twofold
hurdles for the implementation of its strategy in this region: a geopolitically
charged environment and pro-status quo political regimes strengthened by war
in Ukraine and recent tragic events in Paris.
• The new strategy should be worked out on both conceptual and practical levels by
critically revising various perceptions of Central Asia. A more accurate examination
of the correlation between the bilateral and regional dimensions of the strategy is
strongly needed.
• In particular, the new strategy should be more “aggressive”. This means shifting
from a simple, general dialogue with the target country based on axiomatic ideas
and principles to a more meaningful dialogue based on explicit and prompting
criteria to implement those ideas and principles.
• The collaborative value-driven and value-oriented activity of the European
organisations should be strengthened for a dual effect: as a challenge for the nondemocratic states of Central Asia, especially Uzbekistan, and to bring advantages
for the people of Central Asia. The latter will obviously be the major added value
that the EU can offer.
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The European Union’s Central Asia Strategy and Uzbekistan: Performing soft power
of the Spanish envoy Ruy González de Clavijo by
Timur in 1404 – often mentioned today in official
rhetoric and university-level history lessons – reflect
the long tradition of communication between
Central Asia and Europe due to the ancient Silk
Road. This official and reopened historical context
influenced the creation of a somewhat pro-European
state foreign policy and a “Eurostandard” worldview
by ordinary people.
A certain degree of Eurocentrism continues to
characterise Uzbekistan’s foreign policy in the new
era. Current EU-Uzbekistan relations have several
dimensions and are affected by various factors.
I. Retrospective view
The period from 1991 to the present has been
controversial yet promising. Although most of the
When examining the European Union’s (EU) Central
European states established diplomatic relations with
Asian strategy from its inception in 2007 until the
Uzbekistan in 1992, its cooperation within the larger
present, it is hard not to overlook the discrepancy
EU framework started in 1996 with the signing of
between the discursive level of this strategy and the
the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA)
operational one. In other words, there is a divergence
in Florence by the President of Uzbekistan Islam
between the proclamation and the implementation
Karimov during his visit to Italy.
of the strategy. This is a twofold issue that stems from
Europe’s perception of and attitude toward Central
The
bilateral
dialogue
frameworks
between
Asia, and vice versa: the Central Asians’ perception
Uzbekistan and the EU have acquired a corresponding
of and attitude toward Europe.
institutional base and include five joint bodies: the
Cooperation Council; the Cooperation Committee;
Although overall relations between Europe and
the Parliamentary Cooperation Committee; the
Uzbekistan were established and developed since
Subcommittee on Trade and Investments; and the
the collapse of the former Soviet Union in 1991,
Subcommittee on Justice, Home Affairs, Human
earlier contacts between them have a long historical
Rights and Related Issues. It should be noted that, from
background. Independence triggered great interest
the start, the European strategy towards Central Asia
in this historical past. With the restoration of the
has been determined by a normative and soft power
name and memory of the greatest Uzbek ruler,
policy. The European agenda in the region comprises
Amir Timur, the historical fact of his empire’s
cooperation in spheres such as trade, investments,
communication with the French and Spanish kings
information and communication technologies and
was also revisited. The letter sent by Timur to the
education, as well as democratic reforms, good
King of France, Charles VI, in 1402 and the reception
governance and the protection of human rights.
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The European Union’s Central Asia Strategy and Uzbekistan: Performing soft power
Despite the reasonably good start of EU-Uzbekistan
The visit was preceded by opposition from Uzbek
relations in 1990s, these were existentially tested
human rights organisations who criticised the EU for
in the first decade of the 2000s. When in May 2005
receiving the Uzbek leader. Nevertheless, it seemed
the terrorist group Akromiya attacked the provincial
that Uzbekistan’s agreement on the transport of goods
Uzbek town of Andijan, law enforcement forces
to Afghanistan was made in exchange for better
cracked down on them, but hundreds of innocent
EU-Uzbekistan relations. The visit also seemed to
civilians were killed during the counter-terrorist
convey a message to its domestic audience: that the
operation. The US and European countries blamed
frozen period of EU-Uzbekistan relations was over,
the Uzbek government for its “indiscriminate use of
that the EU had forgiven Uzbekistan for “Andijan
force” and demanded an international investigation of
2005” and that the Uzbek President had restored his
the events in Andijan. Uzbekistan, however, cited its
international legitimacy.
sovereignty and refused the demand. That same year,
the EU imposed sanctions on Uzbekistan in response.
The sanctions were lifted between the end of 2008 and
2009, in large part due to the German chairmanship
Nowadays, the rapprochement between Uzbekistan
and Europe fluctuates between symbolic gestures
and pragmatic efforts. Trade and investments are
of the EU in 2007.
the priority for Uzbekistan in its cooperation with
On 24 January 2011, the Uzbek president visited
forums that frequently take place in Tashkent have
the EU and NATO Headquarters in Brussels. He
routinely become platforms for demonstrating
met with European Commission President José
investment potential and overall positive trends in the
Manuel Barroso, EU Energy Commissioner Günther
bilateral cooperation of Uzbekistan with the European
Oettinger, as well NATO Secretary-General Anders
countries.
Fogh Rasmussen. The latter official maintained that
the Alliance had not invited the president, but that the
visit had been initiated by Tashkent. Rasmussen also
commented on NATO’s continuous dialogue with all
of its partners, including a dialogue on democracy
and human rights. Another topic discussed during
the meeting was the operation in Afghanistan and
the transit of cargo through Uzbek territory. During
this visit, the sides agreed to establish a European
Delegation in Uzbekistan, signing a Memorandum
of Understanding on energy cooperation and a
Memorandum of Intent on the implementation of
the Development Cooperation Instrument’s (DCI)
Indicative Programme for 2011 to 2013.
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the European countries. In this respect, the business
Interestingly,
Uzbekistan/Central
Asia-Europe
relations were bolstered by the launch of the Northern
Distribution Network (NDN) and the promotion of
the New Silk Road strategy by the United States. The
NDN was established for the transfer of humanitarian
cargo from Europe to Afghanistan and the withdrawal
of troops, equipment and other supplies from
Afghanistan through the territory of Central Asia,
primarily Uzbekistan, to Europe. The new regional
dynamics related to the situation in Afghanistan
spurred the activation of EU-Uzbekistan interactions.
It is noticeable that defence ministers and other highranking officials from European countries visited
The European Union’s Central Asia Strategy and Uzbekistan: Performing soft power
Tashkent to coordinate the withdrawal of their troops
countries such as Afghanistan, where much remains
via the NDN.
to be done in securing the democratic path.” For this
Meanwhile, Europe attracts Uzbek students and
scholars with opportunities for education and research.
to come true, the strategy must be strengthened to
become much more strategic than tactical.
Today, hundreds of Uzbek students are studying in
In this regard, a critical evaluation of the previous
European universities and acquiring higher degrees.
strategy and a creative approach to the new one is
Europe is also attractive for businesses, and the EU is
crucial. Having made a very interesting and strong
Uzbekistan’s second largest foreign trade partner.
analysis of the strategy’s content and effectiveness
Although the Eurocentrism of Uzbekistan and
the Uzbek people has the potential to grow, recent
in Central Asia, EUCAM has presented some
assumptions that I would like to comment on, below.
experiences confirm that the central challenge for
1. “The EU’s main focus in Central Asia should be on
both sides will be how they manage the EU’s normative
bilateral relations, rather than regional approaches.
agenda and strategic interests.
The Central Asian states have become more diversified
and expect to build their own bilateral relations with
Europe.”
II. Inspective glance
The implementation of the EU’s Central Asian Strategy
from 2007 to 2013 provided important experiences
and lessons for both sides. As many argue, its general
effectiveness can hardly be evaluated as high. Despite
this, the very existence of the strategy helped secure
Europe’s presence, albeit low profile, in the region.
The context in which the next stage of the EU-Central
Asia cooperation will develop will likely be even more
controversial and dynamic. As Federica Mogherini,
the EU High Representative/ Vice President (HRVP),
said of the EU’s new Special Representative for
Central Asia: “The appointment of Peter Burian will
show the EU’s continued cooperation with Central
Asia, ensuring strong presence in our engagement on
key issues of mutual interest including the rule of law,
security, energy, water, education and human rights.
Central Asia is a strategic area. The EU also intends
to continue to support the transition of neighbouring
While it is true that these states have become more
diversified and inclined towards more bilateral
relations with the EU, I would argue that the degree of
diversification has not yet made them much different
or divergent. Countries in Europe are also different,
but this difference does not cause divergence.
However, as the divergences between Central Asians
accrue, it will become increasingly difficult to solve
regional problems. Intensifying the focus on bilateral
relations will do a disservice by ignoring diverging
regional stances of the states concerned. This is why
the central focus should be not on bilateral but on
regional relations.
2. “The same can be said about the water and
environment initiative led by Italy and Romania. This
is a subject important to all Central Asian republics.
However, sensitivities and tensions between several
countries make it difficult to make progress. Moreover,
most international donor programmes increasingly
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The European Union’s Central Asia Strategy and Uzbekistan: Performing soft power
seek a national rather than a regional approach which
only for Europeans in their dealings with Central Asia
has greater practical impact.”
but also vice versa. A recent issue illustrates this point.
If sensitivities and tensions on certain issues are met
For the first time since the EU began to implement
with growing scepticism and the justification of a
its common foreign and security policy based on
reductionist approach, then why develop a strategy?
normative principles, Europe itself has faced a moral
How can issues of a regional nature be reduced to and
and normative crisis. The Charlie Hebdo caricatures
addressed at a national level?
and Muslims’ reaction to them inside and outside
3. “Over the last eight years, no member state has
been willing to take on the education initiative. This
is disappointing, as it is this sector that deserves most
attention – though not necessarily on a regional basis.
If the EU wants to contribute to the development of
Central Asia, become more visible, act strategically
over the long term, and counter Russian influence,
it should invest heavily in higher education (and
where funds allow, also in technical vocational and
secondary education). However, such an investment
(largely consisting of Central Asian students having
the opportunity to study in Europe) will only be useful
if programmes are able to tackle or circumvent the
risk of brain drain and unequal access (of the elites)
to higher education.”
I almost fully agree with this assessment and
recommendation and have only one small comment.
Instead of saying, “not necessarily on a regional basis”,
I would insist on “including on a regional basis”. The
success of the OSCE Academy in Bishkek and the
American University in Central Asia are examples
of the relevance of the regional basis of educational
programmes.
These are just a few examples to show how important
it is for the new strategy to build on an improved and
stronger perception of what is today referred to as the
“target group”. Adequate perception is important not
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of Europe, as well as the recent adoption of laws in
France and Ireland regarding gay rights, have not only
fostered a somewhat immoral image of Europe in the
eyes of Central Asians but also negatively impacted
its foreign and security policy. Indeed, many in
Uzbekistan think that Europe does not provide the
best example of compliance with those norms and
values that it promotes in other parts of the world.
It is argued that freedom of speech, for example,
should not mean freedom of any speech, especially
if it insults a huge community of believers. One of
the popular messages that the authoritarian Uzbek
propaganda eagerly sends out to the public concerns
the “back side” of freedom and democracy in the
West. Citing what is perceived as a moral crisis of the
West, the regime points to “Europe’s sunset” (to use
Oswald Spengler’s phrase) as an excuse of its nonEuropean path and non-European value system. The
axiomatic proposition that “freedom has its limits”,
which supposedly has a relativist meaning in Europe,
is ascribed an absolute connotation in Uzbekistan.
The Uzbek regime propaganda might therefore say
that before teaching us democracy and human rights,
Europeans must display them in their own region.
The ongoing war in Ukraine and Europe’s sometimes
ambivalent position on these tragic events provide
authoritarian regimes in Central Asia, especially
Uzbekistan, with an additional trump to legitimise
the status quo and postpone political reforms. In this
The European Union’s Central Asia Strategy and Uzbekistan: Performing soft power
case, heavily controlled peace is considered better
than uncontrolled freedom. From this perspective,
Europe will have a better chance of playing a leading
role in Central Asia by playing a stronger role in the
resolution of the Ukrainian crisis as a normative, and
III. Perspective vision
We know that the peoples of Central Asia are
historically well predisposed to embrace European
values and cooperate with Europe (retrospective). We
at the same time, geopolitical power.
critically evaluated issues of perception that affect the
At the same time, Central Asian countries are in
Strategy (inspective). Now, we should elaborate on the
a more advantageous situation than many areas
question of how to make that strategy more efficient
adjacent to Europe or countries adjacent to the Central
(perspective).
Asian region itself (like Afghanistan, South Asia or
Iran) in terms of several factors that can push them
closer to Europe. Central Asian countries explicitly
and officially chose democracy as an ultimate goal
(regardless of the present extent to which they
comply with democratic values). They have secular
political systems, they are peaceful and relatively
modernised, they have opted for non-nuclear status
while surrounded by nuclear powers, and they display
a very high literacy rate with relatively well-developed
educational institutions. Even at the early onset of
independence, these countries had quite a good basis
for democratic development, and the EU had quite
good conditions in the region to begin with.
However, these countries are exposed to numerous
security challenges and geopolitical trends. Although
Central Asia is now closer to Europe by many
parameters, it can still drift away from Europe under
the influence of diverse factors and forces. The more
protracted the current ad-hoc status quo becomes, the
greater the distance between the region and Europe can
widen. At the end of the day, the atrophy of democracy
in an authoritarian country will be fait accompli.
quality and implementation of the EU’s Central Asian
Above all, it is important to acknowledge that none of
the five Central Asian states deny the EU’s strategy and
all accept its provisions, albeit to various degrees of
self-restraint. This creates an initial condition for the
EU to occupy a relevant niche in the region, and the
EU has already done this. The key task now is to create
a more favourable environment for this presence.
Taking account of my previous remarks as well as
well-known deficiencies of the EU’s previous strategy,
the following can be proposed at the conceptual and
practical level.
Conceptual level
1. As long as the EU is a normative power, it should
address the bearers of normative values, not so much
the “Leviathan”. Those bearers reside mostly within
civil society, not in the corridors of power. This is
why the EU’s strategy should deal not only with
conservative states but also primarily with those who
could be considered agents of reform. Indeed, hard
power works with (or addresses) a state; but soft
power works with (or addresses) people.
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The European Union’s Central Asia Strategy and Uzbekistan: Performing soft power
2. The EU is likely to lose the game to Russia and
5. The new strategy should be made more “aggressive”.
China as long as the geopolitical agent per se remains
This means shifting from a simple, general dialogue
physically stronger than the normative one in the
with the target country based on axiomatic ideas and
international system. However, this game could be
principles, to a more meaningful dialogue based on
made more sophisticated by turning a soft power,
explicit and prompting criteria to implement those
where Europe is stronger, into a geopolitical asset.
ideas and principles.
Consider, for instance, that the SCO is a group of six,
the CSTO is a group of six and the EAEU is a group of
6. The authors of the new strategy should also envisage
four, but the EU has 28 voices.
the upcoming power transition in authoritarian
3. The EUCAM proposes: “If the EU would decide
“transition period” is coming to an end. In this
to narrow its focus on a few matters where it would
context, such values as democracy, freedom and
seek concrete impact, the focus should be on: bilateral
human rights should receive stronger articulation.
partnerships and increased ties with civil societies;
Europe, before promoting its strategy in the Central
support for democratisation and strengthening the
Asian region based on a normative and value-driven
defence of human rights; modest security cooperation
programme, must prove itself in the eyes of Central
based on conflict prevention; and a more simplified
Asians as the best example or role model in terms of a
and effective development policy with a heavy
firm commitment to those values.
emphasis on education”. I would slightly amend this
proposal by adding to this list of recommendations
“promotion of regional cooperation and integration”.
The regional dimension of the new strategy should be
made much stronger, not weaker.
4. Indeed, while evaluating the concerned countries in
terms of economic and political advancement as well
as cultural traits, the authors of the strategy should
avoid distinguishing (or distancing) them, especially
Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, from each other as if
they were completely different. One should remember
that the very title of the EU’s strategy implies a priori
the existence of the region under the name, Central
Asia. This, in turn, requires consideration of all
Central Asian countries as indispensable parts of a
single region and the display of an explicit regional
dimension in the strategy.
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Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, where the notorious
Practical level
1. The aforesaid criteria can be specified, for example,
as: criteria of openness of all the branches of power,
criteria of civil society engagement and involvement;
criteria of effectiveness of the EU Strategy; criteria
of advancement in education; criteria of good
governance; criteria of the protection of human rights;
and so on.
2. The strategy should be made more flexible in terms
of the projects and mandates that special EU agents in
the recipient countries are authorised to accomplish.
If, in the course of the strategy’s realisation, new
projects are proposed or some of its provisions require
amendment, such in-course changes, including
budgetary flexibility, might be considered.
The European Union’s Central Asia Strategy and Uzbekistan: Performing soft power
3. For the sake of achieving more efficiency and
delivered in 2003 to the Uzbek government, none of
flexibility,
which have been fully solved until now.
a
somewhat
dynamic
consultancy
mechanism could be established in the EU offices
of the recipient countries, such as an operational
monitoring system and the appointment of highly
qualified and independent national professionals for
7. By and large, EU-Uzbekistan relations cannot be
considered separately from organisations such as the
OSCE and NATO. Uzbekistan has been an OSCE
these offices.
member since 1992 and joined the NATO Partnership
4. The strategy should imply frequent interactions
2005 events in Andijan, relations between Uzbekistan
between three sides – EU representatives, state
and these two organisations decreased; even the status
authorities and civil society activists, experts and
of the OSCE Centre in Tashkent was reduced to that
analysts – recognising their potential to achieve joint
of OSCE Project Coordinator. It goes without saying
inputs and outputs. For instance, joint sessions of
that the opening of a new page in these relations will
official and non-governmental representatives might
be mutually very beneficial. It should be stressed
be organised on a regular basis.
that NATO and the OSCE stand out from other
5. Regarding Uzbekistan, I think the new strategy
should place stronger emphasis on education, the
support of NGOs, human rights, good governance,
and developmental, environmental and water projects.
The EU can also address issues such as corruption,
labour migration and drug trafficking. More specific
attention could be given to issues such as: registration
and licensing of non-governmental educational
institutions; support of provincial universities and
schools; institutionalisation of open parliamentary
for Peace programme in 1994. Unfortunately, after the
international organisations with their comprehensive
understanding of the terms “security” and “threat” as
well as the link between national and international
security to human rights and democratisation. This
value-driven and value-oriented activity by European
organisations can have a dual effect, being both
challenging for the non-democratic states of Central
Asia, and advantageous for the people of Central Asia.
The latter is obviously the major added value that the
EU can offer.
hearings; court system reform; development of
8. In this respect, the collaboration of European
alternative energy sources; potable water supplies,
organisations, foundations and institutions with
especially in provinces; as well as the cancellation of the
the diplomatic representations of EU countries
anachronistic exit visa regime. Special courses could
in Uzbekistan can be of great significance. The
be organised in universities on the European Union
promotion of European values in Central Asia and
(let’s symbolically call them “EuropUz”), sponsored
maintaining Uzbekistan’s pro-European orientation
by the EU. Other directions for EU activity in the
in the international arena will largely depend on their
country could be discussed jointly with government
own pro-active stance in this country.
officials and civil society representatives.
Concerning the regional dimension of the strategy,
6. The new strategy should re-address the problems
the EU can share its unique experience of regional
that were indicated in the EBRD benchmarks
integration
that
successfully
began
with
the
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The European Union’s Central Asia Strategy and Uzbekistan: Performing soft power
embodiment of the Marshall Plan. While some experts
speak about Europe’s own “Marshall Plan” for Central
point to tensions among Central Asian countries in
Asia in collaboration with European institutions and
order to assert these countries’ incompatibility for
other interested powers with their own Central Asian
regional integration, one might recall that Europe
strategies. If the EU manages to prompt regional
has passed through even more severe tensions and
integration in Central Asia, it will be the greatest
conflicts and looked even less prone to unite after the
geopolitical thrust and self-affirmation of Europe in
Second World War. From that perspective, we can
the 21st century.
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Dr. Farkhod Tolipov is a Director of the
non-governmental Research and Education
Institution “Bilim Karvoni” (“Knowledge
Caravan”) in Tashkent. He is specialized in
geopolitics, regional security and regional
integration in Central Asia, nationalism and
democratization in Central Asian countries.
He has a PhD degree in Political Science.
Printhouse of
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