Torah Musings
Digests
July through October, 2014
as published on www.TorahMusings.com
Unedited
Introduction
Started as the Hirhurim blog in 2004, Torah Musings relaunched in August 2013 as an online
periodical focusing on multiple areas of interest, including: Textual Studies – halakhah (Jewish
law),hashkafah (Jewish thought), history and parshanut (biblical commentary) that is clear,
interesting, valuable to experienced students but understandable to those with limited Jewish
education; News Stories and Commentary – thoughtful responses based on Jewish texts and
traditions to issues of the day; Dialogue – differing views within the Orthodox camp, discussing
with post and counter-post or in the responses.
In July 2014, the website began sending weekly digests in PDF format. This booklet contains a
collection of these weekly digests from July through October 2014, unrevised and in the same
format originally sent. Currently, these PDF files flow automatically and sometimes misinterpret
formatting commands. Therefore, there are occasional stray sentences that should be ignored.
Please note that authorship of each essay is clear on the website but not always in the weekly
digest. Unless otherwise indicated, assume that I wrote an essay.
Many people contributed to this project. The editorial committee for the first year consisted of
R. Micha Berger, R. Basil Herring and R. Moshe Schapiro, the last two continuing into the
second year. These three scholars devoted many hours to improving and maintaining the
website’s standards. I thank them for their hard work. During the period of this collection,
Efraim Vaynman and David Roth served as editorial interns. I thank them both for their hard
work.
Torah Musings thrives on original contributions by a variety of authors. R. Gidon Rothstein
writes a bi-weekly series on the classic Medieval philosophical work, Derashos HaRan. Dr.
Arnold Lustiger sends in Torah insights on the weekly reading from R. Joseph B. Soloveitchik,
titled here “Vort from the Rav” and included in Dr. Lustiger’s Mesoras HaRav Chumash. R.
Aharon Ziegler submits Halakhic Positions of R. Joseph B. Soloveitchik, of which he has already
published six volumes. R. Asher Bush writes a monthly halakhah column. R. Daniel Mann of
Eretz Hemdah also provides a monthly halakhah column. Joel Rich provides weekly Audio
Roundups, which are highly valued but omitted due to the difficulty of including links to audio
files in this format. I thank all these and other contributors for their valuable additions to the
Torah Musings website.
Additionally, Torah Musings maintains a strategic partnership with Yeshivat Har Etzion’s Israel
Koschitzky Virtual Beit Midrash that allows the website to republish weekly essays on the Torah
reading and occasional other essays. These essays are included in this booklet, with a notice at
the end of each essay indicating its source. I thank the Virtual Beit Midrash and its senior
members, R. Ezra Bick and R. Reuven Ziegler, for allowing this partnership.
Finally, I thank my family and my wife in particular for supporting my work on the website and
allowing me the time and intellectual environment to succeed. This booklet is theirs.
Gil Student
[email protected]
10 Cheshvan 5775 / November 3, 2014
Table of Contents
Halakhah
Berachos
A Personal Bracha ............................................................................................................................6
Torah Reading
Mas’ei: Mysticism, Geography and the Ba’al Korei’s Dilemma .................................................. 31
An Overlooked View on Women’s Aliyyot .................................................................................. 36
An Overlooked View on Women’s Aliyyot II .............................................................................. 39
Shuls
The Rabbi’s Drasha ..........................................................................................................................1
Silent and Loud Prayer .................................................................................................................. 10
Shabbos
Making Tea and Coffee on Shabbos ............................................................................................. 68
Diapers With Disappearing Ink ................................................................................................... 136
Holidays
Havdala With Wine During The Nine Days .................................................................................. 42
Tefillin on Tisha B’Av .................................................................................................................. 47
The Experience of Rosh HaShana ................................................................................................. 88
The Mitzva to Eat on Erev Yom Kippur and the Teshuva of Yom Kippur ................................. 106
May one wear Crocs on Yom Kippur? ........................................................................................ 109
How and Why Should One Rejoice On the Festivals? ................................................................ 114
Women Dancing With Torah Scrolls .......................................................................................... 116
Yom Tov Candles: Women and Shehecheyanu .......................................................................... 118
An Israeli in the Diaspora: How Many Days of Yom Tov? ........................................................ 138
Kashrus
Gelatin in Halacha: Recent Developments .................................................................................... 10
Butchering Judaism ....................................................................................................................... 12
Judaism and Industrial Food Production ..................................................................................... 119
Religions
Jews Attending Church ................................................................................................................. 67
Danger
Avoiding Danger in our Daily Lives ............................................................................................. 15
Leadership
The Rabbi’s Drasha ..........................................................................................................................1
Mourning
Yahrtzeit Practices ........................................................................................................................ 26
The 9/11 Memorial and Jewish Law ........................................................................................... 128
Aveilut for Parents ...................................................................................................................... 136
Beis Din
Redemptive Justice .......................................................................................................................... 2
Where There Is No Beit Din .......................................................................................................... 80
Sacrificing the Sinner .................................................................................................................... 80
The Limits of Teshuvah ................................................................................................................ 84
Interpersonal
The Right Way To Rebuke ............................................................................................................ 68
Answer Your Emails! Return Your Phone Calls! .......................................................................... 72
Say No to Snark ............................................................................................................................. 75
Speaking With Satan ................................................................................................................... 131
The Mitzvah of Bikur Cholim – Visiting the Sick Part 1 .............................................................139
Women
An Overlooked View on Women’s Aliyyot .................................................................................. 36
An Overlooked View on Women’s Aliyyot II .............................................................................. 39
Women Dancing With Torah Scrolls .......................................................................................... 116
The Super-Mitzvah to Have Children ......................................................................................... 133
Rav Soloveitchik
Silent and Loud Prayer .................................................................................................................. 10
Miriam: The Greatest Woman ....................................................................................................... 26
IDF Uniforms ................................................................................................................................ 45
Elevating Evil ................................................................................................................................ 60
The Right Way To Rebuke ............................................................................................................ 68
Aveilut for Parents ...................................................................................................................... 136
Hashkafah
Fundamentals
Torah From Sinai .......................................................................................................................... 45
Why We Do Mitzvos ..................................................................................................................... 61
What Tzenius Is Really About ...................................................................................................... 82
Beyond Words ............................................................................................................................... 86
Community
Looking for the Ghosts .................................................................................................................. 13
Rethinking the Shidduch Crisis: The Role of Jewish Women in Contemporary Society .............. 18
Responding to Catastrophe ............................................................................................................ 43
Modern Orthodoxy and the Right .................................................................................................. 49
What is the Torah’s Ideal Political System? .................................................................................. 64
A New and Old Wind is Blowing .................................................................................................. 87
The Sukkot Transition: From Individual to Community ............................................................. 117
A Matter of Pride ......................................................................................................................... 129
Healing Waters ............................................................................................................................ 135
The New Israeli Army .................................................................................................................137
Leadership
Rabbi Lamm on Da’as Torah .......................................................................................................... 3
Speaking To Each Other .................................................................................................................. 4
Unity in Leadership, Prophecy, and Wisdom ...............................................................................111
Da’as Torah or Advice? .............................................................................................................. 121
Kashrus
Judaism and Industrial Food Production ..................................................................................... 119
Technology
Man on the Moon .......................................................................................................................... 35
Hebrew
The Kalir and Modern Hebrew ...................................................................................................... 54
Incorrect Hebrew Pronunciation .................................................................................................... 63
Repentance
The Ease of Teshuvah: Encouraging or Upsetting? ........................................................................ 5
Sacrificing the Sinner .................................................................................................................... 80
The Limits of Teshuvah ................................................................................................................ 84
On Regret, Annulment, and the Essence of Teshuvah .................................................................. 91
Spiritual Math ................................................................................................................................ 95
Spiritual Math II ............................................................................................................................ 96
Spiritual Math III ............................................................................................................................98
Spiritual Math IV ........................................................................................................................ 100
Spiritual Math V .......................................................................................................................... 104
Tragedy
On the Untimely Death of the Young .............................................................................................. 3
Responding to Catastrophe ............................................................................................................ 43
Punishment of the Individual and of the Nation ............................................................................ 75
The Sin and Punishment of the Tower of Bavel .......................................................................... 124
Sacrifices
Seeing God or Being Seen by God ................................................................................................ 59
Women
Rethinking the Shidduch Crisis: The Role of Jewish Women in Contemporary Society .............. 18
Miriam: The Greatest Woman ....................................................................................................... 26
The Super-Mitzvah to Have Children ......................................................................................... 133
Healing Waters ............................................................................................................................ 135
Kashrus
Butchering Judaism ....................................................................................................................... 12
Derashos HaRan
The Ease of Teshuvah: Encouraging or Upsetting? ........................................................................ 5
If You’re Only Going to Do One… .............................................................................................. 51
Why Would Ran Recycle a Whole Drasha? .................................................................................. 58
Moshe, Prophecy Catalyst ............................................................................................................. 74
Unity in Leadership, Prophecy, and Wisdom ...............................................................................111
Overcoming Nature or Why Bad Things Happen to Good People .............................................. 123
Rav Soloveitchik
Passing The Mantle ......................................................................................................................... 6
The Making of a Lonely Man ........................................................................................................ 52
Lessons from Jewish History in a Time of Crisis and Transition .................................................. 54
On Regret, Annulment, and the Essence of Teshuvah .................................................................. 91
Vort from the Rav: Bereishis ....................................................................................................... 114
Vort from the Rav: Noach ........................................................................................................... 124
Vort from the Rav: Lech Lecha ................................................................................................... 134
Miscellaneous
New Periodical: Hakirah 17 .......................................................................................................... 40
Were the Tosafists Philosophers? II .............................................................................................. 72
New Periodical: RJJ Journal LXVIII ...........................................................................................112
Chumash
Passing The Mantle ......................................................................................................................... 6
Seeing God or Being Seen by God ................................................................................................ 59
What is the Torah’s Ideal Political System? .................................................................................. 64
Punishment of the Individual and of the Nation ............................................................................ 75
Vort from the Rav: Bereishis ....................................................................................................... 114
Vort from the Rav: Noach ........................................................................................................... 124
The Sin and Punishment of the Tower of Bavel .......................................................................... 124
Vort from the Rav: Lech Lecha ................................................................................................... 134
Weekly Digest from TorahMusings.com Torah Musings Digest
4 July, 2014 | A Window into the Orthodox Jewish Intellectual’s World| Edited by: Rabbi Gil Student
The Rabbi’s Drasha
by R. Ari Enkin
It is customary in synagogues worldwide for the rabbi or other
designated individual to deliver a drasha – a sermon – every Shabbat
morning. In most congregations the drasha is delivered immediately
prior to the silent Mussaf amida, while in others it may be given
before the Torah reading service.1 In other congregations, it is given
at the conclusion of the Haftara even before commencing any of the
preliminary Mussaf prayers. One will occasionally find congregations
where the drasha is given at the conclusion of the entire service. As
we will see, it might just be that the different customs as to when the
rabbi should deliver his drasha are all based on different halachic
considerations.
It seems that the custom for the rabbi to deliver his Shabbat drasha
immediately before the start of Mussaf originates in the Talmudic era,
and it is likely the earliest recorded source regarding the placement
of the weekly drasha.2 On the other hand, there were many
congregations and communities throughout history which placed the
drasha prior to the Torah reading. Among the reasons for this was in
order to allow the mourners the opportunity of reciting an extra
Kaddish following the drasha, which would best be inserted at this
time.3 Additionally, as the drasha is usually based on the weekly
parsha, delivering the drasha at this time allows the congregation a
“sneak preview” of the Torah reading. A good drasha with inspiring
interpretations no doubt assists the congregation in better focusing
on the Torah reading. For these and other reasons, Rabbi Dov Lior is
of the opinion that the drasha is best delivered at this time.4
In most congregations today the drasha is given after the Torah
reading, before Mussaf. There is some discussion, however, as to
exactly which point before Mussaf it should be inserted. According to
some authorities, the drasha should be given before the start of
“Ashrei”. This is because Ashrei is the prayer which formally begins
the Mussaf service. It is argued, therefore, that inserting the drasha
at this point is preferable as it allows for an uninterrupted flow of the
Mussaf service.
Others are of the opinion that it is preferable for the drasha to be
given after the Torah has been returned to the Aron Kodesh,
immediately preceding the kaddish and silent Mussaf Amida, which is
the most widespread custom today. Some have questioned this
approach, however, as it is generally preferable not to have any
unnecessary interruption between “ashrei” and kaddish.
Nevertheless, this concern is readily dismissed by the Maharam
Schik, who rules that Torah study (the drasha) is not something which
is to be considered a forbidden interruption between Ashrei and the
kaddish. He concludes that congregations which insert the drasha at
this point are certainly conducting themselves properly, though he
personally favors placing the drasha before the Torah reading in
order to avoid any question whatsoever.5
In many congregations the rabbi delivers his drasha following the
Haftara, even before Ashrei and the returning of the Torah to the
Aron Kodesh. This arrangement has been opposed by some on the
grounds that it is not proper to unnecessarily postpone the return of
the Torah to the Aron Kodesh.6 It is for this reason that in many
congregations the megilla is read on Purim morning only after the
Torah has been returned to the Aron Kodesh. Similarly, whenever a
brit is to take place in the synagogue on Shabbat morning it is
generally performed after the Torah has been put away. Nevertheless,
most authorities allow a drasha, brit, or megilla reading to take place
while the Torah remains on the bima. It is argued that the mitzva
value of such activities justifies performing them even before the
Torah is put away.
Finally, the custom of delivering the drasha at the conclusion of the
entire service may originate in the words of the Rambam who writes
that “the sermon which is customarily delivered on Shabbat is to be
given immediately before proceeding with the Shabbat meal”.7 All
approaches are equally legitimate.
On a related note, there have been authorities in the past who have
frowned upon the practice of delivering a drasha from the bima. They
argue that standing with one’s back towards the aron kodesh shows a
lack of respect for the Torah.8 However, most authorities disagree
and maintain that there is little basis for such a concern, especially
once the Torah has been returned to the Aron Kodesh.9 It is also
noted that the drasha is infrequent and brief in nature and the
speaker’s back is not constantly facing the aron kodesh.10 Finally,
considering that the purpose of the drasha is in order to teach and
inspire the congregation in the ways of the Torah, something which
the Torah itself advocates doing, there can be no mistake that
anything irreverent is taking place.11 It goes without saying, however,
that one must never stand with one’s back towards an actual Torah
scroll.12
1. Mateh Ephraim 602:42. ↩
2. Berachot 28b, Rashi s.v. “lo al l’pirka“. ↩
3. Chikrei Minhagim (Gurary) Vol. II p.96. ↩
4. http://www.yeshiva.org.il/ask/?id=17988 ↩
5. Maharam Schik 126. ↩
6. Torat Yekutiel 55, cited in Chikrei Minhagim (Gurary) Vol. II
p.99. ↩
7. Rambam, Hilchot Shabbat 23:19. ↩
8. Based on YD 282:1. ↩
9. Taz, YD 282:1. ↩
10. Pri Megadim, OC 150; Shaar Hatziun 150:13. ↩
1
Copyright © 2014 Torah Musings, All rights reserved.
1
Weekly Digest from TorahMusings.com Beit Din’s Gap-Filling Function: Using Beit Din to Protect
Your Client by Prof. Michael A. Helfand – The US Constitution
forbids (secular) courts from ruling on any religious issues. Batei
din offer a venue of arbitration for these types of consitutionally
unadjudicable cases. He is not saying that this should be the only
use of beis din, just that people entering agreements with Jewish
institutions should include a beis din arbitration provision.
11. Aruch Hashulchan, YD 282:2. See there for more. ↩
12. YD 282:1; Aruch Hashulchan, OC 282:1. ↩
Redemptive Justice
If there was any question whether we live in an unredeemed world,
the state of our batei din, religious courts, would clear up the status.
One sign of the redemption, and perhaps a way to bring it more
quickly, is through justice. “Zion will be redeemed with justice” (Isa.
1:27). According to all accounts, much of the beis din system is often
a source of perversion of justice rather than the lofty standard it is
supposed to represent.
Next follow six actual BDA decisions, albeit with identifying
information changed. I was surprised by the brevity. The decisions I
have seen published in other journals are much longer. I guess the
authors only sought to publish article-length decisions. These are
generally much shorter.
Bribery, bias and manipulation occur way too often. Every court has
two opposing parties. If one wins, the other loses. If the court enacts
a compromise, one perspective may be that both sides lose. So it is
unsurprising that even the best beis din will face complaints and
criticisms. The lack of justice we are discussing goes beyond the
gripes of a losing party. There is a clear and constant call by litigants
and even judges about corruption, particularly in ad hoc “Zabla”
courts.
The Torah requires us to use a beis din as our venue for resolving
disputes. Yet an unjust beis din can hardly be the Torah’s
prescription.
The rabbinic solution to this problem has been the establishment of
courts that are not corrupt and provide transparency and procedural
guidelines. Primary among these courts is the Beth Din of America
(BDA), affiliated with the Rabbinical Council of America (RCA). As
part of the push for transparency, the BDA recently began publishing
a journal containing a selection of its decisions. Not all decisions can
be included, for reasons of general interest and privacy–both parties
have to agree to allow the decision published. However, what has
been published offers us a window into the methods of rabbinic
adjudication in the modern world.
The recently published second volume of The Journal of the Beth Din
of America opens with three articles:
Meir Simons v. L’Chaim Tours and Josh Rosenberg – A
Pesach program received food delivery on Yom Tov. A guest left
right after Yom Tov and spent the rest of Pesach at another
hotel, at considerable expense. He wants a refund from the
original program. The beis din ruled that since the guest
registered for the program under a specific kosher supervision
agency and that agency approved the food delivery (given the
circumstances), the guest has no claim.
Joseph Goldberg v. Aryeh Schwartz – The Plaintiff made three
large loans to family members to fund a corporation. He was
only repaid about 3/4 of the loan. He is suing a different family
member, who owns 14% of the corporation, for repayment of
14% of the loan. The beis din ruled against the Plaintiff because
the Defendant did not sign for any of the loans and the
corporation, which is now insolvent, is only liable to the limits of
its assets.
Golan v. Schwartz – Tenants whose lease had expired and were
renting on a month-to-month basis, failed to evacuate the
premises after being given proper notice. The beis din ordered
them to evacuate, which they, and awarded the Plaintiff that
month’s rent plus 1/3 of attorney and litigation costs. A late fee
on the rent was struck down because it constitutes forbidden
interest and the attorney/litigation fees were reduced based on
equitable considerations of the beis din, consistent with
halakhah and NY case law.
Kosher Quality Caterers, Inc. V. Kalman Goodman &
Menachem Moskowitz – Agreement was reached to sell a 50%
interest in a pizza place. The Defendants stopped payment on
their check and the Plaintiff sued in beis din for the agreed upon
amount. While the details are complicated, the beis din sided
with the Defendant because there was no written contract, only
a term sheet. The Defendants are morally obligated to complete
the deal but that cannot be enforced by beis din.
Retaining the Proceeds of Secular Court Judgments by R.
Mordechai Willig – Rav Willig, the Segan Av Beis Din (second
leading judge) explores what to do if you are summoned to
secular court by a Jew who refuses to use a beis din. If you
adjudicate in secular court, you may be guilty of theft for
retaining any proceeds you win and you may have removed the
possibility of later changing the venue to a beis din if the other
litigant changes his mind. To avoid all problems, you should
summon the other litigant to a beis din as soon as possible.
The Torah u-Madda Mandat for Beth Din in Today’s World
by R. Yona Reiss – In a memorial lecture for the former President
of the BDA, R. Reiss discusses the importance of including
worldly dayanim and consultants who fully understand the
details and broader context of the cases they adjudicate. He
emphasizes the need to professionalize the beis din, to institute
standard procedures and operate with transparency.
2
Yossi Mandel v. Moshe Hirsch – One of four people who
rented an apartment together decided not to move in. He paid
rent and utilities for three months and suggested possible people
to replace him. The other roommates sued him in beis din to
continue paying rent and utilities. Beis Din ruled that while
halakhah would obligate him to pay, the custom in the
marketplace is to allow roommates to back out at the last
minute. As a compromise, beis din ruled that the Defendant has
to pay 2/3 of another month’s rent.
Copyright © 2014 Torah Musings, All rights reserved.
2
Weekly Digest from TorahMusings.com United Savings, LLC v. Dunkirk Center for Health, Inc. and
Royal Rehabilitation – The Claimant arranged to reduce the
Respondent’s utility costs and receive one-third of the 30-month
savings as payment for his services. The Respondent argued that
the agreement was invalid and that the savings would have been
realized even without the Claimant’s services. The beis din ruled
that the agreement is valid because of, among other reasons, the
secular law doctrine of “apparent authority,” which is recognized
by halakhah as a custom of the marketplace. The agreement
stated that if the Claimant’s advice was implemented and
savings were achieved, he would be paid. His advice was
implemented and the savings were achieved, so according to the
agreement’s wording it does not matter whether the advice led
to the savings.
Rabbi Lamm on Da’as Torah
The issue of Da’as Torah perennially generates confusion. On the one
hand, historians rightly point out that its extreme permutations are
recent inventions. On the other, responses to the ideology are often
overly dismissive, neglecting the historical fact that leading rabbis
have traditionally wielded great influence. Da’as Torah seems like a
tool to assert control, either by its purveyors or its antagonists.
Neither approach seems authentic. Navigating this minefield
faithfully is a critical but rare feat.
R. Norman Lamm, who was a frequent target of Da’as Torah,
struggled with this task. On the one hand, in the following quote he
takes a cheap shot at members of Agudah’s Council of Sages. His
criticism of the group’s name is legitimate but beside the point.
Rabbis rising to leadership positions cannot refuse the title placed
upon them. On the other hand, despite his negative personal
experience, which you can see emerging in his writing, he still resists
the urge to deny all authority to Torah leaders.
R. Norman Lamm, Derashot LeDorot: Numbers, p. 120:
Certainly, there is a difference between authority and
authoritarianism. But Korah identified one with the other and
rejected both. And that rebellion against religious authority
exists in each of us–even as we sought to reject parental
authority when we were adolescents.
Baiting and berating gedolim is as popular in one segment of the
Orthodox community as apotheosizing them is in the other. In
the right wing of Orthodoxy, a new concept has taken hold which
makes of religious authorities supermen and attributes to them a
doctrine heretofore considered exclusively Catholic–infallibility. I
have always been uncomfortable with the institution founded by
Agudath Israel, the Mo’etzet Gedolei haTorah, “The Council of
Giants of the Torah.” What man, with any measure of normal
humility, will allow himself to be inducted in a group which
announces itself as “giants” or greats?” Yet, our camp is equally
guilty of such adoration and such cult of personality when we
blame the gedolim for all sins, from being anti-Zionist to being
unenthusiastic about emigrating from Europe to the United
States of America–as if greatness in Torah automatically implies
the gift of prophecy.
3
Unquestionably, religious authority in Judaism is not
unquestionable. But it is equally true that there is authority.
Emunat Hakhamim, faith in the wise, means that those
individuals are authoritative. It commands us to have reverence
for religious authorities even if we do not feel we can accept
their opinions. It means to follow them even though we often do
not agree with them. At all times it means that we must have
respect, simple derekh eretz.
I grant that it is not always easy to do that. In Avot 6:5 we are
told of the various ways in which Torah can be acquired–one of
them is emunat hakhamim, faith in the Sages, and right next to it
comes yisurim, pain. Acquiring Torah is indeed painful at times,
but it is a pain which must be risked and embraced.
On the Untimely Death of the
Young
by R. Basil Herring
How is the death of the young different from the death of the
elderly? ….. R. Yosi b. Chalafta and his students would rise up
early to study Torah together under a certain fig tree. When the
owner of the tree made a point to harvest its figs before they
arrived the next time, they were concerned that he suspected
them of improperly taking the figs, so they moved to a different
field. The owner followed them and said, “rabbosai you have
deprived me of the mitzvah of having you studying Torah under
my tree, please come back.” Said they “we thought you
suspected us.” So they moved back under the original fig tree,
and the owner did not harvest its figs – which then were
devoured by worms. Said they “we learn from this that the
owner of a fig tree knows better than we do when it is the proper
time to harvest his figs.” (Bereishis Rabbah 62:2)
With heavy hearts, we now know that our three precious boys, Eyal,
Gilad, and Naftali, have been plucked in the bloom of their youth from
the bosom of their grieving families, communities, and all of Klal
Yisrael who prayed for their safe return with all our hearts. It is a
bitter pill to swallow, a tragedy that we cannot begin to comprehend.
Faced with such barbarity, some might counsel despair and giving up
on that place to find some other location to live and study Torah.
Others might question God Himself for allowing such heinous acts of
depravity. But like R. Yosi b. Chalafta and his student, as a people we
must not succumb to the counsels of doubt or despondency. Instead,
like them, we can, we must, find renewed resolve to return to our
original places, even in the forbidding environs of Hevron and Bet
Lechem, surrounded by sworn enemies, while accepting in our hearts
that sometimes Hakadosh Baruch Hu in His inscrutable ways sees fit
to take from us before their time the sweetest, most precious souls of
our people.
Already we have seen how the three of them have brought Klal Yisrael
together as one. Already we have seen that because of them our
enemies have been weakened at a pivotal moment in the
confrontation with terror and evil. And like R. Yosi b. Chalafta and his
students, we can declare through the tears that we as a people will
ensure that the boys will not have lived or died in vain; that we are
Copyright © 2014 Torah Musings, All rights reserved.
3
Weekly Digest from TorahMusings.com resolved that in their memory we will continue to learn and teach
Torah even more than in the past, that we will in their merit
strengthen our attachment to the land and state of Israel, that our
faith in the justice of our cause will never flag, and that we will
always accept God’s will, even when as today He has taken our boys
under the kanfei ha-Shechinah.
Tehay zichram baruch.
Speaking To Each Other
R. Moshe Zuriel is known to graduates of the Sha’alvim yeshiva as its
longtime Mashgi’ach Ruchani, spiritual guide. But to book lovers, Rav
Zuriel is the “Ba’al Ha-Otzaros,” author of a series of encyclopedic
treatments of classical Torah personalities. Each book’s title begins
with the word “Otzeros,” as in Otzeros HaMalbim and Otzeros
HaRambam. The books include intellectual biographies and topical
anthologies of quotations and citations. They are the ultimate guide to
each scholar’s writings.
A number of these books were published together in 2000 in a
four-volume set titled “Otzeros Gedolei Yisrael.” In addition to Rav
Zuriel’s incredible work, the set is adorned with a remarkable
approbation by R. Binyamin Yehoshua Zilber ztz”l, the noted halakhic
authority, in which he extols the variety of approaches Rav Zuriel
brings together. It is a tribute to peace and unity within the Torah
community, a call for harmony in a community that is so full of
ideological divisions.
The following letter was translated by R. Moshe Schapiro:
Approbation
HaRav Binyamin Yehoshua Zilber shlit”a [ztz“l]
Member, Mo’etzes Gedolei HaTorah
[Author of the series “Az Niberu,” “Zeh HaSha’ar” and other
works]
B”H 12th day of Adar II, 5760
My dear friend of many decades, HaRav HaGaon R’ Moshe Zuriel
shlit”a has gathered together in these books indexes and
elucidations to many different issues in Jewish ethics that appear
in the works of the great men of the generations: the Rambam,
Maharal, the Gr”a, the Netziv and others. These ethical schools
each had their own approach. By learning and investigating
these different approaches, the words of the prophet Malachi
will, with God’s help, be fulfilled: “Then those who fear God shall
speak [nidberu] one to another” (Malachi 3:16). “Nidberu” is in
passive conjugation. The prophet declared in God’s name that at
the end of days all the divisions should be removed between
God-fearing people, though they maintain different attitudes and
tendencies in the service of God. Then “nidberu” will
automatically be fulfilled. In light of all this, it is not surprising
that in our times particularly, “the end of days,” there has been a
strengthening of the Evil Inclination for divisiveness between
God fearing people, all “for the sake of heaven” of course. If the
“nidberu” is missing, this is proof that there is division and
divisiveness. Therefore, it is good that the different approaches
be brought together.
4
And it says in Menachot 29b: “And why is the tip of its head (of
the letter yod) bent down? Because the heads of the righteous
are bowed because their deeds are not all alike.” Rashi explains:
“And the honor of one is greater than the other, therefore their
heads are bowed, for they are embarrassed.” This is bewildering.
Because their deeds are not alike–meaning that each one has his
own approach and method and believes that only his approach is
correct and not that of his fellow who is simply mistaken in his
approach–if so how can it be that their heads are bowed? These
are opposite attitudes! We must conclude that the divine soul of
man can contain within it two apparently contradictory things.
On the one hand, to justify and insist upon his approach and
method, and on the other hand, to also justify the method and
approach of his fellow and feel that this was missing to him and
because of this he is embarrassed from his friend.
They say in the name of HaGaon R’ Yisrael Salanter ztz”l that
there is no “fixed rule” in the service of God and that this
principle too is not fixed. Most of the differences between
approaches have to do with the circumstances of the place and
time; it cannot be said about a particular path or approach “Like
this behold and sanctify!” Moreover, we do not deny the
possibility of there being multiple approaches in Judaism. If
there could be a dispute between Beis Shammai and Beis Hillel
in Eruvin 13b about whether it was better for man to have been
created or not, why shouldn’t there be disputes within the
teachings of Jewish ethics and Chassidic thought? Of course, this
is only within the parameters of “These and those are the words
of the Living God” (Eruvin, ibid.). And regarding the dispute of
Beis Shammai and Beis Hillel they said in Yevamos 14b: “Even
though Beis Shammai and Beis Hillel argued… Beis Shammai did
not refrain from marrying with Beis Hillel and Beis Hillel did not
refrain from marrying with Beis Shammai–to teach you that the
relations between them were conducted with love and
friendship, to fulfill that which it says, “Love peace and truth”
(Zechariah 8:19). Peace and truth went joined together. If there
is truth here, there is peace here. And if there is peace here,
there is truth here. But in this generation, standing at the end of
the exile, as the Evil Inclination for divisiveness grows, we must
try to at least minimize the divisions to fulfill the verse “Then
those who fear God shall speak one to another.”
I express gratitude to the Rav, author and anthologizer, for he
practices what he preaches and I write and sign to demonstrate
my approval and appreciation and blessing, that we should merit
to bring merit upon to the public, to bring the true redemption
speedily in our days, Amen.
Binyamin Yehoshua Zilber
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Weekly Digest from TorahMusings.com Torah Musings Digest
11 July, 2014 | A Window into the Orthodox Jewish Intellectual’s World| Edited by: Rabbi Gil Student
The Ease of Teshuvah:
Encouraging or Upsetting?
what befell them.
The favor is in Hashem giving us more time than we deserve, starting
His collection of spiritual overdrafts with others. We are expected to
use what happens to them as a reminder to put our own accounts in
order before Hashem comes to discuss our delinquencies.
by R. Gidon Rothstein
If Ran has convinced us that we need to focus on the religious as well
as the physical in hoping to avoid calamity, we need a better
understanding of the main method of healing religious ills, teshuvah,
repentance. Much of the sixth drasha exhorts, encourages, and
reassures his listeners that they can in fact take advantage of this gift
from Hashem, implying that they weren’t so sure.
It Should Have Been Hard, But It’s Not
Prior essays in this series
You Don’t Have To Be Great to Repent, But It Helps
One worry his listeners seem to have had was that perhaps only those
with great wisdom and perfect knowledge of Torah can successfully
repent. Ran agrees that study of Torah earns great reward. However,
he argues, Berachot 20a—which wonders why miracles happened for
generations that had much less Torah knowledge than others– asserts
that Hashem “cares” most about our sincerity.
Ran is striking a balance. While not denying the importance of Torah
study, he stays firm on the idea that a sincere interest in penitence
and return to Hashem will also accomplish a great deal.
The drasha starts with verses that draw our attention to how
surprising it is that Hashem allows us to get away with repentance.
Really, Michah says (6:6), it should be impossible to make up for
violating Hashem’s will. What should, by rights, mollify the Creator,
Who gave us life out of pure kindness, and Whose commands we
willfully violate?
The Repentance Doesn’t Have to be Great, But It Helps
To our good fortune, Hashem decided to forego His rights, as it were,
and accept repentance. Teshuvah dispenses with compensation in
favor of regret and re-commitment. While this may sound simple,
experience shows that it’s not.
The Downside to How Easy Hashem Made It
The ease of repentance benefits those who avail themselves of it.
However, this very unearned ease heightens the wrongs of those who
fail to repent. Had repentance in fact involved onerous efforts at
rectification, we would have had a bit of an excuse–that it is just too
hard.
To Ran, that’s why Michah 6:10 says that the righteous will succeed
in the ways of Hashem and the wicked will stumble. The very ease of
walking in Hashem’s ways is itself the stumbling block. If it were
hard, failure would be understandable. But it’s so easy!
Making it even easier is Hashem’s helping us return in other ways,
such as by bringing calamities on people far away. Seeing them suffer
should remind us that we could easily deserve a similar fate, spurring
repentance.
I have seen that passage read as Ran saying that Hashem brings
disasters upon those others to teach us a lesson. As if the Merciful
One would cause needless suffering just to call us to repentance! That
mistaken reading misses that Ran never says the people affected
didn’t also sin.
Ran’s next sentence says that if we fail to change, those same
calamities will reach us (which supports my Black Death theory, since
that didn’t start in Spain). He’s saying that the favor is that Hashem
starts with those others even though we were equally deserving of
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Ran’s listeners were also troubled by Yoma’s saying that a “real”
penitent faces temptation once, twice, and three times, in similar
circumstances, and resists. They took that to mean that those who
only repent when they’re older, when many of the urges to sin have
quieted, cannot achieve “real” repentance.
Rambam addressed this, too, distinguishing among levels of
completeness in one’s repentance, without quantifying the difference.
Ran advances the theory that base-level repentance atones, assuaging
the “anger” that is the appropriate response to our sin. More perfect
repentance converts sins into merits, as Yoma 86b notes. For that, we
need to face and resist the exact same temptation. [Ran doesn’t
explain, here, why it would be that such repentance creates merits,
and I don’t have the space to speculate.]
Ran reminds us of the indispensability of sincerity for even that lower
level of repentance. One marker of sincerity is that we do not stop
with the particular sin we’ve noticed, admit it, hope not to repeat it,
and leave it at that. Sincerity would lead us to examine all our
actions, looking for other ways in which we’re imperfect. We would
let all of our imperfections sit in our awareness, as Tehillim 51:5 says,
“for I know my iniquity, and my sins are before me always.” They
would serve as constant fuel for avoiding recidivism and opting for
improvement. That’s sincerity.
The Power of Sincerity
This back and forth shows the difficulty Ran faced. He wanted to
show his listeners how much easier repentance is than it could by
rights have been, without glossing over how far they needed to go to
qualify as sincere and wholehearted.
One last encouragement Ran offers is that proper repentance can
avert the worst of decrees, on an individual or communal level.
Hashem’s righteous wrath over biblical sins were all mitigated with
sincere repentance. These biblical examples include King David’s sin
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Weekly Digest from TorahMusings.com with Batsheva which, as Ran notes, Scripture portrays as an
adulterous affair to show that whatever the sin was, it was as serious
a sin for a man of David’s stature as actual adultery would be for one
of us; Nineveh’s sins, which were bad enough to deserve annihilation;
and even Nevuchadnezzar’s evils,
The implication is that even the Black Death could yield, if Ran’s
audience repented sincerely enough. A challenging claim for them,
clearly, as it would be for us if we, God forbid, faced another such
plague.
Let’s be thankful that we don’t, and hope we can absorb Ran’s lessons
before we ever do.
A Personal Bracha
by R. Daniel Mann
Question: I am often overjoyed that Hashem granted me the zechut
to live in Israel for many years, causing me to make a “spontaneous”
beracha. A friend told me it is forbidden to compose my own berachot
, as one can only use those Chazal composed.Is Judaism not all about
thanking Hashem for all the wonders of creations and providence?
Would I be precluded from thanking Hashem for something important
to me?
Answer: Your assumption that one’s relationship with Hashem should
be personal and overflowing is poignantly and refreshingly correct.
On the other hand, one does not have free reign to serve Hashem as
he desires, as evident from such halachot as bal tosif (not adding on
to the mitzvot) and beracha l’vatala (unwarranted beracha). Let us
seek perspective and guidelines.
The gemara (Berachot 33a) says that one who fulfilled a beracha
requirement and then made an unnecessary one violated the
prohibition of saying Hashem’s Name in vain. Tosafot (Rosh Hashana
33a) argues that uttering Hashem’s Name to praise Him cannot be in
vain, but that it is a Rabbinic prohibition that “leans” on the pasuk.
The Rambam (Berachot 1:15) seems to hold that beracha l’vatala is a
Torah prohibition (Magen Avraham 215:6).
All agree that uttering Hashem’s Name without any purpose is an isur
aseh (low-level Torah prohibition – Temura 4a). Yet, using Hashem’s
Name in the context of praising Him is positive and permitted. In fact,
the Rambam (Shvuot 12:11) says that if one mistakenly uttered the
Name, he should immediately turn it into an appropriate praise of
Hashem, and one of his suggested texts of spontaneous praise begins
with “baruch.”
Where do we draw the line between appropriate praise and a beracha
l’vatala? One approach is that the crucial factor is intention and
context. If one intends to recite a required beracha when he is
actually not required or if a mistake disqualifies the beracha, it is a
beracha l’vatala. If the same words are said as an expression of
personal gratitude, it is permitted (Chavat Da’at 110, Beit Hasafek
20; see Minchat Shlomo II:3). The Chavat Da’at cites a precedent for
the distinction: one is allowed to repeat Shemoneh Esrei (which is
comprised of berachot)with the intention it is voluntary, but not with
an intention for an obligation (see Rosh, Berachot 3:15).
2
Others distinguish based on the text used, which is most severe when
one utters a classic name of Hashem. Some say that if one recites the
beracha in a language other than Hebrew so that the Name is
equivalent only to a kinuy (a descriptive reference) of Hashem, it has
the benefits of a beracha without the fear of beracha l’vatala (see
opinions cited in Shut R. Akiva Eiger I:25, Pitchei Teshuva, YD 328:1,
Piskei Teshuvot 209:7). R. Akiva Eiger (ibid.) and the Netziv (Ha’amek
She’ala 53:2) argue that in the recognized, sensitive context of a
beracha, even a kinuy or foreign language Name can be forbidden, as
we find regarding an oath. The Netziv says that the problem is a
Rabbinic issue of appearing to recite a beracha l’vatala. Therefore,
the closer the text (and/or the context) is to that of a beracha, the
more likely it is to be forbidden. The Minchat Shlomo (ibid.) explains
that one should not act in a way that challenges the rules the Rabbis
set. However, those rules were not set to forbid expression of
personal thanks to Hashem.
We summarize as follows. Your desire to praise Hashem is
commendable. Paradoxically, the more creative the text and style are,
the clearer it is that it is permitted. Convention is that an individual
should generally refrain from using Hashem’s main Names, which we
leave primarily to Chazal and to great rabbis who have composed
prayers and praises throughout history. Saying “Hashem,” “Hakadosh
Baruch Hu,” “Ribbono Shel Olam,” or a Name not in Hebrew is safer
and as profound. It is at least preferable not to recite anything that
resembles a beracha of Chazal by content, by context (e.g., in Birkot
Hashachar) and/or by regularity. That still leaves you with room for
much self-expression.
Passing The Mantle
When Did Moshe Pass the Mantle of Leadership to Yehoshua?
(27:12–23)
by Rav Elchanan Samet
A. Presentation of the problem
(27:12) “And God said to Moshe: Ascend this Mt. Avarim and see
the land that I have given to Bnei Yisrael.
(13) You shall see it and [then] you, too, shall be gathered to
your people, as Aharon your brother was gathered.
(14) As you rebelled against My command in the wilderness of
Tzin, when the nation quarreled – to sanctify Me with the water,
before their eyes; these were the waters of dissent of Kadesh in
the wilderness of Tzin.”
Among his questions on our parasha, Abarbanel asks:
“The ninth question concerns God telling Moshe, ‘Ascend this
Mt. Avarim and see that land,’ concluding with the words, ‘And
you, too, shall be gathered to your people AS AHARON YOUR
BROTHER WAS GATHERED’ – but Moshe did not die upon
receiving this command! Aharon, upon being commanded to die,
ascended the mountain and died. Likewise Moshe, in the parasha
of Ha’azinu (Devarim 32:48–52, 34:1–5). But here, why does God
command him [to ascend Mt. Avarim] if the day of his death has
not yet arrived?”
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Weekly Digest from TorahMusings.com appears in its proper place, but also the motive that leads him to
request this – the command that he ascend Mt. Avarim and die –
appears in its place and at its time, and not in accordance with the
principle that “there is no chronological order in the Torah”. This
brings us back to Abarbanel’s question: “But Moshe did not die upon
receiving this command… Why does God command him if the day of
his death has not yet arrived?”
A great distance separates Parashat Pinchas, where we find
ourselves, and the parashot of Ha’azinu and Ve-Zot Ha-Berakha,
where Moshe is commanded once again to ascend Mt. Avarim to die,
and he does so. Admittedly, from a chronological point of view the
distance in time is not great – only a few months – but those final
months of Moshe’s life were full of momentous events, as attested to
by the end of Sefer Bemidbar and all of Sefer Devarim.
It is therefore impossible that at this very early stage, with many very
important tasks still awaiting Moshe, that he would be told that his
time has come to die, before completing his life’s mission. What, then,
is the point of the verses quoted above?
B. “No chronological order in the Torah” – a solution and its
rejection
The great similarity Bemidbar 27:12–14 and Devarim 32:48–52 gives
the impression that the Torah is describing the same command. This
would tempt us to answer that “there is no chronological order in the
Torah,” and the command appears here before its designated time.
However, this answer is impossible, as we shall see shortly.
Yehoshua’s appointment as Moshe’s successor appears in our
narrative as the crux of the story. Moshe requests that God appoint “a
man over the congregation, who will go out before them and come
before them,” and he makes no mention of any specific person. Only
in God’s response to Moshe, introducing the second half of the story,
do we find the big news:
(18) “Take for yourself Yehoshua bin Nun, a man of spirit, and
place your hand upon him.”
We may conclude that up until this point it is not clear who will
succeed Moshe in the leadership role.
Now we ask: where in the Torah is there any clear indication (by
Moshe or by God) of Yehoshua as the next leader of Israel? Such
indications are found in several places in the Torah, starting in the
final parashot of Sefer Bemidbar and continuing through Sefer
Devarim (e.g., Bemidbar 32:28–29; 34:16–19; Devarim 1:37–38; 3:21;
31:3; etc.).
If the command to Moshe at the end of parashat Ha’azinu to ascend
Mt. Avarim to die there (32:48–52) is the same command given in our
parasha, then it is that command that causes Moshe to ask God to
appoint him a successor, and only then does God notify him that
Yehoshua will be the next leader. But this does not sit well with all the
sources in which we discern that Yehoshua was already recognized as
Moshe’s successor from the time of the events described at the end of
Sefer Bemidbar, even before Moshe launches into his great and final
speech.
We must therefore conclude that the command in our parasha is
located in its proper chronological place. Moshe’s request that a
successor be appointed, and God’s response, revealing Yehoshua as
his successor, apparently took place after the census in the plains of
Moav (chapter 26) and before the war against Midian (chapter 31).
Indeed, nowhere prior to our narrative is there any mention of
Yehoshua as Moshe’s successor.
C. Ramban’s solution: an event in the present that is entirely
concerned with the future
Whether for the reasons above or out of a fundamental objection to
the principle of “no chronological order in the Torah” when not
absolutely necessary, the Ramban attempts to explain God’s
command to Moshe (as well as the continuation of the story) in
keeping with the chronological context. The solution proposed by
Ramban for our verses (12−14) is that they were indeed told to
Moshe here and now, at the time of the events narrated at the end of
Sefer Bemidbar. However, they are not actually a command, “for if
they had been, Moshe would have been obliged to ascend [Mt.
Avarim] immediately,” but rather a notice concerning the future.
Ramban’s approach solves the difficulties mentioned previously.
Without relying on the principle of “no chronological order in the
Torah,” Ramban manages to relate God’s words here to His words at
the end of parashat Ha’azinu. They are indeed the same words, but
they are uttered twice, at different times and for different purposes.
In our parasha they are only a notification as to the future, while at
the end of parashat Ha’azinu they are uttered as a command that
must be fulfilled immediately.
The indication of Yehoshua as Moshe’s future successor similarly
appears in our parasha as notification about the future. From now on,
Moshe and all of Israel know that Yehoshua will inherit Moshe’s
leadership position, even though the actual transfer of power will take
place just before Moshe’s death. This, then, is the reason Yehoshua’s
appointment as Moshe’s successor is a known fact starting from the
final parashot of Sefer Bemidbar.
Thus, Ramban maintains that the dialogue between God and Moshe in
our parasha takes place at the time of its location in the text. It
follows the census described previously, but this dialogue in its
entirety concerns the future. God’s notification to Moshe that he will
die on Mt. Avarim, Moshe’s request that a successor be appointed,
and God’s response – all of these pertain to the future, when Moshe’s
day of death arrives. Why, then, in Ramban’s view, does this dialogue
about the future take place at such an early stage? Ramban explains:
“Since God commands him [right before this], ‘To these shall the
land be divided’ (26:53), He notifies him, ‘It will not be divided
by you, for you will ascend Mt. Avarim… and die there, and will
not get to the land, but only see it.’”
Ramban’s explanation for the Torah dealing with the decree of death
for Moshe in our narrative, such a long time before his actual day of
death, does not solve the issue of why the Torah must also mention
Yehoshua here – which, according to Ramban’s own explanation, is
also a matter that will become real only in the future. It appears that
Ramban was not troubled by this question because he maintained
that the discussion regarding Yehoshua’s appointment was a
But if this is so, then not only Moshe’s request for a successor
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Weekly Digest from TorahMusings.com secondary result of the notice about Moshe’s death in the future,
rather than the whole reason for this parasha.
This gives rise to another difficulty. The majority of our story (nine
out of twelve verses) is devoted to the discussion of Yehoshua’s
succession. From the point of view of literary structure and the
internal proportion between the various parts of the parasha, we must
deduce that the notice of Moshe’s impending death appears to be less
central aspect the story. It seems to appear here only as the pretext
for Moshe’s subsequent request that a successor be appointed. This is
especially true if we accept (unlike the Ramban) that God’s command
to Moshe to appoint Yehoshua, and Moshe’s fulfillment of this
command, pertain to the actual time when our story takes place,
rather than to some time in the future.
D. Abarbanel’s solution: The command that Moshe ascend Mt.
Avarim pertains to the present
Abarbanel attempts to interpret the imperative style of God’s words
to Moshe in their literal sense, but not as an instruction to Moshe that
he go to die upon Mt. Avarim immediately:
“In this utterance, although God commands him to ascend the
mountain and see the land, it is not in order that he die there
immediately. This [command] is not identical to the narrative at
the end of Ha’azinu, and the action described there is not the
same as the one described there, as Ramban thought. For this
reason it is not written here, ‘And die upon the mountain,’ as it
says there. Rather, God commands that he ascend the mountain
that is before them – i.e., several times, and view the land from
there. For whenever he ascends there, he will lift his eyes to the
hills in order to see the land, every day.”
Thus far, Abarbanel has interpreted verse 12, “Ascend this Mt.
Avarim and see the land,” which is literally a command, and pertains
to this moment in time. He now begins to address verse 13, “You shall
see it and you, too, shall be gathered to your people, as Aharon your
brother was gathered”:
“When God says now, ‘You shall see it, and you shall be gathered
to your people,’ it is to teach that now Moshe will see the land
himself, as much as he is able to see, but he will see a different
view of it again at the time of his death, as is mentioned there (in
parashat Ha’azinu). This is the meaning of, ‘You shall see it’ –
i.e., in the future tense [as opposed to the imperative — re’eh —
in the previous verse, which refers to the present tense; the ‘vav’
at the beginning of the word ‘ve-ra’ita’ changes the tense from
past to future]. Then, ‘you will be gathered to your people’ – at
that time, after that final viewing, ‘as Aharon your brother was
gathered.’ Thus, Moshe was not commanded that he would die
right now, but rather was being told to ascend the mountain
regularly and to view the land from there, for his death was not
far away. God gives the reason for his being gathered to his
people in the wilderness, without entering the land, by stating
that it is in accordance with their sin [verse 14].”
Abarbanel interprets all the imperative expressions in our narrative
as regular commands pertaining to the immediate situation. Only
verse 13 – “You SHALL SEE (ve-ra’ita) and you SHALL BE
GATHERED (ve-né’esafta) to your people” – is treated by him as
notification about the future. The verbs in this verse do admittedly
allow such an interpretation, for they are future-tense verbs. The
transition from verse 12, commanding Moshe to ascend Mt. Avarim
immediately, to verse 13, notifying him about the final viewing,
following which he will be gathered to his people – is likewise
exegetically reasonable.
But Abarbanel’s interpretation is not altogether plausible from the
thematic perspective. The very idea that God is commanding Moshe
to ascend Mt. Avarim “several times… for whenever he ascends there
he will lift his eyes to the hills in order to see the land, every day” is a
new idea that makes no sense. The command to Moshe to ascend Mt.
Avarim on the day of his death is a command with a purpose: this
ascent is meant to make the moment of death easier for him to bear,
because he will have feasted his eyes upon the promised land. A
further difficulty that arises from Abarbanel’s interpretation is that if
God is commanding Moshe to ascend Mt. Avarim NOW, where is this
command fulfilled? The absence of any description of the fulfillment
of the command to ascend Mt. Avarim proves the Ramban’s view, or
one similar to it. As the Ramban notes, what Moshe is told in verse 12
“is not a mitzva that the Holy One commands him to fulfill right now,
FOR IF THIS WERE THE CASE, HE WOULD BE OBLIGED TO
ASCEND IMMEDIATELY!”
E. A New Suggestion
Our discussion of the possibilities raised by the various commentators
allows us now to propose an interpretation that will solve the
difficulties we have encountered (while in turn creating new ones).
I propose that God’s words to Moshe in verses 12–14, “Ascend this
Mt. Avarim and see the land,” be wholly identified with their parallel
at the end of parashat Ha’azinu, as the great similarity between the
two sources would seem to suggest. This being so, the appearance of
this utterance by God in our parasha is indeed an instance of “there is
no chronological order in the Torah” – but the same is not true of the
continuation of the story.
At the time where we find ourselves, in the middle of parashat
Pinchas, a few months prior to Moshe’s death, these words are not
told to Moshe – neither as a command that must be fulfilled
immediately (Abarbanel) nor as notification of what will occur in the
future (Ramban). These words are destined to be said to Moshe only
on the day of his death, as recorded at the end of parashat Ha’azinu.
But in parashat Pinchas the Torah gives us this preview, to fill a need
not of Moshe’s, but of ours – the readers.
What makes this preview necessary? It is Moshe’s request of God:
“Let God appoint… a man over the congregation,” and the ensuing
discussion. This request by Moshe comes in the midst of his routine
activity as leader of the nation. Therefore, it would hit us like a bolt of
lightning, without any psychological preparation on our part and
without any introduction in the text, were it not for the Torah’s prior
notification that the day of Moshe’s death is drawing near. This also
hints that Moshe himself is conscious of this fact.
From a thematic point of view, this interpretation is close to the
Ramban’s definition of the function of verses 12–14: as notification of
what is destined for Moshe on the day of his death. The difference is
that the Ramban sees them as NOTIFICATION BY GOD AS
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Weekly Digest from TorahMusings.com ACTUALLY GIVEN TO MOSHE AT THIS TIME, which forces him to
interpret the imperative form of God’s commands as regular future
tense. According to my suggestion, verses 12–14 should be regarded
as NOTIFICATION BY THE TORAH TO THE READERS OF THE
STORY, taking the command in Ha’azinu and introducing it in our
parasha, relying on the principle that “there is no chronological order
in the Torah.”
If verses 12–14 are not God’s actual speech to Moshe, notifying him of
his impending death, what prompts Moshe to request that a successor
be named? In general we may answer that his motivation is his
awareness that his death is drawing near and that he must take care
of the issue of a successor. Moshe needs no reminder of this. He
knows that the decree that has been passed upon him (20:12), “You
shall not bring this congregation to the land that I have given them,”
will be fulfilled. His brother has already died as a result of this
decree, just a short while ago, and the nation is already in the final
stages of preparation for entering the land. If Moshe does not attend
to the appointment of a successor now, when will he do it?
But we, the readers of the Torah, need a reminder of that decree. The
multiplicity of events, of which Moshe is always at the center, may
lead us to forget that Moshe’s death is drawing near. We may
therefore be taken by surprise by his request of God to appoint a
successor when he is still functioning at full strength, fulfilling his
role as leader with no signs of weakening.
F. The census and Yehoshua’s appointment
This interpretation changes our perception of the crux of the story.
Verses 12–14 can no longer be considered the main thrust of the
story; they are merely a necessary technical introduction to assist us
in understanding the rest. It is the continuation, regarding the
appointment of Yehoshua, that is therefore the essence of the story.
The fact that these verses represent a technical introduction is borne
out by thevery fact that our parasha is not their proper place;they
appear here only as a preview.
Because these words were not actually spoken by God to Moshe at
this time, we need not ask why God chooses specifically this moment
to notify Moshe of his impending death. Likewise, there is no need to
find any significance to the juxtaposition of the census, or the
discussion of the inheritance of the land, to these verses. Verses
12–14 are not related to what precedes them; rather, they are a
necessary preamble to what follows them.
The question we must ask is a different one: why does Moshe ask of
God to appoint a new leader specifically at this time? According to the
literal text, it would seem that the motivation for his request right
now is the preceding census. Moshe knows that this was his census of
farewell from the nation, and the population that he counted must
now be entrusted to a new leader. This leads him to ask God to
appoint such a person.
(64) But among these there was not a single man of those
counted (pekudei) by Moshe and Aharon and kohen, who
counted (pakdu) Bnei Yisrael in the wilderness of Sinai.
(65) For God had told them: They shall surely die in the
wilderness. And not a single man remained of them, except for
Kalev ben Yefuneh and YEHOSHUA BIN NUN…
(27:16–17) “Let God, Lord of the spirits of all flesh, appoint
(yifkod) a man over the congregation… that God’s congregation
not be like sheep that have no shepherd.
(18) And God said to Moshe: Take for yourself YEHOSHUA BIN
NUN…”
The concluding verses of the census themselves indicate that this is
Moshe’s farewell census. These verses contrast the two censuses that
frame Sefer Bemidbar: the census conducted in the wilderness of
Sinai in the second year, and the present census, conducted in the
plains of Moav in the fortieth year. The first census was conducted by
Moshe and Aharon – the leaders of the generation that left Egypt. The
present census is carried out by Moshe and Elazar the kohen. Those
originally counted have all been replaced – “not a single man
remained of them.” Even Aharon himself has been replaced by his
son, Elazar. Only Moshe remains as the tangible link between the two
censuses. But it is nevertheless clear from this census that Moshe is
not the natural leader of the new generation.
Who, then, will be the leader of this generation? The answer is hinted
at quite dramatically in the fact that the larger literary unit
describing the census – sixty-five verses in length – concludes,
surprisingly, with the name of Yehoshua bin Nun, seemingly quite
unnecessarily. This conclusion hints that it is Yehoshua who will be
entrusted with the leadership of these people.
Let us now turn to Moshe’s request of God, opening with the word
“yifkod” (“Let [God] appoint…”). The meaning of the word here is
“appoint” and not “count,” but it is certainly no coincidence that both
the root “p-k-d” and the root “m-n-h” are related both to leadership
and to counting. It appears that there is a fundamental connection
between these two actions: the leader is one who counts his nation;
the “mefaked” (leader, commander) counts (poked); the “memuneh”
(appointed one) numbers (moneh).
Likewise, Moshe’s words further on – “that God’s congregation not be
LIKE SHEEP THAT HAVE NO SHEPHERD” – appear to have their
source in the census that has just been completed. Counting the
sheep is one of the regular tasks of the shepherd as he ends his day’s
work and returns the flock to the owner. Similarly, Moshe – the
faithful shepherd – counts his flock before taking leave of them, and
therefore he is concerned that that flock not be left without a
shepherd.
Following all of this we come to God’s response to Moshe, revealing
the name of the next leader who will guide the flock: Yehoshua bin
Nun, whose name concluded chapter 26 – the chapter recounting the
census of Bnei Yisrael.
The root “p-k-d” appears twenty times in chapter 26. Let us review
the concluding verses of this census (mifkad) together with Moshe’s
request and God’s response to it:
(26:63) “These are the people numbered (pekudei) by Moshe and
Elazar the kohen, who counted (pakdu) Bnei Yisrael in the plains
of Moav at the Jordan, near Yericho.
5
This essay originally appeared on Yeshivat Har Etzion’s Israel
Koschitzky Virtual Beit Midrash and is republished here with
Copyright © 2014 Torah Musings, All rights reserved.
9
Weekly Digest from TorahMusings.com permission.
otherwise kosher mixture, the bone counts as part of the kosher meat
to nullify the non-kosher meat,5 or at the very least do not count
towards the forbidden part.6
Silent and Loud Prayer
Halakhic Positions of Rav Joseph B. Soloveitchik
by R. Aharon Ziegler
The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chaim 101:2) states that the individual
Shemoneh Esrei may not be recited in one’s heart or mind but must
be articulated and verbalized so that one hears it oneself. On the
other hand, one must not recite it loud enough for others to hear. The
Mishnah Berurah comments (note 7) that HaKadosh Baruch Hu hears
even silent prayers.
Although the individual’s Shemoneh Esrei is recited silently, the
Chazarat Ha-Shatz (the repetition of the Shemoneh Esrei) is recited
aloud. Rav Soloveitchik explained the difference. The individual, no
matter how righteous, has no right to claim anything from HaShem.
G-d owes the individual nothing. When an individual prays, therefore,
he must do so in the context of supplication, as a poor person at
someone’s door, begging for a donation. The Shali’ach Tzibbur (
Chazan or leader), on the other hand, prays on behalf of the entire
congregation. He thus has the right to demand that HaShem fulfill
His covenantal obligations. He indeed has the right and the obligation
to pray aloud.
Gelatin in Halacha: Recent
Developments
Although in general the bones are still rabbinically prohibited, in the
case of gelatin there may be even more room for leniency because the
bones are completely unfit for human consumption. They were never
included in the prohibition of eating a non-kosher animal in the first
place. This is similar to a case described by the Rama,7 who permits
putting milk into an animal’s stomach which is completely dry like
wood, since it is no longer considered meat. The Shach8 writes that
the same applies to any innards of an animal, such as bones.9
Based on the above, R. Chaim Ozer Grodzinski10 permits the use of
gelatin from a non-kosher animal. An additional consideration of his is
that the processing of the gelatin makes the bones inedible for even
the consumption by a dog. Therefore, the bones, even when
reconstituted in the form of gelatin, are considered “changed” (
nishtanu) in the process and unconnected to the original non-kosher
product. He also noted that gelatin is almost always used in a way
that it is nullified by sixty (i.e., it is less than one sixtieth) in the
finished product.11 This is also the position of R. Ovadia Yosef12 and
can be inferred from the responsa of R. David Tzvi Hoffman.13 R.
Yechezkel Abramsky14 also proposed this approach but cautioned
against leniency, out of fear that permitting something which had
previously been assumed to be prohibited will lead to people being lax
about the halachic process in general.15
Forbidden Bones
by David Roth
For many years, gelatin–which is typically derived from non-kosher
sources–has posed a potential problem for kosher consumers and has
been a major subject of debate among halachic authorities. However,
recent developments in gelatin production might cause a problem
even for those who have been historically lenient.
Gelatin is defined as 1. a nearly transparent, faintly yellow, odorless,
and almost tasteless glutinous substance obtained by boiling in water
the ligaments, bones, skin, etc., of animals, and forming the basis of
jellies, glues, and the like. 2. any of various similar substances, [such]
as vegetable gelatin.1 Vegetable gelatin has few if any kashrus
concerns but gelatin derived from animals has generated vibrant
discussion.
Although according to the above definition gelatin can be made from
ligaments, bones, skin, etc., of animals, the discussions of halachic
authorities appear to be exclusively regarding the bones. If the
gelatin comes from a kosher animal that has been slaughtered
properly, it is kosher and pareve2 according to everyone. Today, a
major source of kosher gelatin is the bones of kosher fish.
Gelatin and Bones
The Gemara3 says that one who cooks bones with milk is exempt from
punishment because the bones do not have the status of meat on a
Biblical level, which is codified in Shulchan Aruch.4 The Gemara
further states that if a non-kosher piece of boned meat falls into an
6
However, R. Aharon Kotler16 argues that the reason that bones are
not included in the prohibition of eating non-kosher animals is simply
because they are unfit for human consumption. However, if they are
reconstituted into gelatin, they are fit to eat and the prohibition
returns. This is because he holds that when the prohibited item itself
is reconstituted, as opposed to just being mixed up with other things
to make it possible to eat the bones, the bones themselves will
become like the meat. If so, at the very least there is a problem of
achshvei (showing that this item has importance), which renders the
item rabbinically prohibited.17 This is also the position of R. Moshe
Feinstein.18 R. Yitzchok Yaakov Weiss19 likewise writes that gelatin
from bones of non-kosher animals has been determined to be
forbidden by most Halachic authorities (al pi daas rov minyan
u’binyan shel gedolei ha’torah). R. Yosef Eliyahu Henkin, while
admitting that there is room to be lenient if the bones are completely
dry, questions whether gelatin is actually made from completely dry
bones. He then says that one should act stringently anyway since
such gelatin is available, and we should try to support those making
gelatin with more stringent standards.20
R. Tzvi Pesach Frank21 takes an interesting middle approach: he
argues that the case of bones that are only rendered unfit from
human consumption, but are still fit for a dog’s consumption, is a
matter of debate. It is contingent on the halachic argument between
the Noda b’Yehuda and the Shach about whether the
above-mentioned Rama, who permits putting milk into an animal’s
stomach that is completely dry like wood, also applies to the stomach
of a non-kosher animal. Was the Rama only lenient about the
prohibition of meat and milk or even about non-kosher animals?
Copyright © 2014 Torah Musings, All rights reserved.
10
Weekly Digest from TorahMusings.com However, if the bones are rendered unfit even from the consumption
by a dog, they should be permitted by all. He concludes that until we
better determine the actual situation, one should be stringent, but
one should not tell those who are lenient that they are acting
incorrectly.
Recent Developments
It is also important to realize that the production process today may
not be the same as that dealt with in the decades-old responsa
mentioned above. The Kosharot organization in Israel22 has made the
claim that today most gelatin is made from fresh bones, in which case
the leniency of dried bones would no longer apply. Therefore, the
gelatin made from these fresh bones of non-kosher animals should be
forbidden according to all halachic authorities.
R. Yaakov Ariel23 responded that even if it is true that gelatin is made
from fresh animal bones, the second leniency still applies. In the
process of making gelatin, the bones are rendered inedible to a dog.
He concludes that it is proper to be strict on that matter, but objects
to calling it non-kosher.
9. The Shach has one caveat, however, which is that he says that
one should not l’chatchila (initially, in the first place) make such
a mixture; however, the Pischei Teshuva (there 19) quotes R.
Akiva Eiger, that this is only when there will not be sixty times
the prohibition in the mixture to nullify the stomach. If there will
be sixty times the prohibition in the mixture to nullify the
stomach, it should be permitted to rely on the leniency even
l’chatchila. ↩
10. Achiezer 3:33:5 ↩
11. He explains that there is no problem of ein mevatlin issur
l’chatchila (nullifying a prohibited item in the first place) in this
case based on a responsum of R. Akiva Eiger (207). R. Eiger says
that if, absent bittul (nullification), there would not be a Biblical
prohibition, there is no issue of ein mevatlin issur l’chatchila
(nullifying a prohibited item in the first place). ↩
12. Yabia Omer YD 8:11 ↩
13. Melamed l’hoil YD 2:24 ↩
The Kosharot organization responded,24 agreeing with R. Ariel that if
the gelatin was indeed made inedible to a dog in the process that it
would indeed be kosher according to some halachic authorities.
However, they deny that this is what actually happens in the process
of extracting gelatin.25 Accordingly, even the lenient authorities
would have to rule strictly if the facts as reported by Kosharot are
confirmed.
14. The responsum is printed in the introduction to Volume 4 of Tzitz
Eliezer. Note that R. Abramsky rejects the logic to permit gelatin
based on nishtanu (that it is changed), and permits it only
because the bones are dried up. He does not address the fact
that there is sixty times the gelatin in the mixture, which could
potentially nullify the gelatin. ↩
The OU and most mainstream kashrus organizations in America are
stringent like R. Aharon Kotler and R. Moshe Feinstein; they only
certify gelatin that is made from the bones of kosher fish, or from
kosher animals which have been slaughtered properly.26 I have found
conflicting sources regarding the policies of the Rabbanut in Israel.27
15. Whenever a Halachic authority mentions something like this, one
would need to determine whether the conditions under which he
made such a statement would still apply, and whether if he were
alive today if he would still say this. In any case, this is well
beyond the scope of this article. ↩
(UPDATED)
16. Mishnas Rebbi Aharon, YD 16–17 ↩
1. http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/gelatin?s=t ↩
17. Achshvei is when one eats something which is not fit for human
consumption; on a Biblical level, there is no prohibition
whatsoever but rabbinically there is a prohibition to eat this item
because you are showing that it does have importance to you. ↩
2. Igros Moshe YD 1:37 and Igros Moshe YD 2:27, based on Noda
B’Yehuda, Volume 1, YD 26, because something that is
completely dry does not have enough taste to make a forbidden
meat and milk mixture. See also Mishnas Rebbi Aharon YD
16:7–13, where he seems to give an additional reason. ↩
6. First opinion in Rama there. ↩
18. Igros Moshe YD 2:27, in the last paragraph. R. Moshe Feinstein
writes that gelatin from a non-kosher animal is forbidden
because the Rambam ruled that bones are forbidden even
though there is no punishment for eating them. Surprisingly, R.
Feinstein seems to ignore the Rama and Shach mentioned above.
However, it is possible (although by no means certain) that he
really meant something along the lines of what R. Aharon Kotler
said, that they are at least forbidden on the rabbinical level. In
any case, it is clear that his position is that gelatin made from
bones of non-kosher animals is forbidden. Also note that R.
Moshe is lenient when it comes to gelatin made from processed
animal skins, see Igros Moshe YD 2:23. ↩
7. YD 87:10 ↩
19. Minchas Yitzchak 5:5 ↩
8. There 33 ↩
20. Edus L’Yisrael, page 177 ↩
3. Chullin 114a ↩
4. YD 87:7. See also in Mishnas Rebbi Aharon YD 16,2, where he is
unsure if the prohibition is really only Rabbinic, as we had
suggested, or if it is indeed Biblical in nature, but one who does
so is exempt from punishment for side reasons. ↩
5. YD 99:1 ↩
7
Copyright © 2014 Torah Musings, All rights reserved.
11
Weekly Digest from TorahMusings.com Butchering Judaism
21. Har Tzvi YD 83 ↩
22. Emunas Itecha, Volume 97, page 41 ↩
A disingenuous animal welfare article stabs Jewish community
interests in the back
23. Emunas Itecha, Volume 98, page 143 ↩
by R. Ari Zivotofsky
24. Emunas Itecha, Volume 99, page 152 ↩
A growing number of US rabbis are engaged in advancing
extra-halachic moral issues. While these are often worthy endeavors,
it is imperative that they be promoted in a positive rather than
negative manner. That is, the inherent good of the cause needs to be
emphasized, rather than merely appearing to be morally superior by
denigrating others. In addition, in order to maintain credibility,
honesty must be strictly adhered to.
25. On
http://www.toraland.org.il/media/273100/emunatTahapuhotZma
n.pdf, page 16 of the pdf, footnote 73, it is suggested that the
argument over whether it is unfit for consumption of a dog might
really be a definitional argument. What does it mean for
something to be unfit for consumption of a dog–is it that a dog
would never eat it, even if it is hungry, or that a domesticated
dog would not normally eat it? ↩
26. See
http://oukosher.org/blog/industrial-kosher/the-fascinating-story-o
f-kosher-gelatin-or-how-a-product-from-beef-can-be-used-in-dairy
-delicacies/, see also
http://www.star-k.org/kashrus/kk-issues-GettingIntoTheThickOfT
hingsGelatin.htm. ↩
27. According to RJJ Journal of Halacha and Contemporary Society,
Volume 30, page 66, footnote 1, the Rabbanut follows the lenient
position. However, according to an article on the Kosharot
website (http://www.kosharot.co.il/show_hadracha.asp?id=60085
), the Rabbanut follows the stringent position, which is
contradicted by another article by Kosharot themselves (Emunas
Itecha, Volume 99, 152) which claims that only mehadrin kosher
supervision follows the stringent opinion. According to an article
on the Tzohar website (
http://www.tzohar.org.il/?content=%D7%94%D7%92%D7%9C%
D7%98%D7%99%D7%9F-%D7%95%D7%9B%D7%A9%D7%A8%
D7%95%D7%AA%D7%95), the Rabbanut is lenient for “regular”
kashrut (as opposed to mehadrin, or higher standard
supervision). Also, see the article on the B’chadrei Chareidim
forum (
http://www.bhol.co.il/forums/topic.asp?topic_id=2024554&f
orum_id=16810) about someone who sued the Strauss company
and the Rabbanut for misleading them into thinking that certain
products containing gelatin are kosher; different parts of the
article appear to present contradictory positions which the
Rabbanut allegedly holds on this matter. Also, see on the Tzomet
website (
http://zomet.org.il/?CategoryID=258&ArticleID=274&
Page=1), where former Chief Rabbi Eliyahu Bakshi-Doron says
that while the Rabbanut does certify gelatin taken from the
bones of non-kosher animals, they require it to be labeled as
such. ↩
8
A text-book example of how not to do it was recently demonstrated in
The Wall Street Journal (WSJ) article Why This Rabbi is Swearing off
Kosher Meat (Houses of Worship, May 29, 2014) by Rabbi Shmuly
Yanklowitz. The missive was a broad based attack on a huge swath of
the kosher industry that contained misinformation and clever but
dishonest tactics. I would first like to address the general issue of
sticking to the positive and then briefly mention the specifics of this
article.
I can speculate that by publishing this article in the WSJ, Yanklowitz
may have had one of two goals in mind. He may have been hoping to
influence the meat or dairy industries to radically overhaul their
practices. The likelihood of a Yanklowitz article in the WSJ leading to
such a change is negligible in my mind, comparable to the YCT
modifying their modus operandi based on a Rabbi Avi Shafran article
in Mishpacha magazine. Alternatively, the goal may have been to
proselytize to the uninitiated and convince others to “boycott” kosher
animal products. Possible, but I think unlikely that an article in the
WSJ will persuade somebody to become a vegetarian.
Unfortunately, other than publicly declaring his moral superiority, a
very likely result of Yanklowitz’s article is that when Jewish
communal organizations are called upon to defend shechita in Europe
or other places, the secular governments will now have one more
piece of ammunition. They can pull out an article by a prominent
“Orthodox” rabbi in the influential WSJ which supports their claim
that shechita is unethical. I have personally been involved in shechita
defense for many years, working behind the scenes clarifying the
scientific and halachic facts about kosher slaughter to keep it legal in
jurisdictions where that is threatened, and this is not a far-fetched
scenario. It may not have been Yanklowitz’s intention, but it is, sadly,
a likely result.
A few specifics about this article. He opens by setting up the
strawman of kosher being healthier and then knocks it down. For
Jews and Jewish law it was never primarily about health and if he so
claims, it is merely a sly tactic to then malign kosher.
He devotes a large section to factory farming and claims that his big
beef is with those practices. If that is true, then he should write an
article about why he hates factory farming and therefore went vegan.
But he should not use his abhorrence of modern animal husbandry to
malign the kosher industry, thereby harming the many observant
Jews who still want to legitimately eat meat, including some who
require it for health reasons.
Copyright © 2014 Torah Musings, All rights reserved.
12
Weekly Digest from TorahMusings.com He devotes considerable space to the treatment of downed (sic)
calves. While this practice may be inappropriate, it is irrelevant to the
kosher meat industry which does not use such animals, a fact that
Rabbi Yanklowitz surely knows. He talks about “story after story” of
Israeli kosher-slaughterhouse scandals. You can count the scandals
(which are unfortunate and most certainly should be dealt with) on
one hand. They are few and infrequent.
What makes this article truly disturbing is the blatant dishonesty
involved. The article implies that after much painful soul-searching
Yanklowitz recently reached his conclusion to stop eating kosher
meat. In reality, he has been a vegan for several years. His ethical
decision is not based on a new epiphany and it relates to all animal
products. His eating habits are not related specifically to the manner
in which kosher meat is slaughtered. This intentional misleading is
nothing less than gneivat da’at.
Most Orthodox Jews who embrace vegetarianism do so with
commendable motivations and do not feel a need to malign kosher
slaughter to justify their choice. In contrast, Yanklowitz attacks the
kosher industry, yet concludes with a personal prayer that the kosher
meat and dairy industries will yet rectify their ways; implying that if
so, he might renounce his veganism. If I invite him to a BBQ with a
backyard raised lamb that I personally schecht gently and with
compassion, will he partake? When the sacrifices are reinstated, as
Orthodox Jews daily pray for, will he willingly eat from the Paschal
sacrifice, after it is lovingly processed by our holy kohanim?
If Yanklowitz chooses to forego meat and other animal products he is
entitled to his choice. He is not entitled to stand on a soap box and
publicly misrepresent the facts about kosher slaughter. There are two
serious problems with this WSJ article – the potential misuse of it and
the deceit in its presentation. His claims, stated and implied, are false
and destructive. In his stab at promoting animal welfare he is (I hope
inadvertently!) harming the interests of the global Jewish community.
She’nishma bsorot tovot.
Looking for the Ghosts
by Aron White
A central feature of the thought of Rabbi Joseph Soloveitchik is the
concept of a Mesorah community. Jews are conceived as part of a
shared community spanning generations, with a shared religious and
spiritual mission and destiny. (Recently this concept was summarised
in an article on this website.)
However, I think that this concept is in danger. I believe that today,
the average Jew is far less conscious, in a daily, existential way, of
being part of an age-old tradition, than Jews of other eras were.
It is very difficult, maybe impossible, to fully understand the
components of another person‘s identity, certainly when talking about
a person one never met. Nevertheless, three factors lead me to the
conclusion that we are less conscious of our past than Jews living in
previous eras.
First, most of the world’s Jews live in relatively young Jewish
communities. 150 years ago the largest Jewish communities were in
9
Eastern Europe and the Middle East (outside Israel) and North Africa.
Today, 80% of the world’s Jews live in Israel and America. There are
surely a higher number of Jews today who are only second or third
generation in their land of birth than at most points in Jewish history.
The old stories of shuls that dated back to eternity, families living in
the same city for generation after generation, even century after
century, whilst obviously never applying to the whole Jewish people,
certainly describe even fewer Jews today. The city of Bnei Brak, now
home to around 180,000 Jews and maybe the spiritual centre of
Charedi Jewry, was only built in 1924. We have few daily reminders of
the Jews who lived one, two, three hundred years ago simply because
we live thousands of kilometres away from the place of their homes,
schools, shuls and cemeteries.
A second factor that undermines our connection to our past is the
style of contemporary Jewish education. Dr. Haym Soloveitchik
famously argued that as we moved from the Shtetl to open Western
societies, Jewish education shifted from being a function of the home
and street to a function of the school. When we lived in closed
communities, the home, and by extension, tradition, were seen as true
expressions of Judaism, capable of accurately transmitting the Jewish
tradition to the next generation. As we became more westernised, our
culture and community became infiltrated with other values; books
and study, rather than the practise and experience of the home,
became the focus. The role of tradition in Jewish education has been
reduced.
The experience of mitzvos, the folklore of mitzvos, is consistent
across generations
The third factor leading to a weakening of historical consciousness is
somewhat ironic. Whilst such generalisations are difficult, it can be
stated that for the last 2 generations, Orthodox children and
teenagers have received more Jewish education, and are more
Jewishly knowledgeable, than their parents. The first generation after
the Second World War saw parents who had had little Jewish
education sending their children to Jewish day schools, and the next
generation saw the flourishing of Year in Israel programs. The
standard image of a child asking his father about the Exodus from
Egypt at the Seder night has been inverted – for nearly two
generations, many Jewish children have grown up with a higher level
of Jewish education than their parents. Whilst this situation is clearly
positive, it has had a side affect of reducing our connection to our
past – for many religiously committed individuals, they look around to
their contemporaries and rebbeim for religious inspiration, rather
than their less religious parents and grandparents. (In numerous
cases, this affect has become so pronounced that, terribly, teenagers
actually look down on their predecessors, and/or consciously distance
themselves from family events and functions. This situation is very
serious, and is worthy of a lengthier discussion in and of its own right,
but is too far afield from our current topic.)
Together, these forces have caused us to lose the sense of being part
of an age-old tradition in a meaningful, tangible way. We live in
relatively new communities and have ceased to see the chain of family
tradition as a method of transmitting Judaism. Is there any way to
revive the Mesorah consciousness, for people to feel part of an age
old tradition in a daily, tangible way?
Copyright © 2014 Torah Musings, All rights reserved.
13
Weekly Digest from TorahMusings.com The answer came to me, as many answers do, in Tzfat. I was
attending a Shabbat meal at the home of a local family. After the head
of the table cut the challa, a guest at the table, a convert from
Scandinavia, turned to me and made a striking comment. She said, in
an offhand manner, but with a seriousness that is hard to describe,
the following:
When I see the head of the table cutting the challa, all I can see
is the ghost of his father cutting the challa, and the ghost of his
father cutting the challa, and so on, for generation upon
generation. And then I see the ghost of his son cutting the challa,
and the ghost of his son cutting the challa, and so on for
generation upon generation. I am a convert, and also I
biologically cannot have children. When I cut the challa, it is just
me, cutting the challa.
The situation of this woman is poignant, even heartbreaking. Her
point, however, is spot on. So many of the actions we perform as Jews
are identical to those performed for generation upon generation.
Philosophically, there have been a huge range of approaches within
Judaism. There are debates over some of the basic philosophical
tenets of the religion (and whether there even are such tenets). Yet,
the mainstays of Jewish observance are remarkably uniform across
communities and across millennia. Our day, as theirs, is framed by
three Tefillot, the wearing of tzitzis, tallis and tefillin, and the reciting
of brachos over food. Our year, as theirs, is framed by Shabbat and
chagim. Our lives, as theirs, are framed by the Jewish rites of
passage.
It is not just the technical mitzvos performance, but the experience of
mitzvos, the folklore of mitzvos, that is also consistent across
generations. My mother always points out that certain pages in the
Haggada are dirtier than others, and in different ways. The page
which contains the brachos for matza always has crumbs in it,
leftovers from previous years Seder night. The pages at which we
drink the cups of wine, and the page where we read out the makkos,
and dip our finger in to the cup, normally are stained red. Last
summer, I was in the Jewish Museum in Amsterdam, where among
other things, there were a number of beautiful handwritten and
decorated Haggados from the 17th century displayed. One was open
to the page of the makkos. The hand that had dipped into the wine
hundreds of years ago had left the telltale wine drops on the page.
Jews have spilled wine on their Haggados for centuries. The wrapping
of the child under the tallis during Birkas Kohanim, the serene
moment of prayer after the lighting of the Shabbat candles, the tune
of Kol Nidrei, are identical across time.
The connection to our Mesorah, to those generations before us, is
present in so much of what we do. We just need to look for the ghosts.
10
Copyright © 2014 Torah Musings, All rights reserved.
14
Torah Musings Digest
18 July, 2014 | A Window into the Orthodox Jewish Intellectual’s World| Edited by: Rabbi Gil Student
Avoiding Danger in our Daily
Lives
“Hashem Watches the Fools”
In many places, the Gemorah13 permits a dangerous action on the
grounds that it is done by many people, and it is included in “shomer
In previous articles we dealt with the halachos of dangerous activities,
pisayim Hashem”14 – Hashem watches the fools.” There are many restric‐
such as eating fish together with meat, talking with food in your mouth,
tions to this idea, as will be discussed below.
learning the halachos of avielus, and going for blood tests on Erev Yom
The simple meaning is that one is permitted to do a dangerous act, since
Tov. In addition, we have dealt with placing food under the bed, leaving
Hashem watches the fools. However, this only applies to a common act
eggs peeled overnight, and the will of Rav Yehuda Hachasid which all in‐
volve some form of danger.
which is not considered dangerous.15 The Achiezer16 maintains that this
Halachically Speaking
The Binyon Tzion18 has a different approach. He says that if one is al‐
Volume 10 Issue 7
ready in danger he has to do whatever is possible to remove himself from
idea was used in a unique case and cannot be applied to other cases.17
the danger. However, if the danger is not yet at hand and there is less
Authored by Moishe Dovid Lebovits
than a fifty percent chance that the action will result in a dangerous situa‐
Reviewed by Rabbi Ben-zion Schiffenbauer Shlit”a
tion, then the specific action is permitted. This is where we apply shomer
Piskei Harav Yisroel Belsky Shlit”a
pisayim Hashem.
Reviewed by Harav Yisroel Belsky Shlit”a
Some only apply this idea where there is doubt if the action is dangerous
In this article, we will focus on other halachos. For example, is one al‐
at all.19 Others limit this idea to someone who is not a learned person (am
lowed to place himself in a potentially dangerous situation, such as at‐
ha’aretz).20
tending a Yeshiva in Eretz Yisroel in a time of war? May one visit danger‐
ous places? Is it permitted to join the army? Kashrus professionals fre‐
“One Who Keeps a Mitzvah Will Know no Evil”
quently go to remote countries to supervise kosher production. Is this per‐
mitted in spite of a potential danger? This topic is especially relevant in
Another common phrase used to permit a dangerous act is that, “One who
the summer months when people like to vacation to remote locations. All
keeps a mitzvah will know no evil.” However, the poskim discuss many
these and other areas of danger will be discussed below.
variables as to when this applies.21
Introduction
“When One is Doing a Mitzvah He Will Not be Hurt”
A person has a mitzvah to remove himself from danger.1 Many poskim say
2
3
The Gemorah22 permits bedikas chometz in a snake-infested area be‐
that this is a mitzvah d’oraisa, while other poskim say it is a d’rabbonon.
cause, “When one is doing a Mitzvah he will not be hurt.” However, this
The Chinuch4 explains that Hashem gave us a nefesh which resides within
only applies if the possible danger is not a frequent occurrence. The Ge‐
the body, and one must protect his body in order to protect the nefesh.
morah23 says that when one learns Torah lishma he is protected from
5
The Be’er Hagolah says that Hashem created the world with kindness for
even dangers that are common, even when he is not learning.
the purpose of doing good to His creations. One who puts himself in dan‐
For One’s Livelihood
ger is implying that he does not want the good that Hashem gave him.
6
There is no greater apikores than such a person. The Mesillas Yeshorim
writes that one who does not treat his body with the appropriate respect
is a shotah. The Sefer Chassidim7 says that one who places himself in a
The Gemorah24 records that workers would risk their lives in order to
make a living. The Nodeh B’Yehuda25 permits hunting for one’s livelihood,
dangerous situation will have to give a din and cheshbon to Hashem why
even if it is a danger. Harav Moshe Feinstein zt”l26 also permits possibly
he did so. The Ritvah8 says that one should not eat any unhealthy food.
dangerous activities for a livelihood. However, one should consult with his
Many people will scrupulously avoid an issur, and Chazal tell us that
Rav before going into business which can involve danger, since there are
9
something that involves danger is more severe than an issur. Whoever
does dangerous things to himself and destroys himself has no olom
haba.10 A person may not say, “I will go to a dangerous place or do some‐
thing dangerous and a miracle will happen,” because maybe a miracle will
not happen to him.11 Although many dangers mentioned in Shas are not
brought in halacha, the Stiepler zt”l was careful with all of them.12
no clear cut rules for this matter.
Living in a Dangerous Place
There is no question that the thousands of people who live in Eretz Yisroel
face the danger of terrorism. We will not arrive at a ruling as to whether
one should live in Eretz Yisroel. Rather, we will discuss the issues involv‐
15
ing the exposure to danger.
However, some argue that there is no obligation if it entails even a sofek
danger.39
Klal Yisroel was given the Torah “to live with (mitzvos)” not to r”l die from
them. This is expressed in the words of v’chai bahem.27
In a case of war, the halacha changes. A war is a threat to the tzibbur, and
the soldiers represent the tzibur. Therefore, the soldiers can save other
We all know that when there is a matter of life and death, one is permitted
Jews who are in danger even if there is a concern that the soldiers will r”l
to even desecrate Shabbos and Yom Kippur, and is only obligated to give
get killed.40
28
up his life in order to avoid Avodah Zarah, illicit behavior, and murder.
Kashrus Professionals
Some are of the opinion that living in Eretz Yisroel is of such great impor‐
tance that one may live there even if he is in danger.29 This is because the
30
mitzvah applies to the masses and not to the individual.
In addition, it is
Many times a kashrus agency may be requested to give a hashgacha in re‐
mote countries. If the place is known to be dangerous, one should not visit
a mitzvah to help fight a war, even if it is dangerous. The admonition of
or send mashgichim there. Each kashrus agency should decide which
v’chai bahem does not apply to wartime.
countries should be avoided.
Furthermore, these people are not in a constant state of danger. In addi‐
The United States Department of State provides a list of dangerous coun‐
tion, those who live in remote locations serve to secure the borders, mak‐
tries: Afghanistan, Chechnya, Colombia, Congo, Haiti, Indonesia, Iraq,
ing sure that the Arabs do not take it over. In this way, they are compara‐
Nigeria, North Korea, New Guinea, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen.41
ble to soldiers of the Israeli army. Based on the above, those who have the
Certainly, Jews should avoid these countries.
courage and strength to live in such places (Shomron, etc.) have on whom
to rely on to do so.31
Placing Money in One’s Mouth
A more complicated issue arises when a student is learning in Eretz Yis‐
The halacha is that one should refrain from placing money in his mouth
roel and a war breaks out, and his parents demand that he come home. Is
the child required to return home? Although there is a mitzvah to obey
32
one’s parents, one need not follow an order to nullify a mitzvah.
How‐
ever, some say that living in Eretz Yisroel is not an active mitzvah for each
33
individual person, but one who lives there fulfills a mitzvah.
Others
treat this like any other mitzvah, and the child is not obligated to obey his
for fear of contracting a disease,42 as people are always touching money,
and may transfer microbes to the money.43 Others explain that one may
inadvertently swallow the money and choke on the coins.44 Based on this,
one should be careful not to place small items in his mouth.45 Special
care should be exercised with little children, as they are accustomed to
place money in their mouths.
34
parents’ demand that he return home.
Other Activities to Avoid
There is another factor that affects this issue.
One should not walk under a shaky bridge, near a shaky wall,46 or enter a
There is a dispute among the poskim if the mitzvah of obeying parents ap‐
ruin because of danger.47 One should not take chewed food out of his
plies when the request is not for something which would directly benefit
mouth and then chew the food again.48
the parent. The consensus is that the mitzvah does not apply. Therefore, if
the request is solely motivated by the parents’ concern for the safety of
Non-Jewish Barber
their child, there is no obligation to obey. However, if the request is due to
the parents’ own peace of mind, then one is permitted to leave Eretz Yis‐
There is a little known halacha that one is not allowed to take a haircut by
roel. In the final analysis, one who does not feel he is in grave danger and
a non-Jew, as he might take the razor49 and use it to r”l murder the client.
wishes to stay in Eretz Yisroel may do so, but he may leave if this will con‐
However, it is permitted if other people are present,50 or if there is a mir‐
tribute to his parents’ peace of mind.35
ror and you can see what he is doing.51
A Sofek Danger to Save From a Definite Danger
Some add that since we are accustomed to pay the barber for his services,
we are not concerned that he will jeopardize his livelihood by harming his
Although a soldier in the Israeli army is definitely exposed to danger, he/
clients.52
she is still permitted to join the army, as will be explained.
Based on kabbalah, some say that one should not take a haircut from a
A person may expose himself to a sofek danger under certain circum‐
stances in order to save someone from a definite danger, since there is a
doubt whether he will ever be exposed to danger.36 This contributes to so‐
non-Jew,53 especially if there are Jews who are just as capable of giving a
haircut.54
ciety, as people will be saved from dangerous situations.37
Loud Music at Weddings
Therefore, one is obligated to make an effort to save others from a dan‐
There is a widespread problem of excessively loud music at weddings.
gerous situation, even if there is a possibility of personal danger. If he fails
Often, the decibel level is sufficient to damage hearing permanently. It is
to do so, he has transgressed the mitzvah of 38.‫לא תעמוד על דם רעך‬
16
common practice in Eretz Yisroel to utilize a sound meter which automati‐
18. 137. ↩
cally shuts off the amplifier when the music reaches a dangerous level.
This is a great idea for us to develop as well.
19. Refer to Shemiras Haguf V’hanefesh pages 66–67, Yabea Omer
Y.D 3:7:3. See Igros Moshe C.M. 2:76. ↩
~~~
1. Meseches Berochos 32b, Rambam Hilchos Rotzeach V’shemiras
Hanefesh 11:4–5, Sefer Sharei Teshuva 3:82, Shulchan Aruch
20. Terumas Hadeshen 211. Refer to Shemiras Haguf V’hanefesh
page 67. See Yabea Omer Y.D. 2:7. ↩
C.M. 427:8, Levush C.M. 116:57, Ben Ish Chai Pinchus 2:10,
Chochmas Adom 68:4, Shulchan Aruch Harav Shemiras Haguf 4,
Aruch Hashulchan Y.D. 116:1, Pela Yoetz Shemirah:pages 577–579
21. Refer to Shemiras Haguf V’hanefesh pages 69–74 in great depth.
↩
(new), Kovetz Igeres (Chazzon Ish) 1:136:page 140, Shevet
Ha’Levi 6:111:1. ↩
22. Pesachim 8a-8b. Refer to Meseches Kiddushin 39b, Pri Megadim
O.C. M.Z. 433:7. ↩
2. Based on the posuk in Devarim 4:9. Refer to Levush C.M. 116:57,
Pri Megadim M.Z. 84:2, Tevuas Shor 13:2, Shulchan Hatohar C.M.
427:9, Aruch Hashulchan C.M. 427:8, Bais Yehuda Y.D. 25, Shem
Aryeh Y.D. 27, see Yabea Omer Y.D. 1:8:4, Al Pi Hatorah (Shemos)
page 343, see Pe’er Tachas Eifer pages 61–68 in great depth. ↩
3. Be’er Hagolah C.M. 427:70, Chinuch mitzvah 546, Chai Adom
16:24, Divrei Malkiel 4:62, see Levush Y.D. 116:1, Me’am Loez
Devarim pages 1:232–240. The Betzel Hachuchma 4:118 differen‐
tiates between what type of danger it is. ↩
4. Mitzvah 73. ↩
5. C.M. 427:10. ↩
6. 11:page 58. ↩
7. 675. ↩
8. Meseches Shavuos 27a. ↩
9. Meseches Chullin 10a, Rama Y.D. 116:5, see Shulchan Aruch
173:2, Imrei Eish Y.D. 60, Shemiras Haguf V’hanefesh page 63,
Chaim L’lo Ishan pages 74–76. ↩
10. Meseches Gittin 57b. ↩
11. Meseches Shabbos 32b. ↩
12. Shemiras Haguf V’hanefesh 265:page 756. ↩
13. Meseches Shabbos 129b, Yevamos 12b, 72a, Kesubos 39a. ↩
14. Tehillim 116:6. ↩
15. Refer to Rav Akiva Eiger 1:71–72, Pischei Teshuva E.H. 23:2, see
Journal of Halacha and Contemporary Society 33:page 59. ↩
16. E.H. 1:23. Refer to Igros Moshe C.M. 2:76, Tzitz Eliezer 10:25:17,
15:37:2. ↩
17. Some say the above phrase only applies to the cases where this
phrase is brought in the Gemorah (Pe’er Tachas Eifer page
77:footnote 1). ↩
23. Sotah 21a. Refer to Avnei Nezer O.C. 454:2. ↩
24. Meseches Bava Metziah 112a. ↩
25. Y.D. 2:10. ↩
26. C.M. 1:104. Refer to Halichos Journal 5755:pages 64–67 in great
depth. ↩
27. Vayikra 18:5. Refer to Meseches Yoma 85b. ↩
28. Refer to Techumin 22:page 117, see Techumin 2:page 187. ↩
29. Refer to Tosfas Meseches Avodah Zarah 110 “hu” who argues. ↩
30. Refer to Techumin 27:page 117. ↩
31. Techumin 22:pages 116–119 in depth. ↩
32. Shulchan Aruch Y.D. 240:15. ↩
33. Refer to Igros Moshe E.H. 1:102, Y.D. 3:122, see Yechaveh Da’as
3:69, 5:57, Tzitz Eliezer 6:32, 10:32, Minchas Yitzchok 10:108,
Minchas Shlomo 2–3:100. ↩
34. Yechaveh Da’as 4:49 in great depth who brings the opinions on
this issue. ↩
35. Refer to Techumin 12:pages 187–199 in great depth. ↩
36. Bais Yosef C.M. 426. ↩
37. Chinuch Mitzvah 237. ↩
38. Shulchan Aruch C.M. 426:1, see Vayikra 19:16. Refer to Sreidim
(Journal) 13:pages 51–52. ↩
39. Refer to Sreidim (Journal) 13:page 52. ↩
40. Tzitz Eliezer 12:57, 13:100. Refer to Sreidim (Journal) 13:pages
51–60 in great depth. See Yabea Omer C.M. 10:6. This is related
to the story of Mordechai and Esther in Megillas Esther as well
(see Yabea Omer C.M. 10:6). ↩
17
41. Refer to http://travel.state.gov/travel/cis_pa_tw/tw/tw_1764.html.
49. We are not concerned about him using a scissor since it is not
common to do damage with it (Taz 1). Some say if the barber uses
↩
a scissor then other people still have to be present to permit tak‐
42. Shulchan Aruch Y.D. 116:5. ↩
ing a haircut form a non-Jew (Be’er Heitiv 156:1). ↩
43. Shach 3, Chochmas Adom 68:2. ↩
50. Shulchan Aruch Y.D. 156:1. ↩
44. Kaf Hachaim 116:38, Chelkes Binyomin 116:34. ↩
51. Rama Y.D. 156:1. Some say if it is an important person there is no
need for him to look in the mirror (Darchei Teshuva 156:1). ↩
45. Ibid. ↩
52. Bais Lechem Yehuda Y.D. 156. Refer to Shach 2. ↩
46. Meseches Tannis 20b, Shulchan Aruch Y.D. 116:5, Shach 5,
Chochmas Adom 68:4. ↩
53. Opinion brought in the Darchei Teshuva 156:4. ↩
47. Shach 5. ↩
54. Ibid. ↩
48. Kaf Hachaim 116:76. ↩
Rethinking the Shidduch Cri‐
sis: The Role of Jewish
Women in Contemporary So‐
ciety
Chareidi life of kollel and klei kodesh, inadequately paid communal work‐
by Efraim Vaynman
who will have to live the bedieved life of working for a living.
Sometimes we don’t see the obvious until we are forced to. The so-called
The question is when these individuals come to this realization. Among
“Shidduch Crisis,” the many singles struggling to find a mate, is a case-in-
men, this often happens when they arrive at the recognition that they are
point. The Chareidi community in particular has proposed many ideas for
not successful in their learning. Realizing that the limited funding should
solving and alleviating the shidduch crisis such as: financial incentives for
go to the best scholars, they wistfully consign themselves to their fate and
setting up older girls, having boys get married earlier, and even having
join training programs that will enable them to earn a living. With a
1
girls start kindergarten later. Much thought has been given to the source
2
of the problem, whether the supposed “age gap theory” or the Western
courtship conventions we’ve adopted. However, not much thought has
been given to the more fundamental question of what we are looking for
in a marriage. But soon the Chareidi world will be forced to confront this
question too.
ers.
The unsustainability of such a community is obvious and many have al‐
ready written about it. Slowly but surely, in both the Israeli and American
Chareidi societies, people are realizing that not everybody will be able to
live a kollel life. While this realization is starting to sink in, there are few
individuals who are willing to accept they will be the unfortunate ones
yeshiva quota system set to be implemented in Israel in the coming years,
this realization will come earlier for these men as they are forcefully re‐
moved from the beis medrash.
But what of the women? When do they reluctantly accept that they will
not be able live the ideal Torah lifestyle? After all, they too are taught to
want,3 or rather demand, that their husbands learn as long as they possi‐
The Financial Situation and its Effects on Kollel Life
bly can.
The Chareidi world is facing tumultuous times. Recent budget cuts by the
For a married woman it would seem that her decision to leave full-time
Israeli government to Yeshiva funding and welfare programs are causing
learning is reached together with her husband. A wife can encourage her
upheaval as Chareidi leaders scramble to arrange alternate funding to
husband to continue learning and offer to financially support the family
support their schools and to continue paying the meager stipends to their
the best she can. However, many times a woman may come to the realiza‐
kollel students. Meanwhile, their American counterparts, while not facing
tion that despite her best efforts, she is unable to make ends meet or con‐
nearly as dire a situation, are also struggling to continue to support the
tinue doing so while still tending to her responsibilities at home and to
ever-expanding kollel system. As more and more yeshiva students marry
her children. For single women this unfortunately seems to often happen
and join the ranks of those who make torasam umanusam, studying Torah
after a prolonged unsuccessful dating period in which they were not able
their occupation, the philanthropic supporters of these yeshivas and kolle‐
to become engaged to a ben torah. Facing the prospect of becoming an
lim are spread increasingly thin. Affluent grandparents and parents who
“older single,” they accept their fate and start dating men who will not be
were once proud and happy to support the kollel lifestyle they never had
long-term learners.
are now pressed hard to come up with the requisite funds to support their
many children and grandchildren who almost all choose to live the ideal
Impending Changes
18
The tides of change have already started to blow, and the situation is on
they will at first only compromise on what they see as the least important
course to dramatically transform in the coming years. The future realities
things and will progressively concede to more compromises as they sense
will compel changes to the Chareidi system of kollel, whether the Charei‐
their shidduch chances wane. The point at which a woman will be willing
dim like it or not. Kollel will not disappear but it will be reserved for the
to forgo a kollel lifestyle and what compromises she will be willing to
best and the brightest. People will eventually realize early on whether
make to attain this lifestyle is our interest here.
they are learners or earners, and will prepare for their future according to
There is a pivotal difference between the way men and women accept
their own self-determination.
their inauspicious fate of not living a kollel lifestyle. When a man reaches
One often overlooked repercussion of this change is its impact this on the
the conclusion that he should leave yeshiva and join the workforce, he ac‐
Chareidi shidduch model. With more men deciding that they will not be
cepts it as the divine will. There are learners and there are earners in Klal
learning long-term there needs to be a commensurate number of women
Yisroel, and God has decided that the best way for this individual to con‐
willing to forgo the ideal kollel lifestyle. While it will be apparent which
tribute to the nation is through working and supporting Torah, and learn‐
men will be learning, it is not at all known which women will become kol‐
ing Torah himself when he can. He finds comfort in knowing that he is
lel wives. The discrepancy in age at which men and women realize their
more fit for earning and can be more productive that way than had an‐
fate is already a big contributor to the shidduch crisis, and without some
other person learning been forced into his fate.
type of change it will be felt more acutely in the coming years. This differ‐
ence in the amount of men planning on learning and women that plan on
For a woman, the realization that she must compromise her ideals and
being being kollel wives has the potential to exacerbate the shidduch cri‐
marry someone who will not be learning does not naturally lead to the ac‐
sis. Signs of the impending crisis are already emerging and according to a
ceptance of her predestined role. After all, until now she was fully pre‐
recent Mishpacha article, the situation in the Chareidi world has been
pared to commit to a self-sacrificing life for the sake of her husband’s and
heightened from an “orange light” to a “red alert”.
4
children’s Torah. What then happened? She was as willing to make the
same sacrifice as her peers who successfully married into kollel life. Why
In addition, in recent times there has been much material published in
is she different? Although it is possible accept that somehow her peers are
which working for living is legitimized. Such material, together with the
more apt or more righteous and deserving than she, this is not an intuitive
growing movement of the so called Blue Shirt Charedim (also called
and comforting answer.
Chardashim, short for Chareidim Chadashim, New Chareidim), are help‐
ing young yeshiva students realize that not everyone is cut out for a life of
The consequence of this thinking is that a woman is less willing to accept
full time learning. Although working for a living is being legitimized and
a secondary role of forgoing kollel life. She will prefer to compromise on
becoming socially more acceptable, the ideal still remains to live a kollel
other things first.
life if pragmatically possible.
The compromises in choosing a marriage partner that some women are
An Exacerbated Chareidi Shidduch Crisis
willing to make in order to live a kollel life are cause for more concern
than the current shidduch crisis. Is it indeed correct to compromise on a
The changing attitude to kollel is predominantly occurring among
husband’s other qualities for this sake? How much can be compromised
Chareidi men. They still cling to the ideal of kollel life, but acknowledge
without endangering a marriage? Assuming that living a kollel life is of
work as a legitimate undertaking and an appropriate role for some people.
paramount importance, it would seem that it would indeed supersede
What sets the kollel elite apart from others is their blessing of a mind bet‐
some other aspects of marital compatibility. I believe that such thinking is
ter attuned for learning and the zitzfleish, the stamina and diligence, to
dangerous and can potentially lead to marital disasters.
continue enthusiastically learning long term.
A Return to the Sources
Because there is no corresponding development among women, this
emerging trend threatens to further aggravate the shidduch problem. For
In the following essay I will review the Talmudic sources on which the
the average shidduch–aged girl, there are not many reasons for her to be‐
Chareidi education system bases itself to teach its daughters to want a
lieve that she is different from her friends who will lead a kollel life.
kollel lifestyle. Through close examination and analysis of the sources I
Although there are women who feel they are not ready be both a full-time
will argue that the applicability of these texts to present day society
breadwinner and mother, for Chareidi women this is an acknowledgment
seems inappropriate.
of weakness of character and self-motivation. There are far fewer women
willing to admit this than there are Chareidi men who are willing to ac‐
knowledge that there are other men whose mental capabilities make them
more successful at learning.
A Return to the Sources
In the prior essay, I argued that the kollel lifestyle is changing but that an
imbalance exists between men and women that will exacerbate the cur‐
The chasm between men’s and women’s willingness to compromise on liv‐
rent shidduch crisis. In this essay I will review the Talmudic sources on
ing a kollel lifestyle lies not just at the root of the shidduch crisis, but is
which the Chareidi education system bases itself to teach its daughters to
also the source of a much more profound problem.
want a kollel lifestyle. Through close examination and analysis of the
As stated earlier, women tend to be willing to compromise on their ideals
sources I will argue that the applicability of these texts to present day so‐
as they age and start to face a much more gloomy perspective. Naturally,
ciety seems inappropriate.
19
It is not in my interest to engage in the polemics of feminist halacha. Such
polemics are often colored, whether they are pro or against a progressive
Further, the Talmud’s rejection of its initial answer needs clarification.
While it is true that women are exempt from learning Torah, the Talmud
interpretation of halacha. My purpose here is to make a convincing argu‐
elsewhere12 makes it clear that one who performs a mitzvah despite
ment for a community that pays no heed to such feminist discourse.
being exempt from it will still receive a reward, albeit not as much one
Although I will argue that the role of women needs to be redefined in con‐
com‐manded in the mitzvah. Rabbi Meir even says that a gentile who
temporary times, I make this argument not on my own, but to clarify that
learns To‐rah is considered like a Kohen Gadol.13 What, then, is the
such is the view of the gedolim of the previous century whose views on
Talmud’s ques‐tion that a woman who learns Torah is not commanded but
this matter have already been accepted in most of Chareidi society.
fulfills? A woman, too, receives reward for learning. Perhaps it is in that
The fundamental discussion focuses around a question that Rav asked R.
merit that her impending death is delayed.14
Chiyya, “Whereby do women earn merit?”5 The response6 recorded is “By
It seems then that when the Talmud says a woman is categorized as one
making their children go to the synagogue to learn Scripture and their
who is exempt and still fulfills it is implying something more than just the
husbands to the Beth Hamidrash to learn Mishnah, and waiting for their
technical aspect of fulfillment of the mitzvah. Rather, the Talmud is saying
husbands until they return from the Beth Hamidrash”.7
that because women are exempt from the mitzvah, their fulfillment of the
mitzvah is seen negatively.15
The Talmud’s answer would seem to confirm the Chareidi viewpoint that
the most important thing a Jewish woman can do to earn a share in the
To better understand the Talmud’s intent it is necessary to see the context
World-to-Come is to facilitate the learning of her husband and children.
of its discussion. The Mishna discusses the disagreement between Ben
Upon closer examination of a parallel text, this answer becomes more
Azai and R. Eliezer whether it is permitted to teach women Torah:
clear.
She had scarcely finished drinking when her face turns
The Mishna8 states that although a Sotah who is impure and committed
green, her eyes protrude and her veins swell; and it is
adultery when secluded with another man will die a bitter death after
exclaimed, remove her that the temple-court be not
drinking the Sotah water, her impending demise can be suspended for up
defiled. If she possessed a merit, it [causes the water] to
to three years if she has some merit. The Talmud inquires:
suspend its effect upon her. Some merit suspends the
effect for one year, another for two years, and another for
What sort of merit? If I answer merit of [studying] Torah,
three years. Hence declared Ben Azzai, a man is under
she is [in the category] of one who is not commanded and
the obligation to teach his daughter Torah, so that if she
fulfills!9
has to drink [the water of bitterness], she may know that
the merit suspends its effect. R. Eliezer says: whoever
teaches his daughter Torah teaches her obscenity.16
After a prolonged discussion of several possible answers that explain the
merit of mitzvot, the Talmud returns to its original assumption that the
merit mentioned in the Mishna is the merit of Torah. Again we find the fa‐
The Talmud here is trying to understand the merit that the anonymous
miliar formulation, this time in the name of Ravina:
portion of the Mishna says will spare the Sotah woman for three years.
Both Ben Azai and R. Eliezer seem to agree that a certain merit will spare
It is certainly merit of [the study of] Torah [which causes
the women. The Talmud asks which merit. It cannot be the merit of Torah,
the water to suspend its effect]; and when you argue that
because according to R. Eliezer, women’s learning is not condoned and
she is in the category of one who is not commanded and
their learning is not meritorious at all. What then, asks the Talmud, is the
fulfills, [it can be answered] that while women are not so
merit intended by the Mishnah, to which both Ben Azai and R. Eliezer
commanded, when they have their sons taught Scripture
agree?
and Mishnah and wait for their husbands until they
return from the Schools, should they not share [the merit]
with them?
The above quoted passage seems to be self-contradictory. At first the Tal‐
mud was reluctant to ascribe the merit to the Torah the woman herself
had learned because “she is not commanded” to learn Torah and as Rashi
explains her merit is not as great as one he who is commanded to learn.
But then the Talmud concludes that her merit is for facilitating the learn‐
ing of her husband and sons. But the original question still remains: her
action, while surely meritorious, is not one in which she is commanded.
The Talmud elsewhere10 makes it clear that he who is charged with learn‐
ing himself is tasked with teaching his sons, which excludes women who
are not commanded to learn. How then is the Talmud’s answer better than
its first assumption?11
This explanation would also resolve another perplexity some of the com‐
mentaries point out. The Talmud strangely seems to assume the merit
mentioned in the Mishna is of Torah. Only after rejecting this possibility
does it propose that the merit could be that of some other mitzvah. This is
quite strange, especially since the source for the Mishna’s statement is
learnt from Nebuchadnezzar, whose life was spared for a year for giving
charity.17 Nebuchadnezzar did a mitzvah, and even the mitzvah that he
did he was not commanded in.18 Why then does the Talmud ask that
women are not commanded to learn Torah; in that respect they are not
different than Nebuchadnezzar who achieved merit by fulfilling a mitzvah
in which he was not commanded?
Following the above-proposed explanation we can explain these difficul‐
ties. The Talmud’s assumption and its following questions concern the un‐
derstanding of merit in the Mishna, even according to R. Eliezer.
When
20
Ben Azai says that “a person is obligated to teach his daughter Torah so if
should not be taught Tanach.22 Bach23 and Taz24 further limited this per‐
she will ever drink she will have a merit,” he implies that the merit men‐
mission to only the simplest explanation of the text. But in today’s high
tioned is Torah. The Talmud’s question about the merit a woman received
schools and seminaries, women are not only taught Tanach without ques‐
from learning Torah is based on the understanding that the merit men‐
tion, but they learn it in great depth, often exceeding the level at which it
tioned by the anonymous part of the Mishna is also in accordance with R.
is taught in male yeshivot.25
Eliezer, who opposes women’s learning. The Talmud’s final resolution is
that the merit is that of a woman facilitating the learning of her husband
Similarly the permission for a self-motivated woman to learn things nor‐
and sons, which is a deed that even R. Eliezer would consider meritorious.
mally restricted to other women does not seem to be applicable to every
student in a school.26 This is especially true for high school students, for
My argument here is that the statement that a woman’s greatest merit in
whom attendance is compulsory, and is probably true for many seminaries
this world is facilitating the learning of her husband and sons is not a
which some students attend because of societal pressure rather a genuine
unanimous ideological declaration about the role of women in Judaism.
desire to learn Torah.
Only according to R. Eliezer, who holds that women may not learn Torah,
does the Talmud state that a woman’s greatest merit in Torah is ancillary.
What, then, do contemporary schools and seminaries rely on when they
According to Ben Azai, who condones a woman learning, that is the big‐
teach women Torah?27 There are two approaches, both of which have
gest merit she can have, which will keep her alive. Although Ben Azai also
sup‐port from prominent and noted rabbis.
agrees that women are not commanded to learn Torah, and presumably
they will not receive the same reward for learning Torah as men who are
One approach is that of the Chafetz Chaim, who famously lent his support
commanded, it appears that the tremendous reward for learning is only
to the then revolutionary Bais Yaakov movement. According to the Chafetz
slightly diminished and it is still greater than other mitzvot.
Chaim, women’s education must be more comprehensive today than what
To be sure , R. Chiyya’s state ment, although independent, also seems to be
the traditional halacha permits. He allows this because “in our many sins,
the education received from the father[’s home] has become very very
in accord with R. Eliezer’s prohibitive position. Indeed the halacha, as
weak…especially those who have learned how to read and write the secu‐
ruled in the Shulchan Aruch19 and almost all authorities,20 follows R.
lar languages, it is a great mitzvah to teach them Chumash, Nach, and
Eliezer. The emphasis on women’s secondary role in Torah study follows
Mussar of Chazal…so that they be imbued with belief in our holy religion.
directly from limiting their ability to study by themselves.
Otherwise we risk losing them completely from the path of God and they
might God forbid violate all of the tenets of our religion.”28
Since the role of women in Torah study is contingent on their ability to
learn Torah themselves, a change to women’s participation in Torah study
In other words, the times have changed and the emergency situation de‐
might possibly be grounds for refocusing their spiritual goals as well.
mands a new approach to women’s education. The Talmud29 establishes
The question then is whether women’s participation in Torah study has
changed in recent times. Is the current state of women’s Torah education
something sanctioned by halacha or a necessary deviation due to exigent
circumstances? If the former, then the quintessential woman is one who
strives to support the learning of her husband and sons. But if the latter,
then perhaps it is time to reassess the role of women in Jewish society.
What the Poskim Permit
A simple reading of the Talmud seems to forbid almost all Torah learning
by women.21 However, some poskim, halachic authorities, allow women
more latitude in the Torah subjects they were allowed to learn. Based on
inferences from the Talmud and logical arguments, many poskim permit
the principle of “eit laasot lahashem“– upholding the whole Torah some‐
times requires abrogating a small part of it. Extensive women’s education
was not necessary in the past when women were more secluded in the
home and had little exposure to the outside world.30 Women with little
Jewish education today are more susceptible to assimilation. To combat
that, it is necessary to instill in women a strong Jewish identity and teach
them the principles of our religion. Teaching women the Oral Torah is not
only allowed but it an absolute necessity for the continuity of our reli‐
gion.31
Some take a different approach to women’s education, and instead of dis‐
cussing the changed circumstances that necessitate an adjustment to
women’s Torah education, they focus on the changed place of women in
women to learn the halachot in which they are commanded and to study
contemporary society.32 R. Yosef Dov Soloveitchik often quoted his father
the entire Tanach. Some even permit them to learn everything that men
as saying that “if not for Rav Chaim it would be impossible to study Ge‐
learn, including Talmud, as long as the learning is done at the woman’s
own initiative.
mara with boys who simultaneously study science, mathematics, and
physics. The Gemara would lag behind their other studies”.33 R.
Soloveitchik, sensitive as he was to this issue, also pushed the envelope on
But are these permissive rulings the source of the current praxis of
women’s education in the Orthodox world when he established Talmud
women’s Jewish education? The poskim give strict parameters as to what
classes for women in his Maimonides high school.34 His son-in-law, R.
they permit based on the Talmud. The application of these rules in the
Aharon Lichtenstein, expanded on this idea and argued that if women can
current curriculum in most Yeshivish and Modern Orthodox high schools
learn and be involved in any other intellectual and academic field, there is
and seminaries seems questionable. Although some of the poskim permit‐
no reason they should not be allowed to learn Torah on an equally ad‐
ted women to learn Tanach, they severely limited this leniency. Rambam,
vanced level.35
who is the source of this distinction, clearly writes that women ideally
21
It happened that the son of Rabbi Akiva married a
Women’s Torah
woman. What did he do? As soon as she entered the room
Whatever the halachic justification, Jewish women’s learning is viewed in
with him he stood the whole night and read the Torah and
Chareidi society as intrinsically valuable and women are encouraged to
learnt the aggadot. He said to her, take for us the lamp
partake in learning, even if this is confined to certain subjects. Women to‐
and illuminate for me. She took the lamp and illuminated
day are finding “spiritual fulfillment through talmud Torah”.36 The educa‐
tion in schools has moved beyond practical halacha, Jewish history, and
morally edifying instruction to Torah lishma – Torah for its own sake.
37
for him the whole night. She stood in front of him and
illuminated and the book was open and she would roll it
[for him] from the beginning to the end and the end to the
This newfound spiritual renaissance that has displaced the Tze’nah
beginning. The whole night she was standing and
u-Re’nah‘s38 of our grandmothers is a natural outgrowth of the deep
illuminating for him until daybreak. In the morning Rabbi
rever‐ence for Torah learning instilled in our schools coupled with the
Akiva approached him and asked him “matza or motze”?
skills to actively participate in Torah learning themselves.
He said to him matza. This [is what the verse means by]
“one who has found a woman has found good”.46
Never before in history have Jewish women been so religiously educated.
They are also more involved in religious life than in previous genera‐
tions.39 At the same time we are also witness to record numbers of men
Yet, despite her love for Torah and her husband the talmid chacham, the
marriage did not end well:
who learn full time, enabled by these very women who accept upon them‐
selves the additional responsibilities of financially providing for the family.
But when years of famine came and they distributed the
The double responsibilities these women accept upon themselves is truly
properties among themselves,47 she started complaining
reflective of their dedication and determination to live a life imbued with
about him to the Sages of Israel. He said to them, for me
she is trustworthy more than anybody. She told them, it is
religiosity and Torah.
true that thus I stipulated with him. [They said to her],
But therein lies the irony. Women–enabled, self-determined, and empow‐
“nothing comes after acquisition.”
ered by the education they received–seek religious fulfillment, not
through the Torah learning they cherish and that inspires them, but
Is there a lesson to be learned from this story? Do contemporary Charei‐
through the learning of their husbands. Supporting their husband’s learn‐
dim believe that one should study Torah even in such circumstances that
ing comes at a cost, and that cost is their own time they could have used
cause extreme strife between spouses?48 Is this even permitted?49
for spiritual deeds. Between her career, child rearing, and other domestic
responsibilities, time for her own religious expression is increasingly rare.
Perhaps the lesson to be learne d from this is that marrying some one be‐
cause she agreed to support one’s Torah learning is what the Mishna in
How is it that women prefer the passive religious fulfillment through their
Avot terms “love dependent of a specific consideration”. The Mishna
husbands’ learning to the active spiritual experience of learning and doing
states that “Any love that is depended upon a specific consideration –
mitzvot themselves? Why is it that girls fresh out of seminary and still
when the consideration vanishes, the love ceases; but if it is not depen‐
very actively involved in learning choose a path in life in which they will
dent upon a specific consideration – it will never cease.”50 When the hard
have very little time for it?
years came and his wife could no longer support him, the love could not
It’s true that the Talmud40 and Shulchan Aruch41 say that one should
marry off one’s daughter to a talmid chacham if possible, and I do not
be sustained and their shalom bayit was compromised.
The story of Rabbi Akiva’s son is not unique; similar stories occur in the
argue oth‐erwise. However, the reason for this is not that it ensures the
Chareidi world with alarming frequency. In an article in Ami Magazine,51
woman’s re‐ligious merit, but rather so that the children will be raised to
one belligerent husband penned an article blaming his ex-wife and her
42
be talmidei chachamim.
Moreover, Chida explains that what is meant by
school loans for their failed marriage. However, had the husband not been
talmid chacham here is not somebody learned but somebody with yirat
so reluctant to leave kollel and get a proper job it is likely that the finan‐
shamayim who acts for the sake of Heaven.43
cial straits could have been avoided.
Truth be told, there is hardly any Talmudic precedent for a marriage from
Conclusion
which the outset the wife agreed to support her husband’s learning.44
The lone exception is a story of Rabbi Akiva’s son:
It is clear that things are changing in the Chareidi world. The financial re‐
alities are such that not everybody will be able to learn indefinitely. It may
It happened that Rabbi Yehoshua the son of Rabbi Akiva
take some time and a cruel crisis but eventually the Chareidi world will
married a woman and stipulated with her that it was on
adjust itself to the new reality. There are however some changes that will
the condition that he would not [have to] feed her or
only come about if the community proactively tries to change them. If they
support her. Not only that, but also [on the condition] that
continue to educate women toward a kollel lifestyle, then not only will the
she feed and support him and teach him Torah.45
shidduch crisis grow but marital problems will increase substantially.
Her commitment to Torah is related in a different story about the night of
their marriage:
I have attempted to show that the groundwork for such a change is al‐
ready in place. An alternative educational philosophy is readily available.
22
The Talmud explicitly acknowledges that women’s Torah learning is
10. Kiddushin 29b ↩
praiseworthy, even if not commanded. In previous generations it was
feared that women’s Torah learning could have potential negative reper‐
11. See Mincha Chareiva ad loc. See also Torat HaKinaot who at‐
cussions and was therefore highly discouraged to the point of complete
tempts an answer based of Maharsha. Rabbi A Steinzaltz (Iyyunim
condemnation. Despite these fears, for the past century women’s Torah
ad loc) explains that Ravina means that a woman would gain more
education was not only allowed but was highly encouraged by the greatest
merit by splitting the merit her husband earns through his learn‐
rabbis. Today, women’s Torah education is near universal. Even rabbis
ing (in which he is commanded) than she would for learning her‐
from the far right wing have given their tacit approval to women’s ad‐
self. But this explanation would not sufficiently explain the men‐
vanced Torah study, albeit with the exclusion of Talmud.
tioning of her sons who are also not required biblically to learn
themselves. See also R. Eitam Henkin, “Shelat Hashivuto shel mi
The past century has shown that because of the circumstances and the
Sheno Metzuva vOseh”, Elon Mamre issue 120 (5767), n. 15. To
way women’s Torah education was implemented there is no longer a con‐
me the very idea that the Talmud would simply assume that the
cern that women will turn the words of Torah into obscenity. The effect
reward for helping someone that is commanded to learn is
has been only positive. Not only are women now more educated, they also
greater than the reward for learning herself is strange and would
seek religious fulfillment through Torah study.
need some type of proof to back it up. Similarly, I think the same
question can be asked of those that explain the first question of
The time has come to take the next step. The Orthodox world needs to ac‐
the Talmud was based on the assumption that the reward of one
knowledge that today’s women seek religious fulfillment as much as men.
not commanded is not enough to protect the women. Why and
Their role is not only as an enabler of Torah study but also a participant;
based on what is such an assumption? Avot 2:1 exclaims, “One
their fulfillment comes from their own accomplishments and not just from
does not know the reward given for mitzvot”. ↩
those of their husbands and children. Women should not be viewed as
their husbands’ supporters in Torah but as partners with their husbands
in both supporting and studying Torah. The transformation was started
12. Kiddushin 31a and Bava Kama 87a. See also Ran to Kiddushin
ibid. ↩
one hundred years ago with support from almost all rabbis and it is time
that the implications of the new educational model, as they relate to mari‐
tal structures, are accepted. The Torah learning of both men and women
13. Avoda Zara 3a. In Sanhedrin 59a the Talmud limits this to learn‐
ing about the seven Noahide commandments. ↩
is important and one needn’t sacrifice one’s spirituality for the other.
14. This question is asked by many commentaries. See Ye’arot Dvash
(Drasha 1 p. 3), Pnei Yehoshua, Imrei Noam, Ben Yehoyada,
Chafetz Chaim (Chovat HaShmira ch. 13), Mincha Chareiva. ↩
1. “Closing the Age gap on Shidduchim goes back to Kindergarten”
from The Partial View. ↩
2. For a mathematical explanation of this theory see, Ariel Halpert,
15. Tiferet Zion ad loc ↩
16. Sotah 20a ↩
“All In The Numbers: A Mathematical Explanation For The ‘Shid‐
duch Crisis’”, Jewish Press, Jan 23 2008. ↩
3. This is also true in right wing Modern Orthodox circles as well
17. Yerushalmi Sotah 3:4 15b ↩
18. Chida in Maarit Ha’ayin ↩
and is similarly causing its own shidduch crisis. See Harry
Maryles’s post A Working Husband? God Forbid!. ↩
4. Issue 472, “From the First Date to the Broken Plate” by Yisroel
Besser. ↩
19. Yoreh De’ah 246:6 ↩
20. With the exception of Piskei Riyaz who follows the general rule
that the halacha is not in accord with R. Eliezer because he is a
‘shamuti’, a follower of Bet Shamai. See also Chida in Responsa
5. The question seems to be in reference to the preceding discussion
Tov Ayen 4. ↩
that talked about a woman’s share in the world to come. See Pnei
Yehoshua and Imrei No’am ↩
21. For example in Yerushalmi Sotah 3:4 16a R. Eliezer refuses to an‐
swer a woman’s question about the Biblical story of the sin of the
6. It is not clear who is answering the question, R. Chiyya or Rav.
golden calf. In Masechet Sofrim 18:8 it is stated more clearly that
See Pnei Yehoshua ad loc. who thinks it is Rav answering his own
even in the plain meaning of the Chumash women do not have any
question. ↩
business knowing. On his inaugural day as Rosh Yeshiva, R.
Elazar ben Azaria is recorded as saying that “Men come to [the
7. Berachot 17a ↩
Hakhel ceremony] to hear (learn), women come to receive reward
for their steps, and children, why are they brought? To give re‐
8. Sotah3:3 ↩
ward for their bringers.” It should be noted that the day R. Elazar
ben Azaria displaced Rabban Gamliel is celebrated as day when
9. Sotah 21a ↩
the Beit Medrash became more inclusive and people previously
23
not allowed in were allowed. Apparently his inclusiveness for
even permitted to teach a woman Torah sh’Bal Peh, that is the
more people to study Torah did not extend to women. ↩
end verdict without having to resort to [halachically questionable
discursive] questions and answers.” ↩
22. Hilchot Talmud Torah 1:13 ↩
32. It is not only the left wing and centrist poskim that support this
23. Yoreh De’ah 246 s.v. vhu shkatav. In addition he rules that women
may not be taught “derech kevah” on a regular basis. ↩
heter for women’s learning but the right wing as well. In Orchot
Rabbeinu vol. 1 p. 193 it is recorded that R’ Chaim Kanievsky
asked the Chazon Ish if it was permitted to acquiesce to his sis‐
24. Yoreh De’ah 246:4 s.k. 4. The Shoel U’Meishiv 4:41 rules like the
Taz. ↩
ter’s request that he learn Gemara with her. The Chazon Ish re‐
sponded that it was permitted so as long as it was done only from
time to time. The Steipler Gaon ruled it was permitted to teach
25. Tzitz Eliezer 9:3 cites the Shulchan Aruch Harav who makes a dis‐
women Mishnayot nowadays. R. Aryeh Zev Ginzberg in his re‐
tinction between the written and oral Torah without Rambam’s
sponsa Divrei Chachamim p. 278 records that he heard from R.
qualification. This might also be the opinion of Piskei Rid,
Shneur Kotler that “halachically there is no prohibition [to teach
Nedarim 37b. R. Menachem Mendel Schneersohn in Likutei Si‐
them Gemara] nowaday, but it should not be done…because they
chot, Vol. 14 p. 150 n. 12 disagrees with this understanding of the
do not have an obligation to learn, and you should oppose one
Shulchan Aruch Harav. Even if scripture can be learned without
that tries to do this.” R. Ginzberg records that he heard similarly
qualification it would seem that these opinions would agree that
from R. Yaakov Kamenetsky that “nowadays there is no halachic
learning that departs from the actual explanation of the text to a
objection to them learning [Gemara] but it should still not be
deeper understanding of what the text relates would still be pro‐
done.” R. Ginzberg explains that they hesitated to actually permit
hibited. See Hagahot Maharatz Chajes, Sotah 21b. ↩
it because they realized that the main thrust of those advocating
26. R. Moshe Weinberger, “Teaching Torah to Women”, printed in the
Journal of Halacha and Contemporary Society, 9 (Spring 1985), p.
47 n. 61. He writes, “These scholars would also agree that the
fact that a girl attends high school does not necessarily mean she
is either mature or serious in terms of Torah study.” ↩
27. There are some schools, in particular those of Satmar and the
Eida HaChareidis, that truly do limit the curriculum to only those
halachot that pertain to women, but the overwhelming majority of
girls schools, even in the Chareidi world, have an expanded cur‐
riculum which includes material that none of the traditional le‐
niencies allow for. I should also note that the answers I assert are
not necessarily the answers the school administrator would admit
to. Unfortunately the exact parameters of the leniencies are com‐
monly not properly understood and some administrators are un‐
for women’s learning was coming from feminists who do not have
pure intentions. This is also the conclusion of Ilan Fuchs, Jewish
Women’s Torah Study, p. _in explaining contradictory rulings by
R. Moshe Feinstein one in which he permitted a woman to give a
shiur to other women in Talmud while in his printed responsa he
forbids the study of Mishnayot in a girls school. Fuchs says the
when R. Feinstein sensed that impetus was feminism he ruled
stringently. ↩
33. The Rav, Aaron Rakffet-Rothkoff (1999) volume 2, p. 42. Rabbi
Soloveitchik continued, “Now the Gemara does not lag behind any
philosophical approach, even the most modern analytical ap‐
proach. We can compete with the most profound and the most
precise philosophical analysis of today.” ↩
34. Seth Farber, An American Orthodox Dreamer: Rabbi Joseph B.
der the impression that they adhere to the strict interpretation of
Soloveitchik and Boston’s Maimonides School, Brandeis Series in
the law. ↩
American Jewish History, Culture, and Life (2003), chp. 4.
28. Likutei Halachot to Sotah 21 in the footnote. ↩
29. Mishna Brachot 9:5 ↩
30. R. Meir Hershkowitz, OhrOr Hamizrach 17:3 p. 130–131. “I say
that [the prohibition to teach women Torah] was only in old times,
when a woman’s only wisdom was that with a spindle, and she
watched the doors of her house, and of the outside world she
knew nothing…and therefore I say that in our times it is very im‐
portant for the sake of preserving the religion that they be taught
Torah, and all of it will be considered like learning about the
‘mitzvot that she keeps’.” ↩
31. R. Zalman Sorotzkin, Responsa Moznayim L’Mishpat 1:42. “Not
only is it permitted to teach Torah and Yirat Shamayim to the
daughters of this generation but there is an absolute obligation to
do so, and it is a big mitzvah to establish girls schools…and it is
The reason why R. Soloveitchik condoned women’s Talmud study
is a matter of dispute. Walter Wurtzberger, in his article, “Rav
Joseph B. Soloveitchik as Posek of Post-Modern Orthodoxy”, Tra‐
dition 29:1 (1994), p. 17–18, relates the version more popularly
known, that R. Soloveitchik “was convinced that under contempo‐
rary conditions, it was necessary to confront the challenge of
modernity, and therefore Jewish women must be provided with
the intellectual resources needed to appreciate the meaning of
halakhic Judaism.” R. Soloveitchik’s own grandson, R. Mayer Tw‐
ersky, maintains that his grandfather’s opinion was that only op‐
tional study of Torah sh’Bal Peh was forbidden by Talmudic in‐
junction. Accordingly, since he, like the Chafetz Chaim before
him, maintained that in modern times women must be taught
more halacha, it was permitted to teach these sections of Torah
sh’Bal Peh in a school setting. R. Twersky stresses that the differ‐
ence between what the Chafetz Chaim advocated and what his
grandfather sanctioned is just a matter of magnitude but not a
24
fundamental disagreement of the underlying argument. See his
teachings from Judaism’s Oral Law such as the Talmud’s Aggada
article, “A Glimpse of the Rav: Talmud Torah for Women and the
and Midrash, which are sometimes called “parables, allegories,
Mehitsa Controversy”, Women and the Study of Torah, ed. Joel
short stories, anecdotes, legends, and admonitions” by secular
Wolowelsky, Ktav (2001), p. 49–54. Farber, ibid p. 83, brings both
writers. The book came to be used by women who could not un‐
opinions and sides with Wurtzberger. See also Moshe A. Mozeson,
derstand Hebrew and was staple in every Ashkenazi home for
“Chinukh Banot (Im Horaot R. Soloveitchik)”, Hadarom 66–67
generations. The book played a major role in the informal Jewish
(1993), p. 63–66.
education women received. ↩
In this light it is interesting to note a letter by Jeffery R. Woolf,
39. I say previous generations because it very well may be that
quoted in Women, Jewish Law, and Modernity, p. 143 n. 146. Ac‐
women in medieval Ashkenaz were even more involved than mod‐
cording to Woolf, R. Soloveitchik “explicitly provided for co-educa‐
ern day Orthodox women. See Avraham Grossman, Pious and Re‐
tion in grades K-12, thus ensuring equal education for all enrolled
bellious: Jewish Women in Medieval Europe, chp. 8 “The Role of
in the school. Perhaps even more significant is the fact that until
Women in Religious Life and Family Ceremonies”, Brandeis
the time of his illness and subsequent retirement, he never veered
University Press (2004), p. 174–197. See also Alan Yuter’s review
from the position that such an arrangement was legitimate and
in the Edah Journal 5:2 who argues that medieval Ashkenaz
halakhically justified, ab initio, and not a begrudged ex-post-facto
should serve as a model for the Modern Orthodox who are cur‐
concession. Indeed the current administration of the school, un‐
rently grappling with these issues. ↩
der the guidance of the Rav’s daughter, Dr. Atarah Twersky, bears
this fact out fully. (I am going out of my way to emphasize this
40. Pesachim 49a ↩
point, as there is significant amount of conscious ‘historical revi‐
sionism’ in the Orthodox community which seeks to portray Rav
41. Even HaEzer 2:6 ↩
Soloveitchik’s position in a different light.)” ↩
42. Pesachim ibid. The Talmud there also says that by marrying one’s
35. See his essay “Ba’ayot haYesod b’Hinuch shel ha’Isha”, tran‐
daughter off to a talmid chacham one connects to talmidei
scribed and edited by Ben-Zion Rosenfeld in HaIsha v’Chinucha:
chachamim. See also Ketubot 111b where connecting to talmidei
Asufat Maamarim b’Halakha u’bMachshava, ed. Ben-Zion Rosen‐
chachamim is equated to connecting to God’s holiness, and this is
feld, Emunah, Kfar Saba 1979, p. 157. R. Lichtenstein also
done by marrying one’s daughter to a talmid chacham. Abarbanel
stresses the reason of the Chafetz Chaim, noting that today many
Gen 6:1 understands the Talmud in Pesachim as saying that it is
women attend universities where they encounter a different
important to marry into rabbinic families because good traits are
worldview and philosophies often antithetical to Judaism. In his
passed through blood and are also taught in rabbinic homes from
opinion “what a woman needs to know to have a proper Torah ed‐
a very young age. ↩
ucation is far beyond what they are being taught today.” A
nephew of R. Soloveitchik, R. Moshe Meiselman, writes similarly,
43. Birkei Yosef E”H 2:2. Talmid chacham may also be referring to
“No authorities ever meant to justify the perverse modern-day sit‐
somebody with proper manners. R. Eliezer is recorded in Kallah
uation in which women are allowed to become sophisticatedly
Rabbasi 1:2 as saying that women do not have derech eretz be‐
conversant with all cultures other than their own.” See his chap‐
cause “anybody that words of Torah do not pass on their lips does
ter “Torah Knowledge for Women” in his book Jewish Women in
not have derech eretz”. ↩
Jewish Law, Ktav/Yeshiva University Press, 1978, p. 40. I should
point out that this approach implicitly acknowledges the contex‐
tual aspect of the rabbinic injunction against women’s learning.
See Responsa Aseh L’cha Rav 2:52 from R. Haim David HaLevi
who writes so explicitly. ↩
36. Bryna Jocheved Levy, “Sense and Sensibilities: Women and Tal‐
44. The manuscript version of Avot d’Rebbi Nosson (chp 6 version A)
says that Rabbi Akiva’s wife supported him during his learning
but other versions of the story seem to imply this was not so and
is therefore rejected by Schechter. Even if he was supported, the
other stories make it clear that this only occurred many years into
the marriage. See also Yichus Tannaim vAmoraim entry for Bar
mud Torah”, Jewish Action, June 20 2013. Available on the OU
Kaparah which says that Bar Kaparah had 12 wives whom he mar‐
website. ↩
ried so that they would support him. Cf. Yerushalmi Yevamot 4:12.
↩
37. See Hanah Kahat, Maamad HaNashim vLimud Torah b’Chevrah
ha’Orthodoxit, available here (PDF). ↩
45. Yerushalmi Ketubot 5:2. To teach him Torah refers to supporting
him while he studied Torah. However, Alei Tamar explains it
38. Wikipedia states: The Tze’nah u-Re’nah, sometimes called the
Women’s Bible, was a Yiddish-language prose work of c.1590s
refers to her actually teaching him Torah, see his explanation ad
loc. ↩
whose structure parallels the weekly Torah portions of the Penta‐
teuch and Haftorahs used in Jewish worship services. The book
was written by Rabbi Jacob ben Isaac Ashkenazi (1550–1625) of
Janowa (near Lublin, Poland), and mixes Biblical passages with
46. Midrash Tehillim 59 ↩
47. This seems to mean that they got divorced and split their posses‐
25
sions. Compare with Tosefta Ketubot 4:5 “If it was years of famine
ning of the marriage. The standard formulation on the ketubah
and he said to her take your get and ketubah”. Other commenta‐
states that a husband accepts to support his wife and beit din
tors explain that they separated their possessions because she
would enforce this even if the husband claims to want to learn.
was no longer able to provide for him and and so not to deplete
Tosafot in Ketubot 63a s.v. Be’omer ein’i zan v’eini m’farnes de‐
each other’s possessions they split them. See also Chasdei David
bates if the formulation would allow beit din to also force the hus‐
and Tosefta Kefshuta to Tosefta Ketubot 4:7 for a different expla‐
band to work for somebone else. Chazon Ish, E”H 108:10, writes
nation. ↩
that even if not legally empowered to do so by the ketubah, beit
din could still force the husband to work for propriety’s sake. See
48. Tosefet Yerushalayim E”H 79:3 says that it is improper to divorce
one’s wife in years of famine similar to what is codified in
also R. Yitzchak Brand, “Ha’im Limud B’kollel Hu Nachlat Ku‐
lam?” available on his website. ↩
Shulchan Aruch there about divorcing one’s wife while she is sick.
Perhaps Rabbi Akiva’s son’s actions are based on his father’s
50. Avot 5:16 ↩
opinion in Mishnayot Gitin 9:10. ↩
51. “Do Us Part: This is not what I had signed on for” available here
49. Rabbi Akiva’s son was only technically able to avoid feeding and
(PDF). ↩
supporting his wife because he had stipulated such at the begin‐
Miriam: The Greatest Woman
Halakhic Positions of Rav Joseph B. Soloveitchik
by R. Aharon Ziegler
Hakarat Hatov, gratitude, is a fundamental requirement in Judaism. It be‐
hooves us to know and understand the great accomplishments and
achievements that Miriam, the sister of Moshe Rabbeinu and Aharon
HaCohen, contributed towards our people.
The Torah quickly passes over her demise by simply stating, “The children
of Israel, the entire assembly, arrived at Midbar Tzin in the first month
[Nissan] and the people settled in Kadesh; Miriam died there and she was
buried there” [Bamidbar 20:1]. (According to Seder Olam, it was on the
10th of the month). No mass funeral or mourning is recorded. Yet, when
Aharon dies, we read, “When the entire assembly saw that Aharon had
died, they wept for Aharon thirty days, the entire House of Israel” [ibid
20:29]. Likewise, when Moshe died, “The Children of Israel bewailed
Moshe in plains of Mo’av for thirty days; then the days of tearful mourn‐
Yahrtzeit Practices
by David Roth
Jews engage in numerous practices to commemorate a yahrtzeit for the
anniversary of a relative’s passing, generally a first degree relative1 for
whom one would observe mourning. What are these practices and on
what date are they observed?
Determining the Date for a Yahrtzeit
ing for Moshe ended” [Devarim 34:8].
According to Rav Soloveitchik, in spite of no mention about her funeral or
mourning, she was the greatest woman in our history. Miriam understood
from the beginning about Moshe’s leadership role better than anyone
else. Thus, she literally stood guard over him and ensured his physical
and spiritual survival. As the Torah states: “When she [Yocheved] could no
longer hide him [Moshe], she took a reed basket, smeared it with clay and
pitch, placed the child into it, and placed it at the edge of the Nile. His sis‐
ter stood from afar, to know what would be done to him….Paroh’s daugh‐
ter, coming down to bathe with her maidens…saw the child and had com‐
passion on him and said: ‘this is one of the Hebrews’. His sister said to
Paroh’s daughter, ‘Shall I go and call for a wet-nurse from the Hebrew
women, so that she shall nurse the child for you?’ Paroh’s daughter said to
her, ‘Go!’. So she went and called the child’s mother.” [Shemot 2:3–8]
Thus, Miriam is responsible for the emergence of Moshe as a leader and
redeemer of his people. If not for her, he would never have been imbued
with great passionate love for his poor brethren. Her involvement at that
crucial moment with Paroh’s daughter, prevented Moshe from disappear‐
ing in anonymity.
Binyamin that the first yahrtzeit should be observed on the anniversary of
the day of the burial, because otherwise people will come to be confused
with the end of the twelve month mourning period because they tend to
assume the yahrtzeit is the end of the twelve month mourning period, but
here it would be before the end of the twelve months, which are counted
from the time of burial. However, in subsequent years the yahrtzeit should
be observed on the day of the death. The Taz himself disagrees with the
ruling of the Masas Binyamin, and argues that it is better to always ob‐
serve the yahrtzeit on the day of the death. The Shach4 suggests a com‐
promise: if the burial took place two days5 or more after the burial, the
yahrtzeit should be observed in the first year on the day of the burial and
The Shulchan Aruch2 rules that yahrtzeit is based on the day of death and
not on the day of burial, unless, as is common, the mourner was present
at the burial but not at the death. The Taz3 quotes from the Masas
in subsequent years on the day of the death. But if the burial took place
on the day of the death or the next day, even the first yahrtzeit should be
observed on the day of the death. The Pischei Teshuvah6 notes, however,
that if the intervening year was a leap year, one should be able to observe
26
the yahrtzeit on the day of death according to everyone, since the twelve
The Shulchan Aruch19 rules that it is proper to fast on the yahrtzeit of a
months of mourning already ended almost a month ago. Customs vary re‐
parent. Furthermore, the Rama20 rules that one should not participate in
garding how to act in this regard, and you should ask your rabbi questions
a meal on the night of a yahrtzeit, even though the fast has not yet begun.
about appropriate practice.
However, the Pischei Teshuva21 quotes the Mekom Shemuel who limits
this to abstaining from a meal for a wedding, but not for the meal of a
Determining Date of Yahrtzeit in Special Situations
bris, pidyon ha’ben or siyum. If the yahrtzeit falls on Shabbos or Rosh
In which Adar does one observe yahrtzeit in a leap year? If the relative
died in a leap year, one observes the yahrtzeit in another leap year ac‐
Chodesh, according to the Shulchan Aruch22 one would fast on Sunday,
but according to the Rama,23 one need not fast at all in such a case. The
cording to whichever month the relative died in, and in a regular year one
Rama24 also adds that this is the halacha on any day on which Tachanun
observes the yahrtzeit in the one Adar. The question is when a relative
is not recited.
dies in a regular year, in which Adar would one observe the yahrtzeit in a
leap year. In one place, the Shulchan Aruch7 rules that one should ob‐
serve the yahrtzeit in the first Adar; in another place,8 he rules that one
should observe the yahrtzeit in the second Adar. The Rama9 writes that
the [Ashkenazic] custom is to observe the yahrtzeit in the first Adar, and
that some people are stringent to observe the yahrtzeit in both months.10
If one’s relative dies on the first day of rosh chodesh of the second Adar in
a leap year, meaning on the thirtieth of the first Adar, then since there is
no thirtieth of Adar in a regular year, one observes yahrtzeit on the first
day of rosh chodesh of Adar, meaning on the thirtieth day of Shvat.11 If
one’s relative dies on the thirtieth of Marcheshvan, which can have either
twenty-nine or thirty days, there is a major debate among the later au‐
thorities whether in a year which has only twenty-nine days whether one
should observe the yahrtzeit on the twenty-ninth of the previous month, or
on the first of the next month. The Mishnah Berurah12 rules that if in the
next year following the death, Marcheshvan has only twenty-nine days,
one should always observe the yahrtzeit on the twenty-ninth of Marchesh‐
van, but if the next year Marcheshvan has thirty days as well, one should
observe the yahrtzeit on years when it has only twenty-nine days on the
first of Kislev. The same would apply to Kislev, which can also have either
twenty-nine or thirty days.13
If the person died in a different time zone than his relative, the yahrtzeit
is determined based on the time and location of the person who died, in‐
dependent of where the relatives may be.14
The Taz25 writes that if somebody is one of the key players in a bris –
which generally includes the mohel, sandak and father of the boy – he is
exempt from fasting. The Gesher Hachaim26 suggests that this should be
extended to a siyyum; however, the Shach27 quotes from the Maharil that
one should not eat at a siyum when he has yahrtzeit. The Gesher
Hachaim28 suggests based on the Beis Lechem Yehuda that one can eat at
his own siyum on a yahrtzeit, but should not partake at a siyum made by
somebody else. Some say29 that learning two pages of gemara with the
commentary of the Rosh is somehow equivalent to fasting, and one can
fulfill the custom of fasting in such a manner.
The practice of fasting on a yahrtzeit is much less widespread today than
it once was. The Minchas Yitzchak30 explains that since it is difficult for
many people today to fast, many have the practice to instead sponsor a
“tikkun” for the yahrtzeit, meaning that they provide food for everyone in
their synagogue. By doing so, they gain the mitzvah of tzedaka (by giving
this food to the poor), as the recitation of and answering “amen” to the
blessings on the food, in memory of the deceased relative of sponsor.
Learning Mishnayos
There is a custom to learn mishnayos beginning with the letters of the
name of the deceased relative.31 If the yahrtzeit falls on Shabbos, it is
permissible to learn the mishnayos on that day,32 although some have the
custom to learn the mishnayos on Friday.33
Some claim that a yahrtzeit is only observed for fifty years, but the com‐
mon custom is to observe a yahrtzeit forever.15
Visiting the Cemetery
Shulchan Aruch34 rules that when a wise person dies, we visit his grave at
Yahrtzeit Candle
the end of twelve months. The custom has developed to visit the grave of
There is a custom to light a candle for the yahrtzeit of a relative. This cus‐
any departed relative on his yahrtzeit.35 Some say that even one whose
tom is mentioned in the Magen Avraham in a completely different context.
relatives are buried far away and will not be able to go them on the day of
The halacha states that when there is a great need, it is permitted to ask a
the yahrtzeit, should still go to another Jewish cemetery nearby.36 Some
non-Jew to perform a forbidden act at the beginning of Shabbos, after sun‐
also say that even a kohen, who cannot enter a cemetery, should neverthe‐
16
set but before it gets dark (tzeis ha’kochavim).
17
The Magen Avraham
less go close to the cemetery.37 The custom is to recite Psalms chapters
says that since people are so careful about lighting a candle for their rela‐
32, 16, 17, 72, 91, 104 and 130 while at the cemetery;38 although nor‐
tives’ yahrtzeit, it is considered a great need, such that one would be able
mally it is not proper to perform mitzvos in a cemetery since the dead can
to ask a non-Jew to do so at the beginning of Shabbos. It is also permitted
no longer perform mitzvos, it is permitted to recite words of Torah in
to light the yahrtzeit candle on the night of yom tov, since he will benefit
honor of the memory of the deceased even in the cemetery.39 The Chazon
from its light, but he cannot light it during the daytime of yom tov, since
Ish is reported to have said that one who is learning full-time in yeshiva
18
that will not serve a purpose.
need not leave in order to visit his relative’s grave, but rather should
learn extra that day.40
Fasting on the Day of a Yahrtzeit
27
Reciting Kaddish and Leading Prayers
Some have the practice to recite kaddish and lead services for their
grandparents once their parents are no longer able to do so; however,
The Rama41 rules that one always recites kaddish on a yahrtzeit, and if he
they are not entitled to do so if that means that they will take these privi‐
is able to, he should lead prayers as well.
leges away from other mourners present.59
In a place where only one person says kaddish,42 the Rama43 rules that
As always, customs vary and you should ask your rabbi questions about
somebody within shiva (the first seven days of mourning after the death of
appropriate practice.
a relative) would take priority over a yahrtzeit; if there is somebody in sh‐
eloshim (the first thirty days of mourning after the death of a relative), the
yahrtzeit gets one kaddish and the person in sheloshim gets the rest of
1. A first degree relative is defined as a father, mother, son, daugh‐
ter, brother, sister and spouse (Shulchan Aruch YD 374:4). ↩
the kaddeishim; and if there is somebody in the eleven-month period of
saying kaddish for a parent, the yahrtzeit gets all of the kaddeishim. The
Biur Halacha,44 however, rules that a yahrtzeit is entitled to one kaddish
even in the presence of somebody in shiva, and that somebody in the
eleven months of saying kaddish for a parent is entitled to certain kad‐
deishim which are external to the main part of the prayer service, such as
shir shel yom. In any case, the Rama45 himself rules that if there is a vary‐
ing local custom, we follow the local custom regarding the matters of how
to distribute kaddish.
2. YD 402:12 ↩
3. YD 402:9 ↩
4. YD 402:10 ↩
5. His position about two days appears to be a little unclear; at one
point he says a distance of three days or more, at another point
he says “the day of the death or the next day.” My inclination is to
How do we determine who leads the prayer service? In general, the priori‐
ties for who recites kaddish apply to leading the prayer service as well.
However, there is only one leader of every prayer service, so therefore it
would follow that only the person with the highest level of priority to get a
kaddish would be entitled to lead the prayer service, namely a yahrtzeit.
However, R. Moshe Feinstein46 rules that the person in sheloshim has
higher priority to lead the prayer services than the yahrtzeit, even though
read it that a delay of two days should be considered a long gap,
and a gap of three or more days means three including both the
days of death and burial themselves, such that one should observe
the first yahrtzeit on the day of the burial. ↩
6. YD 402:3 ↩
7. YD 402:12 ↩
the yahrtzeit has higher priority to receive one kaddish.
8. OC 568:7 ↩
Additionally, the Rama47 quotes the practice in many communities during
the period of selichos, that the person who leads the services for selichos
is entitled to lead all of the prayers for the entire day.
48
The Mishnah
Berurah49 quotes the Magen Avraham50 that he has priority even over a
yahrtzeit. However, the Mishnah Berurah51 also brings the opinion of the
Eliya Rabba and Pri Megadim that if the yahrtzeit is fasting he should be
allowed to lead services even during the period of selichos.
52
The Rama
9. OC 568:7 ↩
also quotes a practice that when there is a bris (circumci‐
sion), the mohel (the one who performs the bris) leads the prayer service.
The Shach53 questions if this is a correct practice to begin with, and he
says that certainly if there is a mourner or a yahrtzeit, the mohel should
not have priority over them to lead the services. However, it is clear from
the Shach that the prevailing custom was indeed that the mohel does have
priority over the mourners to lead services, and yahrtzeit would probably
be the same halacha as a mourner.
There is also a custom that on the Shabbos before a yahrtzeit, one should
receive the maftir aliyah,54 lead the services for Musaf, as well as the
Maariv service immediately following Shabbos.55 Others have the custom
that one leads all of the payer services on the Shabbos before a
yahrtzeit.56 Also, the yahrtzeit is entitled to an aliyah on the Torah read‐
10. Mishnah Berurah (MB) 568:42 rules, however, that in a place
where only one person says kaddish, he is only entitled to a kad‐
dish in the place of other mourners in one month. Presumably this
would be the case for having priority to lead the prayer services
as well. See also Gesher Hachaim, volume 1, 32:10 who brings
both opinions of the Rama and says that the common practice is
to observe yahrtzeit only in the first Adar. ↩
11. MB 568:42; Gesher Hachaim, volume 1, 32:10. ↩
12. MB 568:42 ↩
13. See also Gesher Hachaim, volume 1, 32:11, who rules basically
like MB, although he concludes that when he observes yahrtzeit
on the twenty-ninth, if there are no other mourners from whom he
would take kaddish, it is proper to recite kaddish and lead ser‐
vices on the first of the following month as well. ↩
14. Gesher Hachaim, volume 1, 32:14. See however Penei Baruch
39:40 who cites other opinions as well. ↩
ing day which coincides, or precedes his yahrtzeit, and he should recite a
Kel Malei prayer for the soul of his relative at the time of his aliyah.57
However, the prevalent custom is to recite the Kel Malei prayer on the
Shabbos before the yahrtzeit, or earlier if necessary.58
15. Nitei Gavriel, volume 2, 77:22 ↩
16. Shulchan Aruch 261:1 ↩
28
17. OC 261:6 ↩
39. Shulchan Aruch 344:17 ↩
18. Gesher Hachaim, volume 1, 32:4. One could argue that this does
40. Nitei Gavriel, volume 2, 76:3 ↩
not apply nowadays when the house is fully lit on Yom Tov night
with electric lights. Also, this is difficult for the Penei Baruch,
41. YD 376:4 ↩
chapter 39, footnote 33, who says that the real reason that one
should be allowed to one to ask a non-Jew to light a yahrtzeit can‐
42. The custom in most communities in the past was that only one
dle at the beginning of Shabbos is because it is considered a
person said each kaddish. This is clear for Rama (YD 376:4), Taz
melacha she’eina tzericha l’gufa (an act for a purpose different
(YD 376:4), Shach (YD 376:7–13), as well as Biur Halacha (132),
than that in the mishkan, which is only forbidden Rabbinically),
from the fact that they are discussing who has priority to say
and therefore it should be permitted based on the principle of
which kaddish. In his responsa, the Chasam Sofer (OC 1:159)
shevus d’shevus b’makom mitzva (a double Rabbinic act is permit‐
strongly defends this practice, and argues that a kaddish said by
ted in order to perform a mitzva), but according to this, he does
more than one person will not have much of an effect for the soul
benefit from the light. The last answer in Biur Halacha 514 d”h
of the person who has died. I have also observed that when R.
ner shel batala could possibly be a resolution to our problem. ↩
Hershel Schachter has yahrtzeit, he prefers to not say kaddish at
all, rather than to say kaddish with somebody else. Nonetheless,
19. YD 102:12 and OC 568:1 and 568:7. ↩
the custom in most places today has become to allow all of the
20. YD 391:3 ↩
Teshuva (YD 376:6) in the name of the Divrei Igeres and the Hala‐
mourners to recite kaddish together, as mentioned in the Pischei
chos Ketanos. I have also seen a practice that in general everyone
21. YD 391:8 ↩
says kaddish together, but when there is a yahrtzeit he gets a kad‐
dish on his own. I cannot find any source for this practice, but I
22. OC 568:9 ↩
suspect it is a carryover from the original practice of only one
person saying kaddish at all times. ↩
23. There ↩
43. YD 376:4 ↩
24. There ↩
44. Biur Halacha 132 ↩
25. OC 568:5 ↩
45. YD 391:3 ↩
26. 32:7 ↩
46. Igros Moshe YD 4:60 ↩
27. YD 246:27 ↩
47. OC 581:1 ↩
28. 32:7 ↩
48. There is a debate among the commentaries on the Shulchan
29. Nitei Gaviel, volume 2, 72:6 ↩
30. Minchas Yitzchak 6,135. See also Nitei Gavriel, volume 2, 72:1. ↩
31. Gesher Hachaim, volume 1, 32:3; Penei Baruch 39:13; Nitei
Gavriel, volume 2, 71:10. ↩
Aruch if this is coming to include just Shacharis and Mincha, or if
it even includes Maariv the night before, see MB 581:14. ↩
49. 581:14 ↩
50. OC 581:7 ↩
32. Gesher Hachaim, volume 1, 32:3; Penei Baruch 39:14 ↩
51. 581:14 ↩
33. Gesher Hachaim, volume 1, 32:3; Penei Baruch 39:14 ↩
52. YD 265:11 ↩
34. YD 344:20 ↩
53. YD 265:23 ↩
35. Gesher Hachaim, volume 1, 29:1 and 32:5. He also cites the
54. However, some insist that he should not receive maftir, but rather
Tiferes Yisrael in Eduyos 2:6, but there appears to an issue with
one of the seven main aliyos, see the second opinion in the Penei
the girsa (textual variant) there. ↩
Baruch 39:12. ↩
36. Nitei Gavriel, volume 2, 76:10 ↩
55. Gesher Hachaim, volume 1, 32:2 ↩
37. Nitei Gavriel, volume 2, 76:11 ↩
56. Penei Baruch 39:2 ↩
38. Gesher Hachaim, volume 1, 29:3 and 32:5. ↩
29
57. Gesher Hachaim, volume 1, 32:2 ↩
59. Matte Efraim, dinei kaddish yasom, shaar 3, seif 14; Penei Baruch
39:8; and Nitei Gavriel, volume 2, 70:12 ↩
58. Kol Bo Al Aveilus, 5:4:21 ↩
30
Torah Musings Digest
25 July, 2014 | A Window into the Orthodox Jewish Intellectual’s World| Edited by: Rabbi Gil Student
Mas’ei: Mysticism, Geogra‐
phy and the Ba’al Korei’s
Dilemma
by R. Moshe Schapiro
Sha’arei Ephraim points out that in verse 3 the Torah records that the
Jews left Ra’amses and then after a short digression repeats that they left
Ra’amses in verse 5. He suggests that perhaps the repetition should be
counted as two masa’ot.6 Inspired by this approach, R. Avraham Rapa‐
port7 contends that there really is no repetition and that Ra’amses can le‐
gitimately be counted twice. According to Ibn Ezra8 there actually were
two different locations known as Ra’amses: the province (Shemot 12:37)
and the city (Shemot 1:11). The Jews first traveled from the city in verse 3
Place Names
and then ultimately from the entire province in verse 5. An entirely differ‐
In ancient times when gypsum was more prevalent than the GPS and Gil‐
gamesh was better known than Google Maps, the Torah detailed, in the
opening of Parashat Mas’ei, the travels (masa’ot) of the Jewish people in
the desert. Rashi asks why the Torah presents us with this long list of
forty-two masa’ot, and answers that it teaches us about God’s kindness. It
is true that the Jews wandered for forty years, but if you study their jour‐
ney carefully, you will realize that most of their movements were in the
first and last years of their desert stay. The intervening years were rela‐
tively stable. R. Avraham Saba (a Spanish commentator and kabbalist who
died ca. 1508) offers a different perspective on the significance of this list
in his Torah commentary Tzeror HaMor. He quotes Chazal (source un‐
known) that the forty-two masa’ot of the Jewish people parallelthe mysti‐
cal forty-two-letter name of God and concludes that since God’s name may
not be broken up, when reading this passage in the synagogue, one must
ent solution is suggested by R. Yehoshua Falk.9 Rashi in Shemot 40:38
writes that the Hebrew term mas’a does not refer only to traveling be‐
tween two places, but to the places traveled to and from. Rashi, here in
Parashat Mas’ei, is consistent with his comment in Shemot in counting the
forty-two place names, starting with Ra’amses in verse 5 and ending with
the Jordan River in the Plains of Moav in verse 49, even though there are
only forty-one actual movements between places. R. Rapaport points out
that the practical ramification between these two approaches is whether a
break can be made after verse 3. According to the “two Ra’amses” theory,
the forty-two masa’ot begin in verse 3 and no interruption is allowed from
that point on. However, according to the “place-names” theory, the fortytwo count only begins in verse 5 and an extra aliyah could be inserted be‐
fore that point.
Traveling Non-Stop
read the entire list without interruption. Practically this means that the
first forty-nine verses of Parashat Mas’ei must be read as one aliyah.
There is a lively exchange in the Journal Ohr Yisrael1 between two con‐
Though many authorities, following the Magen Avraham, adopt the prac‐
tice of not breaking up the forty-two masa’ot, they disagree about its ex‐
tent. R. Yechiel Mikhel Epstein10 quotes the Magen Avraham, with one im‐
temporary authors, R. Avraham Rapaport and R. David Yitzchaki regard‐
portant caveat: this rule only applies to the keri’at ha-Torah of Shabbat
ing whether this practice is or should be mainstream. If you look at any of
morning, not to the readings of Shabbat afternoon and Monday and
the chumashim in your local synagogue, you will immediately notice that
Thursday mornings.11 The source for this distinction is Rema’s ruling
when Matot-Mas’ei are read together, which is most of the time, the
fourth aliyah ends after the masa’ot. However, when Mas’ei is read sepa‐
rately, as it is this year, the second aliyah is indicated after verse 10,
which is right in the middle of the list. A similar break-up is found in older
sources. R. Yissachar ben Mordechai Susan (b. ca.1510) marks the end of
the first aliyah after verse 92 and R. Yosef Kosman (d. 1758),3 while won‐
dering why the Tzeror HaMor’s words were disregarded, faithfully
records that the ancient custom of the Frankfort community was also to
break at verse 9. More recently, there is a report that R. Yaakov Yisrael
Kanievsky4 was apparently unfazed when the ba’al korei in his minyan fol‐
lowed the standard printed chumash instead of the Tzeror HaMor. Yet, the
standard commentaries such as the Magen Avraham (Orach Chaim 428)
and the Sha’arei Ephraim (7:25) quote the Tzeror HaMor and the Mishnah
Berurah cites the Magen Avraham, thereby bringing this somewhat ob‐
scure source to the attention of fastidious ba’alei keri’ah and demanding
gabba’im everywhere.
about another Torah portion. The Talmud (Rosh HaShanah 31a) reports
that, in the time of the Beit ha-Mikdash, the Levi’im would sing Shirat
Ha’azinu (Devarim 32) during the service for the Shabbat musaf sacrifice.
They divided the song into six distinct sections, represented by the acro‐
nym ha-ziv lach, spelled out by the first letter of each segment.12 The Tal‐
mud notes that when we read Parashat Ha’azinu in the synagogue, we fol‐
low the same divisions. Rif13 and Rosh14 write that these sections are
maintained both on Shabbat and Monday and Thursday morning, and the
Shulchan Arukh (428:5) follows their opinion. However, Rema decides in
accordance with the Mordechai15 that one need only be careful about this
on Shabbat. R. Chaim Benveniste (1603−1673)16 believes that the major‐
ity of medieval authorities followed Rif and Rosh, and therefore insists
that even Ashkenazim must read Ha’azinu during the week according to
the predetermined sections. Still, R. Ephraim Zalman Margoliyot17 and R.
Epstein in his Arukh HaShulchan decide like Rema. R. Epstein’s ruling
that one may break up the masa’ot during the week is simply an applica‐
A further question is how to count the forty-two masa’ot, as there seem to
5
be only forty-one. R. Shabbtai Lipschutz in his commentary on the
tion of Rema’s distinction between Shabbat and weekday readings with
regard to Parashat Ha’azinu.
31
The Munkaczer Rebbe, R. Chaim Elazar Shapira, disagrees with R. Ep‐
ing. Additionally, Ritva may be relying on the Talmud Yerushalmi (Megillah
stein. While apparently accepting Rema’s ruling regarding Ha’azinu, R.
4:1) that anchors Moshe’s establishment of the Yom Tov and Shabbat23
Shapira argues that, with regard to the masa’ot, he cannot fathom any
readings to a scriptural source. Ritva’s opinion is unique, but it is still sug‐
reason for a distinction between the Shabbat and weekday readings.
18
On
the other hand, R. Yosef Dov Soloveitchik19 rejected the ruling of Rema
gestive of the profound difference between the Shabbat and weekday
readings.
and was careful to maintain the integrity of both Ha’azinu and the masa’ot
during both Shabbat and weekday readings. In summary, there are three
We can perceive the fundamental distinction between the Shabbat and
views. R. Epstein consistently distinguishes between the Shabbat and
weekday readings even in the history of the rabbinic construction of
weekday readings. R. Soloveitchik consistently equates the readings. And
keri’at ha-Torah that is described in Bava Kamma. In that passage, the
the Munkaczer Rebbe, while equating them with regard to the reading of
Talmud is unsure of the exact historical development of this mitzvah. Per‐
Mas’ei, distinguishes between them with regard to the reading of Ha’az‐
haps Moshe Rabbenu instituted that one person should read three verses
inu. We will now attempt to explore these three opinions and place each
or, alternatively, that three people should each read one verse, but in any
within its conceptual framework.
case, Ezra formalized matters, decreeing three aliyot and a total of at
least ten pesukim. The Talmud only discusses the development of the
weekday readings with their three aliyot. What of the Shabbat reading?
The Arukh HaShulchan’s Approach
Magen Avraham, in his opening comments to Orach Chaim 135, argues
20
The Talmud (Bava Kamma 82a) teaches that Moshe Rabbenu
estab‐
that Moshe Rabbenu set the number of aliyot for Shabbat morning at
lished the reading cycle of Shabbat morning, Monday and Thursday so
seven, whereas the formalization of the weekday readings was left for
that the Jews would never go for more than three days without Torah
generations until the days of Ezra ha-Sofer. Clearly, when we speak of
study. Generations later, Ezra ha-Sofer expanded keri’at ha-Torah, requir‐
keri’at ha-Torah, we must recognize that there are really two categories of
ing the reading of more verses and adding to the number of aliyot, and
readings. This explains Rema’s ruling that the strictures that apply to the
also added the Shabbat afternoon reading. What is the relationship be‐
reading of Ha’azinu only apply on Shabbat morning, the primary reading.
tween these different readings? The Talmud (Megillah 31b) records a dis‐
The Arukh HaShulchan’s application of this leniency to the masa’ot makes
pute between R. Meir and R. Yehudah about the schedule of Torah reading
perfect sense.
during the course of the week. According to R. Meir we begin a new
parashah on Shabbat afternoon and at each successive reading we con‐
In fact, R. Epstein consistently follows this line of reasoning. As noted, the
tinue further along in the parashah until we complete it on Shabbat morn‐
Shulchan Arukh codifies the opinion of R. Yehudah that the weekday read‐
ing. However, the normative ruling
21
follows R. Yehudah: we read the be‐
ings repeat the opening of that week’s portion instead of reading further
ginning of the new portion on Shabbat afternoon, repeat the same reading
into the parashah. Rema, quoting the Or Zaru’a,24 comments that if a con‐
on Monday and Thursday and then, starting again from the beginning, we
gregation skipped the Shabbat morning reading they must make it up on
read the parashah in its entirety on Shabbat morning. R. Meir believes
the following Shabbat together with that week’s portion. The Mishnah
that there is no intrinsic difference between any of the readings. Moshe
Berurah25 writes that if a similar thing happened on Monday or Thursday
Rabbenu instituted three readings of essentially equal stature over the
morning, there would be no obligation to make up the reading on Tuesday
course of the week in order to provide spiritual sustenance to the people.
or Friday because Chazal only sanctioned Torah readings on specific days.
However, we follow the position of R. Yehudah, that the keri’at ha-Torah of
The Arukh HaShulchan26 adds that even without this technical reason the
Shabbat morning is primary, while the other readings are only secondary.
entire concept of making up the weekday readings does not make sense.
They are just place holders. The entire portion will be read on Shabbat
The difference between the Shabbat and weekday readings is further un‐
22
derscored by Ritva.
The Talmud (Megillah 17b), after citing the opinion
anyway. Another similar scenario is discussed by the poskim. If the Torah
was read on Monday or Thursday morning, but the wrong portion was
of R. Yehudah ha-Nasi that Shema must be recited in Hebrew, inquires
read accidentally, must the ba’al korei correct his mistake? Presumably, if
whether this implies that according to biblical law, “the rest of the Torah
this were to happen on Shabbat morning, the correct parashah would
may be recited in any language.” Rashi, as quoted by Tosafot (s.v. kol ha-
have to be read, but there is a debate regarding the weekday reading.27
Torah), explains that “the rest of the Torah” refers to keri’at ha-Torah.
R. Epstein rules that, in contradistinction to the Shabbat reading, the
Tosafot is confounded by Rashi’s explanation, since with the exception of
weekday readings need not be corrected.28 This is because the fulfillment
Parashat Zachor there are no biblically mandated Torah readings. What is
of reading the Torah on Shabbat is the reading of the parshiyot over the
this “rest of the Torah” that the Talmud is asking about? Ritva rejects
course of the year in consecutive order. If a parashah is omitted, the obli‐
Tosafot’s premise. Moshe and Ezra only innovated the Torah readings of
gation is not fulfilled. However, the function of the weekday readings is
Monday and Thursday and Shabbat afternoon. The weekly Shabbat morn‐
only to prevent us from going for more than three days without Torah.
ing reading is actually a biblical obligation. The proof for this is that the
Even if the wrong portion is read, the goal of the weekday reading has
Talmud (Berakhot 21a), discussing the biblical commandment to recite a
been accomplished. R. Epstein’s understanding of the two categories of
blessing over Torah study, speaks of making a blessing before and after
keri’at ha-Torah is at the core of his position that when reading Ha’azinu
study. But the personal obligation to study Torah is constant and has no
and the masa’ot on Shabbat, we must be meticulous in dividing the
“after.” Therefore, the Talmud must be speaking of a biblically mandated
parshiyot correctly, but during the week we can be less rigorous.
communal Torah reading, and the passage in Bava Kamma means to say
that Moshe added on the weekday readings to the original Shabbat read‐
R. Soloveitchik’s Approach
32
Even if we accept that the Shabbat morning and weekday readings are
Kamma 82a describes the decrees of Moshe and Ezra in terms of how
functionally or conceptually different from one another, this may not force
many verses must be read: Moshe first decreed that one person read
Rema’s ruling regarding Parashat Ha’azinu or R. Epstein’s conclusion re‐
three verses or, alternatively, that three people read one verse each, and
garding the masa’ot. R. Benveniste, mentioned above, argues against
then Ezra later instituted that three people read a total of ten verses.
Rema’s distinction between the Shabbat and weekday readings of
Therefore the operative principle in keri’at ha-Torah is “any verse which
Parashat Ha’azinu, citing Rambam’s explanation that the Talmud insisted
Moshe did not divide we may not divide” and the Gemara in Megillah that
on dividing Ha’azinu into six distinct segments: “Because they are a re‐
invokes this principle is, in fact, speaking about the laws of Torah reading.
buke, in order that the people should repent.”29 According to R. Ben‐
However, the passage in Berakhot is discussing appending a third section
veniste, this reason applies equally on Shabbat or during the week, and
onto the first two paragraphs of Shema. Keri’at Shema is not the recita‐
the divisions should be the same for both readings. R. Benveniste’s read‐
tion of individual pesukim; it is a mitzvah of reading parshiyot.33 In the
ing of Rambam, is somewhat perplexing, though, because he seems to ig‐
context of Shema, it is the principle of not dividing parshiyot that is opera‐
nore the context of Rambam’s remarks. R. Avraham Dovber Kahane
Shapiro
30
observes that Rambam is discussing the principle that aliyot
tive. Therefore, had Chazal not settled on the fairly short parashah of tz‐
itzit, we would have been bound to read the entire portion of Balak as the
must begin and end with positive themes. The problem is that some of the
third paragraph of Shema in order to access the one verse that speaks of
segments of Ha’azinu, arranged in the pattern of ha-ziv lach, violate this
the Exodus.
rule. Rambam is explaining that since Ha’azinu is read as a form of re‐
buke to motivate the nation to repent, the need to maintain the themes of
Most Torah readings reflect the obligation to read pesukim. However,
the song overrides the usual rules of how to divide aliyot. Rambam is not
there are certain readings that bear unique status, more akin to reading
giving a reason for the intrinsic importance of the six segments, rather, he
parshiyot. Parashat Ha’azinu is not just a group of verses strung together,
is explaining why this is an exception to the general rule of ending aliyot
but a song that must be divided into specific stanzas. The principle “any
on positive themes. On Shabbat our purpose in reading Ha’azinu is to give
portion which Moshe did not divide, we must not divide” is the operative
rebuke to the nation, but, as noted above, our purpose in the weekday
principle.34 The same can be said of the forty-two masa’ot. The list of the
readings is just to read some Torah verses, and if there is no intrinsic
Jewish people’s travels in the desert constitutes a distinct portion, signi‐
need to divide the verses a specific way, perhaps we need not do so. In
fied by the observation that the mystical forty-two letter name of God is
fact, we can read three aliyot on Monday and Thursday that all end and
contained within the united parashah. R. Soloveitchik argues that it is im‐
begin on a positive note, without following the divisions of ha-ziv lach.
material whether the reading takes place on Shabbat morning or during
Therefore, R. Benveniste’s citation of Rambam to prove that there is no
the week. To put it in Brisker terminology: it’s not a din in keri’at ha-To‐
distinction between the Shabbat and weekday readings is unconvincing.
rah, it’s a din in the particular parashah being read. The portions of
Ha’azinu and Mas’ei require, intrinsically, that they be read according to
R. Soloveitchik
31
offers a different rationale to explain his rejection of
the sanctioned divisions.
Rema, based on the rule that “Any portion that Moshe did not divide, we
may not divide.” The Talmud (Megillah 22a) points out that the first para‐
The Munkaczer’s Approach
graph of the Rosh Chodesh reading, comprising only five verses, cannot
be broken up into two aliyot of three verses each and suggests splitting
Why does Rema not employ R. Soloveitchik’s analysis? R. Benveniste, al‐
one verse into two. The Gemara forcefully rejects this suggestion citing
though he rejects Rema’s opinion, offers a crucial explanation of his posi‐
the rule: “Any verse that Moshe did not divide, we may not divide.” The
implication is that, while we may not read only part of a verse, there is no
tion. Rema sees the Shabbat and weekday readings as two profoundly diff‐
fferent institutions, as we explained above. The Shabbat morning reading
rule that prohibits selecting an entire verse from a larger portion to read
is part of the yearly cycle of reading the Torah. Each Shabbat morning we
on its own. But this implication is contradicted by a different Talmudic
must read one parashah or, on occasion, a double parashah as the calen‐
passage. Berakhot 12b discusses the third paragraph of Shema in which
dar requires. Fundamentally, the Shabbat morning reading is the reading
we must mention the Exodus to fulfill the daily obligation of remembering
of a parashah in its totality. The weekday readings are place holders, to
that God redeemed us from Egypt. The Talmud establishes that we read
keep us spiritually connected to Torah between one Shabbat and the next.
the parashah of tzitzit (Bemidbar 15:38–41), which concludes with a dec‐
We read and re-read the same short selection of verses until we arrive at
laration to remember that God took us out of Egypt. However, originally
the next Shabbat and finally fulfill the obligation to read the full parashah.
Chazal considered using the entire parashah of Balak, spanning chapters
R. Benveniste explains that when reading Ha’azinu on Shabbat morning,
22–24 of Bemidbar, in order to read 23:22 which refers to the Exodus.32
R. Soloveitchik’s analysis holds true. We are intending to read the entire
The Gemara asks why it would be necessary to read such a lengthy por‐
tion for the sake of one verse and answers: “Any portion that Moshe did
not divide, we may not divide.” Clearly, this rule prohibits selecting even
one whole verse from a larger context. Is there any way to harmonize
these two opposing statements?
portion. We are going to sing the song. Therefore, we must read stanza by
stanza as it was intended to be sung. The same is true of the mas’aot. On
Shabbat morning, we are going to read Parashat Mas’ei in full. Our inten‐
tion and focus is on parshiyot and therefore, “any portion that Moshe did
not divide we must not divide.” However, during the week, we are not at‐
tempting to read the parashah. We are not thinking of the poetry of Ha’az‐
R. Soloveitchik explains that these rules do not contradict each other,
inu and we do not look upon the list of place names at the beginning of
rather, they apply in different circumstances. The institution of keri’at ha-
Parashat Mas’ei as a unified entity. We are only thinking of reading some
Torah is fundamentally about reading Torah verses. The passage in Bava
verses. We are looking at the trees, not the forest and, therefore, we can
divide the parshiyot as we choose.
33
R. Benveniste’s explanation of Rema’s position, that our intention is deter‐
cuss is how the now archaic triennial Torah cycle which was once
minative, is the key to understanding the Munkaczer’s split decision. On
practiced in Eretz Yisrael fits into this discussion. Most probably,
the one hand, the Munkaczer Rebbe seems to accept Rema’s view that
the triennial cycle represents a completely different approach to
Ha’azinu need not be read in any particular fashion during the week. Yet,
the nature of keri’at ha-Torah and works with different rules and
when it comes to the masa’ot he writes that he cannot even fathom a rea‐
assumptions, and therefore I will not address that question here.
son for a distinction between the Shabbat and weekday readings! What is
↩
the difference between these two parshiyot? The answer is that our inten‐
tion makes the difference. On Monday morning when we read Ha’azinu,
2. Tikkun Yisakhar, 80b ↩
there is no compelling reason to view it as a song. We are reading pe‐
sukim, not parshiyot. However, the masa’ot are a self-contained portion
3. Noheg KaTzon Yosef p.245. ↩
for which there is a compelling reason to view it as a unique parashah and
not just as a string of verses. The unity of God’s mystical name binds the
portion together as one entity. Even during the week the integrity of the
parashah must be maintained. The Munkaczer thus concludes that regard‐
ing Ha’azinu, which can be a unit or individual verses, we can make a dis‐
tinction between Shabbat and weekdays, but regarding the masa’ot,
which are always a unified entity, we cannot.
R. Soloveitchik agrees that the masa’ot are a unified entity, but regarding
Ha’azinu he insists that, even though we do not read the entire parashah
during the week, our intention is still to sing a song, not just to read se‐
lected verses. Indeed, the original source for the six divisions of Ha’azinu
is the Levi’im’s song for the Shabbat musaf offering in the Beit ha-Mik‐
4. Orchot Rabbenu v. 1, p.178. ↩
5. Sha’arei Rachamim 7:26. ↩
6. See also Rashash, Menachot 30a. ↩
7. Ohr Yisrael v. 25 p. 189. ↩
8. Shemot 12:37. ↩
9. Perishah, Tur, Yoreh De’ah 275:12. ↩
10. Arukh HaShulchan 428:6. ↩
dash, and the Talmud (Rosh HaShanah 31a) says that they would read
only one stanza each week, completing the entire song every six weeks.
11. For the sake of simplicity, I will henceforth refer to “weekday
Just as the Levi’im did not read the entire parashah at one time, yet each
readings” or “Monday and Thursday morning,” but this includes
individual stanza constituted a part of the song, so too when we read indi‐
the Shabbat afternoon reading as well. ↩
vidual stanzas from Ha’azinu on Monday and Thursday mornings, we are
singing a song, not just reading pesukim. As such, R. Soloveitchik can as‐
12. Due to the fact that there are several verses that begin with these
sert that during the week, even though we are only reading a small ex‐
letters there are multiple opinions how to identify the correct six
cerpt of Ha’azinu, we are doing so as a song and therefore we must main‐
sections. See She’elot u-Teshuvot Devar Avraham 1:36. ↩
tain that song’s integrity.
13. Megillah 12b. ↩
The End of the Road
14. Megillah 3:2. ↩
While the reading of Parashat Mas’ei separate from Parashat Matot oc‐
curs more often in Israel than in the Diaspora, it is still a fairly unusual
15. Megillah section 805. ↩
phenomenon. Prior to this year it occurred world-wide in 2005, 2008 and
2011, but will not occur again until 2035 and even in Eretz Yisrael it will
only occur four times until then. Yet, the question of preserving the unity
16. Sheyarei Keneset HaGedolah, Orach Chaim 428. See also Peri
Chadash ad loc. ↩
of the masa’ot at the beginning of the Parashah can shed light on the con‐
ceptual underpinnings of keriat ha-Torah throughout the year. Speaking
17. Sha’arei Ephraim 7:27. ↩
practically, we have seen that while there are many communities that will
read Parashat Mas’ei according to the break-up of aliyot indicated in most
18. Nimukei Orach Chaim 428. See also the Munkacz Siddur Minchat
standard chumashim, there are many poskim who strongly advocated fol‐
Elazar, 1992 which has the standard, short reading for Ha’azinu
lowing the words of the Tzeror HaMor and insisted on maintaining the
during the week, but contains the full, expanded reading for
unity of the masa’ot section. A gabbai or ba’al korei who serves in a syna‐
Mas’ei. ↩
gogue that has no tradition with regard to this question should probably
follow the standard chumashim, unless the constituency of the synagogue
is well educated and might be receptive to what others might consider
confusing and strange. In the final analysis, whatever the gabbai or ba’al
korei decides to do, someone is going to yell at them anyway, so why not
change things up a bit? At least it will give people something interesting
to talk about during the kiddush.
1. See vols. 25–26 and 35–37. One important question that they dis‐
19. Nefesh HaRav pp. 140–141. See also R. Hershel Schachter,
“Lesser-Known Laws of Torah Reading,” Journal of Jewish Music
and Liturgy v. 7, 1985, sections 40–43. ↩
20. The Talmud actually refers to “the prophets” of that generation,
but Rambam (Mishneh Torah, Hilkhot Tefilah 12:1) attributes the
takkanah to Moshe Rabbenu. See Kesef Mishneh ad loc. ↩
34
21. Shulchan Arukh, Orach Chaim 135:2. ↩
30. Devar Avraham 1:36. ↩
22. See also Bach, Orach Chaim 685. ↩
31. Shiurim LeZekher Abba Mari z”l. Jerusalem, 2002, v. 1 pp. 19–20
and Nefesh HaRav op cit. ↩
23. See Arukh HaShulchan, Orach Chaim 135:2 ↩
32. The Talmud explains that Chazal preferred Parashat Balak to
24. Hilkhot Shabbat 45. ↩
other portions that mention the Exodus because in in 23:24 (or
according to some texts 24:9), the Torah alludes to the mitzvah of
25. Be’ur Halakhah s.v. Shabbat Achat. ↩
26. Orach Chaim 135:7 ↩
keri’at Shema. ↩
33. There are three main opinions among the medieval authorities re‐
garding the biblical commandment of keri’at Shema: to read the
27. See Mishnah Berurah 135:4 and Pitchei Teshuvah 135:2. ↩
28. Op Cit. 5 ↩
29. Hilkhot Tefilah 13:5 ↩
first paragraph, to read the first two paragraphs or to merely read
the first verse. See Mishnah Berurah 63:16. According to the last
opinion, R. Soloveitchik’s analysis does not apply. ↩
34. See Shiurim LeZekher Abba Mari z”l. Jerusalem, 2002, v. 2 pp.
24–25 ↩
Man on the Moon
The July 21, 1969 landing on the moon was a monumental achievement
for mankind, and the leading Torah scholars of the time were as im‐
pressed as everyone else in the world. They responded in a variety of
ways.
vised edition pp. 15–16):
As an aside, we learn from these words of the Ramban
[on Gen. 1:1], and in particular from what he concluded
in the continuation of his words on verse 8, that
everything that exists in the creation in the entire world,
including the sun, the moon and all the heavenly hosts,
I. May Man Travel to the Moon?
R. Hershel Schachter writes in the name of R. Joseph B. Soloveitchik (Beis
Yitzchak Journal, no. 26 [5754] pp. 193–194; Divrei Ha-Rav, p. 243):
“The heavens and the earth” (Gen. 1:1) – [R. Soloveitchik]
was asked about Judaism’s view of man’s traveling to the
moon, with the questioner suspecting that it might be
forbidden because it is written “The heavens are the
Lord’s but the land He has given to mankind” (Ps.
115:16). [R. Soloveitchik] responded that one can
distinguish in the definition of heavens and earth. The
term “heavens” can be explained in two ways — as
something high and/or distant, as it says “It is not in the
heavens” (Deut. 30:12), according to which the moon is
considered a part of the “heavens.” Alternatively, the
term can be defined as including everything that is
beyond human understanding, including the entire
spiritual realm. According to this second understanding,
the stars and most distant galaxies — and certainly the
moon — are considered part of “earth.” Therefore,
[according to this latter interpretation,] there is no
contradiction between traveling in space or scientific
studies of the cosmos and the verse “The heavens are for
the Lord and the land for mankind.”
II. Is the Moon a Living Being?
R. Ya’akov Kamenetsky (Emes Le-Ya’akov al Ha-Torah, Gen. 1:1, 5761 re‐
are not called “heavens.” The “heavens” are only things
that have no physical bodies, such as angels, hayos and
the merkavah. However, anything that has a physical
body is included in the name “earth” in verse 1…
These words of the Ramban are what carried me when we
saw men descending from a space ship on a ladder onto
the surface of the moon. I thought to myself: “What would
the Rambam, who wrote that the moon has a spiritual
form, answer now?” I thought that at that point Kabbalah
defeated Philosophy, and comforted myself with the
words of the Ramban…
We are forced to say that what the Rambam told us in
these chapters [Hilkhos Yesodei Ha-Torah, chs. 1–4] is
neither ma’aseh merkavah nor ma’aseh bereishis. Rather,
he wrote those four chapters from his deep mind and
from his knowledge of secular wisdom, i.e. not from the
wisdom of Torah but only from Philosophy… and the
Rambam only wrote these as an introduction to the
Mishneh Torah while the main part of the book begins
with chapter 5…
R. Menachem Kasher tried to defend the Rambam in what I can only call a
bizarre and forced way (Ha-Adam Al Ha-Yare’ach, ch. 4):
Question: Is it correct what many are currently saying —
that when man reached the moon and dug from it dirt and
stones, it was proven wrong what the Rambam wrote in
35
Mishneh Torah, Hilkhos Yesodei Ha-Torah 3:9 and Moreh
force is also called an angel because it is an agent of God
Nevukhim 2:5, and brings proof (to Aristotle’s position)
to be made into matter. It is not impossible that this force
from Biblical verses and sayings of the Sages, that the
has its own intellect and rules according to its level and
heavenly spheres have souls, knowledge and
recognizes its creator and master…
understanding, and live, stand and recognize He Who
We can add that the “intellect” of an item is the rules by
said and the world came into being?
which it acts with God’s will and is the essence of its
Answer: I wrote… the early sages R. Sa’adia Gaon, R.
existence. The “soul” of an item is the force that
Yehudah Ha-Levi, R. Chasdai Crescas, R. Yitzchak Ibn
preserves its existence, with God’s will, and is the energy
Latif, the author of Akedas Yitzchak (end of essay 1) and
inside it.
the Abarbanel strongly reject the position of Aristotle and
the Rambam… R. Ya’akov Emden, in his book Migdal Oz
III. Mussar Parable
writes about Aristotle’s position, “It is all nonsense and
lies.” And so the Maharal wrote in the introduction to his
R. Shlomo Wolbe, in a talk on Shabbos Parashas Ki Seitzei in 1969, used
book Gevuras Hashem, that the Rambam’s position is
the moon landing as a parable (Da’as Shlomo, Ma’amarei Yemei Ratzon p.
“nonsense”…
81). Unapologetically and unselfconsciously, he told how the astronauts
were quarantined for 21 days after returning to Earth to ensure that no
In the pamphlet Ge’ulas Yisrael of the Maggid of Koznitz,
alien bacteria or viruses came back with them. Similarly, he suggested, if
the author attempted to defend the Rambam. He explains
there were spiritual beings on the moon they would have quarantined the
[that the heavenly spheres] “are intellects without free
astronauts for upon landing to ensure they were not bringing any “bacte‐
will”… We can explain this idea based on what R. Chaim
ria” of lack-of-God-fearing, any contamination of irreligiosity. If the
Vital wrote in his book Sha’arei Kedushah (3:1) based on
Chafetz Chaim, R. Yisrael Meir Kagan, had been the first to land on the
the principles of Kabbalah, that just like there is a soul in
moon, he would have seen a pure landscape entirely untainted by irreli‐
a living creature, so too there is a “soul” in an inanimate
giosity, perhaps even attaining the level of prophecy.
object. This is the force that combines the four
elements… The position of the Rambam is that just like
I find this reaction entirely characteristic of a Mussar personality — using
there is knowledge and intellect among the angels, which
contemporary events to illustrate a spiritual point. I also find it notewor‐
does not refer to the intellect we have that is connected
thy that R. Wolbe saw no religious challenge in this monumental event, re‐
to our five senses but rather is a spiritual intellect
ferring to it without skeptical disclaimers or intellectual alarm. Instead,
according to their level, we can say the same for the
he found a Mussar aspect which could further the goal of deepening fear
Tohu. [This Tohu] was the first power created by the will
of God.
of God and remains forever in various forms, at first in
the Bohu, i.e. atom, and later in elements and bodies. This
An Overlooked View on
Women’s Aliyyot
by Yitzchak Kasdan
(Adapted from earlier posts)
not read, out of respect for the congregation.
The Frimers, like others including Koren, Artscroll, R. Mendel Shapiro, R.
Yehuda Henkin, R. Avi Weiss, and R. Shlomo Riskin, interpret “le-minyan
shivah” to refer to the seven aliyyot at the Torah reading on Shabbat.
However, another explanation is that “le-minyan shivah” means the “num‐
I pen this piece in reaction to Rabbis Aryeh and Dov Frimer’s brilliant es‐
ber seven aliyyah” i.e., the seventh aliyyah only. 1 As discussed herein,
say on “Women, Kriat Ha-Torah, and Aliyyot” recently published in Tradi‐
that seventh aliyyah, in turn, has been understood specifically to refer to
tion (Winter 2013, volume 46, no. 4). As comprehensive as their article ap‐
maftir, the aliyyah preceding the reading of the haftara, which was added
pears to be in covering the subject matter, it misses one overlooked, yet
after the conclusion of the requisite number of aliyyot for Shabbat. Ac‐
potentially important, explanation of the baraita in BT Megilla 23a regard‐
cording to some sources, the maftir was indeed the seventh and last
ing “hakol olin le-minyan shivah,” which is the primary text about calling
aliyyah on Shabbat.
women to the Torah.
The Seventh
Rav Yitzhak b. Sheshet (the “Rivash”), in his Responsa(no. 326), cites a
version of Rashi on the Mishna in BT Megilla 24a that interprets the
Mishna’s allowance for a minor to read from the Torah as a reference to
The baraita states (Koren translation):
the reading of maftir. The Magen Avraham (OH 282) cites the Rivash (al‐
beit the wrong chapter) and states that according to the Rivash, Rashi un‐
The Sages taught: All people count toward the quorum of
derstood the baraita to mean that a woman may count “specifically to
seven readers (le-minyan shivah), even a minor and even
maftir,” given that a minor could only read the maftir portion.
a woman. However, the Sages said [that] a woman should
36
Although we do not have the text version of Rashi that the Rivash cites, it
The answer to the first question is found on the same page in Megilla as
is nonetheless consistent with another comment by Rashi,elsewhere in the
the baraita. Earlier, the Gemara relates a dispute between Rabbi Akiva
Talmud.
and Rabbi Yishmael as to the number of people required to be called to
the Torah on Shabbat. According to Rabbi Yishmael, and as we hold, that
On Brachot 53b, Rashi interprets the discussion there regarding when an
number is seven. However, according to Rabbi Akiva, it is only six. There‐
adult may answer “amen” to a minor’s blessing to refer both to the bra‐
fore, any aliyyah beyond seven, according to Rabbi Yishmael, and beyond
chot that a minor makes when called to the Torah for maftir and the sub‐
six, according to Rabbi Akiva, was not part of the mandated number of
sequent brachot made on the reading of the haftara. The Raavad, as
aliyyot for Shabbat. Consequently, according to Rabbi Yishmael, maftir
brought down by the Shita M’kubetzet, disagrees with Rashi’sinterpreta‐
was the non-obligatory eighth aliyyah, while the additional non-obligatory
tion, asking why the Gemara would only single out the brachot of a minor
maftir, according to Rabbi Akiva was the seventh aliyyah. In the end, the
when called to read the maftir and haftara — after all, the Mishna in
baraita of “ha-kol olin” can also be understood in accordance with Rabbi
Megilla 24a appears to allows a minor to read any portion of the Torah,
Akiva, i.e. the seventh aliyyah that a woman or a minor could (only) re‐
and by extension (and, presumably per the baraita) to make the brachot
ceive was the maftir.
when receiving an aliyyah for any of the seven aliyyot. The Meiri in Bra‐
chot defends Rashi, explaining that a minor may only read the maftir, and
Moreover, the Gemara, immediately following the baraita of “ha-kol olin,”
thus by implication recites a bracha only for the maftir aliyyah (and there‐
raises the question whether maftir can be part of the seven aliyyot. This
after the haftara).
passage can be interpreted as asking whether maftir was intended to be
part of the seven aliyyot, i.e., whether it could be the seventh aliyyah
The D’risha on the Tur, OH 215, explains that according to Rashi we may
specifically. Understood that way, this sugyah possibly could be another
respond “amen” to the brachot of a minor when he is part of the quorum
source for the fact that, according to some sources, the seventh aliyyah
of seven but that the custom later developed that a minor may not be part
indeed was the maftir aliyyah.
of the seven who are called to the Torah on Shabbat. However, as we saw,
the Magen Avraham understands the Rivash’s explanation of Rashi to
That maftir originally was an added, non-obligatory aliyyah clearly com‐
mean that such always was the case, rather than a later practice.
ports with Rashi’s comments on the Mishna of Megilla 24a which states
that a minor cannot poreis al shema (which consists of leading the congre‐
Moreover, Tosafot (RH 33a d.h. “Hah”) states that “le-minyan shivah”
gation) because (per Rashi) he cannot fulfill an adult’s obligation. By con‐
means “be-sof shivah”, specifically “at the end” or “the last” of the seven
trast, according to the Rivash’s version of Rashi on the same Mishna, a
aliyyot. R. Avraham Naftali Zvi Roth in a 1961 article about the haftara
minor can read the maftir portion from the Torah, because, as explained
and kaddish yatom found in the Talpioth journal published by Yeshiva
above, the maftir reading originally was not obligatory. 5
2
University interprets “be-sof shivah” in this Tosafot to refer to maftir
only. Additionally, the Aruch Hashulchan (OH 282:10) also brings a source
Because the maftir originally was not obligatory, we can now understand
that the baraita refers to the seventh aliyyah only. See also generally Tzitz
why even women originally were allowed to receive the maftir aliyyah and
Eliezer 7:1 who discusses the Rivash and in particular at the end of sec‐
read from the Torah even though they could not fulfill a male adult’s obli‐
tion 13 where he brings down at least one source that also interprets “le-
gation: there was nothing for the adult to fulfill because maftir was not
minyan shivah” as a reference to maftir (albeit with a different explana‐
obligatory.
tion and rationale than what I suggest below). Finally, it is interesting to
note that the total blessings recited by the person receiving the maftir
As to why maftir originally was not an obligatory, thus allowing women
aliyyah, who then recites the blessings for the haftara, total seven; two for
and minors to receive this aliyyah, the answer may be based on one un‐
3
the Torah reading, one before the haftara and four after. Perhaps the
derstanding of the underlying reason for Chazal’s enactment of a maftir
phrase “le-minyan shivah” refers to the person receiving maftir and the
aliyyah and the recitation of the haftara in the first place.
haftara who recites these seven brachot.
Reasons for Maftir
The implications of the above with respect to a Partnership Minyan are
obvious. Even before the limitation on aliyyot for women due to the con‐
The origin of, and the rationale for, the haftara is unclear. As one author,
cern of “kevod ha-tzibbur,” women never received any of the first six
Shlomo Katz, has written in the introduction to his book The Haftarah
aliyyot. Therefore, even if “kevod ha-tzibbur” no longer is an issue (which
(hereafter “Katz”) at p. 3: “The beginnings of the haftarah is shrouded in
the Frimers disprove anyway), to the extent that the baraita of “ha-kol
mystery. Although the practice of reading a selection from the Nevi’im/
olin” supports women’s aliyyot, it could be no more than for maftir.
4
Prophets following the Torah reading is discussed in the Talmud, no expla‐
nation is offered why the haftarah is read. Neither does the Talmud tell us
Challenges
when or where the practice first started.” [Emphasis in original.] 6.
What remains to be answered, however, are two questions: first, what is
One explanation for the maftir relates to its role in offering consolation. In
the source to say that maftir was the seventh and not, as today, the post-
this regard, the haftara and its blessings are viewed as a vehicle of conso‐
seventh or eighth aliyyah (assuming no additional aliyyot), and second,
lation to the Jewish people’s suffering over the generations. As Katz (p.
why would Chazal allow women and minors to receive the maftir aliyyah
10) concisely summarized, in citing Divrei Hashkafah (pp. 30, 93): “ … R’
to begin with?
Soloveitchik [the “Rav’”] suggests that the purpose of the haftara is pri‐
37
marily to strengthen our belief in the final redemption and in the coming
maftir aliyyah was uniquely made available to minors and women because
of mashiach. We see this in the berachot of the haftara, in which the re‐
of its connection to consolation and mourners and its original “non-obliga‐
demption is a recurring theme. This also may be seen in the fact that vir‐
tory” part of the Torah on Shabbat, is worthy of attention and further
tually all haftorot end with words of consolation.”
analysis by scholars. I raise it in the spirit of yagdil Torah ve-ya’adir.
One can take this view of maftir and haftara one step further and suggest
1. See, e.g., the sources discussed by R. Gidon Rothstein in his
that they are connected to consolation of aveilim, mourners. In this re‐
“Women’s Aliyyot in Contemporary Synagogues,” Tradition 39:2
gard, it is noteworthy that the words haftara and maftir have the same
(hereafter “Rothstein”), p. 52. ↩
root (“ptr”) as the word “niftar”– a deceased person – and the maftir and
haftara have been associated throughout the generations with mourners.
7
Indeed, it used to be that a mourner within the first twelve months of his
2. ”Azkarah ve-haftarah ve-kaddish yatom” Talpioth 7, nos. 2–4
(Tishrei 5721 [1961], pp. 369–381 (hereafter “Roth”) ↩
close relative’s death would be called to the maftir aliyyah and recite the
3. See Tosafot Pesachim 104b d.h. “Chutz” ↩
haftara weekly. 8 More recently, the maftir aliyyah and the recitation of
the haftara have become reserved for someone observing the “yom ha-pe‐
tirah” or “yahrzeit” of a mother or father. 9 It well could be, therefore,
that mourners were given the right to recite the maftir in order to console
them by affording them the hope contained in the brachot of the haftara,
as well as the actual verses of the haftara which deal with redemption, of
one day seeing their departed relatives in the times of mashiach when the
dead will return to life.
4. See also Rothstein, id., who makes this similar point. R. Shapiro
also apparently concedes this point according to the Rivash. See
his “Qeri’at ha-Torah by Women: A Halakhic Analysis,” The Edah
Journal 1:2, p. 32. ↩
5. See also Meiri, Megilla 24a to the effect that the reading of the
maftir portion is not a “mitzvah gemurah.” See also Tzitz Eliezer
Another connection between the maftir and mourners relates to the kad‐
dish that is recited after the seventh aliyyah, before the maftir. R. Roth in
his Talpioth article cites Orchot Chaim, who connects an agadah about
7:1 who notes that the reading of the maftir portion from the To‐
rah was “not such a great chiyuv.” ↩
6. See also Rav Dovid Cohen’s Massat Kapai vol. 5 p. 134 who notes
Rabbi Akiva’s10 search for a young orphaned boy to recite barchu and
that no rationale or source for the haftara is brought down in the
kaddish to redeem his father from gehenom, with the specific maftir
Talmud, and that while the Rishonim had understandings and tra‐
aliyyah. This aliyyah begins with the recitation of barchu like all other
ditions about the haftara, it appears to remain a matter of secret
aliyyot but, unlike other aliyyot, is preceded by the recitation of kaddish.
(“sod”) ↩
11
R. Avidah also brings a source to the effect that people paid the most
for the maftir aliyyah due to its precedingkaddish. 12
7. See for example R. Chaim David Halevy’s M’kor Baruch
Hashalem, vol. 3 pp. 161–63. See also R. Yehudah Avidah,
Maftir Implications
“P’rakim B’inyanei Haazkeret,” Sinai, no. 28 (Yerushalyim 1951)
(hereafter “Avidah”), p. 348. ↩
Given the links between the maftir and mourners, one could hypothesize
that because the maftir aliyyah originally was not obligatory as part of the
Torah reading on Shabbat, minors and women initially were allowed by
8. See for example Responsa Rivash no. 115; Bet Yosef, YD 36; Rema
YD 376:4. ↩
Chazal to receive that aliyyah as part of an affirmative outreach to them –
perhaps particularly when they became mourners – since they could not
13
participate as a leader of services and recite barchu in that capacity.
9. M’kor Baruch, id; Katz, pp. 61–62. ↩
Be‐
ing able to recite the barchu of the maftir aliyyah, as well perhaps the
10. According to other versions Rabbi Yochanan ben Zakai ↩
kaddish preceding it, would provide a measure of comfort, much as the
optional Mourner’s Kaddish was added to the services as an outreach to
14
orphans to bring them to shul.
Today, of course, the maftir and haftara indeed are “obligatory” parts of
the services so that, apart from the kavod hatzibbur problem as related in
the baraita, women should not be able to obtain a maftir aliyyah or recite
the haftara. Indeed, I would argue that for the same reason, and despite
some customs and holdings to the contrary, a minor should not be allowed
to obtain the maftir aliyyah either.
In sum, I recognize that the above interpretation of the baraita to refer
only to the seventh aliyyah /maftir is not the majority view of how to inter‐
pret those words. However, I believe that this explanation, which limits
the baraita to the maftir aliyyah only, based on the suggestion that the
11. See also Katz, pp. 59–61, quoting a different version of the Rabbi
Akiva agadah which specifically mentions the need for the de‐
ceased’s son to recite the haftara. ↩
12. See Avidah, p. 339, note 10. ↩
13. However, see Roth, p. 380, preferring the view that the custom
for mourners to obtain the maftir aliyyah was not from the time of
the Mishna, and rejecting this thesis which apparently was pro‐
posed by R. Avidah. In that last regard, see Avidah, p. 348. ↩
14. See Joel Wolowelsky’s Women, Jewish Law, and Modernity (Ktav
1997), p. 85: “ … the early authorities enacted the saying of Kad‐
dish after the recitation of Psalms, which is outside the formal
prayer service, to provide an opportunity for those who would be
38
excluded from acting as hazzan,” citing Roth, p. 375. See also Re‐
“Din Yatom Katan b’Kaddish u’Barchu” wherein he cites some au‐
sponsa Maharil, no. 28; Mishnah Berurah 55:20. As to whether a
thorities who would uphold the practice provided that the adults
minor can also lead the barchu at the end of services, see Sefer
present had already heard barchu (and thus fulfilled their obliga‐
Iyunai Halachot by R. D. Y. Tzvi Rabinowitz (Bnei B’rak), ch. 12,
tion through the sh’liach tzibbur) earlier. ↩
An Overlooked View on
Women’s Aliyyot II
In a follow-up from yesterday’s essay, Rabbis Aryeh and Dov Frimer re‐
spond and Yitzchak Kasdan continues the conversation.
by R. Aryeh and R. Dov Frimer
Dear Reb Yitzchak,
Thank you for allowing us to see your letter to Torah Musings. Below are a
few of our comments.
1. We were fully aware of the position which you focus on. We chose not
to discuss it for two basic reasons.
(a) Firstly, by your own admission it is a minority view. The Rishonim dis‐
cuss the difference between the original Takana where only the first and
seventh oleh made a berakha vs. the later takana where each oleh made a
berakha. The majority indicate that under the original takana – to which
Megilla 23a is referring – women were called to the Torah only for the
middle aliyyot. This is because women are not obligated in keri’at haTo‐
rah and, hence, could not recite the berakhot in aliyyot 1 and 7 and be
motsiot the other olim.1
(b) In our humble opinion, the view you cite has been rejected le-halakha.
The Rema on OH sec 282, no. 3 explicitly states (in the name of Ran and
Rivash) that women and minors cannot receive ALL the aliyyot (which
Mishna Berura, subsec. 14 modifies to even a majority. The MB’s limita‐
tion is rejected by R. Yechiel Zilber, Birrur Halakha, III, sec. 282, end of
s.v. “Shulhan Arukh sham” who writes: ‫אבל נראה לכאורה דנקטינן עיקר לדינא כדעת‬
‫מהר”ם מרוטנברג ואבודרהם ורבינו ירוחם ומאירי ומשמעות הפוסקים דדוקא כולם קטנים לא מהני‬..)
Thus, me-ikar ha-din and kevod ha-tsibbur and minhag aside, women and
minors can receive any of the seven aliyyot – not just the seventh. LeHalakha, then, this is a shita dehuyya. This is explicitly stated by Arukh
haShulhan, 282:10: ‫ומעיקר דינא לא ראינו לאחד מן הפוסקים שימנע את הקטן מלעלות למניין‬
‫שבעה זולת האריז”ל שלא התירו רק לשביעי‬.See also Shulhan Arukh haRav, 282:5.
We have endeavored throughout our Tradition paper on women’s aliyyot
to base our arguments on positions that represent the overwhelming con‐
sensus of poskim – and certainly not on shitot dehuyyot. To do otherwise
appeared to us somewhat intellectually dishonest when analyzing the ha‐
lakhic viability of women’s aliyot. Morover, a serious problem of berakha
le-vatala may well result.
2. Your linkage between Maftir and Aveilim is very tenuous. This certainly
cannot be used to interpret the Baraita in Megilla 23a. What comfort
would such an aliyya be for a women who could not receive it because of
kevod ha-tsibbur. Have you researched when the first mention is of an
aveil receiving Maftir. The story of Rabbi Akiva is a very late midrash only
first cited in Rishonim in the thirteenth century (Or Zarua). Most scholars
date the recitation of Kaddish Yatom to the generation following the cru‐
sades. We would imagine that Maftir and Barekhu are from the same time.
We have not studied this at all – and all this is speculation on our part. But
they all have the same source. It certainly has no mention in Hazal and
could not be used to understand the Baraita Megilla 23a.
Yiyasher Koah and Kol Tuv,
Aryeh and Dov Frimer
P.S. I neglected to note that the Kaf haChayyim in OH 282:3, no. 23
paskens against the Rema, like the Arizal, that a minor and woman can
get only no. 7.
~~~
I wish to thank the Frimers for taking the time to review and to respond
to what I wrote. I will take the occasion to respond briefly to what I be‐
lieve are their two most salient points:
1) While they were aware of the position I cited, viz., that minyan shivah
refers to the seventh aliyyah (and only maftir), they chose not to focus on
it because it is a “minority” view (– as I admitted –) that has been rejected
by halacha; and
2) My linkage between maftir and aveilut is “tenuous.” In particular, as to
this point, the Frimers note that the midrash of Rabi Akiva is late in origin
and that most scholars date the recitation of kaddish yatom to the genera‐
tion following the crusades, i.e., not to the times of the Mishna.
Regarding the Frimers first argument, I do not disagree, although I note
that R. Rothstein appears to contend that the view that women originally
“could only take the “seventh [aliyyah] or, perhaps, the reading added on
for the maftir” “carries greater weight in a traditional halakhic discussion
than any of the others cited [by R. Shapiro].” Rothstein at 52. R. Rothstein
thus concludes that: “Granting all of R. Shapiro’s points [they] still only
support[] the conclusion that there was ‘no halakhic impediment’ to call‐
ing women for the seventh section (and sometimes the additional por‐
tion).” Id. (emphasis in the original).[The Frimers themselves acknowl‐
edge in their reply that (according to their reading) the Kaf HaChaim, OH
282:3, no. 23, like the Arizal, also hold against the Rema, i.e., that prior to
the issue of kavod hatzibbur arisinga woman could only receive the sev‐
enth aliyyah. Moreover, my theory at least better explains why the maftir
seventh aliyyah was permitted to be given to women and minors, since
originally it was not a requirement that needed the congregation to have
any obligation fulfilled by a male adult.]
As to the Frimers second point, once again I cannot strongly disagree with
39
them, as I do not have sources – other than, perhaps, R. Avidah – to sup‐
perhaps the aliyyah as to which he ostensibly taught the boy to recite the
port my hypothesis connecting maftir and aveilut at the time of the
barchu and/or kaddish and/or the maftir itself.
Mishna. And even R. Avidah does not subscribe to a view that a minor
aveil necessarily received maftir at that time. SeeAvidah at 348.
All in all, there are credible sources to limit “minyan shivah” to the sev‐
enth aliyyah. At the same time, my suggestion to tie the seventh aliyyah to
Nonetheless, it is because we really do not definitely know the origin and
maftir and aveilut may, upon further examination, may, or perhaps may
reason for the haftarah, as I have related above, that I feel legitimately
not, be shown to be entirely in error for historical or other reasons. It is
(albeit “tenuously”) able to propose the connection between maftir and
for that reason, therefore, that I have written this l’hagdil Torah
aveilut –even at the time of the Mishna. Moreover, while kaddish yatom
u’lehaderah and to seek further analysis, consideration and review from
was not introduced until the Middle Ages, kaddish – certainly its core
the Rabbis Frimer and other interested readers.
“yehei shmei rabbah” – goes back well in time, see, e.g., TB Shabbat 119a,
and it is entirely possible that aveilim, including women and minors,were
Yitzchak Kasdan
given preference to the maftir aliyyah in conjunction with the kaddish that
preceded it. As R. Scherman in his Introduction to Artscroll’s “Kaddish”
1. See, inter alia, R. Jacob Tam, Tosafot, Rosh ha-Shana 33a, s.v. “Ha
pamphlet (at xxii) writes: “ … the effect of Kaddish was well known in the
Rabbi Yehuda” (the second answer at end) – also cited by Or
time of the Talmud. What happened in medieval times was only that the
Zaru’a, II, Hilkhot Rosh ha-Shana, sec. 266; Hiddushei ha-Rashba,
collective spiritual genius of Israel used the earlier teachings as the basis
Rosh ha-Shana 33a (Mossad ha-Rav Kook ed.), s.v. “Matnitin”
for the universal custom to recite Kaddish as a source of merit for the de‐
(first answer); Meiri, Megilla 23a, s.v. “ha-Kol Olin”; Rosh to Kid‐
parted soul.” Finally, while the Rabi Akivah story was first cited (as the
dushin, ch. 1, sec. 49; R. Nissim (Ran) to Rif regarding Megilla
Frimers noted) by Rishonim in the 13
th
century, it is interesting that the
23a; R. David ben Samuel ha-Kokhavi, Sefer ha-Battim, Beit Te‐
majority version of the story is told in Rabi Akivah’s name, and instructive
filla, Sha’arei Keri’at ha-Torah, Sha’ar 2, no. 6; Perisha, Tur, O.H.,
that he is the Tanah who held that only six aliyyot were required for the
sec. 282, no. 3; R. Hayyim Yosef David Azulai (Hida), Birkei Yosef,
Shabbat reading, meaning that he held the seventh aliyyah to be maftir –
O.H., sec. 282, no. 7; R. Hayyim David ha-Levi, Mayim Hayyim,
III, sec. 5. ↩
New Periodical: Hakirah 17
Hakirah no. 17, Summer 2014:
Letters to the Editor
Review Essay: Torah, Chazal and Science by Dr. Nathan
Aviezer – A review of R. Moshe Meiselman’s book Torah, Chazal &
Science. Good critique of R. Meiselman’s science but little discus‐
sion of his interpretations of Rishonim. I hope to rectify that
somewhat in my review forthcoming in Jewish Action.
Modern Orthodoxy: A Philosophical Perspective by Dr.
Baruch Brody – Provides a positive definition of Modern Ortho‐
doxy: a pro tanto acceptance of modern values, i.e. acceptance
when they do not conflict with the Torah. Valuable definition of
modern values and lengthy exploration of what this means. I
agree with much of what he says but find the idea a little too
close to putting the Torah in a corner and only looking at it when
we have no means of escape. I don’t think Dr. Brody means this
but his approach can be used in that way.
A Kingdom of Priests by R. Asher Benzion Buchman – An analy‐
sis of the Rambam’s approach to certain mitzvos of belief.
Squaring the Circle of Faith: The Hedgehog, the Fox, and
the Divine Masquerade of Otherness by R. Eli Rubin – An ex‐
amination of faith in areas of intellectual debate. Ends with a dis‐
cussion of Lubavitch monism that lost me.
The Thick and Thin of the History of Matzah by R. Ari Ziv‐
otofsky and R. Ari Greenspan – Historical evidence (including pic‐
tures) of different shapes and sizes of matzah in the past. Matzah
wasn’t always a cracker.
A Quantitative and Grammatical Analysis of the Shira De‐
sign by R. Sheldon Epstein, R. Bernard Drickman and R. Yonah
Wilamowsky – A mathematical analysis of why the “vavei haamudim” Torah scrolls (almost all pages begin with a “vav”) are
excellent.
40
Review Essay: Kaddish, Women’s Voices by Dr. Joel Wolowel‐
wisdom based in Yiras Shamayim, its opposition to Chassidus, and
sky – Answers (without asking) the question: why do we need a
the twentieth century suppressing these attitudes. There is much
book written only by women? Why can’t women just join the ha‐
more to say on the subject but this article adds very interesting
lakhic discussion as equals? He answers that this volume speaks
information. Read the footnotes!
to the all-important issue of motivation–do women say Kaddish as
Rabbi Menachem Mendel Schneerson: On Confrontation
an act of religious devotion or rebellion? For that, women’s voices
with the Secular World by R. Chaim Miller – A translation of R.
are what really matter. Although, I’m not sure that a writer al‐
Schneerson’s 1980 speech when R. Soloveitchik came to visit him.
ways bares her full soul in public. Especially in semi-polemical lit‐
Extensive and interesting introduction about the friendship and
erature such as this, you reveal only what supports your agenda.
differences of the two scholars.
The Ashkenazi Custom Not to Slaughter Geese in Tevet and
The Binding of Isaac by R. Mois Navon – Akedah and morality,
Shevat by R. Zvi Ron – This intentionally discarded practice is
from R. Soloveitchik’s perspective. And how Avraham’s tests are
most likely based on gentile superstition.
representative of what every Jew faces personally.
“Upon the Wings of Eagles” and “Under the Wings of the
A New Solution to the Contradiction in Torah Measure‐
Shekhinah”: Poetry, Conversion and the Memorial Prayer by
ments (Hebrew) by R. Mordechai Frank – Proposes the old solu‐
R. Yaakov Jaffe – Most siddurim have the Malei saying “Al Kanfei
tion to the contradiction in Talmudic measurements, that some
Ha-Shekhinah” for kabbalistic reasons, based on the Shelah. Rav
texts refer to an amah of five tefachim and some an amah of six. It
Soloveitchik preferred “Tachas Kanfei Ha-Shekhinah,” apparently
doesn’t really work but the author throws in a few additional con‐
following the Rambam in Moreh Nevukhim. In my editorial work
cerns that adds wiggle room, unconvincingly in my opinion. Also
on the Koren Mesorat HaRav Siddur, I had access to an unpub‐
compares Talmudic measurements to ancient measurements
lished manuscript of the customs of the Maimonides Minyan (of
(based on Wikipedia) and concludes that the Talmudic and Persian
which the author is the current rabbi) and I do not recall this be‐
measurements correspond very closely.
ing mentioned, nor in R. Mendy Gopin’s book. Not that I am
Characteristics of Abayei and Rava in View of their Debates
doubting this testimony–my clear recollections from the funerals
and Stories About Them in the Babylonian Talmud (He‐
and memorial services for YU roshei yeshiva in the early 90′s in‐
brew) by R. Zev Frank – The author found 428 disagreements be‐
clude Malei with “tachas.”
tween Abayei and Rava in the Babylonian Talmud and believes he
Uncovering Mussar’s and Chassidus’ Divergent Approaches
has found patterns in them. I often wonder whether such patterns
toward Enlightenment by R. Moshe Maimon – Excellent article
that people seem to find are merely the result of finding what you
th
about the 19
century Lithuanian/Mussar attitude that is open to
are looking for.
41
Weekly Digest from TorahMusings.com Torah Musings Digest
1 August, 2014 | A Window into the Orthodox Jewish Intellectual’s World| Edited by: Rabbi Gil Student
Havdala With Wine During The
Nine Days
by R. Asher Bush
The communal mourning practices during the period preceding Tisha
B’Av have changed over time, now challenging the performance of an
important mitzvah. The Talmud1 teaches that as part of our mourning
in the period leading up to Tisha B’Av, a number of restrictions were
imposed. When the month of Av begins, joy should be limited; during
the week in which Tisha B’Av falls, it is prohibited to launder or cut
hair. A prohibition to eat meat and drink wine was only formally made
for the Seudah HaMafsekes (the final meal before Tisha B’Av).2
Throughout the generations each of these mourning practices was
extended by communal custom, leading the Rambam3 to record that
the universal practice is to refrain from eating meat during the week
in which Tisha B’Av falls, while some communities refrain from the
first day of Av. Three practices are recorded in the Shulchan Aruch4
regarding the eating of meat and the drinking of wine: to refrain from
the 17th of Tamuz, to refrain from Rosh Chodesh Av (with a Sefardic
variation of eating these foods on Rosh Chodesh but not after5) and to
refrain during the week in which Tisha B’Av falls. The universal
Ashkenazic practice is to refrain from Rosh Chodesh.
Does this also apply to Mitzvos?
It is clear from all sources that the custom of refraining from meat
and wine never applies when there is a mitzvah involved. The Maharil
explains that the reason for this exception is that there is no formal
prohibition on consuming meat and wine. Our practice is based on a
binding community minhag (custom), which the communities never
accepted when the food is part of a mitzvah.6 The most significant and
obvious example of this is the Shabbos meals themselves, which are
not subject to any such restrictions, even if one would start the Friday
night meal before sunset or extend Seudah Shlishis into the night.7
which references the Responsa of the Maharil as the source of this
practice. However, this is not at all what is written in the Responsa of
the Maharil–he writes that he never saw his own teachers refrain
from drinking wine for Havdala. He does, however, quote those who
also allowed drinking wine for Birkas HaMazon, about which he
expressed discomfort. Similarly, in the Minhagim of the Maharil,9 it is
recorded that he permitted wine for a bris, pidyon haben or siyum,
but would not use wine for Birkas HaMazon, even when it would be
given to a child.10
Ostensibly, this ruling of the Ramo seems confusing and perhaps even
problematic, since the practices he records do not seem to match the
rulings of the Maharil at all. Before proceeding, it is important to note
that Rav Moshe Isserles was well aware of the full text of the Maharil,
which he quotes fully in his earlier writing, the Darkei Moshe.11
While there are several resolutions offered to this dilemma, Rav
Moshe Feinstein’s12 is the most straightforward. Rav Moshe explained
that today the common practice is for an adult to drink the wine even
if a child is present. This is not a rejection of the ruling of the Ramo,
but rather a reflection of the fact that wine was not readily available
so throughout the year Havdala was commonly recited on other
beverages. This is not true today where wine is readily available and
is generally used for Havdala.
Based on Rav Moshe’s explanation, it is clear why the Ramo’s ruling
never contradicted the Maharil’s. Given the difficulty in acquiring
wine, it was generally not used for Havdala. Accordingly, if a person
were to use wine for Havdala it would be viewed as a treat to enjoy,
which is most unlike the reason the Maharil permitted its use in the
first place.13 Accordingly, there is no contradiction between what Rav
Moshe Isserles wrote in Darkei Moshe and in his glosses to Shulchan
Aruch. One reflected the ideal while the other reflected the reality
that wine was an uncommon commodity and viewed as a special
pleasure.
So what should be done for Havdala?
Yet we do find that the consumption of meat and wine in various
other mitzvah situations generated significant discussion among the
poskim. The basic rule is reflected in the words of Rav Yosef Karo
who wrote that one may drink the wine of Havdala and Birkas
HaMazon.8 This is consistent with the idea that the custom never
precluded meat and wine when their consumption was part of a
mitzvah.
Based on Rav Yosef Karo’s ruling, the universal Sefardic practice is to
use wine as usual.14 Based on all of the above, it would be assumed
that the Ashkenazic practice is to either give the wine to a child or to
drink it oneself. However, another possibility is also found. Until now,
the thrust of this discussion focused on the permissibility of wine.
Some took this matter in an entirely different direction, using beer or
other alternative beverages instead of wine.15
The Ramo, however, records that the Ashkenazic practice is to refrain
from drinking wine for Birkas HaMazon and Havdala. Instead, he
writes, the practice is to give the wine of Havdala to a child to drink;
absent a child, an adult may drink it. He also adds that at a Seudas
Mitzvah, a celebratory meal for a mitzvah such as a bris, pidyon
haben or siyum, it is permitted for all attendees to eat meat and drink
wine.
While the Ramo recommended giving the wine to a child, the Mishna
Brurah ((651:70)) pointed out that this cannot just be “any child.” The
child utilized must have reached the age of training for brachos and
will drink the proper amount, but not yet reached the age of training
to mourn over Yerushalayim.
Following the Ramo’s comment not to drink wine for Birkas HaMazon
and Havdala, a parenthetical note is found in the text of the Ramo
1
Rav Avigdor Nebenzhal16 pointed out in the name of Rav Shlomo
Zalman Auerbach that it is generally difficult to find such a child who
understands brachos but not the mourning for Yerushalayim.
Accordingly, Rav Shlomo Zalman would drink the wine himself. It
Copyright © 2014 Torah Musings, All rights reserved.
42
Weekly Digest from TorahMusings.com should also be added that given that Tisha B’Av falls in the middle of
the summer, by the time Shabbos ends most such children will be
asleep by that time as well.
13. As noted above in note #11. ↩
Additionally, it might be suggested that even though for all purposes
in Halacha (such as Kiddush, Havdala, Four Cups, etc) grape juice is
considered wine, it still does not provide the joy of wine and might be
a better choice of beverage on which to make havdala during the nine
days.
1. Ta’anis 26b ↩
14. Kaf HaChaim 651:152 ↩
15. Aruch HaShulchan 651:26. Even though ordinarily the use of
alternative beverages is only recommended when wine is not
available (see Mishna Brurah 296:8), this practice considers the
undesirability of wine during the Nine Days as sufficient reason
to view these other beverages as preferred.
It should be noted that while this seems to be a commonly
followed practice, it is not noted by most poskim. ↩
2. Ta’anis 26b, OC 652:1 ↩
3. Laws of Fasting 5:6 ↩
16. Yerushalayim B’Moadeha, (vol. on The Three Weeks, #167) ↩
4. OC 651:9 ↩
Responding to Catastrophe
5. Kaf HaChaim 651:125, 126 ↩
by Aron White
6. Minhagim of the Maharil, Laws of Tisha B’Av #5 & #6. This is
also the reason that Rav Moshe Feinstein (Igros Moshe OC
4:102) permits shaving during the three weeks before Tisha B’Av
for business purposes. His reason is not that a prohibited action
is permitted since it will result in the loss of money but that the
custom was never adopted in such cases. This perspective is
important from the point of view of Halacha and perhaps even
more importantly philosophically. ↩
7. Mishnah Brurah 651:56 ↩
8. OC 651:10 ↩
9. Minhagim of Maharil (Laws of Tisha B’Av #6) ↩
10. Ibid (#8) ↩
11. OC 651:9. He quotes the Maharil saying one is permitted to
drink wine at a Seudas Mitzvah, and all the more so for Havdala.
The logic of this would presumably be that if we permit eating
meat and drinking wine at a meal, where the intent is for
pleasure, all the more so drinking wine for Havdala should be
permitted since the wine is not primarily consumed for pleasure.
The Ramo’s logic would seem to be quite the opposite, since he
permitted wine for a bris but not for Birkas HaMazon or Havdala
. The likely explanation for this approach is that were a Seudas
Mitzva to be eaten lacking the normal celebratory foods of meat
and wine it will be a noticeably deficient meal, while that is not
true in the cases of Havdala and Birkas HaMazon. In the case of
Havdala, where the ideal choice of the Ramo is for a child to
drink, there will be nothing lacking in the mitzva if a child and
not the one who recited Havdala drinks. Regarding Birkas
HaMazon, it seems that the Ramo is following the opinion which
regards the use of a cup of wine as preferable but not required.
↩
12. Quoted by his student Rav Aharon Felder in Moadei Yeshurun
(vol. 1 page 154 footnote 64). ↩
2
The destruction of the Second Beis Hamikdash was a devastating
catastrophe for the Jewish people. The Gemara (Bava Basra 60b)
records the sense of lethargy and depression that set in – Jews were
so demoralised, they did not see any reason to continue Judaism.
Beyond the initial depression, the long term questions of the future of
Jewish identity and observance loomed large. What does Jewish life
look like in a post Beis Hamikdash world? The Beis Hamikdash had
been the centre of religious life for centuries. The Jewish calendar
featured the pilgrimages of Aliya LaRegel. The agricultural cycle
involved bringing the first fruits, the Bikkurim, to Yerushalayim. At
many important moments in one‘s life, such as the birth of a child,
and salvation from a potential danger, one would bring a sacrifice.
The absence of the Beis Hamikdash meant there had to be a paradigm
shift in Jewish observance and identity.
The leader who charted a course forward at this point was Rabbi
Yochanan Ben Zakai. He interacted directly with the Roman
authorities, such as when he famously made three requests from the
Roman leader outside Yerushalayim (Gittin 56a). However, it is in his
Takkanos, enactments, that he made at this time, that we can see the
direction he set for Jewry.
One can find within Orthodoxy today all three elements of the
reaction of Rabbi Yochanan Ben Zakai
The Gemara in Rosh Hashana records that he made eight Takkanos
after the destruction of the Beis Hamikdash (a ninth was made at an
unspecified time). These rulings spanned a broad range of areas, such
as the rules of conversion, the setting of the calendar and the
agricultural cycle. However, the enactments were not haphazard, but
rather represent three different elements of the reaction to the
destruction.
Past
Some of the rules were made “Zecher LaMikdash”, to remember the
Beis Hamikdash. Various practices that had previously been taken
place in the Beis Hamikdash were now to be performed by Jews
everywhere. The Lulav, which had previously only been taken all
seven days of Succos in the Beis Hamikdash, was now to be taken for
Copyright © 2014 Torah Musings, All rights reserved.
43
Weekly Digest from TorahMusings.com all seven days everywhere. The Shofar, which had only been blown on
Shabbos in the Beis Hamikdash, was now to blown on Shabbos in
religious courts outside the Beis Hamikdash. These enactments were
intended to be a reminder of the Beis Hamikdash – as Jewish life
developed and changed, we could not forget our roots.
Present
A second group of enactments were made, not to remember what
was, but to adapt to the new reality. Rabbi Yochanan Ben Zakai made
five rules, each of which are based on the fact that the situation on
the ground has changed. (Many of these rules are quite technical, so I
will attempt to simplify them)
1. During the time of the Beis Hamikdash, witnesses reporting the
new moon would come to the Beis Hamikdash. Now, without a
Beis Hamikdash, there was a requirement to provide a central
place for them to go. Rabbi Yochanan Ben Zakai legislated a
central place that witnesses should always come to.
earlier than during the time of the Beis Hamikdash. He stated his
rationale –“Next year the Beis Hamikdash will be rebuilt, will people
not say “Last year we ate at daybreak?””
Not content to remember the past, and change in the present, Rabbi
Yochanan Ben Zakai looked to the future. As everything around him
crumbled, on the back of the worst calamity and depression the Jews
had faced, he also looked towards a better future.
Rabbi Yochanan Ben Zakai‘s vision was complex and nuanced.
Simultaneously, he required that we remember the Beis Hamikdash,
make the changes necessary to the world without the Beis
Hamikdash, and look forward to rebuilding of the Beis Hamikdash. In
responding to catastrophe, the Jews needed to hold on to their past,
adapt in the present, and look to the future. It was such a vision,
simple as a cliché but far more difficult in the midst of a tragedy,
which Rabi Yochanan Ben Zakai enacted, providing a direction for the
Jewish people.
In Our Days, As Then
2. The Beis Din could only accept witnesses reporting the new
moon if the witnesses arrived at specific times, because of the
cycle of the sacrifices. There were now no sacrifices, so these
limitations were removed.
Since that event, one of the few equivalent catastrophes that has
happened to the Jewish people is the Holocaust. The centre of Jewish
life for the previous three hundred years was destroyed in less than a
decade. Millions were killed, millions were refugees who had to
rebuild their lives from nothing. As with the destruction of the Beis
Hamikdash, beyond the short term mourning and desperation, there
was also the more long term question of how to rebuild Jewish life.
3. Previously, witnesses who had seen the new moon could violate
Shabbos to arrive on time to report it to Beis Din, in order to
ensure the sacrifices of Rosh Chodesh were brought correctly.
Now, in the absence of sacrifices, this permission was removed.
4. One element of the conversion process had been the bringing of
a sacrifice by the new convert. Immediately after the
destruction, new converts had been told to set aside money for
the sacrifice, even if they could not bring it. Rabbi Yochanan Ben
Zakai ruled that converts should not even set aside money for
the sacrifice. This money was likely to be misappropriated,
because it could not be used for a sacrifice, so it was better not
to set it aside.
5. Rules had been in place regarding the tithe of produce that was
brought to Yerushalayim. Certain people had to bring fruit to
Yerushalayim, in order to make Yerushalayim look beautiful, as a
mark of respect for the city. Now the city was desolate of the
presence of God, and such rules were removed.
The destruction of the Beis Hamikdash had changed many things
about Jewish life. Rabbi Yochanan Ben Zakai adapted those practices
that had to reflect the new reality.
Future
The eighth enactment is the most astonishing. (Once again, this rule
is quite technical, but the explanation below, which is the crux of the
idea, can be understood without understanding the full rule.) When
the Beis Hamikdash was in existence, the new produce of a field could
only be eaten after the Omer sacrifice was brought on the second day
of Pesach. In the absence of the sacrifice, the new produce can be
eaten from daybreak of the second day of Pesach, a number of hours
earlier than it could be eaten when the Beis Hamikdash existed.
Rabbi Yochanan Ben Zakai removed this permission to eat produce
3
One can find within Orthodoxy today all three elements of the
reaction of Rabbi Yochanan Ben Zakai. There has been a move to
ensure a continued connection to our past, a move to make the
necessary changes in the present, and a move to look towards our
future.
Three Ways
In many parts of Orthodoxy, there has been a pronounced effort to
maintain a connection with our past. Many students today learn in
yeshivos named Mir, Ponevezh and Grodno, named after the famed
yeshivos of pre-war Europe. The great rabbis of pre-war Europe, such
as Rav Elchonon Wasserman, the Chofetz Chaim, Rav Yerucham
Lebowitz, Rav Chaim Ozer Grodzinski, loom large over the discourse
of much of Orthodoxy. The wearing of hat, jacket, streimel and
Kappote have been maintained, despite the demise of the cultures
that gave rise to them. Sometimes, the Holocaust is consciously or
subconsciously repressed in an attempt to maintain a feeling of
connection, not a break, with pre-war Europe. In many ways, the
great past of European Jewry has been maintained and perpetuated
within Orthodoxy.
There has also been a movement within Orthodoxy to adapt to the
new situation. In many parts of Orthodoxy, the Land of Israel and the
Jewish people have been consciously introduced into discourse as
these topics became more central in our current situation. Yeshivos
have been established in Israel where students serve in the Israeli
army, with names like Sderot, Petach Tikva, HaKotel, Mitzpe Ramon.
In the Diaspora, yeshivos have been established that allow students to
learn in yeshiva whilst earning a degree or a vocational qualification.
Changes in women‘s education and the increase in the study of
Tanach are further examples of the changes that Orthodoxy has made
Copyright © 2014 Torah Musings, All rights reserved.
44
Weekly Digest from TorahMusings.com as it adapts to its new environment.
There has also been a movement in Orthodoxy which is future
oriented. Just three years after the Holocaust, Jews had fulfilled that
hope of two thousand years – to live as a people in their land. Now
was not a time to merely respond to society, but to build one. Jews
threw themselves into professional and academic occupations, not
merely as a way of adapting to a foreign society, but as a way to build
one of their own. Jewish perspectives on society have been
formulated, the fields of Mishpat Ivri and Jewish political theory have
been developed, aiming to build the Jewish State in a Jewish way. In
the Diaspora, Jewish perspectives have been formulated in more
universalistic terms, also aiming to be proactive in building of wider
society.
Torah From Sinai
Questions about the laws in Deuteronomy in comparison with those in
earlier biblical books assume a process of prophetic transmission at
Mt. Sinai and in the Sinai Desert. However, without even minimally
exploring that transmission, we can never even begin to answer those
questions. Jewish tradition teaches a dual transmission–the Written
and the Oral Torahs. Distinguishing between these two traditions
helps us understand the law and resolve texts that otherwise appear
contradictory. What follows is a section of R. Yehuda Copperman’s
Peninei Meshech Chochmah. R. Moshe Schapiro translated the text,
which was not reviewed by R. Copperman and contains additional
paragraph breaks and section headers.
Three Sides Of The Same Coin
~~~
One could put names on these sectors – The first is largely Charedi,
the middle National Religious and the third Modern Orthodox.
However, what this framework can do is break down the barrier we
generally erect between these three. All the above elements of
Orthodoxy are not yet working in tandem, but they are all reading
from the same script. Just as Rabbi Yochanan Ben Zakai two thousand
years ago, Orthodoxy has seen catastrophe and responded in a similar
way. It has maintained a connection to the past, adapted to its new
situation and has continued, even after facing a great catastrophe, to
look towards the future.
The point of departure for the study of Torah is the belief in the
transmission of the Torah by the Holy One, blessed be He (HKBH) to
Moshe and the nation of Israel, at the occasion which is called Ma’
amad Har Sinai. The point of departure, however, is not the biblical
text, as is usually the case with literary study, but the will of the Giver
of the Torah, HKBH. While an examination of a text composed by
human beings can suggest any interpretation that is loyal to the
principles of grammar and syntax, style etc. and any such
interpretation is perforce legitimate – even though it may generate
new meanings that the author had not even considered!- but such is
not the case with the words of Torah. Here the Giver of the Torah,
HKBH, is central and one must study the text that He gave us “from
HKBH’s mouth to the ear of Moshe” (introduction of Ramban to
Torah), as an expression of the general will to teach Torah to the
Children of Israel– that “Torah” which was transmitted partly in
writing and partly orally.
IDF Uniforms
Halakhic Positions of Rav Joseph B. Soloveitchik
by R. Aharon Ziegler
Rav Soloveitchik was very meticulous and stringent in every phase of
Hilchot Tefillah, the laws of prayer. He often cited the Rambam (
Tefillah 5:1) that eight specific aspects of prayer must be adhered to
while standing for Shemoneh Esrei. The first four are: Amidah,
standing; Nochach HaMikdash, facing Eretz Yisrael; Tikun HaGuf,
feet together and clean body; and Tikun HaMalbushim, proper and
dignified attire.
He was once visited by a student who served in the Israel Defense
Forces who asked the Rav the following question: He worked in the
tank division and his job was cleaning and maintaining the tanks.
Often, his uniform would get covered in oil and grime and he wanted
to know if he needed to change clothing before davening Mincha. He
emphasized that it would be possible to do so but it would be quite
inconvenient and difficult. The Rav looked at him in amazement and
said out loud, “Why would you need to change? You are wearing
bigdei Kodesh, holy clothes”!
That is how the Rav felt about someone serving in the the Israel
Defense Forces.
Transmission of the Oral Torah
As is well known, the Oral Torah preceded, from a historical
perspective, the Written Torah. This is not only expressed through the
commandments that were given orally to the forefathers of the nation,
but also through the simple fact that when Moshe Rabbenu ascended
Mt. Sinai (if we exclude from our discussion the Ten Commandments
which have a different status) he received the Oral Torah before the
work on the Written Torah had begun. We can understand this if we
distinguish between the terms “Torah from Sinai” and “Torah from
Heaven”. It is clear that we do not intend to obligate the great ones of
the generations (medieval and modern) to use this terminology (for
example, Rambam in Hilkhot Teshuvah 3:8 writes about “Torah from
Heaven” when he means “Oral Torah”). We are using this distinction
here between these two terms in order to emphasize that the
receiving of the Written Torah and the receiving of the Oral Torah are
two distinct categories, related to different disputes in Chazal and the
medieval commentators, as will be explained further on. For the sake
of simplicity alone we will use the term “Torah from Heaven” to mean
the Written Torah and the term “Torah from Sinai” to mean the Oral
Torah.
It makes sense to relate the term “Torah from Sinai” to the Oral
Torah, for this is the language of Chazal: “Moshe received the Torah
from Sinai and transmitted it to Yehoshua etc.”1 On this matter
there is a difference of opinion between two schools of thought, R.
4
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45
Weekly Digest from TorahMusings.com Akiva and R. Yishmael.2 R. Akiva maintained that the Torah was given
in its entirety – its general principles, derivatives and details – from
Sinai, while R. Yishmael maintained that the general principles were
given at Sinai, but the details were given [later] in the Tent of
Meeting and on the Plains of Moav. This dispute between R. Akiva
and R. Yishmael applies, as stated, only to the receiving of the
commandments orally by Moshe Rabbenu, but is not relevant to his
writing down of the Torah.3
It would seem that the dispute between these two schools of thought
of the Tannaim is echoed much later in history, in the dispute of
Ramban and Arbarbanel with Radvaz regarding the question of
Deuteronomy. Ramban’s opinion4 is that Moshe Rabbenu received all
the commandments orally at Sinai, but only taught the
commandments that appear in Deuteronomy to the Children of Israel
shortly before they entered the Land of Israel. He is therefore
troubled to explain why HKBH held back Moshe’s prophecy for all
those thirty-nine years. In a slightly different vein, Abarbanel5 argues
that Moshe Rabbenu received and taught to the children of Israel all
the commandments that he received while they were still at Sinai
(and this is the point of contention between him and Ramban).6 In
opposition to Ramban and Abarbanel, Radvaz7 argues that the
Deuteronomic commandments were not only introduced for the first
time to the Children of Israel shortly before they entered the land of
Israel, but also to Moshe Rabbenu.
Radvaz stretches the line of the “Torah from Sinai” to the maximum,
in that Moshe Rabbenu was in the process of receiving the Oral Torah
from the mouth of HKBH, starting from the giving of the Torah at
Sinai and ending at the end of his life on the plains of Moav.8 It
appears that Abarbanel explains the concept “Torah from Sinai”
according to R. Akiva’s approach, whereas Radvaz explains it
according to R. Yishmael. It is hard to know, according to Ramban,
who distinguishes between the receiving of commandments by Moshe
and their transmission to the Children of Israel. All this, as stated,
relates to the question of “Torah from Sinai”, in other words the
question of the transmission of the Oral Torah from HKBH to Moshe.
Writing the Torah
In comparing “Torah from Sinai” to the concept of “Torah from
Heaven” we should note the process by which HKBH dictated the
Written Torah to Moshe Rabbenu. The process is defined by Ramban
in this way:9 “But it is true and clear that the entire Torah from the
beginning of the book of Genesis until the last words “Before the eyes
of all Israel” came from the mouth of HKBH to the ear of Moshe.”
Parallel to the dispute in Chazal about “Torah from Sinai” (the Oral
Torah), we find in Chazal another dispute about “Torah from Heaven”
(the Written Torah), namely the question if the Torah was “given
scroll by scroll” or “given complete.”10 Explaining the concept “scroll
by scroll,” Rashi11 writes: “When a portion was spoken to Moshe he
would write it down, and at the end of forty years, when all the
portions were finished he connected them with sinews and sewed
them together.” Explaining the concept “given complete,” Rashi12
writes: “It was not written until the end of forty years, after all the
portions were spoken. And those that were said to him in the first and
second years where arranged by him orally until they could be written
down.” Rashi explicitly says that one should not think that the entire
5
Torah was written at Sinai in a form that it is written today, in
contrast with R. Akiva’s opinion that the entire Oral Torah was given
at Sinai –“its general principles, derivatives and details.”13
What emerges is that “Torah from Sinai” preceded, from a historical
perspective, “Torah from Heaven”; in other words, the Oral Torah
preceded the Written Torah.14 This is the basis upon which we
contended that the point of departure for the study of Torah is not the
Torah text, rather the act of the transmission of the Torah by HKBH
to Israel. Indeed, it’s important to know that there was a possibility
that the Torah would not only have been given orally to Moshe
Rabbenu at Sinai like the opinion of R. Akiva, but also that it would
remainoral in its entirety. It was HKBH, Who first gave it orally, Who
decided to organize it in the form that we have today, namely, the
lesser part in written form, but the greater part in oral form. Any
deep study of God’s Torah must perforce bring the student to a
fundamental question – what is the foundation for this division
between the Torah which is written and that part which remains oral?
This question is discussed by the great commentators, but this is not
the place for a lengthy discussion of that issue.15
From Oral to Written
Part of the Oral Torah remains oral, while a certain part of the God’s
Torah was transferred now to the status of the Written Torah. We find
this process of “transference” of Oral Torah to Written Torah in all
the “newest” commandments in the Deuteronomy, and in the
“explicated” commandments therein, as (according to Ramban and
Abarbanel) they were written now but were already known to Moshe
(and maybe even to the Children of Israel) these forty years. And thus
indeed wrote Rashi (Gittin 60a) that “those that were said to him in
the first and second years were arranged by him orally until they
could be written down.” For example, even according to the opinion
that the Torah was given “scroll by scroll” – and already at Mt. Sinai
the portion of Mishpatim was given in written form, and there it was
written “and in the seventh year he shall go free for no charge” – they
knew and learned the content of the commandment “Adorn him
generously from your flocks, from your threshing floor and from your
wine cellar” which appears in Deuteronomy. It’s possible that they
also knew how to derive this law from the Written Torah (without
Deuteronomy), through the particular hermeneutical principles
through which the Torah is interpreted.
At a later time in history we find a similar process (but not identical)
when words of prophecy were spoken orally at a particular time in the
life of a prophet (“the fruit of the lips”), part of them were copied
down to be written (in general close to the end of the life of the
prophet) based on the criterion of “that which is necessary for the
generations” (Megillah 12a).
According to this understanding that the Oral Torah preceded the
Written Torah, we can perhaps suggest didactically that instead of
posing the question: “how did Chazal derive this or that law from the
verse,” we should reformulate the question and say “how is the oral
component of this commandment connected with the written part of
this commandment?” This novel formulation would have spared us
many of the problems that accompanied the pure, holy study of Torah
and its commentaries in the last few centuries.
Copyright © 2014 Torah Musings, All rights reserved.
46
Weekly Digest from TorahMusings.com 15. See R. Eliyahu Mizrachi to Numbers, BeHa’alotecha 10:11 s.v. “
le-Mishpechotav”. And see our master the Chazon Ish, 125 to
Moed, the essay: Siddur Ketivat Parshiyot HaTorah , and also in
our article Signon HaKatuv part 3, at length. ↩
1. Avot 1:1 ↩
2. Zevachim 115b ↩
3. See Maharal, Gur Aryeh, Mishpatim (21:1) why, according to R.
Akiva, it was necessary to repeat the entire Torah to Moshe
Rabbenu at Sinai, the Tent of Meeting and the plains of Moav,
and one time was not sufficient. ↩
Tefillin on Tisha B’Av
by David Roth
4. Introduction to Deuteronomy ↩
5. Introduction to Deuteronomy ↩
6. It is upon Abarbanel to explain how Deuteronomy is essentially
different from the other chumashim, since the commandments
contained in it are apparently equal to the other commandments
both in terms of when they were received by Moshe Rabbenu
and when they were transmitted to the Children of Israel. See
there, at length, in his introduction. ↩
7. Responsa, 2143 ↩
8. According to the approach of Radvaz it is better understood why
the Torah emphasizes, when speaking of Moshe Rabbenu at the
end of his life, that “his eye was not dimmed, nor his natural
force abated,” in other words that also at the end of his life, his
ability to absorb the commandments of the Torah were not one
bit less than his ability to absorb them at the beginning of his
career at the giving of the Torah at Sinai ↩
Contemporary practice seems near universal that tefillin are worn on
Tisha B’Av in the afternoon but not in the morning. However, the
exceptions–particularly among Sephardim–point to divergent opinions
on the subject. In fact, there is a major debate among the Rishonim
regarding whether one wears tefillin at all on Tisha B’Av.
Different Views
Most Rishonim, including Tosafos,1Rosh,2Ramban,3Ran,4Rashba5 in
the name of R. Hai Gaon, and Beis Yosef6 rule that one is obliged to
wear tefillin on Tisha B’Av.7 The Rambam8 says that some sages do
not put on tefillin shel rosh (the head part of the tefillin) on Tisha
B’Av, but he implies that in principle there is an obligation of tefillin
on Tisha B’Av.9
However, the Semag10 and Rokeach11 say that one should not put on
tefillin on Tisha B’Av. This is also the simple reading of the Maharam,
12
although the Hagahos Maimoniyos13 says that he personally saw
the Maharam putting on tefillin in the afternoon.
The Middle Ground
The Shulchan Aruch14 says that the common custom is what appears
to be a middle position: one does not put on tefillin on Tisha B’Av in
the morning, but rather to do so in the afternoon for the mincha
service.
9. His introduction to Genesis, there. ↩
10. Gittin 60a ↩
11. Ad loc ↩
12. Ibid ↩
13. We have emphasized the Written Torah as it is found in our
hands today, to the exclusion of the Written Torah in the sense
of “the names of HKBH” (according to the language of Ramban
in his introduction to Torah), and this is according to the opinion
of those commentators who see the Written Torah as being given
in its entirety to Moshe Rabbenu in a “closed” form. In other
words, with the letters mixed up, not like the peshat or midrash
today. See about this in the commentary of R. Ovadyah Seforno
to Exodus, Mishpatim 24:14, s.v. “Asher katavti” , and see also in
the words of the Netziv of Volozhin there, s.v. “veha-Torah” and
see also in the words of the Maharitz Chajes, Yoma 75a. ↩
14. And there is no contradiction to our words from the words of
Maharal to Exodus, Beshalach 15:25 regarding the
commandments at Marah which preceded the giving of the
Torah at Sinai about which the Maharalwrites: “For behold the
Oral Torah did not precede the Written Torah”- look there very
carefully! And see about this in the article by R. Mordechai
Gifter “The Writing of Torah, Nevi’im and Ketuvim” in the
memorial book for ha-Gaon R. Y. Weinberg. ↩
What is the reason for this “middle” custom? The Magen Avraham15
says that this is because tefillin is referred to as “glory” (pe’er), and
on Tisha B’Av our glory was taken away. However, he offers no
explanation for the difference between the morning and the
afternoon. The Vilna Gaon16 and Mishna Berurah17 explain that the
practice is based on the verse in Lamentations18 that says that G-d
cast down the glory of Israel from heaven to earth (hishlich
m’shamayim eretz tiferes yisrael)–since tefillin is sometimes referred
to as glory,19 the midrash understands this verse to mean that G-d
cast away our tefillin. However, the Vilna Gaon explains that since
according to the strict halacha one is obligated to put on tefillin on
Tisha B’Av we do so in the afternoon, because in the afternoon we are
more lenient regarding some of the customs of mourning because the
Temple had already started burning. The Mishnah Berurah20 quotes
this explanation for the difference between morning and afternoon, as
well as another: in the afternoon, we wear tefillin as a small sign of
consolation on Tisha B’Av.
While the later Ashkenazic authorities seem to have accepted the
ruling of the Shulchan Aruch to put on tefillin only in the afternoon, a
number of Sephardic communities seem not to have accepted the
ruling of the Shulchan Aruch. The Kaf Ha’Chaim,21 the Rama M’Panau
22
and R. Mordechai Eliyahu in the name of the kabbalists in the Beth
El yeshiva23 rule that one should put on tefillin in the morning. The
Kaf Ha’Chaim24 and Ba’er Heitev25 quote a number of opinions that
6
Copyright © 2014 Torah Musings, All rights reserved.
47
Weekly Digest from TorahMusings.com one should put on tefillin in the morning, but should do so specifically
in private. One either recites the entire prayer service at home with
tefillin before going to the synagogue,26 or one recites just Shema at
home with tefillin and then the entire prayer service in the
synagogue. The Ba’er Heitev27 says that the practice of the Ari was to
recite Shema with tefillin before coming going to the Synagogue.
However, R. Ovadia Yosef28 rules that both customs are valid, and
every place should follow its own local custom.
Problems with Delaying Tefillin
halachic level this compromise does not make sense.
As always, customs vary and you should ask your rabbi questions
about appropriate practice.
1. Moed Katan 21a d”h m’shelishi v’eilach and 21b d”h m’kan
v’eilach (the second one) ↩
2. Taanis 4:37 ↩
3. Toras Ha’Adam, Warsaw 1841 edition, page 55a ↩
The practice of delaying the wearing of tefillin is fundamentally
problematic. The Gemara29 says that anyone who recites Shema
without tefillin is as if he testified falsely. Accordingly, if we assume
that there is really an obligation to put on tefillin on Tisha B’Av, how
can we permit not putting it on in the morning, when one recites
Shema?
4. Taanis 10a in the pages of the Rif ↩
5. Shu”t Rashba 5:214 ↩
6. OC 38:6 and 555:1 ↩
The Rama M’Panau30 and R. Yitzchak Schmelkes31 write that the
prohibition to recite Shema without tefillin is only if one does not put
on tefillin that entire day, but if he will put on tefillin later in the day,
there is no problem. However, the lack of tefillin is clearly an
incomplete fulfillment of the mitzvah of accepting the yoke of heaven.
The Gemara32 says that one who wants to accept the yoke of heaven
in its complete fashion should go to the bathroom, wash his hands,
put on tefillin, say Shema and then Shemone Esrei. Omitting tefillin is
missing a part of the process.
Rabbeinu Tam Tefillin
There is a major debate between Rashi and Rabbeinu Tam regarding
the order of the four different portions of the Torah which are put
inside tefillin.33 The Shulchan Aruch34 says that the general custom is
like Rashi, and the Mishnah Berurah35 quotes from the Beis Yosef36
who uses a stronger language and says that Rashi is the main
halachic opinion that we should follow. Nevertheless, the Shulchan
Aruch37 recommends that one who is well known for his piety38 should
have two pairs of tefillin, one according to Rashi and one according to
Rabbeinu Tam. He should put them on either at the same time, or
wear Rashi during the prayer services, and then Rabbeinu Tam tefillin
after services and repeat Shema while wearing them.
The Rama M’Panau39 writes that on Tisha B’Av one should not wear
Rabbeinu Tam tefillin. However, the Mishnah Berurah40 and Ba’er
Heitev41 rule that one who normally puts on tefillin of Rabbeinu Tam
should do so after mincha. Presumably those who put on tefillin in the
morning of Tisha B’Av also wear Rabbeinu Tam tefillin in the
morning, as well.
However, the Sheyarei Keneses Ha’Gedola42 argues against the Rama
M’Panau‘s reasoning for omitting Rabbeinu Tam tefillin entirely on
Tisha B’Av. One who puts on Rabbeinu Tam tefillin does so because
he is concerned for the possibility that Rabbeinu Tam was correct and
only his tefillin are kosher. Accordingly, since the vast majority of
rishonim hold that one is obligated to put on tefillin on Tisha B’Av,
there should be no difference between Tisha B’Av and every other day
of the year. One should also be concerned on Tisha B’Av that
Rabbeinu Tam was correct. The Chida43 and Kaf Ha’Chaim44 answer
for the Rama M’Panau that he is correct based on Kabbalah, even
though the Sheyarei Keneses Ha’Gedola is correct that on a purely
7
7. The general rule set down by the Talmud (Taanis 30a) is that
everything which applies to a mourner during the first week of
mourning (shiva) applies on Tisha B’Av. Since a mourner does
not wear tefillin on the first day of mourning but does on
subsequent days (Shulchan Aruch YD 388:1), these Rishonim
explain that Tisha B’Av is more similar to subsequent days of
mourning, when one does wear tefillin. They explain that the
above-mentioned rule that everything which applies to a
mourner during the first week of mourning (shiva) applies on
Tisha B’Av only applies to practices of mourning that are
applicable for the entire shiva period, but not to practices which
apply just on the first day. ↩
8. Hilchos Taaniyos 5:11 ↩
9. This is the understanding of the Magid Mishneh (there) and Beis
Yosef (OC 555:1), unlike the Rabeinu Yerucham (quoted in the
Beis Yosef there) who understood that the position of the
Rambam is that it is forbidden to wear tefillin on Tisha B’Av. ↩
10. Rabbinic positive commandments 3 (Hilchos Tisha B’Av) ↩
11. 310 ↩
12. Hilchos Semachos m’es Rabbeinu Meir ben Rabeinu Baruch
M’Rothenberg, Jerusalem 1976 (5736), page 68 ↩
13. Hilchos Taaniyos 5:11:3 ↩
14. OC 555:1 ↩
15. OC 555:1 ↩
16. Biur Ha’Gra OC 555 ↩
17. 555:1 ↩
18. 2:1 ↩
19. See Ezekiel 24:17 and Moed Katan 15a ↩
20. 555:3 ↩
Copyright © 2014 Torah Musings, All rights reserved.
48
Weekly Digest from TorahMusings.com 44. 555:3 ↩
21. 555:1 ↩
22. 107 ↩
23. Maamar Mordechai OC 2:47; This practice of the Beth El yeshiva
is also mentioned in Kaf Ha’Chaim 555:4 ↩
24. 555:4 ↩
25. OC 555:1 ↩
26. This is the recommendation of R. Haim Palaggi (Ruach Chaim
OC 555). R. Refael Aharon ben Shimon (Nehar Mitzraim, Hilchos
Tisha B’Av 12) strongly attacks this practice and says that he
does not understand who gave them permission to not pray with
a minyan (quorum) because of this, and says that at the very
most one should say kerias shema with tefillin at home before
going to the synagogue, but one certainly should not say all of
the prayers by himself; and he suggests that for most people who
do not follow Kabbalistic practices in general, they should simply
follow the ruling of the Shulchan Aruch and not put on tefillin in
the morning at all. ↩
Modern Orthodoxy and the
Right
During the time of unity in which we find ourselves, due both to the
war in Israel and the Tisha B’Av season, I want to review an
interesting comment by R. Norman Lamm. R. Lamm’s sermons are
fascinating for many reasons. He is a master of the sermon, both
stylistically and with profound midrashic insight. Dating from his time
as a pulit rabbi, his sermons show his leadership intuition, his
messages for personal and communal direction. The publication of
these edited sermons in Derashot LeDorot (so far, four volumes) is an
important contribution.
On Parashas Pinchas, while discussing zealotry (in a 1975 sermon
titled “Great Ideas Are Dangerous”), R. Lamm explains why he
believes Modern Orthodoxy should not cut itself off from the right
despite the many disagreements and the frequent heated rhetoric of
which R. Lamm would later become a regular target. He insists on a
balance, joining together with the right but being conscious of its
extremes.
He writes (vol. 4, pp. 157–159):
27. OC 555:1 ↩
[W]hat is true for the State [of Israel] is true for Judaism. We
have survived to this station because of the self-sacrifice of
countless zealots, the historical successors of Pinhas.
28. Yechave Daas 2:67 ↩
29. Berachos 14b↩
That is why I am not overly anxious for our camp, what we call
“Modern Orthodoxy,” to cut off from the “right wing.” The
“yeshiva world” and the “hasidic world” are reservoirs of
passionate commitment, without which we are wishy-washy,
wan, weak, and wavering. Of course I am unhappy with many of
their policies. But our very survival may well depend on the
degree to which we can become inspired by their zeal and learn
to bring passion to our own commitments, no matter how much
we may disagree with them on specific issues.
30. Alfasi Zuta Berachos 14b ↩
31. Beis Yitzchak OC 17:13 ↩
32. Berachos 14b-15a ↩
33. Rashi Menachos 34b, d”h kan m’yamino; Tosfos Menachos 34b,
d”h v’ha’korei korei k’sidran ↩
34. OC 34:1 ↩
However, even in the Torah itself we find hints of apprehension
that, like all great ideas, kana’ut has an “other side,” that of
destructive fanaticism. The other side of a warm-blood is a
hot-headed one. In our sidra, Pinhas is praised and rewarded and
yet if we study the verses of today’s sidra carefully, we can find
in them tell-tale signs of reservation and hesitation about
zealousness. Our Rabbis (Yerushalmi Sanhedrin 9:7) were much
more explicit when they said that Pinhas acted “against the
wishes of the Sages”…
35. 34:4 ↩
36. OC 34:2 ↩
37. OC 34:2 ↩
38. OC 34:3 ↩
39. Responsa 107 ↩
So, in all aspects of contemporary life, we must seek out kana’ut,
but by keeping it confined and restrained and in the context of
love and peace, we will avoid the “other side” of fanaticism.
40. 555:4 ↩
41. OC 555:2 ↩
As I have said, I admire the zeal of our right-wing. But emor–we
must become upset and indignant when it is thoughtless,
abusive, uncivilized. At that point, it can well become destructive
and self-defeating.
42. OC 555:1 ↩
43. Birkei Yosef OC 555:1 ↩
Of course it is not easy to propose clear formulae on how to
8
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49
Weekly Digest from TorahMusings.com determine when zeal shades into fanaticism, when passion
becomes poisonous.
But if we are conscious of this potential danger, if we are aware
of how destructive great ideas can become, then we will be able
to latch on to greatness and avoid the snares and ppitfalls of “the
other side.”
9
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50
Weekly Digest from TorahMusings.com Torah Musings Digest
8 August, 2014 | A Window into the Orthodox Jewish Intellectual’s World| Edited by: Rabbi Gil Student
If You’re Only Going to Do
One…
but I suspect it was his source).
To Ran, that explains what Makkot 23b-24a was telling us: Moshe
Rabbenu gave the whole shebang of commandments, not
differentiating among them, in the hope that we would fulfill all, or
almost all, without regard to more or less important.
by R. Gidon Rothstein
The juiciest nuggets often come in the digressions in a lecture.
Having discussed the two substantive parts of the sixth drasha, let’s
look at the fascinating way in which Ran opens the talk. It’s a
complete digression, bearing no clear connection to the rest, except
that it’s building off of another point made by the verses he cited.
Since he was Ran, even those of his remarks he obviously delivered
for both introductory and ancillary reasons offer much food for
thought.
Sometimes You Gotta Prioritize
What David HaMelech (and the rest of the figures in that
Gemara—Yeshayahu, Michah, and Habakkuk) saw was that people
weren’t keeping enough of the range to justify withholding
information about what was important. If people were keeping a small
portion of the 613, but were including the most important ones, there
might be no need to clarify. But in David’s time, they were neglecting
some of the most important ones.
One Mitzvah Can Be Enough
Prior essays in this series
The verses with which he opened the drasha, as we’ve seen, were
Michah 6:6–8. But verse 8 figures in another Talmudic discussion,
Makkot 23b, and it’s that discussion Ran brings up first. The Gemara
there (which I discussed in more detail in We’re Missing the Point)
says, without explanation, that Moshe brought 613 mitzvot down from
Sinai, that David HaMelech reduced those to eleven (derived from
Tehillim 15), Yeshayahu reduced them to six, Michah to three,
Yeshayahu another time to two, and Habakuk to one.
Ran will get to that, but he starts with Rambam’s view that the full
and proper performance of even one mitzvah, with no ulterior motives
or interests other than love of Hashem, suffices to earn a share in the
World to Come. For Rambam, that’s what the last Mishnah in Makkot
means when it says Hashem gave us many commandments for our
benefit. The more commandments there are, the more likely each of
us will find one to perform in the best way.
Great Reward Isn’t the Same as Perfection
Ran notes that Rosh?? accepted that view, and applauds it himself,
but adds an element. He does not accept that any one mitzvah earns
us a share in the World to Come (although it does seem that any one
mitzvah, done consistently for a lifetime, will earn such a share),
although they all bring some reward, Ran held that differing mitzvot
earn different rewards—some mitzvot might only give us a few more
years of life in this world, some might give us a small share in the
World to Come, and some might give us a share equal to that given
for several smaller ones.
To rectify that, David came up with a list that could lead to a
perfection of its own. It wouldn’t be the perfection of the 613, but it
would be something meaningful. Before that, while the people of his
time thought they were observing the Torah, they in fact were
missing some or all of the most crucial parts. This itself is worth
noting, that people can think of themselves as observing the Torah
and yet be missing what’s most important and essential. Avoiding that
is the primary reason to make clear that which qualifies as most
important and essential.
In Ran’s view, then, Michah was saying to the people of his time that,
whatever they were observing, they had lost sight of the necessity of
justice, kindness, and modesty to any meaningful definition of Torah
observance.
Ran notes that the examples the Gemara gives for doing something
modestly are weddings and funerals. Preferably even those events
would happen with the unavoidable minimum of public fanfare.
Therefore, he says, after the custom spread to have an address at a
wedding, it should happen in the wedding hall, not a more public
place, because the Torah told us to act in privacy even with those
activities no one else does privately.
Modesty as a Central Part of the Religion
Hashem didn’t tell us the rewards for each mitzvah because people
would zero in on the most rewarding ones, whereas Hashem wanted
us to engage the full panoply of them. Instead of our hoarding
reward, Hashem wanted us to achieve as complete a perfection as we
could, and that comes from working on all the mitzvot, not just the
most important ones (this concern with achieving well-rounded
service rather than quantitative reward is already articulated in
Rabbenu Yonah’s commentary to Avot; Ran doesn’t acknowledge that,
1
The comment suggests Ran was giving this drasha at a wedding,
which makes for interesting speculation about his pastoral choices.
Here he is, at a wedding, and he takes the opportunity to suggest it
would have been better to situate the lecture part of the wedding in a
more private or modest venue. He seems to have been confident his
audience would take his comments in the vein in which they were
given.
Aside from that, he has made two interesting points. First, he reminds
us that significant authorities held that there are in fact more and less
important mitzvot, even as we know that Hashem prefers the
well-roundedness of doing all the mitzvot.
Second, Ran reads great figures of our past as having noticed when
the ideal was unattainable and having carved out ways to produce a
Copyright © 2014 Torah Musings, All rights reserved.
51
Weekly Digest from TorahMusings.com meaningful religiosity within the powers of the members of their
generation.
The hagiographical literature also includes many stories of the Rav’s
kindness. Collections of recollections produced by the Rabbinical
Council of America, Young Israel and the Rabbi Joseph B. Soloveitchik
Institute all included memories of the Rav’s generosity and morality.7
According to my count, more than seventeen contributors to these
volumes chronicled these attributes of their sainted teacher. Later on,
a few dozen rabbis and leaders wrote essays on the Rav that
appeared in a special series hosted in the Yeshiva College newspaper,
which I expanded in book form.8 Once again, I counted another ten
chapters that delved into the virtuous character of the Rav.
Last, Ran has reminded us that avoiding publicity was one of the
three, according to Michah. When we’re down to articulating all of
the service of God in three principles, one of those three is not living
our lives in public. I wonder how many of us see that preference for
privacy as even a desideratum, let alone one of three indispensable
linchpins of any meaningful observance.
Each of these points, which really aren’t connected to Ran’s main
thrust, are nonetheless as relevant and challenging to us today as I
would imagine they were to whoever showed up at that wedding
almost six hundred years ago.
The Making of a Lonely Man
The Making of a Lonely Man: The Posthumous Profile of Rabbi
Soloveitchik
by Zev Eleff1
In 2008, Noah Greenfield posed a provocative question: “Was the Rav
a Tsaddik?”2 The writer did not doubt that Rabbi Joseph B.
Soloveitchik was a most righteous person.3 Still, it was striking to
Greenfield that he was unaware of evidence that could prove that
conviction. Surely, he reckoned, someone with his background should
have been informed of the Rav’s magnanimity. Greenfield graduated
from YULA High School in Los Angeles, studied at Yeshivat Har
Etzion (Gush) and enrolled at Yeshiva College. All three institutions
are pathways to the Rav’s teachings. “While I have read many of the
Rav’s writings, studied under many of his students, and heard and
read countless stories about him,” explained Greenfield, “I still have
no idea if the Rav was a tsaddik.”4 If his Orthodox community did not
extol the virtues of its most esteemed rabbinic figure then, he
wondered, perhaps the women and men who claimed membership to
that enclave did not value those qualities in their own lives.
The whole matter is a complicated one. On one hand, Greenfield’s
claim was something of an overstatement. The Rav’s righteousness
was in plain view just as his followers began to construct their
master’s posthumous legacy. Rabbi Soloveitchik died in April 1993.
Shortly afterward, Yeshiva University held a memorial service to
honor him. In the weeks that followed, YU provided a prominent
evening forum for the Rav’s disciples to share their “Torah” and
“stories” of their beloved teacher.5 Of course, Rabbi Soloveitchik was
recalled as a masterful Talmud scholar and, along with his wife, Dr.
Tonya Soloveitchik, as a founder of Maimonides School. The Rav was
more than an educator, however. One memoirist recalled the focus on
the Rav’s benevolence at those lectures in Washington Heights:
In the period after the Rav died, I was struck by how much of the
eulogizing of the Rav took place through storytelling. There were
wonderful anecdotes about his charming relationship with
first-graders in Maimonides; his concern for one of his
shamashim (aids) who was going out on a date but didn’t have
the proper socks; his hesed toward the Irish Catholic
housekeeper who had fallen on bad times, and about his hosting
a party for a chambermaid at Yeshiva University.6
2
In addition, one story published in another memorial detailed a most
inspiring instance of the Rav’s charitableness. Since then, it has
gained considerable traction. The tale was canonized by Joseph
Telushkin in his Code of Jewish Ethics and included in a popular
documentary on the Rav’s life.9 To my knowledge, it was first
recounted in detail by Rachel Wiederkehr about her brother:
When my brother, Ezra, was 16, he was diagnosed with
Hodgkin’s disease. It was about the same time the Rav’s wife
became ill with lymphoma, and he would call my parents weekly
to see how Ezra was doing. After graduating from Maimonides,
Ezra became a Talmid in the Rav’s shiur at YU, and the Rav kept
up with every detail of my brother’s illness. Ezra was undergoing
chemotherapy then, though at YU nobody except the Rav knew
he was even sick. Once, a chemotherapy appointment meant that
Ezra would have to leave shiur early. Aware that my brother’s
departure would arouse the curiosity of his classmates, the Rav
dismissed the entire class early that day so that Ezra would not
feel conspicuous, and so that his secret remain safe.10
However, while the facts do not agree with Greenfield, the sentiment
of the literary corpus probably does. The tales of the Rav’s kindness
appear secondary to his scholarly attainments. In fact, other episodes
that depict a far fiercer Rabbi Soloveitchik rise above the rest.11
Among the hundreds of published tributes that memorialize the Rav,
just one eulogist devoted his entire remarks to the Rav’s kindness. In
contrast to other memoirists who focused on Rabbi Soloveitchik’s
towering intellect and leadership, Abe Levovitz of Boston chose
instead to focus on the “Rav’s human qualities.”12 Originally delivered
before a synagogue audience, Levovitz stressed to his listeners that
he wished to “paint a slightly different pictures of this man among
men.” To him, it was most important to share Rabbi Soloveitchik’s
“humanity, his love, his forgiving nature, his nobility, his aristocracy,
his charity, and above all, his human frailty.”13
Levovitz’s portrayal of the Rav’s forthcoming forgiveness was
particularly poignant. In 1941, a number of Boston Jews slandered the
Rav. They accused him of operating a kosher meat racket. In the end,
Judge Abraham Cohen acquitted Rabbi Soloveitchik of all charges. To
Levovitz, this was no surprise. What astonished him was that the Rav
forgave his Orthodox rabbinical foes and went to certain lengths to
help them in their times of need.14 In addition, the Rav issued a pass
to the well-heeled, Massachusetts-based Feuerstein clan who had
powered the assaults on Rabbi Soloveitchik in Boston as well as in
New York.15
The Rav was not the only one who harnessed this supreme skill. Much
Copyright © 2014 Torah Musings, All rights reserved.
52
Weekly Digest from TorahMusings.com earlier in the twentieth century, Rabbi Avraham Yitzhak Kook
endured vitriolic attacks on his labors in the Holy Land. His rivals
accused him of concocting works of “sorcery” that “turn light to
darkness and darkness to light.”16 Similar to Rabbi Soloveitchik after
him, Rav Kook did not respond to the assailants. They burned his
book but the Zionist ideologue said nothing in retort. Likewise, Rav
Kook forgave his rivals and offered them aid when his opponents
required his support.
August 3, 2014). ↩
4. Noah Greenfield, “Was the Rav a Tsaddik?,” 3. ↩
5. See “Teachings of the Rav: Something for Us to Remember,” The
Commentator (April 28, 1993): 2. ↩
In all probability, individuals familiar with Rav Kook are not surprised
by this. There exists a softer side of Rav Kook that is nearly absent in
Rabbi Soloveitchik’s posthumous profile. Perhaps that sturdier—or,
more expansive—legacy that Rav Kook enjoys is a reason that he can
be invoked on so many matters within Israeli religious life.
In contrast, the Rav’s foremost status is that of a Torah scholar and
dynamic educator. True, he wrote far less for later generations to
examine than Rav Kook. Yet, it is also certainly the case that
America’s Orthodox Jews cast the Rav as an intellectual monolith
without much reach into some of the more mundane matters of
everyday Jewish life. He is the “Lonely Man” after all, somewhat aloof
and unintelligible to ordinary people. He is not quite grounded
enough to aid the rest of us who cannot access his high-level
rabbinics or highfalutin English.17
He did not assume this role, of course. Rather, Rabbi Soloveitchik’s
disciples and devotees stressed these scholarly and philosophical
features in order to construct religious communities that might
appropriately match those emphases. Decades ago, the enclaves that
viewed the Rav as a “symbolic exemplar” needed a spiritual godfather
of outmatched intellectual ability and pedagogical vision.18 Forces to
the left and right questioned the credibility of these religious
communities and Rabbi Soloveitchik offered the middle-ground an
elegant, legitimate response. No doubt, it helped that the hoisted role
model was someone who also exhibited good moral character but this
was rarely the most poignant point to stress.
In April 2013, dozens of Jews (mostly men) ascended pulpits and
podiums to publicly remember Rabbi Soloveitchik on the occasion of
the twentieth anniversary of his death. In the United States and
Israel, the Rav’s followers recalled their master as they had in
previous forums. Few offered fresh insights and virtually every
speaker and writer underscored the Rav’s scholarship rather than his
fine character. I could not help but think that we missed a chance to
breathe new life into this very Lonely Man of Faith.
1. I offer my thanks to Melissa Eleff, Isaac Ehrenberg and Noah
Greenfield for their helpful suggestions to improve this essay. ↩
2. Noah Greenfield, “Was the Rav a Tsaddik?: In Search of Modern
Orthodox Saints,” Kol Hamevaser 1 (February 27, 2008): 3. ↩
3. Unfortunately, that this was merely a question about the Rav’s
legacy and not a statement about his conduct was missed by at
least one subsequent critic. See Rabbi Aaron Rakeffet-Rothkoff’s
lecture at the Gruss Kollel in Israel, March 16, 2008. Available
online at
http://www.yutorah.org/lectures/lecture.cfm/723037/Rabbi_Aaro
n_Rakeffet-Rothkoff/3008–03-16_R_Yitzchak_Hutner (accessed
3
6. David Shatz, “Memorializing the Rav: Time and the Masorah,” in
Memories of a Giant: Eulogies in Memory of Rabbi Dr. Joseph B.
Soloveitchik zt”l, ed. Michael A. Bierman (Jerusalem: Urim,
2003), 355. ↩
7. See Rabbi Joseph B. Soloveitchik: Man of Halacha, Man of Faith,
ed. Menachem D. Genack (Hoboken: Ktav, 1998); “Harav Yosef
Dov Halevi Soloveitchik: A Rosh HaYeshiva and Manhig who
Inspired Generations,” Viewpoint (Fall 1993): 16–28; and
Memories of a Giant. A number of essays were reprinted in
identical form in multiple collections. ↩
8. See Mentor of Generations: Reflections of Rabbi Joseph B.
Soloveitchik, ed. Zev Eleff (Jersey City: Ktav, 2008). ↩
9. See Joseph Telushkin, A Code of Jewish Ethics: You Shall Be
Holy, vol. I (New York: Bell Tower, 2009), 289–90; and Lonely
Man of Faith: The Life and Legacy of Rabbi Joseph B.
Soloveitchik, DVD, directed by Ethan Isenberg (2006; Brooklyn:
Second Look Productions, 2010). ↩
10. June Glazer, “Glimpses of the Rav,” YU Review (Winter 2003): 6.
For more on Ezra Lightman, see Zev Eleff, Living from
Convention to Convention: A History of the NCSY, 1954–1980
(Jersey City: Ktav, 2009), 41–42. ↩
11. See Aryeh A. Frimer and Dov I. Frimer, “Women’s Prayer
Services—Theory and Practice,” Tradition 32 (Winter 1998): 41;
and Norman Lamm, Seventy Faces: Articles of Faith, vol. 1
(Hoboken: Ktav, 2002), 3–22. ↩
12. Abraham Levovitz, “The Rav’s Human Qualities Invoke Indelible
Memories,” in Memories of a Giant, 229–235. ↩
13. Ibid., 235. ↩
14. See Seth Farber, “Reproach, Recognition and Respect: Rabbi
Joseph B. Soloveitchik and Orthodoxy’s Mid-Century Attitude
Toward Non-Orthodox Denominations,” American Jewish History
89 (June 2001): 206–7. ↩
15. See Zev Eleff, “Freedom and Responsibility: The First Orthodox
College Journalists and Early Yeshiva College Politics,
1935–1941,” American Jewish Archives Journal 62 (December
2010): 72–81. ↩
16. See Yehudah Mirsky, Rav Kook: Mystic in a Time of Revolution
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 2014), 168. ↩
17. Of course, much of Rav Kook’s Hebrew writing is esoteric and
“highfalutin” in different ways than the Rav’s essays. Still, many
of the topics included in Rav Kook’s literary corpus deal with
Copyright © 2014 Torah Musings, All rights reserved.
53
Weekly Digest from TorahMusings.com more grounded topics like the importance of exercise and
self-defense. ↩
campaign to create a Jewish State in the land of Israel. In so doing he
became a leading voice of modern Religious Zionism. In this next
section, the Rav turned his attention to the question of how the
massive persecution of European Jewry could have come about, and
in particular to understand the nature of the unprecedented
anti-semitism that was at its core.
18. On the term “symbolic exemplar,” see Jack Bloom, “The Rabbi’s
Family,” Central Conference of American Rabbis 86 (1976):
105–14. ↩
The Kalir and Modern Hebrew
R. Joseph B. Soloveitchik, Kinot Mesorat HaRav (R. Simon Posner
ed.), pp. 386–387:
Rabbi Elazar HaKalir was a master of the Hebrew language and
very creative in his use of Hebrew. If not for him, modern
Hebrew could not have come into existence. Before HaKalir, the
Hebrew language was very rigid. For example, the nouns and
verbs were fixed in their form. It was difficult to transform a
verb into a noun or a noun into a verb, a simple matter in other
languages. The gender of words was also inflexible. For example,
in the Bible “shoshana” (perhaps a rose or lily, although we are
not precisely certain of the meaning) is always in the feminine,
as in “ani havatzelet hasharon shoshanat ha’amakim” (Song of
Songs 2:1). But Rabbi Elazar HaKalir, in his piyut for Musaf of
Yom Kippur, states “shoshan emek,” in the masculine. His
linguistic style was very complex and often obscure, and he
therefore had many critics. Ibn Ezra, for example, in his
commentary on Ecclesiastes 5:1, rails against HaKalir. But
HaKalir made a critical contribution to the development of the
Hebrew language by endowing the language with flexibility,
thereby paving the way for the development of modern Hebrew.
There were other early paytanim, composers of piyut, such as
Yose ben Yose, but they were not as radical in their literary style
as HaKalir. HaKalir was the father of the paytanim, and he dared
to do more than any other paytan.
Lessons from Jewish History in
a Time of Crisis and Transition
We saw the Moon in the Morning in the East, but in the
Evening in the West:
On the Destiny of Contemporary Jews and Judaism:
Lessons from Jewish History in a Time of Crisis and Transition
An early Yahrzeit Lecture by Rav Joseph D. Soloveitchik
Edited by Rabbi Basil Herring
Part II
Rising Anti-Semitism:
Modern anti-semitism had been on the rise throughout Western and
Eastern Europe since the late nineteenth century. Most perplexing to
Jews was that this had occurred precisely in highly civilized and
cultured societies where Jews had reached pinnacles of cultural and
intellectual influence, and contributed in every way to the enrichment
of their societies. In this section, the Rav sought to explain this
unprecedented hatred and persecution of the Jewish people under
such paradoxical circumstances. What had changed in modern times
that might account for the Shoah?
Herein lies the importance of his analysis 70 years later. For in 2014
we are once again confronted with rising anti-semitism, in particular
in Europe, but elsewhere too.
__________________________
Holiness versus Wisdom, the Heart versus the Mind
A precious homiletic jewel is hidden in the luggage of the Sages, for
they declared that Jews sin against God by substituting the mind for
the heart. Instead of a vital, beating heart that instinctively longs for
its beloved, they embrace a placid mind that belittles emotion and
feeling. Yehudah Halevy described this precisely when he invoked the
midrash that the Jews are the heart of mankind, and that in the heart
of every Jew there is a hidden love for God. The modern secular Jew
substituted for this warm heart a cold mind, one that is bereft of the
glory of Judaism.
In referring to the Jewish heart and the mind, we are referring to the
separate goals of holiness and wisdom, respectively. The Torah
teaches us, as described at the revelation at Sinai, what makes the
Jewish people special: namely, being a goy kadosh, a holy nation (Ex.
19:6). What makes our people different from all others is our longing
to embrace the transcendent world of holiness. The search for
holiness is at the very center of the spiritual life of Israel, infusing
infinite light into its mundane daily existence. By declaring that we
are a holy nation, the Torah taught us that we are distinguished by
dedicating our actions, desires, and aspirations to achieving
sacredness. In this we are to serve as an example for the entire world
of a life of purity in each succeeding era, transcending the crude
values of those among whom we might live. The task of Israel is to
embody the ideal of a holy nation, known for the modesty of its ways,
the harmony of its character, and the nobility of its spirit. Our duty is
to embody an elevated sensibility, a purity of thought, and a glorious
will, as a nation filled with holiness, purity, and an upright soul.
This idea was expressed by the midrash (Lev. Rabbah 30) that “the
fruit of a splendid tree – pri etz hadar (Lev. 23:40) – this is the esrog
which is like the heart.” This reflected the Sages’ world-view that the
power and charisma of the Jewish nation are to be found in its heart,
as symbolized by the heart-shaped esrog. When a Jew takes an esrog
and recites a berachah on it, he experiences the light of eternity
which in turn causes him to praise God by immediately reciting the
How and Why the Modern Variety Differs from that of the Past
Editor’s Introduction
In the first part of this shiur, delivered in 1943 as the horrific
contours of the Shoah were becoming clear, the Rav embraced the
4
Copyright © 2014 Torah Musings, All rights reserved.
54
Weekly Digest from TorahMusings.com Hallel. Thus does he transcend the physical universe to enter the
domain of the Shechinah. Note that there is nothing among the four
species of Sukkos that might symbolize the mind, for the intellect is
irrelevant to the process by which man realizes his spiritual
aspirations.
basic rights?
For the same reason R. Yitzchak in the midrash declares that “the
Torah should logically have begun with ‘this month will be the first of
months’ for that was the first commandment to the Jewish people (see
Rashi to Gen 1:1).” That is, it is only when Jews sanctify the world
that God created by performing His mitzvos, and are themselves
sanctified in the process, that the world finally achieves the purpose
for which it was created. Conversely, when Jews fail to live holy lives
the cosmos too remains formless and empty.
What the Jews of Modernity have Changed
But what has the modern Jew wrought? What have liberal and secular
nationalistic Judaism brought about?
They have embraced a different view of what makes the Jew special.
To them, Jews are above all an am chacham ve’navon, “a wise and
understanding people (Deut. 4:6).” Modern Jews have substituted
wisdom for sanctity, and instead of being a “nation of priests” (Ex.
19:6) they preferred to be a nation of the wise. Rather than being a
holy people they have sought only understanding. Worse yet, they
have replaced real wisdom with a much more limited “knowledge,”
which itself has been reduced to a mere utilitarianism, pragmatism or
know-how.
Judaism of old declared that “the foundation of wisdom is the fear of
Hashem” (Proverbs 111:10), and the source of understanding is
purity of the soul. It furthered crucially proclaimed that the nations of
the world would come to recognize that our wisdom as a great nation
derives from our adherence to kol ha-chukim ha-eleh, i.e., all of the
laws and statutes of the Torah (Deut. 4:6). But the Jews of modernity
have rejected these teachings by rebelling against the centrality of
holiness. Instead they declare that the foundations of wisdom can
only be found in pragmatism and functionality, in which the measure
of the good life is in its utilitarian results, as man searches for earthly
happiness and the pleasures of this world.
As a result modern Jews have taken inordinate pride in their many
contributions to modern culture. They are proud to proclaim that Jews
are the essential catalysts and agents of society’s highest cultural
achievements, and that our sons and daughters having enriched the
Western European spirit, while contributing greatly to its civilization.
And indeed it is true that many of the intellectual and cultural giants
of modern times have been Jews born within the walls of the Jewish
ghetto who went on to embrace the worlds of science, literature and
the arts.
The problem is that the so-called wise men at the helm of our people
in recent generations did not fully comprehend what was happening.
They thought that by contributing their many tithes to the cultural
treasuries of society the Jews would receive appreciation and respect
from the nations of the world. They thought that the nations would
graciously appreciate these gifts. But were they right? Did those
contributions strengthen the Jews’ political situation, or improve its
fragile standing? Was the Jewish people rewarded with more secure
5
The truth is that had our so-called wise men of modernity realized
that love and appreciation of the Jew would not result from the
contributions of its scientists or intellectuals, and that civic
acceptance would not ensue from the efforts of its artists, actors, or
politicians seeking to improve the world, they would never have
exchanged holiness and a life of separation and elevated living, for
the meager rewards of cultural utilitarianism.
What was the result? It was that the life-giving wellsprings that had
watered our soil for centuries dried up, leaving us in a spiritual
wasteland, deprived of the sources of our intellectual vitality and
faith. We forfeited the joys that crowned the love of young marrieds in
their devotion to each other, and the love of parents and children that
were found in the ancient “tents of Jacob.” The Shabbos queen, that
was so pure, holy and blessed, went into exile. The national life of
Israel was emptied of the old wine and pomegranate nectar of
tradition. Diminished were the reflections of chesed, and pale was the
star of compassion that had served to illuminate our paths from
generation to generation. The flame of refined thought was
extinguished, while purity of feeling was replaced with a polluted
soul. We became preoccupied with the pursuit of many disciplines
and sciences, including philosophy, metaphysics, ethics, esthetics,
and politics, none of which can or will restore the glorious crown of
our people, nor form the dew that might revitalize our dry bones that
are so dispersed over the secular landscape.
The Key Difference between Classical and Modern
Anti-Semitism
Recognizing this is the key to understanding the difference between
classical and modern anti-Semitism.
In earlier times the nations did indeed recognize the glory of our
holiness, even if they did not respect our wisdom. In earlier ages our
detractors saw us as an exotic and foreign people, accusing us of
being strangers who were very different from all other nations. They
came at us alleging that we deliberately chose to be different and
apart, as they noted that the openings of our tents did not face those
of our neighbors, and that we had marked off the outer perimeters of
our domains. Classical anti-semitism faulted the Jews for standing
apart, but it never came to despise or disrespect Judaism. Never did
ancient Jewry experience their enemy’s abhorrence. Jews knew that
deep down their enemies respected and admired them. The old Jew,
burdened by the weight of adhering to the laws of the sabbatical and
jubilee years, went about in the land with a raised arm and unbowed
head. The hatred of his detractors was the result of their envying his
hidden strengths and the beauty of his existence. On the one hand the
anti-semite never understood the eternal Jew, and was unable to
penetrate into the inner dynamic of his world. This failure to
comprehend the Jew led to perpetual hatred for this eternal people.
But on the other hand the anti-semite did not deny the Jews’
transcendental strength or the elevated beauty that God had
bestowed on this people to ennoble its life with radiance and dignity.
Our enemies knew that in spite of our lowly condition and physical
poverty, we stood astride the cosmos and attained eternity. They may
have attacked Knesset Yisrael, but against their will they recognized
the holiness and dignity of its soul. In the words of King Solomon, in
Copyright © 2014 Torah Musings, All rights reserved.
55
Weekly Digest from TorahMusings.com their eyes Israel was black (shechorah) – but it was also beautiful (na’
avah) (Song of Songs 1:5.)
But now the cursed eternal Jew who was also so mysterious and
incomprehensible, whose impenetrable existence could not be figured
out, is no more. In his stead there is the modern Jew, all suited and
perfumed, his soul and spirit revealed to all, filled with intellect and
modern thought. How does the anti-semite respond to such a person
of high culture? The anti-semite now deals with a cultured man who
seems similar to all men, and inhabits the same sphere with them. No
longer are there differing values, spiritual strangeness, or withdrawal
from the world at large. The Jew is not distinguished by a unique
spiritual quality. He has no specific philosophical outlook to set him
apart. Instead he seeks the approval of his peers. He generously
contributes of his spirit and intellect to general culture, as an artist,
scientist, politician, philosopher, author and journalist, participating
in cultural creativity with every fiber of his being. He is open to many
ideas and worships many gods. And yet – he is no less hated by his
intellectual peers and colleagues, by the students who benefit so
much from his wisdom, and by the world of culture that surrounds
him.
This new hatred differs from other forms of bigotry that have arisen
in our time. This hatred is not the result of envy but the result of
disgust and abhorrence. The anti-semites mock us, saying “where
now is the eternal and mysterious Jew who used to possess
transcendental aspirations and lofty ideals? Where is his spiritual
courage, pride, strength and humility? Where the ancient glory and
the eternal radiance that once characterized him? It must be that the
eternal Jew who saw visions of the divine has become just another
citizen of the marketplace, one who has absorbed all of the dirt of the
public domain, in his yearning to embrace a life of ease and comfort.
That mysterious Jew who was the hero of ancient tales, and whose
exotic visage cast such fear upon us, now stands revealed to us as a
simple creature of flesh and blood who aspires merely to the
enjoyment of physical pleasures and the joys of this world. He has
none of the fire of the prophets, or the stubbornness of the
Maccabees, or the sanctity of the Nazirites. Neither does he rise
ethically or in his life-style above his contemporaries, so why did we
fear him?”
Thoughts such as these bring such people to a hatred and enmity that
amount to nothing but loathing. Our contemporary anti-semitism
contains no awe, fear, or envy that are the result of admiration, but
instead expresses disdain and revulsion that bring shame and
indignity upon our people.
So, as between hatred that is the result of envy, or hatred that is the
result of disdain, which is preferable?
Editor’s Comments
1. It is remarkable how thoroughly the Rav embraced the primacy
in Judaism of the heart over the mind, the predominance of
warm feelings over cold logic. After all the Rav was a leading
practitioner of Brisker intellectualism, whose forebears followed
in the austere footsteps of the Vilna Gaon. Even his academic
studies and degrees were steeped in Kantian logic and
rationalism. And yet the Rav here places emotion and feeling at
6
the very center of the religious life, relegating intellectual
speculation to a secondary role. In this he explicitly chooses R.
Yehudah Halevy (“the Jewish people is the heart of the world”)
over Rambam, joining with the former in seeing the Jewish
people as the unique “heart” among the nations. The acquisition
of wisdom is not the defining characteristic of the Jew – rather it
is the pursuit of a life of holiness and purity through the mitzvos
of the Torah. To think otherwise is to fall into a modernist trap
that betrays a fundamental teaching of the Torah.
2. We can also note the anti-elitist corollary of this position: a Jew
embraces the Shechinah by reciting a brachah and then holding
the Four Species of Sukkos. He transcends the physical world by
reciting the Hallel, esrog in hand. This is a religion for the
masses, not just for the intellectual or moral elite, or for the
talmid chacham. This is far indeed from the elevated standing of
the chosen few described in the parable of the palace found in
the Rambam’s Guide for the Perplexed (Guide 3:51).
3. This brings us to the central thesis of this section. For the Rav, in
opposition to many Jews of modernity, anti-semitism is a
constant, a given, a matter of fate. Nothing the Jew does can
prevent its emergence. Not assimilation or the embrace of
non-Jewish values and behaviors. Not even unparalleled Jewish
contributions (read “Nobel Prizes” et al) to the well-being and
progress of humanity in every imaginable sphere. Surely the rise
of Hitler was proof that those Jews who thought that by being
good citizens of the world who had cast off their Jewish markers
they would be freed from the scourge of anti-semitism, were
completely mistaken. To the contrary, says the Rav, the more
Jews transcend their Jewish otherness or (as he calls it)
“exoticism,” and the more they reject the life of holiness and
mitzvos, the less the anti-semites respect them. At least in the
past, the bigot grudgingly recognized the holiness, purity, and
eternity of the Jewish soul. But now that so many Jews are
indistinguishable from their fellow citizens, and bereft of the
unique spiritual qualities that were always the source of Jewish
strength, the anti-semite for the first time in history has nothing
but scorn and disgust for the Jew, irrespective of all that
individual Jews have contributed to the enrichment of the
cultural life of society at large. Paradoxically, it seems, the more
the Jew contributes and assimilates, and the more he loses his
unique otherness and distinctive identity, the less he is
respected, and the more he becomes an object of disgust and
revulsion.
4. An instructive recent illustration of this point can be found in the
recently released Notebooks of Martin Heidegger. To the dismay
of all those who have admired his work, this eminent German
philosopher now stands revealed as a thorough and unrepentant
Nazi. Most interesting, is Heidegger’s characterization of the
modern Jew, in which he writes “contemporary Jewry’s increase
in power finds its basis in the fact that Western metaphysics –
above all in its modern incarnation – offers fertile ground for the
dissemination of empty rationality and calculability…” He
accuses the Jews of excessive intellectualism, and the loss of
loyalty to their historical “national community.” In the past,
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56
Weekly Digest from TorahMusings.com Heidegger wrote, the Jews lived as a separate nation or “race,”
but now as Jews seek to assimilate and be accepted by other
peoples, there is a world-wide cosmopolitan Jewish conspiracy to
alienate the world’s peoples from their rootedness in soil and
nationality. (See Richard Wolin, in The Jewish Review of Books
5:2, pp. 40ff.)
5. Hence, for the Rav, we can understand the emergence of an
unprecedented persecution of the Jews. In this respect it is the
discarding of Jewish separateness and holiness itself which leads
to the heightened oppression of the Jew, who is now not only
hated. The Jew is also an object of disgust in his utter loss of
community and nationality on account of his excessive
“rationality” and “calculability.”
6. The Rav’s analysis of classical versus modern anti-semitism,
written during the unfolding of the Shoah, has many
ramifications for the modern Jew. One might argue that much of
the recent growth of anti-semitism is connected to the State of
Israel in relation to the Moslem world, and thus the Rav’s thesis
has only limited application to such changed circumstances. On
the other hand, if one views the State of Israel (or modern
Zionism) as a stand-in for the historical Jew, one can argue that
the Rav’s analysis remains quite relevant to the realities of
today. If the State of Israel is to be seen as merely a state of the
Jews, one in which Jews can live securely and in freedom like
every other nation-state, contributing in a variety of not
particularly Jewish ways to world-culture, and without the state
bearing an essentially Jewish character, then the Rav’s critique
of the modern Jew in relation to anti-semitism remains intact in
application to this “state of the Jews.”
7. But if Israel can be a specifically “Jewish State”, one that
preserves the uniqueness of the Jew and of Jewish life, seeking
to enhance the spiritual and moral identity of the Jewish people
by strengthening all that has always identified the Jews as a
special or holy nation, both ethically and religiously. If Israel is
such a state then it will be a country and a society that will be
respected and recognized as the modern-day embodiment of the
ancient and glorious Kingdom of Israel, filled with justice and
goodness both within and beyond its borders, even if it has the
ineluctable fate of always being beset by cruel enemies and
detractors.
8. In that respect, which path the State and the Jewish people will
follow is the ultimate issue that confronts the State of Israel, and
the Jewish people, in our time.
7
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57
Weekly Digest from TorahMusings.com Torah Musings Digest
22 August, 2014 | A Window into the Orthodox Jewish Intellectual’s World| Edited by: Rabbi Gil Student
Why Would Ran Recycle a
Whole Drasha?
by R. Gidon Rothstein
In the seventh Drasha, Ran repeats much material; indeed, almost the
whole Drasha has appeared before (mostly in the alternate version of
the fifth Drasha, as discussed here). By paying careful attention to
what is different, I think we can discover his true message in this
Drasha.
Is Touchiness a Flaw in Torah Scholars?
Prior essays in this series
The Drasha opens with a story in Chagigah 3a, R. Yochanan b. Baroka
and R. Elazar b. Chisma visiting R. Yehoshua. He asks them what was
said in the Beit Midrash that day and they demur, saying they are his
students. He encourages them to share anyway, since houses of study
always produce new ideas, and they tell him three ideas R. Elazar b.
Azaryah had said.
It is the third of R. Elazar b. Azaryah’s inferences that will launch Ran
on the true topic of the drasha. He has discussed that third inference
both in the third Drasha and, at greater length, in the second version
of the fifth Drasha. Here, he starts from the beginning of the story,
with the interaction between the rabbis and then a discussion of each
of R. Elazar b. Azaryah’s insights.
1) The first is that the mitzvah ‫הקהל‬, the entire nation gathering in
Jerusalem after each shmittah year to hear words of Torah, included
children in order to give reward to those who brought them. R.
Yehoshua praised the idea, saying, “You had a precious jewel in your
hands and wanted to deny it to me?”
Ran relates their original reluctance to accept a story told on the
other side of that page in Chagigah, where R. Elazar took umbrage at
R. Yose b. Dormsekit responding to his inquiry about what happened
in the Beit Midrash. Ran seems comfortable with great scholars
objecting to lesser scholars sharing Torah ideas without first asking
permission, even in reply to a direct question.
What Ya’akov’s Family Realized Before Hashem Commanded It
2)The second of R. Elazar b. Azaryah’s ideas comes from an analysis
of Devarim 26:17–18. The verse says the Jewish people have affirmed
that Hashem is their God, and Hashem has affirmed that the Jews are
His treasured people. R. Elazar b. Azaryah read that as Hashem
saying, “you have made me One in the world,” proving it from the
first line of Shema. In response, Hashem will make the Jews unique.
Ran notes that Shema is a commandment, so why should that earn
people credit for making Hashem One in the world? Further, if
observing a commandment to recognize Hashem qualifies as
declaring Oneness, why not point to ‫אנכי ה‘ אלוקיך‬, I am the Lord
Ran argues that the Shema referenced here is the one in a story in
Pesachim 56a. R. Shimon b. Pazi understands Ya’akov Avinu to have
wanted to reveal the end of history to his sons, only to find that the
Divine Spirit had left him (because we aren’t supposed to know the
future, we have to live our way to it). Ya’akov worried it was because
one of his sons was unworthy; to reassure him, they all said Shema
(reading “Hear O Israel” as a reference to the Patriarch, not the
people).
[This story is the source for our custom to add the line ‫ברוך שם כבוד‬
‫ מלכותו לעולם ועד‬to Shema, what the Gemara reports as Ya’akov’s
response to his sons’ words. Rambam reports this story in Laws of
Keriyat Shema 1:4, meaning he saw this story as halachically
significant.]
Why Take the Long Route?
3) The third of R. Elazar b. Azaryah’s inferences is one we have seen
before, as will be much of the material in the rest of the Drasha. If it’s
that third one that mattered to Ran, why include the first two, when
he has not done so the other times he quoted this one?
We can’t say he did it to be complete—citing a whole piece of the
Gemara, once he was citing one part of it– because he did not do that
the other times he quoted this. We might argue that he did it to spice
up the speech, to give listeners some new material, to hide how much
was repeat. But since we’ve seen that this work seems to have been
carefully gathered, that would raise the question of why it was
included here.
I think a better answer is that all three of R. Elazar b. Azaryah’s
statements are relevant to this Drasha. Even though Ran is repeating
much if not most of it, I hope to show that it takes him to a different
place than before. Ran is emphasizing Chazal’s centrality to our
religious and spiritual welfare. Without their guidance, without
following their wisdom and their paths, we cannot truly understand
the Torah, Hashem’s revealed will.
If I’m right, that explains everything we’ve seen: the students’
hesitance to speak before someone greater than them, the right of
great scholars to react sharply to disrespect, the sons of Ya’akov
reciting Shema long before Hashem commanded it. These all combine
to remind us of the powers of our great leaders.
That focus is made explicit in R. Elazar b. Azaryah’s reading of
Kohelet 12:11, the statement we’ve seen before. I will review that and
the rest of the repeated material briefly, paving the way, next time, to
see the closing of this Drasha, which adds new insight. I think this
will let us see Ran’s powerful message in this Drasha as a whole.
Into the Land of Repetition: The Importance of Chazal’s Words
Ran proceeds to quote passages that highlight humanity’s decisive
role in the interpretation of Torah. The verse declares: “The sayings
of the wise are like goads, like nails fixed in prodding sticks. They are
given by one Shepherd.” (Kohelet 12:11) This tells us that the words
of Torah, including those of the wise Sages, push us to eternal life. As
Your God?
1
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58
Weekly Digest from TorahMusings.com twice before, Ran adds that the cleverness Torah gives us is not
damaging nor does it teach us wrong ideas (implying that he knew of
other kinds of cleverness that do both).
R. Elazar b. Azaryah also focuses on how two sides of a debate could
be from one mouth, leading Ran to repeat his view that Hashem
prefers our following the majority to finding the original intended
Truth. From there, he moves into a recapitulation of stories of the
human intellect confronting the Divine, with the upshot being the
value of the former.
Ran then reviews the story of R. Eliezer taking on all the Sages, Bava
Metzia 59b, culminating in R. Yehoshua declaring that the Torah is no
longer in Heaven, and Hashem being quoted as saying that His
children have defeated him. From there, Ran moves into the story of
Rabbah bar Nachmani (Baba Metzia 86a) being called to rule on a
heavenly debate about a tsara’at issue, leading to a repeat of Ran’s
views about the importance of Chazal’s definitions of Torah law as well
as their additional and protective decrees; all are included in the
Biblical commandment of ‫לא תסור‬, not straying from what our Sages
earns greater reward than other mitzvot and is punished more
harshly. Eruvin 21b says that anyone who willfully violates a Rabbinic
commandment deserves the death penalty. For Ran, that is because
most of Rabbinic law extends the Torah; anyone who keeps the Torah
faithfully but violates Rabbinic law shows disrespect, since Ran
cannot see how there would be a temptation to violate an extension
but not the original law. It is the sinner’s attitude that deserves the
death penalty (this seems to imply that any time any of us violate
halachah out of disregard, we deserve death).
As in the earlier drasha, this again leads Ran to question Sotah 22b’s
including those who serve out of fear in a list of people who look
pious but actually aren’t. As before, he differentiates between fear of
punishment and fear (or, better, awe) of Hashem; the former is a
lesser form, whereas fear of Hashem is the goal.
tell us. This continuing emphasis on the importance of human views,
combined with the prior emphasis on respect for the Sages, leads to a
demand for respect and fealty to the Sages’ Torah views.
Other than the opening, this Drasha has hit many themes we have
seen earlier, particularly the role of the human intellect in service of
Hashem, Chazal’s right and responsibility to use that intellect in
formulating halachah, the rules they thus enact being key to our fear
of Hashem, and that fear—the highest version of it—being the central
focus of observance. The next, brief, closing piece of the Drasha
offers new material, which casts what we’ve seen in a new light.
The Centrality of Chazal to Experiencing the Torah
As we’ll see next time.
Ran continues with Gittin 60b, that the principle part of Torah (and
the reward we earn for observance) comes from following the Sages
when they make decrees or ordinances that have no direct basis in
the Torah. That means those decrees become like Torah law, since we
have a general principle that those who are commanded are greater
than those who act voluntarily.
Seeing God or Being Seen by
God
by R. Elyakim Krumbein
Our parasha concludes with the mitzva of “aliya le-regel,” the
obligatory pilgrimage to Jerusalem three times a year. This mitzva is
repeated several times throughout Chumash, each time with a similar
expression – “Three times a year all your males shall be seen before
the Lord your God.” As in our parasha, this verse closes the
discussion of the festivals in both Parashat Mishpatim and Parashat
Ki-Tisa.
Ran again offers his three explanations for why being commanded
creates greater reward. First, reward depends on the level of
resistance one feels towards doing an act, and it’s being commanded
that sparks resistance. Since Rabbinic ordinances also spark
rebelliousness, those who follow their ordinances get that level of
reward.
Second, Hashem might direct mitzvot to certain groups because they
apply more to them, in which case someone else’s doing it wouldn’t
be as valuable. There too, once Chazal obligate an act, it’s equivalent
to the Torah having done so. Third, since Hashem commands mitzvot
to improve us, those who weren’t commanded don’t necessarily need
that form of self-improvement, a reasoning that again would not
exclude Chazal’s commands.
The Importance of ‫יראת שמים‬, Fear of Heaven
Ran then (again) cites Rabbenu Yonah, Sha’arei Teshuvah 3:7, who
takes for granted that fear of Heaven is the foundation of all the
commandments (that’s an arguable assumption—there are other
candidates for “the foundation of all the commandments– but Ran
supports the idea with several Talmudic statements, including
Shabbat 31b, where R. Yehudah says Hashem only created the world
for humans to fear Him, with a supporting verse from Kohelet). The
Sages must be followed out of piety, because their ordinances is that
they train us in fear of Heaven.
However, one view in Chazal points to yet another instance in
Chumash where this mitzva is introduced, in a context seemingly
unrelated to the festivals. Towards the end of Parashat Mishpatim,
Moshe conducts the ceremony of the covenant between God and
Benei Yisrael at Mount Sinai. As part of this ceremony, we are told,
“He [Moshe] designated some young men among the Israelites, and
they offered burnt offerings and sacrificed bulls as offerings of
well-being to God” (Shemot 24:5). The Gemara (Chagiga 6a) presents
two views as to the identity of these burnt-offerings: one opinion
associates this sacrifice with the korban tamid, the daily offering
brought each morning and afternoon, while the other view identifies
this burnt-offering as an olat re’iya. The olat re’iya is the sacrifice
required of every pilgrim to the Temple on the festivals, in
accordance with the dictum, “They shall not appear before the Lord
empty-handed” (Devarim 16:16). The obvious question to be asked of
this latter view is: how could one bring a pilgrimage offering during a
time other than a festival?
Rashi, in his comments to that Gemara in Chagiga, explains the
Ran adds that that is why observing Rabbinic commandments both
2
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59
Weekly Digest from TorahMusings.com second opinion. Although this occasion was not one of the required
pilgrimages to the Temple, the offering of an olat re’iya was
nevertheless warranted, since this experience, too, involved re’iya
(beholding):
This verse, then, sheds light on the grammatical enigma of our
phrase, “all your males shall be seen the face of God…” This phrase
implies both seeing as well as being seen. God does not only see man,
but He is seen by man, as well. He reveals Himself to man, and is thus
seen, here on this mountain.
“And they saw the God of Israel: under His feet there was the
likeness of a pavement of sapphire… they beheld God, and they
ate and drank.” (Shemot 24:10–11)
If we continue along the lines of Rav Yoel Bin-Nun’s approach cited
above, then we may conclude that the Temple is the place for the
renewal of God’s choosing of His nation (we are “seen,” i.e. chosen,
by Him) and for our choosing of God. As such, the end of the parasha
directly relates to its opening: “See, this day I set before you blessing
and curse” (11:26), which seems to allude to a later verse in Sefer
Devarim: “I have put before you life and death, blessing and curse,
and you shall choose life” (30:15). The triennial pilgrimage to the
Temple constitutes a renewal of the bond between, and mutual
selection of, Am Yisrael and their Father in Heaven.
Rashi’s interpretation, however, seems quite difficult. A clear
distinction exists between the “beholding” during the festivals –
which involves the people’s being seen by the Almighty – and that of
Mount Sinai, where the people beheld God, as it were. The question,
then, remains: why do Chazal relate these two sacrifices with one
another?
This enigmatic passage in the Gemara calls our attention to the
unusual wording of this mitzva. The verse literally reads, “… all your
males shall be seen the face of God …” – “yera’eh kol zekhurkha et
penei Hashem.” “Yera’eh” is in the “nifal” construction, which does
not jibe with the “et” following it. Seeing the face of God would read
“YIR’EH et penei Hashem,” and being seen before God would read
“yera’eh LIFNEI Hashem;” but what is meant by “yera’eh … et penei
Hashem” – “shall be seen the face of God?”
Similar to the events at Mount Sinai, there are other instances in
Chumash when God’s “face” is said to have been seen. In Parashat
Vayishlach, Yaakov proclaims after his wrestling with the angel, “I
have seen God face to face” (Bereishit 32:31), and later tells Esav,
“For to see your face is like seeing the face of God” (33:10). This
concept appears in one other context in Chumash, namely, akeidat
Yitzchak: “Avraham named that site Hashem Yireh [literally, ‘God will
see’], whence the present saying, ‘On the Mount of the Lord He/he
will be seen’” (Bereishit 22:14). Here, for the first time, we find the
concept of “seeing” in the context of the Temple site and,
furthermore, the relationship – or perhaps play on words – between
the object and subject: the one who sees and the one who is seen.
The “seeing” in the beginning of the verse – Avraham’s name for the
mountain, “God will see” – is clearly a reference to his earlier remark
to his son, “God will see to the sheep for His burnt-offering” (22:8).
Most likely, as Rav Yoel Bin-Nun posits, the verb “re’iya” in the story
of the akeida denotes choosing and selecting, rather than seeing. God
chooses a sacrifice – Yitzchak – and now God chooses that spot as the
location for sacrifices. Thus, “Hashem Yireh” constitutes both a
parallel and precedent to the term, “the place that God will choose,”
which appears numerous times in our parasha.
However, what is meant by the end of the verse – “whence the
present saying, ‘On the Mount of the Lord He/he will be seen?’” At
first glance, this verse seems to prophesy about a later period, when
the people will ascend the “Mount of the Lord” in order to “be seen”
thereupon. (And thus the pronoun is “he,” with a lower-case, referring
to man.) The problem is that nowhere in this verse is the subject – the
person – mentioned. Thus, it seems that the One “being seen” in this
verse is none other than the Almighty Himself [= He, with a capital H,
will be seen]. Indeed, this is how Rashi, as well as many other
commentators, interpret the verse: “[The mountain] about which the
people of all generations will say, ‘On this mountain God appears to
His nation.’”
3
Another basis may be suggested, as well, for the peculiar expression,
“be seen the face of God.” The very concept of “seeing God” poses a
serious theological problem, as God possesses no visible form. The
expression “shall be seen the face of God” may very well expresses
the hesitation of the Torah, as well as the student, with regard to the
institution of pilgrimage, the sacrifices offered and the festive
celebrations associated therewith. Such festivities in the “presence”
of God may result in a certain irreverence towards God.
Unquestionably, the experience of “They beheld God, and they ate
and drank” poses great danger. The Torah therefore substitutes
“yireh” – shall see God – with “yera’eh” – will be seen. Similarly,
elsewhere in our parasha the Torah makes a point of entrenching
within us the concept of “yir’a,” fear of God, within the context of
pilgrimage to the Temple: “You shall consume there in the presence
of the Lord your God, in the place where He will choose to establish
His Name… so that you may learn to fear the Lord your God forever”
(14:23).
This essay originally appeared on Yeshivat Har Etzion’s Israel
Koschitzky Virtual Beit Midrash and is republished here with
permission.
Elevating Evil
Halakhic Positions of Rav Joseph B. Soloveitchik
by R. Aharon Ziegler
In the Al HaNissim prayer recited on Chanukah there is one phrase
that is meant to charges us with a responsibility for all year, even
beyond Chanukah – namely, “u’temei’im b’yad t’horim” (“and the
impure into the hands of the pure”).
Who exactly were the “impure” that were handed over into the hands
of “the pure”? Rav Soloveitchik suggested that the “impure” refers
not to our Greek enemies, for they were included in the phrase “
ve’rabim b’yad me’atim,” (“the many into the hands of the few”), but
rather, it refers to our most dangerous enemy – our own people. The
temei’im were the radical assimilationists among our own people.
They were our internal enemy, who sought to adopt Greek culture
and values and discard the essence and foundation of Judaism. They
rejected the Torah and its laws as antiquated relics of a bygone past
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60
Weekly Digest from TorahMusings.com that had failed to successfully compete with the glory of Greece.
In contrast, the “pure,” the Maccabees, were a relatively small
number of Jewish loyalists who were dedicated to maintaining the
glory and integrity of our holy Torah. Thus, the most dangerous part
of the war was not the war between the Jewish people and our
external enemies, the Syrian-Greeks. Rather, the war that determined
the future of our nation was the civil war between the Torah
observant (tehorim) and the Hellenistic assimilationists (the temei’im,
or mityav’nim). The victory of the tehorim over the temei’im is one of
the major reasons we exist as a people today. Yet, the Rav suggested,
one of the true aspects of Chanukah is the concept that it is possible
to transform and elevate such evil and change it into a positive force.
A similar idea if found in the Gemara (Berachot 10a). There were
certain Jewish bandits in R’ Meir’s neighborhood who caused him
much distress. Being unable to cope with them, R’ Meir decided to
pray for them to die. His wife B’ruriah objected to such a prayer and
said to him: “What is the reason to pray for their deaths? King David
wrote in Psalms “Let sinners cease from the earth.” But, she asked, is
the word “chot’im,” meaning “sinners,” is not written in the verse?
No! the word used is “chata’im,” which refers to that which causes
one to sin, i.e., the Yeitzer HaRa, the evil inclination. Accordingly,
David HaMelech is not praying for the death of sinners, but for the
end of the Evil Inclination that leads them to sin. Furthermore, you
should pray for mercy regarding these bandits that they should
repent, and then indeed, the wicked will be no more. R’Meir heeded
her advice and eventually, these bandits did teshuva, and repented
for their wickedness.
We learn from Chanukah and from B’ruriah to never give up on a Jew.
(Source: Rabbi David Etengoff)
the Creator. Ibn Ezra (Ex. 20:1) proceeds to answer with an
impressive philosophical excursus. In the course of his discussion, Ibn
Ezra asks why we do mitzvos and offers three answers. His first
explains the “Avadim hayinu response. God freed us from servitude
and in response, as a show of gratitude, we obey His commands.
Ramban (Ex. 20:1) explains the reference to the Exodus in the first
Commandment differently. God did not free us from slavery. Rather,
He redeemed us from Egyptian slavery so that we are now His
servants. According to the Ramban, we do mitzvos because God
commanded us to. He created us, redeemed us and now retains the
right to tell us how to live our lives.
II. The Authority Approach
Ramban’s answer is simple and compelling. We do mitzvos because
God told us to. There really is no need to overthink the issue or
discuss it further. However, Rambam (Commentary to the Mishnah,
Sanhedrin, Introduction to Cheilek) divides this attitude in two. We
educate children with a carrot and a stick. If they do good, we reward
them, and if not we punish them. Similarly, God offers rewards and
punishments to people for their success and failure in adhering to
commandments.
However, the desire for reward and the fear of punishment are not
the optimal reason for fulfilling commandments; that motivation is
considered she-lo li-shmah. Mature people follow commandments
because God commanded us to. Out of respect for God, we do the
right thing and follow His will. The ultimate reason for doing mitzvos
is that God commanded us to do so, but not everyone can reach that
level of understanding. Those who cannot should obey due to the
divine carrot and stick.
III. The Philosophical Approach
Why We Do Mitzvos
A large part of an observant Jew’s day consists of performing mitzvos,
fulfilling religious commandments. How often do we stop to ask
ourselves why we do this? Why do we expend so much time and effort
in the pursuit of mitzvos? I see three general answers to, or
approaches to answering, this question. Two of them revolve around
the four sons in the Haggadah.
I. Two Answers for Four Sons
The four sons famously ask questions about the Pesach activity (or,
three ask and one is unable to ask). The answer we give is “Avadim
hayinu,” we were slaves in Egypt and God took us out. However,
simply understood, this response fails to answer one of the question: “
Mah he-eidos ve-ha-chukim ve-ha-mishpatim…, What are the
testimonies, statutes and laws…”1 This question is too broad to refer
to just the Pesach rituals. It is about all of Judaism, all the
commandments. It is our question: why do we do mitzvos? The
answer that we were slaves and God redeemed us does not seem to
offer a sufficient response. What is this answer in the Haggadah to
the four sons’ questions?
Ibn Ezra and Ramban disagree what this answer means. R. Yehudah
Ha-Levi, author of the Kuzari, asked Ibn Ezra why the first of the Ten
Commandments refers to God as the redeemer from Egypt and not
4
The Ibn Ezra’s approach had been previously suggested by R.
Sa’adiah Gaon (Emunos Ve-Dei’os 2:1) and thoroughly developed by
R. Bachya Ibn Pakuda (Chovos Ha-Levavos, Avodah). R. Sa’adiah
argues that natural law (ha-seikhel mechayev) requires the
beneficiary of a kind act to respond with another kindness to the
benefactor’s liking or at least with a verbal thanks. God continuously
sustains us and bestows us with kindness. Therefore, we must
respond with a kindness, by fulfilling His request. God’s
overwhelming and constant kindness to us demands an impressive
response, which is fulfilling the mitzvos.
It is interesting that R. Yitzchak of Corbeil, in his Semak (no. 4), offers
two reasons why we must do mitzvos. The first is that we must fulfill
God’s commands, either due to reward and punishment or our
profound respect for the King of Kings. The second is the debt of
gratitude we owe God for His countless and continuous acts of
kindness to us.
We have already discussed the Semak‘s attitude to philosophy and his
citation of R. Sa’adiah Gaon (link). Here we find another case in
which he adopts R. Sa’adiah Gaon’s philosophical approach, albeit
without citation. (Neither R. Bachya nor Ibn Ezra quote R. Sa’adiah
Gaon as their source.) However, I am not yet ready to change my
conclusion that the Semak did not engage in philosophy.2 The Semak
utilizes the two approaches we discussed above but–significantly, I
believe–omits a third.
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61
Weekly Digest from TorahMusings.com IV. The Benefit Approach
The Mishnah (Berakhos 33b; Megillah 25a) says that we silence
someone who says that God’s mercy extends to birds’ nests. The
Torah (Deut. 22:6–7) requires us to shoo away a mother bird before
taking her eggs. The Mishnah disallows attributing the reason for this
mitzvah to God’s mercy on birds. Rashi (Berakhos 33b sv. midosav)
explains that it is wrong to attribute mitzvos to specific reasons.
Rather, we must see them as divine decrees. Tosafos (Megillah 25a
sv. mipnei) seem to agree. The Tur (Yoreh De’ah 181) explicitly
rejects the attribution of rationales to mitzvos. According to these
authorities, we cannot find and should not look for reasons underlying
the mitzvos. Even if a mitzvah seems designed to show mercy on a
bird, we may not assume that this is so. We must see the mitzvah as a
divine decree.3
Ramban (Commentary to Deut. 22:6) interprets this Mishnah very
differently. He believes that we can find rationales for the mitzvos.
The Mishnah is only denouncing this specific rationale, that the
command to send away the mother bird is due to compassion for the
animal. Really, the Ramban contends, the mitzvah is for the sake of
people. Sending away the mother bird is a way to ingrain mercy and
compassion in people. Rambam (Moreh Nevukhim 3:48) argues that
this Mishnah follows a rejected opinion that we do not accept.
Maharatz Chajes (Glosses, ad loc.) points out that in many other
places the Gemara asks about a command and answers. However, he
points out, the language here is different. In other places, the Gemara
asks “mipnei mah,” for what reason. Here, regarding shofar, the
Gemara asks “lamah,” why. We can never know why God gives a
command. We can never understand His will. However, we can find
reasons for the mitzvos, reasons that speak to us even if they do not
fully explain the commandment..
Similarly, R. Yosef Dov Soloveitchik (the great-grandfather in his Beis
Ha-Levi Al Ha-Torah, Bo sv. di-kvar, p. 9d/18) says that the mitzvos
came first and the world was created around them. We do not eat
matzah on Pesach because we left Egypt too quickly for bread to rise.
Rather, God wanted us to eat matzah on Pesach so He made sure we
left Egypt without time for the bread to leaven. What we see in
retrospect is not the true reason. However, it is still meaningful to us.
R. Chaim Soloveitchik is reported as having explained that the term
for the reasons for the mitzvos, “ta’amei ha-mitzvos,” really means
the tastes of the mitzvos. They are our subjective impressions, the
meanings we find, in God’s commandments. As long as we do not
attribute too much authority to these “reasons,” we can gain much
spiritually from them (see this post).
Both Rambam and Ramban agree that, in general, we should look for
rationales for mitzvos. Indeed, many have followed suit and engaged
in this search, this reverse engineering of the laws we have received.
In his monumental study of this extensive literature, Prof. Yitzchak
Heinemann divides the approaches to mitzvah rationales into three
categories, reflecting different personalities: practical, rationalistic
and symbolic (Ta’amei Ha-Mitzvos Be-Sifrus Yisrael, 1993 edition, vol.
1 pp. 138–139).
All these different rationales point to another reason we observe the
commandments: doing so is good for us. Whether spiritually or
psychologically, individually or socially, the mitzvos make us into
better Jews.
I find it interesting that the Semak did not offer this reason. He must
have been at least a little familiar with the approach. After all, many
earlier scholars–including R. Sa’adiah Gaon in his Emunos Ve-Dei’os
–offer rationales for mitzvos. Perhaps the Semak omits this approach
because he follows Rashi and Tosafos in rejecting it. Perhaps the
Semak, like Rashi, believes we must accept the commandments as
God’s decrees.
Perhaps we can suggest that Rashi, Tosafos and the others do not
object to finding our own meanings in the mitzvos. They only object to
declaring that these are the reasons for the commandments, which
are ultimately unknowable. They may not even object to the
Rambam’s, Ramban’s and many others’ exploration of the meaning of
the mitzvos, when seen in this way. Their objection is to the certainty,
the attribution of specific motive to the divine will.
It is not just that when we believe we have found the reason for a
mitzvah, we may rationalize it away. We have seen this in history and
the result is a quick disappearance of other commandments, a
marked diminishment of overall religiosity. It is more than that. When
we master a mitzvah, when we believe we have fully plumbed its
depths, we lose respect for it and ultimately interest in it. When the
mystery disappears, the mitzvah loses meaning.
Finding meaning in mitzvos is crucial in building a spiritually aware
personality. We spend so much of our time doing mitzvos, how can
anyone fail to question why? But a claim to fully understand is the
first step to boredom, to moving on to the next challenge. Bridging
the gap to divine intent is crossing over the mystery. We can get
tastes of the reasons but ultimately we perform them because God, to
whom we owe our lives, commanded us to.
V. Harmonizing the Views
These approaches may not be as far apart as they initially seem.
There is a Brisker way of bringing them closer together. The Gemara
(Rosh Hashanah 16a) asks why we blow a ram’s horn on the Jewish
New Year. One opinion is that the ram’s horn reminds God of Akeidas
Yitzchak, the Binding of Yitzchak. Another opinion is that we blow a
ram’s horn because God commanded us to. This answer might sound
sarcastic but it is actually quite profound. It is implying the futility of
searching for God’s reasons, the chasm that lies between our
understanding and God’s. We can never fully know why God tells us
to do something. But that should not stop us from obeying the
command.
5
1. Note that in Deut. 6:20–21, this answer immediately follows the
question about eidos, chukim and mishpatim. ↩
2. Dr. David Berger brought my attention to an article in his
Cultures
in Collision and Conversation in which he explores this issue at
length and reaches a similar conclusion, albeit with more nuance
and authority than I am capable of mustering. ↩
3. See also Rashi’s commentary to Prov. 25:2; Gen. 26:5; Ex. 15:26;
Lev. 19:19; Num. 19:2, cited in R. Gersion Appel, A Philosophy of
Mitzvot, 2008 edition, pp. 33–35, as part of an extensive survey
Copyright © 2014 Torah Musings, All rights reserved.
62
Weekly Digest from TorahMusings.com of different views on this subject. ↩
Incorrect Hebrew
Pronunciation
by Dr. David Berger
The issue of incorrect pronunciation is, I think, even more challenging
nowadays than what Gil presented in his extremely useful piece on
the subject, and we probably have little choice but to be lenient in
most cases. I just heard an otherwise excellent layning in pure
Ashkenazis except that tav without a dagesh was pronounced “t”
rather than “s.”. Thus, to take one of a myriad examples, “Untonom
Hashem Elokekho lefonekho ‚” which is, from the perspective of the
standard pronunciations, internally inconsistent. Conversely, I have
heard—in the same shul—many laynings in otherwise pure
Ashkenazis (including the “s” sound for the tav without a dagesh), in
which every kamatz (or, if you wish, kametz) gadol was pronounced
“a” as in Sefaradit rather than the Ashkenazic “o.” Sometimes this
was done even for a kamatz katan, as in “shisha chadashim
ba-besamim” in Esther (2:12). In this case, a correction may well be
necessary since the erroneous pronunciation produces a different
meaning. (“Six months with perfumes ” is turned into “six new things
with perfumes.”)
In addition, the introduction of elements of Sefaradit produces
inconsistencies because the reader’s childhood instincts cannot be
consistently overcome. Thus, sometimes the kamatz is pronounced as
(short) “o” and sometimes as “a.” Do you correct the “a” to “o” when
dealing with a present tense verb that becomes past tense if
pronounced with an “a” (as in nikhtav substituted for nikhtov) when
this layner pronounces the kamatz as “a” thirty or forty percent of the
time? (In practice, you don’t.)
What about people who pronounce the guttural ayin and the dagesh
chazak (gemination, or doubling of a consonant) even though they
were not brought up to do that? In the large majority of cases, they
cannot do this consistently, so that the ayin and the dagesh will go
unpronounced ten to twenty percent of the time. Thus, in the same
layning with which I began, the reader pronounced the ayin about
eighty percent of the time, but—to take one example—he did not do
so in the word arba’im, which appears several times in that parshah.
Precisely because he is usually careful to pronounce it, this raises the
question of whether the failure to do so constitutes the substitution of
an aleph for an ayin. (What if the word were “attah” with an ayin,
where the same word with an aleph has a different meaning?) Of
course we do not correct this, but why we do not is not so clear in
technical terms. I once heard a person brought up in the Litvish
pronunciation of the cholam (“ay”) who had later moved to standard
American Ashkenazi pronunciation (“o”) revert to his childhood
practice when layning the word “levonatah.” He read “levaynosoh,”
which is, of course, a different word. Do you have to correct this or do
you just accept the fact that this is his original reading tradition? No
one in the shul, myself included, corrected him.
the end of a word where there is a patach genuvah. This is especially
serious in “ve-yagea‘” in Parshat Zakhor, but it is serious in any
context. (It is the equivalent of saying “Nocha” instead of “Noach.”)
This is a very common error among people who have decided to
pronounce the ayin when they come from a community that does not
do this. It is a hiddur ha-mevi li-(ye)dei pesul (roughly an intrinsically
preferable practice that leads to a disqualifying consequence). It is
also virtually impossible to correct since no one—or almost no
one—will have the faintest idea of what you are talking about.
Prof. Richard Steiner, one of the greatest Hebrew linguists in the
world, said to me in discussing these matters, “In my field, every
mistake is called a reading tradition.” We were, I think, discussing the
pronunciation that drops the yod sound in the final diphthong of
words like ‘goy” and the shem adnut (the divine name usually
translated “Lord”). (I once heard a Jew from such an area say, “Az m’
gayt in college iz men shon a go.”) I don’t believe that the newly
created abolition of the patach genuvah under an ayin yet qualifies as
a reading tradition, but the basic point is true, important, and
probably determinative in most halakhic contexts. Nowadays, when
far-flung Jewish communities have been brought together, every
genuine reading tradition should probably be respected almost
everywhere, though this is not the case is some Sephardi– especially
Edot Ha-Mizrach—settings, and in some strongly Zionist Israeli shuls.
(R. Meir Mazuz, the distinguished Sephardi rosh yeshiva in Israel,
once remarked that Ashkenazim are blasphemers because they say “
lesakken olam” with the kingdom of God, which in Ashkenazic
pronunciation means to repair the world but in Sephardic to
endanger the world. I was there, and he was absolutely serious.)
My favorite example of the need for mutual respect came when I
heard a rabbi with a Galitizianer reading tradition layn the phrase “
asher hukkah et ha-midyanit” (Num. 25:14). He read “asher hikku.”
Had I read it that way, I would have invalidated the reading twice
over—no small feat in a two-syllable word–by turning a passive into
an active and a singular into a plural. In his case, he had read it
absolutely correctly. I ask myself if it would have been necessary to
correct him had he read “hukkah” or “hukkoh,” and I am strongly
inclined to think that the answer is yes.
Poskim should probably take a serious look at these phenomena, but
in most instances, the problem is likely to be intractable, and with a
few exceptions tolerance must prevail.
Addendum: It is extremely common in yeshivish circles to pronounce
the shem adnut with a chirik in the second syllable (A-dee-noy). I’ve
elicited two speculations from scholars as to how this may have
happened, but the phenomenon is real and very widespread. Someone
asked me how you are yotze when you pronounce the word with a
chirik instead of a cholam when you don’t do this in any other word. I
suppose one can say that a reading tradition has developed for this
one word, but this doesn’t make me particularly comfortable. At the
very least, people who do this—and many may not even be aware that
they are doing it—should consult their rabbinic authorities to
determine if they need to mend their ways.
An error that I am convinced must be corrected—at least at this stage
of development—is the pronunciation of the ayin before the patach at
6
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63
Weekly Digest from TorahMusings.com Torah Musings Digest
29 August, 2014 | A Window into the Orthodox Jewish Intellectual’s World| Edited by: Rabbi Gil Student
What is the Torah’s Ideal
Political System?
Tosefta Sanhedrin ch. 4), and in the Sifri Devarim on our parasha.
R. Yehuda said, Three commandments were given to Israel [to
fulfill] upon their entry into the land: appointing a king,
destroying Amalek, and building the Temple.
by Rav Elchanan Samet
R. Nehorai said, This parasha [of appointing a king] was given
only in response to their murmurings, as it is written (17:14),
“And you shall say, ‘Let us appoint over ourselves a king [like all
the nations around us].’”
A. Appointing a King: Mandatory or Optional?
Does the Torah set out a particular social-political way of life for the
nation of Israel dwelling in its land, or does it leave this sphere open
to the people’s choice? This question may be clarified in the context
of the section of this week’s parasha (17:14–20) dealing with the
mitzva of appointing a king (and also by examining the chapters
describing the establishment of the kingship in Shemuel I chapters
8–12).
The central question from an exegetical point of view is this: is the
appointment of a king mandatory or optional? This question arises
from a lack of clarity – perhaps it should be called a contradiction – in
the text:
(17:14) “When you come to the land which Hashem your God has
given you and you possess it and dwell in it, and you say, ‘Let us
appoint a king for ourselves like all the nations around us,’
(17:15) You shall surely appoint a king over yourselves, whom
Hashem your God will choose, one of your brethren shall you
appoint as king over you. You may not appoint a stranger over
you who is not your brother.”
R. Chaim ben Atar (Ohr Ha-Chaim 17:14) presents the problem thus:
When the text says, “When you come to the land… AND YOU
SAY…,” it means that it is not God’s command to you that a king
should reign; rather, if the nation speaks so, then they are
permitted [to appoint him]. But later it says, “You shall surely
appoint” – the language here shows that God is commanding that
they appoint a king!
According to this commentator, the whole of verse 14 contains the
conditions for the command (i.e., the circumstances in which it
applies), while the command itself is given in verse 15. The conditions
for the mitzva in verse 14 are twofold: the first condition defines the
time and the historical circumstances in which the mitzva applies:
after the inheritance of the land and the settlement of it. The second
condition stipulates the necessary social and political circumstances:
when Am Yisrael requests a king. If the mitzva is conditional upon an
expression of national will that the institution of kingship be
established, then what this means is that the appointment of a king is
voluntary, and the Torah merely details the procedure of this
appointment. But if this is so, then why does the Torah in the next
verse seem to formulate an absolute command to appoint a king?
B. The Tanaitic Dispute
The beginning of the exegetical dispute on this question is to be found
in a debate between Tana’im found in a beraita (Sanhedrin 20b, and
1
Rashi interprets the words of R. Nehorai thus: “‘You shall surely
appoint over yourselves a king’ is a command, but only in response to
your murmurings, for it was known to God that they would murmur
about this in the future.” The predicted “murmurings” of Israel were
realized in the days of Shemuel. The mitzva in the Torah was meant to
create a response to address this murmuring in advance, i.e., to
create a framework for this future appointment of a king, which is
voluntary and based only upon their dissatisfaction.
The Sifri (156) formulates a slightly different explanation:
“And you shall say, Let us appoint over ourselves a king” – R.
Nehorai says: This is a matter of disgrace to Israel, as it is
written (Shemuel I 8:7) “For it is not you whom they have
despised, but Me whom they have despised from ruling over
them.”
R. Yehuda said: But it is a mitzva from the Torah for them to
request a king for themselves, as it is written, “You shall surely
appoint over yourselves a king.” So why were they punished for
this in the days of Shemuel? Because it was too early for them to
ask.
“Like all the nations around us” – R. Nehorai said, They did not
ask for a king for any other reason but so that he would institute
idolatry, as it is written (Shemuel I 8:20), “And we, too, shall be
like all the nations, and our king will judge, and he will go out
before us and fight our wars.”
Attention should be paid to the fact that R. Nehorai’s statement
contains two parts. At first, when interpreting the beginning of the
verse (“Let us appoint a king”), he says that the very wish for a king
represents a rejection of God’s rule over them, as expressed in Sefer
Shemuel. R. Nehorai then interprets the continuation of the verse
even more critically: their desire to be “like all the nations around us”
reveals that their wish for a king is bound up with their wish to be
free to engage in idolatry.
Despite the broad basis the R. Nehorai brings for his claim, the
Rambam – and, following his example, most of the early authorities –
rules according to R. Yehuda: he counts the mitzva of appointing a
king as one of the 613 mitzvot (Sefer Ha-mitzvot, positive mitzva no.
173, Hil. Melakhim 1:1). This situation has caused many biblical
commentators throughout the ages to interpret the text here in
accordance with the explanation of R. Yehuda and the ruling of the
Rambam, in order that their interpretation be compatible with the
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64
Weekly Digest from TorahMusings.com halakha.
However, some commentators differ with the majority and maintain
that the appointment of a king is a voluntary matter. The existence of
such an opinion among the Tana’im certainly strengthens their case.
C. The Dispute Among Rishonim
As stated, many of the medieval authorities rule as the Rambam did
(the Semag – positive mitzva 114, Sefer Ha-Chinukh 497, the Me’iri in
Beit Ha-Bechira on Horayot 11b, the Ran in his eleventh derasha),
and many of the early and later biblical commentators interpret the
verses in the Torah accordingly (Radak in his commentary on Sefer
Shemuel, Ramban, Ralbag, Rabbeinu Bechaye, Akeidat Yitzchak,
etc.). We shall suffice with examining just one representative of this
great camp: the Ramban. Thus writes the Ramban on the words, “And
you shall say, ‘Let us appoint over ourselves a king’”:
According to the opinion of our Sages, this is equivalent to the
Torah saying, “and you shall say.” In other words, “Say: Let us
appoint over ourselves a king.” This is a positive mitzva,
obligating us to declare this after the inheritance and settling of
the land…
Indeed, the Ramban succeeds thus in resolving the contradiction in
the text: he changes the boundaries between conditions for the
mitzva and the mitzva itself, defining them differently than the Ohr
Ha-Chaim previously did. “And you shall say…” is not, in his opinion,
part of the conditions for the mitzva but rather the beginning of the
mitzva itself, which in turn is composed of two parts: one is a
requirement that the nation REQUEST of its leaders that a king be
appointed, and the other part is that the nation receive a positive
response and that a worthy king in fact be appointed. The logic
behind this double mitzva is that in this way the appointment of the
king will not be forced on an unwilling nation. As for the end of the
verse – “like all the nations” – the Ramban this phrasing is not
mandatory, but rather a prophetic foreshadowing and warning of
what they will actually request in the time of Shemuel.
Attention should be paid to the fact that the Ramban interprets the
text thus in order to adapt it to “the opinion of our Sages” – i.e., the
opinion of R. Yehuda. However, he ignores the existence of a different
opinion among Chazal – that of R. Nehorai.
As opposed to the large group of commentaries who interpret the
appointment of a king as mandatory, there are only a few who
interpret it as voluntary. This latter group includes Targum Yonatan,
Rabbenu Meyuchas of Greece, and Ibn Ezra. Ibn Ezra expresses his
view clearly and concisely:
“You shall appoint” – this is optional;
“Whom God will choose” – through a prophet or the decision of
the Urim Ve-tumim; meaning – not someone whom you yourself
will choose.
D. Abarbanel and Seforno
If we say that the appointment of a king is voluntary, and that the
mitzva involves merely the procedures that Benei Yisrael must follow
under circumstances that they themselves bring about, one important
question arises: Is it desirable for Benei Yisrael to bring about these
2
circumstances? In other words, is it optional and encouraged or
optional and discouraged?
Two commentators expressed their positions in this regard explicitly
and in detail. The similarities between the two are not coincidental:
both lived in Renaissance Italy and both involved themselves not only
in Biblical exegesis, but also in Jewish philosophy. They were both
involved in the general culture of their time and had direct contact
with the European political philosophy of their period as well as the
various regimes that ruled throughout Europe and Italian provinces.
Thus, their comments regarding the issue of Jewish monarchy take on
special significance.
A) Rav Yitzchak Abarbanel:
To properly understand his approach on our issue, we must first find
out a little bit about his life. Abarbanel was born in 1437 to the
minister of the treasury for the Portuguese king. His father provided
him with both a Jewish and general education. The latter included
Greek and Roman literature as well as command of the Portuguese
language. Rav Yitzchak assumed the post as minister of the treasury
upon his father’s death, but shortly thereafter, with the change of rule
in Lisbon, he was compelled to flee for his life to neighboring Spain.
There he became the general economic advisor to King Ferdinand
and Queen Isabella. In 1492 he left Spain as a result of the expulsion
order. He resided in Naples where he served as royal economic
advisor until he was again forced to flee, this time as a result of the
French conquest. At the end of his life he lived in Venice, which was
then an independent republic, where again he worked as an economic
advisor to the authorities. He lived in Venice until his death.
Alongside his political and economic involvement, Rav Yitzchak
Abarbanel remained intensely engrossed in Torah studies, writing
commentaries to Tanakh and other works.
Abarbanel was the only Jewish exegete of his time whose knowledge
of various forms of government was that of an insider. He literally
lived in the households of kings and rulers and caught more than a
glimpse of their respective qualities and shortcomings, as well as
those of the differing political theories and policies of his period.
In his lengthy introduction to our parasha, Abarbanel asks: If
appointing a king is a mitzva, why didn’t Yehoshua or others fulfill it?
Furthermore, he asserts, Jewish history demonstrated that most
Israelite kings led the people astray, and general history has shown
that the more power is concentrated in an individual, the more
corrupt he is likely to be. Abarbanel then presents his explanation of
our verses:
“When the Torah says, ‘When you come to the land… and you say: Let
us appoint a king for ourselves like all the nations around us,’ this
does not constitute a mitzva at all. God did not command that they
say this and request a king (as the Ramban had explained). Rather,
this is foretelling the future. It means, after your settlement in the
chosen land, the conquest and all the wars, and after the division [of
the land] … I know that you will be ungrateful and say of your own
volition, ‘I will set a king over me,’ not out of necessity to fight the
nations and occupy the land, for it will have already come under your
occupation, but rather to render yourselves equivalent to the nations
that crown kings over themselves. He mentioned that when this
occurs, they should not crown that king based on their own will, but
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65
Weekly Digest from TorahMusings.com rather [they must crown] the one who God chooses from among their
brethren… According to this, then, the issue of the king is a positive
commandment that depends upon a voluntary situation, as if to say,
when you want to do so, notwithstanding its impropriety, do so only in
this manner.”
B) Rav Ovadia Seforno:
Seforno (born in 1470) lived a generation later than Abarbanel and
acquired vast scientific knowledge in the university in Rome.
Although he never worked as a politician, Seforno, too, had close
relationships with important figures in Italy and was quite familiar
with the political culture of his time. He writes:
“Let us appoint a king for ourselves like all the nations around
us” – that the kingship will belong to him and his offspring, as
opposed to the system of judges [“shoftim”] whereby only the
judge himself serves, not his children after him.
They were commanded regarding the appointment of a judge in
this manner (that is, without automatic transfer of authority to
his children) upon their entry into the land, as it says (Bemidbar
27:17), “So that God’s community may not be like sheep that
have no shepherd.” True, a king like the kings of the gentiles –
who hold kingship for themselves and their offspring – is
despicable to God. However, He commanded that when they
insist upon setting up a king over themselves in this manner,
they should select only a deserving person whom God chooses.
He will not bring Yisrael to violate their religion, and he will not
be a gentile… When they sinned by asking for a king who will
rule as would his offspring “like all the gentiles” (as described in
Sefer Shemuel), they were punished through the mishaps
suffered by the masses as a result of the king, as it says
(Shemuel I, 8:18), “The day will come when you cry out because
of the king whom you yourselves have chosen; and God will not
answer you on that day.”
The comments of the Abarbanel and Seforno resemble each other, but
here we will point out their differences:
1. The ideal government in the eyes of the Abarbanel is a republic
(as he witnessed in Venice). Unlike Seforno, Abarbanel did not
see in a single, authoritative figure who rules until his death an
ideal example of government.
2. Abarbanel sees the problem with the request for a king as
relating to the desire to grant exclusive authority to a single
individual. According to Seforno, by contrast, this is not the
problem at all. Only the establishment of a hereditary kingship
renders the request worthy of criticism.
3. Abarbanel emphasizes the failure of the institution of the
monarchy as demonstrated by both Jewish and general history, a
failing that he attributes to the ethical shortcomings inherent in
the institution. Seforno, however, speaks of the punishment that
will befall Benei Yisrael only for their sin of requesting a king
who will bequeath his power to his heir.
Thus, Rav Ovadia Seforno expresses more mild opposition to the
institution of the monarchy than does Rav Yitzchak Abarbanel
3
(perhaps because he did not have firsthand experience with kingship
as did Abarbanel).
Seforno’s approach raises the question: Wherein lies the fundamental
difference between a king who bequeaths his rule to his son, a system
that God deems “despicable,” and a king who does not pass down his
reign, the appointment of whom constitutes a mitzva? One would
perhaps suggest that hereditary kingship contains the potential for
corruption and the ascent of unqualified rulers to the throne. This
answer, however, fails to justify the irreligious between these two
forms of government as expressed by the Seforno.
A non-dynastic monarchy requires in every generation – or even more
frequently – a selection of a new ruler over the people. When God
Himself performs this selection, whether He does so directly through
a prophet (the way Shaul and David were appointed) or in a
roundabout manner through the emergence of a charismatic leader
who saves the people from their enemies (as occurred during the
period of the judges), then the sense of the presence of divine
supervision remains among Benei Yisrael. By contrast, a kingship
“like all the nations” gives the nation a sense of political stability that
undermines their awareness of divine providence. This concern forms
the basis of God’s words to Shemuel when the people came to him to
ask for a king (Shemuel I 8:7): “For it is not you that they have
rejected; it is Me they have rejected as their king.”
E. The Netziv’s Innovative Approach
Two commentators tried to resolve the contradiction between verses
17:14 and 17:15 by suggesting that the appointment of the king
involves both an obligation as well as a voluntary measure. The first is
the Ohr Ha-Chaim (in his interpretation of R. Nehorai’s view), which I
will leave for the reader to look up. The second commentator who
adopts this approach is the Netziv, in his “He’amek Davar,” only he
develops this theory within Rav Yehuda’s view:
“And you say: Let us appoint a king for ourselves” – This is does
not imply “saying” in the typical sense, that is, verbally (as the
Ramban explained), but rather [it denotes the people’s desire]…
Indeed, from this expression it appears that this does not signify
an outright obligation to appoint a king, but it is rather
voluntary…
However, it is well known in the words of Chazal that there does
exist a mitzva to appoint a king. If so, then why is [the mitzva
written in an equivocal fashion]? It seems that [this is] because
national leadership changes [with regard to] whether it is
controlled by the will of the monarchy or by the desire of the
population and their elected officials. Some countries cannot
tolerate royal authority, and other countries are like a ship
without a captain when they do not have a king. This matter
(determining the form of government) cannot be done according
to a mandatory positive mitzva. For with regard to matters
relevant to leadership over the nation at large, this involves
issues of life-and-death that override a positive commandment.
Therefore, it was impossible to command in absolute terms the
appointment of a king UNTIL IT WAS AGREED UPON BY THE
NATION to tolerate the royal yoke based on their observation
that the surrounding nations managed better [under a
Copyright © 2014 Torah Musings, All rights reserved.
66
Weekly Digest from TorahMusings.com monarchy]. Only then is it a positive mitzva for the Sanhedrin to
appoint a king. … This is why throughout the three hundred
years that the Mishkan was chosen to stand in Shilo there was
no king – because there was no consensus among the people.
Underlying this original position of the Netziv are two basic
assumptions, and only upon these cornerstones could he posit his
startling approach. His first assumption he writes explicitly: that
Chazal viewed the appointment of a king as a mitzva. Of course, this
assumes the viewpoint of Rav Yehuda and ignores the opposing
position of Rav Nehorai. The Netziv was most likely influenced by the
ruling of the Rambam and others.
The second assumption emerges from his words more subtly. It is
clear to the Netziv that careful consideration of the different forms of
rule among the nations will bring those contemplating this issue to
the conclusion that absolute monarchy is preferable over other forms
of government (such as that which operates “according to the desire
of the population and their elected officials”). The Netziv attributes
this assumption to the Torah itself, which patiently waits for Benei
Yisrael to arrive at this “correct” political outlook. Only then does the
Torah mandate the appointment of a Jewish monarch. Of course,
living in nineteenth-century Russia under the Czar, this presumption
may have seemed to him natural and self-evident, but it is one which
is difficult for contemporary man to accept.
F. Another Perspective on the Issue
In conclusion, we should note that most commentators saw the
parasha of the king as the locus for a discussion regarding the
Torah’s preferred form of government. However, in the textual and
historical contexts in which the issue of the monarchy arose
(especially during the time of Shemuel), it seems that the question
here involves a different issue: is there, according to the Torah, a
need to establish any central authority at all? In other words, does the
Torah destine Benei Yisrael for life within the framework of a political
state, or does it prefer existence within a more anarchic social
framework lacking any governmental authority?
This second possibility describes Benei Yisrael’s history during the
time of the judges until the period of Shemuel. They lived within the
framework of tribal treaties and agreements with no central authority
endowed with the power of legislation or coercion. This social system
was not easy for them, as external pressures from enemies did
receive proper response given the lack of a king or organized military
and governmental mechanism. Indeed, thoughts of a central authority
arose from time to time throughout the period of the judges. Gidon
responded the people’s request for a hereditary monarchy by
proclaiming, “I will not rule over you myself, nor shall my son rule
over you; God alone shall rule over you!” (Shoftim 8:23). Apparently,
behind this anarchistic societal life stood a firm, religious outlook.
The same may be inferred from Shemuel’s reaction to his
constituents’ request for a monarch. Their request in essence meant
turning the voluntary treaty among the tribes into a single political
body with central authority. The issue of the precise character of such
a government is but a secondary question.
The Tana’im who disputed the issue of the mitzva to appoint a king –
R. Yehuda and R. Nehorai – seemed to have debated the question of
the necessity of a state, not of the best form of government.
4
According to Rav Yehuda, there is a mitzva for Benei Yisrael to
establish a political framework in its land, for only thereby can they
carry out the tasks with which they were charged upon entry into
Eretz Yisrael – destroying Amalek and building a Mikdash. The
Gemara notes that the appointment of a king had to precede the other
two, since only a political entity with concentrated authority can draft
the necessary resources for the other two tasks. Shaul’s victory over
Amalek and Shelomo’s construction of the Mikdash could not have
occurred during the period of the judges.
According to what we have said, an anarchist could find in the Torah
and the commentaries cited here a basis for his political theory, just
as one who insists upon one form of governmental authority or
another can find support for his view.
This essay originally appeared on Yeshivat Har Etzion’s Israel
Koschitzky Virtual Beit Midrash and is republished here with
permission.
Jews Attending Church
R. Haskel Lookstein generated a storm of criticism when he attended
the inaugural church services for President Obama and recited a
non-denominational prayer (see this post). Many pointed out the
questionable halakhic basis for such a practice, and R. Lookstein
himself agreed that he would only attend such a service in the
exceptional case of a request by a world leader. Many others noted
that English Chief Rabbis have historically attended select church
services.
I do not know if anyone quoted the following from the former Chief
Rabbi of England, R. Immanuel Jakobovits, upon which I recently
stumbled. He discusses the issue twice in his 1995 book, Dear Chief
Rabbi: From the Correspondence of Chief Rabbi Immanuel Jakobovits
on Matters of Jewish Law, Ethics and Contemporary Issues,
1980–1990.
In one letter (p. 46), R. Jakobovits writes:
After consultation with the [London] Beth Din, my own practice
is occasionally to attend Church services on royal and state
occasions to represent the Jewish community. But I never
actively participate, nor do I wear cap and gown. I find that my
Christian hosts usually show understanding and respect for this
attitude and its reservations.
Note that he visibly refrained from participating in the prayer
services. Also note that he received approval from his beis din to
attend.
In another letter (p. 49), he writes:
Naturally I often face the problem of having to respond to
invitations to take part in interfaith services, sometimes at the
highest level for royal and national events. My attitude invariably
is that I cannot take an active part in a religious service of any
except my own faith, and this is always understood and
respected. But I do on occasions attend such services as a
representative of the Jewish community, though without wearing
canonicals or “officiating” in any other form.
Copyright © 2014 Torah Musings, All rights reserved.
67
Weekly Digest from TorahMusings.com He continues that a cantor wishing to take part in an interfaith
memorial service televised in a church may pre-record an appropriate
prayer elsewhere to be played before or after the church service.
I make no claim that R. Jakobovits’ view (and that of his beis din)
become normative. I am describing, not prescribing (nor proscribing),
them. And even he would agree that the permissive practice only
applies to state and royal functions at the highest levels.
The Right Way To Rebuke
Making Tea and Coffee on
Shabbos
by David Roth
One of the thirty-nine prohibited categories of forbidden activities on
Shabbos is baking or cooking.1 However, much to the relief of many
coffee and tea drinkers, there may be a number of reasons that
making coffee or tea is not included in the prohibition of cooking.
Cooking Something That Has Already Been Cooked
Halakhic Positions of Rav Joseph B. Soloveitchik
Instant coffee:
by R. Aharon Ziegler
With dry items, the prohibition of cooking only applies to something
that has not been sufficiently cooked,2 not to re-heating already
sufficiently cooked food. Therefore, most halachic authorities3 permit
one to pour hot water on instant coffee that has been roasted in the
manufacturing process.
Rav Soloveitchik taught that the way to give mussar or rebuke is not
to belittle or embarrass a person, rather, to show him that he has
erred and that he should correct his ways. By verbally attacking the
wrongdoer, most likely that person will react negatively and
aggressively, which is the opposite of what we want. Furthermore, he
will raise his defense and spitefully continue his malevolent behavior,
in order to enforce the fact that he does not consider such behavior as
being wrong. Obviously, effective rebuke cannot be achieved by
directly confrontation and belittling the perpetrator. How then should
we convey our message of rebuke? The answer, Rav Soloveitchik
found, is in the Torah.
Yosef HaTzaddik, after revealing himself to his brothers, has good
reason to rebuke his brothers for the terrible crimes of throwing him
into a pit and then selling him to merchants heading down to
Mitzrayim. It is now 22 years later and Yosef is the highest official in
Mitzrayim, only Paroh is above him, and he has his brothers at his
mercy.
The very first thing that Yosef does is request that all Egyptians leave
the room, so as not to embarrass his brothers in front of strangers
(Bereishit 45:1). Now that they are alone the brothers fear and expect
the harshest rebuke imaginable. But, lo and behold, Yosef chooses
three words, and says to them – “Ha’od Avi Chai?” “Is my father still
alive?” (Bereishit 45:3). It has its effect, for immediately after hearing
those words, “his brothers could not answer him for they were left
disconcerted before him.”
From these three words our lesson in giving rebuke becomes clear.
Effective reproof is accomplished by focusing on the victim’s pain
rather than on the wrongdoing of the perpetrator. When he sees the
pain and suffering that he has caused, he comes to the understanding
that he has behaved improperly.
The fact that “Ha’od Avi Chai” was the first thing that Yosef asked
indicated that what most concerned him during the previous 22 years
was being away from his father. His question should be interpreted as
an outpouring of his own personal grief over being in a position
where it was impossible to maintain a loving relationship with his
father. The brothers were filled with shame, not because Yosef
directly chastised them, rather as a result of understanding the grief
that their actions had caused. That is why Yosef focused on my father
rather than your father. He was expressing his personal grief over the
loss of his loving relationship with his father.
5
However, some halachic authorities disagree. The Shulchan Aruch4
cites the concept that there is no prohibition of cooking once
something has been sufficiently cooked the same way but not with
two different forms of cooking, such as boiling and baking. These
halachic authorities5 argue that the roasting (of beans) and the
cooking with water entailed in making coffee represent different
forms of cooking. Although the Shulchan Aruch seems to conclude
that one can be lenient on this question, the Rama rules that
Ashkenazim should act stringently. The previously mentioned
dissenting authorities argue that this ruling of the Rama poses a
concern for Ashkenazim, unless the instant coffee has already been
cooked in water or the roasting is somehow considered a similar
enough cooking to the making of the coffee.6 Additionally, R.
Mordechai Eliyahu7 argues that although instant coffee is roasted,
adding hot water completes the cooking process. Prior to the addition
of hot water, the coffee is not completely cooked, thereby rendering
the addition a new act of cooking rather than just re-heating.
According to this, one would never be able to make coffee on
Shabbos, and one could only use coffee that was made before
Shabbos.8
Another potential issue of making coffee on Shabbos is that the Rama
9
says that it is praiseworthy to be stringent (ha’machmir tavo alav
beracha) not to add salt to even to a hot keli sheini (a secondary
vessel, not the one which was on the fire). R. Yitzchak Weiss10 argues
that adding instant coffee to hot water is equivalent to adding salt,
which the Rama said is better not to do.11 R. Yaakov Breish12 argues
similarly, but concedes that in a keli sheini there is enough room to
be lenient. However, R. Ovadia Yosef13 distinguishes between instant
coffee and salt because he believes the Rama only recommends
against adding uncooked salt. If the salt, or in this case the coffee, is
already cooked, there should be no problem. The general practice
appears to be lenient regarding making instant coffee on Shabbos.
Instant tea:
Some authorities permit using pre-cooked tea leaves. For example, it
would be permitted to pour hot water onto the tea leaves before
Shabbos and then to pour more hot water onto the same dry leaves to
Copyright © 2014 Torah Musings, All rights reserved.
68
Weekly Digest from TorahMusings.com make tea on Shabbos. Some halachic authorities14 apply the rule that
there is no prohibition of cooking something that has already been
cooked completely. The Aruch Ha’Shulchan15 accepts this as well, but
adds that when one pre-cooks the tea before Shabbos, he must leave
the hot water on the tea for a while to make sure that it is fully
cooked. However, some halachic authorities16 forbid this practice
because the tea leaves are used purely to extract their taste.
Therefore, as long as the tea leaves continue to emit taste, they are
not considered already cooked.
Keli Sheini and Keli Shelishi
As a general rule, a keli sheini (a secondary vessel, not the one which
was on the fire) does not cook for Hilchos Shabbos purposes.17Tosafos
18
explain that since a keli sheini was never on the fire, its walls are
cooler and it cannot cook.
However, if something is considered mi’kalei ha’bishul (easy to cook),
it will cook even in a keli sheini.19 The Ran,20Magen Avraham,21
Mishna Berura,22 and R. Moshe Feinstein23 rule that we do not know
what foods are mi’kalei ha’bishul, and therefore we need to be
concerned that all foods fall into this category unless explicitly
excluded in the Talmud.24 According to this view, one is forbidden to
put tea leaves even in a keli sheini, because they might be mi’kalei
ha’bishul. The Aruch Ha’Shulchan25 is certain that tea is mi’kalei
ha’bishul. However, the Chazon Ish26 argues that one need not be
concerned that a given food is mi’kalei ha’bishul unless an explicit
source says that it is.27 R. Hershel Schachter writes that R. Joseph B.
Soloveitchik made tea in a keli sheini because he did not consider tea
leaves to be mi’kalei ha’bishul,28 and R. Schachter himself rules this
way as well.29
A keli shelishi (a tertiary vessel, from which something was poured
from a keli sheini) may provide a solution to those who are concerned
that tea may cook in a keli sheini. Talmudic sources do not mention
such a concept, nor do Rishonim (early authorities) distinguish
between keli sheini and keli shelishi. To the best of my knowledge,
the only Rishon who talks about a keli shelishi is R. Eliezer of Metz,30
who explicitly says that a keli shelishi is the same as a keli sheini.
Nevertheless, many Achronim (later authorities)31 rule that a keli
shelishi does not cook even food that is mi’kalei ha’bishul, or that one
need not be concerned that something is mi’kalei ha’bishul when
using a keli shelishi (but they hold that in a keli sheini one should be
concerned). However, many halachic authorities32 disagree. The
Chazon Ish33 argues that there is no basis to distinguish in theory
between a keli sheini and a keli shelishi. However, he continues, there
may be a practical distinction: the Chayei Adam34 rules that a keli
sheini that is extremely hot (yad nichveis bo) will cook. Based on this,
the Chazon Ish says that we use a keli shelishi because by the time
the item has been transferred twice, it is probably no longer as hot,
and therefore one does not need to be concerned for this opinion of
the Chayei Adam.35
Making Tea Using Essence
Mishna Berura36 states that the best way to make tea on Shabbos is to
make essence, meaning a very strong tea, before Shabbos. When one
wants to drink tea on Shabbos, he can put hot water in the cup, and
then add the cold essence. This solution works according to all views
because everyone agrees that water is not mi’kalei ha’bishul and
6
therefore will not cook in a keli sheini.
Using a Timer
The Mishna37 records an argument between Beis Shamai and Beis
Hillel whether one can start a melacha (activity forbidden on
Shabbos) before Shabbos that will continue by itself into Shabbos,
such as soaking something in water to extract a dye. The halacha
follows Beis Hillel to be lenient on this.
Based on this, we are used to assuming that it is permitted to set a
timer to turn on or off an electric device on Shabbos. However, R.
Moshe Feinstein38 does not approve of this leniency and argues that it
should be relied on only for electric lights.39 R. Hershel Schachter is
also very sympathetic to the position that timers should not be used
on Shabbos.40 Nevertheless, the opinion of most halachic authorities41
as well as common practice is to allow the use of timers for all
electric devices whose use does not detract from the spirit of
Shabbos. The following discussion assumes that the use of timers in
general is permitted.
There is another Mishna42 which says that before Shabbos one may
not put water into a vessel that is used to hold a lit candle because he
may come to extinguish the fire. Tosefos43 explain that the difference
between this case and the previous case with the dye is that the
soaking of a dye on Shabbos is a very serious prohibition, so people
will be careful to avoid it. In contrast, adding water is not an active
violation but rather just causing the candle to go out indirectly, about
which people will be less careful. This reason is quoted in the Magen
Avraham,44Taz,45 and Shulchan Aruch Ha’Rav.46 Some suggest47 that
putting food to cook or coffee to brew on a timer is equivalent to
adding water in the vessel below the candle: one might come to add
the coffee mix on Shabbos, which would be problematic because he is
doing an act on Shabbos that is causing the coffee to be cooked.48
Furthermore, others who see him cooking might not realize that it
was set on a timer before Shabbos and might come to do it on
Shabbos.
Another reason why it might not be permissible to make coffee on
Shabbos with a timer is the Rabbinic prohibition of returning an even
fully cooked food item to an uncovered fire.49 This prohibition is
either because of a concern that one may stoke the coals or because
he appears to be cooking.50 The Rama51 says that it is even forbidden
to ask a non-Jew to return the fully cooked item to the uncovered fire,
even though one might have expected permission to ask a non-Jew to
do this rabbinically forbidden action in order to fulfill a mitzvah (such
as the enjoyment of Shabbos). The Chazon Ish52 explains that the
prohibition is to have the food returned to the uncovered fire,
whether the Jew does the act himself or not. Thus, the fact that a
non-Jew returns the food to the fire is irrelevant; the Jew violates the
prohibition passively. Presumably, the same would apply to a timer:
even though a Jew does not do any action and the timer turns on the
fire which warms up the food, the Jew violates the prohibition of
returning food to the fire by virtue of the fact that such a thing
occurred in his house, even without an action. In other words, even if
the Jew does nothing, there is still a concern that he might stoke the
coals. However, if the system is set up before Shabbos in such a way
that the oven is sealed and cannot easily be opened on Shabbos, this
would not be a concern.53 The same would probably apply to a sealed
Copyright © 2014 Torah Musings, All rights reserved.
69
Weekly Digest from TorahMusings.com coffee maker that cannot be easily opened or adjusted.
4. OC 318:5 ↩
There is an additional reason why it might be prohibited to set up a
system to cook on Shabbos using a timer, but it may not be applicable
to a coffee machine. The Shulchan Aruch54 rules that if one takes a
pot off the fire before it is fully cooked, one may not remove part of
the dish with a spoon because he will end up stirring it. Regarding a
different case, the Gemara55 says that it is permitted to put wool in a
boiling pot before Shabbos, and we are not concerned that he will stir
the pot on Shabbos. The pot is covered and sealed, and by the time
one breaks the seal, he will remember that it is Shabbos. R. Eliezer
Silver56 and R. Eliezer Waldenberg57 argue that if one puts food in an
oven which is set on a timer to cook on Shabbos, there is a concern
that he will come to stir the unsealed pot. However, I doubt this
applies to a coffee machine because it is not normal to stir coffee
while it is brewing.
5. Chasam Sofer OC 1:74 concedes that there is enough room to be
lenient that it is permitted to ask a non-Jew to make instant
coffee; R. Ovadia Yosef (Yabia Omer 8:35:8) writes that
Ashkenazim should be stringent if the coffee is only roasted and
not cooked, but he says that most instant coffee is indeed
cooked; See also Kaf Ha’Chaim (318:63) who brings many
opinions of achronim on both sides of this issue. ↩
6. R. Moshe Feinstein (Igros Moshe OC 4:74:16) and R. Ovadia
Yosef (Yechave Daas 2:44:16) both say that the coffee is cooked
already such that this should not be a concern. They seem to be
assuming something along the lines of this second approach. ↩
7. Responsa Maamar Mordechai OC 2:11 ↩
58
R. Gedalia Felder states that the Chasam Sofer was lenient to allow
one to set up a system to light a fire elsewhere before Shabbos, such
that the fire will spread over the course of Shabbos and reach the
food at the time when he wants his food to be warmed up. This seems
like a precedent that would allow using a timer to cook. However, R.
Felder argues that this is different from the case of a timer. In the
Chasam Sofer‘s case, there was a fire before Shabbos while in the
case of a timer the fire did not yet exist before Shabbos. Therefore,
there is no proof that one can be lenient with a timer.
For all of these reasons, many halachic authorities59 forbid using a
timer to cook or brew coffee. However, some halachic authorities60
permit cooking with a timer in the case of monetary loss or illness,
provided that the system is completely set up before Shabbos and the
food is already in place before Shabbos, such that no adjustments will
need to be made on Shabbos itself.
8. Shulchan Shlomo, Shabbos 218:24 quotes R. Shlomo Zalman
Auerbach as ruling leniently on this issue. ↩
9. OC 318:9 ↩
10. Minchas Yitzchak 1:55 ↩
11. However, in the responsum he only addresses making coffee by
pouring from a keli rishon (the original pot which had been on
the fire) and does not address the question of a keli sheini at all.
↩
12. Chelkas Yaakov OC 131 ↩
13. Yechave Daas 2:44:6 ↩
14. Pri Megadim, Mishbetzos Zahav 318:15; R. Yosef Mashash,
Mayim Chaim OC 118; R. Yaakov Ettlinger, Binyan Tziyon, no. 17
(at the very end); first opinion and main ruling of MB 318:39. ↩
As always, you should ask your rabbi questions about appropriate
practice.
1. Mishna, Shabbos 73a, and Gemara 74b ↩
15. OC 318:28 ↩
2. Shulchan Aruch OC 318:4. “Sufficiently cooked” meaning
nisbashel kol tzorko. Note that returning something already
cooked to a fire could be Rabbinically prohibited (see Shulchan
Aruch OC 253). Here our discussion is regarding using water
which has already been removed from the fire. ↩
16. R. Moshe Feinstein, Igros Moshe OC 2:85; R. Ovadia Yosef,
Yechave Daas 2:44:3; Maharam Shik OC 132:2 ↩
17. Shabbos 40b; Shulchan Aruch OC 318:9; Shulchan Aruch YD
105:2 ↩
3. R. Ovadia Yosef in Yechave Daas 2:44; R. Tzvi Pesach Frank in
Har Tzvi, Tal Harim, Bishul 8; R. Yechiel Yaakov Weinberg, as
quoted in Chelkas Yaakov OC 131; Mishpetei Uziel YD 2:44:3; R.
Baruch Avraham Toledano in Shaalu L’Baruch OC 38; The Ben
Ish Chai in Rav Pealim OC 3:11 seems to assume that it is
obvious that there is no problem of cooking on Shabbos by
making coffee, as the only concern he addresses is regarding
coloring the water. Although a number of halachic authorities
mention this concern about coloring the water, most assume it is
not an issue based on the ruling of the Shulchan Aruch (OC
320:19) that there is no prohibition of coloring food. However,
the Ben Ish Chai argues that this is only for solids, but with
liquids there is a prohibition of coloring. ↩
7
18. Shabbos 40b d”h u’shema mina ↩
19. Mishna, Shabbos 145b, Shulchan Aruch 318:4 ↩
20. Shabbos 20a of Dapei Ha’Rif d”h u’m’ha shaminan ↩
21. OC 318:18 ↩
22. 318:42 ↩
23. Igros Moshe 4:74:4 ↩
24. The Rama (OC 318:5) is concerned about the possibility that
bread can be cooked in a keli sheini, so one must either say that
Copyright © 2014 Torah Musings, All rights reserved.
70
Weekly Digest from TorahMusings.com 37. Shabbos 17b ↩
he agrees with this position or that bread is easier to cook than
other items because it is already baked. ↩
38. Igros Moshe OC 4:60 ↩
25. OC 318:28 ↩
26. Chazon Ish OC, Moed, Hilchos Shabbos 52:19 ↩
27. The Aruch Ha’Shulchan (OC 318:44) says that onions are not
mi’kalei ha’bishul. He seems to assume that food should be
assumed not to be mi’kalei ha’bishul. However, as we said above,
he assumes that tea is in fact mi’kalei ha’bishul because we see
that it cooks so easily. ↩
39. R. Moshe is very concerned that the use of timers will detract
from the atmosphere of Shabbos (zilusa d’shabbos) since one can
do almost anything with them, and he says that if timers would
have been around in the times of the Gemara, they would have
made a decree against using them, and then he continues to say
that maybe it is included in the prohibition of amira l’nochri
(asking a non-Jew to do melacha for a Jew). He permits the use
of timers for electric lights because the custom in many places in
Europe was to permit amira l’nochri to light candles anyway. ↩
28. Nefesh Ha’Rav, page 170 ↩
40. I heard this from him. See also the responsum of R. Avraham
Litch-Rosenbaum (Ben Yehuda 1:151) who similarly forbids the
use timers. ↩
29. Notes from Rav Hershel Schachter in R. Mordechai Willig, The
Laws of Cooking and Warming Food on Shabbat, page 178. ↩
30. Sefer Yere’im, no. 274 (in old editions, no. 102) ↩
31. R. Moshe Feinstein (Igros Moshe OC 4:74:15) rules that a keli
shelishi never cooks, even for food that is mi’kalei ha’bishul; Peri
Megadim, Eishel Avraham 318:35; MB 318:45 and 318:47 rules
that a keli shelishi does not cook regarding putting bread in
soup, but in 318:42, where it comes to making tea, recommends
using essence. R. Mordechai Willig (Am Mordechai, Shabbos, p.
70) explains that making tea in a keli shelishi should be a
problem according to everyone because it is normal to make tea
that way even during the week. Shemiras Shabbos K’Hilchasa
(second edition 1:57, third edition 1:62) says that that the
general custom is to be lenient in a keli shelishi, but says that
one should be stringent on tea leaves because they are mi’kalei
ha’bishul. R. Yaakov Posen, a student of R. Yitzchak Weiss, says
in Kitzur Hilchos Shabbos, p. 48, that tea should be considered
mi’kalei ha’bishul. ↩
41. Shoel U’Meishiv 2:1:5; Maharam Shick OC 157; Shu”t Riv”a OC,
Mafteichos 6; Zekan Aharon OC 1:15; Yabia Omer OC 10:26:6;
Minchas Shlomo 2:26. Elsewhere (Meorei Eish, ch. 4), R. Shlomo
Zalman Auerbach permits the use of timers explicitly but raises a
concern that one might violate the prohibition of shevisas keilim
(work done by one’s utensils on Shabbos) according to the
opinion of the Bach. He therefore recommends that one declare
the timer ownerless (hefker) in order to avoid this issue. ↩
42. Shabbos 47b ↩
43. Shabbos 47b d”h m’penei she’mekareiv ↩
44. OC 265:7 ↩
45. OC 265:2 ↩
46. OC 265:8 ↩
32. Bach OC 318:7 d”h u’ma she’kasav aval seifel; Responsa of
Chasam Sofer YD 2:95. R. Binyamin Zilber (Az Nidberu 5:16)
argues that there is theoretically no difference between a keli
sheini and a keli shelishi, but when it comes to issues of
something which appears to be but is not really cooking (
mechazi k’mevashel), there is more room to be lenient on a keli
shelishi. ↩
47. Tzitz Eliezer 2:6:3; Oros Ha’Shabbos 45 ↩
48. See Tzitz Eliezer 2:6:1 and Chavatzeles Hasharon 1:24 for a
discussion about the prohibition one violates by doing this. ↩
49. Shulchan Aruch 523:2 ↩
50. See Or Sameach, Shabbos 3:1 who discusses the practical
differences between these reasons. ↩
33. OC, Moed, Hilchos Shabbos 52:19 ↩
34. Volume 2–3, Kelal 20, Seif 4; See, however, Beis Yosef YD 110:2
d”h v’im hu cham who disagrees and says that a keli sheini does
not cook even if it is boiling. ↩
35. R. Moshe Sternbuch (Teshuvos V’Hanhagos OC 1:207:5) writes
similarly, and suggests that one should be stringent to only add
tea essence to hot water in a keli shelishi. R. Binyamin Zilber (Az
Nidbaru 1:35), however, is concerned about yad nichveis bo even
in a keli shelishi. ↩
36. 318:39 ↩
51. OC 318:5 ↩
52. OC, Moed, Hilchos Shabbos 37:21; Minchas Yizchak 4:26:10–13
says similarly. See also Mishpetei Uziel, hashmatos 1:1:3. ↩
53. Chazon Ish, OC, Moed, Hilchos Shabbos 38:2; R. Chaim
Kanievsky in Shone Halachos 254:11. ↩
54. OC 318:18 ↩
55. Shabbos 18b ↩
8
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71
Weekly Digest from TorahMusings.com 56. Quoted in Oros Ha’Shabbos 45 ↩
believe it is obviously forbidden and unworthy of discussion, 2)
you believe it is obviously permitted, 3) you do not want to take a
stand on such a controversial subject. I find it most likely that
Semak follows the first view.
57. Tzitz Eliezer 2:6:5–7 ↩
58. Yesodei Yeshurun, vol. 3, p. 43 ↩
59. See also Zekan Aharon 1:15–16 who feels that putting something
fully cooked and dry into such an oven before Shabbos should be
theoretically permitted, but he cautions against doing so out of
concern that people will take the leniencies too far and come to
do things which are actually prohibited. He also argues that it is
not in the spirit of Shabbos (zilusa d’shabbos). ↩
60. R. Ben Zion Abba Shaul in Or L’Tzion 2:31:18; Yerushas Peleita
16. Melameid L’Ho’il, Even Ha’Ezer 3:58 permits it in principle,
but warns that it should only be done to warm up something that
is fully cooked because otherwise he might come to set it up on
Shabbos itself. R. Yosef Eliyahu Henkin is quoted in Luach
Ha’Yovel of Ezras Torah (p. 82) as permitting warming up
already cooked food in this manner, but not to cook raw food. R.
Ovadia Yosef (Yabia Omer OC 10:27) says that one may use an
electric plata on a timer even without a great need (in
accordance with R. Ovadia’s opinion in Yechave Daas 2:45 that
there is no problem of placing a fully cooked item on such a plata
). R. Shlomo Zalman Auerbach (Meorei Eish, ch. 4) also permits
such an arrangement, although he recommends that one declare
the timer ownerless, as explained above (n. 41). ↩
Were the Tosafists
Philosophers? II
3. In the mitzvah to follow God’s ways (Aseh, no. 7), Semag (not
Semak) includes a brief anti-philosophical polemic. He tells how,
in his travels, he explained to the wise men of Spain that the
verse “Know the God of your father and worship Him” (1
Chronicles 28:9) refers to acts of kindness (as proven by Jer.
22:15–16). I can imagine him saying this with a gentle,
mischievous smile to Spanish philosophers or to rabbis in Spain
who are anti-philosophy. Either way, he seems to knowingly
albeit implicitly denounce the philosophical definition of
knowledge of God.
Answer Your Emails! Return
Your Phone Calls!
by Rabbi Ari Enkin
It’s fair to say that most people, including this writer, are greatly
disturbed by those who don’t respond to letters, emails, or return
phone calls within a reasonable amount of time. In fact, in the event
of a first time correspondence, the timeliness in which a person
responds is actually the only gesture which offers a glimpse into that
person’s level of derech eretz.
In fact, failing to respond to others in a timely manner is not only
distasteful behavior but it might actually be a Torah transgression, as
well. As Rabbi Chaim Palagi writes:1
I’ve had a few more thoughts about this issue since I wrote the
original essay on the topic. I took another look at Dr. David Berger’s
book, Cultures in Collision and Conversation. Aside from a chapter
that directly addresses the question, many parts of the book discuss
it. This is a topic that has been recently debated among the experts.
What follows are a few of my amateur thoughts after a summer of
teaching classes on the Semak:
1. As we discussed last week, the Semak, in the mitzvah of fearing
God (no. 4), utilizes the philosophical argument that Jews are
obligated in mitzvos as a matter of gratitude. This argument was
also proposed by R. Sa’adiah Gaon and R. Bachya Ben Pakuda.
The Semak does not cite a source for this argument but it is still
a philosophical argument. It is noteworthy precisely because it is
so unusual.
2. In the mitzvah to learn Torah (no. 105), Semak speaks at length
about the need for constant, devoted study. More briefly (no.
15), Semak also lists a prohibition against failing to study Torah.
In both places, he condemns non-Torah-related speech (albeit
with a nuanced difference). Someone who adopts this strict
regimen of Torah study who is interested in studying philosophy
would have to allow for the time spent on it (as Rambam does in
Mishneh Torah, Hilkhos Talmud Torah 1:13). It seems to me that
one would omit this permission for any of three reasons: 1) you
9
Derech eretz kadma l’torah….Therefore, one who has received a
letter from a friend should respond immediately as there are a
number of prohibitions which one may violate by not responding
in a timely manner. Responding to a correspondence is basic
derech eretz, and forcing someone to yearn for a response has
the potential to cause that person long term health concerns… It
might just be that one’s reply will be the catalyst for some type
of mitzva to be performed… Not responding causes the one who
sent the letter great pain while he waits for his query to be
addressed. It is also cruel and a sign of arrogance. He who
judges the world will pay back such people midda k’negged
midda. I myself have sent letters to many prominent people, and
those who failed to answer my letters fell to unfortunate
circumstance.
Furthermore, in yet another one of his works,2 Rabbi Palagi quotes
the Re’im who goes off on an especially lengthy tangent, apologizing
to someone for not having responded to a letter, explaining that he
did not receive it and that perhaps it got lost. He also emphasizes to
the person he is addressing that it is the first time he has ever missed
responding to a letter. The Re’im also writes that he is proud to be
among those who answer letters from all people, regardless of their
stature or prominence. Rabbi Palagi then elaborates on the
importance of responding to correspondences and says that it should
be one of the first things that one hurries to perform. He again
asserts that not doing so is a sign of arrogance.
Copyright © 2014 Torah Musings, All rights reserved.
72
Weekly Digest from TorahMusings.com We also find that Rabbi Chaim Benvinisti once apologized excessively
and begged forgiveness from someone for not having responded to a
letter in a timely fashion. He too, elaborates on the importance of
responding to letters in a timely manner.3 Rabbi Avraham Palagi, the
son of Rabbi Chaim, writes regarding his father: “He always
answered letters from even the most simple people. He did so even
when it was terribly inconvenient.”((Tzavaa M’chaim 75.))
Although the issue of v’ahavta l’reiacha kamocha,4 loving your fellow
Jew as yourself and treating others how you yourself would want to be
treated5 is not explicitly cited, it is no doubt one of the “number of
prohibitions which one may violate by not responding in a timely
manner”. I would also add that there are some serious violations of “
lo tonu“,6 the prohibition against wronging another person, along
with ona’at devarim – causing others pain and distress.7
After contacting a number of experts in the field of social and
business propriety, it seems to be the consensus that proper etiquette
calls for electronic and phone correspondences to be responded to
within two days or less. As with most matters related to civil and
monetary law, the “minhag hamedina“, the custom of the society, has
the strength to establish halacha.8 As such, I would like to suggest
that those who delay, let alone ignore their obligation to respond to
correspondences, will be in violation of the issues discussed above
once two or three days have passed since receiving them.
Although the issue of responding to emails and phone messages may
seem somewhat trivial in the greater picture of halachic practice, this
is simply incorrect. Unfortunately, many people have a conceptual
difficulty attaching non-ritualistic precepts to a spiritual
accountability. It is time that as part of our constant efforts to
upgrade our halachic behavior, we pause to reflect and better apply
day-to-day bein adam l’chaveiro principles to the many social
obligations we find ourselves in, including this one. Perhaps the
words of the Rambam will inspire us to internalize this idea. The
Rambam once praised himself saying: “…how many [written]
questions have I received and not answered? I swear to you that I
have no recollection of ever not answering a single question.”9
1. Ginzei Chaim 20:73. ↩
2. Nefesh Hachaim 1:20. ↩
3. Boei Chayei, CM 1:56. ↩
4. Vayikra 19:18. ↩
5. Shabbat 31a. ↩
6. Vayikra 25:14,17. ↩
7. See Sefer Hachinuch 338. ↩
8. Bava Metzia 83a. ↩
9. Igrot Harambam , vol. 2 in a letter to Rabbi Pinchas Hadayan. ↩
10
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73
Weekly Digest from TorahMusings.com Torah Musings Digest
19 September, 2014 | A Window into the Orthodox Jewish Intellectual’s World| Edited by: Rabbi Gil
Student
Moshe, Prophecy Catalyst
prophecy requires jumping into an experience that contradicts one’s
physical nature, which is hard.
by R. Gidon Rothstein
This was the first part of Hashem’s lesson in how Moshe differed from
them. His physical side did not conflict with his prophetic one, so
there was no resistance to sudden prophecy. Being involved in a
marriage would change him to make that no longer true.
Does Hashem have to say please? In the eighth drasha, Ran is puzzled
that Hashem begins with the word “please” his rebuke of Miriam and
Aharon for their criticizing Moshe’s separation from his wife. Miriam
and Aharon thought that since they maintained healthy married lives,
why couldn’t Moshe do the same?
Prior essays in this series
Ran thinks they spoke up at this point because Moshe now had
seventy elders helping him. Until then, he might have been too
involved in one mitzvah, leading the people, to perform another,
being married. With the change, his siblings felt he should have
returned to Tzipporah.
Aside from their error in seeing Moshe as similar to them in prophecy
(which Hashem corrects), Ran notes that they failed to ask Moshe for
an explanation before they drew conclusions. However, Ran’s real
interest is why Moshe had to be present when Hashem showed them
their error. He sees Hashem’s politeness as the key to this mysterious
behavior.
Understanding Moshe’s presence at Miriam and Aharon’s rebuke will
shed light on why Moshe had to be present for the first prophecies of
the seventy elders. Underlying both issues is the tangible impact our
non-physical selves have on this world.
That does not yet explain why Moshe had to be there. Ran suggests
that it wasn’t just hard for Aharon and Miriam to have sudden
prophecy; it was impossible. Moshe served as a sort of receiver for
the prophetic communications from Hashem, which could then spread
to Miriam and Aharon even though they weren’t worthy.
Ran applies a similar logic to Moshe’s presence at the first prophecy
of the seventy elders. Hashem says He will speak with Moshe, taking
some of that spirit and placing it upon them. Because they weren’t
worthy of prophecy on their own, Hashem “needed” Moshe to ease
the process.
The Beit HaMikdash and the Graves of the Righteous
Ran does not limit this idea to prophecy. Next time, we will see that
he sees it as the reason Moshe was supposed to hold his staff when
speaking to the rock. He also says that about the Beit HaMikdash, a
place prepared for prophecy and wisdom. When it was standing,
wisdom and prophecy spread from that structure throughout Israel.
In that time, in other words, it was easier to be a prophet or to
achieve wisdom.
Notice that he has slipped in wisdom, which is not usually seen as
supernatural in the same way as prophecy. Yet when the Temple
stood, wisdom was more accessible, all over the world.
Let’s start with Miriam and Aharon, picking out the pieces of the
Drasha that deal with them (the Drasha starts and ends with them,
with some scattered references in the middle—in the name of
coherent presentation, I am taking those this time, and will return to
Ran’s other ideas in essays to come). Ran reminds us of a debate in
Sifrei (Beha’alotcha 100) about whether Moshe heard his siblings’
slander (the view of R. Natan). Ramban’s explanation, that Hashem
included Moshe to teach him that Hashem would stand up for his
honor regardless of Moshe’s humility, fits with R. Natan’s view, that
Moshe had heard and ignored the original incident.
Prophets and wise people themselves influence others, Ran says,
lifting them to higher levels than they might reach on their own. After
their deaths, some of that ability to bring Divine influence into this
world survives, becoming concentrated at their burial place. That is
why Sotah 34b favors visiting and praying at the graves of the
righteous. Since the righteous buried there were repositories of
Divine influence in their lifetimes, prayer there has a greater chance
of success (not praying to the righteous, praying in the presence of
their earthly remains).
Ran wants an explanation that works for the other view, that no one
heard other than Hashem.
Catalyst, Not Cause of Punishment
The Difficulties of Immediate Prophecy
His entry point is Hashem’s saying ‫נא‬, please, to Miriam and Aharon.
Ran wonders why Hashem had to ask politely. Especially if Hashem
was coming to explain what they had done wrong before punishing
them, we would not expect Hashem to ask their permission.
Ran answers that the “please” was to apologize for the suddenness of
the visitation. Like everyone other than Moshe, Miriam and Aharon’s
physical side made prophecy difficult, necessitating preparation. By
appearing without warning, Hashem was pointing out that immediate
1
Ran’s belief in special people’s impact on others, without speech or
action, raised the possibility that Moshe caused Miriam’s leprosy by
taking umbrage at what she said (this is similar to how the Evil Eye
works, Ran notes). To be sure we not misread Moshe, the verse
pauses to tell us that he was exceedingly humble, and was not (or
would not have been) offended by her words.
Then Hashem tells them the several ways Moshe’s prophecy differed
from theirs (as Ran said in earlier Derashot). Most directly relevant,
his physicality did not impede his prophecy, which meant he
Copyright © 2014 Torah Musings, All rights reserved.
74
Weekly Digest from TorahMusings.com prophesied while fully awake. He also did not use his imagination to
prophesy, which means his experience was more directly
recorded—what he saw was exactly what he told us.
“An evil man is ensnared by the transgression of his lips. But the
righteous will escape from trouble.” (12:13)
Other prophets’ visions, with metaphors, needed translation and
explanation. Moshe didn’t see a house with a rooftop, and then a
fence being built, letting him and us infer that we should fence in
dangerous places. He was told the commandment to build a fence for
one’s roof.
“The tongue of the wise makes knowledge acceptable, but the
mouth of fools spouts folly.” (12:15)
“Wise men store up knowledge, but with the mouth of the
foolish, ruin is at hand.” (10:14)
“The one who guards his mouth preserves his life. The one who
opens wide his lips comes to ruin.” (13:3)
Which is why he is called the most ‫נאמן‬, trustworthy or dependable,
of those in Hashem’s house.
“In the mouth of the foolish is a rod for his back, but the lips of
the wise will protect them.” (14:3)
But all that is not the aspect of the incident that will fuel Ran’s other
interests. The discussion of Miriam and Aharon led him to articulate a
view of how influence can flow without connection or interaction from
animate and inanimate objects (people, graves, a staff, the Beit
HaMikdash).
“He who guards his mouth and his tongue, guards his soul from
troubles.” (21:23)
That influence affects both prophecy and wisdom, leading to
questions of how much teachers affect students, how close a
connection there is between one prophet and another, one wise
person and another. As we’ll see next time.
Say No to Snark
by Dr. Erica Brown
“A fool’s lips bring strife…A fool’s mouth is his ruin, and his lips
are the snare of his soul.”
Proverbs 18:6–7
We’ve all been in the unhappy presence of snark. We know people
who make critical, cutting, biting or snide comments when they could
have easily said the same thing in a more pleasant way. The problem
with snarkiness is that people find it entertaining. There is always an
audience for gratuitous meanness wrapped in a thin slice of humor.
The Urban Dictionary coined a term for it – snarcastic – that cynical
voice that makes us laugh at someone else’s expense and then,
hopefully, regret it.
I don’t remember growing up with the word “snarky” and was trying
to find out how long it’s been in our lexicon of nasty behavior. The
Grammarphobia blog notes this about the word’s history: “The
earliest published reference for the verb ‘snark,’ meaning to snore or
snort, is from 1866, according to the Oxford English Dictionary.”
Apparently by 1882 it also meant to find fault with or to nag. In
adjective form as a way to refer to someone as irritable, it’s been
around since about1906. Lewis Carroll used it in his poem “The
Hunting of the Snark” as an imaginary figure.
So snark has been around a lot longer than most of us realize. In fact,
why date it to 1882 when we can go all the way back to the biblical
book of Proverbs to find evidence for it everywhere – even if it is not
mentioned by name? Language that hurts, damages and dismisses
others is referenced in virtually every chapter of Proverbs as bringing
harm to the one who uses it and to its victims. Here are a few choice
selections:
“Death and life are in the power of the tongue…” (18:21)
2
We all know that speech has this immense power, but we don’t always
harness that power responsibly. We love sarcasm. It’s the foundation
of the T-shirt and bumper sticker industry (Here’s this week’s bumper
sticker winner: “I’m not speeding. I’m qualifying.”) What we don’t
realize is how diminishing sarcasm can be for the growth and esteem
of those on the receiving end.
But, wait, there’s good news. A new paper published in Science and
reported in The New York Times testing morality in everyday
behaviors found that while there was no difference in the survey
between behaviors of religious and nonreligious participants, it did
find that good deeds are “contagious.” In their words: “People on the
receiving end of an act of kindness were about 10 percent more likely
than the average person to do something nice themselves later in the
day.” The only down side of this research is that those who did acts of
kindness were slightly more likely to commit a small act of rudeness
“as if drawing on moral credit from their previous act.”
This new study should give us renewed energy to help goodness go
viral and be ever more careful about language that is mean, snarky,
sarcastic or cynical. As Proverbs warns, we don’t want our lips to be
“the snare of the soul.”
So please add these two questions to your Elul challenge:
What can I not say right now because I am concerned about
someone else’s feelings and because it will reflect poorly on my
moral choices?
What can I make a point of saying right now that will make
someone else feel safe, open, special, holy and happy?
Punishment of the Individual
and of the Nation
by Rav Mordechai Sabato
Parashat Nitzavim, comprising slightly less than two whole chapters
(29:9–30:20), opens in the middle of Moshe’s speech. The speech
begins at the end of the previous parasha, at the beginning of chapter
29: “And Moshe called to all of Israel and said to them…” It concludes
at the end of chapter 30. Proof of the connection between the
beginning of our parasha and the previous section is to be found in
the linguistic similarity between the last verse of Ki Tavo, “And you
Copyright © 2014 Torah Musings, All rights reserved.
75
Weekly Digest from TorahMusings.com shall observe the WORDS OF THIS COVENANT and perform them”,
and the first verse of Nitzavim: “You are all standing today before the
Lord your God… to enter into THE COVENANT OF THE LORD YOUR
GOD and into His oath which the Lord your God seals with you
today… Not with you alone do I seal THIS COVENANT and this
oath…” (29:9–13).
There can be no doubt, then, that our parasha is not an independent
literary unit, and that it should be treated as part of Moshe’s speech
starting in chapter 29. In this shiur, we shall address the structure of
chapter 29 and its significance.
At the center of chapter 29 stands the covenant that Moshe makes
with Israel in the plains of Moav. The word “covenant” (berit) appears
five times in the chapter (8, 11, 13, 20, 24), and connects chapter 29
with the conclusion of chapter 28, where we read, “These are the
words of the COVENANT that God commanded Moshe to make with
the children of Israel in the land of Moav, aside from the COVENANT
that he made with them at Chorev.” Thus we may deduce that chapter
28 concluded the speech of the mitzvot and the subsequent blessing
and curse, which are called in the Torah “the words of the covenant.”
In chapter 29, now that the nation has been made aware of the details
of the covenant, Moshe actually carries out the ceremonial sealing of
the covenant.
Let us now look at the structure of chapter 29.
being made, and the central verse of this unit (12), emphasizing the
significance of the covenant.
The bracketing verses correspond to one another in chiastic form:
verse 11 parallels verse 13; both mention the sealing of the covenant
and the oath. Verses 9–10 parallel verse 14; both mention Israel
standing before God. The main point that is emphasized in the
bracketing verses is the absolute universality of participation in the
covenant. Verses 9–10 stipulate that participants include all strata of
the nation and all social levels. Verses 13–14 tell us that the covenant
includes all generations of the nation. Later on we shall address the
significance of this point in the chapter as a whole.
In the third section, verses 16–20, Moshe emphasizes the punishment
that awaits someone who violates the covenant:
(15) For you know how we dwelled in the land of Egypt and how
we passed through the nations that you have passed by;
(16) you have seen their abominations and their idols of wood
and stone, silver and gold, that were among them.
(17) Lest there be among you a man or woman or family or tribe
whose heart turns today away from the Lord our God, to go and
worship the gods of those nations, lest there be among you a
root that gives forth gall and wormwood,
(18) and it happens, when he hears the words of this oath, that
he blesses himself in his heart, saying, Peace will be with me,
although I walk in the stubbornness of my heart, in order to add
drunkenness to thirst.
The first section of the chapter, comprising verses 1–8, serves as a
sort of introduction to the covenant ceremony, where Moshe urges
the nation to observe the covenant:
…You have seen all that God did before your eyes in the land of
Egypt, to Pharaoh and all of his servant and all of his land… And
you shall observe the words of this covenant and perform them,
in order that you may succeed in all that you do.
The next section, verses 9–14, describes the ceremony whereby the
covenant is sealed:
(19) God will not agree to forgive him, for then the anger and
jealousy of God will smoke against that person, and all the curse
that is written in this book will come upon him, and God will
erase his name from under the heavens.
(20) And God will separate him for evil from among all the tribes
of Israel, as all the curses of the covenant that are written in this
book of Torah.
(9) You are all standing today before the Lord your God: the
heads of your tribes, your elders, your officers – all the men of
Israel,
The principal difficulty in understanding this section lies in verse 18.
Two points in this verse require explanation: a. Why would a person
whose heart has turned away from God still believe that all will be
well with him, despite the fact that he has heard all the words of the
oath, and its curses? B. What is the meaning of the idiom, “to add
drunkenness to thirst?”
(10) your children, your wives and the strangers that are
amongst your camp, from the hewers of wood to the drawers of
water,
(11) to enter into the covenant of the Lord your God and His
oath, which the Lord your God seals with you today.
(12) In order that He may establish you today as His nation, and
He will be your God, as He spoke to you and as He promised to
your forefathers, to Avraham, to Yitzhak and to Ya’akov.
(13) It is not with you alone that I make this covenant and this
oath,
Rashi writes: “Whose heart turns today – i.e., refuses to accept the
covenant upon himself.” From here we may understand that the
person believes that the curse will not affect him because he does not
accept the covenant. Rashi then interprets the difficult idiom as
pertaining to the punishment that will come upon him:
“In order to add drunkenness” – For I shall add punishment for
him over and above what he has done so far by mistake, and I
shall review them and now cause them to be counted as
intentional sins, and I shall punish him for all of it…
“Drunkenness” – an unintentional sin that was performed, like a
person who is drunk and is not aware of his actions. “Thirst” –
that which he does knowingly, out of desire.
(14) but with those who are standing here with us today before
God our God as well as with those who are not standing with us
here today.
In this section, a distinction should be made between the bracketing
verses (9−11 and 13–14), which indicate that the covenant is indeed
3
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76
Weekly Digest from TorahMusings.com The idiom therefore relates not to the thoughts of the sinner, but
rather to the punishment that awaits him.
compared to a “lone tamarisk in the desert.”
The Ibn Ezra teaches that the person blesses himself in his heart,
saying that all will be well with him, because he believes that the
merit of the many righteous people will save the lone sinner.
Both aspects of Rashi’s explanation seem somewhat forced. The
reason for the person’s thoughts (“whose heart turns today”) should
seemingly have been written adjacent to the quotation of his
thoughts, not prior to them. Likewise, the interpretation of the idiom
as relating to the punishment seems forced, for it is only in verse 19
that we read, “God will not agree to forgive him” – meaning that it is
only there that the description of the punishment begins.
The Ibn Ezra quotes R. Yehuda ha-Levi in his explanation, as follows:
“And he will bless himself in his heart” – R. Yehuda ha-Levi z”l
taught that this expression is meant literally; when he hears the
curse then he will bless himself in his heart, saying, “All will be
well with me.” As though, upon hearing the curse, he says,
“excluding me.” “In order to add (sefot)” – R. Yehudah ha-Levi
taught that this is an expression of being destroyed, as in “Will
you destroy (tispeh) the righteous with the wicked?” In other
words, the person who blesses himself thinks to cancel or
destroy the words of the righteous, who is referred to in the
word “ravah” (previously translated as drunkenness, here
interpreted as satiation), by means of his thirst. For the
righteous is strong in his satiation like a tree planted by the
water, and the wicked one languishes in thirst like a tamarisk in
the desert. And he believes that his own blessing in his heart will
stop the curse.
What R. Yehuda ha-Levi means is that a person whose heart turns
from God (and such a person is referred in the text as one who is
“thirsty”) believes that his prediction that “All will be well with me,”
which is a kind of blessing, has the power to cancel the effect of the
curse uttered by Moshe (who is referred to as “satiated”).
The advantage of this explanation lies in the fact that it connects the
idiom to the thoughts of the sinner, and the text itself hereby explains
why he believes that the curse will not come upon him.
However, this explanation also presents some difficulties, concerning
both syntax and content. The preposition “by” (et) (in “destroying
satiation by thirst”) is not appropriate here, for this word appears
nowhere else meaning “by means of.” What the text should have said,
then, is “in order that the thirst cut off the satiation,” for it is the
words of the wicked one that are meant to cancel the words of the
righteous. Moreover, we may argue that it is difficult to understand
why a person would believe that his prediction, “All will be well with
me,” has the power to cancel the curse.
Hence, it may be preferable to adopt the interpretation of the Ibn
Ezra himself, who writes:
In my opinion, the word “sefot” is derived from “tosefet”
(addition)… The verse then means: All will be well with me even
though I walk in the stubbornness of my heart, because I shall
live by merit of the righteousness of the righteous ones, for they
are many and I am an individual sinner. But God will not agree
to forgive him… Thus, “sefot” means “added,” for the satiation
will be added to the thirst. The righteous is represented by
satiation, for he is compared to a “tree planted by streams of
water,” while the wicked one is represented by thirst, for he is
4
Thematically, this explanation is greatly advantageous, since it gives
special significance to this section, and to chapter 29 as a whole, as
well as relating our chapter to the curses in chapter 28 – a
significance that would seem to fit in well with the language of the
chapter. Most of the curses in chapter 28 pertain to the nation as a
whole; there is almost no mention there of punishment to individuals.
The most outstanding example is the final curse – exile – which is
described in chapter 28 as a national punishment, not a punishment
for individuals. In our chapter, by contrast, Moshe highlights the fact
that he is speaking to individuals: “Lest there be among you a man or
a woman or a family or a tribe…” This is a series of individual
exceptions: one man among the many, one family among the many, or
one tribe among the many. The sinful individual therefore believes
that the curse described in chapter 28 will not come to pass for him,
because it is directed to the community as a whole, and since the
community is not sinful – only he is, alone – the “satiation” will
protect the “thirst.”
Ibn Ezra thus understands that in our section, the Torah means to
teach that this perception is mistaken. The curse, which is essentially
meant as a curse to the nation, may also apply to a sinful individual.
“For then God’s anger and His jealousy will smoke against THAT
MAN and all the curse that is written in this book will come upon
HIM.” Indeed, the end of the section reads, “And God will separate
him for evil from among all the tribes of Israel, according to all the
curses of the covenant that is written in this book of Torah.” In other
words, although chapter 28 treated the entire nation as a single unit,
when necessary one tribe may be singled out from among all the
tribes of Israel for the curses of the covenant.
Despite the thematic advantage of the Ibn Ezra’s explanation, we are
still left with a syntactical question concerning his interpretation of
the idiom. The righteous one does not “add” to the wicked one, but
rather “protects” him.
The Abarbanel adopts the Ibn Ezra’s main idea in one of his
explanation, and writes as follows:
Perhaps the individual… with bless himself in his heart, saying,
“All will be well with me… because I will be included in that
good that the blessed God bestows upon Israel, and the curses
will not be able to affect me individually, because He will not
curse the nation since they are blessed.” And this is what he
means by “All will be well with me” – individually, while I walk in
the stubbornness of my heart and do whatever I wish to. And this
is what is meant by, “In order to add satiation to thirst,” which is
a parable. For if a person has two fields, one alongside the other,
one in need of water and the other well watered and having no
need for irrigation – there is no doubt that when watering the
dry field, he will come to water also the other one, even though
he does not water it intentionally. Likewise, this heretic believes
that although God does not mean to shower blessings upon him,
since he walks in the stubbornness of his heart, he will
nevertheless still receive goodness and salvation and success
Copyright © 2014 Torah Musings, All rights reserved.
77
Weekly Digest from TorahMusings.com because he is part of the whole.
(24) And they shall say, “Because they abandoned the covenant
of the Lord, God of their fathers, which He made with them
when He took them out of the land of Egypt.
The difference between the Abarbanel and the Ibn Ezra is that the
former does not understand “satiation” and “thirst” as referring to
the righteous person and the wicked one, but rather as being part of
the parable itself. It is the way of the world that a well-watered field
receives some of the water that is directed towards the neighboring
dry field.
(25) And they went and worshipped other gods and bowed down
before them, gods that they did not know and that He did not
give to them.
This explanation is advantageous in that in many places in Tanakh the
words “satiated” and “thirsty” are used to describe land or a field. But
we still have a problem with the word “add” (sefot) as it appears here.
S.D. Luzzato proposes a correction to the above explanation,
suggesting that the root “s-f-h” is related to the root “s-f-ch,” meaning
joining or annexing, but this still seems forced.
Perhaps we should adopt the suggestion of N.H. Tur Sinai that the
root of the word “sefot” is “s-f-a,” meaning “eating” in Ugaritic or
“feeding” in Aramaic. According to this theory, the interpretation of
the idiom would be that a well-watered field also provides water to a
dry field, in the same way that the Abarbanel explained.
In summary, the Torah’s intention in these verses is to negate the
mistaken perception that the concept of collective punishment
described in chapter 28 means that there is no individual punishment.
The Torah teaches in Chapter 29 that its curses can come upon the
individual – whether an individual person, an individual family, or an
individual tribe. To this we must add the fact mentioned above, that
at the beginning of the parasha Moshe emphasizes that the covenant
applies to everyone, including every individual of every social level
and in every generation. Thus the Torah removes the possibility of
any individual in any generation escaping the covenant and its curse.
To complete our understanding of this section, we should add that
both the Ibn Ezra and the Ramban comment on verse 19 that the
Torah’s description of the punishment relates to all three levels –
individual, family, and tribe – in order to illustrate most clearly that
there is no escape from punishment for the individual on any level.
The Ramban writes,
(26) And God’s anger burned against that land, to bring upon it
all the curse that is written in this book.
(27) And God rooted them out of their land with anger and fury
and great wrath, and sent them to another land until this day.
At first glance, this section would seem to be an exception to the
subject of our chapter, as we explained it above. It appears to
describe the destruction of the land and the exile of the nation as a
whole (as would seem explicit from verse 27) and not to refer to
punishment of the individual.
Indeed, some commentators maintain that this section is not a
continuation of the previous one, but rather continues from where the
Torah left off in chapter 28. After the description of exile in chapter
28, the Torah goes on in 29:21 to describe the reaction of the nations
to the sight of the land in its destruction and the nation led away into
exile. The verses in between – 29:1–20 – are a sort of parenthetical
explanation of certain points.
However, close examination of the language of the text reveals that
the above explanation is difficult to accept, for two reasons:
1. These verses emphasize once again that the plagues came upon
“that land” (21, 26). This expression is not generally used in the
Torah to refer to the land of Israel as a whole, but rather to a
certain part of it that has previously been mentioned.
2. Verse 21 distinguishes between the later generation, “your
children that will rise up after you,” and “the stranger that will
come from a far-off land.” The text does not say of the children
that they will come from a far-off land as it does of the stranger.
This means, logically, that the children are already in the land,
and have no need to come from afar. Thus, the Torah cannot be
talking about children who were exiled from the land.
“God’s anger and His jealousy will smoke against that person” –
this is a curse upon the individual man or woman; “and He will
erase his name” – a curse upon the family, for the entire
household is called after its head; “and He will separate him for
evil…” – namely, He will separate this tribe from among all the
remaining tribes of Israel.
Let us move on to the final section of the chapter:
(21) So that the later generation, your children who will rise up
after you, and the stranger who will come from a far-off land,
who will see the plagues of that land and its sicknesses that God
has sent to it, will say,
(22) with the whole land burning in brimstone and salt, not being
sown nor bearing fruit nor giving forth any grass, like the
overthrow of Sedom and Amora, Adma and Tzevoyim, which God
overthrew in His anger and His fury,
(23) Then all the nations will say, “Why did God do thus to this l;
what is the heat of this great anger?”
5
The combination of these two questions shows that the land referred
to by the Torah in these verses is not the land of Israel in its entirety,
but rather the land belonging to the tribe mentioned at the end of the
previous section. “The later generation” means the children of the
tribes who were not exiled, and it is they who wonder at the meaning
of the destruction that meets their eyes in that portion of the land
whose inhabitants were exiled.
But we may still ask why the Torah devotes an entire section to what
the stranger will say, arriving from a far-off land, and why his
astonishment is described specifically in the context of the
punishment of a single tribe, rather than the exile of the nation as a
whole.
Concerning the first question, the Rashbam writes:
“Because they abandoned” – They will not say, “For lack of God’s
Copyright © 2014 Torah Musings, All rights reserved.
78
Weekly Digest from TorahMusings.com ability…,” as I explained on the words, “And I fell before God and
I said…” (9:25–26).”
This refers back to the Rashbam’s commentary on 9:25 –
“And I fell before God for forty days… and I fell before God and I
said…” – Who is wise enough to pay attention and understand
why there is a need to repeat this “falling before God” for forty
days? Does the Torah then usually repeat itself? … The text
should have said, “And I said…” in the previous verse, without
any need to repeat itself in order to tell Israel what exactly was
the content of the prayer.
But there is a great wisdom here, with which to reprove Israel.
Lest you say: In a sin as great as that of the golden calf, Moshe’s
prayer was effective and we were saved; so in Eretz Yisrael, too,
if we sin then the prayers of the prophets will be effective.
Moshe is telling them: Prayer will not help you in Eretz Yisrael.
For here you were forgiven only in order that God’s Name not be
desecrated, for that is in fact what I prayed: “Lest they of the
land from which you took us out will say, It is for lack of God’s
ability to bring them [to the land, that He destroyed them].” For
this reason you were not given the death sentence in the desert.
But after God wipes out thirty-one kings before you, and makes
you inherit the land, then He will be able to expel you from the
land, for there is no longer an issue of desecration of God’s
Name, that the nations will say that God was unable to help you.
Rather, the nations will say, “Israel sinned before Him,” as we
are told explicitly in the parasha of Nitzavim: “And all the
nations will say, For what reason did God do this to this land;
what is this great heat of anger?” And they will answer,
“Because they abandoned the covenant of the Lord, God of their
fathers… and God uprooted them from upon their land with
anger and fury and great wrath, and He sent them to another
land until this day.”
Here the Rashbam answers our first question, but he fails to answer
the second one: why do the nations speak thus only concerning a
partial exile, and not concerning the exile of the whole nation?
Gozan, until this day.”
2. Melakhim II 17:6 – “In the ninth year of Hoshea, the king of
Ashur captured Shomron and exiled Israel to Ashur, and settled
them in Chalach and in Chavor at the river of Gozan, and the
cities of Madai.”
In both places, the exile affected more than one tribe. But both are
instances of a partial exile, and not the exile of the nation as a whole.
It is instructive to note that when Chazal discuss the question of
whether the “ten lost tribes” will eventually return, they bring proof
from our chapter.
The ten tribes are not destined to return, as it is written
(Devarim 29:27), “And He will send them to another land until
(lit., like) this day.” Just as “this day” disappears as does not
return, so they who go will not return – this is the opinion of R.
Akiva.
R Eliezer says, Just as the day first becomes dark and then
becomes light, so the ten tribes, who at first suffered darkness
(exile) will eventually enjoy light. (Sanhedrin 10:3)
It seems, therefore, that Chazal, too, interpret these verses as
pertaining to a partial exile, and not the exile of the entire nation.
R. Akiva’s proof from the text seems somewhat forced. It is especially
difficult to understand in light of the fact that in the next chapter (30),
the Torah promises the return of Israel to their land, if only they will
return to God.
It is possible that R. Akiva claims as he does because of the context of
our chapter. As we mentioned in the shiur on parashat Ki Tavo,
chapter 30 adopts the language of the end of chapter 28, and clearly
continues the description there. We asked why the two sections are
divided, and why chapter 29 is inserted between them. We may now
return to this question.
Chapter 29 opens with a description of the sealing of the covenant.
The fact that this description comes before chapter 30, which speaks
of teshuva (repentance) and redemption, teaches that teshuva and
redemption are not part of the covenant. This coalso arises from the
language of the verse that concludes chapter 28, “These are the
words of the covenant that God commanded Moshe to make with the
children of Israel in the land of Moav.” These words – and no more.
This means, as we have said, that teshuva and the promise of
redemption that will follow it are not part of the covenant.
Redemption in the wake of teshuva is a gift from God’s attribute of
mercy and kindness; it is beyond the letter of the law. The covenant
ceremony is not the place for promises that are beyond the letter of
the law; these promises are beyond the framework of the covenant
itself.
Perhaps we may answer as follows: In the event of a complete exile,
there is no assurance that the nations will attribute the exile to the
sins of Israel. It is more likely that they will attribute the exile to the
limited power of Israel’s God, to their view, as opposed to the nation
that waged war against Israel and its God. However, if the exile
affects only one tribe, while the rest of the nation remains in place,
then even the nations will recognize that the reason for the
destruction is God’s anger at their sins – as our parasha teaches.
Was there any period in history when the threat set down in our
chapter was actualized? We may point to at least two instances of
partial exile:
1. Divrei ha-Yamim I 5:25–26 – “And they sinned against the God of
their fathers and went astray after the gods of the nations of the
land which God had destroyed before them. And the God of
Israel stirred up the spirit of Pul, king of Ashur, and the spirit of
Tilgat-Pilnesser, king of Ashur, and He exiled them – the tribes of
Reuven, Gad, and the half-tribe of Menashe, and He brought
them to Chalach and to Chavor and to Hara and to the river of
6
On the other hand, since chapter 30 echoes the language of chapter
28, we may conclude that the promise of redemption in the wake of
teshuva relates only to the event of a total exile of the nation, as
described at the end of chapter 28, but does not apply to the exile of a
tribe or a few tribes, as described at the end of chapter 29.
Hence we may say, concerning the status of the individual – man,
woman, family or tribe – is the opposite of what the sinner thinks. The
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79
Weekly Digest from TorahMusings.com sinner believes that collective punishment could serve as the refuge
of the individual, who would be saved because of the merit of the
community. But the text teaches us that not only will the individual
not be saved in the merit of the community, and not only will all the
curses of the covenant come upon him, but his punishment will be
even harsher than that of the community. If the nation is exiled, they
are promised that they will be redeemed, if only they will return to
God. If an individual (person, family or tribe) is exiled, no such
promise is extended. This, then, is the background to R. Akiva’s view.
Perhaps R. Eliezer’s view may also be anchored in our chapter. It is
true that, linguistically, chapter 30 is a return to chapter 28, but it is
located after chapter 29. Perhaps it is because of this that R. Eliezer
maintains that the promise contained here applies even to the
instance described in chapter 29. Thus we may conclude that even if a
single tribe or group of tribes is exiled, they are promised that God
will return their exile and bring them back to the land – if only they
will return to God.
This essay originally appeared on Yeshivat Har Etzion’s Israel
Koschitzky Virtual Beit Midrash and is republished here with
permission.
Where There Is No Beit Din
by R. Daniel Mann
Question: I am a lawyer in a country with a small Jewish population,
in which when we need a din Torah, we fly someone in from another
country. A Jew who is suing another Jew asked me to represent him,
and the dispute is on a modest amount of money, which is less than
the cost of bringing a beit din. May we sue in non-Jewish courts?
Answer: Although we respect and value local governmental courts
(see Avot 3:2), Jews are required to seek adjudication specifically in a
beit din (Shulchan Aruch, Choshen Mishpat 26). There are two main
rationales for this halacha: 1. It is wrong for the incorrect litigant,
from the perspective of Torah law, to win the case. 2) Seeking a
different system of justice is a severe affront to the Torah’s
pertinence in the critical realm of justice (see Beit Yosef, CM 26; S’ma
26:4).
Factor #1 does not apply if the two sides agree to go before the
non-Jewish court, as they can decide on other forms of dispute
resolution, e.g., mediation, flipping a coin … However, factor #2 is
still a problem. If adjudicating in a beit din is unfeasible, then factor
#2 should not be a problem because one is not rejecting Torah justice
but is just dealing with a situation where it is not an option. Indeed,
the gemara talks about adjudication before unknowledgeable Jews
when no local Jews are capable of functioning as a proper beit din
(Sanhedrin 23a, adopted by the Rashba, cited in Beit Yosef, CM 8).
The implication is that this is preferable to going to the local
non-Jewish court. On the other hand, there is room to argue that this
was based on an assumption, which is not as prevalent in our days as
in the past, that the courts were a corrupt and a dangerous place for
Jews and the Jewish community (see Rashba, Shut II:290).
What does one do when a city has no Jewish tribunal at all? The Rama
(CM 14:1) says that this is grounds for going to another city from the
7
one in which the case should have been heard. However, as the
discussion above implies, out-of town alternatives may be deemed
practically unfeasible.
Most poskim posit that when there is no beit din that can adjudicate,
it is permissible to go before a non-Jewish court (Chukot Hachayim
(Palagi) 6). The Rivash (216) implies this. The Shulchan Aruch (CM
61:6) says that although a contractual stipulation does not allow a
lender to make payment from a borrower’s property without
involvement of beit din, he may do so if he cannot find a beit din to
adjudicate.The Maharikash (Erech Lechem, ad loc.) broadens this
concept to allowing a Jew to sue in non-Jewish court when a local beit
din is unwilling to hear the case. There is discussion about the
conditions under which such action is justified (see Chukot Hachayim
ibid.) and on whether a beit din must at least grant permission, but in
cases where there is no alternative, it is permitted to go to the courts.
Spending more money on transportation than the claim warrants is
one such case (see Sanhedrin 31b). On the other hand, there are
often reasonable alternatives. Mediation and non-judicial arbitration
are often good ideas in any case. Nowadays, there are recognized
batei din which will adjudicate via video-conferencing, as our beit din
has done successfully. While a standard hearing is more effective, we
find precedents for compromising effectiveness in a case of need. For
example, when one side wants to go to an expert regional beit din and
the other prefers a local lower-level one, they adjudicate locally, and
the beit din sends questions to experts (ibid.; Shulchan Aruch, CM
14:1).
We suggest that your plaintiff propose one of the above alternatives.
If the other side rejects them, it is like any case in which the
defendant refuses to submit to beit din and beit din grants permission
to go to court. It would be legitimate for the plaintiff to refuse to offer
one of these options if he truly believes that they will take away from
his right for justice. In any case, it would be permitted for you to
represent him as a lawyer in court.
Sacrificing the Sinner
by R. Gil Student
I. Two Reasons for Punishment
Beruriah famously inferred from the Bible that God does want sinners
to suffer punishment but rather to repent (Berakhos 10a). Does this
desire for repentance mean that religious authorities should tread
lightly with a sinner to prevent his going farther off the path? On the
other hand, if authorities fail to punish wrong-doers, others will be
emboldened to follow in their path.
Put differently, one purpose of punishment is rehabilitation, bringing
the perpetrator back toward good citizenship. Another is to serve as a
deterrent, scaring away other would-be criminals. When the goal of
rehabilitation clashes with that of deterrence, which should Jewish
authorities prefer?
In the modern Jewish community, post-Enlightenment and
post-Emancipation, religious authority means something very
different than it did when the Jewish community was autonomous and
largely self-governing. For the current study, we will only examine
Copyright © 2014 Torah Musings, All rights reserved.
80
Weekly Digest from TorahMusings.com pre-modern texts, with the latest being a responsum by R. Ya’akov
Emden, who lived at the time that the Enlightenment began to
flourish. Later literature overflows with the dilemma of dealing with
sinners, the struggle of tradition in a non-traditional era. Rabbis of
this time are full of angst over this dilemma. But their reality is so
different from that of prior eras that their discussions deserve
separate treatment.
story and not rendering judgment on the outcome. (R. Ya’akov Emden
(She’eilas Ya’avetz 1:79) was puzzled by the Chavos Yair‘s change of
opinion at the very end of the responsum when discussing this text.
But I this it is clear that he was merely discarding this proof without
changing his opinion.)
III. The Idol Servant
II. Rebbe’s “Prophecy”
Three Talmudic passages are particularly relevant. The Gemara (
Kiddushin 72a) records R. Yehudah Ha-Nasi’s surprising last words.
He listed four places in Babylonia and denounced their residents. One
city, he said, was full of mamzerim. Another of Amonites. In a third
city, wife-swapping occurred. And in a fourth, they caught fish on
Shabbos. R. Achi Bar Yoshiah was so upset that he excommunicated
the people of this fourth city, who in turn proceeded to leave Judaism
entirely.
R. Yisrael Isserlein of 15th century Austria (Terumas Ha-Deshen
2:138) quotes R. Alexander Suslin (14th century German author of
Sefer Ha-Agudah) who uses this Gemara as proof that religious
authorities should punish wrong-doers even if it will push them
farther away from Judaism. The Talmud seems to approve of the
action despite the unfortunate albeit predictable repercussions. A
century later, far from R. Isserlein’s home Vienna, R. David Ibn Zimra
of 16th century Egypt (Responsa Radbaz 1:187) infers the same
conclusion from this passage.
Similarly, R. Binyamin Ze’ev of early 16th century Greece (Responsa
Binyamin Ze’ev, no. 287) reads the passage similarly. He was dealing
with a man who consistently insulted rabbis and denigrated conversos
who had escaped Christian lands and returned to Judaism. This latter
group had suffered religious persecution and now had to suffer this
man’s insult. The offender deserved excommunication until he
apologized and repented of his ways. However, there was apparently
a concern that he would leave Judaism over the punishment. Based on
the above Gemara, R. Binyamin Ze’ev ruled that the punishment
should be applied.
th
Significantly, R. Moshe Isserles of 16 century Poland (the Rema;
Shulchan Arukh, Yoreh De’ah 334:1) rules according to the Terumas
Ha-Deshen (and the Radbaz and R. Binyamin Ze’ev). However, R. Yair
Chaim Bacharach (Chavos Yair 141) of 17th century Germany, while
agreeing with this ruling, questioned the interpretation of this
passage.
The Chavos Yair was asked whether the community should fine and
denounce a man who drank gentile wine if, in response, he would
likely eat non-kosher food and leave Judaism entirely. The local rabbi
decided not to punish the man so as not to push him farther away.
When the Chavos Yair was asked, he strongly disagreed because
leniency on this man might encourage other sinners by removing
their fear of communal consequences. A court is even empowered to
execute someone for a minor violation in order to prevent widespread
lawlessness (Sanhedrin 46a). Certainly, the religious leadership may
punish someone appropriately to similarly prevent lawlessness.
However, the Chavos Yair did not see the text about R. Yehudah
Ha-Nasi as conclusive. In his opinion, the Gemara was only telling the
8
The Gemara (Kiddushin 20a-b) discusses the case of a man who sells
himself as a slave to an idol, meaning to work on its behalf by
chopping word or cleaning the area around it. Perhaps such a person
who would sell himself to an idol should be abandoned. After all, he
has clearly separated himself from Judaism. Maybe we should “throw
a rock after the fallen.” No, the Gemara concludes, we must still
redeem him from his servitude.
R. David Ha-Levi Segal of 17th century Poland (Taz, Yoreh De’ah
334:1) cites this passage as a counterproof to the Rema’s above
ruling. Since we are willing to save someone from apostasy, certainly
we will prevent causing someone to leave the fold. Better to refrain
from action than to cause someone to abandon Judaism.
However, R. Shabsi Cohen (Nekudos Ha-Kessef, ad loc.), a younger
contemporary and frequent sparring partner, disputes the relevance
of this text. An individual must redeem his relative, even a servant to
an idol. But that is about individuals. Why should we be surprised that
we must care for our family, even if they are wayward? However, a
court must fulfill its duty to punish wrongdoers, come what may.
Otherwise society will crumble.
The Taz further quotes a ruling by R. Yehudah Mintz (Responsa
Mahari Mintz, no. 5) about a divorced woman who married while still
nursing, which is rabbinically forbidden. If the court attempted to
force the couple to divorce, there was a distinct possibility that they
would leave Judaism to avoid the verdict. Mahari Mintz ruled that the
couple may stay together. The Taz sees here a proof for his approach
that it is better to allow a violation rather than risk losing the Jews to
religion.
However, as R. Shimshon Morpurgo (Shemesh Tzedakah, Yoreh De’ah
, no. 48) of early 18th century Italy points out, the Mahari Mintz only
reaches that conclusion because he found other reasons for leniency.
He argued that a minority opinion among earlier authorities would
allow this marriage. Additionally, he believed that as a single woman
this nursing mother would act promiscuously. He felt that the
minority opinion combined with his concern for the woman’s possible
improper activity and that this couple might leave Judaism were
sufficient for leniency.
R. Morpurgo’s case was even more vexing. Should the court censure
a licentious woman who threatens to convert to Christianity along
with her four young children? Even if you follow those who are
unconcerned for the sinner’s possible apostasy, what about the
innocent children? R. Morpurgo quotes the Rema’s ruling (Yoreh
De’ah 334:6) that a religious court may prevent the circumcision of an
excommunicated man’s children or even expel them from school as
proof that we punish deviant parents even if it affects their children.
While this approach is surprising, it recognizes that any action
against parents cause the children to suffer. Should we refrain from
imprisoning parents who commit crimes so the children will not be
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IV. Let Him Suffer the Consequences
The Mishnah (Ma’aser Sheini 5:1) states that someone should mark
his forbidden food to prevent others from eating it by mistake. R.
Shimon Ben Gamliel says that this does not apply to food that others
can only steal. The Gemara (Bava Kama 69a) explains that R. Shimon
Ben Gamliel holds the surprising view of “haliteihu le-rasha ve-yamus,
let the wicked stuff themselves and die.” In other words, if they want
to sin then they have to suffer the consequences, as serious as they
may be.
R. Yair Chaim Bacharach (ibid.) applies this to the case of someone
who may leave Judaism over punishment for his sin. He sinned and
must suffer the punishment. If that causes more problems for him, it
is his fault. The literature on this passage has grown significantly in
recent years but that takes us past our chosen timeframe and must
wait for separate discussion.
V. Community Priority
In an astonishing passage, R. Yitzchak Arama of 15th century Spain (
Akedas Yitzchak, Vayera no. 20) discusses the general communal
ambivalence to the use of Jewish prostitutes and the existence in a
few places of communally supported brothels. The religious
leadership in those places had decided that it was better for people to
commit this sin rather than worse sins with married or gentile
women.
quotes the verse (Lev. 20:4): “And if the people of the land hide their
eyes from that man…” On this verse, the Sages (quoted by Rashi) say
that if the court ignores one sin they will eventually ignore many sins.
In other words, by failing to properly rebuke a sinner you are
enabling him and others to sin more.
Additionally, if we decide not to punish sinners then society will break
down. Without law enforcement, there will be no order. Theft,
violence, adultery and the like will proliferate. In other words, society
as a whole needs the deterrence, which prevents us from reducing
the criminal’s sentence. Similarly, R. Ya’akov Emden (ibid.), in
discussing someone who stole from a man, committed adultery with
the victim’s wife, defamed him and caused his death (presumably
through aggravation), rules that the perpetrator may not be accepted
into the community without returning the stolen money to the
deceased’s family and asking their forgiveness–even if this
requirement causes the transgressor to leave Judaism. R. Emden
argues that if we fail to enforce the law then not only will justice be
perverted but the deterrence will be diminished and violations will
spread further. Additionally, we cannot maintain the strength of
deterrence if we enforce the law selectively. If we force other people
to repay their thefts then the authorities must also force this man.
The Radbaz also suggests that someone like that will often leave
religion regardless of what the religious authorities do. Others point
out that some people who threaten to leave the community do not
really intend to. It is generally difficult to gauge whether these
possibilities are serious concerns.
R. Arama rails against this practice. He distinguishes between the sin
of an individual and of the community. If an individual sins then he
will be punished, either by human or divine hands. But if the
community in general and the religious authorities in particular allow
the sin, or even support it, then it becomes the sin of the entire
community, a massive undertaking of sinfulness. Better an individual
commit a terrible sin than the entire community commit together a
smaller one. Therefore, the religious authorities cannot look the other
way but must condemn and attempt to prevent such sin.
VII. Conclusion
There is a concept in Jewish law of preferred ignorance. If someone is
going to ignore warnings and commit a sin, better not to inform him
that the act is forbidden. In this way, at least he is sinning
accidentally rather than intentionally (e.g. Shabbos 148b). However,
this rule has limitations. For example, it only applies to rabbinic
violations and not biblical (ibid.). R. Shimon Ben Tzemach Duran (
Responsa Rashbatz 2:47), in 16th century Algeria, rules that we set
this concern aside for the sake of the community. We inform a
community that an act is forbidden to prevent the general populace
from sinning, even if an individual will thereby become an intentional
sinner. Similarly, R. Bacharach (ibid.) writes: “we worry about the
interests of the community even if it is against the interests of the
individual.”
Contemporary Jewry faces very different communal challenges than
pre-modern Jewry. Of course, that does not mean we ignore the ample
precedents. However, these rulings must be carefully applied, taking
into account the changed circumstances. Unsurprisingly, there is a
large body of literature of religious authorities of the past two
centuries doing just that. I leave surveying that literature as a subject
for a future essay.
VI. Other Considerations
The Radbaz (ibid.) adds other considerations. First, Jews are
responsible for one other–Kol Yisrael areivim zeh la-zeh. However, the
application of this principle could easily be reversed on the Radbaz. If
we are responsible for their current sins, certainly we should avoid
causing them to commit even worse sins. However, the Radbaz
9
The Radbaz reaches a wise and important conclusion. He points out
that this is a sensitive matter that must be carefully considered by the
generation’s highest leadership. Every person is different and every
transgression is different. If we truly believe that mercy will
rehabilitate the sinner, then we should help him return to good
standing. Ultimately, it the judge must decide based on his best
judgment.
What Tzenius Is Really About
by R. Gil Student
A yeshiva student complained in an online letter, reported in JTA, that
checks for adherence to the school’s dress code are “predatory.” She
may be right. Enforcement of any standard can be taken too far. Or
she may be a teenager complaining that she is forced to follow rules
rather than do what she wants. We cannot comment without knowing
the specifics of this situation.
Naturally, some people are taking this story as a condemnation of
Orthodoxy as a society that represses women with primitive dress
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82
Weekly Digest from TorahMusings.com codes. I’m not sure that is really what this story is about. I remember
when I attended high school, the administration strictly enforced its
rule that boys must wear shirts with collars. We were routinely
checked and boys who did not have collars were punished with
increasing severity. Some boys wore fake collars that they removed
during the day. It was silly. Requiring a boy to wear a collar is
probably less onerous than requiring a girl to wear a skirt rather than
pants. But I think an argument can be made that requiring a boy to
wear a tie, as at least one Modern Orthodox yeshiva does, is more
oppressive than requiring a girl to wear a skirt below her knee. One
local boys yeshiva recently instituted a strict white-button-down-shirt
policy, to the great consternation of parents and students. I have not
seen any media outcry about the oppression of boys. But that is
beside the point.
Schools have a right to establish dress codes that set a specific
desired atmosphere. And if the administration and faculty fail to
enforce a rule, they make a mockery of themselves and the school’s
rules. The extent of their enforcement depends on many factors,
including the rebelliousness of the students. A school administration
has to carefully balance student freedom with school rules.
Overemphasis on either side leads to an unproductive school
environment. I don’t expect teenagers to understand that. They want
freedom and the ability to express themselves in any way they choose,
at any time they desire. But I expect adults to understand.
This is even more important because we are dealing with a rule based
on religious requirements. If there was a problem in the school of
students bringing ham sandwiches for lunch and eating them in front
of all the other yeshiva students, a flagrant religious violation, the
administration would be justified in checking students’ lunches or
otherwise ensuring that this does not occur. But these adult critics
presumably do not consider dressing according to halakhah to be a
“real” religious issue. Regardless, a school has every right to define
and enforce a dress code. Adults who join with the children in
complaining are acting, well, childish. It’s sad to see our communal
discussion descend to this level. The way to avoid harping over a
dress code is to follow it. That makes life much easier and the school
environment less oppressive.
That said, I am further pained that discussion of tzeni’us, roughly
translated as modesty, revolves around female dress codes. It should
not be that way. Shulchan Arukh has a section called “the laws of
tzeni’us” and it does not include dress codes. In fact, women’s dress
codes are not directly discussed anywhere in Shulchan Arukh, only
indirectly (primarily in Orach Chaim 75 and Even Ha-Ezer 21),
probably because local customs were historically stricter than
halakhah. (A reader skeptical of the dress codes can find a helpful
review of the primary sources in R. Elyakim Ellinson’s Hatznei’a
Lekhes.)
R. Yitzchak of Corbeil is unique among Medieval codifiers in including
a separate mitzvah for tzeni’us. He counts as the 57th mitzvah: “To be
modest, as it says (Deut. 23:15) ‘And your camp shall be holy.” Within
the obligations of tzeni’us he includes baring oneself as little as
possible in the bathroom, covering one’s excrement and being modest
while engaging in marital relations (which he leaves undefined). He
continues that tzeni’us is particularly important during prayer and
Torah study. By this he means avoiding urine and excrement, which in
the days before plumbing required effort. It still does today when
dealing with passed gas or children who are not yet toilet trained. It
is also relevant when walking down the street and discussing Torah in
a city that can be littered with animal droppings. While the Semak
does not mention this, there is similarly a problem of studying Torah
in sight of improperly dressed people. (Note that Shulchan Arukh
includes these laws in various places.)
What do these rules tell us about tzeni’us? God comes down to us and
dwells in our midst, so to speak (see the beginning of Deut. 23:15 and
Chinukh 543). But He avoids a place where people refuse to act
refined, where nakedness, excrement and impurity abound. In this
sense, cleanliness does, indeed, lead to godliness (see Avodah Zarah
20b).
The reason why nakedness is bad leads us to the character trait of
tzeni’us, which is distinct from the halakhic obligation. The prophet
Micha (6:8) teaches that God wants to us to “walk humbly (hatznei’a
lekhes) with your God.” Commentators such as Radak and Metzudas
David explain this to mean worshipping God privately, emphasizing
the internal over the external. Sha’arei Teshuvah (1:25) and Orechos
Tzadikim (Anavah) use the concept to describe humility and a lack of
desire for personal honor. These are all true, and there is much more
to the character trait of tzeni’us. God desires Jews who are humble
and maintain their own privacy, including physical privacy. We must
cover our bodies appropriately and use them privately, especially–but
not only–during prayer and Torah study, which constitute important
parts of the yeshiva school day.
Most importantly, tzeni’us is not just for women. Tzeni’us is an
obligation and a value for all Jews. Making it primarily about required
skirt and sleeve lengths, a sad reality of our time, is a perversion of
the concept. It is sad that people have such difficulty with the basics
of covering themselves that they miss the larger message.
Undoubtedly, this is due to the permissive society in which we live.
We have to teach our children that Judaism is a counter-culture, a
tradition with its own values and emphases. Following the latest
fashions when they contradict halakhah is a subversion of the basic
idea of Judaism in the modern world, submission to God’s
commandments in order to elevate ourselves.
Hilkhos Tzeni’us in Shulchan Arukh (Orach Chaim 240–241) contains
two chapters, one on a married couple’s proper behavior in the
bedroom and the other an admonition against urinating naked. The
former is much discussed by later authorities, with wide ranging
opinions, but these are usually communicated privately. (For an
accessible discussion in English, see R. David M. Feldman, Birth
Control in Jewish Law, ch. 5.)
10
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24 September, 2014 | A Window into the Orthodox Jewish Intellectual’s World| Edited by: Rabbi Gil Student
The Limits of Teshuvah
converso, who under fear for his life converted to Christianity,
remove the obligation to recite kaddish and therefore remove all
priority for the mourner. The Radakh rules that the mourner has full
priority as someone mourning for his father.
by R. Gil Student
Teshuvah, repentance, breaks through the heavenly barrier, reaching
the divine throne and tearing evil decrees. However there is a large
distance between heaven and earth. Does teshuvah have this same
piercing power in the earthly realm? Is there a Jewish concept of
parole or even dismissal of charges due to repentance?
I. Teshuvah and Theodicy
Tosafos (Kesubos 30b sv. din) ask the traditional question why bad
things do not always happen to bad people. Someone who commits a
sin that merits execution should be smitten by God. Yet we see many
such people living long lives. Today, when many find it difficult to
accept that truly bad people exist, the common question is why bad
things happen to good people. Traditionally, however, the more
frequent question was about the success of the wicked. As Jeremiah
(12:1) asks, “Why does the way of the wicked prosper?”
In the course of this discussion, the Radakh points out that criminals
are required to confess immediately prior to their executions.
However, we still treat them like wicked people even after their
deaths, forbidding their family from mourning or burying the
deceased in family plots. The Radakh suggests that mere recitation of
a confession does not constitute repentance. However, a truly
penitent criminal, after his execution, is buried among his family and
is mourned. R. Yosef Engel (Gilyonei Ha-Shas, Makkos 13b) points out
that the Radakh would still have the court execute a repentant
criminal. The lenient treatment does not undo the sentence.
R. Engel (ibid.) discusses three reasons why the court should not
absolve a repentant criminal.1 However, I am not convinced they all
survive scrutiny.
III. Who Knows?
Tosafos offer two answers: 1) the wicked repent and in response God
lessens or entirely removes the punishment; or 2) a merit of the
wicked, some good deed they performed for which they deserve
reward, delays their punishment. I do not believe that these answers
are intended as comprehensive theodicies. I suspect that Tosafos
would accept other answers, such as those suggested by other
commentators.
II. Teshuvah and the Commutation of a Sentence
Regardless, Tosafos’ first answer raises another question. A wicked
person’s teshuvah removes the sin or even transforms it into
something positive. This change leads God to lighten or even remove
entirely the punishment. Does teshuvah similarly relieve the
perpetrator from human punishment? For example, should a (duly
authorized) religious court execute a murderer who undergoes a
religious transformation via teshuvah or should it set him free? The
Noda Bi-Yehudah (1:OC:35) puts it this way: If witnesses to a murder
only come forward decades after the event, and in the meantime the
murderer repents and completely turns his life around, should the
court convict and execute him for the murder?
R. Yaakov Weil of fifteenth century Germany (Responsa Mahari Weil,
Dinin Ve-Halakhos 61) states that a blood avenger (Num. 35; Deut.
19) retains his right to revenge even if the murderer repents. Mahari
Weil assumes that the earthly punishment is not averted by teshuvah.
However, he does not explain why.
R. David HaKohen of Corfu (Responsa Radakh 30:2) was asked
whether a mourner for a converso father has the same priority as
other mourners. In a time when only one person recited kaddish at a
time, priority was important. If a mourner for a sibling was present,
would the mourner for a converso take precedence because he is
saying kaddish for his father? Or does the fact that his father was a
The Mabit (Beis Elokim, Teshuvah ch. 2) offers two reasons why a
court must still punish a repentant criminal. One of these is that the
court cannot know who truly repents. I find this the most surprising
of all reasons because courts already have a procedure for detecting
penitents. Indeed, the responsa literature indicates that communities
have needed to use this procedure over the ages.
Men who engage in wicked behavior are invalid as witnesses in court.
The Gemara (Sanhedrin 25b) describes how such men regain their
credibility. In theory, all they need to do is repent. However, in
practice they must prove their repentance by going in the other
extreme. Gamblers must destroy their gambling paraphernalia and
not even play the gambling game without money; interest lenders
must tear up their contracts and refrain from lending with interest in
even permissible situations; merchants who sell forbidden fruits of
the Shemitah year must pass another Shemitah year without
succumbing. Jewish law allows for criminals to demonstrate their
changed ways, to prove their teshuvah.
Similarly, chazzanim and shochetim, cantors and slaughterers, who
are caught sinning must be removed from their positions and can only
regain their jobs after demonstrating their teshuvah. As can be
expected, many such cases have arisen over the years, leading to
wide discussion of general principles and specific cases.2 The bottom
line is that religious courts already recognize repentance and have a
mechanism for determining its sincerity. Therefore, this reason seems
difficult.
IV. Then What?
The Noda Bi-Yehudah (1:OC:35) argues that if courts commute
sentences for penitent criminals, they will effectively undermine the
entire judicial system. Of what purpose is a law if we do not enforce
1
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84
Weekly Digest from TorahMusings.com it? God intended the punishments as a deterrent. If no one is ever
punished, and a convicted killer can easily say that he repents, then
the divinely ordained punishment is undermined.
This seems to be a combination of the previous concern of being
unable to determine true repentance and another concern about
deterrence. We already responded to the first issue. This would mean
that not just anyone could claim to repent. Such a claim would have
to be accompanied by appropriate behavior. But even then, someone
wishing to avoid execution could falsely change his behavior. While a
cantor wishing to regain his job could fake repentance, presumably
someone awaiting execution has greater motivation.
However, it seems the validity of this concern is a debate between
Rashi and Tosafos. Rashi (Makos 5a sv. mai ta’ama) states that a
criminal who confesses before witnesses testify against him in court
exempts himself from punishment. Tosafos (ad loc., sv. de-be-idna)
argue that this position would nullify all punishments. Criminals could
simply immediately confess their crimes, thereby avoiding
punishment. This seems to be precisely the Noda Bi-Yehudah‘s
concern about repentance.
R. Tzvi Hirsch Chajes (Glosses, Makkos, ad loc.) defends Rashi on two
points. First, he notes that the conclusion of the Gemara in Bava
Kama (75b) is that someone who confesses to a fine (as opposed to
physical punishment, which is Rashi’s extension) is exempt from
paying the fine, but only if his confession obligates him to pay the
principal amount. A confession that totally exempts one from paying
anything is too easy. Similarly, R. Chajes contends, Rashi is arguing
that someone who confesses to murder will still be punished, just not
executed. The court will find a lesser punishment to impose.
However, R. Ya’akov Ettlinger (Arukh La-Ner, Makkos, ad loc.)
convincingly argues that Rashi on Bava Kama reads the Gemara
differently and allows for a confession that completely exempts the
perpetrator.
R. Chajes makes another point that indirectly responds to the Noda
Bi-Yehudah. The Sages were not concerned that courts would only
administer the Torah’s punishments infrequently. To the contrary,
they embraced the concept. The Mishnah (Makkos 7a) states that a
court should execute at most once a decade, or even less frequently.
It seems that allowing repentance to remove an execution sentence is
consistent with this Talmudic attitude. R. Chajes suggests that this
explains Rashi’s view that a criminal is exempted from punishment if
he confesses, even without full repentance, before the court receives
testimony against him. This would also seem to respond to the Noda
Bi-Yehudah‘s explanation for the reason that courts punish a penitent
criminal.
V. Sin and Punishment
The Mabit‘s second reason why a court must punish a repentant
criminal is that all sin requires punishment. Even after teshuvah, the
sin must still be punished. Either a court will punish the criminal or
God will. The Mabit explains that this is why Tosafos say that God will
lighten the punishment of a penitent sinner. He must still administer
some punishment. And so must a human court.
However, this approach seems to ignore a key phrase in Tosafos.
Tosafos explicitly state that God either lessens or removes the
2
punishment. There is at least some case in which God refrains
entirely from punishing a repentant criminal. R. Ya’akov Emden (
She’eilas Ya’avetz 2:9) goes so far as to disagree with Tosafos over
this phrase. R. Emden believes that every criminal must be punished.
Allow me a brief digression to describe R. Emden’s case because it is
so interesting. One of the attendees at R. Emden’s private minyan
reluctantly went to the main shul in town and saw someone treat the
shul disrespectfully by smoking a pipe at the entrance during service.
This man objected and knocked the pipe out of the other man’s
mouth. This other man then pulled out a knife and stabbed the first
man fatally, in shul. Apparently, there was insufficient evidence to
convict the killer so the local (gentile) court was willing to acquit him
if he swore his innocence. The perpetrator’s rabbi ruled that he was
allowed to swear falsely to save his life. R. Emden wrote this
responsum to argue that this murderer, even if penitent, must be
punished and may not swear falsely in court.
VI. Inadmissible
The Maharal (Nesivos Olam, Teshuvah, ch. 2) offers two related
reasons why a court cannot change its sentence based on the
perpetrator’s repentance. First, earthly courts only focus on the bad,
the crime. In contrast, the heavenly court looks at all sides of the
issue, including the good. I think this means that God considers all
extenuating circumstances, including mindset and subsequent
developments. A human court can only look at the facts of the crime
and not the broader picture.
Maharal adds that teshuvah brings an individual closer to God. It is a
change in the relationship between an individual and God. Therefore,
only God can accept penitents and no one else. A human court has no
place in this personal relationship. This second, mystical approach is
difficult to understand given the practical reality of accepting
penitent chazzanim and shochetim. The human court is not accepting
teshuvah but recognizing its effect on the perpetrator.
Perhaps the Maharal means that teshuvah is inadmissible in a
criminal trial in a religious court. Certainly American judges are
limited in the evidence they can consider. Evidence obtained illegally
or otherwise inadmissible cannot be utilized in reaching a decision.
We can easily transfer this concept to a religious court and suggest,
based on the Maharal, that repentance is inadmissible in a Jewish
criminal trial. However, in determining rehabilitation, which is not a
trial, repentance is admissible as a character assessment.
The Mishnah (Avos 1:6) tells us to judge every person–all the
person–favorably. Some commentators (e.g. Sefas Emes) interpret
this to mean that we must look at a person and consider his whole
personality and his complete circumstances rather than looking at a
specific incident. From what we have learned, this is a divine
perspective. Human courts are procedurally limited in their focus. On
a personal level, though, we are asked to look more broadly, to see a
person’s bigger picture which is usually more positive.
As we enter Rosh Hashanah and the season of heavenly judgment, we
pray that our own larger picture be taken into account. Our many
merits should lighten the load of any misdeed we may have
committed. In preparation, we can consider how we can judge others
with this heavenly perspective. By acting more divinely, we can see
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85
Weekly Digest from TorahMusings.com the world more positively and, in return, be judged favorably as well.
Perhaps, the two Mitzvos we heard directly from Hashem are indeed
fundamentally different than the others. More specifically, they were
encoded in our collective conscious/unconscious differently than were
all the others.
1. I first became aware of R. Engel’s discussion from a Shabbos
Shuvah lecture by R. Ephraim Kanarfogel over 20 years ago. ↩
2. See Magen Avraham 53:8; Shakh, Yoreh De’ah 2:11; Pischei
Teshuvah, Yoreh De’ah 2:5; Shulchan Arukh, Yoreh De’ah
119:15; Taz, ad loc. 16. ↩
Beyond Words
Beyond Words: The Dance Between Knowing and Not Knowing
Hashem
by R. Yehuda Krohn, Psy.D.
This is for anyone who, even as Rosh Hashanah approaches, faces
doubt – in particular questions of Emunah/belief. The source of doubt
could be one’s own uncertainties or perhaps those of someone we
know.
Questions may arise about Hashem’s existence, the compatibility of
science and Torah, or the presence of suffering and evil in the world.
They may involve measuring the congruity of Torah values with those
modern values we would not wish to dismiss (e.g., inclusivity). The
questions may derive from a comparative religion course we once
took.
The list is not exhaustive, but for many who try to find inspiration and
connectedness in the month of Elul, it can be exhausting – or at least
depleting of the spirit. It may as well lead to a sense of alarm, shame
and/or isolation. Something along the lines of “Why do these
questions bother me? Given that I entertain them, can I even consider
myself Frum? How would others in my community relate to me, if
they knew what went on inside my head?”
I would like to suggest a limud zechus/positive reframe for anyone
who, despite his desire to be observant and to belong, is being
gnawed at by doubt. It starts with a Gemara toward the end of
Makkos (23b, 24a).
Rabbi Simlai expounds: Six hundred and thirteen Mitzvos were
said to Moshe – 365 negative commandments, corresponding to
the days of the solar year; 248 positive commandments,
corresponding to the limbs of a person. (I will assume that up to
this point, most of us are familiar with the material.) Rav
Hamnunah adduces a Biblical proof: Torah was commanded to
us by Moshe, an inheritance to the congregation of Jacob
(Devarim 33:4). The word “Torah” has a numerical value of 611;
[whereas] the commandments of “I (am your G-d)” and “You
shall have no (other gods)” we heard directly from the Mighty
one (i.e., G-d himself).1
So, 611 Mitzvos – corresponding to the word “Torah” – were conveyed
to us through Moshe Rabenu and 2 Mitzvos came directly from
Hashem. It would seem odd, given the above, that the one word with
which we try to capture the essence of the Five Books of Moshe –
namely “Torah” – points to an incomplete number of Mitzvos.
Moreover, the Mitzvos that are excluded from the count arguably lie
at the very foundation of all other Mitzvos. Why should this be?
3
Har Sinai was not simply an awe inspiring event for the Jewish
people. It was traumatic – particularly the moments that Hashem
commanded, “I am your G-d… You shall have no other gods…” We
would have been absolutely and utterly powerless as the words
thundered down upon – or, more accurately, surrounded – us. It was
not just a near death experience. The Rabbis teach us that our souls
did, at least temporarily, take leave of our bodies, only to
miraculously return.
Trauma is encoded differently than are other memories. Typical
memories are verbal in nature and tend to be recalled, in relation to
time, as would be chapters in a book. Trauma, in contrast, is
imprinted, in iconic fashion, on a different part of the brain. It
typically resides as a group of loosely connected images, sounds and
tactile impressions. Most significantly, we typically don’t have access
to trauma, when trying to recall it. Yet, it may intrude, as a flashback,
when we are not trying to recall it. This leads to trauma being
unknown at a verbal, semantic level, while being intimately known at
a visceral level – one that is disconnected from the dimension of time.
For some reason, Hashem chose to impart to us the fact of His
existence – Anochi Hashem – in a manner that we simultaneously
recall and don’t recall, know and don’t know. Perhaps it would be too
easy (Nahama Dikisufah/humble pie) if we had the more
conventionally typed experience of his presence. Alternatively, in
order for the Jewish people to withstand the challenges they’ve faced
over millennia of exile, they need a belief or, more accurately, a faith
that is safely ensconced in a realm beyond both time and reason. Our
Emunah would, thus, be shielded from, what at different points of
time, would seem to be overpowering logic-based counterargument.
Either way, the word “Torah” (e.g., equaling 611), which also means
“teaching”, cannot fully capture the two commandments that we
recall, but don’t recall, know, yet don’t know, given the traumatic
manner they were seared into our brains. Even as we listen in Shul to
the narratives of the Sinai experience, the primarily verbal, temporal
nature of the Kriah/reading, would not and could not fully connect
with our collective memory of the event – one that is beyond both
words and time.
For many individuals, the knowing, yet not knowing is experienced as
uncertainty and doubt. The challenges they face with Emunah are less
a function of waywardness, and more a natural, almost expected
outcome of the manner that Hashem chose to reveal Himself.
All the same, persistent, gnawing doubts tend to deplete our energy;
denial of access to vital memories robs us of our sense of
connectedness. This is where Rosh Hashanah and the Shofar come to
play.
Rabbah says. God has said “Say before me [verses corresponding
to] Kingship, Memory and Shofar; Kingship so that you may
coronate Me; Memory so that memories of you should come
before Me for the good; and with what? The Shofar.” (Rosh
Hashanah 34b)
Copyright © 2014 Torah Musings, All rights reserved.
86
Weekly Digest from TorahMusings.com According to Rabbah, the Shofar is the vehicle, not only for invoking
good memories, but for the coronation of Hashem. How fitting!
Shofar represents sound without speech. (Hence, Kol Shofar and not
Divrei Shofar.) It is the unarticulated sound of the Shofar that bathes
and nourishes our timeless, wordless memories of Sinai. Moreover,
the Shofar of Rosh Hashanah bridges 3300 years and sets resonating
our collective memory of the Shofar of Sinai and, with it, the
memories of our most direct experience of Hashem.2
It is conceivable that we would not be consciously aware of an
“Emunah surge” during the Shofar blowing. All the same, it is hard to
imagine that this primal, visceral Mitzvah not touch us in ways that
leave an impression… and perhaps a sense of being a little bit less
alone.
May we all merit this Rosh Hashanah to reconnect Be’emunah
Shelaimah to our experience of Hashem’s Kingship and to be granted
a Kesivah VaChasimah Tovah.
1. In fact, the language of the first two commandments indicates
that Hashem is speaking directly to the Jewish people, whereas
the language of subsequent commandments indicates that
Moshe is referring to Hashem, as he conveys the
commandments. ↩
2. We may homiletically add that, in this context, the Gemara’s
term Zichronos/Memory refers to our own memories (not
Hashem’s awareness of us) traveling and transcending the
limitations of this world, such that we can approach The Good
One, whom we understand to exist beyond time and space. ↩
A New and Old Wind is
Blowing
by Shmuel Winiarz
Is the “Yeshiva world” too insular? Does its single-minded focus on
Talmudand codesstifle its members from exploring the world of ideas?
One graduate of Volozhin expressed that very notion in a poem he
wrote in 1898, entitled Hamatmid. Chaim Nachman Bialik writes of
his profound ambivalence towards the schools of his youth. He
expresses his admiration for the dedication of yeshiva students to
their Talmudic studies on the one hand, while critiquing what he
viewed as a narrow world that was insular to broader intellectual
ferment. Yet many people would dare to disagree and a recent
seminar that took place in Long Island serves as ample proof that
Bialik would need to update his famous poem were he alive today.
Perhaps Hamatmid 2.0.
Certainly the Internet has made knowledge available on an
unprecedented scope. Unstructured online learning through
searching, reading and watching educational videos offers insular
yeshiva students the opportunity to stretch their intellectual wings.
But even before the Internet, public libraries enabled yeshiva
students to take books out and read them in their free time. In
Volozhin, studying disciplines beyond the yeshiva curriculum was
generally discouraged although some students could be found
4
clandestinely reading literature of the haskalah. However, times have
changed and the curious student in many yeshivos find the time and
tools to learn about the world and its great thinkers. Granted, some
yeshivos actively discourage intellectual exploration. But this
ideological closedness is hardly a uniform policy. However, what’s
missing in this autodidactic universe is structure and the guidance of
experts. A recent small seminar took a big step in filling this gap, with
the goal of training a cadre of future community leaders.
An overview of the seminar is needed to grasp the surprising
magnitude of this modest event. Under the aegis of the Tikvah Fund,
the seminar invited 17 promising young men (average age in the late
twenties) who spent significant time in yeshivos such as Ner Israel,
Mir & Shaar Hatorah (and one person who took an uncommon path
from Bais Hatalmud to Bar-Ilan) to spend a week immersed in
non-standard Torah study, engaging with the contemporary internal
and external issues that face our Torah communities. Led by R.
Yitzchak Adlerstein, R. Mark Gottlieb and R. Jonathan Rosenblum, the
program began each day with a presentation on the weltanschaung of
various Torah thinkers, some of whom are often neglected during the
standard yeshiva zman, including R. Samson Raphael Hirsch, R.
Yisrael Salanter, R. Yosef Dov Soloveitchik and R. Avraham Yitzchak
Kook. Presentations were geared toward the rigor of yeshiva
students, beginning with classical texts and proceeding to extract
from them approaches to the great issues of Jewish thought, with
spirited debate all along the way. Issues including rational versus
mystical approaches to Judaism, the proper role of academic Jewish
studies (such as the traditionalist Wissenschaft of R’ David Zvi
Hoffman) and how to relate to the non-Orthodox and gentile worlds
were raised and a genuine milchamtah shel torah echoed through the
Glen Cove Mansion in Long Island where the seminar was held.
The second part of the program exposed the students to sophisticated
thought in the fields of economics and social and public policy. Dr.
James Otteson delivered presentations on the thought of great
economists such as Adam Smith and Friedrich Hayek, as well as the
moral foundations of free markets and competing visions of political
economy. Ryan Anderson, co-author of “What is Marriage? Man and
Woman; A Defense,” laid out his argument for protecting marriage’s
traditional definition which avoids religious claims and resonates with
a wider audience. Dr. Vincent Phillip Munoz, a political science
professor at Notre Dame, lectured on John Locke and the origins and
evolution of American political thought through Abraham Lincoln and
its relevance to contemporary issues of religious liberty. The
students’ exposure to political and economic theory introduces these
future Jewish leaders to the tools and vocabulary necessary to
formulate public policy.
One idea that struck me as particularly timely is the notion of
religious liberty. Our faith community derives its value system from a
Torah and halacha that doesn’t always conform to the contemporary
zeitgeist. Issues such as bris milah (ritual circumcision), shechitah
(ritual slaughter) and medical ethics have been flashpoints of conflict
in recent years between Orthodox communities and parts of the
broader world. Understanding the meaning of religious liberty (not
just using it as a catch-phrase), both in its historical context and
present usage, is invaluable when advocating for tolerance and
acceptance of faith practices in the modern era.
Copyright © 2014 Torah Musings, All rights reserved.
87
Weekly Digest from TorahMusings.com The Experience of Rosh
HaShana
In between presentations, a marketplace of ideas flourished as
like-minded budding scholars debated the hot topics of the day. With
animated exchanges typical of the yeshiva study hall, abstract
theories were applied to real situations in order to clarify the issues
and resolve communal problems. Topics included effective advocacy
for Israel, organizational challenges facing Jewish agencies, the
differences between Torah communities in Israel and the United
States and the meaning, application and limitations of the oft
misunderstood term “daas torah”. On Shabbos, R’ Meir Triebitz
presented a multi-discipline vision spanning many earlier discussed
topics, formulating a philosophy of Halacha and arguing for a Jewish
theology of politics and economics. In many ways, this aptly capped
the seminar, demonstrating how a wholly traditional talmid chacham
can incorporate the many different perspectives into a single, Torah
framework.
by R. David Brofsky, excerpted from Hilkhot Mo’adim: Understanding
the Laws of the Festivals
Rosh HaShana in Tanakh
Rosh HaShana, as it appears in Scripture, is somewhat mysterious.
The Torah commands:
And in the seventh month, on the first day of the month, it shall
be a holy convocation [mikra kodesh] for you; you shall do no
servile work; it shall be a day of terua for you. (Num. 29:1)
While the celebration of Rosh HaShana does not entail the pilgrimage
component of the other festivals, it shares an issur melakha, the
prohibition of labor, as well as the title of “mikra kodesh.” The
uniqueness of Rosh HaShana seems to lie in its being a “yom terua,” a
“day of terua,” the ululating sound that is variously described in
Scripture as emanating from the shofar, trumpets, or human throats.
Similarly, the Torah teaches elsewhere:
Yet now thinking back on the seminar, two themes resonate as
particularly significant. First, responsibility for the entire Jewish
community or to coin a phrase, having a klal conscious. Because the
seminar’s participants all aspire to find a place in the public square,
the seminar included presentations about R’ Moshe Sherer and R’
Nathan Birnbaum, two leading Torah spokesmen of recent times.
These larger-than-life leaders articulated compelling narratives for
the entire Jewish people. They rejected a utilitarian view bent on the
narrow goal of accessing the public coffers, but rather advocated for
a deeply Jewish moral responsibility to speak out. They insisted that
the traditional Jewish voice must be heard on both issues that are
particular to Jews and concerns that are universal to humanity, of
which we also have societal interest in engaging. Sadly, their view of
askanus, public advocacy, has lost currency today and cries for
revival.
And God spoke to Moshe, saying: “Speak to the Israelites,
saying: In the seventh month, on the first day of the month, it
shall be a solemn rest for you, a terua memorial [zikhron terua],
a holy convocation. You shall do no servile work, and you shall
bring a fire-offering to God.” (Lev. 23:23–25)
The second key takeaway is the rejoinder to Bialik. A choice is often
presented between breadth and depth. Some rabbinic voices claim
that the only way to become a talmid chacham is to focus intensely
and solely on Talmud and codes, to the exclusion of any other field of
study including Jewish History, Jewish Philosophy and even Tanach.
But that choice is a false dilemma. One can achieve breadth without
significantly altering the yeshiva curriculum by finding opportunities
outside its schedule. Each participant in this event for expanding
horizons was already a yodea sofer, well read in a broad range of
traditional texts. Each came firmly grounded in the tenets of our faith
yet open to explore new areas of knowledge.
From Volozhin until today, the yeshiva study hall, at its best, nurtures
intellectual curiosity so its brightest stars succeed in traditional
Talmud study and find additional time and opportunities to ameliorate
their unquenchable thirst for knowledge. As I looked around at this
seminar, I saw in its participants and some of its distinguished
presenters living proof that intense Talmud study of the most
traditional kind does not preclude great breadth and depth of
knowledge.
Here, too, Rosh HaShana is described by the term “terua.” While our
sages understand this to refer to the mitzva of shofar, the Torah uses
the term to describe the day itself. In what way does “terua”
characterize the day? What does blowing a shofar or trumpet
symbolize?
Throughout Tanakh, we can identify two distinct, yet apparently
contradictory descriptions of these sounds, and thus, of Rosh
HaShana itself. On the one hand, the prophet Zephaniah describes
the horrors that will befall the Jewish people as follows:
Hark…the great day of God is near; it is near and hastens
greatly, the sound of the day of God, wherein the mighty man
cries bitterly. That day is a day of wrath, a day of trouble and
distress, a day of waste and desolation, a day of darkness and
gloominess, a day of clouds and thick darkness, a day of shofar
and terua, against the fortified cities, and against the high
towers. (Zeph. 1:10, 14–16)
The terms “shofar” and “terua” are clearly employed here to depict
alarm and distress. Similarly, Amos describes the blowing of the
shofar and the people’s response: “Shall a shofar be blown in the city,
and the people not tremble? Shall evil befall a city, and God has not
done it?” (Amos 3:6) Indeed, when the Jewish people go out to war,
they are commanded to make this sound:
And when you go to war in your land against the adversary that
oppresses you, then you shall sound a terua with the trumpets;
and you shall be remembered before Lord your God, and you
shall be saved from your enemies. (Num. 10:9)
These verses strongly imply that “a day of terua” is a day of alarm,
5
Copyright © 2014 Torah Musings, All rights reserved.
88
Weekly Digest from TorahMusings.com crisis, and distress.
HaKippurim, as they are days of repentance [teshuva], fear [yira
], and dread, not days of excessive joy [simcha yeteira].1
On the other hand, the trumpets are also sounded on festive days, as
the very next verse in Numbers notes:
Rambam describes Rosh HaShana as a day of repentance,
characterized by “fear and dread,” yet he still implies that there is
some mitzva to rejoice.
And on the day of your joy, and on your appointed seasons, and
on your new moons, you shall blow the trumpets over your
burnt-offerings and over the sacrifices of your peace-offerings;
and they shall be for you as a memorial before your God: I am
Lord your God. (Num. 10:10)
Similarly, we find the following description of Ezra’s joyous reading of
the Torah on Rosh HaShana:
And Ezra the Priest brought the Torah before the congregation,
both men and women, and all that could listen with
understanding, on the first day of the seventh month…. And
Nechemia, who was the governor, and Ezra the Priest, the
Scribe, and the Levites who taught the people said to all the
people, “This day is holy to the Lord your God; neither mourn
nor weep!” For all the people were weeping, as they heard the
words of the Torah. Then he said to them, “Go on your way. Eat
the fat, and drink the sweet, and send portions to him for whom
nothing is prepared; for this day is holy to our God; do not be
sad, for God’s gladness is your strength.” So the Levites stilled
all the people, saying, “Hold your peace, for the day is holy; do
not be sad.” And all the people went their way to eat, to drink, to
send portions, and to make great joy; because they had
understood the words that were said to them. (Nech 8:2, 9–12)
Nechemia commands the people to overcome their grief over their
failure to keep the Torah. Instead, it is time to celebrate, because
“this day,” Rosh HaShana, “is holy to our God.”
In summary, Tanakh portrays Rosh HaShana as both “a day of terua”–
of fear and apprehension – and a day of great joy.
Hallel and Simchat Yom Tov on Rosh HaShana
The uncertainty regarding whether Rosh HaShana is a day of alarm
and distress or one of happiness and joy continues in the halakhic
literature. The Gemara instructs us to recite Hallel on the festivals
and the eight days of Chanukka. The Gemara then questions why
Hallel is not mandated on other special days, such as Rosh Chodesh,
Chol HaMo’ed Pesach, and Purim. Rosh HaShana and Yom Kippur
seem to meet the requirements for Hallel; they are “appointed
seasons” with a prohibition of labor. Why are they excluded?
Indeed, the Rishonim disagree as to whether the mitzva of simchat
Yom Tov, the command to rejoice on the festivals, applies to Rosh
HaShana. The Torah instructs, “Vesamachta bechagekha” – “And you
shall rejoice on your holiday” (Deut. 16:14). Is this mitzva limited to
the consumption of the shalmei simcha, the joyous peace-offerings
brought on the Shalosh Regalim (the Three Pilgrimage Festivals) for
the purpose of rejoicing, in which case it would not apply to Rosh
HaShana, or does it extend to other expressions of happiness as well?
Tosafot assume that the obligation of simchat Yom Tov may only be
fulfilled through the consumption of shalmei simcha. The obligation to
rejoice on the festivals nowadays, in the absence of the Temple, must
be rabbinic in nature.2 On the other hand, Rambam writes:
A person is obligated to rejoice on these days – he, his children,
his wife, his grandchildren, and all those who have joined his
family – as the Torah states, “And you shall rejoice on your
holiday.” Even though the Torah is referring to the obligation to
offer and consume peace-offerings (the shalmei simcha),
included in this obligation to rejoice is for a person and his entire
family to rejoice in the manner that is appropriate for him. How
is this practiced? One distributes parched grain, nuts, and
delicacies to the children. One purchases, depending on what he
can afford, clothes and beautiful jewelry for the women in the
family. The men eat meat and drink wine, as there is no rejoicing
without meat and wine.3
Rambam expands the parameters of the mitzva of simchat Yom Tov to
include other expressions of joy as well. Clearly, Tosafot cannot
maintain that the obligation to rejoice on festivals applies to Rosh
HaShana, when there is no obligation to offer shalmei simcha.
Rambam, however, who expands the definition of simchat Yom Tov,
might apply this mitzva to Rosh HaShana. Indeed, as we saw above,
he describes Rosh HaShana as a day without excessive happiness, but
with happiness, nonetheless. Furthermore, he implies elsewhere4 that
the mitzva applies to festivals other than Pesach and Sukkot,
seemingly referring to Shavuot, Rosh HaShana, and Yom Kippur.
Rabbi Aryeh Leib ben Asher Gunzberg (1695–1785) discusses this
issue in his Shaagat Aryeh,5 concluding that there must be a mitzva of
simchat Yom Tov on Rosh HaShana since one is allowed to perform
certain types of labor necessary for producing food (“okhel nefesh”)
on Rosh HaShana. If not for the commandment to rejoice, he
assumes, it would be prohibited to cook on Rosh HaShana.
R. Abbahu said: Is it seemly for the King to be sitting on His
Throne of Judgment, with the Books of Life and Death open
before Him, while the people sing joyful praises to Him?
(Arakhin 10b)
From the fact that the Gemara asks why Hallel is not recited on Rosh
HaShana, it seems to assume that it would certainly be appropriate, if
not obligatory, to recite the joyous prayer of Hallel on Rosh HaShana.
The Gemara’s answer, however, is somewhat unclear. Does the
Gemara intend to deny Rosh HaShana any aspect of joy or happiness,
or merely to temper it by omitting Hallel? Interestingly, Rambam
writes:
Mourning on Rosh HaShana
The Mishna discusses which holidays preempt the first seven (shiva)
and first thirty days (sheloshim) of mourning observed after the burial
of a close relative (Mo’ed Katan 19a). The Chakhamim and Rabban
Gamliel dispute whether only the Shalosh Regalim cancel shiva, or if
Rosh HaShana and Yom Kippur do so as well.
Rabbi Achai Gaon explains that Rabban Gamliel, who rules that “Rosh
However, we do not recite Hallel on Rosh HaShana and Yom
6
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89
Weekly Digest from TorahMusings.com HaShana and Yom Kippur are akin to the festivals,” maintains that
the commandment of simchat Yom Tov also applies on these days.
Rabbi Achai Gaon clearly assumes that it is the mitzvato rejoice that
cancels shiva.6
Ramban derives from the verse in Nechemia cited above that there is
“simcha and a prohibition to be sad” on Rosh HaShana, and the
observances of shiva and sheloshim are thus put to an end by Rosh
HaShana.7 The Shulchan Arukh rules in accordance with Rabban
Gamliel; Rosh HaShana and Yom Kippur cancel shiva and sheloshim.8
Fasting on Rosh HaShana
He cites Rabbi Chaim Vital, who testifies that the Arizal would cry
during his Rosh HaShana and Yom Kippur prayers. Alternatively, he
notes that the Vilna Gaon maintains that one should not cry during
the prayers on Rosh HaShana and that the cantor should lead the
prayers with a traditional festival melody.20 Rabbi Yosef concludes
that one who is naturally overcome by tears may cry, but one should
not bring himself to weep; rather, one should pray with happiness and
great focus.
Conclusion
Rosh HaShana surely emerges as a confusing holiday. From the Sages
to the later Acharonim, our greatest minds have grappled with its
nature and experience. It would seem that this confusion is no
accident. In fact, all service of God, as King David relates, reflects this
dialectic. In his Tehillim, we find both, “Serve God with joy; come
before His presence with singing” (Ps. 100:2) and “Serve God with
fear, and rejoice with trembling” (2:11). Midrash Tehillim asks:
The halakhic ambivalence toward the nature of Rosh HaShana is
found once again regarding one’s demeanor while eating on the
holiday. The Shulchan Arukh writes:
They eat, drink, and rejoice, and they do not fast on Rosh
HaShana and Shabbat Shuvah. However, they should not eat to
satiety, in order that they not become lightheaded – “that the
fear of God should be upon their faces” [cf. Ex. 20:16].9
The Mishna Berura explains that although Rosh HaShana is a “day of
judgment,” the commandment of simcha obligates one to eat and
drink, as stated in Nechemia.10
Rema,11 however, cites the Terumat HaDeshen,12 who asserts that
some consider it “a mitzvato fast on Rosh HaShana.” Magen Avraham,
in his introductory comments to this chapter, cites Bach, who relates
that Maharshal would not eat fish on Rosh HaShana, as he especially
enjoyed this dish and he wished to restrict himself in some way.
Magen Avraham also cites a discussion regarding the propriety of
eating meat and wearing festive clothing on Rosh HaShana.
In opposition to this opinion, the Mordekhai13 cites Rabbi Nachshon
Gaon, who prohibits fasting on Rosh Ha-Shana due to its inherent
simcha, and Taz14 and Mishna Berura15 concur.
Tefilla on Rosh HaShana
The question of the nature and experience of Rosh HaShana may also
impact upon the text and recitation of the day’s prayers. Rosh16 and
his son, the Baal HaTur,17 record different customs regarding the text
of the Shemoneh Esreh and Kiddush of Rosh HaShana. They cite
Rabbi Sar-Shalom, Rabbi Paltoi Gaon, and Rabbi Shmuel ben Chofni,
who report that in the two major Babylonian yeshivas, the standard
Shalosh Regalim formula was recited on Rosh HaShana, thanking God
for giving us “mo’adim lesimcha, chagim uzemanim lesasson” –
“appointed seasons for rejoicing, holidays and times for jubilation.”
Tur concludes, however, that the custom is in accordance with Rabbi
Hai Gaon, who omits the references to simcha. Clearly, these scholars
are debating the very nature of Rosh HaShana.
Interestingly, the posekim also discuss the manner in which one
should pray on Rosh HaShana. The Kitzur Shulchan Arukh, for
example, records that some are accustomed to praying the silent
prayers of Rosh HaShana and Yom Kippur while bowed, with their
heads lowered. He personally recommends praying upright, with a
“bent heart and with tears.”18
“Serve God with joy” – another verse says, “Serve God with
fear.” If [one serves] with joy, how is it with fear? And if [one
serves] with fear, how is it with joy?21
The Midrash records different resolutions to this quandary. R. Acha
suggests that one should serve God in this world with fear in order to
reach the next world with happiness. Similarly, R. Aivu distinguishes
between tefilla, during which joy is the primary feeling, and other
activities, during which fear dominates. The Midrash suggests
another type of solution as well: “‘With joy’ – is it possible without
fear as well? The verse therefore teaches, ‘with fear.’” In other words,
joy and fear do not necessarily contradict each other; rather, they are
crucial and complementary components of our service of God.
Rosh HaShana is “yom harat olam,” “the day of the world’s creation,”
during which we coronate God as King over humanity. Standing
before God and accepting upon ourselves His service inspires not only
feelings of fear and trepidation, but feelings of joy and happiness as
well. These seemingly contradictory feelings are natural for one who
truly experiences and internalizes Rosh HaShana, setting the proper
tone for the entire year, during which our service of God vacillates
between simcha and yira, and at times is even made up of both.22
1. Hilkhot Megilla and Chanukka 3:6. ↩
2. Tosafot, Mo’ed Katan 14, s.v. aseh deyachid. ↩
3. Hilkhot Yom Tov 6:17–18. ↩
4. Ibid. ↩
5. Sha’agat Aryeh 102. ↩
6. She’iltot, Parashat Chayei Sara 15. ↩
7. Ramban, Mo’ed Katan 24b. ↩
8. Shulchan Arukh, Yoreh De’ah 399:6. Rabbi Soloveitchik
addresses this issue as well in his Shiurim LeZekher Abba Mori.
↩
Rabbi Ovadia Yosef also discusses this issue: should one pray with
happiness and elation, or out of “fear of judgment,” while crying?19
7
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90
Weekly Digest from TorahMusings.com The Nature of Kol Nidrei and Hataras Nedarim
9. Ibid., Orach Chaim 597:1. ↩
We can begin with the Tikkunei Zohar1 that explains the reason we
begin Yom Kippur with Kol Nidrei: on Yom Kippur we seek to annul
God’s vow to punish the Jewish people for its many sins during the
preceding year. Therefore at Kol Nidrei we establish a beis din of
three dayyanim (i.e., the Shaliach Tzibbur with two men at his side)
and in so doing facilitate God’s forgiveness on that holiest of days.
The source of this passage in the Zohar is Rava’s statement in this
Gemara.
10. Mishna Berura 597:1. ↩
11. Rema, Orach Chaim 597:3. ↩
12. Terumat HaDeshen 245. ↩
13. Mordekhai, Rosh HaShana 708. ↩
14. Taz, Orach Chaim 597:1. ↩
15. Mishna Berura 597:12. ↩
16. Rosh, Rosh HaShana 4:14. ↩
17. Tur, Orach Chaim 582. ↩
18. Kitzur Shulchan Arukh 129:2. ↩
19. Yechave Da’at 2:69. ↩
20. Maase Rav 207. ↩
21. Midrash Tehillim 100, s.v. ivdu. ↩
22. I heard this analysis in 1992 from Rabbi Michael Rosensweig. ↩
On Regret, Annulment, and the
Essence of Teshuvah
Va-Yechal Moshe: On Regret, Annulment, and the Essence of
Teshuvah
Part of a Shiur by Ha-Rav Joseph Dov Soloveitchik
Congregation Moriah, New York, NY, Dec 1st 1956
The Torah teaches us that when a person takes a vow and then
regrets it (i.e., has charatah) a beis din can void it completely. How
can a beis din nullify an actual event, declaring that it never took
place? This can be explained as follows. Generally, regret for an act
one has performed can take one of two forms. The first occurs when
someone changes his or her mind, in light of new realities that make
it clear that the earlier action is no longer appropriate. For example
we see today how in light of new geopolitical realities the US State
Department regrets having cooperated so closely with the European
powers, and is seeking to align itself with the Asian and African
nations.2 According to the Ran in Nedarim such a change of mind
cannot allow hatarah (annulment). Hatarah requires charatah
me-ikara, i.e. the person who took the oath must feel that the vow was
mistaken to begin with, as even under the original circumstances it
was unjustified. Only thus can one feel the bushah (shame) that can
undo that earlier action, leading to its annulment by the beis din.
Therefore in hataras nedarim we declare (as the hataras nedarim text
puts it) boshti ve’nichlamti (I am ashamed and mortified). So too
regarding repentance in general – it is not enough to change one’s
behavior because new circumstances lead to the conclusion that it no
longer pays to do that aveirah (as would be the case when a
businessman becomes a Shomer Shabbas upon his retirement). Real
teshuvah requires one to realize that the preceding behavior was
completely wrong and inexcusable from the very beginning.3
The Real Self and the Pseudo Self
Edited by Rabbi Basil Herring, Ph.d
Editor’s Note: What follows here is not a verbatim
transcription, but a summary of the main ideas of the Rav in
this lecture. The material constitutes the concluding section of
a larger shiur on the Gemara (Berachos 32a), dealing with
related subject matter. The endnotes are supplied by the
editor. The full audio presentation, in its original Yiddish, can
be accessed here: link
Va-Yechal Moshe (And Moshe pleaded) before Hashem (Ex.
32:11). Said Rava: Moshe pleaded with God until he was able to
annul God’s vow (Rashi: “His declaration ‘I will destroy them’
(vs. 10)”). For it is written here Va-Yechal and it is written
elsewhere (Numbers 30:3) “lo yacheil devaro (he shall not annul
his vow). The master has explained that this teaches that while a
person who takes a vow cannot himself annul it (as it says “he
shall not annul” it), others can do so. (Berachos 32a)
This Gemara is difficult to understand. How can one compare a
rabbinical court annulling a personal vow to Moshe annulling God’s
vow to destroy Israel for worshipping the Golden Calf?
8
Moreover, teshuvah requires one to disassociate from the “self” that
performed those earlier acts.4 One must feel that the person
committing those actions was not the real “me,” because “I gave in to
an ‘out of character’ impulse.” Take for instance someone who suffers
from uncontrollable anger. I myself used to be subject to angry
outbursts, which after much hard work over many years I have
learned to keep under control for the most part (although even now I
can get angry when someone kricht arein in mein kop, i.e. gets inside
my head).5 But in the days when I would be overwhelmed with such
outbursts, I would after a while experience deep remorse, with a
feeling that I had been overtaken by an alien spirit, or possessed by a
demon – what Chasidim call a dybbuk. It is similar to when a person
acts “under the influence” of an intoxicant and does things that he
would normally never do.
So too sometimes we think we know someone, but in due course come
to realize that the real person was hidden from us, and we were
misled by external appearances. I myself can recall people whom I at
first held in high regard, only to subsequently understand that my
first impression had been completely mistaken. There were two
completely different persona’s: an outer person and an inner one. So
Copyright © 2014 Torah Musings, All rights reserved.
91
Weekly Digest from TorahMusings.com too the Gemara (Berachos 58a) says that Rav Sheshes turned a
certain Sadducee into a gal shel atzamos “a pile of bones.” Could it be
that Rav Sheshes was guilty of taking someone’s life? Of course not!
It simply means that whereas initially he had thought highly of the
Sadducee, he subsequently came to realize that he was a worthless
person, i.e., like a pile of dried bones. From this we learn that in
evaluating people it is important to distinguish between a misleading
outer image and the real person.
So too when it comes to teshuvah: one should feel that even though a
transgression occurred, it was not the real “me” that was acting, but
rather a “pseudo-me” – such that my deepest self was not implicated
in those acts, and thus has remained in its pristine state. For this
reason we declare every morning neshamah she-nasata bi tehorah hi,
“the soul You have implanted in me remains pure and guiltless” no
matter how much we may sin. We must strive to be true to our pure
neshamah, which is our real self.6
Avoiding Hypocritical Behavior
Don’t we all know people who live multiple lives with contradictory
personalities or selves? At home they act one way, but in public they
act very differently. In the synagogue they act righteously, but in
business they are dishonest or exploitative. The Gemara (Pesachim
68b) relates that on Shavuos R. Yosef would have three calves
prepared, and declare “were it not for Shavuos (when the Torah was
given) I would be like these three calves and there would be three
Yosefs in the marketplace, not just one.” What did he mean by this?
He was declaring that without the Torah his life would have been
filled with contradictions and multiple persona’s, like animals that
may be placid in the barn, ravenous in the pasture, and aggressive
when provoked. For R. Yosef it is the Torah that keeps us true to
ourselves at all times, the Torah that maintains the consistency of our
inner and outer personae, and the Torah that strengthens us to resist
the temptation to live fragmented and inconsistent lives. This is the
very opposite of people I have known who in public were respected,
upright, and charitable, but who in their private lives were menuvalim
(despicable). Such people are like three Yosefs, no like fifty Yosefs!
The Torah essentially demands that we overcome the natural
temptation to put on appearances tailored to specific settings. For
such is human nature. I know rabbonim who when praying at home
finish the Shmoneh Esrei quickly – but in public recite it at great
length. For this reason my grandfather R. Chaim always opposed the
widespread notion that a Rav should cultivate a distinctive public
image. For this reason he would wear the same simple clothing both
at home and in public. This is the real meaning of shivisi Hashem
lenegdi samid (I have placed God always before me; Psalms 16:8) –
i.e., I have been shaveh, consistent, in my actions before God, tamid,
in every circumstance). This lesson was taught by R. Yisrael Salanter
who was once traveling with a wagon-driver when they came upon a
large pile of unguarded hay in a field. When the driver started to steal
some of the hay, R. Salanter called out, “What you are doing, you are
being watched!” Thereupon the driver desisted and anxiously climbed
back on the wagon. After a while, he said “There was no one there,
why did you say I was being watched?” To which R. Yisrael answered,
“You were indeed being watched – by God!” That is, in all our ways,
and in all circumstances, public and private, our behavior must be
consistent, for we are always in the presence of an all-seeing God.
9
Thus at the very outset of the Shulchan Aruch Orach Chaim the Rema
comments:
This is a great Torah principle characteristic of the righteous,
insofar as normally a person does not act at home as he does in
the presence of a great king, nor is his speech when with his
family as it is were he to be in the ruler’s palace. How much
more so that when one realizes that the King Whose glory fills
the cosmos is watching him … one should feel fear and shame,
and not be embarrassed in front of people who might mock him
for serving God…
The Foundation of Teshuvah
And so, when a Jew sins, we consider it as if he has two “selves,” two
Yosefs. While the external one may have sinned, the other which is
the real self, has remained pure, no matter what. And when that Jew
comes to beg for forgiveness, we say that the inner, core Yosef never
sinned, only the superficial one did. This is the yesod of teshuvah (the
foundation of repentance). Were it not so, how would it be possible
for anyone to experience remorse? Surely it is the pure self which
experiences charatah, regret. Otherwise how could that person be
motivated to repent out of nowhere? Nothing comes from nothing.
Let me further illustrate the point. I have known people who in spite
of their Torah upbringing stopped keeping Shabbos, kashrus, and the
like, only to return to a life of Torah many years later. When I would
ask them what had happened during those interim years they would
say “Rebbe, it wasn’t me who acted that way. Something else
possessed me, and made me do those things.”
The Rambam expresses this idea exactly when he writes in Hilchos
Teshuvah (2:4) that a baal teshuvah must declare that “I am a
different person, not the one who did those things.” In other words in
order to do real teshuvah one must feel that one was under the
influence of a foreign spirit, dybbuk, or ruach ra’ah (evil spirit), and
thus resolve to expel or control every such force in the future. In
Samuel (1 18:10) we find a similar phenomenon: King Saul sought to
kill David on account of what the verse calls a ruach ra’ah, an “evil
spirit” that overtook him. After all Saul was a great person, a bechir
Hashem (chosen by God). Only an overpowering spirit inimical to his
true self, could have caused him to act that way.
So it is with us when we sin. In hindsight we sometimes think to
ourselves, “Where was I, what was I thinking, how could I have done
such a thing?” What do we mean by this? After all we know very well
where we were and what we did. What we really mean is that I am
better than that, and “the real ‘me’ could not have done those things.
It must be that I was ‘possessed’ or overcome by something else.”7
Thus according to Rava in our Gemara the phrase Va-Yechal Moshe
(Moshe annulled) teaches us how Moshe argued with God on behalf of
Israel. He said “Just as You gave a beis din the mechanism to release
a Jew from his vows on the grounds that his real self was not fully in
control at the time, I hereby declare that the Israelites did not act in
accordance with their real selves, but merely under some external or
foreign influence.8 Deep down their real selves have remained pure
and sinless. Therefore, they are not deserving of punishment or
destruction, and I am able to void Your punitive decree that held them
responsible for something they did not do.” Thus did Moshe annul
Copyright © 2014 Torah Musings, All rights reserved.
92
Weekly Digest from TorahMusings.com God’s vow, and avert the decree.
entire approach to Yahadus. And it is the approach we must take in
our own day, especially with regard to raising our children.
Interestingly, this very idea constitutes the basis of all modern
psychotherapy, i.e., a person’s actions do not necessarily reflect or
emanate from his real self, but from a pseudo-self.9 Thus it is that a
person can change behavior, and experience positive change and
personal growth.
1. Zohar, Raya Mehemna, Parshas Pinchas 255:1 ↩
Practical Consequences of this Principle
This is not simply a philosophical principle, but something that has
practical consequences for every rabbi, teacher, and parent.
Especially in our time, we should each strive always to appeal to
people’s better, deeper, and more authentic selves that are not
always apparent to others. I have often said that there are two kinds
of mussar, rebuke. The first tells the sinner that he has done bad
things and must renounce his erroneous ways. The problem with this
approach is that it does not always work – and can even be
counter-productive. This is especially true in our time whether in
Israel or here, for if we tell the modern Jew that he is a sinner, a
heretic, a bad person on account of his being (for instance) a Shabbos
violator, we will not bring even one person back into the fold. Today
we must favor the second approach, which is the way of Moshe in
Va-Yechal, when approaching sinners. We should speak to them with
words that convey that they are not as bad as they think, that their
errant actions are not consistent with their core selves which remain
unsullied and pure at all times. We must be very cognizant of the fact
that today if someone believes that he is a bad person or an
inveterate sinner, there is a good chance that he will find it
impossible to change for the good. The prophet Yechezkel described
such people as declaring u-nemakosem ba-avonoseichem (you shall
pine away in your iniquities; Yechezkel 24:23), i.e., being
overwhelmed by your many transgressions you will feel that it is
hopeless to even try to change, and thus you will conclude that the
gates of repentance are closed to you. I know people who would like
to become ba’alei teshuvah but who feel that it is simply impossible
for them to change. For this reason we declare that God is
Ha-pose’ach yad la-poshim (He reaches out to sinners with an open
hand). How does He do that? By allowing the sinner to sense that he
can improve his ways, insofar as his real self has remained untouched
by sin, and is ready to reconnect with God. Granting an “open hand”
bestows the ability to open oneself to discovering the self that was
heretofore hidden, and closed off. Conveying this lesson to
transgressors is not an easy task, but it is the hallmark of a real
leader. So too in our time, I believe that this approach can bring many
Jews back to Yahadus.
Interestingly, this was the original approach, and the real strength, of
Chasidus, especially that of Chabad. Their way was to teach that
kedushah (holiness) can be found in every place and in every person,
even in the klipas noga (the tainted outer shell). They taught that
because a spark of holiness resides in all such places, our task is to
liberate and raise those hidden sparks to their original place. The
great contribution of Chasidus was to proclaim that no matter his or
her past, a Jew can be saved; that we must never despair of any Jew,10
for otherwise he or she might well be lost to us forever.11
This approach to teshuvah was adopted by the Gedolei Yisrael
throughout the generations – indeed it was the foundation of their
10
2. The Rav here refers to the Suez Canal War that had occurred in
the months preceding this lecture, in October and November
1956. When Israel attacked the Egyptian forces in the Sinai in
response to Egypt’s threats to Israel’s existence, France and
Britain bombed the Egyptian forces that also threatening their
interests in the Suez Canal. This led to the complete defeat of
the Egyptian army, to the chagrin of its Soviet patrons. The
United States, in partnership with the Soviet Union, and in
opposition to its erstwhile allies France and Britain,
co-sponsored a UN resolution forcing the withdrawal of Israeli,
French and British forces from the Sinai. ↩
3. A feeling of bushah (shame) is integral to the process of
complete repentance. See the Rambam, Hil. Teshuvah 2:2. ↩
4. At this point, the Rav’s analysis takes a dialectical turn that
seems to turn the preceding point on its head. Until this point he
had emphasized the essential need for the sinner to take
personal responsibility, and feel profound shame and guilt for his
actions, without any attempt at self-justification or shifting the
blame. Now the Rav posits that, having taken responsibility and
expressed deep anguish and guilt for his actions, in order to
avoid feelings of despair or a spiral of spiritual paralysis, the
sinner must recognize that his “real” self was guilty only of
allowing himself to fall under an extraneous influence. It is this
realization that will allow the sinner to summon the inner
resources to find his way back from the path of sin. ↩
5. As a teacher, The Rav was known to be extremely tough on his
students, especially in his younger days, when he would inspire
genuine fear and trepidation among them. It would appear that
in referring to his powerful anger, and his sustained efforts to
control it, the Rav here was acknowledging his effect on his
students (and possibly others), and felt sufficient remorse that
he sought to temper his emotional response to their
shortcomings. Indeed as he grew older his teaching style in this
respect softened significantly. In any case it is remarkable that
in this shiur the Rav was prepared to bare his soul in a way that
acknowledged what he considered a personal flaw. Such
intimate reflections and self-critical honesty only added to the
emotional power and impact of his public lectures. They allowed
him to speak critically of others, including rabbinic leaders, as
we find him doing in this shiur, albeit never identifying them by
name. ↩
6. On another occasion (at a lecture in Boston Sept. 6 1972, and
referenced in the Rosh Hashanah Machzor Mesoras Harav, p.
247), the Rav expressed this idea in the context of Psalm 130
that is recited throughout the Ten Days from Rosh Hashanah
through Yom Kippur. Mi-Ma’amakim kerasicha Hashem, is
usually understood as calling unto God from the depths of
despair or distress. But it can also be taken as referring to one’s
deepest, most hidden, mysterious, and truest self, one that is
Copyright © 2014 Torah Musings, All rights reserved.
93
Weekly Digest from TorahMusings.com unaffected by sin. In this sense, the psalmist is declaring “even
though I have sinned, there is deep within me my real self that
remains pure and unaffected by my transgressions, and it is that
which can serve as the springboard for me to return to You.
Therefore Hashem shim’ah be’koli – God please hear my real
voice, and annul the sins of my pseudo-personality.” This
alternate understanding of the Psalm is entirely appropriate to
the required mindset of the Aseres Yemei Teshuvah. ↩
Chasidus is a repeated theme in his lectures. Throughout this
shiur, there is a remarkable blending of such widely-disparate
intellectual sources. Thus he quotes halachic and aggadic
sources; anecdotes relating to his grandfather R. Chaim as well
as R. Yisrael Salanter of the Mussar Movement; teachings of the
Misnagdim and the Chasidim; little-noticed passages in Tanach
and the Zohar, as well as erudite references to the teachings of
secular psychology. ↩
7. Of course there is a danger in this disassociative approach to sin.
One can come to shift the blame for one’s actions onto others, be
they other people or specific circumstances that “made me do
it.” The archetypical instance of such thinking is the very first
human sin, in which Adam blamed Chavah (“she gave it to me so
I ate it”), and even shifted responsibility to God Himself (“You
placed her at my side”), while Chavah in turn blamed the serpent
(“the serpent induced me to eat it”). It is all too easy and facile
to deny personal responsibility for one’s actions, for such is
human nature. That is how it has always been since the creation
of man.
The Rav’s analysis here, however, avoids this problem by
focusing on the ability of the individual to immediately recognize
his responsibility to overcome those superficial or exterior
factors that led to the problematic behaviors. It is not simply that
the real me is blameless. It is rather that the real me must
prevent that from happening again. Because my innermost being
remains pure and uncompromised, I have the ability to rise up to
the challenge, and am not hopelessly compromised or sunken in
sin. As always, the real me must strive to do the right thing in
spite of everything, and I am not free to abdicate responsibility
for my future actions. ↩
8. Although the Rav does not at this point makes reference to the
so-called erev rav (the 3,000 members of the mixed multitude
who went forth from Egypt with the Israelites) that many
commentators consider the instigators of the event, one might
consider them to be a prime example of such an external
influence, as the Rav here describes it. ↩
9. See for instance Freud‘s late theory of the ego as the product of
identifications, which render it a false self. So too Erich Fromm,
who in his The Fear of Freedom distinguished between original
self and pseudo self — the inauthentic nature of the latter being
a way to escape what Fromm called the loneliness of freedom.
Much earlier Kierkegaard had claimed that “to will to be that
self which one truly is, is indeed the opposite of despair” — the
despair of choosing “to be another than himself”. See
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/True_self_and_false_self. ↩
10. The point is amply analyzed by the Rav elsewhere. See for
instance our presentation in Torah Musings (Tishri 5774) of the
Rav’s shiur on Elisha b. Abuya, who failed to understand that
even an inveterate sinner such as he could repent, insofar as he
misunderstood the heavenly voice that proclaimed the power of
repentance by even one such as he. ↩
11. The Rav’s profound affinity for, and indebtedness to, Chabad
11
Copyright © 2014 Torah Musings, All rights reserved.
94
Torah Musings Digest
3 October, 2014 | A Window into the Orthodox Jewish Intellectual’s World| Edited by: Rabbi Gil Student
Spiritual Math
(Mishlei 1:29). The Vilna Gaon (ad loc.) emphasizes the failure to
“choose.” To choose implies that there are two roughly equal alternatives.
Ideally, one should proactively pursue mitzvot and Torah study, but even if
one is not motivated to do so, when a mitzvah presents itself in an easy
and convenient way, one should be willing to make the minimum effort to
fulfill that mitzvah. Unfortunately, for the scorners of the first chapter of
Mishlei, the Torah is not even a choice. It does not rate for them at all.
The Vilna Gaon explains that this is the same idea being expressed in the
phrase “ve-lo shavah lanu”. The Hebrew root “shavah” appears in the Bi‐
ble with the meaning to be equal, namely, to have “worth” or “value.” For
instance, in Esther 5:13 Haman, upset that Mordechai would not bow
down to him, tells his wife and advisors, “ve-chol zeh einenu shoveh li” –
“all this [my wealth and political power] is of no value to me.” The Vilna
by R. Moshe Schapiro
Gaon translates the Selichot prayer– “We have strayed from Your com‐
mandments and from Your benevolent statutes and they [the command‐
Spiritual Mathematics: Math Phobia and the Yamim Nora’im
=?
We repeat the phrase “sarnu mi-mitzvotecha u-mi-mishpatecha ha-tovim”
– “We have strayed from Your commandments and from Your benevolent
statutes”around forty times from the first night of Selichot until the last
moments of Né’ilah, and while we understand these words, the meaning
of the three words that follow: “ve-lo shavah lanu” is ambiguous. The
scriptural source for the expression “ve-lo shavah lanu” is found in Iyov
33:27, in which Iyov’s friend Elihu ben Barachel encourages Iyov to make
a public confession of his sins and say, “chatati ve-yashar he’eveiti ve-lo
shavah li”- “I have sinned, and I have made crooked that which is straight
and it is not shavah for me.” The word shavah means “equal,” but that
does not seem to make much sense in this context. The Talmud (Yoma
87a) derives from this verse that one who seeks his friend’s forgiveness
must appeal to him three times in the presence of three people. Rashi ex‐
plains that the three expressions “chatati” and “ve-yashar he’eveiti” and
“ve-lo shavah li” are confessionary phrases and therefore we derive from
them the requirement of making three attempts to appease a friend.1 This
ments and statutes] were not of value to us.” It is terrible that we have
strayed, but it is even worse that the reason we did so was a failure to
value God’s commandments.
Why do we not we value the commandments, and what can we do to help
ourselves to value them? Two fundamental deficiencies underlie our lack
of appreciation of the mitzvot. The first problem with which we struggle is
that many of the commandments have no clear purpose or readily under‐
standable rationale. Rambam distinguishes between two categories of
commandments: “The ‘mishpatim’- ‘ordinances’ are commandments
whose reason is obvious and the benefit derived in this world from doing
them is well known; for example the prohibitions against robbery and
murder, or the commandment of honoring one’s father and mother. The
‘chukim’ – ‘statutes,’ on the other hand, are the commandments whose
reason is not known” (Hilkhot Me’ilah 8:8). It is human nature to devalue
that which we do not understand and Rambam (ibid.) cautions against this
kind of thinking:
A law for which he finds no reason and understands no
cause should not be trivial in his eyes…behold it says in
is in consonance with the interpretation of Metzudat David, who under‐
the Torah, “u-shemartem et kol chukotai ve-et kol
stands that the last phrase “ve-lo shavah li” is synonymous with the previ‐
mishpatai va-asitem otam” – “And you shall observe all My
ous phrase “ve-yashar he’eveiti.” The word shavah means equal in the
statutes and all My ordinances and perform them”
sense of straight. Accordingly, the translation of the Selichot prayer
(Vayikra 20:22). Our Sages commented that the verbs
should be, “We have strayed from Your commandments and from Your
“observe” and “perform” refer to both the statutes and
benevolent statutes and we have not kept to the straight path.” However,
the ordinances (Sifra 10). Now “va-asitem” – “and
many commentators are bothered by the unnecessary redundancy of Met‐
perform” is understood; it means to perform the statutes.
zudat David’s reading of the phrase, and suggest alternative understand‐
But “shemirah”- “observe” means that one must be
ings that can deepen the meaningfulness of our prayers during the Yamim
careful concerning them and not imagine that they are
Nora’im season.
less important than the ordinances.
=∞
According to Rambam by recognizing the tendency to devalue that which
is not understood, we become self-aware and can overcome that tendency.
The book of Mishlei declares that terrible punishments will befall those
who scorn the Torah: “tachat ki san’u da’at ve-yirat Hashem lo bacharu” –
“because they hated knowledge and did not choose the fear of God”
However, Rambam’s presentation of the Sifra is problematic because the
95
Sifra defines “shemirah” differently in another location. Echoing the
Eden and for others it is Gehinnom. Our physical orientation cannot be
words of Vayikra 20:22, the Torah states, “u-shemartem mitzvotai va-
denied, but a healthy dose of perspective may help to bridge the gap be‐
asitem otam” – “and you shall observe My commandments and perform
tween our limited perception in olam ha-zeh and the proper sense of ap‐
them.” Rashi (quoting Sifra 8) explains: “u-shemartem” – “and you shall
preciation for what lies before us in olam ha-ba.
observe,” this refers to study; “va-asitem” – “and perform,” this refers to
action. Sifra clearly defines “shemirah” as study, not as a humble religious
The Dubner Maggid (Kol Negidim s.v. havel havalim) explains the opening
posture towards the commandments as portrayed by Rambam. Rambam
message of Kohelet that everything in the world is “havel havalim” – “van‐
makes use of the Sifra’s emphasis on “shemirah” of chukim, but seems to
ity of vanities” by noting the developmental nature of man. A baby’s great‐
ignore the Sifra’s understanding that “shemirah” means study.
est desire is for his mother’s milk. After being weaned, he shuns his
mother’s milk and wants to play games of pretend. The teenager does not
We can harmonize Rambam’s comments with the words of the Sifra by
enjoy playing horsey, but derives tremendous pleasure from other activi‐
drawing an analogy to another area of human endeavor. The workings of
ties, such as playing video games. Later in life, the same person finds
the human brain are frustratingly complex, yet those who study neurology
these games silly and gets his pleasure out of making money and acquir‐
will not demean the structures and mechanisms of the brain. On the con‐
ing fancy possessions. Even in adulthood our tastes develop to become
trary, they will be filled with awe and inspiration both from the mystery
more sophisticated and discerning, so that what we once enjoyed becomes
which hovers over their work as well as from the conviction, formed from
a memory belonging to a past version of ourselves while we go on to at‐
years of study, that the brain is indeed a brilliant, ordered system, even if
tain the next perceived source of pleasure. This is the meaning of havel
they have not yet plumbed its depths. The way to find value in the com‐
havalim: each new vanity is just the latest in a long line of vanities.
mandments of God is to study them. After working through the intricacies
of a dispute between Rashi and Tosafot and laboring over a long Be’ur
As mature adults we can recognize that what we once thought was plea‐
Halakhah, one may not understand the philosophical underpinnings of a
surable was really childish and foolish. While we may not be able to com‐
given commandment, but a sense of meaning will set in. When Rambam
prehend the exact nature of the reward for observing mitzvot, we can now
writes regarding the statutes that “one must be careful concerning them
dimly perceive that when we leave this world it is reasonable to assume,
and not imagine that they are less important than the ordinances,” he is
based on all our past experiences, that the forms of pleasure and sources
describing the result of “shemirah.” The way to achieve that result–
of happiness in the next world might be different, but, nevertheless, will
shemirah – is as the Sifra states, through study. The less a person under‐
be fundamentally satisfying. Unlike a child who cannot even imagine how
stands the purpose of a commandment the more he should delve into its
anyone could possibly enjoy certain adult activities, we should have the
details and forms. Like the study of the brain, he may never fully under‐
perspective to appreciate that something truly great awaits us in the final
stand the essence of the mitzvah, but he will never again be able to dimin‐
and eternal stage of our existence.
ish its value.
Every mitzvah equals infinity. Maharal (Tiferet Yisrael 13) explains that it
The second aspect of our lack of appreciation for the mitzvot is that we do
is for this reason that the Talmud asserts, “sechar mitzvah be-hai alma
not have a concrete notion of what the reward for observing the com‐
leika” – “there is no reward for commandments in this world” (Kiddushin
mandments will be. We live in a physical world and our ability to imagine
39b). The intrinsic value of a mitzvah is boundless and its reward is im‐
a spiritual concept of reward is strikingly limited. The Talmudic sage Rav
measurable. The physical world which is finite cannot possibly contain
would often say, “In the World to Come there is no eating, no drinking, no
within it the infinite nature of the reward for mitzvot. During Selichot we
procreation, no business, no jealousy, no hatred and no rivalry. Rather, the
confess that God’s commandments have not been “shavah lanu.” We have
righteous sit with their crowns on their heads and delight in the radiance
failed to perceive the worth of His commandments, but by committing
of the divine Presence” (Berakhot 17a). Now, frankly, to most people that
ourselves to Talmud Torah and by contemplating our own developmental
probably sounds incredibly boring. In Jewish folklore it is said humorously
nature we can strive to correct this serious flaw.
that there is no difference between Gan Eden and Gehinnom. In both, one
sits in a Beit Midrash and studies Gemara. For some people that is Gan
1. However, see Ran (ibid.) who explains the Talmud’s inference
from this verse differently. ↩
Spiritual Math II
by R. Moshe Schapiro
96
=0
the perspective that what we have accomplished in terms of spirituality is
relatively insignificant and that which we have not yet attained should ap‐
Within the interpretation that the word “shavah” connotes value or worth,
pear larger and more tantalizing in our eyes. R. Falkenfeld explains that
there is another way to understand the meaning of the phrase “ve-lo
this concept of spiritually-focused imagination is the key to understanding
shavah lanu.” The Talmud (Sukkah 51a) describes an apocalyptic scene in
a parable offered by Chazal to illustrate why Moshe Rabbenu excelled in
which God slaughters the Evil Inclination:
yirat shamayim compared to the rest of his generation:
In the time to come the Holy One, blessed be He, will
R. Chanina said, “To illustrate by a parable: if a man is
bring the Evil Inclination and slay it in the presence of the
asked for a large vessel and he has it, it seems to him like
righteous and the wicked. To the righteous it will have the
a small vessel. If he is asked for a small vessel and he
appearance of a tall mountain, and to the wicked it will
does not have it, it appears to him like a large vessel”
have the appearance of a thread of hair. Both the former
(Berakhot 33b).
and the latter will weep. The righteous will weep saying,
“How were we able to overcome such a tall mountain?”
The common explanation of this passage is that to fulfill what might be
The wicked also will weep saying, “How is it that we were
considered a difficult request is easy for someone who has the means to
unable to conquer this thread of hair?”
fulfill it, whereas even a small request is made difficult by not having
those means. In the case of Moshe Rabbenu, the small and large vessels
This Talmudic passage is perplexing. Is the yetzer ha-ra a mountain or a
refer to small and large spiritual demands. Moshe Rabbenu, who had al‐
hair? What accounts for the extreme difference in perception between the
ready achieved great spiritual heights, could consider a demanding chal‐
righteous and the wicked? R. Yosef Dov ha-Levi Soloveitchik (Beit Ha-Levi,
lenge to his yirat shamayim like a minor request. The others of his genera‐
Bereshit s.v. be-mas’ sukkah) writes that in fact the Evil Inclination is
tion who were not possessed of such greatness, found that even a small
merely the power of our imagination. The righteous, who never gave in to
spiritual challenge seemed overwhelmingly large.
their desires, imagine that the yetzer ha-ra must be monstrous and moun‐
tain-like. They will shed cathartic tears. However, the wicked who never
R. Falkenfeld presents a novel interpretation of this parable. The person
resisted the Evil Inclination know that the desire is always much greater
who owns the large vessel views it as a small vessel because human na‐
than the actual pleasure gained. To the wicked, who will finally contem‐
ture is to devalue that which is already in our possession. However, if a
plate their deeds at the end of time, the yetzer ha-ra will seem like a pa‐
small vessel is requested and he does not yet own it, human nature will
thetic, puny thread of hair and they will cry tears of bitterness at their in‐
cause him to view it as a large vessel. Moshe channeled this natural in‐
ability to resist its temptations.
stinct toward spiritual endeavors. He viewed whatever attainments he had
made thus far, no matter how great they might have been, as small mat‐
The Beit Ha-Levi explains that this is the meaning of the Selichot prayer:
ters compared to what was yet left to accomplish. Conversely, every new
“We have strayed from Your commandments and from Your benevolent
spiritual demand, no matter how small, loomed large in Moshe Rabbenu’s
statutes and it was not worth it to us.”1 Our yetzer ha-ra fooled us into
eyes. Moshe’s contemporaries, whose imaginations were not as focused
thinking that we would gain so much pleasure from violating God’s will,
on spiritual matters, could not match Moshe’s ambitions and consequently
but in the end we realize our folly. We have all experienced that uncom‐
could not equal his accomplishments.
fortable sense of guilt and embarrassment after having given into our de‐
While we must strive to emulate Moshe Rabbenu, to channel our imagina‐
sires and realizing that it was not even worth it.
tion toward spiritual goals, we must also maintain the battle against get‐
R. Meir Schiff [17th cent.] (Chidushei Maharam Schiff, Chullin, Drushim)
ting caught up in our overblown expectations of physical and material
also notes this quirk of the human imagination. The Midrash (Kohelet
pleasure. The Beit Ha-Levi (Parshat Yitro, s.v. lo tachmod) instructs us
Rabbah 1:13) asserts, “A person does not die with half of his desires in
how to fight this battle. We can all imagine the following scene: a person
hand. For he who has a hundred, desires to make of it two hundred.” One
overpowered by his desire for a cheeseburger is running down a snow-
does not have to be a math professor to realize that if you have a hundred
covered street. Just as he is about to reach the Golden Arches® he slips
and you want two hundred that you do in fact have half of your desires in
on the ice. The momentary fear that he might fall seizes him and drives
hand. The Midrash’s calculations are seemingly flawed. The Maharam
the thought of a Big Mac® right out of his mind. Even a small amount of
Schiff explains that while it is true that one hundred is half of two hun‐
fear can dispel the physical urges that sometimes take hold of a person.
dred, the half that the person does not have seems much larger to him
The Beit Ha-Levi concludes that the only way to overcome the maddening
than the half he already has. The Midrash is precise in its words. He does
clutches of the yetzer ha-ra is with the power of fear. However, this fear
not have “half of his desires.” For that which is desired will always seem
must be a healthy one.
greater.
After the revelation of God on Mt. Sinai, the people told Moshe Rabbenu
R. Shmuel Falkenfeld [1737–1806] (Beit Shmuel Acharon, Parshat Ekev)
assumes that the trait to amplify the importance of unsatisfied desires was
2
that they were terrified by the awesome spectacle they had just wit‐
nessed. Moshe Rabbenu explained to them God’s purpose in revealing
implanted in us by God and must serve a higher purpose. Instead of
Himself in such a daunting manner: “Do not fear. For God has come in or‐
dreaming about material and physical gratification we should endeavor to
der to elevate you; so that the fear of Him should be upon your faces, so
exaggerate the significance of unfulfilled spiritual goals. We should adopt
that you shall not sin” (Shemot 20:17). This verse seems to contradict it‐
97
self. First Moshe Rabbenu tells the people not to fear and then he says
ural human tendency to exaggerate the appeal of what we desire is diffi‐
that the purpose of the revelation was that they should fear. The Sefat
cult. Developing a sincere feeling of yirat shamayim and orienting our de‐
Emet (Parshat Yitro, 5648) explains that God does not want us to experi‐
sires toward spiritual attainment are lifelong endeavors. By proclaiming
ence a fear that is paralyzing and destructive. Rather, the fear of God
“lo shavah lanu” we are committing ourselves to this struggle.
should be experienced in a way that is motivating and constructive. If we
can ingrain this uplifting sense of awe into our consciences, then when an
1. See Rashi to Iyov 33:27. ↩
illicit desire arises in our hearts it will be banished by the stronger sensa‐
tion of overwhelming dread of the Almighty.
2. The Beit ha-Levi (ibid.) argues that this peculiarity of human na‐
ture was not God-given, but was acquired by man when he ate
Before committing a sinful act we imagine we will experience a worth‐
from the etz ha-da’at tov va-ra –“the tree of knowledge of good
while pleasure, however, in the end we know the truth: the value of a sin
and evil.” He even suggests that the name of the infamous tree
is zero. During Selichot we proclaim that we have sinned and we admit
should be understood as “etz ha-da’at tov”–“the tree of thinking
that “lo shavah lanu” – our sins have gained us nothing. Defeating the nat‐
something is good,”“va-ra”–“but it is really bad.” ↩
Spiritual Math III
by R. Moshe Schapiro
=≠
The word “shavah” can also be defined as “un‐
changing” or “constant.” The scriptural basis for
this definition is found in Mishlei 27:15, “delef
tored be-yom sagrir ve-eshet midyanim nish‐
tavah [from the Hebrew root shavah]” – “An irk‐
some dripping on a rainy day and a contentious
wife are equal [i.e., alike].” Although many of the
commentaries translate the above verse as we
have done, Metzudat David and Malbim inter‐
pret Mishlei 27:15 as follows: a drip is only irk‐
some on a yom sagrir – a rainy day when every‐
one is inside the house under the leaky roof.
However, a contentious wife is “nishtavah” a con‐
stant source of irksomeness.1 If shavah denotes
constancy, the meaning of the Selichot prayer is,
“We have strayed from Your commandments and
Your benevolent statutes and things did not stay
the same for us.” We often imagine that we can
contain the implications and repercussions of our
sins, but all too often that is simply not true.
Straying from God’s commandments can have di‐
rect and indirect consequences, both of which
can be significant.
The psychological dynamic that causes us to
downplay the direct impact of our actions is very
familiar to us. Someone trying to lose weight
reaches into a potato chip bag to take “just one
chip.” Then, they reach in again for “just one
more.” Not too long after, an empty bag is
thrown away and the consequences show up
mercilessly on the scale. The response to this
psychological foible is articulated by Shlomo HaMelekh in the book of Kohelet: “tovah chochmah
mi-klei kerav ve-chote echad ye’abed tovah har‐
beh” – “wisdom is better than weapons of war
and one sin can destroy much good” (Ko‐
helet 9:18). The Talmud (Kiddushin 40b) explains
the second half of the verse:
A person should always perceive
himself as though he were half guilty
and half meritorious: if he performs one
mitzvah he is fortunate, for he has
tipped the balance for himself to the
side of merit. If he commits one
98
transgression, woe to him, for he has
tipped the balance for himself to the
side of guilt. As it says, “and one sin
can destroy much good.” Because of a
single sin that he committed much
good is lost to him.
However, while the Talmud addresses the end of
the verse, it does not explain the relevance of the
opening words, “wisdom is better than weapons
of war.” R. Yaakov of Lissa (Ta’alumot
Chochmah, Kohelet, ad loc.) explains that the be‐
ginning of the verse sets up a contrast between
the weapons of the Evil Inclination and the wis‐
dom of the Good Inclination. The all-too-familiar
tactic of the yetzer ha-ra is to convince us that
what we are about to do is “just one” little thing
with no long term impact. To counteract that
thinking we need the wisdom of the yetzer hatov, namely, “ve-chote echad ye’abed tovah har‐
beh”–“and one sin can destroy much good.”
Every single act is important and can have
weighty repercussions. The Talmud’s formula‐
tion, “A person should always perceive himself,”
is a restatement of the first half of the verse.
The chochmah of the yetzer ha-tov is to make the
second half of the verse our mantra: “ve-chote
echad ye’abed tovah harbeh.” We have to habitu‐
ate ourselves to a different mode of thinking. At
every turn we should reject the “just one” atti‐
tude and consciously adopt an “each and every
one” attitude.
Dessler terms their “nekudat ha-bechirah” – the
point of juncture between Free Will and the per‐
son’s environment. A person who grew up in a re‐
ligious home has a different set of choices before
him than a person who grew up in a secular envi‐
ronment. They both have bechirah chofshit, but
the kinds of choices they need to make are al‐
ready prepared for them by their previous life
choices and experiences. If we sin or if we make
certain decisions regarding our religious trajec‐
tory, then that will influence the entire context in
which we will live our spiritual lives.
The Torah records the formula to be recited
twice in every seven-year Shemittah cycle upon
the disposition of tithes:
Then you shall declare before Hashem,
your God, “I have cleared out the holy
portions from the house [bi’arti hakodesh min ha-bayit]. And I have given
it to the Levi, the stranger, the orphan
and the widow, just as You commanded
me. I have neither transgressed nor
neglected any of Your commandments.
I have not eaten of it while in
mourning; I did not consume any of it
in a state of impurity and I did not give
of it for the needs of the dead. I obeyed
Hashem, my God. I have done just as
You have commanded me.”
Even one sin can directly impact upon our every‐
day life. However, there are many indirect effects
of sin that can be more far-reaching and signifi‐
cant. R. Eliyahu Dessler (Michtav me-Eliyahu v.1
pp.113–114) writes that while every human being
has “bechirah chofshit”- “Free Will,” to choose
between good and evil, a person only exercises
their Free Will within the framework of what R.
(Devarim 26:13–14).
Chazal term this declaration “vidui ma’aser”“the confession of the ma’aser tithe.”2 Why do
the Sages use the term “confession”? This decla‐
ration is a boast, not a confession. R. Ovadyah
Seforno explains that originally the service of
99
God in the Temple was to be performed by the
first born male of each family and they would re‐
ceive the tithes. It was only after the sin of the
Golden Calf that the kohanim and levi’im were
chosen to replace the firstborns.3 The farmer’s
statement, “bi’arti ha-kodesh min ha-bayit” is a
confession that due to the sins of his forefathers,
the holy tithes, instead of staying in the family
and being given to his first born, must now be
distributed to the levi’im. In effect, the man is
saying, “Yes, I did everything as commanded, but
the entire plane upon which I performed
these mitzvot was created through sin. It is not
the ideal. I can be proud that I have acted well
within my framework, but it is a sorry frame‐
work, indeed.”
A single decision or act can sometimes have pro‐
found, life changing consequences. We might pat
ourselves on the back now and think that we are
being very good Jews in our daily lives, but is our
concept of a good Jew as advanced and as ele‐
vated as it could have been if we had made other
choices or avoided certain kinds of behaviors or
activities? We cannot change history. The first
born males will never be reinstated to the Temple
service. The tithes will always belong to the ko‐
hanim and levi’im. However, being aware of the
fact that we often create the context in which we
act out our spiritual lives can help us going for‐
Spiritual Math IV
by R. Moshe Schapiro
ward. We can re-evaluate our religious attitudes
and re-think our religious goals and aspirations.
Most importantly we must train ourselves to em‐
phasize the importance of every choice we make.
When we stand before God and proclaim that we
have strayed from His commandments “ve-lo
shavah lanu”–“and things have not stayed the
same,” we are recognizing two realities. First, we
realize that we often give in to the “just one” ar‐
gument of the yetzer ha-ra and we acknowledge
that this is foolish because it is false. Second, we
admit that our choices have impacted the sub‐
stance of who we are and how we live. Starting
now we must re-invigorate our spiritual ambi‐
tions so that things will not be the same. They
will be better.
1. The same usage is found in the liturgical
poem Ve-chol Ma’aminim recited on
the Yamim Nora’im where we describe God
as “Ha-Shaveh u-mashveh katon ve-gadol”“the unchanging One, Who treats small and
great alike.” ↩
2. See Berakhot 40b and Masoret HaShas there. See also Megillah 20b. ↩
3. See Rashi Bemidbar 3:12 ↩
≤0
If our spiritual trajectories have changed, and
not necessarily for the better, we can suggest an
additional interpretation of the phrase ve-lo
shavah lanu, returning once again to the mean‐
ing of value or worth.1 Perhaps we have reached
a moment of crisis and we despair that we have
squandered our talents and wasted our spiritual
potential. Just as Haman proclaimed, “ve-chol
zeh einenu shoveh li” – “all this is worth nothing
100
to me,” so too we have come to the realization
that ve-lo shavah lanu- nothing is worth anything
to us. We fear that God will never forgive us and
that we have strayed so far that we can never re‐
pent. Our lives are devoid of existential meaning
and all our hopes are dashed against the cruel
reality of who we have become and what we have
failed to accomplish. This loss of hope paralyzes
us.
To combat the feeling of ye’ush, we must first re‐
store our confidence in our own ability to repent.
We are afraid that after having sunk so low, we
simply will not be able to climb out of the abyss.
However, Chazal teach, through several dramatic
examples, that there is no depth from which a
person cannot rise. The Midrash (Bereshit Rab‐
bah 65:22) tells the story of Yosef of Shita, who
was so indifferent to God, that he willingly dese‐
crated the Beit ha-Mikdash and Yakum of Tzero‐
rot who was so distant from his own people that
he mocked the martyrdom of his own uncle, one
of the Sages of Israel. Yet, they both were moved
to repent and were given special passage into the
World to Come. Similarly, the Talmud (Avodah
Zarah 17a) tells the story of Elazar ben Dordaya
whose descent into immorality and decadence
was simply astounding. His subsequent despair
was pathetic and heart-wrenching and his repen‐
tance was accepted. His example is so inspiring
and emboldening that the Talmud concludes that
he received the posthumous title Rebbi, because
he taught that repentance is always possible. Th‐
ese stories are extreme examples in which the
protagonists’ overwhelming remorse is so power‐
ful that it leads to premature death and immedi‐
ate entry to the World to Come. Obviously, we do
not seek to emulate the exact manner of their re‐
pentance. However, their stories serve as inspira‐
tion to resist the feeling of ye’ush.
Rambam incorporates the concept that repen‐
tance is always possible in several places in his
Laws of Repentance. After meticulously listing
those sinners who forfeit their share in the World
to Come, Rambam concludes: “When were these
words said, that each of these does not have a
share in the World to Come? When he dies with‐
out having repented. However, if he repents of
his wickedness and dies in his penitence, behold,
he is worthy of the World to Come. For, there is
nothing that stands in the way of repentance”
(3:14). Later, Rambam lists a series of behaviors
or attitudes that prevent or hinder repentance.
Again, he concludes: “All these matters and such
like, even though they prevent repentance, they
do not preclude it. Rather, if a person repents
from them, he is a penitent and enjoys a share in
the World to Come” (4:6). Finally, Rambam offers
words of encouragement, poetically describing
the potency of teshuvah: “How exalted is repen‐
tance? Last night he was odious before God… to‐
day he is beloved… last night he was separated
from Hashem, the God of Israel… but today he
clings to the divine presence” (7:6–7). Repen‐
tance is always possible no matter how odious
the sinner or how distant he is from God.
Concomitant with the recognition that we are ca‐
pable of repentance is faith in the power of God’s
forgiveness. In Psalm 130, Shir HaMa’alot
MiMa’amakim,the psalmist struggles with the
fear that his prayers may not be heard because
his sins stand in the way. He beseeches God, “For
with You is forgiveness, that You may be feared”
which seems counterintuitive. Why would for‐
giveness lead to fear of God? Wouldn’t the expec‐
tation of forgiveness lead to an attitude of per‐
missiveness and laxity? R. Menachem Meiri (ad
loc.) explains that the very possibility of forgive‐
ness means that all is not lost. If there was noth‐
ing we could do to escape punishment or to miti‐
gate the consequences of our sins, we would sim‐
ply give up. Therefore, the recognition that there
can be forgiveness leads to the fear of God and
doubting that forgiveness leads to spiritual paral‐
101
ysis. In fact, doubting God’s forgiveness is the
first step in a course of self-destructive behavior.
Moshe Rabbenu offers a powerful lesson about
the self-destructive nature of ye’ush in the begin‐
ning of Parashat Nitzavim. After setting forth the
terrible punishments that will be visited upon the
Jewish people if they abandon God’s Torah,
Moshe warns that there may be an individual
who will “hear the words of this curse and will
bless himself in his heart [ve-hitbareikh bi-lev‐
avo] saying, ‘Peace will be with me, though I
walk as my heart sees fit’” (Devarim 29:18).
God’s reaction to this individual is resolute,
“Hashem will not be willing to forgive him” (ibid.
19). The Targum Yonatan translates the above
bracketed phrase: “ve-yitya’eish be-libeih” – “and
he will give up hope in his heart.” The desired re‐
sponse to hearing the curses is to repent and
thereby be forgiven. However, some people, feel‐
ing that they cannot possibly live up to God’s de‐
mands and will never be forgiven, surrender to
their feelings of ye’ush and take the
path of least resistance. R. Yosef Albo (Sefer
HaIkkarim 4:26) notes that this is a self-fulfilling
prophecy because the possibility of forgiveness
creates not just a hope, but an obligation to re‐
pent. If the sinner abandons that hope, he actu‐
ally intensifies his sinfulness and consequently,
“Hashem will not be willing to forgive him.”2 On
Fast Days we read the words of the prophet Ye‐
shayahu urging the Jewish nation to repent:
“May the wicked one forsake his path and the
sinful man his thoughts, and let him return to
Hashem Who will show him mercy, and to our
God for He is abundantly forgiving” (Ye‐
shayah 55:7). R. Avraham Shmuel Binyamin Sofer
(Derashot Ketav Sofer, Shofar 5655) writes that
the “path” of the sinner is his wicked actions and
corrupt character traits, but the “thoughts” of
the sinner which must be forsaken refer to his
thoughts of self-doubt and giving up hope. Only
by rejecting and rising above his feelings
of ye’ush can the sinner return to Hashem and be
forgiven.
We may have capitulated to feelings of despair
and let many opportunities to repent slip through
our fingers in the past, but, as we declare in
the Né’ilah service, God’s hand is always
“stretched out to receive those who repent.” R.
Tzvi Hirsch of Dinov (Agra de-Kallah, Parashat Ki
Tisa s.v. saru maher)notes, homiletically, that
there are only two verses in the Torah that begin
with the Hebrew letter samekh. The first, “Saru
maher” – “They have strayed quickly” (She‐
mot 32:8) describes the sin of the Jewish people
with the Golden Calf. The second, “Salachti ki-de‐
varekha” – “I have forgiven according to your
word” (Bemidbar 14:20) is the expression of
God’s forgiveness for the sin of the spies. The
roundness of the two letters samekh signifies the
constant interplay between sin and forgiveness.
Man sins again and again, but sin is not a spiri‐
tual cul-de-sac because, as Yeshayahu teaches us,
God is “abundantly forgiving.” He forgives again
and again if we only turn to Him and repent.
Ultimately, even if we feel we can repent and
even if we are confident in God’s forgiveness, we
may be dragged down by the reality that we have
caused irreparable damage in many areas of our
life and nothing can change the ramifications and
negative outcomes that our sins and flawed per‐
sonalities have yielded. It would be dishonest and
naïve to pretend that this is not the case. Our ac‐
tions and attitudes can have consequences that
will continue beyond our repentance and often
may not be changed by attaining forgiveness. We
have to lick our wounds and move on. Before the
Jewish nation would go to war the head chaplain
(mashu’ach milchamah) would proclaim, “Hear O
Israel [shema yisrael] today you draw near to war
against your enemies. Let not your heart be faint;
do not be afraid, do not panic and do not
be bro‐
102
ken before them” (Devarim 20:3). The Talmud
(Sotah 42a) associating the declaration “shema
yisrael” here with the more famous twice-daily
recitation of Shema, understands that
the mashu’ach milchamah is offering words of
encouragement as the army marches out to meet
the enemy: “Even if you have only fulfilled the
recitation of Shema morning and evening, you
will not be given over into their hands.”
Fulfilling the mitzvah of Keri’at Shema seems like
a very low standard to merit divine protection .
An apparently contradictory view emerges from a
different Talmudic passage (ibid. 44a) that
records a dispute between R. Akiva and R.
Yossi ha-Galili. After exempting men with specific
personal needs from army service, the ko‐
hanim make one final proclamation: “Who is the
man who is fearful and fainthearted? Let him go
and return to his house and let him not melt the
heart of his fellows like his heart” (De‐
varim 20:8). While R. Akiva understands the in‐
tent of the kohanim literally, namely that those
who lack physical courage should turn back from
the battle, R. Yossi ha-Galili maintains that
the kohanim’s words are figurative. They refer,
not to “the man who is fearful” of fighting, but to
“the man who is fearful” of the sins he has com‐
mitted and does not have confidence that he will
merit divine protection. If the only merit one
needs to be victorious in war is the
recital Shema, why would a soldier be fearful
that he might not merit protection?
R. Menachem Mendel of Kotzk (Emet ve-Emu‐
nah 507) comments that even a soldier who has
committed a transgression can be worthy of di‐
vine protection in battle, if he can accept the
yoke of Heaven upon himself by reciting Shema.
If a sinful individual can pick himself up, commit
himself to Torah and mitzvot and leap back into
the fray, then he can fight courageously and be
confident of divine assistance. R. Yossi ha-Galili is
speaking of a man who is afraid of his sins. He
wallows in his depression and allows the feelings
of guilt and hopelessness to overwhelm him. He
cannot properly recite Shema because he cannot
accept the yoke of Heaven and move forward in
his service of God. Such a person cannot go out
to war. There may be permanent consequences to
our sins and we may have lost many battles, but
if we cannot let those losses and failures cripple
us. If we are confident that we can still prevail,
God will help us to do so.
As we stand before God on Yom Kippur and pro‐
claim that we have strayed from His Torah and
commandments, we may be struck by a very
painful realization: ve-lo shavah lanu – nothing is
worth anything anymore. We feel powerless to re‐
pent, hopeless that God will forgive us and para‐
lyzed by the real and lasting consequences of our
actions. Yet, we must immediately stir ourselves.
We cannot be fearful and softhearted. We must
be brave and leap back into the fray. We can re‐
pent and achieve atonement and we can make
the most out of our circumstances. Our life is not
equal to zero, it can still be full of worth and
meaning.
1. I thank Dr. Michael Samet who suggested
this interpretation to me. ↩
2. For more on this theme see Meshekh
Chochmah, Devarim 30:11. ↩
103
Spiritual Math V
by R. Moshe Schapiro
> or <
If we return one final time to the original defini‐
tion of the Hebrew root “shavah,” meaning
“equal” in the sense of “worth,” we can discern
an additional intent in the phrase “ve-lo shavah
lanu.” The prophet Yeshayahu promises the peo‐
ple forgiveness for their sins if they repent, “im
yiyihu chata’eichem ka-shanim ka-sheleg yalbinu
im yadimu ka-tola ka-tzemer yiyihu” – “if your
sins are like scarlet, they will become as white as
snow. If they have become as red as crimson they
will become as wool” (Yeshayahu 1:18). The
Jerusalem Talmud (Shabbat 9:3) offers a homileti‐
cal interpretation of this verse by playing on the
Hebrew word for scarlet “shanim” which can also
mean “years.” If a man’s sins are according to his
years, then they will become as white as snow. If
they are greater than that, they will only become
as white as wool. R. David Frankel [18th Cent.]
(Korban Ha-Edah, ad loc.) explains that it is natu‐
ral for a person to struggle with different kinds of
temptations at different times in his life. As long
as he eventually rises above his desires and re‐
pents, God is willing to forgive him because the
fact that the sins he committed were natural for
him at that time in his life is a mitigating factor.
However, if he commits a sin that is unnatural for
his stage in life, it is much harder to achieve for‐
giveness. If an adult filches lollipops from the
candy man’s bag in Shul, his lips may be purple,
but his soul is crimson. The Tzeilemer Rav, R.
Levi Yitzchak Greenwald (Migdalot
Mirkachim, Seder ha-Tefillah p.4) expands this
idea beyond chronological stages in life to each
person’s unique life circumstances. The religious
struggles of a successful Wall Street banker are
different than those of a Rosh Kollel- even if they
end up in the same jail cell for cheating on their
taxes. R. Greenwald suggests that this is the in‐
tent of the phrase “ve-lo shavah lanu.” We are
confessing that we have committed sins that
were not “worthy of us” namely, that were not
appropriate for our circumstances or stage in
life.
R. Eliyahu Meir Bloch develops a similar inter‐
pretation, but adds a new dimension. In the haf‐
tarah for Parshat Vayigash, Yechezkel communi‐
cates God’s promise that He will redeem the
Jewish people and cleanse us of our sins:
Behold! I shall take the Children of
Israel from among the nations to which
they went and I shall gather them from
around and bring them to their own
land. I shall make them a single nation
in the land, on the hills of Israel, and
one king shall be king of them all.
Never again shall they be two nations
and never again shall they be divided
into two kingdoms. And they shall no
longer be contaminated by their idols
and their abhorrent things, and by all
their other transgressions. I will save
them from all their dwelling places [mikol moshvoteihem] where they sinned
104
and I will cleanse them. Then they shall
be My people and I will be their God”
(Yechezkel 37:21–23).
These verses seem redundant. We are told that
God will gather us from exile and that we will no
longer engage in our former sinful behavior. Why
does the navi repeat that God will save us from
our dwellings in exile and purify us from our
sins?
R. Bloch (Peninei Da’at, Parshat Vayigash) re‐
sponds to the seemingly redundant message of
double salvation by delineating two kinds of sin.
A Jew may transgress the Torah’s laws, but still
retain his essential character as a Jew. However,
there are some sins and attitudes that are foreign
to the spirit of a Jew. The navi terms these alien
behaviors and modes of thought “mi-moshvotei‐
hem” – adopted from their dwelling places in ex‐
ile because of the forces of assimilation.
Yechezkel first addresses our salvation from
those offenses which, while of a serious nature,
did not compromise our core identity. However,
transgressions “mi-moshvoteihem” that stem
from outside influences require a second salva‐
tion. Even strictly observant Jews who are com‐
mitted to the Torah’s
worldview are not always fully aware of the de‐
gree to which ideas antithetical to the Torah can
take hold of them. R. Bloch explains the Seli‐
chot prayer in this way: “We have strayed from
Your commandments and Your benevolent
statutes and it was not worthy of us [i.e., it was
not consonant with our Jewish identity].” Some of
the behaviors and thoughts that we have had are
alien to us as Jews.
was not worthy of us” as amplifying the serious‐
ness of our sins, it is also possible to see in this
phrase a source of hope and inspiration. We men‐
tioned above that the declaration of a farmer
upon clearing out his house of tithes is termed
by Chazal “vidu’i ma’aser” – “the confession of
the ma’aser tithe.” We noted that this term is in‐
congruous because the content of the recitation
seems more like a boast that he has fulfilled all
the laws correctly, rather than a confession of
wrongdoing. Rabbi Yosef Dov Soloveitchik
(Chameish Derashot, Berit Avot, pp. 85–87) an‐
swers that there are two prerequisites for repen‐
tance. First, a person must be able to recognize
that he has sinned. If there is no hakarat ha-chet,
repentance is impossible. Second, the penitent
must believe that he is capable of purifying him‐
self from the contamination of sin. He must feel
that inside of him are the sources of spiritual
strength and renewal. If he cannot believe in his
own power to improve and rise above his past be‐
havior, then the teshuvah process cannot move
forward. This second prerequisite is just as cru‐
cial as the first. The farmer who comes forward
to recite vidu’i ma’aser is stating proudly that he
has fulfilled the commandments of God. This is a
confession. He is admitting that he can live up to
the demands of God’s will. In fact, by recognizing
that he can succeed he will also be able to con‐
fess when he has fallen short.
When we declare in Selichot that we have
strayed from God’s commandments “and it was
not equal to us” we are saying that our past be‐
havior was not worthy of who we really are. We
are better than our behavior might show and we
can do better going forward. Our sins are not
greater than us. We are greater than our sins.
∑
While both R. Greenwald and R. Bloch under‐
stand the phrase “ve-lo shavah lanu” – “and it
After striking our chests and listing off the mis‐
takes and shortcomings of the past year
we have
105
to step back and try to figure out how, despite
our commitment to the Torah, did we stray from
its path. The words “ve-lo shavah lanu” open up
many avenues of introspection. If shavah con‐
notes “worth” and it is due to our lack of appreci‐
ation for the worth of God’s commandments that
we have drifted (Vilna Gaon), then we must
rededicate ourselves to Talmud Torah and rein‐
force the recognition of each mitzvah as infinite
both in terms of its intrinsic value as well as its
ultimate reward. If we have succumbed to the il‐
lusion that by sinning we will reap great benefit
and we are declaring that the sin was “not worth
it to us” (Beit Ha-Levi) then we must channel our
desires into spiritual venues, enhance our yirat
shamayim and continually remind ourselves that
a sin is really worthless. If we have fallen prey to
yet another gimmick of the yetzer ha-ra, to down‐
play the impact of individual sins or choices and
their repercussions (R. Yaakov of Lissa) and we
are bemoaning the fact that “things have not
stayed the same for us” then we must train our‐
selves to emphasize the seriousness of every act
and constantly keep guard over our spiritual
course which can shift quickly, because things do
not remain the same. If we despair that “nothing
is worth anything to us,” we must remind our‐
selves that repentance and forgiveness are al‐
ways possible (Ketav Sofer and Agra de-Kallah)
and we must confidently and bravely continue
the fight even as we feel the pain of our battlescars (Kotzker Rebbi). Finally, we must consider
that our statement– “ve-lo shavah lanu” is mak‐
ing us aware that many of our sins are not con‐
sistent with our stage in life and individual cir‐
cumstances and that many of our attitudes actu‐
ally contradict and undermine our most cher‐
ished beliefs as Jews (Rabbis Bloch and Green‐
wald).
The Mitzva to Eat on Erev
Yom Kippur and the Teshuva
of Yom Kippur
Laws of the Festivals
The Yamim Nora’im season is a time of spiritual
mathematics and it is scary. We tally our deeds
and calculate our accomplishments and deficien‐
cies. In elementary school, addition is easier than
subtraction. Unfortunately, in the realm of spiri‐
tual math, it is easier to subtract. As we strike
out chests and declare our sins, we can quickly
find ourselves in the range of negative numbers.
This realization can be terrifying and paralyzing.
However, we must not forget to add the essence
of who we are to the equation. We are capable of
better and we have great spiritual potential
within us. We must rise above past mistakes and
strike out boldly to make this coming year a year
that is “shavah lanu”– equal to who we really are.
Many customs and laws occupy us on the day preceding Yom Kippur.
Some have the custom of visiting cemeteries before Yom Kippur,1 others
participate in kapparot, swinging a live chicken or a small sack of money
above their heads,2 and some even have the custom of receiving malkot
(lashes).3
In addition, the Gemara teaches that there is a mitzva to eat on Erev Yom
Kippur. What is the significance of the Se’uda HaMafseket, the meal eaten
immediately before the Yom Kippur fast?
The Talmud teaches:
R. Ḥiyya bar R. Difti taught: It says, “And you shall afflict
yourselves on the ninth” [Lev. 23:32]. Now on the ninth
by R. David Brofsky, excerpted from Hilkhot Mo’adim: Understanding the
do we fast? Do we not fast on the tenth? Rather, this is to
106
tell you that anyone who eats and drinks on the ninth, the
therefore they would not fast then. Similarly, it is now
Scriptures considers it as if he fasted on the ninth and the
understood that one who eats and drinks on the ninth, it
tenth.4
is as if he fasted for the ninth and the tenth, because the
fast on the tenth is harder for him…and therefore the fast
Indeed, the Gemara records that “Mar the son of Ravina would sit at all
on the tenth counts for him for two fasts.9
times in fast except for the days of Shavuot, Purim, and Erev Yom Kippur”
(Pesaḥim 68b).
Interestingly, Torah Temima’s father, R. Yechiel Michel Epstein
(1829–1908), cites both reasons in his Arukh HaShulḥan, insisting that
The Gemara teaches that there is a mitzvato eat on the day before Yom
while the fast may be difficult due to excessive eating the day before,
Kippur and that eating on Erev Yom Kippur and then fasting on Yom Kip‐
one’s ability to fast successfully will still be enhanced by eating on Erev
pur is somehow tantamount to fasting for two days. What function does
Yom Kippur.
this mitzva fill? How are we to understand the Talmud’s equation between
eating on the ninth of Tishrei and fasting on Yom Kippur? And does this
Given this discussion, we might question the permissibility of ingesting
mitzva somehow reflect the true nature of Yom Kippur? The Rishonim diff‐
pills before a fast that are purported to relieve the discomfort of the fast.
ffer as to how to understand this mitzva.
Indeed, R. Hayim Hezkia Medini, (1833–1904), in his Sedei Ḥemed, cites a
scholar who discouraged engaging in segulot (spiritual remedies) in‐
Some view the obligation as a form of preparation for the fast. Rashi, for
tended to ease the fast.10 Most posekim, however, insist that there is no
example, explains:
reason to be stringent, especially since according to Rashi, the entire in‐
And the verse says, “And you shall afflict yourself on the
tention of this mitzva is to ease the fast the next day.11
ninth,” implying [that you should] prepare yourself on the
After citing the views of Rashi and the Rosh, Rabbeinu Yona (Spain,
ninth in order to be able to fast on the tenth. And since
1180–1263) presents an alternate perspective of this mitzva. He writes:
the Torah employed the language of “affliction,” it
teaches that it is as if one fasted on the ninth.5
If a person transgressed a negative commandment and
repented, he should be concerned with his sin and long
Rashi understands that one eats on the ninth of Tishrei in order to pre‐
and wait for the arrival of Yom Kippur in order that God
pare for Yom Kippur. For this extra preparation, one receives “credit” as if
will be appeased.…And this is what they meant [Rosh
one fasted on both days.6 Rosh concurs, explaining:
HaShana 9a] [when they said that if] one who eats a
special meal on the eve of Yom Kippur it is as if he was
In other words, “prepare yourselves on the ninth,
commanded to fast on the ninth and tenth and did so, as
rejuvenate and strengthen yourselves through eating and
he demonstrated his joy that the time for atonement has
drinking, in order that you will be able to fast tomorrow.”
come, and this will be a testimony for his concern for his
This is in order to demonstrate God’s affection for Israel,
guilt and his anguish for his sins.…Second, on other
similar to a person who has a beloved child who must fast
festive days, we eat a meal for the joy of the mitzva…and
for a day; he will give him food and drink the day before
since the fast is on Yom Kippur, we were commanded to
the fast in order that he will tolerate [the fast]. Similarly,
designate a meal for the joy of the mitzva on the day
God does not normally command the Jewish people to
before Yom Kippur.12
fast, except for one day, for their own good, to atone for
their sins.7
Ritva paraphrases Rabbeinu Yona, explaining that the mitzva to eat on
Erev Yom Kippur is meant “to demonstrate that this day is holy to our
Rosh understands the mitzva, like Rashi, as a preparation for the fast, but
Lord, and it is appropriate to eat sweet foods, like on Rosh HaShana, but
he adds that it demonstrates God’s affection for the Jewish people and His
the Torah commands us to abstain on this day from physical pleasures in
desire that they should not suffer.
order that we should be like angels, as the Midrash says.”13 Rabbeinu
Conversely, Shibbolei HaLeket suggests that one who eats “well” on the
day before Yom Kippur will experience more discomfort on Yom Kippur it‐
self.8 Similarly, R. Baruch HaLevi Epstein (1860–1941) explains in his To‐
Yona clearly believes that we are not to view the mitzva to eat on Erev
Yom Kippur as a preparation for the fast, but rather as an independent
commemoration or celebration of Yom Kippur that was “pushed up” to the
day before.
rah Temima:
Incidentally, while ostensibly, “ve’initem et nafshoteikhem” (Lev. 16:31,
Based upon what appears in Taanit 27b, that the anshei
23:27, 23:32; Num. 29:7) should be translated literally: “And you shall affl
‐
mishmar [the Kohanim on duty] in the Temple would not
fflict your souls,” implying that the purpose of the inuyim is to afflict, to
fast on Sunday…and according to one [reason] in order
cause discomfort, in order to motivate the person to repent, most Ris‐
that they should not go from rest and enjoyment [on
honim, however, explain that the Torah commands the Jewish people to
Shabbat] to discomfort and fasting. And the
eat on Erev Yom Kippur so that they should experience less discomfort
commentators explain that a fast which comes after a day
during the fast (Rashi, Rosh), or to express one’s joy upon the opportunity
of excessive eating and drinking is more difficult and
to receive absolution (Rabbeinu Yona, Ritva).
107
The Aḥaronim discuss these two approaches – whether the mitzva is in‐
Kippur, when one’’s eating also fulfills the commandment of “inuy.”18
tended as a preparation for the fast of Yom Kippur or as a separate com‐
mandment – at great length. They raise a number of potential differences
Rav Avraham Yitzḥak HaKohen Kook (1865–1935) analyzes this mitzvain
between these approaches. R. Akiva Eiger (1761–1837), for example,
his Ein Aya, a commentary on the Aggadic sections of the Talmud.19 He
questions whether women are obligated in this mitzva. He was asked to
begins by asserting that there are two dimensions of teshuva that are al‐
rule regarding an ailing woman who was warned by her doctors not to
luded to in verses from the Torah:
eat, lest her condition deteriorate. He writes:
And it shall come to pass when all these things come
God forbid, she should not eat. And since you say that she
upon you, the blessing and the curse that I have set
is learned, and fears the word of God and will hardly
before you, and you will take it to your heart among all
listen to you, my advice is to take a servant or two to tell
the nations where the Lord your God has driven you. And
her that a letter arrived from me prohibiting her from
you will return unto the Lord your God and hearken to
eating anything more than she is accustomed to each day.
His voice, according to all that I command you this day,
you and your children, with all your heart and with all
He concludes with the following thought:
your soul.…And the Lord your God will circumcise your
heart and the heart of your children to love the Lord your
While this ruling must not be delayed, I am somewhat
God with all your heart and with all your soul, so that you
curious regarding healthy women [as well], whether they
may live. (Deut. 30:1–2, 6)
are obligated to eat on Erev Yom Kippur, as possibly they
may be exempt, as they are exempt from all time-bound
If one “returns” to God, then why must God “circumcise his heart” in or‐
commandments.…Or possibly, since the verse employs
der to bring about “the love of the Lord your God”? Rav Kook explains
the phrase “the ninth of the month,” implying that it is as
that sin impacts upon a person in two ways. First, the person has violated
if one fasted on the ninth and the tenth, therefore all who
the will of God. Second, the person has distanced himself from God, de‐
must fast on the tenth, to fulfill “and you shall afflict
creasing the love and fear of God in his heart. The process of repentance,
yourselves,” must fast on the ninth.…This question
therefore, must both correct the sin as well as restore the love and fear of
requires further thought for a less busy time.14
Other Aḥaronim discuss this question as well.15 In his commentary on R.
God to one’s heart. These two goals of teshuva are accomplished in differ‐
ent ways.
Aḥai Gaon’s She’iltot, R. Naftali Tzvi Yehuda Berlin (1816–1893), Netziv,
The teshuva of restoring one’s personal relationship with God can best be
supports the understanding that one eats on the ninth in order to prepare
achieved without the distractions of the physical world. However, fixing
for the fast on the tenth.16 Indeed, the text of the She’iltot reads, “One
what one has wronged cannot be fully accomplished while detached from
who eats and drinks on the ninth and fasts on the tenth, the Scriptures
the world; rather, he must be immersed in this world. The Rabbis teach:
considers it as if he fasted on the ninth and the tenth,” implying that one
eats on the ninth in order to successfully fast on the tenth. If so, Netziv
What is the definition of a baal teshuva (a person who has
questions whether one who is confident in his ability to fast must still eat
repented)? R. Yehuda said: One who has the opportunity
and drink on the ninth. Conversely, must one who is unable to fast on Yom
to do the same sin [implying that circumstances are such
Kippur eat on the ninth?
that his desire to do the sin is the same] and this time
does not do it! He is a baal teshuva! (Yoma 86b)
R. Avraham Shmuel Binyamin Sofer (1815–1871), Ketav Sofer, also asks
whether one who is unable to fast on Yom Kippur must still fulfill this
17
mitzva on Erev Yom Kippur.
He concludes that an ailing woman who
If so, Rav Kook claims, “One must be involved in business dealings and in
his day-to-day dealings and [still] act according to the God’s Torah and its
cannot fast on Yom Kippur would certainly not be obligated to eat. He ar‐
commandments” in order to perform teshuva properly. One might there‐
gues that if the obligation relates to the fast, then she should be exempt,
fore claim that the abstinence of Yom Kippur, through which one restores
as she will not fast the next day, and if this halakha constitutes and inde‐
his personal relationship with God, does not actually achieve full and com‐
pendent obligation, she should be exempt because it is a time-bound com‐
plete teshuva. We thus eat and drink on the day before Yom Kippur, “and
mandment.
are careful in the service of God, placing the fear of God upon us so that
we do not stumble with regard to any prohibition, even through eating
Finally, should one strive to eat a meal with bread on Erev Yom Kippur? It
and drinking, and we therefore engage in active repentance, and only af‐
would seem that those who view this mitzvaas a preparation for the fast
terward can we increase our repentance with added sanctity.”20 This
would see no reason to prefer one manner of eating over another. How‐
beautiful idea explains why the Talmud equates the ninth and tenth days,
ever, those who view this mitzva as a “se’udat mitzva”” or even a “se’udat
as together they compose the complete experience of Yom Kippur.
Yom Tov,” might be inclined to prefer a more festive meal made over
bread. Similarly, Minḥat Ḥinukh questions whether there is a minimum
1. Rema 605. ↩
amount that one must eat. He concludes, creatively, that since the halakha
defines “inuy” on Yom Kippur as abstaining from food the size of a date
(kakotevet), one should similarly eat a minimum of a “date” on Erev Yom
2. Ibid. ↩
108
3. See, for example, Siddur Rashi 211, Me’iri Ḥibbur HaTeshuva
(Buber), p. 404, Rosh, Yoma 8:25, Tur and Shulḥan Arukh 606.
11. See Ḥelkat Yaakov 2:58; Tzitz Eliezer 7:32; Mishneh Halakhot
2:66. ↩
See also Rabbi Yitzḥak Tessler, “Matay Lokin Malkot BaErev Yom
HaKippurim” Yeshurun, v. 11 (Elul 5762), who discusses when
12. Rabbeinu Yona, Shaarei Teshuva 4:8–10. ↩
lashes were generally given. ↩
13. Ritva, Rosh HaShana 9a. ↩
4. Yoma 81b, Rosh HaShana 9a, Pesaḥim 68b, Berakhot 8b. ↩
14. Teshuvot Rabbi Akiva Eiger 16. ↩
5. Rashi, Yoma 81b, s.v. kol. ↩
15. See Reshash, Sukka 28b; Minḥat Ḥinukh 313. ↩
6. Rashi offers a similar interpretation in his commentary to Ber‐
akhot 8b, while he explains differently on Rosh HaShana 9a. ↩
16. HaEmek She’ela 167:12. ↩
7. Rosh, Yoma 8:22. ↩
17. Ketav Sofer 112. ↩
8. Shibbolei HaLeket 307. ↩
18. Minḥat Ḥinukh 313:9. ↩
9. Torah Temima, Lev. 23, n. 97. ↩
19. Ein Aya 38. ↩
10. Sedei Ḥemed, Ma’arekhet Yom HaKippurim 10:1. ↩
May one wear Crocs on Yom
Kippur?
by R. Shlomo Brody, excerpted from his new
book, A Guide to the Complex: Contemporary
Halakhic Debates
The permissibility of wearing comfortable, nonleather shoes on Yom Kippur has been much
talked about over the last several years, follow‐
ing proclamations by rabbis Yosef Shalom
Elyashiv and Yaakov Ariel, among others, which
strongly discouraged the wearing of Crocs on
Yom Kippur. Despite the brouhaha, this debate is
actually a continuation of a millennia-old discus‐
sion regarding the prohibitions of Yom Kippur.
20. Ein Aya 38. ↩
The Torah never specifies which actions are for‐
bidden on Yom Kippur. Rather, five times the Bi‐
ble states that a person should afflict (innui) him‐
self, in addition to refraining from the work that
is forbidden on Shabbat (Lev. 16, 23; Num. 29).
Unlike the medieval Karaites, for whom affliction
included wearing sackcloth and ashes, abstaining
from sleep, and other deprivations, the sages lim‐
ited this term to five areas of self-denial: bathing,
anointment, sexual relations, donning shoes, and
nourishment (eating and drinking), with the lat‐
ter seen as the most severe prohibition, whose vi‐
olation was punishable by spiritual banish‐
ment, karet (Yoma 73–74).
Some scholars believed that despite this afflic‐
tion, an element of festive joy is also mandated,
as on other holidays (mikra’ei kodesh) mentioned
in the Torah (Lev. 23:27). In addition to dressing
nicely (Shabbat 119a), we recite the shehe‐
heyanu blessing, which commemorates special
occasions. Mourners even halt their seven-day
(shiva) bereavement practices so as to accord
some measure of festivity to the day (Rabbi
Yonatan of Lunel, Eiruvin 40a). Indeed, some un‐
derstood the requirement to eat before Yom Kip‐
109
pur as fulfilling the obligation to feast on festivals
(BY OH 604). The Talmud further states that Yom
Kippur was deemed a happy occasion because of
the atonement afforded by the day (Taanit 30b).
Nonetheless, most scholars understood the day
to be uniquely lacking in holiday festivities
(Hizkuni, Rabbi Ovadia Seforno, Lev. 23:27). We
refrain from reciting the joyful Hallel Prayer or
engaging in excessive happiness (MT Laws of
Reading the Megilla and of Hanukka 3:6), both
deemed inappropriate for a day of judgment
(Arakhin10b). Ultimately, the Torah aims to
achieve a day of respite (shabbaton) from physi‐
cal pleasure along with a feeling of affliction
(Maimonides, Sefer HaMitzvot, Aseh 164).
This goal, however, might afford certain lenien‐
cies with respect to activities that are clearly not
intended for pleasure. The Talmud, for example,
allows people to rinse dirt from their body and
wash their hands after using the bathroom or be‐
fore performing ritual activities (OH 613). These
dispensations led some to assert that the activi‐
ties prohibited on Yom Kippur for the sake of affl
‐
ffliction – with the exception of nutrition – origi‐
nated as rabbinic edicts (Rosh, Yoma 8:1).
Others, however, believed that the Torah prohib‐
ited only acts of pleasure, leaving room for le‐
niency in other circumstances (Yere’im 420). By
nature, however, anointment and nutrition entail
enjoyment; therefore they remain prohibited, ex‐
cept in cases of medical necessity (OH 614:1,
618).
An interesting debate exists regarding actions
that alleviate discomfort. Many decisors permit‐
ted the use of snuff (AH OH 612:6), for example,
which some considered an appropriate way to
mark the festivity of the day (Gan
HaMelekh 145). Other scholars allowed people to
swallow slow-release pills before the fast to pre‐
vent headaches (Tzitz Eliezer 7:32).
Contrary to popular belief, the Talmud never ex‐
plicitly limits the ban on footwear to leather
shoes. The Mishna states a blanket prohibition
(Yoma 73b), with a parallel tannaitic text further
forbidding socks (Tosefta Yoma 4:1). The only ex‐
plicit exceptions are for cases of illness, in‐
clement weather, or walking in hazardous areas.
However, some sages covered their feet in reeds
or rags (Yoma 78b). Some understood that these
rabbis limited the prohibition to formal “shoes,”
rendering all other protective devices permissi‐
ble. Others, however, allowed such footwear only
if one’s foot still felt discomfort from the ground;
anything providing greater protection was dis‐
qualified (Nahmanides, Shabbat 66a).
This dispute continued into the medieval era,
with Maimonides (MT Laws of Yom Kippur 3:7)
and others requiring one’s foot to feel the
ground, while others, followed by Rabbi Joseph
Karo, forbade only footwear made of leather or
wood (OH 614:2). Despite the latter, normative
ruling, many prominent figures, including rabbis
Yisrael Meir Kagan (MB 614:5) and Yehiel Michel
Epstein (AH OH 614:4), deemed it meritorious to
wear slippers or soft-soled shoes in which one
feels the ground. While Rabbi Joseph B.
Soloveitchik also discouraged padded sneakers
(Nefesh HaRav, p. 210), Rabbi Moshe Sternbuch
further suggested that any regularly worn, com‐
fortable shoes should not be donned on Yom Kip‐
pur (Moadim U’Zemanim 6:28). Despite these
sentiments, the widespread practice – as noted
by Israel’s chief rabbi during the recent Crocs
controversy – is to wear any type of non-leather
shoe.
110
Unity in Leadership,
Prophecy, and Wisdom
Moshe’s calming response was that Hashem’s granting them prophecy
should reassure them of Eldad and Medad’s fitting with the current lead‐
ership.
The Value of Teachers and the Decline of Prophecy and Wisdom
Ran’s belief that proximity to a person at a higher level can elevate the
one at the lower level gives a value to the presence of teachers beyond
their technical roles. Since the teacher—of wisdom or prophecy—is at a
higher level than the student, the teacher can help the student advance in
ways independent of the explicit act of teaching.
He uses that to explain why Ketubbot 111a stresses the added value of
studying with a teacher, and why R. Yehudah haNasi said (Eruvin 13b)
that his greater success at Torah study was having seen R. Meir from be‐
by R. Gidon Rothstein
hind. He hadn’t received actual learning from R. Meir; he had been in his
presence. (This obviously militates against distance learning in all its
How unified a leadership do we want? In democracies, we like checks and
forms, but that’s a different discussion).
balances, diversity and multiplicity of opinion, to avoid getting trapped in
one mode of thought. Ran assumes the opposite, that one leader is best.
If all learning is jumpstarted by a teacher, whose proximity takes us be‐
This shapes how he views the process of the elders joining Moshe
yond what we are ready for, we become an offshoot of that teacher (as
Rabbenu’s leadership team.
with the elders—not only did they need Moshe because they weren’t
ready for prophecy, Hashem wanted them to be offshoot prophets, to
Last time, Ran said Moshe had to be present for Miriam and Aharon’s re‐
maintain the unity of leadership).
buke because they were not able to have prophecy on such short notice.
That also explained why he was there for the anointing of the elders, who
were not ready for independent prophecy.
If so, since Moshe Rabbenu is the original source of prophecy and Torah
knowledge (as Avot reminds us in its first Mishnah, Moshe brought the To‐
rah down from Sinai and passed it along), everyone who follows are off‐
The Elders as Offshoots of Moshe
shoots, and cannot surpass him.
But Ran offers another reason Hashem wanted Moshe there. He takes for
Ran takes this as a logical necessity, when it’s not. While Miriam and
granted, without explanation, that societies run better with one leader.
Aharon needed Moshe there that time, for example, they theoretically
For him, that is why the Torah obligates establishing a king; any other sys‐
could have surpassed him in prophecy at other times. Even if Devarim
tem leads to anarchy.
34:10 tells us that Moshe’s prophecy was unique, it does not force the
conclusion that no disciple prophet could be greater than his direct mas‐
(Ran will discuss the role of the king more in upcoming drashot. As we
ter (a first-grade teacher might be the reason students are able to grasp
read his view, we can weigh the values he saw in a single-leader society
the letters of the alphabet when they aren’t yet ready for it, in Ran’s sys‐
against the value we see in societies with more spread out leadership.
tem, but that does not translate into their never being able to surpass that
With the current dysfunction in Congress, we might be more open to his
teacher in the understanding of the letters).
claim about anarchy, which Plato also made, than we would have been
years ago.)
Ran does assume it, though, as we see from his reading of Elisha and
Eliyahu.
Unfortunately, as Yitro had earlier pointed out to Moshe, it is difficult for
one man to lead a large nation all on his own. When Moshe threw up his
Elisha Seeing the Elevated Eliyahu
hands once the people complained about the man, Hashem wanted the
new leaders to function as one unit with Moshe, to maintain the single-
The day Eliyahu was taken up to heaven, he asked Elisha what he wanted
source leadership. To ensure that, Hashem took the spirit for the elders
as a parting gift, and then says that Elisha’s request for double Eliyahu’s
from Moshe’s.
spirit was a difficult one. If Elisha were to see him taken to heaven,
Eliyahu says, he’ll know he’s got it. Ran wants to know why the request
For Ran, that explains why Yehoshua and Moshe reacted differently to El‐
was so difficult, and what would change if he saw Eliyahu go.
dad and Medad. Yehoshua saw them as interlopers, securing prophecy
even after having been told they were not among the elders (according to
His answer is that since Elisha’s prophecy was nurtured and grown off of
one view), or choosing to stay back and seek prophecy on their own. They
Eliyahu’s, asking to surpass it is difficult if not impossible. At the moment
were either protesting the elder-selection process or serving as a competi‐
of being taken up to Heaven, however, Eliyahu himself would be reaching
tive source of prophecy to Moshe, in Yehoshu’a’s view.
a level he never did in his life. Witnessing that would be a new source for
Elisha’s prophecy, and could then double what Eliyahu had previously.
111
Forging and Forcing Unity
tee that, their prophecy was made an offshoot of his. Yet Ran also recog‐
nizes that Hashem could sometimes do that even without Moshe being
This wasn’t Ran’s central point, so he does not deal with it fully. We will
present, such as Eldad and Medad. That suggests that unity does not re‐
have to wait for other drashot to see whether and how his interest in cen‐
quire keeping everyone in lockstep with the original leader, that there are
tralized leadership, of later generations building off of their teachers, and
other ways to achieve the kind of unity Ran saw as necessary for a healthy
of all wisdom and prophecy extending from Moshe, figure in his thought.
polity.
What he has said clearly is that the process of selecting elders included
But that’s not for this drasha. The next and last piece in this drasha is in‐
Moshe out of necessity and will. The necessity was their lack of readiness.
herent nature, whether and how we can overcome it, and what that says
The will was that they should jell with Moshe, not oppose him. To guaran‐
about when bad things happen to good people.
New Periodical: RJJ Journal
LXVIII
New issue of The Journal of Halacha and Con‐
temporary Society LXVIII (Succot 5775, Fall
2014):
Letter From the Editor – R. Alfred Cohen,
founding editor and steward of the journal
for over 30 years, announces his retirement
as editor. No hint of his successor. R. Cohen
created a genre with this journal. He taught
and inspired multiple generations of rabbis,
including me. He published many ground‐
breaking articles but, more importantly,
served as a Torah resource for scholars and
laymen alike. Much of what you see on this
website is due to the influence of R. Cohen
and his journal. May he continue teaching
Torah in good health for many years to
come.
Using Tzedaka Funds to Pay for Fertility
Treatments by R. David Sukenik – Two
separate questions: 1) can infertile couples
use their own tzedaka money to pay for
their fertility treatments? 2) can people in
general use their tzedaka money to pay for
the fertility treatments for infertile couples?
Yes
112
Honoring Parents by R. Alfred Cohen –
The editor leaves the journal with a compre‐
hensive article (more than half the issue) on
the mitzvah to honor parents. Starts from
the basics and addresses many complex
cases such as divorces and adoptions.
Practical Halachic Questions for
Anatomy Students by Matthew Schaike‐
witz – A medical student discusses common
issues arising from cadaver study. I find it
odd that he issues rulings but he generally
does a good job.
When is a Kallah Required to Cover her
Hair? by R. Dovid Emanuel Feinberg –
Quotes and explains all the opinions: before
the wedding ceremony, after the ceremony
but before the reception or the next morn‐
ing.
Letters
Dr. Ira Taub and R. Moshe Revach dis‐
cuss R. Revach’s article on giving
tzedaka to collectors. I think R. Re‐
vach writes too unequivocally, since in
his article he notes that authorities
disagree while here he says that the
halacha remains constant.
R. David Zaback corrects a citation on
cloning
Eliezer Eisenberg, R. Ezra Schwartz
and R. Micah Segelman critique R.
Yosef Gavriel Bechhofer’s article on
deciding matters of belief. R. Bech‐
hofer responds at length with citations
and direct quotations.
113
Torah Musings Digest
15 October, 2014 | A Window into the Orthodox Jewish Intellectual’s World| Edited by: Rabbi Gil Student
Vort from the Rav: Bereishis
Genesis 4:6
‫שׂכִּיל‬
ְ ‫ְוכִי תַ ֲאוָה הוּא ָלעֵינַיִם ְונֶ ְחמָד ָהעֵץ ְל ַה‬
and that it was a desire to the eyes, and the tree was
attractive to look at.
The Tree of Knowledge is described in purely esthetic categories: 1) ‫– תַ ֲאוָה‬
the moment of lust, invincible, hypnotic desire that spells ethical atrophy
and indifference; 2) ‫ – נֶ ְחמָד‬in the sense of attractiveness and fascination:
esthetic tension brought about by the experience of beauty (Le-haskil)
therefore in this context denotes to the eye. Onkelos translates ‫שׂכִּיל‬
ְ ‫ ְל ַה‬as
‫“( ְלאִסתַּ כָּ ָלָא בֵּיה‬to look at”). David Kimhi in Sefer Shorashim cites several
other examples where ‫שכֶל‬
ֶ sechel, normally translated as “understanding”
in fact means visual apprehension: see 1 Sam. 25:3, Prov. 3:4). In light of
this interpretation, the noun ‫( דַּ עַת‬knowledge) takes on a new meaning. It
does not refer to ‫ דַּ עַת‬in the cognitive sense—theoretical knowing—but to
the esthetic subject-object relationship, hedonic knowledge. ‫עֵץ הַדַּ עַת טוֹב ו ָָרע‬
means “the tree of foreknowledge of the pleasant and unpleasant” or “the
tree of anticipating the agreeable and disagreeable.” This is the tree of es‐
thetic motivation, of the orgiastic tension. God forbade man the orgiastic
How and Why Should One
Rejoice On the Festivals?
by Rav Chaim Navon
Limits to the Mitzva of Rejoicing
Elsewhere, we noted that the mitzva of rejoicing on a festival is excep‐
tional, in that it combines concrete action and inner emotion. We also said
that this combination necessitates special caution. We are dealing here
with a mitzva that can easily turn into wild abandon and blur the spiritual
aspects of the commandment. When Halakha nurtures and stirs up a
volatile emotion like joy, it also imposes limits, for it is well aware of the
dangers posed by unrestricted emotion. We shall bring here a famous re‐
striction cited by Rambam, which aims at diminishing these dangers:
And while one eats and drinks himself, it is his duty to
feed the stranger, the orphan, the widow, and other poor
and unfortunate people, for he who locks the doors to his
courtyard and eats and drinks with his wife and family,
without giving to eat and drink to the poor and bitter in
soul – his meal is not rejoicing in a divine commandment,
but a rejoicing in his own stomach. It is of such persons
that Scripture says: “Their sacrifices shall be unto them
esthetic experience, the acquisition of the pleasure impulse; he was not
allowed to overemphasize the moment of wantonness, making the beauty
ideal the fascinating force in human life.
It is natural that the immediate change precipitated by the eating of the
forbidden fruit expressed itself in the feeling of shame. Adam and Eve be‐
gan to feel embarrassed in exposing their organs. Why? Because the sex
urge was now distorted by the pleasure desire. Each of the partners be‐
gan to feel the pressure of guilt and culpability. Eve became the desired
beautiful person with whom Adam wanted to merge his existence for the
sheer delight of possessing her. Sympathetic intimacy is here determined
by a sinister longing for dominion and exploitation, for demoting the other
individual to the status of slave. Had the sexual love represented ethical
solidarity and co-responsibility, the guilt moment would not have ap‐
peared at all. Partners would in such a case yearn for each other in an
ethical mood; equality and reciprocity would be the foundation of the exis‐
tential union realized through carnal means. Yet, man freed himself from
the fetters of the ethos, and yielded to esthetic hypnosis. The pleasure and
comfort of the partner is irrelevant; his interests come first. Man began to
hide his desire, for that very desire spelled the humiliation of his partner.
He acquired the feeling of shame (Emergence of Ethical Man, pp.
117–128).
as the bread of mourners, all that eat thereof shall be
polluted; for their bread is for their own appetite”
(Hoshea 9:4). Rejoicing of this kind is a disgrace to those
who indulge in it, as Scripture says: “And I will spread
dung upon your faces, even the dung of your sacrifices”
(Malakhi 2:3). (Hilkhot Yom Tov 6:18)
Rambam sets here a practical limitation: One is obligated to allow the
poor to participate in the rejoicing, or else it is not deemed “rejoicing in a
divine commandment,” but rather “rejoicing in one’s stomach.” The Torah
does not legitimize all types of rejoicing during the festival period. It in‐
sists that the rejoicing must remain clean and pure, true rejoicing in the
mitzva, and not just rejoicing in one’s stomach.
We find another such limitation imposed upon the mitzva of rejoicing in a
famous halakha:
Mishna: We may not marry women on Chol Ha-mo’ed,
neither virgins nor widows, and we may not perform
levirate marriage, because it is joy for him …
Gemara: And if it is joy for him, what of it? … Because we
do not intermingle one joy with another joy. Rabba bar
Rav Huna said: Because [the groom] will put aside the joy
of the festival, and involve himself with the joy of his wife.
(Mo’ed Katan 8b)
114
Why is marriage forbidden on the intermediate days of a festival? Rabba
Rabbi Soloveitchik relates to this point as well. In this context, he refers
bar Rav Huna’s explanation is easy to understand: we are concerned that
to the well-known words of Ramban in his critique of Rambam’s Sefer Ha-
the groom will neglect those actions that give expression to the rejoicing
mitzvot:
required by the festival. But what is the meaning of the first explanation
offered by the Gemara, “because we do not intermingle one joy with an‐
For Moshe was commanded at Sinai that Israel should
other joy”? Tosafot explain:
recite a song [of praise] on their appointed days in honor
of God who took them out of Egypt, split for them the sea,
Because we do not intermingle one joy with another joy –
and set them aside for His service. [Later,] David came
this is a scriptural decree, as is explained below … it
and instituted for them this Hallel for them to sing … And
seems to be based on a small measure of reason, for just
it appears from their words that [the obligation to recite
as we must not perform the mitzvot in bundles – for a
Hallel] is a Torah obligation, as I have explained. And it is
person must direct his heart to a single mitzva, and not
a halakha that was given to Moshe at Sinai, or else it is
divert his attentions from it – so regarding [intermingling]
included in the joy regarding which we have been
one joy with another, a person must direct his heart to [a
commanded, as the verse says: “Also in the day of your
single cause for] joy. (Mo’ed Katan 8b, Tosafot, s.v., lefi)
gladness, and in your solemn days, and in the beginnings
of your months, you shall blow with the trumpets” … This
Tosafot explain that a person must not mix other joys together with the joy
being the case, we may interpret that on the festival days,
required by a mitzva, not only on the practical level, but on the emotional
when all types of rejoicing are commanded, singing
level as well. This is an additional limitation: rejoicing on a festival must
[God’s] praises is included among them. (Ramban,
be prevented from turning into mundane joy, even in the case of legiti‐
critique of Rambam’s Sefer Ha-mitzvot, first principle)
mate rejoicing, like the joy of marriage. The Torah is very strict in its in‐
sistence that the joy remain pure, for there is grave danger that the joy of
According to Ramban, singing God’s praises is a fulfillment of the mitzva
the mitzva will turn into empty joy. Hence, it is forbidden to intermingle
of rejoicing on a festival. We see from this, as from the words of Rambam
this rejoicing with other joys.
cited above, that we are not dealing here with empty joy, but with joy that
stems from spiritual aspirations, joy that expresses itself, among other
Rambam adds another limitation, aimed at preserving the purity of rejoic‐
ways, through the singing of God’s praises. The Sha’agat Arye (no. 69) re‐
ing on a festival:
jects Ramban’s position, but he argues that one of the fullest and most
perfect expressions of the mitzva of rejoicing on a festival involves Torah
When one eats and drinks and rejoices on a festival day,
study, about which the verse states: “The statutes of the Lord are right,
he should not overindulge in wine, merriment, and
rejoicing the heart” (Tehillim 19:10). We see again that we are not dealing
frivolity, in the belief that the more he does of this the
here with empty joy, but with joy that is bound to a particular spiritual po‐
more he is fulfilling the commandment to rejoice. For
sition.
drunkenness, excessive merriment, and frivolity are not
rejoicing but madness and folly, and we were commanded
What is that spiritual position? In order to clarify the matter, Rabbi
to indulge not in madness and folly but in the kind of
Soloveitchik cites another halakha. The Gemara in tractate Mo’ed Katan
rejoicing which partakes of the worship of the Creator of
discusses whether or not a leper observes the special laws pertaining to
all things. For Scripture says: “Because you did not serve
him on a festival. The Gemara proves that he does from the fact that a
the Lord your God with joy, and with gladness of heart, by
High Priest who is a leper observes the special laws of leprosy all year
reason of the abundance of all things” (Devarim 28:47),
round, and all year round for the High Priest parallels a festival day for an
showing that one should serve God with joy, whereas it is
ordinary person:
impossible to serve God in the mood created by
merriment, frivolity, or drunkenness. (Hilkhot Yom Tov
And surely the status of the High Priest all year is like
6:20)
that of all other people on a festival. (Mo’ed Katan 14b)
When a person rejoices, he must conduct himself with restraint, because
Tosafot Ha-Rosh explains the meaning of this passage:
wild rejoicing and rowdiness have no part in the joy that is an element of
the service of God, for “it is impossible to serve God in the mood created
That which we compare the High Priest all year round to
by merriment, frivolity, or drunkenness.” How important is it to repeat
all other people on a festival, that is so as to prevent the
and reiterate this bold assertion in our day!
laws of mourning pertaining to a leper from applying to
him, just as we see that the joy of his holiness prevents
The Role of Joy in the Worship of God
the laws of mourning over a deceased relative from
applying to him. (ad loc.)
The closing words of the passage cited from Rambam raise an additional
point. Rambam notes that rejoicing partakes of the service of God. What
According to most Rishonim (with the exception of Rambam), this Gemara
does he mean by this? What is the role of joy in our worship of God?
teaches us that the High Priest does not observe any of the laws of mourn‐
ing, because his status all year long is like that of all other people on a
115
festival. What is the meaning of this comparison? Rabbi Soloveitchik ex‐
on a festival is not merely an external decoration adorning the holiday;
plains that joy stems from standing before God. On a festival day we are
rather, it stems from the spiritual essence of the day.
bound by the mitzva of rejoicing, because on a festival day we stand be‐
fore God. The source of the joy is spiritual. The High Priest stands before
This essay was translated by Rav David Strauss. It
God all year long. He is, therefore, in a state of joy the entire year, and as
originally appeared on Yeshivat Har Etzion’s Israel
a result he is automatically excluded from the laws of mourning. Rejoicing
Koschitzky Virtual Beit Midrash and is republished here
with permission.
Women Dancing With Torah
Scrolls
by R. Gil Student
I don’t like dancing, not on Simchas Torah nor at bar mitvahs nor even at
my wedding. It’s a chore I’ve learned to deal with. Looking over the me‐
Soloveichik, told me that he opposed this practice when
questioned by synagogues in Brookline, Massachusetts,
and New York City. The basis for this ruling, he told me, is
that the Talmud in Berakhot [63a] which says that just as
there is an etiquette that regulates one’s behaviour when
visiting someone else’s home, so too there is a tradition
that regulates behaviour in the synagogue. Thus, for
example, eating in the synagogue is not permitted. An
chitzah on Simchas Torah, I am both troubled and envious.
element of proper synagogue behaviour, such as the
Many of the women I see look very bored. Why should they sit bored on
in legal detail by the Talmud and by subsequent codes of
this holiday? On the other hand, they do not have this communal, family
Jewish law. The same applies to the introduction of
and customary obligation to dance. They can sit in the women’s section
innovations which our ancestors considered to be in
and open a sefer and learn. I can’t do that without being reprimanded. In
conflict with the feeling of respect and awe owed to the
many synagogues, the women watch the men dance, some with great de‐
synagogue. Proper synagogue behaviour is determined by
light, others bored and others just talking with each other and ignoring
practice and tradition. Since it has been the age-old
the dancing. To level the field and give women more options, decades ago
practice of synagogues that women do not dance with
some synagogues began women dances and even introduced Torah scrolls
Torah scrolls during hakafot, the introduction of this
into the women’s dances. This was and remains controversial.
practice would be a violation of synagogue etiquette.
prohibition against eating in the synagogue, is explicated
The Beit Hillel organization in Israel recently published a responsum per‐
R. Menachem Schneerson, the late Lubavitcher Rebbe, wrote a 1975 let‐
mitting women to dance with Torah scrolls on Simchas Torah. They base
ter to R. Shlomo Riskin, voicing his opposition to women’s dancing with a
their view on R. Nachum Rabinovich’s ruling in Si’ach Nachum (no. 40),
Torah scroll on Simchas Torah. You can see the letter in Hebrew here:
explicitly permitting this practice. Without detracting from R. Rabinovich
link. He argues that:
or the men and women of Beit Hillel, I cite here contrary opinions.
1. We may not create new synagogue customs
Primary among them is that of R. Joseph B. Soloveitchik. He is quoted by
2. We may not change existing synagogue customs
his nephew, R. Moshe Meiselman, as deeming the practice impermissible
3. The Rema only permits menstruating women to attend synagogue
(he does not say forbidden). While R. Meiselman’s assertions in the name
and pray with the community–responding “Amen” and “Yehei she‐
of his uncle can sometimes be questioned, and in the next issue of Jewish
meih rabbah“–because of “great sadness” if they are prevented
Action I do just that on one specific point, readers should note that the fol‐
from attending synagogue. R. Schneerson infers that only attend‐
lowing quote appeared in a book published in 1978 as part of R. Norman
ing synagogue is permitted and not other changes.
Lamm’s Library of Jewish Law and Ethics. I am not suggesting that R.
Lamm agrees with everything in this book (he indicates in his Foreword
that he does not). I am suggesting that if an explicit quote in this book in
R. Soloveitchik’s name was incorrect, in all likelihood he would have made
it known. I am not aware of any claim that this specific depiction of his
view is inaccurate.
R. Moshe Meiselman, Jewish Woman in Jewish Law (New York, 1978), p.
146:
More recently, R. Yaakov Ariel opposes women dancing with a Torah scroll
(link). He points out that celebrating the Torah does not require dancing
with a Torah scroll. Some communities have the tradition that even men
do not dance with Torah scrolls. Women are right to want to celebrate the
Torah but they should do so creatively, finding their own way to do so
rather than imitating how (some) men celebrate.
R. Dov Lior (link) writes that throughout the generations, women have not
danced with Torah scrolls. The differences between men and women are
An associated issue, although technically totally different,
is the permissibility of women dancing in the synagogue
with Torah scrolls during hakafot on Simhat Torah. This
practice has been opposed by all contemporary rabbinic
authorities. My revered teacher, Rabbi Joseph B.
real, each with their own religious roles. When women act in ways that
men traditionally have, they detract from the respect due their own roles.
Therefore, women certainly should not dance with Torah scrolls.
I don’t claim that this list is comprehensive. I appreciate if readers post in
the response section what other halakhic authorities have said or written
116
on the subject. In the end, it is up to the synagogue rabbi to consult with
his posek and decide what is permissible and appropriate.
The Sukkot Transition: From
Individual to Community
Days of Awe we have nobody to rely on but ourselves, nowhere to look but
by R. Yehoshua Pfeffer
The calendar transition from the gravity of the Days of Awe to the festive
atmosphere of Sukkot involves a change of atmosphere laden with reli‐
gious meaning.
According to one suggestion raised by the Midrash (Midrash Tanhuma,
Emor 18), the change reflects two phases of a single process: Rosh
Hashanah heralds the beginning of war, a ten-day struggle between life
and death. Sukkot, as it were, represents the “victory parade” after com‐
ing back from war.
Another explanation expounds on the closeness of Hashem to His people
during the Days of Awe. Of this time the Sages apply the verse “Seek out
Hashem when He is present, call upon him when He is close” (Yeshayahu
55:6; Rosh Hashanah 18a). On Sukkot we go a step further and experi‐
ence the elation of actually being together with Him, enveloped by the
Clouds of Glory (see Sukkah 11b).
In this sense the Vilna Gaon explains how the temporary dwellings imply
ultimate closeness with Hashem: “The mitzvah of Sukkah indicates how
Hashem took us from the direction of the constellations, and brought us
into the providence of Hashem and His guidance, without any intermedi‐
ary. This is unlike the nations of the world, who dwell beneath the armies
of the constellations…. Therefore, we are instructed in the shade of the
Sukkah” (Introduction to Oneg Yom Tov).
However, the two times also involve a social transition that should not be
overlooked. Beyond the bein adam laMakom element of moving from Rosh
Hashanah to Sukkot, there is also a bein adam lechavero aspect that de‐
serves attention. The Days of Awe with which Tishrei open are days of the
individual. Sukkot is a time of community.
Rabbi Moshe Isserles (Rema, Orach Chaim 605) records an ancient cus‐
tom of visiting graveyards during the period of the High Holidays. Beyond
the message of taking life seriously, if there is one emotion that graves
awaken in us it is the feeling of loneliness.
The custom of visiting cemeteries reminds us that just as we die alone, so
we stand in judgment alone.
Rosh Hashanah as the Day of Judgment, and the days that follow up to
and including Yom Kippur, impel us to perceive ourselves as individuals.
As the Mishnah writes (Rosh Hashanah 16a), all the people of the world
are judged alone, passing by the Divine judge in single file.
Judgment is not passed in groups. We are not judged primarily as com‐
munes or as communities, but as individuals. The merit of one cannot
avail another, and one person’s crimes will not indict his neighbor. On the
inwards.
In this sense the Days of Awe erect partitions between one man and his
fellow. Each person has an individual purpose in life. Each possesses
unique character traits and dispositions, unique strengths and weak‐
nesses – and each must strive to make the most of what he has. As we en‐
gage in self-analysis and reflection, the Days of Awe accentuate our indi‐
viduality.
On Sukkot the reverse is true. Rather than an individualistic self-percep‐
tion, we see ourselves as a people united by a single purpose.
Leaving our homes on Sukkot, we set aside the conventional differences
of society and class, coming together in the uniformity of the Sukkah (be‐
fore the advent of the living-room Sukkah!). The lonely partitions of the
Days of Awe melt away as we dwell as we celebrate, together, the festive
atmosphere of the time.
The Talmudic Sages note this concept of festive togetherness in the ex‐
pression: “The entire nation of Israel can dwell in a single Sukkah”
(Sukkah 27a). In contrast with other mitzvot, which are generally fulfilled
individually (I cannot eat your matzah), the mitzvah of Sukkah can be ful‐
filled communally. The entire Jewish People can dwell in a single Sukkah.
Before reaching the exultation of communal celebration, we must pass
through the phase of individual reckoning. For if we are not individuals,
each with his special path and his own calling, we cannot be a community.
A human grouping is worthy of its name only insofar as it binds together
individuals who are essentially different from one another. A group of
clones is not a community but a herd.
A rainbow is only as beautiful as the variety of its colors, and by the same
token a community as valuable as the diversity of its constituents. Absent
individual diversity and you absent the entire concept of community.
There is no human value in bonding together more of the same.
According to tradition, Rosh Hashanah is the day on which Adam was cre‐
ated (Vayikra Rabbah 29:1). In contrast with every other form of life,
Adam was created alone – to teach us that no two people are the same,
and that each is an entire world unto himself (Mishnah, Sanhedrin 4:5).
On Rosh Hashanah and during the days leading up to Yom Kippur we ac‐
centuate our uniqueness and our individuality. Only following this can we
enter the national communion of Sukkot and experience the joy of a di‐
verse and multicolored community.
Howard Thurman once said the following: “Don’t ask yourself what the
world needs; ask yourself what makes you come alive. And then go and do
that. Because what the world needs is people who are alive.”
On the Days of Awe we ask ourselves what makes us come alive. We deal
with the ongoing and never-ending question of self-definition: Who are
117
we? What are our personal aims and goals and how do we plan to achieve
On Sukkot, we discover that the answers each one of us gives are in fact
them? Are our actions in line with our self-definition, and how can we en‐
individual pieces of a collective puzzle, components of a people with a
hance them?
shared purpose. Our colorful lives converge onto a single canvas – the
Sukkah – to create a unified and harmonious picture.
We give ourselves life with the answers we find for these questions.
If we could really feel that, we would definitely be rejoicing.
Yom Tov Candles: Women and
Shehecheyanu
Most other authorities, however, permit a woman who recited she‐
hecheyanu at candle lighting to respond “amen” when hearing it again as
part of Kiddush. They argue that the shehecheyanu recited as part of the
Kiddush is an inherent and integral component of the Kiddush that a
woman must hear before she is permitted to eat the Yom Tov meal. Rav
by R. Ari Enkin
Moshe Feinstein explains that just like the shehecheyanu blessing is not a
With the exception of the last day(s) of Pesach, the “shehecheyanu” bless‐
ing is recited as part of the Yom Tov candle lighting and the evening Kid‐
dush. While most men generally fulfill their requirement to recite she‐
hecheyanu by reciting it (or hearing it) as part of the Kiddush, most
women recite it as part of the Yom Tov candle lighting.1
hefsek for the one making Kiddush, it is automatically not considered to
be a hefsek for those listening to his Kiddush even if they already fulfilled
their shehecheyanu requirement when lighting the candles. According to
this approach, answering amen is not considered to be a hefsek.8
It is important to point out that the concern that answering “amen” to the
shehecheyanu blessing recited as part of kiddush might be a hefsek is
Although there is an opinion that women should not recite the she‐
hecheyanu blessing at candle lighting, but rather to wait to hear it as part
of Kiddush,2 common custom is not like this view. Indeed, women whose
family custom is to recite shehecheyanu at candle lighting should be sure
to do so regardless of all other considerations.3 It is interesting to note
that if, for whatever reason, one did not recite or hear the shehecheyanu
blessing at the start of the holiday, one may recite it anytime one remem‐
bers throughout the duration of the holiday.4
only relevant for a woman who intends to drink from the Kiddush wine (or
grape juice). A woman who does not have the custom to drink some of the
wine upon which Kiddush was recited is completely permitted to answer
‘amen’ to shehecheyanu. This is because only the one who actually recited
the Kiddush is required to drink any of the wine or grape juice. There is
no true obligation for others present to drink any of the Kiddush wine
even though widespread custom is to do so.9
Finally, some people have the custom to always recite their own borei pri
There is much discussion as to whether a woman who recited she‐
hecheyanu as part of her candle lighting should answer “amen” when
hearing it recited later on at Kiddush. This is because, according to a
number of authorities, responding “amen” to the shehecheyanu of Kid‐
dush would be a hefsek, a forbidden interruption, between the Kiddush
and the drinking of the wine, if she already discharged her obligation to
recite the shehecheyanu blessing when she lit the candles earlier.5 In‐
deed, a woman who recites Kiddush for herself on Yom Tov night does not
repeat shehecheyanu as part of her Kiddush if she recited it earlier at can‐
dle lighting. According to this approach, a woman who recited “she‐
hecheyanu” at candle lighting does not respond “amen” to the “she‐
hagafen blessing when drinking wine after hearing kiddush recited by
someone else.10 A woman whose custom it is to do so is permitted to an‐
swer “amen” to shehecheyanu, or to any other blessing for that matter,
before drinking the wine. This too is consistent with all that has been ex‐
plained above. This is because any possible hefsek with a woman answer‐
ing “amen” to the shehecheyanu at Kiddush can only affect the legitimacy
of the “…borei pri hagafen” blessing and the permissibility of drinking the
kiddush wine. It has no bearing, however, on the legitimacy of the actual
Kiddush, and the permissibility of beginning one’s Yom tov meal.
It is interesting to note that in most Yemenite communities, especially the
hecheyanu” at Kiddush,
“Baladi” and “Dardaim” ones, Yom Tov candles are not lit at all. And even
those that do light Yom Tov candles generally do so without reciting the
In a slightly different approach, some authorities rule that a woman
should not answer “amen” to the shehecheyanu recited as part of Kid‐
dush, with the exception of Pesach, at which time she should. The reason
for the difference is that the shehecheyanu recited as part of Kiddush on
Pesach also serves to cover the other mitzvot of the evening, such as the
four cups of wine and the eating of the matza. As such, it would not be a
accompanying blessing.11 This is because there is no mention of a re‐
quirement to light Yom Tov candles in either the Gemara12 or Rambam13
— the two, almost exclusive, sources of halacha for Yemenite Jewry. In‐
deed, the primary reason we light Shabbat candles is due to the require‐
ment of “shalom bayit”, namely, so that there should be light in the home
hefsek to respond amen to this specific shehecheyanu. Some also add the
on Shabbat eve.14 On Yom Tov, however, one is permitted to light a fire
Kiddush that is recited on Sukkot eve to this exception since the she‐
(from a pre-existing flame), and therefore, there is no true need for Yom
6
hecheyanu recited at that time serves to cover the mitzvot of Sukkot. On
a related note, even those who do not recite their own Kiddush on Pesach
night, but rather hear it from the head of the household, should raise their
wine glass and hold it as if they were making Kiddush themselves.7
Tov candles at all.
1. Mateh Ephraim 581:54. ↩
2. Leket Yosher p. 49; She’eilat Yaavetz 107; Mishna Berura 263:23;
118
Tzitz Eliezer 14:53; Yechave Daat 3:34. ↩
11. Peulat Tzadik 3:270; Arichat Hashulchan 2:178. It is interesting to
note that some Rishonim hold that no blessing is recited on Shab‐
3. Ibid. ↩
bat candles either. See Tosafot, Shabbat 25a s.v. “chova” and
Moshav Zkeinim Miba’alei Hatosafot, Vayikra 24:2. ↩
4. Mishna Berura 473:1. ↩
12. The sefarim do make mention of a Yerushalmi that requires the
5. Har Tzvi 154; Shevet Halevi 3:69. See also Shaarei Teshuva
lighting of Yom Tov candles, however, no such passage exists in
167:3. ↩
the text of the Yerushalmi that we have today. It might just be that
this reference to a “Yerushalmi” is not referring to the Talmud
6. Shevet Halevi 3:69. See also Kaf Hachaim, OC 473:6. ↩
Yerushalmi, but rather, to a book of customs from medieval Ger‐
many entitled “Yerushalmi”. ↩
7. Shemirat Shabbat K’hilchata 47 note 26. ↩
8. Aruch Hashulchan, OC 263:12; Zecher Simcha 34; Ein Eliezer 47;
13. The Rambam, in his Perush Hamishnayot to Shabbat 2:3, does
mention a requirement to light Yom Tov candles. As a general
Be’er Moshe 8:215; Igrot Moshe, OC 4:101, 4:21:9; Rivevot
rule, however, only what the Rambam wrote in his Mishna Torah
Ephraim 1:182; Minchat Shlomo 2:58:2. See also Nitei Gavriel,
is considered to be authoritative. It is also believed that the Ram‐
Erev Pesach Sh’chal B’erev Shabbat, Teshuva 1. ↩
bam held that the issue was a dispute between the Bavli and
Yerushalmi, and therefore did not include it in his Mishna Torah.
9. For more on the issue of participants drink from the Kiddush
↩
wine, see: OC 271:14, Shemirat Shabbat K’hilchata 48:11, and
Shulchan Aruch Harav, OC 190:5. ↩
14. Shabbat 25b. ↩
10. Piskei Teshuvot 271:10. ↩
Judaism and Industrial Food
Production
by R. Gil Student
Keeping kosher has never been easier, both for the poor and the wealthy.
The centralization of food production has allowed for scales of operation
that greatly reduce prices for consumers. It also enables kosher certifica‐
tion for a wide variety of products that are prepared in industrial plants
rather than locally. Many people with only marginal interest in keeping
kosher do so because so many options are readily available, even if they
are somewhat more expensive than non-kosher food.
However, the centralization has also led to significantly worse treatment
of animals. I claim no expertise but the documentaries I have seen show
animals raised in incredibly tight quarters, fed unhealthy diets and
slaughtered in a production line process. Seeing this makes any normal
person queasy. Some people, after learning how animals are raised and
killed, abstain completely from meat consumption through vegetarian di‐
ets.
From a religious and ethical perspective, industrialized food production
has weights on both the positive and negative sides of the scale. However,
an argument can be made that from it is religiously preferable to localized
food production. One can argue counterintuitively that the treatment of
animals is ethically better when it is centralized even if it is factually
worse.
I. Sending Away the Mother
Two main theories of Jewish animal ethics are widely discussed. Both suff‐
ffer weaknesses and at least one may have never been intended by its main
proponent. The discussion revolves around the Biblical commandment to
send away a mother bird before taking its children (Deut. 22:6–7). The
Mishnah (Berakhos 33b) states that anyone who prays to God that His
mercy extends to a bird’s nest must be silenced. One explanation in the
Gemara is that this prayer implies that the reason for the commandment
is God’s mercy on animals when really it is an unfathomable divine de‐
cree.
Rambam (Moreh Nevukhim 3:48) dismisses this attitude as a rejected
opinion and explains the commandment precisely in that way. God has
mercy on animals and therefore commanded us to send away the mother
before taking her children.
Ramban (Commentary to Deut. 22:6) accepts the Mishnah’s admonition
and Gemara’s explanation as authoritative, removing God’s mercy from
consideration. He instead explains this mitzvah as a tool for character
growth, a method to avoid or even remove cruel traits. The focus is not on
the animals but on our own personalities. While God’s attributes are in‐
scrutable, His plan for us can be understood. He does not want servants
who will needlessly act cruelly.
These are the two main theories, which we have discussed elsewhere.
However, the Rambam’s approach is actually more complex. Elsewhere in
Moreh Nevukhim (3:17), he writes that tza’ar ba’alei chaim, the prohibi‐
tion against harming animals, is intended to improve our personalities.
This seems like the Ramban’s view. In Mishneh Torah (Hilkhos Tefillah
9:4), the Rambam writes that the commandment to send away the mother
bird is a divine decree, not mercy. Because, he points out, if it were mercy
on animals then God would not allow us to slaughter them at all. How do
we make sense of the Rambam’s competing theories of animal ethics?
119
R. Yonasan Blass (Mi-Nofes Tzuf, vol. 2 pp. 851–853) sees three levels of
Similarly, the Avodas Ha-Gershuni (13)1 rules that one may stab an animal
meaning within the Rambam’s understanding of this commandment:
rather than slaughter it less painfully in order to preserve the skin for us‐
age. We do not need to be concerned for causing necessary pain in killing
1. We must display mercy in our interactions with animals
animals when it serves a constructive purpose. He notes that the Gemara
2. On a more abstract level, these merciful actions are supposed to
(Chullin 28a), when discussing possible areas on animal in which God
imbibe us, through training, with merciful personalities
could have commanded us to slaughter animals rather than the neck, is
3. On an even more abstract level, we are expected to walk in God’s
not concerned with the least painful method. The Shevus Ya’akov (3:71)
path and follow His trait of mercy. While God’s essence is unfath‐
rules similarly regarding medical experimentation on animals, although
omable, we relate to it through these types of actions.
that topic is more complex and deserves its own treatment.
II. Animal Cruelty With a Purpose
However, common halakhic rulings pose difficulties to these approaches.
Tosafos debate whether the prohibition against animal cruelty (tza’ar
ba’alei chaim) is equal to that against wasting (bal tashchis) or stronger. If
these two laws are equally strong, then tza’ar ba’alei chaim would not ap‐
ply when there is a constructive purpose, like bal tashchis. If tza’ar ba’alei
chaim is stronger, then even a constructive purpose would be insufficient
to permit animal cruelty. Tosafos in Bava Metzi’a (32b sv. mi-divrei) take
the position that they are equal. However, Tosafos in Avodah Zarah (11a
sv. okerin) state that animal cruelty is stronger. According to this second
Tosafos, human need does not override animal pain. However, this view is
not accepted by subsequent authorities.
The Terumas Ha-Deshen (2:105) rules that animal cruelty is permissible
whenever there is a constructive purpose, albeit with an important caveat.
He discusses whether one may pull feathers off a live goose for human
use. He points out that the Gemara (Kiddushin 82a) states that animals
were created to serve humanity. We eat animals and use them to carry our
burdens and plow our fields. I understand this to mean that the animals’
lives and deaths in service of humanity enable them to join our worship of
God, providing them with meaning they cannot even understand. There‐
fore, the Terumas Ha-Deshen concludes, there is no technical prohibition
to pull feathers off a goose because of the usage, but people still do not do
it because it involves the character trait of cruelty. The Rema (Shulchan
Arukh, Even Ha-Ezer 5:14) rules like this Terumas Ha-Deshen, and it
seems to be the accepted ruling.
While a minority approach within Jewish law forbids animal cruelty even
when it benefits humanity, the consensus allows it. According to the Ram‐
bam (simply read), this ruling is difficult. If God has mercy on animals,
how can we ignore it just because people benefit? According to the Ram‐
ban, how can adopting cruel character traits be an afterthought? Charac‐
ter development should be the primary concern.
III. Cruel Endings
The Gemara (Chullin 7b) records a discussion about what to do with dan‐
gerous white mules. One suggestion is to maim them, which is rejected
because of tza’ar ba’alei chaim, animal cruelty. Another suggestion is to
destroy them, which is rejected because of bal tashchis, wasting the ani‐
mals. R. Yechezkel Landau (Noda Bi-Yehudah 2:YD:10,13) infers from this
passage that the prohibition of tza’ar ba’alei chaim does not apply to
killing animals. The Noda Ba-Yehudah is discussing hunting, which can of‐
ten cause an animal painful death. While he denounces recreational hunt‐
ing as Esav’s occupation unbefitting Ya’akov’s descendants, he argues
that tza’ar ba’alei chaim is inapplicable.
These rulings have broad significance. Pain inflicted as part of the slaugh‐
ter process, if it happens, does not fall under the prohibition of animal
cruelty, although as we will see there might still be a concern. According
to the Rambam (broadly read) and Ramban, that God wishes to instill
within us a merciful trait, why are we allowed to inflict pain as part of the
slaughter process?2
IV. Ecology and Animals
Abarbanel (Deut. 22:6) offers a different explanation for the mitzvah to
send away the mother bird before taking her children, an approach that is
faithful to the Gemara and consistent with subsequent halakhic develop‐
ment. While acknowledging that developing a merciful character is an ele‐
ment of this commandment, Abarbanel sees its primary purpose as pro‐
tecting the environment. The world has a continuing need for an animal
population. If we deplete a species, we are causing the world and our‐
selves great harm. God placed us here to use the world, not destroy it.
Therefore, we may take the children birds but must send away the mother
to have more children. Similarly, we are not allowed to slaughter a cow
and its calf on the same day in order to decrease the chances of depopula‐
tion. Our stewardship of this world requires that we let one of them go
and continue the species.3
I believe that this theory fits in better with the post-Talmudic halakhic de‐
velopments discussed above. We must avoid unnecessary cruelty to ani‐
mals but only as a secondary concern. God created the world, including
its animals, for our benefit. We may use it and them for our needs, even
when some cruelty unavoidably happens. But we must minimize the ani‐
mal suffering and avoid developing negative character traits.
The Mishnah (Kiddushin 82a) calls butchers “the partners of Amalek.”
Tosefos Yom Tov explains that some people are naturally inclined to shed‐
ding blood. They can either utilize their talents for evil by killing people or
devote themselves to good by preparing animals for human consumption.
Butchers are potentially evil but, in practice, earn an honest and praise‐
worthy living by serving others. Yes, bloodshed is distasteful, even cruel.
But when allowed, it is a mitzvah.
V. Animal Slaughter Today
My mother and mother-in-law tell their children and grandchildren how, in
their childhood, the animals their family kept were fed better than the
children. The children saw, fed and even played with the animals. Then
the family would take the fattened animals to the butcher who would
slaughter them, and the family would eat the animals. My generation ben‐
efited from centralized food production and never saw an animal slaugh‐
120
tered. We are much farther removed from the cruelty than any generation
vironment. Is centralized food production good or bad for the environ‐
in history.
ment? Will species disappear, will the world be permanently damaged, by
centralized food production? A good argument can be made that indus‐
However, if the documentarians are to be believed, animals raised for
trial food production, as it is currently practiced, is causing irreparable
slaughter today are treated more cruelly than ever in history. Granted, as
damage to the environment. However, every indication I have seen is that
we have seen, this cruelty is permitted if it serves a purpose for humans,
this is caused by the massive non-kosher producers. Kosher food produc‐
such as providing more and less expensive food. Even cruel and painful
tion, particularly kosher animal slaughter, seems to have little to no per‐
slaughter, if it occurs, is technically allowed but should be avoided if pos‐
manent environmental footprint. Even if every kosher slaughterhouse shut
sible.
down, the rate of deforestation, species extinction and other similar mea‐
sures would not change at all.
If this is true, then the question is whether the Torah prefers less animal
cruelty that is closer to the communal experience or more animal cruelty
We have not mentioned every possible concern, such as taste, health and
that is farther from the community. Now, I am not suggesting that my
the economic effect on local producers. This is a passionate political issue
grandparents or grandparents-in-law were cruel people for having raised
(albeit not my issue) and I distrust every statistic presented and every lob‐
animals and then taken them to slaughter. However, this is, to some de‐
byist and partisan advocate. Be that as it may, we should at least recog‐
gree, a cruel experience that must somehow desensitize people, even if
nize both the positive and negative aspects of industrial food production,
just a little, in a way that no longer occurs. Are we better off avoiding that
and the light Jewish thought sheds on the various issues.
experience if it means more animal cruelty somewhere in factory farms?
1. Quoted by Gilyon Maharsha, Avodah Zarah 13 and others ↩
According to the Rambam as simply read, that God is concerned for ani‐
mals’ pain, then perhaps we should revert to local slaughter. Less animal
2. Note that I am not suggesting that kosher slaughter causes pain.
cruelty is better regardless of its impact on people. According to the Ram‐
But there are unusual circumstances in which pain can be in‐
ban and the more expansive reading of Rambam, centralized food produc‐
flicted, such as hunting or killing for the hide. ↩
tion is an improvement because it decreases the development of the char‐
3. The Kol Bo (111) writes similarly that the reason for the mitzvah
acter trait of cruelty in the vast majority of people.
to send away the mother bird is to save the species and to prevent
us from becoming cruel. ↩
According to the Abarbanel, we must be concerned primarily with the en‐
Da’as Torah or Advice?
by R. Gil Student
Many religious Jews today ask rabbis life questions–whom to marry, where
to live, what career path to follow–and take their answers as authoritative
rulings. In one sense, the modern world is based on autonomy, indepen‐
dent choice. Submission to a rabbi’s authority on these major decisions is
a wholesale rejection of the modern enterprise. If this is what the Torah
requires then so be it. However, according to the Vilna Gaon’s tradition,
this is not the Torah approach for life choices.1
Every person has a different path in life but finding one’s direction is of‐
ten difficult. The Vilna Gaon (Commentary to Mishlei 16:4) explains that
search. His student, R. Chaim Volozhiner, saw this subject slightly differ‐
ently.
No human has the power to see into our souls or to predict the fu‐
ture
Hillel says (Avos 2:7): “The more counsel, the more understanding.” In his
commentary on this (Ruach Chaim, ad loc.), R. Chaim Volozhiner quotes a
common saying he endorses that you should seek advice but then do what
you think is best (she’al eitzah va-aseh ki-rtzonkha). Why, he asks, bother
asking for advice? He answer that other people do not grasp all the fine
details of the issue. If you ask many people, each will see some of the de‐
tails. After listening to all the different perspectives, the individual will
have the best idea of how to deal with the situation.
in ancient times, Jews would ask prophets for guidance. With his access to
The Vilna Gaon recommends waiting for divine inspiration based on Torah
divine insight, the prophet would show each person where the nature of
study and observance. In contrast, R. Chaim Volozhiner advises consulta‐
his soul and body direct him. But prophecy is long gone.
tion with multiple people. Neither suggest going to a single Torah scholar
In theory, we should each be able to utilize our own access to ruach hakodesh, the divine spirit, to discover our own paths but we face too many
and following his advice.
The Netziv, a grandson-in-law of and successor to R. Chaim Volozhiner,
obstacles to successfully achieve that. Instead, the Vilna Gaon says, we
takes a third approach. In his Torah commentary (Ha’amek Davar, Deut.
must observe the commandments. God wants our Torah study and obser‐
29:8), the Netziv states that one finds the right counsel in the merit of To‐
vance. In return, He will show us our paths in life.
rah study. In this, he follows the Vilna Gaon. In his commentary to Koheles
Note the lack of a Torah scholar in this discussion. Apparently, the Vilna
Gaon thought that Torah scholars play no unique role in each individual’s
(Eccl. 8:1), the Netziv points out that a Torah scholar’s mood will affect
his advice. Additionally, not everyone can always predict the future.
Therefore, a questioner has to use his own judgment to decide whether to
121
follow any advice he receives. According to the Netziv, you can ask a To‐
viding insight and not even advice. Even when the conclusion is obvious,
rah scholar but then decide whether to follow his advice.
they always leave it to me to reach the conclusion, to make the appropri‐
ate decision. I believe that this is the tradition of the Vilna Gaon, which is
These three approaches are hardly contradictory. They all reflect the in‐
uniquely appropriate to the modern world where autonomy is so impor‐
herent human difficulty of seeing the future and even the innermost
tant.3
present. No human has the power to see into our souls or to predict the
future. At best, they can make educated guesses. Some people will try to
independently decide their own paths. Others will ask many for advice.
1. We are only discussing advice for life choices. Halakhah and fun‐
damental beliefs are a separate discussion. ↩
And still others will seek guidance from a Torah scholar. No one will argue
that a wise rabbi is somehow excluded as a source of wisdom for seekers
2. With two exceptions: 1) One rabbi told me not to send my chil‐
simply because he is a rabbi. However, because no one today can access
dren to schools with religious outlooks that are very different
the divine knowledge of inner truths, each individual has to use his own
from my own, to avoid forcing my children to choose between
best judgment in deciding his life path. Advice is just that, an input from a
their teachers and their parents. 2) The same rabbi also told me
(hopefully) wise person to be applied by the individual to his circum‐
to stay away from someone who seemed dishonest. He did not
stances.
merely discuss the issues but specifically said to do or not to do
something. They stand out for me as understandable exceptions.
I never had the merit of speaking with R. Joseph B. Soloveitchik because
↩
he was ill when I entered Yeshiva. However, in my many conversations
with some of his students, I noted that they have (almost) never told me
2
what to do. They consistently discuss the issues from various angles, pro‐
3. All these sources are found in R. Moshe Zuriel, Otzeros Ha-Net‐
ziv, sv. eitzah. ↩
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Overcoming Nature or Why
Bad Things Happen to Good
People
Ran is bothered by the other view, that of R. Chanina, who says
astrology does affect the Jewish people. How could the Torah promise
physical rewards for observing mitzvot, such as long life, health, and
wealth, if it is all guided by the stars?
With Moshe there for the rebuke of Aharon and Miriam, people might
think Moshe’s feelings had led to Miriam’s leprosy. Hashem has the
Torah speak of Moshe’s humility to make clear that’s not what
happened, but the possibility leads Ran to a discussion of what’s
inherent to us, such as the possibility of Moshe causing his sister’s
leprosy, even without intention.
He digresses to point out that one can avoid looming danger by being
somewhere else (running away to Samaria, for those who get the
reference) or parrying that danger (wearing a bullet-proof vest). Ran
thinks even R. Chanina accepts that; the stars tell us what will
happen, but we can avert those outcomes. Torah and mitzvot give us
ways that, by our actions, we will either be elsewhere when tragedy
strikes, or will have made ourselves immune to those outcomes when
they arrive (like avoiding certain disease-causing foods because the
Torah prohibits them).
Does Our Fault Lie In Our Stars?
Changing Fate
Prior essays in this series
The debate with R. Yochanan was whether mitzvot could attack fate
at its source, rendering it ineffective, such as Chananiah, Mishael,
and Azariah being immune to the fire into which Nevuchadnezzar
threw them. R. Yochanan’s view was that proper observance of the
Torah could lead fire to be ineffective against them (R. Chanina would
by R. Gidon Rothstein
Ran points to Shabbat, which says that a person born in ‫מאדים‬
,
under Mars, will shed blood. He is bothered by the implication that
we are fated to sin (in this example, to shed blood); fate precludes
reward and punishment.
His first answer is that predetermination might be probabilistic, not
determinative. As we would say for genetics today, our makeup might
lean us in a certain direction, but we can overcome it. Astrology or
genetics affect the body, but our soul can overcome that and push us
in a different direction. A potential murderer can, by the discipline of
following what the soul says, stop him or herself from drawing blood.
Secondly, the soul can channel the bodily tendencies in more
productive directions. As R. Ashi said on that folio in Shabbat, a
murderer can become a ritual slaughterer, or one who circumcises
babies. Genetics (and astrology) isn’t the whole story, even when we
are following the path our stars or genes laid out.
say this took an active miracle, a violation of the natural order, where
R. Yochanan was saying Hashem made the world such that a person’s
spiritual profile can lead nature to treat him or her differently).
Ran finds support for that view in the conversation between Hashem
and Avraham on that folio in Shabbat. R. Yehudah says in the name of
Rav that when Avraham told Hashem he knew he could not have
children(Bereshit 15:5), Hashem responded that He could change
that, moving the problematic star from east (where Avraham could
not have children) to west.
Ran notes that the Gemara does not say Hashem told Avraham he
could ignore the star; He told him He would change its position and
effect. For R. Yochanan, Ran says, mitzvot function the same way,
nullifying the power of the stars.
Predispositions and What We Do with Them
It is in that light that Ran reads Niddah 16b, which describes an angel
consulting with Hashem before conception, asking whether the child
will be wise or stupid, rich or poor.
Ran notes that the angel does not ask about righteousness. You can’t
coach height, they say in basketball, and Ran is saying the same
about our lives. Our stars, as it were, might make us poor or rich, but
whether we are righteous or not is up to us, completely and totally.
Ran applies that to the debate, also on Shabbat 156a, as to whether
the Jews are subject to astrology. He says that even R. Yochanan, who
says we are not, means only that we have the power to change our
fates, by prayer, charity, and other good deeds (to translate into
modern terms: genetics works, nature works, science works; but Jews
have the ability to change all that). Everyone agreed, Ran says, that
astrology never had a role in whether we observe mitzvot.
Avoiding Fate, Even If You Believe In It
1
Why Bad Things Happen to Good People
Given the two ways we can avoid fate, Ran notes that some tragedies
might strike people who are good but not good enough to have
Hashem guide them to avoid the coming disaster. That, for Ran, is
what R. Yosef means by saying (Baba Kamma 60a) that once
destructive forces are unleashed into this world, they do not
distinguish between righteous and wicked.
Once the determination has been made to launch a disaster, Ran says,
the world works in generalities. The plague that was going to hit the
first-born, for example, focused on some physical aspect of all first
born (Ran pauses to claim that all first-born share a physical
similarity, based on being the first out of their mother’s womb; I make
no claim that scientists today would agree). Naturally, Jewish
first-born would have been affected as well, not because they
deserved it, but because it was hitting all first-born, and they did not
have the merits to avoid or nullify it.
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123
Weekly Digest from TorahMusings.com When Hashem saved them by telling them to stay in their houses,
with the blood of the sacrifice on their door-posts, that was a special
intervention, obligating them to become Hashem’s special servants,
later switched out for the Levi’im.
contrast, Japheth was motivated by appearance and peer pressure.
Japheth helped cover Noah only after Shem had taken the initiative,
acting only because Shem would appreciate this help. As a result,
Japheth’s reward was the burial of his progeny, as burial reflects the
concept of kavod habriyos, human dignity, a religious category that
dictates how one person should relate to another. (Nefesh Harav, p.
272–3)
A Brief Translation to Modern Terms
Ran’s Medieval terminology translates easily. In brief, he was saying
that there are natural or genetic predispositions in the world. These
determine some aspects of our lives, but not our choices of how to
respond, nor our religious decisions.
In acting religiously, we build our relationship with Hashem, but also
find ourselves guarded against some tragedies. Either by being
elsewhere (such as going to Yerushalayim for a major holiday,
avoiding an epidemic where we live), by protecting ourselves from a
problem (by not eating animals prone to carrying disease), or by
being so righteous that nature itself is ineffective (so that our body
itself will resist the disease), our spiritual lives affect our physical
fates.
Any of that takes a certain level of greatness, and even seemingly
righteous people might not be at that level. When tragedy strikes
such people, it is a tragedy. But, Ran says, it’s a function of the world
working in generalities. To avoid those generalities, we need to work
harder to be the kinds of people for whom Torah and mitzvot offer all
the necessary protection.
The eighth Drasha started from Moshe and his siblings, took us on a
tour of leadership and the value of its centralization, on how wisdom
and prophecy are passed through the generations, and how
predispositions affect us and do or do not determine our fate. Some of
these, we can bet, will figure in the discussions we will see in the
Drashot to come.
Vort from the Rav: Noach
The Sin and Punishment of the
Tower of Bavel
“And Man’s Loftiness Will be Bowed:”1
The Sin and Punishment of the Tower of Bavel
by Rav Elchanan Samet
On the surface, the brief episode of the Tower of Bavel (Bereishit
11:1–9) appears to be a story of sin and its punishment. However,
what is the nature of this sin, and where exactly is it described in the
narrative? These are not easy questions. Bereishit Rabba notes
(38:10), “The deed of the Generation of the Flood is explicated, but
the deed of the Generation of the Dispersal is not.” Yet, their story is
clearly a seminal event in Bereishit and in the Torah’s view of history,
shifting the focus from a universal approach to the concept of the
Chosen People. How are we to understand this cryptic but
momentous passage?
1. The View Of The “Pashtanim”
A group of early commentators, termed by the Ramban “the pursuers
of peshat” (the literal meaning of the text), read our passage in light
of God’s blessing to Adam (1:28) and Noach (9:1): “Be fruitful and
multiply and fill the land…” The following is Ibn Ezra’s commentary to
verse 4 (emphasis mine):
The verse reveals their desire and their ultimate intent: to build
a metropolis to inhabit, and to build a high tower to provide a
symbol and fame and acclamation… Their reputation would
outlast them, as long as the tower stood; this is what Scripture
means when it quotes their objective, “And we shall make for
ourselves a name…”
Genesis 9:2
‫יהם‬
ֶ ‫וַ יְ ַכ ּס ּו ֵאת ֶע ְרוַ ת ֲא ִב‬... ‫ש ְמ ָלה‬
ׂ ִ � ‫ – וַ ִ ּי ַ ּקח ׁ ֵשם וָ יֶ ֶפת ֶאת ַה‬And Shem and
Japheth took the garment…and they covered their father’s
nakedness.
Rashi explains the use of the singular ‫ ַּח ִּקיַ ו‬emphasizing that Shem
initiated the activity of covering his father, with Japheth later joining
him. Our sages indicate that as a reward for covering their father’s
nakedness, Shem merited that his descendants would be given the
mitzvah of tzitzis, while the reward for Japheth was that his
descendent Gog would merit burial (Ez. 39:11, Bereishis Rabbah 36:6).
Shem and Japheth had differing motivations for their action; Shem was
motivated by ethics, while Japheth was motivated by etiquette. Ethics
as a value obligates man to do what is proper, even when there is no
one to witness and appreciate his action. Upon seeing Noah’s
nakedness, Shem immediately acted to save his father from
embarrassment. His descendants were thus given the mitzvah of
tzitzis, because according to the basic halacha, the talis katan should
be worn under ones clothing, with only the fringes exposed. The
mitzvah of donning a piece of clothing that is not readily visible is a
reflection of Shem’s emphasis on ethics in the private domain. In
2
Do not be confused by the expression, “[A tower] with its top in the
heavens,” as Moshe used a similar expression (Devarim 1:28): “Great
cities, fortified to the heavens.” These builders attempted to prevent
their own dispersal; God did not desire this — BUT THEY DID NOT
KNOW.
Similarly, in his explanation of verse 7, Ibn Ezra states: “God spread
them out, FOR THEIR OWN GOOD, as it says, ‘Fill the land.’”
Apparently, based on his approach, the story is not one of sin and
punishment, but rather a story of human error and its divine repair.
The builders’ monomania contradicts the divine plan, and therefore
God involves Himself — so that His design will be realized, for the
ultimate benefit of humanity.
Yet it is difficult to accept that our passage is not one of sin and its
punishment. Verse 5 relates, “God descended to observe the city and
the tower,” reminding us of a similar verse regarding another sinful
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124
Weekly Digest from TorahMusings.com city, Sedom (18:21): “I will descend and observe if they have done as
the cry which has come to Me [indicates].’” Both examples describe
God’s descent to observe, akin to the judge’s survey of the scene of
the crime before issuing a verdict (see Rashi’s commentary to these
two verses). It appears that the general ambiance of the story does
not agree with Ibn Ezra’s analysis.
could climb to the heavens. They also were not afraid of the
Flood, for Noach and his children, to whom God had sworn [not
to bring another deluge], were still alive, and all listened to
them, as all humanity was descended from them.
Consequently, Radak accepts the main thrust of Ibn Ezra’s
explanation, but sees in the actions of the architects of the city a
direct and willful rebellion against the divine plan. He explains (11:5):
They are called ‘Children of Adam’ since they follow their heart’s
inclination, ignoring God’s actions; for He wanted the world,
from east to west, to be settled, while they wanted to settle only
one small location, AND THEY INTENDED BY THIS TO ANNUL
GOD’S WILL.
The common point shared by all three of Rashi’s explanations,
representing the Sages’ view of the Dispersal generation, is that they
regard this sin as a serious revolt against God.3 Thus, Rashi’s
exegetical approach intensifies their sin, to the same degree that the
approach of the other commentators lightens it. The sin is severe, in
theological terms, creating an expectation of a corresponding
punishment. However, in actuality, that generation’s punishment is a
slap on the wrist: they are simply scattered linguistically and
geographically. Rashi (11:9) struggles with this question, once again
following Bereishit Rabba:
Which sin was worse, that of the Flood generation or that of the
Dispersal generation? The former did not assault the Essential,
while the latter did assault the Essential (as if it were possible to
wage war on Him); yet those were drowned, while these were
not utterly destroyed! Still, those of the Flood generation were
thieves, and they had social strife, so they were destroyed; but
these acted with love and fellowship, as it says, “one language
and united ideas.” We thus see that contention is despicable,
while peace is great.
Rashbam’s explanation (11:4) runs along the same lines.
Ramban, however, asks a common-sense question of these pursuers
of peshat (11:2):
If they are correct, [the builders of the city] would have to be
fools. How could any one city or tower be sufficient to hold the
entire world’s population? Or did they think that they would not
reproduce?
Indeed, it is difficult to see God’s blessing to Adam and Noach as the
background of our narrative. There is a great conceptual difference
between the two instances: there mankind is blessed to “fill the land”
through normal population growth, while in our case God spreads the
people all over the face of the land not in order to settle it, but to
disperse them. An analysis of the root of the Hebrew word for
spreading, “hafatza,” in Scripture, reveals that, in the vast majority of
cases, it describes a negative scattering: usually, the losers in a
battle, the shepherdless sheep, and the far-flung exiles are the
Scriptural “nefotzim.”2
2. The Midrashic Approach of Rashi
In his commentary, Rashi pursues the path of derash, the non-literal,
aggadic approach. In accordance with Bereishit Rabba (38:6), he
finds the allusion to sin already present in verse 1: “All of the land
was of one language and united ideas” — “one language” refers to a
shared tongue, while “united ideas” denotes a universal consensus.
(Radak echoes this.) Regarding what was their consensus? Rashi
supplies three possibilities:
Ironically, the phrase that condemns the Dispersal generation, “one
language and united ideas,” also proves to be their salvation. Rashi’s
aim here, following the midrash, is clear: to teach us that human
unity, even when used for evil and thus necessitating dissolution, is
considered meritorious.
3. The Historical Background of the Narrative
One who reads the story of the Garden of Eden in the previous
parasha does not ask questions concerning the realia of the story
(e.g., Where is Eden located? What species was the Tree of
Knowledge? How could the serpent speak? etc.), and rightly so,
because that narrative (like many of the early episodes in Bereishit)
has a distinctly unreal quality. What about our narrative?
In its opening lines, the narrative describes a known geographic area:
“a valley in the land of Shinar,” or Mesopotamia, and at its close it
names the city of Bavel, one of the oldest and most famous in the
ancient Near East, mentioned repeatedly in Scripture, and site of the
earliest archeological excavations.
They came with one counsel and declared: “[God] is not the
be-all and end-all, that He should select the upper regions for
Himself. Let us ascend to the firmament and wage war on Him.”
Alternatively, [“united ideas” (“devarim achadim”) means]
concerning the Unique One (“Yachid”).
Alternatively, “united ideas” implies that they said: “Once every
1656 years the firmament collapses, as it did in the time of the
Flood; let us make supports for it!”
These explanations are derived by way of derash; the pashtanim, as is
their wont, deal with Rashi’s commentary only to question it. Without
mentioning by name Rashi or the midrashim, Ibn Ezra (11:4) states:
These builders of the tower were not such fools as to think they
3
The city of Bavel was already very large in the earliest extant records,
and its temple to Marduwas distinguished; its toweas well was the
grandest in ancient Babylonia, earning it the appellation, “The House
of the Foundation of Heaven and Earth.” The ruins of this tower,
which our episode deals with, are visible today (for those who have
the opportunity to stroll through rural Iraq), and they were excavated
at the turn of the century.
We do not know exactly when the tower and temple of Bavel were
built – nor did the ancient inhabitants of the city. But we do know that
the ancient inhabitants of the city were quite proud of their edifices,
attributing their construction to the gods themselves. The towers, or
ziggurats, were meant to serve as a point of encounter between the
gods (dwelling in the heavens) and man (dwelling on earth). A
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125
Weekly Digest from TorahMusings.com stunning set of stairs surrounded the tower, allowing the priests to
ascend to its apex. At the tower’s top sat a temple, in which the priest
would “meet” the gods.
divine arena, force themselves on the supernal realm, and walk there
as the equals of God. This is nothing but a ludicrous declaration of
war by humanity on the divine.
With this background in mind, it appears that the traditional exegetes
erred in seeing the expression “with its top in the heavens” as
hyperbole. The ziggurat’s architects and their followers truly intended
for the tower to reach the heavens, the residence of the gods.
The Sages were closer than the medieval pashtanim to the realia of
the Tower of Bavel episode, both chronologically and geographically.
They lived either in Israel or in Babylonia itself, at a time when the
remains of Bavel’s towers, and of the city of Bavel itself, were still
recognizable. In Bereishit Rabba (38:8), a number of sages describe
their personal observations of the remnants of the Tower. In their era,
the pagan myth still had followers, and the link between it and the
still-visible ancient ruins of Bavel, as well as the Torah’s response,
was natural and understood.
Knowledge of these historical and archeological facts compelled
Cassuto to explain our narrative as satire, intended to mock the
pagan pride of Bavel. The city of Bavel, with its temple and tower,
was destroyed many times throughout the long march of history, and
there were long periods in which the entire city, and the tower in
particular, were heaps of ruins. We cannot point out all the details in
the story which Cassuto explains as satirical,4 but let us cite one
example.
5. The Literal Exegesis
Verse 5 ties together the two halves of the story, serving as its central
axis: “The Lord DESCENDED to observe the city and the tower which
the CHILDREN OF ADAM had made.” The first difficulty is
theological: does God need to descend in order to observe the actions
of the humans? Rashi replies by citing the Tanchuma’s words: “He did
not need to do so, but He came to teach judges not to condemn the
accused until they would see and understand [the facts of the case].”
Cassuto adds,
There is a satirical allusion here: they thought their tower would
reach heaven, but in God’s eyes their edifice was not giant, but
rather the creation of puny creatures, a thing of earth and not of
heaven. If God, the Dweller of the Heavens, wanted to see it up
close, He had to come down from heaven to earth.
Similarly, the words “children of Adam” at the verse’s end, which are
strikingly extraneous, prompt Rashi to ask: “Rather than children of
whom? Perhaps children of donkeys or camels?” Cassuto attempts to
see here as well satirical allusions: divine beings did not build the
tower, as the Babylonian myth claims, but rather children of Adam
built the city and its tower.5
4. The Exegesis of Chazal: A Reexamination
This conception of the episode, as a satirical protest aimed at the
pagan arrogance of the ancient inhabitants of Bavel, brings us back to
Chazal’s explanation, cited by Rashi, of the Dispersal generation’s sin.
Following are Midrash Rabba’s original words (38:6):
Rabbi Yochanan says: ‘Devarim achadim’ — that they said harsh
things (devarim chadim) about ‘the Lord our God, the Lord is one
(echad)’… They said, ‘He is not the be-all and end-all, that He
should select for Himself the upper regions and give us the lower
regions! Rather, let us build for ourselves a tower, AND LET US
MAKE AN IDOL AT ITS TOP, and we will put a sword in its hand,
and it will appear as if IT WAGES WAR ON HIM.
It becomes apparent that the midrash links the Tower of Bavel to the
idol at its apex, which dovetails beautifully with our knowledge of the
ancient conception of the ziggurat. However, the midrash tells us
more: the basis of this paganism lies in typical human arrogance and
foolishness. Thanks to their technological know-how, with which they
are blessed by their Creator, they suppose that they can invade the
4
According to this view of our episode, shared by both Chazal and
contemporary commentators,6 our story deals with the most serious
human sin imaginable: rebellion against God. Man is created to serve
God, and if he rebels, his very existence is counterproductive. This
revolt, with its basis in human arrogance, with its undermining of the
boundary between the human and the divine, finds its fruit in
paganism.7
Thus, the sin of the Tower’s architects lies not in their desire to be
united, but rather in their audacious attempt to darken heaven’s
doorstep and to defy their human bounds. “And we shall make for
ourselves a name” is the essence of their pretension. In the
dedications of various kings discovered in excavations in
Mesopotamia (some of them in bricks sunk into the foundations of
ziggurats), we repeatedly find the claim that their towers reach
heaven. These dedications claim, many times, that the kings who built
(or restored) these towers “made a name” for them and their
kingdoms — even to the extent of earning them a place among the
gods.8
According to this explanation, we might say that the words “lest we
be scattered across the face of the whole land” do not indicate the
objective of the construction of the city and the tower per se (as the
pashtanim explained) — rather the aim is mentioned prior to this: to
reach the heavens at the tower’s apex, and thereby “we shall make
for ourselves a name.” The end of the verse, “lest we be scattered,”
expresses their anxiety; something might prevent the united
community from making its name. Social unity creates the desire for
immortality and provides the tools to realize the most grandiose
construction project in human history. If this unity is compromised for
any reason whatsoever, this initiative cannot be realized, and
therefore the construction of the city and the tower must be
completed with all due haste.
6. Bavel and Eden: The Tower and the Tree
In many ways, our story seems to be the continuation of the story of
man’s sin in the Garden of Eden. Both narratives explain the reason
for basic problems affecting the human species. The story of the
expulsion from Eden explains why man must struggle in the two most
basic area of his existence: finding sustenance and begetting
children. (In both of these areas, man is at a distinct disadvantage as
compared to the animals.) Adam and Eve desired to “be as gods”
(3:5), and the perpetual existential struggles that they were punished
Copyright © 2014 Torah Musings, All rights reserved.
126
Weekly Digest from TorahMusings.com with serve to humble them.
The Garden of Eden narrative gives a reason for man’s weakness as
an individual. Our narrative, on the other hand, gives a reason for the
basic failing of mankind as a whole, namely its lack of unity. The
linguistic, cultural, and geographic divisions weaken mankind and
lead to unending strife and warfare between different groups. This is
a fitting punishment for humankind, which, when it was united,
dedicated its great power to overstepping its bounds and climbing
into the divine arena. Thus, two curses peculiar to man — labor for
Adam and Chava, war for the Bavel architects — emerge from these
twin sins of presumption.
This commonality between the narratives is expressed in their shared
syntactic structure. Compare “Behold, the man has been like one of
us to know good and evil” (3:22) with “Behold, one nation and one
language tthem all, and this is what they begin to do” (11:6). Si, “And
now, lest he send his hand and take from the Tree of Life and eat and
live forever…” is mirrored by “And now, whatever they plot to do will
not be beyond them.” Therefore, the result is similar: expulsion from
the Garden of Eden and dispersal from the focus of human strength,
Bavel, to the face of the entire earth. Man, in his wretchedness, as an
individual struggling with the provision of the most basic needs, or as
a member of a species sunk in internecine war, cannot reach
self-deification. The human race, in this environment, learns to
swallow that bitterest of pills, humility.
7. The Hope for the Future
With the Dispersal, the pride of a humanity united for evil was
broken, stripping the species of the ability to execute similar
schemes. From that point forward, the nations were divided,
separated in their language and their culture, doomed to wage war
with their neighbors — but not forever. When humankind once more
comes together, not for self-deification, but for the greater glory of
God, this unity will be restored in all spheres, as described by the
prophets. “Then will I convert the nations to a pure language for all of
them to call in the name of God,” and to serve Him with one consent,”
declares Tzefania (3:9), foreseeing a return to a common tongue. The
dream of the entire race finding that unity of purpose and place is
most elaborately described by Yeshayahu (2:2–4):
And it will be in the end of days, the mount of the House of God
will be set right… and all the peoples will flow to it. Many
nations will go and say: ‘Let us go and ascend to the mountain of
God, to the house of the God of Yaakov, and He will teach us of
His ways; and we will walk in His paths…’ And they shall beat
their swords into plowshares and their spears into pruning
hooks; nation shall not lift up sword against nation, and they
shall not learn war any more.
argument, since the events of chapter 10 are explicated in
chapter 11. ↩
3. See Sanhedrin 109a; Bereishit Rabba para. 38; Tanchuma, end
of Parashat Noach (para. 16–19); and other midrashim. ↩
4. For the historical background of Bavel, see, e.g., Umberto
Cassuto, From Noach to Avraham,” Hebrew edition, pp. 155–58,
and “Olam Ha-tanakh: Bereishit” (p. 83). For the satirical
aspects of the Tower story, see Cassuto, esp. pp. 157–58. ↩
5. As Cassuto notes (p. 155), this also explains why this episode,
unlike that of creation, the Flood, etc., has no analogue among
pagan sources. A narrative devised as a satire of pagan
arrogance would hardly have found a receptive audience among
ancient Israel’s neighbors. ↩
6. By “contemporary commentators,” I mean Yechezkel Kaufmann
in his work “Toldot Ha-emuna Ha-yisraeilit” (vol. 2, pp. 412–14),
though he ignores the archeological background of the story,
and, more recently, Nachum Sarna, in his work “Understanding
Genesis” (New York 1970), pp. 63–80.
Cassuto, it should be noted, does not fully concur with this view.
In his introduction to his explanation of our episode (p. 154), he
writes that the Torah’s intent in this narrative is to endorse two
religio-moral principles: “1. THAT PRIDE AND
SELF-AGGRANDIZEMENT ON THE BASIS OF MATERIAL
STRENGTH is a sin in the eyes of God; 2. that ‘God’s counsel
stands forever,’ and any plan conceived by Him is necessarily
realized, despite all of man’s efforts and schemes to defeat it.”
He means by this the divine command to “fill the land,” and here
he follows the pashtanim mentioned above, totally disregarding
the midrashim. ↩
7. The Mesopotamian ziggurats appear to be the most ancient of
the monumental edifices in human culture dedicated to pagan
worship. The earliest known example, excavated at Tel Arakh
(approximately 200 kilometers southeast of the city of Bavel), is
attributed to the beginning of the Sumerian era at the latest. (By
contrast, the Egyptian pyramids come later, and they were not
temples but rather royal tombs.) It should not be too surprising
that the construction of the Tower of Bavel — the tallest ziggurat
ever — is seen by the Torah as the inception of human rebellion
against God and the birth of paganism. ↩
8. So claims Guda, king of Lagash (c. 2000 BCE), in one inscription.
↩
This essay was translated and adapted by Yoseif Bloch. It
originally appeared on Yeshivat Har Etzion’s Israel Koschitzky
Virtual Beit Midrash and is republished here with permission.
1. Yeshayahu 2:17. ↩
2. The root appears twice in the preceding chapter: “From these
the land spread out” (10:2) and “Afterward, the Canaanite
families spread out” (10:18). This does not contradict our
5
Copyright © 2014 Torah Musings, All rights reserved.
127
Weekly Digest from TorahMusings.com not the deceased.2
The 9/11 Memorial and Jewish
Law
by R. Gil Student
As a New York resident who worked in Manhattan on September 11,
2001, I will forever be haunted by the tragic day and its aftermath.
However, visitors and future generations, including my own children,
need more than personal memories. The 9/11 memorial and museum
are intended to provide that. A recent article in First Things by
Catesby Leigh, an architecture and art critic, excoriates the National
September 11 Memorial & Museum. I am hardly an architecture or
art critic and I have not even visited the memorial or museum.
However, I would like to discuss the concepts involved and the light
Jewish tradition can shed on them.1
R. Yitzchak Ya’akov Weiss (Minchas Yitzchak 1:29) explains that a
gravestone is not important in itself. It is secondary to the grave and
therefore not comparable to an idolatrous monument. He was asked
whether a community could erect a monument for Holocaust victims.
He answered that this would be biblically forbidden according to the
Rambam unless they include the remains of someone deceased, such
as ashes or soap made from humans, which would render the
monument a gravestone.
R. Weiss quotes two halakhic authorities who disagreed with him. R.
Yehudah Leib Tzirilson (Ma’archei Lev, no. 42) and R. David Sperber
(oral communication to R. Weiss) argue that since monuments for the
dead are never used for idolatry, they are not subject to the
prohibition even according to the Rambam. R. Weiss was not
convinced by this argument.
I. Monuments
III. Gravestone Substitutes
The Torah (Deut. 16:22) explicitly forbids erecting monuments. After
the Holocaust, Jewish authorities grappled with the need to
remember and the biblical prohibition forbidding monuments.
Medieval authorities debate the nature of this prohibition. Rashi (ad
loc.) states that the Torah forbids erecting (single stone) monuments
for sacrifices to God similar to those used by idolators. We may only
use altars (made of multiple stones) in our worship of God. Similarly,
R. Moshe of Coucy (Semag, prohibition 41) lists two requirements to
fall under the prohibition: the monument must be made of a single
stone and used for sacrifices.
R. Moshe Feinstein (Iggeros Moshe, Yoreh De’ah 4:57) implicitly
disagrees with R. Weiss. He was asked whether someone who does
not know where his parents are buried is still obligated to erect a
gravestone, perhaps at an empty plot in a cemetery. After discussing
and rejecting various prooftexts, R. Feinstein concludes that there is
no basis to obligate a child to erect a gravestone in such a situation.
His discussion assumes that erecting a gravestone without a buried
body in the grave is permissible, implicitly ruling against the Rambam
or interpreting his position differently.
However, the Rambam (Sefer Ha-Mitzvos, prohibition 11; Mishneh
Torah, Hilkhos Avodah Zarah 6:6) defines a forbidden monument as
one where people gather. In order to fall under the biblical
prohibition, it need not be made of a single stone nor be used for
sacrifice or any other form of worship. The Chinukh (403) explains
that since monuments were used for idolatry, we may not use them
for anything, even the service of God. While only a minority view, the
Rambam’s position cannot be easily dismissed. The codes and
responsa literature do not offer much guidance on this subject.
II. Gravestones
However, the Rambam himself (Mishneh Torah, Hilkhos Avel 4:4)
rules that we must erect gravestones for the deceased. Is this not a
monument that should be biblically forbidden? The Rambam here
follows the Mishnah (Shekalim 2:5) and its accompanying Talmud
Yerushalmi which states that a Torah scholar does not need a
gravestone because his Torah insights serve as a memorial. However,
everyone else requires a gravestone, which the Mishnah calls a “
nefesh,” a soul.
At the unveiling of R. Moshe Sofer’s (the Chasam Sofer) gravestone,
his son and successor, R. Avraham Shmuel Binyamin Sofer, asked
why we erect a monument for Torah scholars against the conclusion
of the Yerushalmi and Rambam (Responsa Kesav Sofer, Yoreh De’ah
178). He explains that for most people, we write their names on their
gravestones so their relatives and friends will pray for them. The
gravestone is intended to benefit the deceased’s soul (nefesh).
Righteous people do not need this help. Their gravestones are for the
visitors to pray in the merit of the righteous, a service to others and
6
R. Feinstein proceeds to deciding the most appropriate way to
memorialize a deceased relative whose burial site is unknown,
making a crucial distinction. A gravestone without a grave gives
honor to no one. And if we cannot directly honor the deceased among
the dead, we should honor him among the living. Therefore, R.
Feinstein suggests, a child should erect in honor of the deceased a
building–or donate partially to a building–that will be used for
educational or charity purposes. Let his name be remembered as
enhancing religious lives.
IV. Museums and Monuments
We see three methods for memorializing the dead, each appropriate
in different circumstances:
1. We place a monument, a gravestone, near the burial place for
the sake of the deceased’s soul
2. For the righteous, we place a gravestone at the burial place for
the benefit of visitors
3. Elsewhere, a monument is either forbidden (R. Weiss) or
inappropriate (R. Feinstein). Instead, we build educational or
charitable institutions.
A 9/11 monument, listing the names of the deceased, is appropriate
for the site where some remains still rest. It is a burial site, a grave
for individuals and for the nation that mourns them. Some of the
buried may qualify as righteous, whether as victims of a vicious attack
or would-be saviors, rushing to assist the injured. The monument
commemorates the fallen and allows us to pray for them and for
ourselves.
Copyright © 2014 Torah Musings, All rights reserved.
128
Weekly Digest from TorahMusings.com If a graveside monument is impossible, an educational
institution–including a museum–is a proper additional
commemoration. It should not be a place to merely revisit the
tragedy. As an educational institution, this museum must teach the
lessons of 9/11. To me, those lessons are about patriotism, bravery
and selflessness. When I think of 9/11, I think of firefighters rushing
to the scene to help. I see Abe Zelmanowitz, from my neighborhood,
who stayed behind to help his quadriplegic colleague. And I think of
the remarkable national unity that followed the tragedy. Teaching
those lessons to a future generation would be a fitting
commemoration of the martyrs of 9/11.
1. I am certain some people will expect a discussion here of
whether kohanim may enter the memorial. I do not know and am
not willing to rely on news reports. ↩
2. See also Minchas Elazar 3:37. ↩
A Matter of Pride
by Aron White
Torah study has been a fundamental part of Judaism for a long time.
However, there is one element of it which can be found throughout
classical Jewish sources right up until the previous century, which I
believe has eroded greatly in the past fifty years. This element is the
idea of pride in Torah and Talmidei Chachamim.
In order to explain any change in religious psyche, it is incumbent to
provide the model against which I am comparing us. The Harvard
sociologists Mark Zborowski and Elizabeth Herzog wrote a book, Life
is With the People, which aimed to capture the worldview of the
European shtetl. Quite a large part of it is devoted to the shtetl’s view
of Talmidei Chachamim, the scholars and Yeshiva students of the
village. Locals viewed the yeshiva students in the most glowing terms.
They were known as the “shayneh” people, the “good” people. They
were given pride of place in the synagogue, by being given the
Eastern wall to sit at. Torah knowledge was the number one
determinant of social status (though wealth was certainly a close
second). A stellar yeshiva student was someone people wanted to
host, as well as the choice match for their daughters. In short, the
Talmid Chacham was an object of much adoration and communal
pride.
I believe that across the orthodox spectrum, from Yeshivish to
Modern Orthodox, this sense, at least regarding yeshiva students, has
largely eroded. Rabbis maintain a certain amount of respect, as
leaders, teachers and officiators of religious ceremonies. However,
the relationship with the young scholars of the community, the
yeshiva students, has changed dramatically in the past half century.
The reasons are different in each community, and I will analyse them
separately. The analysis of this issue cuts to the core of some of the
major elements of each community, as well the future courses these
communities will take.
The Yeshivish Community
It may seem surprising to accuse the Yeshivish community, where
Talmud Torah is the primary value, of a lack of pride in Torah
7
scholars. However, the way to demonstrate this lack of pride is to see
what happens in Bein Hazmanim (intersession), when yeshiva
students pour back, from outside of town or from Israel, into their
respective communities. The shuls and batei midrash are more
packed than usual, filled with a buzz of people returning, seeing
family and friends. Pizza shops fill with yeshiva students catching up
with each other. Shadchanim (and marriage age girls) go into a frenzy
of calls and arrangements. Yet amidst all the commotion and emotion,
one cannot really detect a sense of communal pride in the yeshiva
cohort. Whereas in the life of the shtetl, the Talmid Chacham was a
source of pride, there is no real sense today of our yeshiva students
as something we are proud of –“Wow, our community is full for a
month with so many people who are studying Torah!” There is no
sense that the people who have come back to town are the cream of
the crop, the pride of our community, a group we hold up high and
proclaim, “Here are the finest our community can offer!” The month
is passed with a lot of excitement and fun, but pride is not really in
the cards.
I believe that two factors have caused this change in our relationship
with yeshiva students. The first is the fact that the term “yeshiva
student” means something totally different now than it used to. In the
past, yeshiva study was limited to an elite minority who dedicated
themselves whole-heartedly to their studies. Moreover, being a
yeshiva student almost implied certain personality traits. The Talmid
Chacham in the shtetl is described as having distinctive way of
walking and talking; a certain refinement and fineness was built into
what it meant to be a yeshiva student. Frequently in Chazal, and
Rambam’s Hilchos De’os, reference is made to the external behaviour
of a Talmid Chacham as beautiful, fine, praiseworthy. Today, yeshivot
are open to everyone. Whilst this certainly has many benefits, one
side effect is that being a yeshiva student no longer imposes any
requirements of personal development. There are many students in
yeshivot who are not sophisticated or refined, but quite shallow, even
boorish. Whereas once a yeshiva student could be discerned by his
calm and dignified walk, yeshiva students who have returned to their
communities for Bein Hazmanim are often identifiable by less noble
features. Hanging out on street corners, coming out of a late minyan,
smoking and bad driving are unfortunately all things that have
become part of the cultural lexicon of yeshiva students. Such a group
is far less worthy of adoration and pride in the eyes of the community,
and justifiably so.
A second reason for a change in the Yeshivish community’s
relationship with its yeshiva students is actually due to the attitudes
of the yeshiva students themselves. Because Yeshiva and Kollel have
become parts of the fabric of life, one often finds people who are
enveloped in learning for many years, yet without conveying any
great passion for what they are doing. Free time is a great barometer
for this. There are many yeshiva students who learn for a large
numbers of years without ever considering to learn any time beyond
the yeshiva schedule. When I see a yeshiva student on a long distance
flight without a sefer in his bag, or eat a Shabbat meal at the house of
a Kollel student where not a word of Torah is discussed (communal
politics and housing costs instead), it makes me wonder how serious
his engagement with Torah really is. A good counterexample to this
phenomenon is the (theoretical) student from public school in the
Midwest, studying in Israel for the year. The student becomes totally
Copyright © 2014 Torah Musings, All rights reserved.
129
Weekly Digest from TorahMusings.com engrossed in his studies, inspired by the beauty of living in the Jewish
land with the Jewish people, thirsty for knowledge. He is filled with a
joy, a remarkable passion that places him on cloud nine for months,
enthralled by the experience. Compared to the emotional experience
many have when jumping into the world of Torah study, those for
whom learning Torah is just what one does can sometimes seem
apathetic to, or simply uninspired by, the beauty of what they are
involved in. If the student himself does not see Torah as something
wonderful, beautiful, and worth being proud of, it is no surprise the
community does not have pride in him.
Thus, the fact that yeshiva students are no longer a refined elite, and
the fact that the routine of the yeshiva lifestyle has removed some of
the passion and beauty of Torah study, combine to make the Yeshivish
world’s relationship with its yeshiva students more ambivalent than in
past eras.
The Modern Orthodox Community
Modern Orthodoxy also has a difficult relationship with its budding
scholars and yeshiva students. Here I will draw on an example from
Israel. The Modern Orthodox magazine Motzash (an acronym for
Motza’ei Shabbat) ran a story a few months ago describing the 150
bright young prospects (under age 36) in the National
Religious/Modern Orthodox community in Israel. People from every
field were represented as the future and the pride of the community –
lawyers, soldiers, professors, entrepreneurs and social activists.
Amongst the 150, there was not one person listed as a leading Torah
scholar or teacher. In my own personal experience, in many settings,
when I introduce myself by saying “I am in my fifth year in Yeshiva,”
there is a certain awkwardness created. Only when I say “I am also
studying for a degree” is the atmosphere relaxed, and I am welcomed
as a social equal, to be valued and respected.
I believe that there are two factors that play into Modern Orthodoxy’s
relationship with its Torah students. First, the Modern Orthodox
community has a multi-faceted value system. Whereas in the shtetl,
Torah knowledge was the key to social standing, in the Modern
Orthodox community, there are so many things that are central to
Modern Orthodoxy’s worldview, that Torah knowledge is no longer
enough by itself to give one any social standing. Career,
qualifications, sophisticated views, breadth of knowledge, range of
experiences – all are things that are vital to a good social standing in
Modern Orthodoxy, most of which (experiences being the exception)
are not provided by years learning in yeshivot. To many in Modern
Orthodoxy, the first thing they think about when they think of yeshiva
students is, well, kids. It is simply harder for someone with a
successful career, experienced and nuanced political views and a
complicated financial plan for his family to take an 18 year old kid
seriously based on his greater Torah knowledge. When subjects such
as Israeli politics, inter-denominational relations or LGBT issues are
raised, often yeshiva students’ opinions range from naivety to
fundamentalism. No amount of Gemara and Tosafos is going to cut it
for you if you cannot talk about the prospects of the Two State
Solution… or hold extreme views about the topic. The multi-faceted
nature of the Modern Orthodox value system means that Torah
knowledge alone is not going to cut it for anyone in this community as
a symbol of social standing, and the “bubble/like” environment of
yeshivot mean that, by definition, yeshiva students will be less
8
engaged with the world and values that their community is engaged
with.
The second part of the relationship is as significant, if not more so.
Modern Orthodoxy’s relationship with yeshivot is governed by a fair
amount of fear, primarily parental, but also communal. The changes
that some students have undergone in yeshivot are well known. Many
become more religiously observant – no more touching girls, listening
to women sing, hugging family members of the other gender, eating
at their families favourite restaurant (“even the rabbi eats there!”)
due to new kashrut requirements. Some “shift to the right”– out go
the coloured clothes and Israeli flag, in comes the hat and jacket, and
series of esoteric sefarim discussing “lomdus.” On the other end of
the spectrum, some become more liberal – Rashi, Ramban and Netziv
are all outside the confines of “Pshat” and thus irrelevant, whereas it
is vitally important for one to be well versed in philosophy,
comparative theology and Biblical criticism in order for Judaism to be
relevant and sophisticated. Others become more Zionist – they serve
in the Israeli army before going to live in some legally questionable
residence somewhere over the Green Line, Israelize their surname,
and look pitifully on those unlucky Jews, still living in the Galut.
Each of these are not merely personal choices, but choices that
directly impact the student’s relationship with his parents – they are
no longer observant/”frum”/intellectual/Zionist enough for him. In the
Modern Orthodox community, yeshivot have become a place that
parents are sometimes a little bit scared of. As one woman put it to
me, “guys stay in yeshiva for Shana Aleph [first year] and Shana Bet
[second year]. If they stay a third year, then the Gimmel stands for
Gone.” This has also served to make it harder for communities to put
their yeshiva students on a pedestal, to be genuinely proud of the
religious growth they undergo.
For many people in the community, “religious growth” in yeshiva
means students taking on stringencies that seem extreme or bizarre.
“Developing a connection with Eretz Yisrael” means viewing life in
the Diaspora as illegitimate, and thus losing respect for their
community. The building blocks of religious growth have been turned
into things to be feared, lest they go too far. The very institution of a
yeshiva is viewed with suspicion. In such an atmosphere, Modern
Orthodoxy is too focused on making sure religious growth does not
“go too far” to focus on the beauty of the religious growth itself.
The Modern Orthodox community’s multiple values, combined with
the drastic changes some students undergo in yeshivot and the
ensuing suspicion of yeshivot, are the two major causes of a lack of
pride in yeshiva students in the Modern Orthodox community.
The Path Forward
The question is, what is the path forward? None of the societal
changes that I have mentioned seem poised for reversal, and many of
them are not necessarily changes that we want undone. I believe
healing will come about through gradual changes in all parties.
Yeshiva students must recognize that they are Torah ambassadors to
the world. They must model proper interpersonal behavior and show
care for mitzvah observance. They do better davening late in private
than assembling late-morning minyanim, sending the message that
yeshiva students have not a care in the world. Yeshiva students must
be more conscious of the sensitivities of their parents, ensuring that
Copyright © 2014 Torah Musings, All rights reserved.
130
Weekly Digest from TorahMusings.com they are not treading on anyone’s toes in their religious growth. Life
becomes complicated as one’s financial, familial and communal
obligations grow. Yeshiva students must recognize their parents’
sacrifices for religion as true Jewish worship, even if not codified in
Shulchan Aruch. They must respect their parents as they develop
their own path. In turn, parents must reciprocate by allowing their
children room to develop their own identity.
and exiting a bathhouse. The prayer recited on entering the
bathhouse included asking God to prevent bad things from happening
and also a request that if something bad should happen, it should
serve to atone for past sins. Again, Abaye objects based on Resh
Lakish’s saying that one should not open one’s mouth to Satan. This
prayer should not even mention the possibility that something bad
may happen.
I will conclude by giving two reasons why it is so important for us to
take steps that will allow us–laypeople across the Orthodox
community–to regain a sense of pride in our yeshiva students. First,
for one’s own individual religious life, it is correct and healthy to
maintain pride in those who are fully engrossed in religious study.
One should have a very positive relationship and feeling towards a
central part of our religion. But more importantly, yeshiva students
are an important resource for the Orthodox community, maybe one of
the most important. Few things could be more important for the
continuing vitality of the Orthodox community than education about
our religion and traditions. Looking at the broader Jewish community,
across all denominations there is anguish amongst Jewish leadership
that so many Jews are ignorant of their rich heritage. The knowledge
gained by thousands of students a year (and whatever we think of the
breadth of the yeshiva curriculum, the amount students learn in a
year of study, with 12 hour plus learning days, is incredible) is a vital
resource for the community. Finding a way of being proud of these
students will help give them a platform to spread their knowledge,
and make no small contribution to the continuing vitality of the Jewish
community.
When did Resh Lakish say this? The Gemara (Kesubos 8b) tells us the
circumstance. The tutor for Resh Lakish’s sons lost his own children.
On paying a shivah call, Resh Lakish asked his translator to offer
words of comfort. The translator said that death has been around
since the six days of Creation; many have drunk of it and many will
drink of it. He then asked that God comfort these mourners. Resh
Lakish objected that the translator should not have said that many
will drink of it because this constitutes opening one’s mouth to Satan,
which once should not do.
Speaking With Satan
by R. Gil Student
God is just, merciful and fair. Why, then, are we told that saying
something bad–opening our mouths to Satan–can cause bad things to
happen? Why should a just God punish us for discussing a negative
possibility?
The Talmud raises this issue in three places but does not explain the
theological mechanisms by which it operates. I’d like to explore
approaches from mystical, rationalist and moralistic perspectives.
I. Don’t Say This
A mourner is required to justify God’s judgment, to say “tziduk ha-din
.” The Talmud (Berakhos 19a) offers a formula for tziduk ha-din that
begins: “Master of the worlds: I have sinned much before You but You
have only punished me one thousandth [of what I deserve].” Abaye
objects that this formula violates Resh Lakish’s saying (and it is also
taught in the name of R. Yossi) that a person should not open his
mouth to Satan (le-olam al yiftach adam piv le-Satan). By saying that
one deserves more punishment from God, one is asking for bad things
to happen.
In ancient times, the bathhouse was apparently a dangerous place,
perhaps due to the combination of germs and perverts. However, in
the days before indoor plumbing, it was the only option for basic
cleanliness where running water was unavailable or dangerous. The
Talmud (Berakhos 60a) discusses prayers one should say on entering
9
What are we to make of this? On the face of it, this seems capricious.
Why should speech move the scales of divine justice?
II. Mystical Approaches
One possible approach is suggested by a literal view of the heavenly
retinue. R. Moshe Chaim Luzzatto explains (Ramchal, Derech Hashem
2:6, Kaplan translation):
God arranged matters so that His direction of the world should
resemble that of an earthly government… The spiritual realm
therefore contains courts of justice and deliberating bodies, with
appropriate rules and procedures.
While Ramchal does not explicitly state it, I take this to mean that he
believes there is a heavenly accuser, a prosecuting attorney, called
Satan. This prosecutor looks for opportunities to press charges. If we
antagonize him, we risk catching his attention and facing his wrath.
The Rashba (Responsa 1:408) takes a different approach. He sees this
as a matter of the power of human speech. People have the ability to
use their godly power of speech to curse and bless in supernatural
ways. Similarly, they can cause bad things to happen by opening their
mouth to Satan. How this works is beyond our understanding, even a
refutation of philosophy which cannot explain it. However, the lesson
it teaches about the importance of controlling our words is certainly
comprehensible.
III. Rationalist Approach
R. Yitzchak Arieli (Einayim La-Mishpat, Berakhos 18a no. 10) points
out that the Rambam does not rule like the Gemara regarding
refraining from saying bad things that might spur Satan. The
Rambam includes this among other Talmud superstitions (or popular
beliefs) that he rejects. Rambam’s rationalist approach is to reject
this concept.
R. Avraham Ibn Ezra (Job 1:6) famously quotes R. Sa’adia Gaon as
explaining that the Satan mentioned in the book of Job is a person.
Ibn Ezra rejects this and claims it is connected to the astrological
order of the universe, the planetary system we call nature. This is
similar to Rambam’s (Moreh Nevukhim 3:22) explanation that Satan
is the natural order of the universe that sometimes causes bad things
Copyright © 2014 Torah Musings, All rights reserved.
131
Weekly Digest from TorahMusings.com In addition to the above approaches, I see this as an optimistic
approach to life. Our speech should reflect hope, a bright future, trust
in God. Avoiding verbalizing negative possibilities, even when this
causes us to say things a little awkwardly, enforces an upbeat tone.
The Talmud (Shabbos 53a) says that we all know what a bride and
groom do on their wedding night but we shouldn’t say it. Refraining
from doing so keeps our (and other people’s) minds on appropriate
things. Similarly, we all know that bad things happen but refraining
from saying it explicitly helps us maintain an optimistic outlook.
to happen. Ibn Ezra and Rambam would seem to leave no room for
our speech inadvertently influencing Satan.1
However, R. Menachem Meiri, in his commentary to Berakhos (19a),
quotes the bathhouse prayer in its emended fashion. He implicitly
accepts the criticism about opening one’s mouth to Satan. Meiri is
well-known as a rationalist who explains the Talmud according to
Rambam’s general principles. Yet here he accepts the idea of
influencing Satan. I’m not sure how to explain this.2
IV. Moralistic Approaches
1. Ibn Ezra mentions the possibility of speaking to Satan in his
commentary to Ex. 1:10 but that is an explanation of what
Pharaoh may have been thinking, which Ibn Ezra rejects. ↩
R. Avraham Kook (Ein Ayah, Berakhos 19a) offers an intriguing
explanation. Opening one’s mouth to Satan, suggesting that
something bad might occur to oneself, is a lack of proper faith.
Self-awareness is a necessity for religious growth. But recognition of
one’s behavioral flaws should not morph into a misunderstanding of
God’s ways. One must believe that God rewards and punishes people
justly.
2. See also Meiri to Gittin 36b. ↩
Someone who secretly believes that he deserves worse but that God is
mercifully saving him from his true recompense is suffering from a
dangerous misunderstanding. This reliance on divine mercy can easily
deteriorate into further religious misbehavior. After all, if God doesn’t
truly punish for sins, why be careful to behave properly? In the end,
this statement about what one “truly” deserves becomes true.
Opening one’s mouth to Satan is a self-fulfilling prophecy.3
3. R. Kook’s writing is notoriously obscure. This is how I
understand his explanation. R. Ya’akov Ibn Chaviv (Ha-Kosev to
Ein Ya’akov, Berakhos 19a) seems to say the exact opposite. He
contends that if a person explains divine recompense based on
justice, then divine mercy can no longer be applied to him. ↩
4. Although R. Ya’akov Reischer (Iyun Ya’akov, Berakhos 19a)
suggests that the rule of not opening one’s mouth to Satan only
applies to a time of danger or judgment. ↩
R. Eliyah Dessler (Mikhtav Me-Eliyahu, vol. 4 pp. 219–223) proposes a
different moralistic explanation. Speech reflects our inner refinement.
If we are truly horrified by profanity and violence then we will be
unable to verbalize it. The fact that we can say something bad shows
an inner lacking.
Judaism is an optimistic religion, which we must fully internalize.
Judaism also values life, a concept with which R. Dessler takes
specific aim at violent sports. People who are willing to endanger
their lives for entertainment, and even call it bravery, suffer from a
sad and empty life. We are not cowards for refusing to engage in
violent sports. We love life for the religious opportunities it offers,
refusing to endanger it without reason.
A refined person with proper priorities will be unable to say anything
that implies he does not fully value life. Saying so, opening one’s
mouth to Satan, displays a lack of sensitivity to Torah values. This, in
turn, opens the possibility for negative repercussions. The mechanism
by which these repercussions occur remains a mystical phenomenon.
However, the underlying cause is moralistic.
V. Optimistic Judaism
However we explain it, halakhic authorities have generally accepted
the concept of refraining from opening one’s mouth to Satan,
Rambam notwithstanding. The Rema (Yoreh De’ah 376:2) rules that a
person should not say that he has not been punished according to his
deeds, a variation of the Talmud’s tziduk ha-din. The Magen Avraham
(239:7) rules that one should not recite the deathbed confession every
night (as some do) for the above reason. The Kitzur Shulchan Arukh
(33:14) follows the Shulchan Arukh Ha-Rav in ruling that one should
never say that something bad will happen to another Jew.4
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Torah Musings Digest
31 October, 2014 | A Window into the Orthodox Jewish Intellectual’s World| Edited by: Rabbi Gil Student
The Super-Mitzvah to Have
Children
different mitzvah. Why should an owner free his stake in a servant,
suffering a financial loss, to allow a half-servant to fulfill peru u-revu,
a commandment in which he is not technically obligated? It is true
that a half-servant is not obligated to be fruitful and multiple.
However, he is still obligated to settle the world by having children.
Everyone, freeman and servant, man and woman, is obligated in
sheves.
The Logical Imperative to Procreate
by R. Gil Student
The “Shidduch Crisis,” the growing number of older singles in the
Orthodox community, is not a uniquely Jewish phenomenon, nor
should it be. Contemporary society is also undergoing a “Singles
Crisis.” This should give us pause when proposed solutions to the
Shidduch Crisis, no matter how clever (and especially when too
clever), only address concerns specific to our community. Can it
really be a coincidence that we are suffering from the same problem
as the culture around us? If not, we need to recognize this within our
proposed course of action.
Additionally, acknowledging this link to general society gives us
opportunity to consider why this phenomenon is so troublesome as to
be called a “crisis.” Yes, we see the very real human suffering, but we
have to look more deeply and ask: Why are these humans suffering?
I. The Half-Servant
The first commandment in the Torah is to be fruitful and to multiply (
peru u-revu), to have children. This was said first to Adam and
Chavah as a blessing, like that said to the other animals, and again to
Noach as a blessing and command (Gen 1:28, 9:1, 9:7). Since it was
not repeated after the Torah was given, this mitzvah only applies to
Jews. Gentiles are not obligated to be fruitful and multiply. However,
we see a curious development twice in the Talmud.
Back when slavery was allowed, centuries before the Emancipation
Proclamation, the Talmud (Gittin 41a) discussed the case of a
half-servant. A servant is bought by two owners in a partnership and
one owner sets him free. The half-servant is in a state of limbo–he
cannot marry a free woman because of his servant half and he cannot
marry a maidservant because of his free half. Therefore, the Sages
decreed, the other owner must set the man completely free. The
prophet declares: “Lo sohu vera’ah, la-sheves yetzarah, [God] did not
create [the world] to be barren, He created it to be settled” (Isa.
45:18). This teaches an overriding obligation to have children (a
mitzvah of sheves) that even applies to a servant.
Why did the Talmud quote a verse in Isaiah and not one of the three
verses from Genesis about being fruitful and multiplying? Is not an
explicit commandment in the Torah more compelling than a prophetic
passage? Two students of the great Tosafist, Rabbenu Tam, disagree
how to interpret this passage.1 R. Yitzchak of Dampierre (Ri) explains
that the prophet emphasizes the importance of this mitzvah (peru
u-revu) to the divine plan. Even though a half-servant is not really
obligated in this commandment, his master should still free him to
allow him to fulfill this great mitzvah.
The other Talmudic reference to sheves limits the sale of a Torah
scroll. Normally, you may never sell a Torah scroll, perhaps the most
sacred possession an individual or community can acquire. The
Talmud (Megillah 27a) allows for the sale of a Torah scroll in only two
circumstances: in order to study Torah or to pay for an orphan’s
wedding expenses. The latter exemption is supported with the above
verse from Isaiah. Since sheves is so important, or so
all-encompassing, it overrides the sanctity of the Torah scroll in this
respect. Commentaries to the Shulchan Arukh note that the Talmud
uses the masculine form of the word for “orphan.” What about a
female orphan?
It is quite surprising that the Torah only obligates men to have
children (Yevamos 65b). Peru u-revu, childbirth and childraising, is a
mitzvah placed only on males. Certainly, most people find this
contrary to their biological, psychological and sociological instincts.
The most popular explanation for this curious halakhic position was
offered by R. Meir Simcha Hakohen of Dvinsk in his Meshekh
Chokhmah (Gen. 9:7). R. Meir Simcha argues that the Torah is
merciful and does not obligate people in tasks that are necessarily
painful (see Yevamos 87b). The Torah exempts women from the
obligation because childbirth is extremely painful for them.
That exemption takes a surprising turn. We may sell a Torah scroll to
enable an orphan to fulfill the mitzvah of marrying. However, women
are not obligated in the mitzvah. Therefore, perhaps we may not sell a
Torah scroll to fund the wedding of a female orphan. Commentaries
struggle with this surprising and counterintuitive conclusion. Chelkas
Mechokek (Even Ha-Ezer 1:1) adopts it while Beis Shmuel (Even
Ha-Ezer 1:2) and Magen Avraham (153:9) dispute it (see also Ba’er
Heitev, Even Ha-Ezer 1:2; Otzar Ha-Poskim 1:11). Who needs
communal assistance more than a female orphan? One answer lies in
the debate between Ri and Rivam.
According to Ri, there is only one mitzvah to have children; sheves is
the same as peru u-revu, from which women are exempt. However,
Rivam sees these as two separate mitzvos. All people, men and
women, are obligated in sheves. Therefore, since the permission to
sell a Torah scroll is based on the verse in Isaiah about sheves, this
permission must include orphan women. Note that according to the
Ri, the discussion is not over. There might be other reasons to extend
the permission to orphan women, as discussed in Otzar Ha-Poskim
1:11.
III. The Source for Sheves
R. Yitzchak Ben Mordekhai of Regensburg (Rivam) sees in sheves a
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II. Women and Procreation
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The idea that sheves obligates everyone to procreate requires
explanation. Where do we see women receiving such a command?
And why would the Torah mercifully exempt women from peru u-revu
and then turn around and re-obligate them in the very same thing via
sheves?
I suggest that sheves is not a direct command. The prophet is not
telling us what to do but explaining to us God’s will, posing a simple
syllogism:
Lichtenstein takes a similar approach, albeit not within Rivam’s
view. See this Hebrew essay: link (RTF), section 2, fourth
approach. ↩
Vort from the Rav: Lech Lecha
Genesis 15:4
� ‫ִּכי ִאם ֲא ׁ ֶשר יֵ ֵצא ִמ ֵּמ ֶע‬
‫יך הוּא יִ ָיר ׁ ֶש �ך‬
This one will not inherit you, but the one who will spring from
your innards-he will inherit you.
1. God put people on this big planet
2. God does not do things without a reason
3. Therefore, God wants the world populated.
This is not an unassailable argument. Maybe God wants people to
occupy only one place, even though the planet is large. Maybe He
only wanted us on this world for a short time. How are we expected to
fully grasp the divine will?2 In this case, prophecy does not command
us but educates us, informing us of God’s will. Sheves does not
command us but tell us what God wants.
Yet, we did not need this revelation. Merely observing the world
teaches us that people were created with innate biological and
psychological desires to have children. God must have implanted
within creation the drive for procreation for a reason. The suffering of
singles in this “crisis” is a symptom of spiritual unfulfillment, a sign of
the divine plan of marriage and procreation. Genesis 1–2 is part of
our inherent psychological makeup.
Once we know that God desires procreation, we are bidden, as His
created beings, to fulfill His will. He wants people in the world, a full
world, so we cannot allow humanity to dwindle. We must continue the
human chain, implementing God’s will. Having children is one way in
which we can fulfill God’s desires.3
This is not a meta-mitzvah, an overarching command like “And you
shall do the right and the good” (Deut. 6:18). Rather, it is a logical
mandate supported by prophecy. It is founded in the fundamental
duty of every created being to fulfill his master’s will. As such, it
presumably obligates all people, gentiles and Jews, every created
being seeking to fulfill the will of its Creator.4
If this is correct, then God, through His merciful Torah, does not
command women to have children. However, the continuation and
growth of the human species is God’s will, which all people–men,
women, Jew and gentile–must fulfill and through which they achieve
their highest purpose. Their suffering, the communal and societal
crises, demonstrates this need.
1. Tosafos, Gittin 41b sv. lo; Chagigah 2b sv. lo; Bava Basra 13a sv.
she-né’emar. ↩
2. And does this make space travel, settling the vast universe, a
religious obligation? ↩
3. One can argue that we need not fulfill God’s will, only His
command. See this post: link. ↩
4. After writing this, I was gratified to see that R. Aharon
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This promise is the culmination of a long and frustrating journey for
Abraham. When Abraham received God’s command of lech lecha, he
also received a promise that the Almighty would make him a great
nation and he would be a blessing to all people on earth (Gen.
12:1–3). Abraham interpreted this promise to mean that his mission
was to convert the nations of the world to monotheism, starting with
the inhabitants of the land he would be shown. Since he was
concerned with converting the people he would meet, on his journey
he took not only Sarah, his wife, but also Lot and the converts that he
and his wife had already made in Haran. We do not, however, hear
another word about these converts; they apparently abandoned
Abraham the closer he came to Canaan. Abraham then “passed
through the land” (Gen. 12: 6), directing his message to the
Canaanites. Although God then appeared to Abraham and said, “to
your own children will I give this land,” Abraham thought that the
message referred to spiritual children, so He built on that spot an
altar to God in accordance with his interpretation of God’s message
(Gen. 12: 7). It is noteworthy that the Torah never says that he
sacrificed upon the altars he built, for apparently he built them to
attract a crowd so that he could address the people.
Abraham kept traveling further southward towards Egypt, which was
then the center of civilization. Who better to heed his message than
the Egyptians? Only when Abraham realized how immoral the
Egyptians were, and that his message had no chance of catching on
there, did he leave. After the great disappointment of his encounter
with the highly civilized but grossly immoral Egyptians, Abraham
escapes Egypt, again unsuccessful in his mission. Yet he continues his
journey and goes back to the same places he had come to before, and
finally to the very place where he had earlier pitched his tent, east of
Beth-El. He returns, indeed, to the very altar he built from which he
preached to all, and again calls out in God’s Name (Gen. 13:3–4).
And here began his second great disappointment. Among Abraham’s
entire coterie, his nephew Lot should have been most affected by his
message. Yet Lot and his shepherds forsook Abraham and his mission,
and chose to dwell among the most wicked people of that time, the
people of Sodom. Abraham is not sure where to turn to continue his
teachings. If Lot would not listen, then who else would? Yet Abraham
is so imbued with belief in his message and his conviction that the
people of the land, even of Sodom, would ultimately heed it, that he
moves his tent to another location, Elonei Mamre, and again builds an
altar (Gen. 13:18). His last hope is that the power is yet within him to
convince the inhabitants of the land of Canaan (including Sodom and
its wicked neighbors) of the error of their ways. There is a war of four
kings against five; Lot and his family are taken prisoner together with
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the King of Sodom and his followers. Abraham is forced to arm his
household and to rescue them. Abraham triumphs, saves Sodom’s
king and his followers as well as his nephew Lot and his family. Does
the King of Sodom mend his ways, or even show gratitude? On the
contrary, he says Give me the souls, and the possessions take for
yourself. “Abraham, your spiritual message is meaningless. We know
what really interests you. You take the booty.” For the first and only
time in the Torah, Abraham displays fury. In the king of Sodom’s
cynical words, Abraham sees his perceived mission of influencing
mankind crumble before his eyes.
purified once he immerses, even though there was no change in his
body.”
Maimonides continues this thought by suggesting that the mikve is a
place where, with the right intention, we rid ourselves of impure
thoughts that lead to bad behaviors: “Similarly one who focuses his
heart on purifying his soul from the impurities of the soul, which are
the wicked thoughts and bad character traits, becomes purified when
he resolves within his heart to distance himself from such counsel and
immerses his soul in the waters of knowledge, as Ezekiel states, ‘I
shall sprinkle upon you water of purification, and you shall be
purified. I will cleanse you from all impurities…’” It is almost as if the
soul rather than the body was being dipped into ‘waters of
knowledge’ and rinsing away the internal filth that builds up daily:
the arguments, the gossip, the grudges, the jealousies, the meanness.
It sluices away when we enter the mikve, and we emerge re-born, in
the mystics’ view, trying once again to get it right.
So Abraham now answers God’s promise of reward with a desperate,
heartbreaking cry. In response, God assures him that Eliezer will not
be his heir; that actual children and not converts will carry on the
message. With the Bris Bein Habesarim Abraham begins a new
mission. (R. Nisson Shulman Notes, 1952)
Healing Waters
by Dr. Erica Brown
“I shall sprinkle upon you water of purification, and you shall be
purified. I will cleanse you from all impurities…”
Ezekiel 36:25
In the past few weeks, the mikve, a space of sacred purity and
privacy, has become a subject of scrutiny and suspicion. For those
who perform this mitzva regularly, an obligation of holiness suddenly
provokes worry. Is someone watching me? For those who have never
immersed in a ritual bath, the chances of ever going to the mikve
have just gotten slimmer. It’s not hard to understand the anxiety. This
mitzva has been sheltered both in the placement of the building and
the secrecy of the practice. Open conversations about mikve use are
rare.
Immersion in the mikve is one of my very favorite mitzvot, and I hate
to see it belittled and diminished, particularly by those who have
never seen its value or dipped into its waters. It’s time to strengthen
its observance because, as Rahm Immanuel said, “Never let a good
crisis go to waste.”
Maimonides references the biblical verse above in the very last law of
his “Laws of Mikvaot” [11:12]. He acknowledges that this mitzva
would not have emerged from natural observance or logic; it demands
a suspension of logic because notions of purity rarely make sense.
“Impurity is not mud or filth that can be washed away with water,”
Maimonides writes. “Instead the immersion is a Scriptural decree and
requires focusing one’s heart.”
This led Maimonides to the conclusion that unlike other mitzvot
where action trumps intention, the mikve requires both action and
intention to be fulfilled optimally. If I sit in a sukka but am distracted
and not thinking about the mitzva at all as I perform it, I have still
satisfied the legal requirement of sitting in the sukka, even if it is
sub-optimal. If I immersed in the mikve and was distracted, I have to
immerse again because without intention, the mitzva has not been
fulfilled at all. Maimonides, therefore, writes, “When one immersed
but did not intend to purify himself, it is as if he did not
immerse…One who focuses his heart on purifying himself becomes
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One person’s abuse of the mikve turned it, in some people’s minds,
into the exact opposite of what the space is – safe, sacred and special.
It’s time to take the mikve back – for converts and regular users – by
recommitting ourselves to its deepest meaning and purpose as a
spiritual tool to achieve holiness and to encourage its use for those
who have never experienced the beauty of ritual immersion.
For converts and others who feel violated, perhaps – in the spirit of
Maimonides – it is time to immerse in the mikve once again to rid
oneself of this impurity, the impurity of these past weeks. If it helps,
before the immersion, you may want to recite on or both of these two
excerpts from prayers traditionally said before immersion:
“…Just as I am cleansing my body of spiritual impurity in this water,
so in Your great mercy and abundant kindness may You cleanse my
soul of all impurity and dross, so that we might experience fulfillment
of the verse ‘I shall sprinkle upon you water of purification, and you
shall be purified,’ for as it is written, ‘God is the hope [mikve] of
Israel.’” This was written by the Ben Ish Chai (1832−1909). The full
text appears in the Jewish Woman’s Prayer Book by Aliza Lavie.
Devra Kay collected this prayer in Seder Tkhines: The Forgotten Book
of Common Prayer for Jewish Women, likely written by a woman in
the 19th century:
“God, my God, the time has come today
For me to cleanse myself of my impurities.
God, my God,
May it be Your will that my cleansing
In the water of the mikve
Be counted with the purification
Of all pious women in Israel
Who go to the mikve at their time
To cleanse themselves.
God Almighty
Accept my prayer…”
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Diapers With Disappearing Ink
by R. Daniel Mann
Question: Is it permitted to use on Shabbat a diaper with forms on
the outside that disintegrate when the diaper is soaked, alerting
parents to change the diaper?
Answer: There is a Torah-level violation to erase (mochek)writing or,
according to many, a picture or figure (see Shulchan Aruch, Orach
Chayim 340:3; Beur Halacha to 340:4). When the erasure does not
serve a positive purpose such as enabling new writing, the violation is
only Rabbinic (Mishna Berura 340:17). Thus, the diapers in question
would seem to have no more than a Rabbinic prohibition. Another
possible reason for no Torah prohibition is that the erasure’s result
may be “destructive” (mekalkel). It is debated whether considering
the side benefit, that the disintegration provides desirable
information, it is mekalkel (see Beur Halacha to 340:13).
The main cause for leniency relates to who and how the erasing is
done. Directly, it is the baby who erases by urinating, but he is almost
always too young to require training in Shabbat prohibitions.
Although one must not “feed” children prohibited matters, he may
allow a situation in which a baby might choose to do a forbidden
action (see Yevamot 114a). Here it is even better, as the baby
“violates” Shabbat without any knowledge of this consequence of his
action, in which case it is not a fundamental Shabbat violation even
for an adult (see Shut Rabbi Akiva Eiger I:8).
Thus, the question is whether the adult violates Shabbat by creating a
situation in which a future event will set off a melacha. Specifically,
putting the diaper on the baby creates a situation where erasure will
occur. When the direct cause (urination) of the erasure has yet to
occur at the time of the adult’s action (diapering), we say that the
adult acted through gerama (indirect action). Violation of Shabbat
through gerama is a very low level violation of Shabbat, to the extent
that it is permitted in certain cases of need (Rama, OC 334:22).
In this case, there are often additional points of leniency. For parents
who are not interested in the erasure, as they can easily determine
the “old way” when the diaper is soaked, the erasure is permitted as a
davar she’eino mitkaven (an unintentional forbidden result of one’s
action) of the diapering. It is true that when the forbidden result is a
definite outcome (psik reishei), the action is forbidden by Torah law
(Ketubot 6b). However, when the result is arrived at through gerama,
many important poskim permit psik reishei (Shemirat Shabbat
K’hilchata 12:18, based on Rav Auerbach; see discussion in Orchot
Shabbat 29:(41)). Some say that gerama is permitted in cases where
direct action is only Rabbinically forbidden. Other opinions disagree,
and in any case the leniency likely does not apply to every Rabbinic
prohibition (see Yabia Omer III, OC 17). Yet the above is probably not
needed, as, in actuality, the erasure is not a psik reishei. For a variety
of reasons, including the baby soiling with solids before the diaper is
soaked, diapers do not always reach the point that forms are erased.
Orchot Shabbat 15:59). We find this distinction in such cases as
cutting cake with writing or clear figures vs. nondescript shapes
(Rama, OC 340:3).
One may generally use diapers with disintegrating ink (Orchot
Shabbat 15:52). However, note that many of the reasons for leniency
are based on the assumption that one does not have intention when
diapering for the erasure, which is a valid assumption when one did
not intentionally buy diapers with this marginally useful feature.
However, for one who values this function, use of such diapers on
Shabbat may very well be forbidden and should be avoided.
(Regarding a slightly stricter case of a color-changing strip, see the
Star-K website, which has a similar ruling to the above.)
Aveilut for Parents
Halakhic Positions of Rav Joseph B. Soloveitchik
by R. Aharon Ziegler
Many people have wondered why aveilut for a parent is twelve
months while for a child is only thirty days. After all, the loss of a dear
and loving parent is a natural phenomenon of life, and it is
anticipated, yet here the Halacha requires twelve months of
mourning. But one who is subjected to the loss of a child, which is
unnatural and extremely traumatic for the surviving parents, is told
by Chazal that one month of aveilut is enough. How do we justify it?
Rav Pinchus Teitz from Elizabeth, New Jersey suggested that a
parental loss is in a category of its own. Parents are unique. More
children and siblings may be acquired. But there is only one mother
and one father. The added mourning is to manifest this uniqueness.
According to Rav Soloveitchik, when parents become old a role
reversal takes place. The parent, who cared for and sustained the
child, is no longer physically capable of doing so. The parent now
needs a support system. The child takes on the parental role of
caring, sustaining and protecting the parent. In the latter stages of
illness the parent is cared for almost like a child. Chazal imposed a
longer mourning process to overcome the image of the child-like
invalid parent in order to remember and vividly recall the parent not
as viewed in the end of life but rather, as he/she appeared as a
strong, vigorous caring parent. This process requires a considerable
longer period of time.
On a simpler level, the Rav commented, the aveilut for parents is
longer than for children because for parents it’s a mitzvah of Kibbud
Av and Kibbud Eim.
When there are not meaningful figures of letters but just a line or
dots, there is even more room for leniency, as erasing such
nondescript things is not a (full) violation of mochek unless the
erasure uncovers or enables writing (see Shulchan Aruch, OC 340:3;
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The New Israeli Army
emphasis on army service, now serve for three years, and thus are
able to take more senior positions in the army than previously
possible. Additionally, these soldiers, who have spent a year
preparing emotionally, spiritually and physically for the army are far
more prepared and motivated than their peers who are arriving
straight from high school – 80% of Mechina students go to combat
units, almost double the national average. With the large number of
highly motivated religious soldiers serving for three years, the change
in leadership of the Israeli army was almost inevitable.
by Aron White
In a book released last year, Amos Harel, the army commentator for
Haaretz and the author of a number of books on the Israeli military,
describes how the Israeli army is changing. The changes are
fascinating. Due to the internet, more information is available to new
soldiers about what to expect, removing the traditional element of
surprise. As the standard of life in Israel improves, soldiers expect
better quality services on their army bases as well.
The place of the National Religious in Israeli Politics
One of the main changes that Harel documents is the army’s
increased religiosity, both in terms of its soldiers and its leadership.
This drastic change impacts three major issues in Israeli society – the
place of the national religious community in Israeli politics, the
Haredi draft and the relationship between religious and secular.
The religious shift of the army
There has been a dramatic increase in the number of religious
soldiers in the army, particularly in combat units and leadership
positions.1 In the infantry division in the year 1990, 2.5% of
commanders were graduates of religious high schools. By 2000, this
figure had jumped to 15%. By 2007, the number had reached 31.4%.
Within the infantry division, the Golani and Givati brigades have even
higher percentages that are religious. In 2010, two thirds of the
commanders in Givati were religious. The Brigadier General of the
entire Givati brigade, Ofer Vinter, is himself also religious. One piece
of anecdotal evidence: The author of the study quoted in Harel’s book
served in the Shaldag unit in the mid 80s, when the unit had two
religious soldiers, both of whom “removed their Kippa” by the time
they left the army. When he returned to the unit 18 years later, 40%
of the junior commanders and 30% of the senior commanders were
religious. A friend of mine in Golani said that if someone were to
never have seen Israel, and were to walk into his army base, he would
believe that at least half the country is observant. The army is now
full of religious soldiers and commanders.
This change can be explained by looking at the internal organisation
of the National Religious (Dati Le’umi) community. The National
Religious community places a strong emphasis on the land of Israel
and the Jewish people, and thus army service is a highly esteemed
value. This value was converted into its current position in the army
due to a watershed development in 1988. Until 25 years ago, there
were two paths National Religious teenagers would take in army
service. Yeshivot Hesder (such as Kerem B’Yavneh and Yeshivat Har
Etzion) provide a program whereby students would learn Torah for 3
and a half years, and serve in the army for a year and a half. Yeshivot
Gevohot (such as Merkaz Harav) provide a framework where one
could learn for 5 or more years before serving in the army, often for
half a year or so. Students in the Hesder or Yeshiva Gavoha programs
usually served in religious-only units, and most importantly, usually
serve less than a full three years. In 1988, a new framework, that of
the Mechinot, was established. The Mechinot provide a year of
religious study for students, who then go on to serve full three years
in the army, usually in the same units as everyone else. This
framework has significant societal implications – these soldiers from
religious communities, educated in an environment that puts great
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The first implication of this shift is the way the National Religious
community is perceived in Israeli society. It is common to
characterise the pre-State years of Israel and its first three decades
as the era of the secular, Kibbutz, socialist vision of Israel. In the
early years of the State, continuing through the 80s and 90s, there
was a tendency to say that secular socialists built the country. This
was the state built by the “Tel Aviv” consensus, while Sephardim and
religious minorities had not “earned their stripes” and were residents
of a home built by someone else. The Israeli identity was formed by
the Ashkenazi secular consensus, and other groups were peripheral
to this group.
This culture has gradually broken down in a number of ways. First, of
course, was the shock of the 1977 election victory of the right wing
traditionalist Menachem Begin. Parts of “Tel Aviv” became
embarrassed by the country and institutions they had once been
proud of building, as peace with the Palestinians continued to remain
elusive. And minorities–Sephardi, religious, and then Russian–began
to demand their place in the development of the State.
The National Religious are now a major, if not the primary,
demographic force in the Israeli army. 36% of soldiers from Gush Dan
serve in combat units as opposed to the 62% of soldiers from Yehuda
and Shomron, and 54% from Jerusalem (both National Religious
strongholds). Efrat is the city in Israel with the highest percentage of
its soldiers in leadership positions – fully 22% of its soldiers achieve
Ketzuna (middle level leadership). This has created a growing sense
that the National Religious also built this country, and thus a growing
confidence in the political sphere. Israel will be a state that was built
by Tel Aviv, but is currently being developed by Gush Etzion as well.
This development has significant implications for Israeli identity and
politics.
The Haredi Draft
The religious nature of the army also affects the Haredi draft. It has
become orthodoxy in the Haredi community that the army is a great
threat to the religiosity of soldiers, and many outside the Haredi camp
begrudgingly agreed that the army was inhospitable to a religious
person. Indeed, much of what the Haredim say about the army and
the statistics quoted were quite accurate – but for the 80s and 90s.
The recent major shift renders untrue the view of the army as an
anti-religious hotbed. The legendary encounter between the Yeshiva
student and the anti-religious commander is quickly disappearing. As
mentioned above, in some brigades two-thirds of the commanders are
religious. (This is combined naturally with the existence of many
religious-only units, but that has existed for decades.)
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Beyond the issue of the commander, the growth of religious personnel
also gives the army bases a more religious feel.2 During the operation
in Gaza in 2009, the army newspaper BaMachane reported that
soldiers from the Givati unit in the army queued up to receive a
personal blessing from the unit’s rabbi, who was holding a Sefer
Torah, before entering combat. The central defence building in Tel
Aviv, and the General’s headquarters have a sign at the entrance
explaining how to avoid activating the electronic sensor that will open
the door on Shabbat. On the training base for the Nachal, outside the
bathroom, the wall which once contained a list of the types of
weapons held by the Syrian army has been replaced by an “Asher
Yatzar” card. At an army conference a few years ago, a senior
commander caused surprise by talking about the soldiers who are
fighting “to protect the holy land of Gaza.” When the largely secular
crowd responded angrily to this overt show of religiosity, he was
supported by another senior commander. Both commanders in
question are themselves not religious.
There are unquestionably issues that still arise, halachic dilemmas
that crop up. Certain units may still have individual commanders who
are not sensitive to the needs of the religious. But the idea that the
army, as a general rule, is anti-religious is simply no longer true. The
Haredi discourse must change to match this new situation, and we do
not need to accept the claims (which were a little ridiculous to begin
with) that service in the army threatens the perpetuation of Orthodox
Judaism. As always, there are tracks in the army where one can serve
entirely with religious soldiers. The recent development is that the
commanders of those units are predominantly not only sensitive to
the needs of the religious, but religious themselves. The army has
become, and is continually becoming more, conducive to service for
the Haredi community. The Haredi community will find it more
difficult to excuse itself from service based on last generation’s
reasons.
The relationship between religious and secular
The tide has now turned and whereas previously the religious were
worried about the army being to secular, the secular are now worried
about the army being too religious. There have been instances were
army events are perceived as being too religious. This summer, many
were surprised when the brigadier general of Givati rallied his troops
with the cry of “Shema Yisrael.” In his writing for Haaretz over the
years, Harel documented how the Army Rabbinate, under Chief Rabbi
Rontzki, was very active in trying to bring secular soldiers closer to
religion.3 The important issue of how religious soldiers relate to their
non religious comrades, and increasingly, juniors, requires
clarification.
But there is one concern that looms larger than these more localised
issues. There has always been a fear in the army of religious soldiers
because religion provides them with another source of authority– to
whom would they listen in a clash between their religion and an army
command? The major flashpoint for this was the removal of
settlements in Gaza in 2005. Would rabbis tell their students to refuse
orders to remove residents from Gaza? Would they listen? In 2005
there was a huge discussion about this, but in the end, there were
relatively few refusals to serve, mainly at junior levels of the army.
Many soldiers also came to individual agreements with their
commanders, thus averting head-on clashes.
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But the fear has not gone away, and the implication of this issue for
the two-state solution could be far greater. In the event of a two-state
solution, would the religious soldiers take part in a mass removal of
settlements in the West Bank – removing hundreds of thousands of
people from land, such as Shechem, Kever Rachel, Chevron and Shilo,
that is so central to religious people, ? Is it even possible that the
army could one day have so many religious soldiers and commanders
that the viability of any such operation depends on the participation
of the religious soldiers? If it were known that all the religious
soldiers and commanders will not participate in such an operation,
could the army reach a certain point when a two state solution could
actually not viably be pulled off? This situation seems very unlikely –
there were numerous Rabbis who called on their students not to
refuse orders in 2005, and if there was a threat to the political
viability of the country, many more would likely make similar calls.
However, the balance between listening to religious teachers and
army hierarchy is a crucial tension that must be worked out within
the National Religious community.
With its newfound hegemony in the army, the National Religious
community has many complex issues to discuss. Its relation to the
secular majority, both in day-to-day routine as well as in larger
political decisions, must be reanalysed and discussed.
Conclusion
The Israeli army is different than it once was ‚and the religious are
now a significant feature of its makeup. Managed properly, this
situation can allow for a more even spread of political power, a
window to finally solve the issue of the Haredi draft, and a chance to
create a less suspicious relationship between the religious and
secular. There is a lot to discuss.
1. All statistics, unless otherwise mentioned, come from Harel’s
book. ↩
2. These anecdotes are from Harel’s book. ↩
3. http://www.hofesh.org.il/articles/hiloni_dati/idf-missionary/idf-mi
ssionary.html ↩
An Israeli in the Diaspora:
How Many Days of Yom Tov?
by R. Ari Enkin
I was excited to get my hands on R. Shlomo Brody’s new English
halacha sefer, A Guide to the Complex – Contemporary Halachic
Debates (Maggid), adapted largely from his regular Ask the Rabbi
column in The Jerusalem Post Magazine. R. Brody treats us to well
over 100 different exciting and practical issues of the day, providing
readers with the primary and prominent authorities to have dealt with
each issue. While every chapter has material worthy of comment, I
found one item particularly attention catching, since I have not fully
yet come out of Yom Tov mode.
In his chapter on whether visitors to Israel should observe one day of
Yom Tov or two, he cites the celebrated view of the Chacham Tzvi
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that visitors to Israel need only observe one day of Yom Tov. R. Brody
seems to then fall prey to the common misconception that the
Chacham Tzvi holds that “one’s current location determines his
festival observance.” According to this approach, visitors from Israel
to the Diaspora would be required to keep two days of Yom Tov.
The Chacham Tzvi, however, says no such thing, and there is little
basis to suggest that this is how he would rule. Indeed, Rav Tzvi
Pesach Frank (Har Tzvi 3:78) argues that the Chacham Tzvi would
only require visitors from Israel to observe one day of Yom Tov in the
Diaspora. Among his arguments for this position, is that the Chacham
Tzvi asserts that nowadays there is no true “doubt” as to when Yom
Tov should be observed as there was when the decree (or custom) to
observe two days of Yom Tov was instituted. Therefore, according to
Rav Frank’s interpretation of the Chacham Tzvi, visitors from Israel to
the Diaspora need only observe one day of Yom Tov. (The only place
that I ever saw this very reasonable interpretation of the Chacham
Tzvi brought to the attention of English readers was is in R. David
Brofsky’s Hilkhot Moadim – Understanding the Laws of the Festivals,
another Maggid gem.)
Rav Frank’s argument is especially noteworthy in the “Why can’t we
just do away with Yom Tov Sheini nowadays?” era we live in — a cry I
neither endorse nor even sympathize with. That being said, however,
we see that there is some acknowledgment in the writings of the
greatest poskim that nowadays there is no true doubt in our calendar,
and with that, there is value in observing Yom Tov as the Torah
instituted whenever additional considerations in halacha can combine
to make it possible.
Make no mistake, I’m not picking on R. Brody. It’s just that having
been a visitor from Israel to the Diaspora over Sukkot recently, this
issue was especially relevant to me, and is one I wanted to share with
you. The timely release of R. Brody’s great sefer was a perfect
opportunity to do so.
The Mitzvah of Bikur Cholim –
Visiting the Sick Part 1
Many times one hears that a person he knows is not well r”l and he
wishes to go visit him in the hospital or at home. There is a mitzvah to
visit a sick person, but the rules are not well known. What is this
mitzvah? When should one visit? Whom should you visit? What should
be said? What should not be said? How should he visit the sick
person? Can one visit a sick person on Shabbos? Is calling, writing or
emailing a sick person a fulfillment of the mitzvah? In the next two
issues we will deal with the halachos of bikur cholim in depth.1
Halachically Speaking
Volume 10 Issue 9
Authored by Moishe Dovid Lebovits
Reviewed by Rabbi Ben-zion Schiffenbauer Shlit”a
Piskei Harav Yisroel Belsky Shlit”a
Reviewed by Harav Yisroel Belsky Shlit”a
Davening Not to Get Sick
One should always daven that he should not get sick, because once he
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falls ill, he needs a zechus to recover.2
When a person falls ill, it is a mitzvah to visit him;3 this is known as
bikur cholim.
Why the Mitzvah
The Toras Hamincha4 gives the following reason for the mitzvah of
bikur cholim: Hashem gives a person yesurim in order to atone for his
or her sins. This will allow the person to receive the maximum award
in Olam Haba. When the visitor observes the patient’s suffering, he is
inspired to change his ways, and will not need any yesurim.
The Mitzvah5
As mentioned above, there is a mitzvah to visit the sick.6 This mitzvah
is for everyone (see below).7 There is a discussion in the poskim if this
mitzvah is d’oraisa or rabbinic in nature.8 The overwhelming opinion
is that this is a rabbinic mitzvah.9 The Gemorah10 says that we should
follow in the middos of Hashem, and one of those middos is to visit
the sick,11 as we find that Hashem visited Avraham Avinu after he had
a bris milah.12 According to some, the mitzvah of bikur cholim is
included in the mitzvah of gemilas chasadim.13 No beracha is recited
on this mitzvah.14 First, it is possible to nullify this mitzvah if the sick
person does not want visitors.15 Second, we do not recite a beracha
for an action that is also practiced by other nations.16
The Focus of Visiting the Sick
A number of things are accomplished by visiting the sick.17 One of the
main purposes is to pray for the sick person; it is like giving him life.18
In addition, one should see to it that the sick person has all his needs
taken care of (i.e. telling someone19 to fix his bed, cleaning around
the room, etc.),20 and make sure he has all the necessary medical
supplies.21 This includes shopping for the person.22 Some opine that
this aspect of the mitzvah may not apply today, since hospitalized
patients have medical staff that cares for all their needs.23 Making the
sick person happy is also included in the focus of the mitzvah.24
Hashem visited Avraham after the bris, but we do not find that He
said anything to him. Harav Moshe Feinstein zt”l25 proves from here
that one does not have to say anything to the sick person.
One who visits a sick person has to daven for him,26 and one who fails
to do so has not fulfilled the mitzvah of bikur cholim27 in its entirety.28
Based on this, some explain that the term bikur cholim signifies that
the point of the mitzvah is to ask what he needs. It is nice to send
other visitors to see how a sick person is doing, but the main mitzvah
is to go himself and daven for the recovery of the patient.29
Who is Considered a Sick Person Regarding This Mitzvah
The mitzvah of bikur cholim certainly applies to anyone who is
dangerously ill.30 It also applies to a sick person who is not in danger.
31
However, it does not apply to someone who has a minor headache
or a slight ailment. Some are of the opinion that it applies to someone
who is bedridden and cannot fend for himself and needs people to
help him/her.32 The Maharal of Prague33 asks why Hashem didn’t visit
Avraham until the third day. He answers that until then the operation
only affected one organ of Avraham’s body, while his entire body was
affected on the third day. According to this opinion, one who broke
his foot and is not bedridden would not be considered a sick person.34
Others maintain that if the illness has not lasted for three days there
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is no need to visit him or daven for him.35
It should be noted that the mitzvah of bikur cholim also applies to
woman on bed rest36 or other people who are home bound.37 There is
a discussion in the poskim if the mitzvah applies to one who is
mentally ill.38
Reward
Prepare a joke, or simply have a mental list of neutral topics.
Obviously, the content of the conversation must match the personality
of the patient. A talmid chacham will appreciate a devar torah, while
a simple person might discuss the weather. One should use his
intellect when conversing. One should not discuss the sickness unless
the patient brings up the topic and wishes to discuss it.65
Helping the Sick Person With Your Visit66
Bikur cholim is one of the mitzvos which gives a reward this world
and retains the main reward for the next world.39 The Aruch
Hashulchan40 calls it one of the greater mitzvos.41 The Gemorah42
says one who visits a sick person is saved from the din of gehonim.43
In addition, Hashem saves you from yesurim, from the yetzer hara,
and it makes the sick person live.44 Some explain the power of this
particular mitzvah is that one merits exposure to the Shechina, which
is on top of the sick person.
It is unfortunate that today people are lax with the mitzvah of bikur
cholim. This is especially true if the patient is a poor person.45 Many
times the poor person will not have money to buy medicine, and
coming to his aid will bring you great reward.46 This is also included
in the mitzvah of bikur cholim.47
The visit removes one sixtieth of the disease.67 Some say that only
applies if the visitor was born in the same time68 (under the same
constellation)69 as the patient (ben gilo)70 or young or old).71 Why
don’t many people line up to visit a sick person and cure the sickness
completely?72 The Meiri73 explains that the concept of removing a
sixtieth of the sickness is that the visitor talks to the patient and
strengthens him, thus minimizing the impact of the disease. However,
when the visitor leaves the sickness returns in force. Others explain
that the disease is only diminished if one really loves the sick person.
74
The Ben Yehoyada75 explains that the visitor does not adopt one
sixtieth of the sickness, for there is no reason that he should suffer
any ill effects.76 Rather, a sixtieth of the pain is removed from
shomayim when he relates to the suffering of the patient. The Keren
Orah77 explains that he removes some of the sickness from the
patient, since he gives him strength.
How Many Times
One who does not visit the sick is like he kills him.78
The mitzvah of bikur cholim has no set limit,48 and one can go even
one hundred times.49 (This is also applies to how much time is spent
visiting the sick person, as long as it is not a bother to the sick
person).50 The more one goes, the better it is.51 This is true even if the
medical staff takes care of the sick person, as it is still a mitzvah to
daven for him.52 Nonetheless, one should be careful to avoid
antagonizing the staff by visting too many times.53 It is better to visit
two sick people for a small time than to visit one sick person for a
long time.54
Taking Children
Being Lax With This Mitzvah
At Night
It is good to visit frequently even at night (as long as it is during
visiting hours and the sick person is awake or willing to accept
visitors).55
The posuk says that when Yaakov was ill, Yosef came to visit with his
two children Ephraim and Menashe.79 Based on this, some opine that
one should take his child along to be mechanech him.80 If he will
disturb the sick person then the child should not go.81
Man Visiting a Woman and Vice Versa
A man may visit a sick woman and a woman may visit a sick man.
However, one should be careful of the issur of yichud.82 Others are
concerned about a lack of tznius (other than relatives for whom
yichud is permitted).83 Hospital gowns often do not provide adequate
coverage, and one should not visit a woman if there is a breach of
tznius.84
Visiting a Wicked Person
Going Alone – Many People
One should visit a wicked person, since he may be inspired to do
teshuva and become a better person.85
The Shiltas56 says that one should visit a sick person alone.57
However, this is not the overwhelming custom.58 In any case, if one
wishes to go with a lot of people he should ask the doctor first if this
is beneficial for the sick person.59
Chosson and Kallah Visiting the Sick During Sheva Berachos
Although a chosson and kallah are supposed to be happy during sheva
berachos, they are permitted to visit a sick person.86
What to Say
One should be prepared with the right words to say, if the sick person
wants to converse. If one goes without a plan on how to make him feel
better he is not fulfilling the mitzvah completely.60 As mentioned
before one should daven for the sick person, and tell him that
everything will be ok.61 One should not show the sick person a sad
face or an expression of worry.62 One should come with a happy face
and say words which will ease his pain.63
Certainly, one should not say that so and so died because of this
sickness.64 Part of your visit should be to cheer up the sick person.
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Where to Sit
The Shechina hovers over a sick person87 (some say this means
through davening).88 Therefore, when the practice was that the sick
person lay on the floor, then the visitor should not sit on a chair or
bench, since he is higher than the sick person.89 However, when the
sick person is on a bed then the visitor may sit on a chair or bench90 if
it is not much higher than the bed.91 The Meiri92 explains that the sick
person is doing teshuva and asking for mercy. When he sees the
visitor sitting on a higher level he despairs of davening. According to
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the writings of the Zohar, if the patient is an average person then the
visitor should not sit at the sick person’s feet, because the angel of
death is there, and he should not sit at the head because the Shechina
is present. If the sick person is a tzadik gamur then one should only
sit at the sick person’s feet since the Shechina is all around except his
feet.93 If the sick person asks you to sit near his head or feet you
should do so.94 If he is wicked, then danger can be found all around
the body.
One is allowed to stand95 or pace back and forth when visiting.96
What to Wear
The visitor should dress in presentable clothing97 that he would wear
when he goes to shul to daven98 since the Shechina hovers over the
head of a sick person.99 Therefore, one should do so out of fear for
Hashem and be humble.100 It is the opinion of some that those who
wear a hat and jacket when they go to shul to daven should wear
them when visiting a sick person. Those who do not should wear what
they would wear when visiting an important person.101Harav Yisroel
Belsky Shlita maintains that since the Shechina is above the head of a
sick person one should make sure his thoughts are pure when
visiting.
When to Visit – Days – Relatives Friends and Everyone Else
Relatives and friends (some say this means even a talmid chacham)102
of the sick person can visit him/her right away, while others should
wait three days before visiting. One reason is to make sure not to
spoil the mazal103 of the patient by letting everyone know he is sick.104
The Meiri105 explains that we do not want to frighten him into
thinking that he is in worse condition than he actually is. If the
situation deteriorates, then anyone can enter right away. ((Rambam
Hilchos Ovel 14:5, Shulchan Aruch YD. 335:1, Chochmas Adom 151:1,
Aruch Hashulchan 5.)) The Levush106says that relatives and friends
may enter right away because the patient knows them and their
presence will comfort him and help him feel at ease.
There is an opinion that this only applies for the first two complete
days, and all friends can visit at the beginning of the third day.107
Others permit a phone call right away.108 If the sick person needs
people to tend to him, then anyone may visit right away.109
Older Person Visiting Younger Person
An older or wiser person should go to visit,110 and should not consider
it degrading.111 This is clear from the fact that Hashem Himself went
to visit Avraham.112 This applies even to a talmid chacham visiting
one who is less learned.113 When a talmid chacham goes to visit he
should bring people along so that they can take care of any menial
tasks.114
might interfere with the attendants. The Aruch Hashulchan120 says
that this is good advice, but it is not forbidden to visit then. Others
maintain that it is forbidden by halacha.121 Even according to this
view, if there is no other time available, one may visit then.122
There are a few differences between the Rambam’s reason and the
first reason.123 If it is a minor illness that does not progress in stages,
the first reason would not offer any restrictions, while the Rambam
would. Similarly, if the visitor commits himself to daven for the sick
person no matter what, then the first reason would permit the visit,
but the Rambam would not.124
It would seem that calling on the phone (see part 2) during these
hours would be permitted according to all opinions, since one does
not daven then, and the call will not interfere with the medical staff.
However, each situation should be assessed beforehand.125
The Aruch Hashulchan126 (and others)127 says that today we are not
concerned with the above restrictions. According to the Rambam, if
we know that the attendants are not busy with the needs of the sick
person at those times,128 or if they are not bothered by the presence
of visitors, there is no restriction.129 Therefore, if there are specific
visiting hours in a hospital, the patient and medical staff are prepared
to work around the presence of visitors, and there is no need to
refrain from visiting.
Asking for Mercy for the Sick Person
One who is asking for mercy from Hashem for the sick person in his
presence can daven in any language.130 The reason is that the
Shechina rests above the head of a sick person131 and Hashem knows
any language.132 However, if the patient is not present, then one
should only say it in lashon kodesh.133 If ten people are present, one
can daven in any language since Hashem is present134 (even if the
sick person is not there.)135 When one asks for mercy he should say
that, “Hashem should have mercy on you and other sick people in Klal
Yisroel,”136 since tefillos have a better chance to be heard when they
include other members of klal yisroel.137 The opinion of Harav Shlomo
Zalman Aurbach zt”l138 is that wishing a refuah sheleima is also
considered davening for the sick person.
One who is davening in front of the sick person does not mention the
person’s name.139 This is how Moshe Rabbeinu acted when davening
in front of Miriam on her behalf.140 Based on kabbalah, the reason is
that mentioning the name awakens the middas hadin.141
If one will not daven with kavana for a sick person, it is better that he
does not go.142
If one cannot visit, then davening for him is a fulfillment of the
mitzvah of bikur cholim.143
When to Visit – Which Hours
Settling Accounts With Others and Doing Teshuva
It is not advisable to visit a sick person the first three hours of the day
(shaos zemanios – not regular sixty minute hour)115 because then the
sickness eases then, and the visitor will not be concerned enough to
daven for him.116 One should not visit the last three hours of the day
(also shaos zemanios)117 because then the sickness is strong and the
visitor will despair of davening for him.118 The Rambam119 explains
that the sick person is usually tended to at those times, and the visit
As mentioned above, one has to be very careful about what he says to
a sick person. Halacha states that one should ask him144 if he in
possession of someone else’s belongings, or if his items are held by
others, or what he wishes to tell his children. This is by no way a
means of scaring the sick person that he will die,145 since even a
healthy person should have his life organized. In the merit of
discussing this Hashem will send the sick person a refuah sheleima.
146
This should be done once the illness lasts three days.147
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One should discuss teshuva as well.148 This may be a touchy topic if
you are not too friendly with the patient.
mareches Bais 116 (1:pages 150–151), Ze Hashulchan 335:1,
Teshuvos V’hanhugos 2:592, Yabea Omer Y.D. 3:22:23, Halichos
(journal) 118–120 pages 37–38. ↩
When the Visitor Does Not Know You Visited Him
As mentioned above, one of the main points of visiting the sick is to
daven for him. Accordingly, one could visit a total stranger, or
someone who is unaware of the visit. The same is true for visiting a
young baby149 (i.e. just after his bris milah).150 Obviously, the other
aspects of bikur cholim such as cheering him up would not be fulfilled
in this situation.151
9. Kol Bo 112, Rambam Hilchos Avel 14:1, Meiri Meseches
Nedarim 39b, Tur 335, Levush 1, Beer Moshe 2:104. Refer to
Maharitz Chiyas Meseches Nedarim 39b who says it is a halacha
Moshe M’Sinai. See Rambam sefer hamitzvahs shoresh 1 and 2.
↩
10. Meseches Sotah 14a. Refer to Meseches Bava Metziah 30a. ↩
Asleep
11. Refer to Toras Haodom shar hameicosh 1, Tur 335, Bais Yosef,
Bach, Levush 1, Kitzur Shulchan Aruch 193:1, Torah Temimah
Bereishis 18:1, Aruch Hashulchan 2. See Beer Mayim Chaim
Vayeira 18:1. ↩
If the sick person is asleep one has still fulfilled the mitzvah since he
can daven for him and speak to people to make sure his needs are
taken care of.152 This is proved from the fact that Hashem came to
visit Avraham but did not speak or do anything.153
Giving Blood
Since bikur cholim involves making sure that the sick person has
what he needs, some poskim maintain that one can fulfill part of the
mitzvah of bikur cholim by giving blood to a sick person, even though
he does not visit him.154
12. Vayeira 18:1. Refer to Meseches Bava Metziah 86b, see
Meseches Tanchuma Vayeira 1. Refer to Baal Haturim Vayeira
18:1. ↩
2. Meseches Sotah 14a, Levush Y.D. 335:1, Yaavetz 2:page 588:1.
Refer to Meseches Shabbos 32a, Bava Metziah 30a, Bava Kama
100a. ↩
13. Maharsha Meseches Nedarim 39b “bikur,” Seder Hayom page
90, Yosef Ometz perek bikur cholim page 323, Ahavas Chesed
3:3. For more on this issue see Tzitz Eliezer 5:Ramat Rochel 2.
Refer to Meseches Bava Metziah 30b. Others say it is included in
V’ohavta L’reiacha K’mocha (Rambam Hilchos Avel 14:1). Since
bikur cholim is part of gemilas chasadim we have the following
question: Why in the first Mishnah in Meseches Peah does it list
gemilas chasadim and bikur cholim if it is the same? The answer
is that there are two kinds of gemilas chasadim. One is with ones
money, like lending people money feeding people, and clothing
people. The other kindness is with one’s body – going to visit a
sick person and consoling the bereaved. ↩
3. Levush 1. ↩
14. Refer to Miyum Hahalacha 4:56, Yalkut Yosef 7:page 23. ↩
4. Parshas Vayeira. ↩
15. Refer to Rashba 1:18. ↩
5. The Chazzon Ish zt”l said that the mitzvah of bikur cholim
applies to a sick person as well on himself, to make sure he is
taking care of himself (Massei Ish 2:page 162). However, some
opine that this is not exactly doing bikur cholim to a sick person.
The reason why it is considered bikur cholim on some level is
because when one davens for himself he is making the sickness
lighter on him (Mitzvahs Bikur Cholim page 244). In regard to
whether there is a mitzvah to visit the sick in place of learning
Torah refer to Mitzvahs Bikur Cholim pages 418–429 in depth. ↩
16. Binyomin Zev 1:169. ↩
1. The Taamei Haminhagim page 425 says the reason why it is
called “bikur” cholim and not reih (seeing) or halicha (going) is
because one is supposed to teach the sick person to look into his
ways. Also see Medrash Seichel Tov Bereishis 19:34, Mavar
Yabak page 219 (new), Mitzvahs Bikur Cholim pages 353–357. ↩
17. Refer to Mitzvahs Bikur Cholim pages 111–120. ↩
18. Toras Haodom shar hameichosh 1, Kol Bo 112, Bais Yosef,
Levush 1, 4, Kitzur Shulchan Aruch 193:3, Chochmas Adom
151:3, Yaavetz 2:page 589:15, Aruch Hashulchan 3, Pela Yoetz
Choleh page 232, Igros Moshe Y.D. 4:51, Yechaveh Daas 3:83. ↩
19. There is no need for the one visited to fix or clean himself
(Prisha 335:4, see Meiri Meseches Nedarim 40a). ↩
6. Meseches Nedarim 39b, Bava Metziah 30b, Rambam Hilchos
Avel 14:4, Shulchan Aruch 335:1, Chochmas Adom 151:1. Refer
to Medrash Tanchuma Toldos 12. ↩
7. Rambam Hilchos Avel 14:4, Kitzur Shulchan Aruch 193:1. This is
for simple people even if one is unsure if their tefillos will be
accepted for the sick person to get better. In addition, it applies
to those who sin. ↩
20. Meseches Nedarim 40a, Bais Yosef 335, Prisha 4, Levush 1,
Tocheches Chaim Parshas Vayichei, Kitzur Shulchan Aruch
193:3, Chorev page 408, Aruch Hashulchan 2, Kaf Hachaim O.C.
287:6, Minchas Yitzchok 2:84:6, see Gesher Hachaim 1:1:2. This
is even in a hospital where they clean, it can happen that a bed
needs to be changed or a room is dirty. The Chazzon Ish zt”l
brought food to a sick person (Massei Ish 2:page 133). ↩
8. Refer to Ran Meseches Berochos 3 who says it is a d’oriasa,
Rabbeinu Yonah Meseches Berochos 11b, see Sdei Chemed
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21. Refer to Pela Yoetz Refuah page 540. One is not allowed to give
a sick person something which is not good for him even if it will
make him happy (Mitzvahs Bikur Cholim page 274, see Yehuda
Yaleh O.C. 160, Pnei Boruch – Bikur Cholim K’hilchoso 1:32). ↩
38. Refer to Mitzvahs Bikur Cholim pages 117–118. ↩
39. Mishnah Meseches Peah 1:1, Meseches Shabbos 127a (it is
included in gemilas chasadim). Refer to Rambam Peirush
Hamishnayos Peah 1:1. ↩
22. Mitzvahs Bikur Cholim page 223. ↩
23. Tzitz Eliezer 5:ramat Rochel 3. Refer to Tzohar 5:pages 345–348
who says based on this people do not go visit if all the needs are
taken care of since one can daven for them even when one is not
in front of them (Tzohar ibid). ↩
40. 335:2. ↩
24. Rambam Toras Haodom shar hameichosh, Bais Yosef 335. Refer
to Avnei Yushfei 1:230. See Michtav M’Eliyahu 4:page 296,
Mitzvahs Bikur Cholim pages 268–277 in great depth. ↩
42. Meseches Nedarim 40a. ↩
25. Dorosh Moshe Parshas Vayeira beginning. Refer to Maharsha
Meseches Bava Metziah 30b. ↩
26. Rambam Hilchos Ovel 14:6, Shulchan Aruch 4. ↩
27. Bais Yosef 335, Shulchan Aruch ibid, Levush 4, Yosef Ometz
perek bikur cholim page 323, Kitzur Shulchan Aruch 193:3,
Chochmas Adom 151:3, Aruch Hashulchan 8. ↩
41. Refer to Levush 1, Menoras Hameor 7:page 550, Tocheches
Chaim Parshas Vayichei. ↩
43. Refer to Ahavas Chesed 3:3. See Maharal Nesivos Olom page
160 who explains the reason why one is saved from gehonim is
because when one visits a sick person he wishes to save him
from death so one is spared gehonim which is death of the soul.
Also see Maharal Nedarim 39b, 40a and Tocheches Chaim
Parshas Vayichei. ↩
44. Meseches Nedarim ibid, Meiri Meseches Nedarim ibid, see
Aruch Hashulchan 3. Refer to Maharsha Meseches Nedarim 40a
‘ma.” Because of this some say one should even travel to another
city for this mitzvah (Derech Sicha 2:page 25). ↩
28. However, one has fulfilled some part of the mitzvah (see Ahavas
Chesed 3:3, Avnei Yushfei 1:230, V’ein Lamo Michshal 6:page
219:footnote 2). Refer to Pnei Boruch – Bikur Cholim K’hilchoso
haskama from Harav Fisher zt”l 1. See Mitzvahs Bikur Cholim
pages 121–133 in great depth. ↩
45. Ahavas Chesed 3:3, see Sefer Chassidim 361. Refer to Tzitz
Eliezer 5:Ramat Rochel 6. ↩
46. Ahavas Chesed Ibid, Igros Moshe Y.D. 1:223. ↩
29. Be’er Mayim Chaim Bereishis 18:page:134. ↩
47. Igros Moshe Y.D. 1:223. ↩
30. Refer to Meseches Nedarim 40a. Also refer to Mitzvahs Bikur
Cholim pages 186–192. ↩
48. For an in depth discussion on this refer to Mitzvahs Bikur Cholim
pages 142–150. ↩
31. Refer to Meseches Nedarim 41a, Meseches Shabbos 12a, Igros
Moshe Y.D. 1:263. ↩
49. Meseches Nedarim 39b, Shulchan Aruch Y.D. 335:2, Chochmas
Adom 151:1, Aruch Hashulchan 5, Ahavas Chesed 3:3. ↩
32. V’ein Lamo Michshal 6:pages 2215-216. Refer to Birchei Yosef
335:2 who is lenient that it can apply to any weakness. It does
not only apply to a sick person who is in danger (Shevet
Hakehusi 6:394). See Ohr Hachaim on Vayeira 18:1. Also refer to
Asya 67–68:pages 80–92 in great depth. See Meseches Nedarim
50. Tzitz Eliezer 5:Ramat Rochel 8. ↩
34. Mitzvahs Bikur Cholim page 331. ↩
51. Kol Bo 112, Meiri Meseches Nedarim 39b “mitzvahs,” Rambam
Hilchos Avel 14:4, Shulchan Aruch Y.D. 335:2, Chochmas Adom
151:1, Aruch Hashulchan 5. Refer to Mitzvahs Bikur Cholim
pages 134–141 in great depth. Based on this some say this is
why you do not generally see people visiting a sick person at
home since it is a bother to them (Mitzvahs Bikur Cholim pages
140:9, 225:6). However, in this situation one should call
(Mitzvahs Bikur Cholim page 225). ↩
35. Refer to Biur Halacha O.C. 219 “kegon.” Also see Mitzvahs Bikur
Cholim oages 333–335. ↩
52. Refer to V’ein Lamo Michshal 6:pages 214–215. Yalkut Yosef
Y.D. 335:2, Divrei Sofrim page 3. ↩
36. Regarding visiting a woman who just gave birth see Bikur
Cholim B’halacha U’bagadah page 26:footnote 21. ↩
53. Divrei Sofrim 335:footnote 9. ↩
41a. ↩
33. Bereishis 18:page 50-50b. See Piskei Teshuva 242. ↩
54. Bikur Cholim B’halacha U’bagadah page 54:19:footnote 30. ↩
37. Visiting the Sick page 22 (Glatt). Refer to Bikur Cholim
B’halacha U’Bagadah page 28:footnote 18 quoting the opinion of
Harav Chaim Kanievesky Shlita. ↩
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55. Bikur Cholim B’halacha U’bagadah page 52:12:footnote 20,
Divrei Sofrim 335:11. Refer to Mitzvahs Bikur Cholim page
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132:12. ↩
56. 93:page 86. See Tzafnas Paneach Vayechei 48:1, Ze Hashulchan
335:1. Refer to Meseches Berochos 28b, 54b, Nedarim 40a. ↩
76. Some do say that the visitor takes it and it is not an issue since it
is such a small amount it is botel b’shishim and has no effect on
the visitors (Toras Chaim Meseches Bava Metziah 30a). ↩
57. But one does not have to (Mitzvahs Bikur Cholim page 338). ↩
77. Meseches Nedarim 40a (page 445 new). ↩
58. Haemek Sheilah 93:7, Igros Moshe Y.D. 4:51, Yalkut Yosef
7:page 125. Refer to Bikur Cholim B’halacha U’bagadah page 64.
↩
78. Meseches Nedarim 40a, Kol Bo 112, Rambam Hilchos Avel 14:2,
Aruch Hashulchan 3. Refer to Maharal Meseches Bava Metziah
40a. ↩
59. Igros Moshe Y.D. 4:51. ↩
79. Bereishis 42:1. ↩
60. Gesher Hachaim 1:1:3. ↩
61. Pela Yoetz Rofeh page 542. ↩
80. Maver Yabak page 254 (new), Ze Hashulchan 335:1, V’ein Lamo
Michshal 6:page 215. Refer to Reishis Chuchma shar gidol
bonim 3:page 1003. ↩
62. Gesher Hachaim 1:1:3. ↩
81. Ze Hashulchan 335:1. ↩
63. Tocheches Chaim Parshas Vayichei. ↩
82. Aruch Hashulchan 11, see Beer Moshe 2:107. This is the opinion
of Harav Shlomo Zalman Aurbach zt”l as quoted in Nishmas
Avraham Y.D. page 258 (English), and in Chuko Mamtakim
1:page 70. However, one should not stay too long to talk (ibid).
Refer to Sdei Tzofim Meseches Nedarim 39b. ↩
64. Refer to Mavar Yabak page 62 (new). ↩
65. Mitzvahs Bikur Cholim page 273. ↩
66. For a detailed explanation of this issue see Mitzvahs Bikur
Cholim pages 151–167. ↩
83. Harav Yisroel Belsky Shlita, see Tzitz Eliezer 5:Ramat Roche
5:16. Refer to Miyum Hahalacha 2:27–28. ↩
67. Medrash Rabbah Vayikra 34:1 (only if he loves the sick person),
Meseches Nedarim 39b, Bava Metziah 30a, Kol Bo 112, Tur 335,
Levush 2, Shach 335:1, Chochmas Adom 151:1, Aruch
Hashulchan 5. Refer to Rambam Hilchos Avel 14:4. See Maharal
Nedarim 39b. See Rivevos Ephraim 4:page 355:8. The visitor
takes it but since it is such a small amount it is botel b’shishim
and has no effect on the visitor (Toras Chaim Meseches Bava
Metziah 30a). Some say just going to visit a sick person without
saying or doing anything is a mitzvah since one takes 1/60th of
his sickness (Refer to Bikur Cholim B’halacha U’bagadah page
39:footnote 28). ↩
68. Chochmas Adom 151:1. ↩
69. Ran Meseches Nedarim 39b “v’ben,” Ben Yehoyada Meseches
Nedarim 39b:page 6. Refer to Chelkes Yaakov Y.D. 147:2. ↩
84. Beer Moshe 2:107. ↩
85. Beer Moshe 5:151. Refer to Miyum Hahalacha 4:56. On the topic
of davening for a wicked person see Meseches Berochos 10a,
Sefer Chassidim 688, Ahavas Chesed 3:8, Mitzvahs Bikur Cholim
pages 315–318. ↩
86. Opinion of Harav Elyashiv zt”l quoted in Bikur Cholim B’halacha
U’bagadah page 119, see Betzel Hachochma 2:44. ↩
87. Meseches Nedarim 40a, Levush 3, Kitzur Shulchan Aruch 193:2,
Chochmas Adom 151:2. See Aruch Hashulchan 7. Refer to
Vayikra Rabbah 34:1. ↩
88. Tzitz Eliezer 5:Ramat Rochel 10. ↩
70. Today this can be done by anyone who visits a sick person
(Shevet Yehuda 335:2, Chasam Sofer Meseches Nedarim 39b). ↩
71. Rashi Meseches Nedarim 39b “v’ben gilo.” ↩
72. Refer to Meseches Nedarim 39b. See Chasam Sofer Meseches
Nedarim 39b. ↩
89. Meseches Shabbos 12b, Nedarim 40a, Rosh Meseches Shabbos
1:30, Shulchan Aruch Y.D. 335:3 Levush 3, Kitzur Shulchan
Aruch 193:2. Refer to Meseches Nedarim 40a “lo.”See Tzitz
Eliezer 5:Ramat Rochel 11. Some say one should not sit at his
head (Shiurei Beracha 335:1). ↩
90. Tosfas Meseches Shabbos 12b “lo,” Meiri Meseches Shabbos
12b, Rama 335:3, Levush 3, Kitzur Shulchan Aruch 193:2,
Chochmas Adom 151:2, Aruch Hashulchan 7. Refer to Bais
Lechem Yehuda 335. See Minhagei Yisroel 6:pages 74–80, Ze
Hashulchan 335:3. ↩
73. Meseches Nedarim 39b ‘mitzvahs.” Refer to Chofetz Chaim on
Meseches Nedarim 41. ↩
74. Divrei Sofrim 335:10. ↩
91. Opinion of Harav Elyashiv zt”l quoted in Bikur Cholim B’halacha
U’bagadah page 75:footnote 5. ↩
75. Meseches Nedarim 39b:page 6. ↩
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92. Meseches Nedarim 40a “v’mekul mokom.” ↩
151:1, Aruch Hashulchan 5. Refer to V’ein Lamo Michshal
6:pages 207–208 if this applies to a talmid chacham visiting a
simple person. See Igros Moshe Y.D. 1:222. For a reason why
this is not an issue of a lowering of honor to the greater person
see Shalmei Nedarim 39b:page 33. ↩
93. Aruch Hashulchan 7. ↩
94. Gesher Hachaim 1:1:5. ↩
95. Tosfas Meseches Nedarim 39a “efsher,” Ran, Chelkes Yaakov
Y.D. 188. ↩
111. Ahavas Chesed 3:3 in footnote, Beer Moshe 2:106, Tzitz Eliezer
5:Ramat Rochel 8. See Rashi Meseches Nedarim 39b “v’afilu,”
Shita Mekubetzes Meseches Nedarim 39b. ↩
96. Tzitz Eliezer 17:20. Refer to Pnei Boruch – Bikur Cholim
K’hilchoso haskama from Harav Fisher zt”l 2. ↩
112. Shevet Yehuda 335:2. ↩
97. Refer to Rambam Hilchos Ovel 14:6, opinion of Harav Korelitz
Shlita quoted in Bikur Cholim B’halacha U’bagadah page
77:footnote 9. ↩
113. Opinion of Harav Chaim Kanievesky Shlita quoted in Bikur
Cholim B’halacha U’bagadah page 48:footnote 4. ↩
98. Shevet Yehuda 335:3. ↩
114. Igros Moshe Y.D. 1:222, opinion of Harav Chaim Kanievesky
Shlita quoted in Bikur Cholim B’halacha U’bagadah page 124:7.
↩
99. Meseches Shabbos 12b, Rashi “m’sateif,” Tur 335, see Bach.
Boruch – Bikur Cholim K’hilchoso haskama from Harav Fisher
zt”l 2.
115. Ahavas Chesed 3:3:page 262. There is an uncertainty if these
hours start from alos hashachar or netz hachama (Ze
Hashulchan 335:4, Al Pi Hatorah Shemos page 375). Refer to
Divrei Sofrim 335:footnote 36. ↩
[1] Refer to Rambam Hilchos Ovel 14:6, opinion of Harav
Korelitz Shlita quoted in Bikur Cholim B’halacha U’bagadah
page 77:footnote 9. See Tzitz Eliezer 5:Ramat Rochel 10. ↩
100. Meiri Meseches Shabbos 12b. Refer to opinion of Harav Chaim
Kanievesky Shlita (who says the custom is to be lenient) in Bikur
Cholim B’halacha U’bagadah pages 124–125:8. However, on
ibid:page 130:22 he says the custom is to wear a jacket to visit
the sick. ↩
101. Opinion of Harav Elyashiv zt”l quoted in Bikur Cholim B’halacha
U’bagadah page 77:footnote 9. ↩
102. Opinion of Harav Chaim Kanievesky Shlita quoted in Bikur
Cholim B’halacha U’bagadah page 62:footnote 12 and page
127:15. Refer to Ruach Chaim 335:1 in depth. ↩
116. Shulchan Aruch 4, Levush 4, Chochmas Adom 151:3, Aruch
Hashulchan 8. ↩
117. Ahavas Chesed 3:3:page 262. ↩
118. Meseches Nedarim 40a, Tosfas “b’tlas,” Shita Mekubetzes
Meseches Nedarim 39b, Tur 335, Shulchan Aruch Y.D. 335:4,
Kitzur Shulchan Aruch 193:3. Refer to Rambam Hilchos Avel
14:5, and Bais Yosef 335. In regard to whether to tell a sick
person how severe his sickness is see Miyum Hahalacha 2:26,
Betzel Hachochma 2:55. ↩
119. Hilchos Avel 14:5. See Bach who questions why the Rambam
mentions a different reason then the Gemorah. The Meiri in
Meseches Nedarim 40a quotes same reason as the Rambam.
Refer to Ze Hashulchan 335:4. ↩
103. Refer to Maharsha Meseches Nedarim 40a this is the same idea
as “not to open ones mouth to the sotton” and say he is sick. ↩
104. Yerushalmi Meseches Peah 3:9, Tur 335, Shulchan Aruch 335:1,
Kitzur Shulchan Aruch 193:1, Chochmas Adom 151:1, Aruch
Hashulchan 5. Refer to Taz 1, Biur Halacha O.C. 219 “kegon.” ↩
120. 335:8. Harav Yisroel Belsky Shlita holds that if one is not a
relative he should not visit within the first or last three hours of
the day. ↩
121. Tzitz Eliezer 5:Ramat Rochel 12. ↩
105. Meseches Nedarim 40a “v’mekul mokom.” ↩
122. Ahavas Chesed 3:3. ↩
106. 335:1. ↩
123. Refer to Shevet Yehuda 335:4. ↩
107. Tzitz Eliezer 5:Ramat Rochel 7. ↩
124. Bikur Cholim B’halacha U’bagadah pages 65–66. ↩
108. Harav Yisroel Belsky Shlita, Bikur Cholim B’halacha U’bagadah
page 43:footnote 13. ↩
125. Bikur Cholim B’halacha U’bagadah page 65:footnote 13. ↩
109. Divrei Sofrim 335:5. ↩
110. Meseches Nedarim 39b, Kol Bo 112, Rambam Hilchos Avel 14:4,
Tur 335, Shulchan Aruch Y.D. 335:2, Levush 2, Chochmas Adom
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126. Aruch Hashulchan 8. Refer to opinion of Harav Chaim
Kanievesky Shlita quoted in Bikur Cholim B’halacha U’bagadah
page 125:10. ↩
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127. Ze Hashulchan 335:4. Refer to Salmas Chaim 661 (old). ↩
148. Yosef Ometz perek bikur cholim page 323, Keren Orah Meseches
Nedarim 40a, Tzitz Eliezer 5:Ramat Rochel 27. ↩
128. Tzitz Eliezer 5:Ramat Rochel 12. ↩
129. Birchei Yosef 335:2. ↩
130. Toras Haodom shar hameicosh 1, Tur 335, Shulchan Aruch 5,
Levush 5, Kitzur Shulchan Aruch 193:4, Chochmas Adom 151:3,
Aruch Hashulchan 9, Mishnah Berurah O.C. 101:16. Refer to
Shulchan Aruch O.C. 101:4. ↩
149. Avnei Yushfei 1:230, Derech Sicha 1:page 65.Refer to Rivevos
Ephraim 8:291:1, V’ein Lamo Michshal 6:pages 211–212. If one
visits a child who is sick just to make the parents feel good he
has not fulfilled the mitzvah of bikur cholim (opinion of Harav
Elyashiv zt”l quoted in Bikur Cholim B’halacha U’bagadah page
46:footnote 1). ↩
131. Meseches Shabbos 12b, Bach, Shach 3, Taz 3. ↩
150. Mitzvahs Bikur Cholim pages 184–185:15. ↩
132. Rashi Meseches Shabbos 12b “d’Shechina,” Bach, Levush 5,
Shach 3, Taz 3, Prisha 10. Refer to Tzitz Eliezer 5:Ramat Rochel
13. Refer to Maharil Diskin (Kuntres Achron) 182:page 162 who
says to daven in loshon kodesh even in fron of the sick person. ↩
151. Opinion of Harav Elyashiv zt”l quoted in Bikur Cholim B’halacha
U’bagadah page 38:footnote 26. ↩
133. Shulchan Aruch 5. Refer to Taz 4. See Ahavas Chesed 3:3. ↩
153. Refer to Derech Sicha 1:pages 65–66. ↩
134. Meseches Sanhedrin 39a. ↩
154. Opinion of Harav Ephraim Greenblatt zt”l quoted in Bikur
Cholim B’halacha U’bagadah page 31:footnote 5. See ibid:pages
130– 131:23:footnote 27 and page 131:23. ↩
135. Shevet Yehuda 335:5, V’ein Lamo Michshal 6:page 247. ↩
152. Rosh on Parshas Vayeira 18:1. ↩
136. Tur 335, Shulchan Aruch 6, Levush 6. ↩
137. Shach 4. Rashi Meseches Rosh Hashanah 16a “keman”. ↩
138. Halichos Shlomo Tefillah 8:footntoe 63, Shevet HaLevi 5:184.
Refer to Toraso Yeheigei 12:3:footnote 11 who quotes poskim
who disagree. ↩
139. Meseches Berochos 34a, Magen Avraham O.C. 119:1, Mishnah
Berurah 2, Rivevos Ephraim 7:335. Refer to Chasam Sofer
Meseches Nedarim 39b, Pri Temarim 7:pages 73–74:3. Refer to
Pri Chadash O.C. 119 who says one can say the name of the sick
person in front of him as well. ↩
140. Bamidbar 12:13. ↩
141. Chasam Sofer Meseches Nedarim 40a. Refer to Ben Yehoyada
Meseches Berochos 34a. See Yalkut Revuenei Parshas Vayeira
18:1. ↩
142. Toras Hamincha parshas vayeira 9:page 50. ↩
143. Refer to Mitzvahs Bikur Cholim pages 230–243 in great depth. ↩
144. The opinion of some poskim is that this should be done right
when the person gets sick and it should not wait until the
situation is serious (Shevet Yehuda 335:7). ↩
145. Shulchan Aruch 7, Levush 7, Kitzur Shulchan Aruch 193:5,
Chochmas Adom 151:5, Aruch Hashulchan 10. ↩
146. Aruch Hashulchan 10. ↩
147. Refer to Chuchmas Adom 151:11, Ahavas Chesed 3:3, Tzitz
Eliezer 5:Ramat Rochel 15. ↩
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