The Harrier AV-8B and the
U.S. Roland Programs:
A Comparative View of
Technology Transfer to the
United States of EuropeanDesigned Systems
BY R obert Foxcurran
In this article, we will compare the experiences of two
programs wherein weapon systems designed and developed
in Europe were adopted by the U.S. armed forces for
manufacture of improved versions on this side of the Atlantic
during the 1970s and 1980s. These two systems are the U.S.
Marine Corps’ Harrier AV-8B strike fighter and the U.S.
Army’s U.S. Roland mobile all-weather anti-aircraft system.
Here we will review the planning process and debate
centering on the selection and conversion of these two
systems to U.S. military requirements.
Over the last six decades of NATO’s existence, in the ongoing
pursuit of operational and cost improvements, there have
been a number of U.S. government initiatives to increase
inter-allied cooperation in the acquisition of weapon systems.
Furthermore, as within the individual nation states, this has
included the need for a redistribution of the publicly funded
work in order to optimize alignment with the geopolitical
units footing the bills.
associated with the change of administrations and relative
threat assessments. One such opportunity arose in the early
1970s, allowing for the acquisition of weapon systems of allied
origin. During a period when the development of new
systems in the United States had been severely limited by
operational preoccupations with Southeast Asia, the Europeans had been successful in developing several major systems
for which there were no U.S. counterparts. The United States
began to refocus its containment strategy as hostilities wound
down in Southeast Asia, shifting back toward the NATO
Europe front. Among systems of potential interest were the
Harrier Vertical Takeoff and Landing (VTOL) strike fighter
developed in the U.K., and several surface-to-air missile
(SAM) systems under development in France, Germany, and
the U.K. Several of these systems had been able to benefit
indirectly from an infusion of U.S. dollars and technology
during a prior wave of NATO joint weapon initiatives in the
late 1950s and early 1960s.
About the Author
A Window of Opportunity
Within this context, Pentagon research and development
budgets have periodically gone through austerity cycles when
impacted by such factors as increased overseas operational
demands, or as a consequence of new personnel and policies
ROBERT FOXCURRAN is retired from The Boeing Company,
where he worked as an economic analyst, project historian, and
procurement agent on multiple military programs, including a stint
as Boeing’s U.S. Roland procurement agent for Euromissile. He
graduated from the University of Washington with BAs in Japanese
and French studies, and received an MBA in business economics
and history.
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the harrier AV- 8B and the u.s. rol and programs: a comparative view of technology
transfer to the united states of european - designed systems
These two systems were the exception, however. Inter-allied
programs had proliferated, but usually along other lines. The
overwhelming majority of inter-allied weapon programs were
either those based heavily on U.S. systems and technology or
those involving the “middle powers” of Europe—France,
Germany, the U.K., and occasionally Italy. These nations
often opted for bi- or tri-national joint development teams of
co-equal partners.
The Harrier Family of V/STOL Fighters—
France Balks, the U.K. Proceeds with U.S.
Support Channeled through NATO, and the
U.S. Marine Corps Waits
The Harrier project dates back into the mid-1950s when a
French design engineer named Michel Wibault was rebuffed
by his own government. Paris-based NATO authorities,
however, encouraged Wibault to take his concept across the
channel to Bristol Aero Engines in the U.K. After a couple of
years of further design work, the engine was mated with
Hawker Aircraft’s P.1127 VTOL aircraft design.
Hawker committed funding to a proof-of-concept prototype
for which the U.S.-funded NATO Mutual Weapons Development Program agreed to provide 75 percent of the funding
of the “Pegasus” engine. By 1959, the Royal Air Force was
beginning to see the operational advantages of opting for a
VTOL strike aircraft to replace its Hawker Hunters. A draft
requirement was issued for the purchase of two P.1127
aircraft.
Meanwhile, the U.S. Marine Corps was responding to its
own experience half a world away on the Korean peninsula.
Being structured as a light maneuverable force available for
rapid deployment, the Marines were more reliant than the
U.S. Army on close air support (CAS) as an alternative to
artillery, especially once they had moved in-land out of the
range of the U.S. Navy’s protective guns. The key was driving
down response time for CAS provided from carriers off-shore
and distant airfields. In 1957, the Marine commandant, Gen.
Randolph Pate, laid down the Corps’ position in a letter to
the Chief of Naval Operations stating, “All tactical aircraft
should possess a short/vertical take-off and landing capability
as soon as technically feasible without sacrificing existing
mission capabilities.”
The U.S. Navy and U.S. Air Force had other priorities,
however. Fortunately, this did not prevent the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) from investing around $80 million
68 Summer 2013 / Journal of Contract Management
on VTOL fighter development in the course of the 1960s. Of
this total, $50 million went into two successive British VTOL
projects: the P.1127 and the follow-on Kestrel prototype.
Further improvements in the Pegasus engine had led to the
subsonic fighter named the “Harrier.” The Royal Air Force
placed an initial production order for 60 aircraft, achieving
operational capability in 1969. Two squadrons of Harriers
were assigned to NATO duty at dispersed sites in Germany.
Following these developments from the sidelines, the U.S.
Marine Corps’ interest in VTOL capability intensified by the
late 1960s. The Marines prevailed upon the U.S. Navy in
1969 to request funding to procure 12 Harriers for test and
evaluation. The program was authorized, but with the
appropriation of funding, Congress placed the condition that
any future orders of Harriers would be from a U.S. source
producing the aircraft under license. British industrialists
soon finalized license agreements with McDonnell Douglas
and Pratt & Whitney.
When follow-on orders were funded in 1974 to bring the total
Marine Corps buy up to 110 AV-8A Harrier aircraft, Congress had second thoughts. They balked at the idea of paying
the nonrecurring costs of establishing a second source in the
United States for a modest quantity of aircraft.
In lieu of paying a premium for licensed production, DOD
purchased the balance of the aircraft off of the original
production line, while opting instead to use the technical data
package for continued development. This was to proceed as a
joint development program, aiming at doubling the first
generation Harrier’s payload/radius capability.
After 1975, the two allies opted to continue their national
developmental programs separately. Both nations’ efforts
involved design of a new super-critical wing. Unlike McDonnell’s composite wing, the new aluminum wing of the British
aircraft could be retrofitted to existing aircraft. Furthermore,
the British placed greater weight on air-to-air combat, as
opposed to the U.S. Marine Corps’ focus on the air-toground role.
France and Germany Launch the Roland SAM
System in 1964
As the Harrier was intended to improve allied CAS, there was
also the need to defend one’s own troops located in Germany
from the ever-improving CAS capabilities of the Warsaw Pact.
The NATO Hawk and Roland SAM programs were each to
the harrier AV- 8B and the u.s. rol and programs: a comparative view of technology
transfer to the united states of european - designed systems
be part of the response to this threat.
The medium-altitude, multi-vehicle NATO Hawk SAM
System was launched in the late 1950s, and license production in Europe of the system began to wind down in the
mid-1960s. The NATO Hawk System had represented one of
several major U.S. initiatives to encourage greater self-sufficiency by the European allies in equipping themselves with
the most modern weapons. The United States threw in all of
the technology along with some of the funding for the
program. At this point, in the mid-1960s, the two primary
governments participating in this NATO program, France
and Germany, agreed to proceed bilaterally in taking the
technology and know-how acquired from Raytheon and the
U.S. Army through the Hawk production program to develop
a low-altitude, single-vehicle system of their own design. The
SAM system was named for a common Franco-German
legendary hero, Roland.
As part of a broader evolution toward aerospace industrial
consolidation—at first at the national and then at the
transnational level—over the following decade, the firms
receiving these contracts were incorporated into the French
powerhouse, Aerospatiale, and the German firm MBB. Then,
a decade later, these two in turn merged to become European
Aeronautics & Defense Systems (EADS). Along the way, they
had given birth to a number of very successful joint ventures,
such as Airbus and Eurocopter, plus one that was chartered to
manage several joint tactical guided missile programs.
Logically enough, this latter venture was named “Euromissile.”
The award of the initial contract in 1964 for Phase I of the
project was to design, develop, and test four prototype “fire
units” and 40 missiles. For each program, the two companies
led a team of manufacturers designated by their respective
governments. Neither of the firms selected their major
subcontractors. This team included the single major beneficiary of the technology infusion from the NATO Hawk
Program, Thomson-CSF, along with several other participants, including the German-led firm for NATO Hawk,
AEG-Telefunken.
Once Phase I was underway in 1964, it soon became clear
that the two armies’ very different ideas as to the basic
requirement were not coalescing. Germany needed an
all-weather capability for its Roland systems, while France
opted for optical sighting only. Both dug their heels in. The
French Air Force already had such a system under development with Thomson-CSF. It was called the Crotale system,
with capabilities and characteristics that fell somewhere
between the Roland and the Hawk. And like the latter, it was
a mobile, multi-vehicle SAM system. Therefore, after
prolonged discussions were unable to break the impasse,
Germany was forced to proceed unilaterally in 1967 with the
funding of development of an all-weather version of the
system, now designated Roland II.
This switch involved a substantial loss of time during Phase II.
This is a typical story. Reconciliation of differing military
requirements leading to costly delays has been endemic with
these joint European design and development programs.
What had now become the French version, with optical-sighting only, had to be kept in sync with the belated parallel
development of the Thomson-CSF track radar for the
German variant. With the start of Phase III in 1970, the
French government finally reversed its position and agreed to
invest in the development and evaluation of the all-weather
version. Phase III involved another seven fire units, 285
missiles, plus tooling for low-rate production.
But the German commitment had been cooling. At this
juncture, the sudden interest of the U.S. Army in the Roland
II version was credited with being instrumental in Germany’s
decision to continue funding the all-weather variant.
The U.S. Army Organizes a Competition to
Fill Its SHORAD Requirement
For the all-weather, mobile, short-range air defense
(SHORAD) component of the U.S. Army’s range of air
defense needs, a requirement had surfaced and then re-submerged over the course of the decade preceding 1973. This
capability was looming, however, as an especially critical one
for troops in the same Central European environment where
the Harriers were initially deployed. This was one where long
periods of low visibility seriously limited the effectiveness of
clear weather air defense systems.
This interest followed on the heels of the Harrier procurement
by the U.S. Marine Corps. This led to a broader DOD
initiative. During the year following the initial Harrier
procurement, in mid-1970, the Office of the Secretary of
Defense issued a directive encouraging U.S. industry to seek
out teaming arrangements with European contractors developing a new generation of weapon systems that might be able to
backfill for gaps in U.S. research and development efforts.
DOD had three options:
• Develop the clear-weather-only Chaparral SAM system
into an all-weather system,
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• Start a new U.S. development program, or
• Deploy a European-designed system.
In order to assess the latter option, the U.S. Army began
testing three European systems that were being developed to
address the low-altitude/short-range requirement. This
included the British Rapier/Blindfire, the French Crotale, and
the Franco-German Roland II. Though each was at various
stages of development, the U.S. Army judged each to be able
to meet U.S. requirements.
It was estimated at the time that developing a new system
could take 10 years. Furthermore, DOD told Congress in
presenting its fiscal year 1973 budget that the acquisition of a
foreign all-weather system could save $200 to $400 million in
research and development investments.
U.S. contractors began to team up with the British, French,
and German firms associated with the previously mentioned
systems. Several license agreements were negotiated in the
1972–1973 timeframe to be ready to respond to a possible
request for proposals for such a mobile all-weather SHORAD
system. When the U.S. Army issued a request for proposal in
July 1974, four firms responded:
• Philco-Ford with an all-weather version of the Chaparral,
• Representing their European licensors—Rockwell
International for the Thomson-CSF Crotale,
• United Technologies Norden Division and McDonnellDouglas for the Rapier/Blindfire, and
• A Hughes and Boeing team proposing the FrancoGerman Roland II.
In addition to technical concerns on the feasibility of coming
up with an all-weather version of the Chaparral, the Crotale
(the most sophisticated of the contenders) plus the Rapier/
Blindfire were assessed as having high life cycle costs due to
their being multi-vehicle systems with larger crews. The
Roland II, though somewhat less mature than the other
European systems, had a single vehicle with a smaller crew
and a high single shot kill probability in both clear weather
and in all-weather operations.
In January 1975, the Hughes/Boeing team was awarded the
contract for technology transfer fabrication and test to build
five U.S. Roland fire units and 126 missiles. Implementation
problems began almost immediately following contract
award at the beginning of 1975, leading to delays and cost
overruns. The complexity of the task had been underestimated at all levels. As the U.S. Roland technology transfer
70 Summer 2013 / Journal of Contract Management
fabrication and test program was being launched, the
Roland II system was only entering low-rate production in
France and Germany. More engineering would be required
before the system would be producible on either side of the
ocean. Keeping a technology transfer fabrication and test
program from drifting into one of design, development, test,
and evaluation would prove to be a challenging task. As it
turned out, a great deal of new ground had to be broken, at
least on U.S. soil.
The principal problems encountered by the U.S. Army and
contractors stemmed from the following:
• Insufficient data had been transferred for the proposal
with a resultant over-estimation of the system’s performance and the maturity of its design—the system was
developed, but not yet producible;
• The design of each of the two systems was modified
following contract award;
• U.S. government policy shifted early in the program
with regard to NATO standardization—i.e., continuing
Americanization while maintaining international
interchangeability;
• Under-estimation of the task with regard to transfer and
conversion of the technical data package (TDP)—e.g.,
design and drawing differences and the conversion of
parts, materials, and processes;
• The interrelated issue of differences in the capital
intensity of the European and U.S. industrial bases at the
time and the resultant lack of manufacturing documentation stemming from a more “artisanal” workforce in
the originating countries; and
• The lack of a U.S. government focal point during license
negotiations meant that there had been insufficient
guidance as to the particulars of rights and the associated
compensation—consequently, all prior agreements had
to be thoroughly revised and renegotiated following
contract award and initiation of the program.
As one might expect, the announced delays and cost overruns
were poorly received in Congress, especially at hearings before
the House Armed Services Committee’s research and
development subcommittee. Substantial savings in money
and time had been the original rationale for picking a foreign
system. Options under discussion included outright cancellation. The French, German, and even the British governments
weighed in on the debate.
The U.S., French, and German governments realized belatedly
that they needed to negotiate an intergovernmental agree-
the harrier AV- 8B and the u.s. rol and programs: a comparative view of technology
transfer to the united states of european - designed systems
ment to encompass transatlantic coordination between their
respective programs. They proceeded to negotiate a Rolandspecific memorandum of understanding (MOU), signing it in
October 1975, nine months after contract award. Among
other commitments for such matters as pricing and quality
assurance audits to support mutual procurements, in line
with the broader set of NATO standardization initiatives
then underway, the three nations agreed in the MOU to
achieve international interchangeability between their Roland
systems through a tri-national control committee composed
of each nation’s project manager. This was called the “Joint
Roland Control Committee.”
Consequently, in March 1976, the U.S. Roland Program was
redirected. Among other things, it was realized that the
cumulative cost and schedule issues could be mitigated by
such changes as procuring test equipment for manufacture
and maintenance of the system from Europe along with
adopting a joint test program that extended the initial
utilization of French and German facilities into test firings
for the technology transfer fabrication and test and low-rate
production phases. In April 1976, the U.S. Army asked
Hughes and Boeing to re-price a restructured technology
transfer fabrication and test program.
One example of terms of the license agreement that had to
be renegotiated concerned “Amendment No. 9,” which
allowed the U.S. Army the right to establish an additional
second source in the United States to maintain domestic
competition. Unlike in the United States, Euromissile
owned the rights to the data, not the respective governments
involved. Euromissile was reluctant to allow for the U.S.
Army option of procuring the system from additional U.S.
sources. Euromissile did ultimately acquiesce with the
proviso that all data would be returned by the U.S. firm
with a certification that it would not be used for any other
purposes. A supplemental written assurance was also
obtained from the U.S. government on data use, along with
a provision that data would only be made available to
potential second-source manufacturers after low-rate
production was underway.
A restructured program was finally initiated in October
1976—21 months after the initial award. One year later, the
first technology transfer fabrication and test fire unit had
been manufactured along with its full complement of missiles.
The incoming Carter administration gave the program its full
support in early 1977, with contract award for low-rate
production coming in 1979.
The Marines Fight to Sustain Funding for
Their New VTOL Fighter
By July 1976, developmental work at McDonnell Douglas
had progressed to the point where the Pentagon authorized
the production and testing of two YAV-8B prototypes to be
built by the U.S. licensee. The original British contractors
would build most of the engines and much of the airframes as
well, but now under subcontract to McDonnell Douglas. The
first flight of the YAV-8B prototypes occurred in late 1978.
Features of this American version included greater use of
composites and adoption of avionics from the A-4 Skyhawk.
With newly elected presidents comes reassessment of budgetary and military priorities. The Carter administration entered
office in January 1977. At the policy level, they endorsed the
prior administration’s reemphasis on NATO Europe, including greater reciprocity in weapon system collaboration.
Though the U.S. Roland Program received the Carter
administration’s endorsement, two of the three systems
targeted for cancellation were actually inter-allied projects
with a heavy European technological imprint. These were
Boeing’s NATO PHM Hydrofoil and the AV-8B Harrier. The
new administration bought into numerous other inter-allied
projects based on U.S. systems, including the F-16 fighter,
and three NATO-endorsed programs involving the Airborne
Warning and Control System (AWACS), the AIM 9L
Sidewinder air-to-air missile, and the MLRS rocket-launched
artillery system.
In the summer of 1977, the new secretary of defense, Harold
Brown, announced that he had decided to reduce the U.S.
Marine Corps’ request for the AV-8B by half. The U.S. Navy
aimed to achieve the economies offered by internal standardization on one multi-role fighter compatible with large
carriers—the F/A-18—including the Marines.
In response to reports that DOD was considering terminating
the development of the AV-8B, a bipartisan group of eight
senators stepped forward in October 1977 calling for continuation of the program. After Marine Corps Commandant Gen.
Louis H. Wilson testified in favor of the AV-8B, Congress
restored the full funding.
In mid-March, Sen. Gary Hart introduced a resolution
calling DOD’s reduction of funding “in violation of explicit
congressional intent, and, in terms of the procedures chosen,
also in violation of the 1974 Budget and Impoundment Act.”
The House appropriations defense subcommittee chairman,
Sen. Joseph Addabbo, joined in, sending Brown a letter of
protest. The comptroller general addressed a letter to the Vice
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transfer to the united states of european - designed systems
President Walter Mondale, pointing out that a violation of
the 1974 Budget and Impoundment Act had occurred.
In late March, under increasing pressure from congressional
and service advocates of the AV-8B Program, Brown backed
off, releasing the deferred research and development funding
from the fiscal year 1979 appropriations. The U.S. Navy
announced the award to McDonnell Douglas on April 20 of
a contract to initiate the first phase of full-scale development.
In the meantime, as the industrial partners worked on their
separate national development and test programs, they were
still coordinating closely. For starters, 16 British companies
were providing most of the engines and airframes for the
YAV-8B prototypes. The members of the Anglo-American
industrial team were also providing each other with visibility
on progress in their respective national development efforts.
By October, all performance objectives of the 1979 YAV-8B
flight demonstration program were achieved. For the third
year in a row, however, the Carter administration would not
step forward to support the program. As in the two previous
years, Congress again had to take the initiative in providing
the funding to preserve the production option. Leaving office
in January 1981, the Carter administration did finally submit
budget proposals that included AV-8B development funding.
Funds committing DOD to start the $6 billion production
program of 336 AV-8Bs were still excluded, however.
The U.S. Roland Gets Its Share of Attention
in Congress: 1978–1981
In contrast to the praise and intervention on behalf of the
U.S. Marine Corps fighter program, with the U.S. Roland,
congressional support was uneven and often critical of the
way it was being managed.
With the restructuring of the U.S. Roland technology
transfer fabrication and test program in 1976, criticism
within Congress died down, for a while. In early 1978,
congressional criticism began to gather strength again over
plans for initial production. The House Armed Services
Committee (HASC) authorized the requested $210 million,
but only with the proviso that the secretary of defense certify
to Congress that the U.S. Roland had been adequately
evaluated and would meet its specifications. The committee
expressed its concerns that total costs were now double the
original estimates. In the Senate, the Senate Armed Services
Committee (SASC) took even stronger action, cutting
$103.3 million from the program.
72 Summer 2013 / Journal of Contract Management
A special Office of the Secretary of Defense review of the
technology transfer fabrication and test phase had in the
meantime been held in June 1978, and had determined that the
U.S. Roland was suitable for the award of contracts for engineering services and initial production facilities. After a delay of
seven months, Defense Systems Acquisition Review Council
approval to commence production was given in May 1979.
However, the prior year’s criticisms were mild compared to
those raised in fiscal year 1980. The General Accounting Office
(which is today known as the Government Accountability
Office) published a report that was critical of the program and
utilized as the basis for questioning in the relevant committees.
The HASC zeroed in on a four-fold increase in estimated
acquisition costs since 1976, concluding that the U.S. Roland
was not cost effective. The HASC deleted funding for both
production and research and development, stating that a mix
of alternative air defense systems such as the improved Hawk
and Chaparral could perform the U.S. Roland’s mission at
less cost. The SASC had come to similar conclusions, and
convened a special session. Undersecretary of Defense
(Research and Engineering) William Perry testified strongly
on behalf of the U.S. Roland, countering an alternative mix of
air defense systems with “[t]hose available are not equal and
those equal are not available.” Perry convinced the SASC and
HASC to approve the U.S. Roland program, once again.
During fiscal year 1981 budget discussions, the U.S. Roland
still received special notice, but congressional concerns were
less intense. Fluctuating U.S. Army support was noted. Under
the same policy of fiscal restraint impacting the Carter
administration’s support for the advanced Harrier Program,
the U.S. Army reduced its planned buy from four down to
two battalions. The requested funding for production was
approved, however. Through all this, Congress had finally
come to a painfully acquired consensus supporting the U.S.
Roland program. In September 1980, when the HASC
learned of a proposed 60-percent cut in all air defense
programs by the Carter administration, the committee sent a
strongly worded letter to the secretary of defense. Funding
was soon restored. In reaction to a perceived inconsistency in
the support of DOD and the U.S. Army for the U.S. Roland
program and the broader air defense spectrum, Congress
requested that DOD submit an air defense plan.
The original request by the outgoing Carter administration
for the U.S. Roland was to have been $529 million. However,
with last-minute budget limitations placed on DOD by the
Carter administration, the final submittal by DOD to
Congress for the U.S. Roland was for only $65 million.
the harrier AV- 8B and the u.s. rol and programs: a comparative view of technology
transfer to the united states of european - designed systems
The incoming Reagan administration reviewed the matter
in early 1981. It decided to restore the full amount to $529
million following a supplemental request that was approved
by the new Congress. Furthermore, the U.S. Army was
again recommending recognition of the four-battalion
requirement.
The British Face a Difficult Decision Over an
Advanced Harrier
Meanwhile, with a definitive decision by the United States in
favor of advanced Harrier production, there was a growing
pressure on Britain to commit to the U.S. program. Back in
1975, after dropping out of the joint development effort with
the United States the same year, Hawker Siddeley had
received contracts for the Sea Harrier variant for the Royal
Navy, along with one for design of a new wing for retrofit on
the first generation Harriers.
In 1979, the British government had been approached on
joining the U.S. Marine Corps Harrier project instead.
British industry was expected to retain a major role in the
U.S. production program. British Aerospace would build the
center and aft fuselage sections, Rolls-Royce would provide
the Pegasus 11 engine, Dowty the undercarriage, Smiths the
HUD, Dunlop the brakes, and Lucas the generator.
we get down to the level of specific programs, there is
considerable variance in continuity and implementation.
The Reagan administration had come into office earlier in the
year with a mandate to increase defense spending. Within
several months, the administration had added $657 million
to proceed with procuring the first pilot production Harriers,
for deliveries to commence in late 1983, while providing a
green light for the full 336 aircraft production run.
The initial deliveries of advanced Harriers would re-equip the
three squadrons operating British-built AV-8As, followed by
five squadrons flying the Skyhawk transitioning to the AV-8B
by the end of the 1980s. Eventually, two other NATO navies
later stepped forward to buy second-generation AV-8B
Harriers for their carriers—Spain in the late 1980s and Italy
in the 1990s. The Spanish Harrier II’s were assembled in
Spain by CASA, while the Italian aircraft were of the Harrier
II Plus night attack version being assembled in Italy by Alenia.
• Stick with the Harrier Mk. 5 and maintain British
V/STOL design potential embodied in the team at
British Aerospace Kingston, or
• Be satisfied with a significant share in a larger AV-8B
program, thereby relinquishing design leadership.
By September 1981, the U.S. Roland had been in low-rate
production for two years, but after an initial period during
which the armed services found themselves suddenly
authorized to pursue practically everything on their “wish
list,” Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger realized that
his budget was getting out of hand. Weinberger suddenly
decreed that each of the services had to sacrifice one program
in order to correct this. The new secretary of the army, having
formerly been on the losing end of the source selection
process when the U.S. Roland had been picked over his firm’s
proposal for an all-weather version of the Chaparral system in
1975, saw his chance to settle an old score. After an expenditure of roughly a half-billion dollars over six years, the U.S.
Roland was suddenly terminated.
The larger program of over 400 aircraft would allow the
British aircraft industry to retain a disproportionate share of
the work, while allowing for the AV-8B to enter production
with almost all parts being single-sourced. Only final
assembly and test of their respective national variants was to
be duplicated with one line in each country.
This was changed to a “soft termination” once it was realized
that manufacturing was too far along for a complete shutdown. In the end, Boeing and Hughes Aircraft delivered 27
production fire units and 595 missiles that were transferred to
a New Mexico National Guard unit that was assigned to be
an element of the Rapid Deployment Force.
The U.K. faced a difficult set of alternatives:
The Reagan Administration Reverses the
Position of DOD on Both Programs
With the Reagan administration’s arrival in 1981, the Harrier
AV-8B program was finally out of the woods, but the U.S.
Roland suddenly found itself lost deep in the forest. Again,
this new administration declared its support for NATO
collaboration and greater reciprocity. But once again, when
The U.S. Army opted instead to proceed with development of
the division air defense, computer-controlled Gatling-gun to
fill the SHORAD requirement. Unfortunately, five years later,
with Sgt. York program development encountering severe
problems, it in turn was cancelled after spending another
half-billion dollars. Hence, 11 years and a billion dollars of
taxpayer money and the U.S. Army still had no all-weather
SHORAD system.
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the harrier AV- 8B and the u.s. rol and programs: a comparative view of technology
transfer to the united states of european - designed systems
The Sequel
The termination of the full U.S. Roland production program after
so many years of public posturing and commitments by U.S.
authorities added a sour note to relations with the allied countries
concerned. Even though Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger and French Defense Minister Charles Hernu were of like
minds on general defense issues under discussion, the differences
raised by the American termination of the purchase of the
Franco-German Roland were far from resolved. Hernu did not
conceal his irritation and expressed his opinion as to the
“aggravating precedence” this act would create, impacting the
“two-way street” in the transfer of military technology and
equipment between Europe and the United States.
Then, in the early 1980s, U.S. Air Force Europe (USAFE)
found itself engaged in its own indirect procurement
arrangements with two important allied host countries to
backfill for the U.S. Army’s shortfall in defending its airbases.
Several years later, DOD would reach a set of agreements
with Germany tied in with the latter’s participation in the
NATO Patriot SAM project, wherein the latter would
procure and man Roland II systems to provide air defense for
USAFE air bases in Germany. This was preceded by a similar
agreement with the British to provide Rapier units for
protection of USAFE bases located in the U.K., which
partially reversed the outcome of the 1974 source selection
decision wherein the Rapier had lost out to the Roland. For
better or worse, in an alliance with so much talent at work,
there always seemed to be alternate choices available.
As for the French, after Hernu had vented his anger with
Weinberger over his reneging on a set of prior agreements, the
French Air Force proceeded with its plans for a joint program
with the U.S. Air Force to re-engine the two countries’
Boeing (K)C-135 tankers, and eventually all future Boeing
AWACS using the 707 airframe. The French Air Force then
bought AWACS planes, which was greatly facilitated by this
large industrial share for France. Once again, in matters of
inter-allied relations, there is so much to forgive, though not
necessarily to forget, and the business of NATO goes on.
Conclusion
There are several major points in these two project histories
worth retaining for posterity. First of all, the Harrier, unlike
the U.S. Roland, proceeded in the following sequence:
• The purchase of an initial batch of the limited-capability
British version on an off-the-shelf basis, along with the
associated TDP;
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• Operational testing and deployment of the purchased
aircraft combined with further development in the
United States of the system over several years; and
• Tooling-up for a U.S. production program was only
started once development of an advanced version had
been completed.
• The sequencing might have saved the system from a fate
such as that of the U.S. Roland.
The second major point worthy of remembering is that in a
licensed manufacturing program, it is necessary to gradually
transfer and gear up production of second-source manufacturing in a step-by-step manner. The licensee selects a
technical “tranche” within the TDP to start out with,
sequentially substituting a greater share of local content
produced in the customer country. This usually commences
with assembly and test by the licensee—with technical
assistance of the licensor—of hardware manufactured in the
originating country. Larger shares of the manufacturing are
later transferred to second sources in a cost-effective manner.
Unfortunately for the U.S. Roland program, it was decided to
obtain almost 100 percent U.S.-manufactured content from
the start instead of a phased step-by-step approach. The
history of licensing programs where the European allies were
setting up the second source, such as the sequential NATO
Hawk Production and Improvement programs, and the
manufacture in Italy under license by Agusta of the CH-47C
under license from Boeing bore this out. This is especially
true when the original TDP is still fluid while development is
in the final stages of wrap-up, such as what happened with
the Roland II radar for the all-weather version being adopted
by the U.S. Army. When this process is not managed properly,
the cost and schedule penalties can increase almost exponentially. The resultant over-capitalization and escalation in other
nonrecurring costs will seriously compromise much of the
potential savings in cost and time.
A third major point is that during these programs a great deal
was learned as to the planning and administrative mechanisms
that need to be set up to facilitate and control the adoption of
a foreign-designed system to the U.S. manufacturing base.
The U.S. Roland had the misfortune to precede the establishment of a series of intergovernmental arrangements that would
govern it and future inter-allied programs. Production of the
Harrier AV-8B started up several years later once much of this
had been sorted out. The management of technology transfer
includes a series of initial decisions within the customer
government on levels of standardization, interoperability, and
interchangeability, then conversion of foreign TDP in line
the harrier AV- 8B and the u.s. rol and programs: a comparative view of technology
transfer to the united states of european - designed systems
with this initial guidance, plus ongoing coordination of
configuration control between the allied services.
After the technology transfer and conversion process had
started for the U.S. Roland, a DOD-wide initiative led to a
new requirement for interchangeability to be maintained
between allied systems, thereby reversing the usual preference
for standardization within U.S. armed services. Hence, the
program had to be stopped, restructured from top to bottom,
re-priced, and restarted. Unfortunately, what in hindsight
might be the logical sequence of a negotiated umbrella MOU
between governments covering reciprocal arrangements for
procurement from each other’s industries, followed by a
program-specific MOU, then finally industry-to-industry
licensing arrangements, actually proceeded in reverse order.
Once corrective measures were taken, and the administrative
infrastructure was in place, collaboration could proceed in a
more orderly manner on the U.S. Roland and subsequent
programs, such as the Harrier.
A fourth point is that these two projects provide examples of the
high-visibility, turmoil, and instability such programs endure.
Even more so than national programs, inter-allied programs are
continually running the gantlet, facing strong vested interests.
Foreign born, they lacked the support of a broader constituency
enjoyed by competing domestic alternatives. The Harrier made
it to the end of a longer race without too much injury, while the
U.S. Roland never fully recovered after stumbling on the initial
sprint. Then, add their inevitably controversial nature and they
find themselves vulnerable to rogue elements (never too late
for an old vendetta), especially when transitioning to a new
administration or congress after a national election. There is
very little room for error here.
Adopting a foreign-born system for U.S. military application
is a high-risk venture—let there be no illusions on this point.
Add the political challenges to the technical, and you have an
extremely unstable situation. The recent refueling tanker
decision comes to mind. JCM
project histories of every inter-allied project cited. Copies of the
NATO history are available at the libraries of the UW, NDU, and DAU.
Aerospace Daily, “Marine Corps Makes Final Plea for AV-8B”
(March 9, 1979).
Aerospace Daily, “AV-8B+ Capable of ‘Variety of Missions,’
Navair Report Says” (March 19, 1979).
Aerospace Daily, “Hill Committees Consider Administration
Deferral of FY79 AV-8B Money” (March 21, 1979): 101.
Aerospace Daily, “Royal Air Force Eyes New larger Wing For Harriers”
(April 6, 1979): 183.
Aerospace Daily, “House Armed services Unit Adds $180 Million
for AV-8B” (May 4, 1979): 22.
Aerospace Daily (April 24, 1981): 316.
Aerospace Daily (March 15, 1982): 81.
Aerospace Daily, “Most Aircraft Programs Gain in Reagan Budget
Revisions” (October 19, 1982): 81.
Aerospace Daily, “United Technologies, British Aerospace Sign
Rapier Agreement” (March 12, 1982): 77.
Aerospace Daily, “With Roland in RDF, NATO Requirement Remains”
(January 28, 1982): 140.
Aerospace Daily, “Maverick, Rapier Get Hill Attention”
(April 27, 1982): 140.
Aviation Week & Space Technology (March 2, 1970): 17.
Aviation Week & Space Technology (March 9, 1970): 36.
Aviation Week & Space Technology (June 6, 1977): 111.
Aviation Week & Space Technology, “Advanced Harrier Support
Rises in Senate” (October 31, 1977): 18.
Aviation Week & Space Technology (November 27, 1978): 14–15.
Aviation Week & Space Technology, “USAF to Buy British Rapier”
(March 2, 1979): 23.
Aviation Week & Space Technology, “AV-8B Funds Released,
Congressional Support Rising” (April 4, 1979): 16.
Aviation Week & Space Technology, “McDonnell Team to Visit British”
(October 15, 1979): 65.
Aviation Week & Space Technology, “British Drive to Sell Rapier
to U.S.” (October 8, 1981): 53.
Defense & Foreign Affairs Daily, “US: Brown Clears Rapier Deal”
(May 27, 1980): 2.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
The information distilled in this article is for the most part extracted
from a document written by Rob Foxcurran titled “NATO: A Business
History,” dating from 1986, which was printed and distributed by
Boeing, including a project history of the early phases of the Harrier
program, plus a more detailed history of the U.S. Roland program,
along with a history of the development and production of the
Roland SAM system by the Euromissile consortium. More recent
history is derived from a number of articles and books, with the
heaviest reliance being on Lon Nordeen’s Harrier II: Validating
V/STOL. Also, the NATO business history manuscript contains
Defense & Foreign Affairs Daily, “UK: Harrier Data Evaluated”
(December 4, 1979).
John Dibbs and Tony Holmes, Harrier: The V/STOL Warrior
(London: Osprey Aerospace, 1992).
The Economist, “The Tinwing Temptation: Don’t. Go Anglo-American
Instead” (June 2, 1979): 16–17.
Michael Feazel, “U.S. Protectionism Irks Germans,” Aviation
Week & Space Technology (January 19, 1983): 16–19.
Journal of Contract Management / Summer 2013
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the harrier AV- 8B and the u.s. rol and programs: a comparative view of technology
transfer to the united states of european - designed systems
Flight International, “Brown Remains Unconvinced on AV-8B”
(January 5, 1980): 9.
Flight International, “Harrier II rolls out at St. Louis”
(October 21, 1981): 1228.
General Research Corporation (GRC), “NATO Standardization and
Technology Transfer,” Volume II—Main Report (August 1977).
Fred Hiatt, “Pentagon Can’t Afford Roland Missile, Can’t Give
it AWAY,” Seattle Times (as quoted in The Washington Post
(September 6 1984): A12).
Interavia: Air Letter (January 29, 1980).
Interavia: Air Letter, “UK Restarts AV-8B Evaluation”
(March 28, 1980).
International Defense Review, “Enlarged Wing Proposed
for Harrier Retrofit” (March 1979): 318.
Robert A. Kittle, “Anatomy of a Pentagon Horror Story,”
U.S. News & World Report (October 15, 1984): 69.
Eugene Kozicharow, “U.S., Germans Discussing 30 More Roland
Systems,” Aviation Week & Space Technology (August 6, 1984): 25.
Eugene Kozicharow, “Army Plans to Test Roland DIVAD Role,”
Aviation Week & Space Technology (January 21, 1985): 22.
P. Langereux, “Firing of Stinger Missiles by Roland Weapon
System,” Air & Cosmos (May 15, 1982).
Le Monde, “La Visite a Paris du Ministre Americain de la
Defense” (October 16, 1981).
Richard G. Lone, “Roland Efforts Test Technology Transfer,”
Aviation Week & Space Technology (November 14, 1977): 18.
Col. D.K. Malone, USA, “Roland: A Case For or Against NATO
Standardization?” monograph.
Peter March, The Harrier Story (United Kingdom:
Sutton Publishing, 2007).
John Marriott, “Has America Bought The Wrong Weapon?”
NATO’s Fifteen Nations (December 1976): 79.
Lon O. Nordeen, Harrier II: Validating V/STOL
(Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 2006).
Brig. Gen. Frank P. Ragano, USA, “U.S. Roland—A Giant
Step Toward Weapon Commonality,” Defense Systems
Management Review (vol. 1, no. 3): 9.
John H. Richardson, “Roland, A Technology Transfer Program,”
Defense Systems Management Review (vol. 1, no. 3): 13.
Clarence A. Robinson Jr., “AV-8B Pivotal in Naval Aviation Fight,”
Aviation Week & Space Technology (October 31, 1977): 18.
INTERVIEWEES AND AUTHORS OF INTERNAL MEMOS
Boeing—Len Savage, Gene Mikov, Erwin Molnar, Alex Munro,
Thomas Lindberg, Eric Fromm, Gerry Magness, and Lydia Pickup.
Euromissile/Aerospatiale—Bruno Didelot and Jacques Sorlet.
U.S. Department of Defense—Frank Cevasco.
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